State of Indiana v. Shianne Brooks-Brown ( 2024 )

IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
State of Indiana, FILED
Oct 16 2024, 9:17 am
Appellant-Plaintiff
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
Shianne Brooks-Brown,
Appellee-Defendant
October 16, 2024
Court of Appeals Case No.
24A-CR-627
Interlocutory Appeal from the Carroll Circuit Court
The Honorable Benjamin A. Diener, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
08C01-2106-MR-1
Opinion by Judge Mathias
Judge Bailey concurs with separate opinion.
Chief Judge Altice dissents with separate opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-627 | October 16, 2024 Page 1 of 34
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Shianne Brooks-Brown alleges that she is a victim of human sexual trafficking.
When one of her alleged traffickers set her up with a John1 near Flora, Indiana,
the trafficker robbed and murdered the John. The State does not believe that
Brooks-Brown is the victim of human sexual trafficking and has charged her as
an accomplice to that robbery and murder. She has been incarcerated on those
charges since June 2021.
[2] Brooks-Brown filed a witness list that made it clear that she intended to argue
that she did not have the mens rea required to commit the alleged offenses due
to the circumstances and associated trauma of being the alleged victim of
human sexual trafficking. The State responded with a motion in limine to
exclude any such evidence on the ground that a defendant’s challenge to her
mens rea may only be made under Indiana’s insanity defense. The trial court
denied the State’s request to exclude the evidence, but the court certified its
order for interlocutory appeal, which we accepted.
[3] We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Brooks-Brown is not asserting that she
engaged in otherwise proscribed conduct because of a mental disease or defect.
Nor is she asserting that her alleged victimization by human traffickers is an
effect of battery, which in some circumstances also requires, by statute, alleging
1
A “John” is “a sex worker’s client.” John, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/john (last visited Sept. 30, 2024).
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an insanity defense. Rather, Brooks-Brown is alleging that her actions were not
done knowingly or intentionally but only out of acquiescence to her traffickers.
[4] There is no statute on point for this scenario, and, indeed, related statutes reflect
conflicting legislative intents. Accordingly, we turn to our common law to
resolve this appeal. And Indiana law is unambiguous that the mens rea for a
criminal offense requires the fact-finder to determine the defendant’s subjective
state of mind at the time of the alleged offense. As Brooks-Brown’s proffered
evidence is relevant to her subjective state of mind, we affirm the trial court’s
denial of the State’s pretrial motion to exclude Brooks-Brown’s evidence.
Facts and Procedural History
[5] The “facts” relevant to this pretrial interlocutory appeal are limited. Indeed, as
there has been no assessment of the parties’ evidence before a fact-finder, all
factual assertions by both parties are at this stage allegations.
The probable cause affidavit
[6] Both parties rely on the probable cause affidavit to establish the State’s
foundation for its charges against Brooks-Brown. According to that affidavit,
shortly after 5:00 a.m. on June 16, 2021, Joshua and Sarah Barns of Flora
called local police officers to report an unresponsive male on their couch with a
“traumatic physical injury to his face.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 24. Officers
arrived and identified the man as Willie Lee Smith, Jr. Paramedics transported
Smith to a hospital in Lafayette. He died there two days later, and the cause of
his death was identified as blunt force trauma to the head.
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[7] The circumstances at the scene of the Barnses’ residence “strongly indicated
that Smith was robbed and assaulted near his vehicle,” which was parked
nearby. Id. at 24-25. Based on security footage, officers came to suspect “three
people at Jennifer Deans[’s] residence [who] may [have been] involved with the
incident,” namely, Tyrone Leftridge, Brooks-Brown, and a third person. Id. at
25. In the afternoon of June 16, officers located Leftridge and Brooks-Brown,
and they both agreed to speak with officers at the police station.
[8] There, Leftridge initially denied any knowledge of the incident, but he then
admitted to knowing what had happened. He stated that “the plan was to lure
Smith to the location.” Id. at 25. When Smith arrived, “Leftridge was nearby
hiding behind a garage.” Id. Leftridge stated that he heard another person
“attack Smith.” Id. At that point, Leftridge asked to leave the police station.
Meanwhile, Brooks-Brown told officers that “Leftridge had told her not to talk
to the police because he had done something bad . . . .” Id. Officers then
arrested Leftridge.
[9] On the morning of June 17, Leftridge made a recorded phone call from the jail.
In that call, “Leftridge admitted he had hit the guy with a baseball bat . . . .” Id.
Later that day, officers again spoke with Brooks-Brown. She told officers that,
“on the morning of the 16th, Leftridge used her social media app on her iPhone
named Meet-me” to “broadcast[] her information to those logged on.” Id. She
then received a message “from one individual,” Smith, “who was coming to
Flora” to meet with her. Id. Brooks-Brown told officers that, at that point,
“Leftridge . . . told her the arrangement was for her to have sex with this person
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for $80.” Id. Meanwhile, “Leftridge said he was going to hide around the other
side of a nearby building and watch.” Id.
[10] Brooks-Brown informed the officers that, as Smith approached the chosen
location and got out of his car “expecting to have sex with her,” “Leftridge
came running out from behind the garage and struck [Smith] in the head twice
with a baseball bat.” Id. at 26. Brooks-Brown stated that she “turned and ran to
the Deans[’] residence.” Id. Leftridge arrived shortly thereafter with “cash in
denominations of $20 bills . . . .” Id.
The State’s charges against Leftridge, Dean, and Brooks-Brown
[11] The State charged Leftridge and Jennifer Dean with felony murder. Leftridge
pleaded guilty, and a jury found Dean guilty. Brooks-Brown testified against
Dean at Dean’s trial. On appeal, we affirmed Dean’s conviction and ensuing
sentence. Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.
[12] The State also charged Brooks-Brown as an accomplice to the robbery and
felony murder of Smith, and she has been incarcerated on those charges since
June 2021. The State’s witness list identifies both Leftridge and Dean as
witnesses against Brooks-Brown. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 48. In May 2022,
based in part on the manner in which Brooks-Brown presented herself when she
testified against Dean, Brooks-Brown’s appointed counsel requested the court
to order a psychological evaluation of Brooks-Brown. Id. at 52. The trial court
granted that request over the State’s objection.
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[13] Although the probable cause affidavit does not say so explicitly, the plain
implication from the affidavit is that Brooks-Brown was at the scene of Smith’s
robbery and murder as an apparent prostitute. Indeed, the State expressly
concedes as much on appeal, stating that Brooks-Brown knowingly or
intentionally participated in “lur[ing]” Smith “to the scene under the false
pretenses of an anticipated act of prostitution.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. However,
although the State concedes that the charges at issue arose out of an act of
prostitution, 2 the State has not charged Brooks-Brown with prostitution.
Brooks-Brown’s proffered expert evidence
[14] Elizabeth Schutz, a licensed professional counselor in the State of Texas and
proffered expert in human trafficking and exploitation, conducted multiple
interviews with Brooks-Brown, which included the use of validated screening
tools that measure different impacts of trauma. Schutz also reviewed Brooks-
Brown’s medical history and statements made in the course of the instant
proceedings. Schutz concluded that Brooks-Brown is “a victim of trafficking in
persons for the purpose of commercial sexual activity by force, fraud[,] or
coercion.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 99. In particular, Schutz found that
“Dean trafficked [Brooks-Brown] through trauma-coerced attachment common
for those who have suffered prior sexual assault as [Brooks-Brown] had.” Id.
2
An act of prostitution occurs when sexual intercourse is offered for money, not the act of intercourse itself.
As Indiana Code section 35-45-4-2(a)(1) makes clear, “[a] person at least eighteen (18) years of age who
knowingly or intentionally . . . performs, or offers or agrees to perform, sexual intercourse or other sexual
conduct . . . for money . . . commits prostitution, a Class A misdemeanor.” (Emphasis added.) The offense is
a Level 6 felony if the person has two prior convictions under that statute. Id.
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Schutz further found that “Dean also preyed upon [Brooks-Brown’s]
intellectual disabilities” and “trafficked [Brooks-Brown] by use of psychological
manipulation and threats about her family and about the police.” Id.
[15] Regarding the events of June 16, Schutz found:
At the time of the crime[s, Brooks-Brown] was under the direct
control of her trafficker, Jennifer Dean[,] as well as under the
control of an abuse partner[, Leftridge], whom Jennifer Dean had
introduced [Brooks-Brown] to. [Leftridge] physical[ly] and
emotionally abused [Brooks-Brown], including severe choking on
multiple occasions resulting in loss of consciousness.
In my expert opinion[,] the criminal conduct charged against
[Brooks-Brown] resulted directly from her own victimization as a
sex trafficking victim. . . .
Id. Schutz expounded on her opinion as follows:
[Brooks-Brown] was a trafficking victim at the time the homicide
occurred. She was only at the scene of this crime due to her own
victimization and the power and control excerpted [sic] over her
by both Jennifer Dean and [Leftridge]. She was in no way
responsible for or involved in this crime but for her status as a
victim of human trafficking . . . . In fact[,] due to her own
victimization, [Brooks-Brown] repressed severe trauma and terror
to appear acquiescent and even complicit in the crime because
any indication of noncompliance would invite life-threatening
violence and abuse against her and possibly her child. The fawn
response demonstrated by [Brooks-Brown] is a learned response
by victims to avoid further abuse by pleasing or acquiescing to
the offender. [Brooks-Brown’s] reports of dissociation and night
terrors are supported by the results of my assessments and
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consistent with someone who has experienced severe trauma and
is a victim herself.
Id. at 106.
The State’s motion in limine
[16] In July 2023, Brooks-Brown filed an amended witness list and identified Schutz
and Stephanie Richard, another proffered expert in human trafficking, as
witnesses for her defense. The State filed a motion in limine to exclude:
6. Any attempt to have Stephanie Richard and/or Elizabeth
Schutz testify on behalf of the Defendant as to whether or not the
Defendant is a victim of sexual human trafficking as it is not
relevant to any element of the offenses and it is not an affirmative
defense under IC 35-41-3.
7. Any reference to the Defendant as a victim of sexual human
trafficking as it is not relevant to any element of the offenses and
it is not an affirmative defense under IC 35-41-3.
Id. at 206 (citations omitted). In an accompanying brief, the State argued that
Brooks-Brown’s evidence of her as an alleged victim of human trafficking
should be excluded because she “has not filed the appropriate notice or
followed the appropriate procedure” for an insanity defense to challenge her
mens rea. Id. at 155. In a blunt responsive brief, Brooks-Brown stated in
relevant part that her evidence was relevant and probative to demonstrating
whether she had “acted ‘knowingly or intentionally,’” as the State would be
required to prove at trial. Id. at 161.
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[17] The trial court denied the State’s request to exclude Brooks-Brown’s experts and
any other evidence that she is an alleged victim of human trafficking. The court
then certified its order for interlocutory appeal, which we accepted. 3 This
interlocutory appeal ensued.
Standard of Review
[18] The issues in this appeal present questions of law, which we review de novo.
E.g., Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 585 (Ind. 2022). Specifically, the parties’
arguments require us to interpret various statutes and to determine the law
underlying the State’s demand to exclude Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence.
As our Supreme Court has made clear:
In doing so, we begin with the statutory language itself. Powell v.
State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 265 (Ind. 2020). We read the “words in
their plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the
structure of the statute as a whole.” Town of Linden v. Birge, 204
N.E.3d 229, 237 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). We presume the General Assembly “intended for the
statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent
with the statute’s underlying policy and goals.” Id. (internal
quotation and citation omitted). We are mindful “of what the
statute says and what it doesn’t say” and “avoid interpretations
that depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to
irrational and disharmonizing results.” Id. (internal quotation
and citation omitted). Our ultimate goal is to “to determine and
3
The trial court has stayed proceedings pending the resolution of this appeal.
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give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Id. (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 772 (Ind. 2024).
Discussion and Decision
[19] The State has charged Brooks-Brown under a theory of accomplice liability for
the offenses of robbery and felony murder. A defendant may be found guilty as
an accomplice if the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” aided, induced, or
caused another person to commit an alleged offense. I.C. § 35-41-2-4. “A
person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is
aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). And “[a]
person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it
is his conscious objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).
[20] The central question in this appeal is whether Brooks-Brown may present
evidence at trial that challenges the State’s allegations that she acted knowingly
or intentionally as an accomplice to the robbery and felony murder of Smith.
According to the State, any such argument by Brooks-Brown must be made in
accordance with Indiana’s insanity defense.4 Brooks-Brown, on the other hand,
4
In its brief on appeal, the State also argues that the defenses of duress and involuntariness are not available
to Brooks-Brown, and Brooks-Brown does not argue otherwise. The defense of duress requires the defendant
to show an “instant and imminent” threat of serious bodily injury to the defendant or to a third party, which
Brooks-Brown has not alleged. See Murrell v. State, 960 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Love v.
State, 271 Ind. 473, 393 N.E.2d 178, 179 (1979)); see also I.C. § 35-41-3-8(a). Nor has she claimed that her
actions were involuntary, i.e., that she was not in conscious control of her body. See McClain v. State, 678
N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ind. 1997). Accordingly, neither of these arguments by the State is relevant, and we do not
consider them further.
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asserts that the insanity defense is limited to specific types of mental diseases or
defects, which is not her putative defense. Rather, her putative defense is that
she did not act knowingly or intentionally, not that she acted pursuant to a
mental disease or defect.
[21] Brooks-Brown’s putative defense does not fit neatly into any statutory defense.
But it is plainly not an insanity defense. We therefore conclude, in the absence
of clear legislative direction to the contrary, that Brooks-Brown’s proffered
evidence is relevant to the fact-finder’s determination of her subjective state of
mind underlying the alleged offenses.
1.1 Brooks-Brown’s putative defense is not an insanity
defense.
[22] We initially consider the State’s contention that Brooks-Brown’s evidence is
inadmissible except through an insanity defense. Addressing this issue requires
an understanding of Indiana’s defense of insanity and the related defense of
effects of battery. We therefore begin with the insanity defense under Indiana
Code section 35-41-3-6, which provides as follows:
(a) A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited
conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he was unable
to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the
offense.
(b) As used in this section, “mental disease or defect” means a
severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and
demonstrably impairs a person’s perception, but the term does
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not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful
or antisocial conduct.
[23] When the defendant in a felony criminal case intends to interpose the defense of
insanity, he or she must file a notice of that intent with the trial court no later
than twenty days before the omnibus date. I.C. § 35-36-2-1. However, the court
may permit the notice to be filed “at any time before the commencement of the
trial” when doing so is “in the interest of justice” and supported by “a showing
of good cause.” Id. There is no dispute that Brooks-Brown neither filed a timely
notice of an intent to interpose an insanity defense nor has she requested the
trial court to permit her to file that notice belatedly.
[24] Our Supreme Court has long cautioned against attempts by the State to
pigeonhole all challenges to a defendant’s mens rea into the defense of insanity.
In McClain v. State, 678 N.E.2d 104 (Ind. 1997), our Supreme Court considered
a nearly identical argument to the argument being made by the State here, albeit
with respect to the defense of involuntariness. As our Supreme Court explained:
Both the language of the insanity statute and the policies
underlying the insanity defense counsel against classifying
evidence of automatism as a mental disease or defect. . . .
Read expansively, [the insanity] statute could encompass a broad
range of conduct. As [the defendant] argues, intoxication alters a
person’s state of mind and perception, but it is not recognized as a form of
insanity. Like intoxication, “automatism may . . . be manifest in a
person with a perfectly healthy mind.” Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142,
145 (Wyo.1981). While automatistic behavior could be caused by
insanity, “unconsciousness at the time of the alleged criminal act
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need not be the result of a disease or defect of the mind.” State v.
Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348, 360 (1975). The decisions
holding that automatism is not a species of the insanity defense
have relied on this point and we find it persuasive. Automatism,
27 A.L.R.4th 1067 at § 3(b) (collecting cases). . . . Consistent
with this view, we hold that [the defendant’s] evidence of
automatism as pleaded does not need to be presented under the
insanity defense. We understand [the defendant’s] defense to
consist of automatism manifested in a person of sound mind. To
the extent involuntary behavior is contended to result from a
mental disease or defect, the insanity statute would apply.
Because the Legislature has placed the voluntary act requirement in a
different statute from the insanity defense, we discern no legislative intent
to merge the automatism and insanity defenses as the State urges us to
do in this case. Moreover, such a merger would produce
consequences that we believe were not intended by the framers of
Indiana’s insanity statute. The requirement that criminal
defendants in Indiana be forced into commitment proceedings if
found “not responsible by reason of insanity” reinforces our
conclusion. See [I.C.] § 35-36-2-4 (1993) (requiring prosecutor to
file petition seeking commitment hearing where defendant found
not responsible by reason of insanity). As the Wyoming Supreme
Court observed in Fulcher, a sane but automatistic defendant
forced to plead the insanity defense faces a choice of possible
commitment or effectively presenting no defense to the crime.
Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 146 (construing similar statutory framework).
A defendant intending to plead the insanity defense must give
notice to the court so that the court can appoint independent
experts to examine that defendant’s particular psychiatric
characteristics and offer an opinion on the validity of the claim.
[I.C.] § 35-36-2-2 (1993). For an automatistic defendant, as here,
there is no need for independent experts at public expense. The
issue turns on a series of historical events and the factual
circumstances bearing on the defendant’s voluntariness, as
opposed to the defendant’s mental fitness. Although expert
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testimony may be helpful, if offered consistent with the Indiana
Rules of Evidence, automatism presents an issue qualitatively the
same as any other factual determination. There is no special
reason to deviate from the normal adversary process of allowing
each side to call witnesses and cross-examine those called by the
other side.
One important policy underlying the insanity defense is ensuring
that mentally-ill criminal defendants receive treatment for their
condition. This raises a second and equally important
consideration why automatism should not be regarded by the
courts as a species of insanity. Although automatism could be the
product of a diseased mind in need of treatment and
rehabilitation, nothing in the record indicates that [the defendant]
presents such a case and [the defendant] does not assert that he
does. A “successful” defense resulting in a “not responsible by
reason of insanity” verdict would leave the automatistic
defendant in custody pending a commitment hearing. [I.C.] § 35-
36-2-4 (1993). Consequently, merging the automatism and insanity
defenses could result in confinement, at least temporarily, not of the
insane but of the sane. This is a significant deprivation of liberty for
an automatistic defendant where the outcome of the commitment
hearing is a foregone conclusion. Even apart from the
defendant’s interest, in the absence of grounds for believing an
automatistic defendant suffers from a recurring mental disorder,
it is reasonable to infer that legislators did not intend to occupy
the courts with commitment hearings for defendants whose
sanity is not in question.
The State does not claim that [the defendant] suffered from a mental
disorder at the time of the alleged offenses, only that his “medical
condition” and “medical testimony” related to his ability to form a
criminal intent must be presented under the insanity provisions. The
statute, however, does not deal with every “medical condition.” Rather, it
turns on the presence of a “mental disease or defect,” which connotes a
disorder naturally occurring or condition of the mind, as opposed to an
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induced condition (whether self-induced or otherwise). [The defendant]
seems uncertain exactly how to describe his allegedly
automatistic condition, calling it “sleep deprivation,” “sleep
violence,” “sleepwalking” and even a state of sleep itself. The
gravamen of [his] argument, however, is that but for a lack of
sleep over the course of several days, he would not have been in
this state at the time he allegedly involuntarily struck police
officers on December 20, 1993. [The defendant’s] condition thus is
more analogous to intoxication than insanity because it had an external
cause. Unlike intoxication, the Legislature has presented no
specific standard for dealing with or assessing this defense.
Compare [I.C.] § 35-41-3-5 (1993). Automatism is simply a denial
of one element—voluntary action—that the Legislature has
required for most crimes. It is not a disease or defect within the
meaning of Indiana Code § 35-41-3-6. . . .
Id. at 108-09 (emphases added).
[25] Around the same time as McClain, our Court was asked in Barrett v. State, 675
N.E.2d 1112, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied, to determine “whether
testimony regarding Battered Women’s Syndrome is relevant to the issue of a
defendant’s intent to commit a crime.” The State had charged the defendant
with Class B felony neglect of a dependent after her four-year-old child died at
the hands of her live-in boyfriend. She sought to present expert testimony that
she suffered from battered women’s syndrome, which we described as “a cluster
of symptomatic behaviors that women exhibit after they have lived in an
environment of trauma and abuse for a period of time.” Id. at 1115 n.3
(quotation marks omitted). In particular, she argued that that evidence “was
relevant to show that she did not knowingly or intentionally neglect her child.”
Id. at 1115. The trial court excluded her evidence on the theory that evidence
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relating to battered women’s syndrome is available only under a theory of self-
defense against the perpetrator of the abuse.
[26] We reversed the trial court’s judgment and held that the evidence was relevant.
As we explained:
As part of its burden of proof, the State must show that the
accused was subjectively aware of a high probability that she
placed the dependent in a dangerous situation. Proof of this
subjective awareness requires resort to inferential reasoning to ascertain
the accused’s mental state. Therefore, evidence or testimony regarding the
accused’s mental state is relevant to determine whether the accused
knowingly or intentionally placed the dependent in a dangerous
situation.
Here, [the defendant] offered the testimony of Gail Beaton, a
social worker, to explain how [battered women’s syndrome] can
affect a person’s state of mind and perception of danger to her
dependent. This testimony was relevant and necessary to
determine [the defendant’s] mental state and, therefore, whether
she acted knowingly or intentionally in neglecting her
dependent. . . .
Id. at 1116 (second emphasis added; citations omitted).
[27] Following our Court’s opinion in Barrett, our General Assembly enacted
Indiana Code section 35-41-3-11, which is commonly referred to as the “effects
of battery” statute. See Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1126 (Ind. 2001). That
statute codified the defense that “the defendant was at the time of the alleged
crime suffering from the effects of battery,” with Indiana Code section 35-31.5-
2-109 defining “[e]ffects of battery” as “a psychological condition of an
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individual who has suffered repeated physical or sexual abuse inflicted by
another individual” who is both the “victim” of the defendant’s alleged offense
and also is the defendant’s spouse, parent, guardian, custodian, or cohabitant
(or a former person in those roles). Thus, the effects-of-battery statute
superseded our Court’s opinion in Barrett by limiting that defense to
circumstances in which the defendant’s “victim” is also the person whose past
course of conduct is alleged to have resulted in the defendant suffering from the
effects of battery. I.C. § 35-41-3-11. However, our General Assembly’s
codification of the effects-of-battery defense had no impact on the Barrett panel’s
well-founded assessment that criminal offenses require the fact-finder to “resort
to inferential reasoning” to ascertain whether the defendant was “subjectively
aware” that she was engaging in a criminal act. 675 N.E.2d at 1116; see also
Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1985) (rejecting an objective
approach to determining a defendant’s mens rea and holding that a “subjective
standard [is] mandated by our culpability defin[ing] statute[s]”).
[28] To raise the statutory defense of effects of battery, Indiana Code section 35-41-
3-11 requires the defendant to allege one of two scenarios. First, the defendant
can allege an insanity defense under I.C. § 35-41-3-6; that is, the defendant can
allege that the effects of battery made the defendant not responsible as a result
of a mental disease or defect that rendered the defendant unable to appreciate
the wrongfulness of the alleged conduct. I.C. § 35-41-3-11(b)(1). Alternatively,
the defendant can argue that the alleged criminal act was the use of justified
reasonable force under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2, which recognizes that a
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person may use reasonable force, including deadly force, to protect oneself, a
third party, or one’s property. 5 I.C. § 35-41-3-11(b)(2).
[29] Following the enactment of the effects-of-battery statute, the State charged
thirty-one-year-old Julie Marley with the murder of Donald Marley, who had
been convicted of molesting Julie when she was fourteen years old. Julie sought
to introduce medical expert testimony that, at the time she killed Donald, “she
was not conscious of her actions due to post-traumatic stress disorder and
dissociation,” which conditions “stemmed largely from” Donald’s prior
molestations of her. Marley, 747 N.E.2d at 1126. Notably, there was no
suggestion that Julie’s killing of Donald had been the use of justified reasonable
force under Indiana Code sections 35-41-3-2 and 35-41-3-11(b)(2).
[30] The State moved to exclude the evidence of Donald’s molestations of Julie and
the mental harms he had caused her on the ground that Julie had not properly
alleged an insanity defense as required under Indiana Code section 35-41-3-
11(b)(1). The trial court agreed that Julie’s evidence could be admitted under
the effects-of-battery statute only “for maintaining an insanity defense.” Marley,
747 N.E.2d at 1126-27.
5
In either the use-of-justified-reasonable-force or the insanity scenario, the effects-of-battery defense includes
a notice requirement equivalent to the notice required to assert an insanity defense. See I.C. § 35-41-3-11(c).
As with the insanity defense, there is no dispute that Brooks-Brown has not provided any notice of this
defense.
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[31] Our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and concluded that the
effects-of-battery statute was intended to “require that battered women’s
syndrome evidence be limited” to insanity or the use of justified reasonable
force. Id. at 1127-28. The Court further noted that “the legislative response to
Barrett suggests that the General Assembly considered the Barrett defense to be
in the nature of an insanity defense . . . .” Id. at 1128. As Julie’s claim was “of
the same sort,” our Supreme Court held her evidence “was therefore
properly . . . subject to the insanity statute.” Id.
[32] However, as it had in McClain, our Supreme Court again cautioned that “the
definition of insanity if read broadly could embrace a wide variety of mental
conditions that are not properly held subject to the insanity statute,” such as
disorders “that are not attributable to any mental disease or defect . . . .” Id. The
Court then stated as follows:
In contrast, we conclude that the legislature has determined that,
where the defendant claims that battered women’s syndrome has affected
her ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct, she must
proceed under the insanity defense. . . .
Limiting the admissibility of battered women’s syndrome
evidence in this manner is consistent with well established
principles of Indiana law. Over one hundred years ago, in Sage v.
State, 91 Ind. 141, 145 (1883), this Court held that the current
statutory scheme did not recognize a middle ground between
sanity and insanity. Thus, insanity was recognizable as a defense,
but not as a mitigating circumstance. Similarly, our current
statutory scheme recognizes no “middle ground” between
insanity and sanity. More recently, this Court summarized this
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principle, stating that, “[i]n Indiana we do not recognize degrees
of insanity.” Cardine v. State, 475 N.E.2d 696, 698 (Ind. 1985)
(quoting Cowell v. State, 263 Ind. 344, 348-49, 331 N.E.2d 21, 24
(1975)); accord Holmes v. State, 671 N.E.2d 841, 857-58 (Ind. 1996)
(instruction to jury that evidence of mental state was properly
offered to negate defendant’s capacity to form requisite intent
was erroneous). Rather, “within the ambit of the terms
comprising the definition of legal insanity[,] complete mental
incapacity must be demonstrated before criminal responsibility
can be relieved.” Cowell, 263 Ind. at 349, 331 N.E.2d at 24(citations omitted). In short, as a general proposition Indiana has long
held that a defendant may not submit evidence relating to mental disease
or defect except through an insanity defense.
Id. (emphases added; alterations original to Marley). Thus, in Marley our
Supreme Court was obliged to direct the defendant to present her effects-of-
battery evidence under the insanity defense in accordance with our legislature’s
clearly stated intent.
[33] A panel of our Court also addressed an insanity-related attempt to invoke the
effects-of-battery defense in Green v. State, 65 N.E.3d 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016),
trans. denied. In Green, the defendant shot her ex-husband, with whom she still
lived, five times while he slept; left the room to reload her weapon; and then
returned to the room and shot him five more times. She then took steps to cover
up the killing.
[34] The State charged her with murder. She initially filed the requisite notice of her
intent to use effects-of-battery evidence to show that she did not appreciate the
wrongfulness of her conduct, but she later withdrew that notice. Nonetheless, at
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trial she sought to admit an out-of-state attorney’s testimony as expert evidence
that she suffered from the effects of battery, which testimony the trial court
excluded. She was then convicted of murder.
[35] We affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the proffered testimony on appeal. Id.
at 630-33. We noted that the out-of-state attorney was not qualified to provide
expert testimony on the effects of battery. Id. We also noted that the defendant
had withdrawn the notice of her intent to assert an effects-of-battery defense. Id.[36] That background brings us to the instant case. Relying on Marley and Green, the
State argues that the trial court here erred in not excluding Brooks-Brown’s
evidence challenging her mens rea. According to the State, Marley requires any
“evidence relating to mental disease or defect” to be raised only “through an
insanity defense.” See id. As the State puts it, that means:
A defendant who wants to claim that she could not form the
requisite mens rea due to a trauma-induced abnormal mental
condition may only do so through an insanity defense. She may
not claim that a trauma-induced mental condition not rising to
the level of insanity excuses her from criminal culpability.
Appellant’s Br. at 11. The State also asserts that Brooks-Brown’s circumstances
“cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the facts of Green.” Id.[37] The State’s position on the relevant law is incorrect for several reasons. First,
the State’s reliance on Marley and Green is misplaced. Our Supreme Court’s
analysis in Marley is expressly and exclusively focused on claims where the
effects of battery suffered by the defendant are alleged to have resulted in a
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mental disease or defect that made the defendant unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of her conduct. 747 N.E.2d at 1128. Further, that analysis was in
accordance with clear legislative direction. See id. But Brooks-Brown has not
alleged that she suffers from the effects of battery, let alone that any such effects
have resulted in a mental disease or defect of any kind. Nor has our General
Assembly defined being the victim of human trafficking as a species of insanity.
And the facts of Green are not reasonably comparable to the facts before us in
this case.
[38] Second, the State’s assertion that Indiana law demands that all “trauma-
induced mental condition[s]” being used to challenge the mens rea of a criminal
allegation must be brought solely by way of an insanity defense is extremely
overbroad. The effects-of-battery statute itself does not demand as much,
allowing defendants to either assert that the effects of battery resulted in a
mental disease or defect or that the effects of battery placed the defendant in a
circumstance where she believed the use of justified reasonable force to have
been necessary. I.C. § 35-41-3-11(b).
[39] Moreover, the State’s expansive understanding of when the insanity defense
should apply is expressly contrary to our Supreme Court’s caution in both
Marley and McClain. As our Supreme Court made clear in Marley, “the
definition of insanity if read broadly could embrace a wide variety of mental
conditions that are not properly held subject to the insanity statute.” 747
N.E.2d at 1128. Like the circumstances in McClain that our Supreme Court held
to not be an appropriate use of the insanity defense, here Brooks-Brown is
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relying on an “induced condition,” not a “mental disease or defect.” 678
N.E.2d at 109. And, unlike the effects-of-battery circumstances in Marley, our
General Assembly has not expressly defined the induced condition here to be
one that must proceed by way of the insanity defense. See 747 N.E.2d at 1128.
Accordingly, the insanity defense is not applicable here.
[40] The State’s argument, if adopted, would fundamentally and improperly
transform a wide range of evidentiary challenges into “insanity.” See id. Indeed,
like the argument rejected by our Supreme Court in McClain, adopting the
State’s argument here would require that a “successful” defense result in a “not
responsible by reason of insanity” judgment. 678 N.E.2d at 109. That, in turn,
would leave a sane human trafficking victim in custody pending commitment
proceedings, which is absurd and antithetical to the purpose of the insanity
defense. See id. The State’s argument is thus contrary to law and amounts to
concluding that trafficking victims are mentally diseased or defective. We reject
the State’s argument accordingly.
1.2 Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence is relevant to her
subjective state of mind.
[41] Brooks-Brown’s putative defense seeks to challenge the State’s assertion that
she knowingly or intentionally aided others in the robbery and felony murder of
Smith. She intends to argue that she did not act knowingly or intentionally but,
rather, merely out of acquiescence toward her alleged traffickers. Thus, she
seeks to present evidence at trial to counter the State’s evidence regarding the
statutory element of her state of mind.
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[42] As long as Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence is admissible under the Indiana
Rules of Evidence, her evidence is entirely consistent with Indiana law. As our
Supreme Court has long made clear, whether a defendant acts knowingly or
intentionally is a question directed to the defendant’s subjective state of mind.
Armour, 479 N.E.2d at 1297. And, as we made clear in Barrett, “[p]roof of this
subjective awareness requires resort to inferential reasoning to ascertain the
accused’s mental state.” 675 N.E.2d at 1116. “Therefore, evidence or testimony
regarding the accused’s mental state is relevant to determine whether the
accused [acted] knowingly or intentionally . . . .” Id.[43] Further, we are not persuaded by the State’s reliance on Indiana Code section
35-38-10-2. That statute provides a limited post-conviction remedy for inmates
who have been convicted of an offense that did not result in bodily injury to
another person where the inmate was “a trafficked person at the time” of the
offense and “coerced” or “under the control of” another person at the time of
the offense. I.C. § 35-38-10-2. We think that statute demonstrates a legislative
intent commensurate with the language used: to provide a limited opportunity
for post-conviction relief to certain inmates.
[44] Indeed, the limited legislative intent underlying Indiana Code section 35-38-10-
2 is made clear by another statute. In particular, Indiana Code section 35-45-4-
2(a) states in relevant part that a person who knowingly or intentionally offers
or agrees to perform sexual intercourse with another person for money commits
prostitution, which is either a Class A misdemeanor or a Level 6 felony.
However, subsection (b) of that statute states that “[i]t is a defense” to an
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allegation of prostitution “that the [defendant] was a victim or an alleged victim
of an offense” of human trafficking. I.C. § 35-45-4-2(b) (citing I.C. §§ 35-42-3.5-
1 to -1.4). Thus, when prostitution has been alleged, our General Assembly has
provided a complete trial defense for alleged victims of human trafficking. See
also Anderson v. State, 237 N.E.3d 714, 717-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. not
sought. That is plainly more comprehensive than the relief available by way of
the post-conviction process.
[45] Although not addressed by the parties in this appeal, we also acknowledge that
the statutory defense of human trafficking provided for under Indiana Code 35-
45-4-2(b) is not Brooks-Brown’s putative defense. As we have explained, the
statutory defense of human trafficking admits to the elements of prostitution—
including the mens rea—but excuses culpability for the offense notwithstanding
that admission. Id. Brooks-Brown’s defense, in contrast, is not that she
knowingly or intentionally engaged in robbery and felony murder but should be
excused from those acts; her defense is that she did not have the state of mind
required to commit those acts in the first instance.
Conclusion
[46] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the State’s pretrial
request to exclude Brooks-Brown’s proffered evidence with respect to her
subjective state of mind at the time of the alleged offenses. We express no
opinion on the admissibility of any such evidence at trial under the Indiana
Rules of Evidence.
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[47] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., concurs with separate opinion.
Altice, C.J., dissents with separate opinion.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Lori S. James
Law Office of Lori S. James, P.C.
Rensselaer, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-627 | October 16, 2024 Page 26 of 34
Bailey, Judge, concurring.
[48] The central issue in this case is whether Brooks-Brown may present evidence to
rebut the State’s claim that she had acted with the requisite intent to commit the
offenses. I fully agree with the lead opinion that Brooks-Brown’s putative
defense is “plainly not an insanity defense.” Slip op. at 11. And I agree that her
proffered evidence is relevant to her subjective state of mind.
[49] However, I write separately because I believe that the statutory defense of
human trafficking is relevant to our analysis. Indiana Code section 35-45-4-2(a)
states in pertinent part that a person who knowingly or intentionally offers or
agrees to perform sexual intercourse with another person for money commits
prostitution, which is either a Class A misdemeanor or a Level 6 felony.
However, subsection (b) of that statute states that “[i]t is a defense” to an
allegation of prostitution “that the [defendant] was a victim or an alleged victim
of an offense” of human trafficking. I.C. § 35-45-4-2(b) (citing I.C. §§ 35-42-3.5-
1 to -1.4).
[50] I acknowledge that the State has not formally charged Brooks-Brown with
prostitution. However, the State charged her with aiding, inducing, or causing
felony murder and aiding, inducing, or causing robbery resulting in serious
bodily injury. And the State concedes on appeal that it charged Brooks-Brown
as an accomplice based on its allegation that she “lured” Smith “to the scene
under the false pretenses of an anticipated act of prostitution.” Appellant’s Br.
at 14. In other words, while the State has not charged Brooks-Brown with
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-627 | October 16, 2024 Page 27 of 34
prostitution, the alleged act of prostitution is the nexus for charging accomplice
liability. That is, in order to convict her under an accomplice liability theory,
the State must prove that she aided, induced, or caused the felony murder and
robbery by engaging in prostitution.
[51] It is of no moment whether the act of prostitution is the focus of the
prosecutor’s discretion or whether, as here, it is the link the prosecutor uses to
support the charges. Under either scenario, a successful defense will excuse
liability. Because the statute provides a human trafficking defense to counter
any prostitution allegation that is the basis for criminal charges, it is immaterial
whether the State actually charged her with prostitution or whether the alleged
act is a component of another charge. I would therefore hold that Brooks-
Brown’s proffered evidence is admissible to support a statutory defense to
human trafficking.
[52] While I agree with the lead opinion, I believe the foregoing establishes an
additional rationale for the admission of her proffered evidence. Therefore, I
concur.
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Altice, Chief Judge, dissenting.
[53] I agree with the State that Brooks-Brown may not – outside the confines of an
insanity defense – present expert testimony on the effects of human trafficking
for her stated purpose of establishing that she did not knowingly or intentionally
act as an accomplice to the robbery and murder. Our Supreme Court has stated
several times that we do not recognize degrees of insanity in Indiana. E.g.,
Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (Ind. 2001). The effect of the majority’s
decision here, however, creates a middle ground between sanity and insanity,
opening the floodgates of evidence bearing on a defendant’s mental condition –
short of insanity – to show their “subjective state of mind” at the time of the
crime. 6
[54] It is true that our Supreme Court has recognized that “the definition of insanity
if read broadly could embrace a wide variety of mental conditions that are not
properly held subject to the insanity statute.” Id. (citing McClain v. State, 678
N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ind. 2001)). But I cannot agree with the majority’s reading of
McClain and Marley as somehow cautioning against “attempts by the State to
pigeonhole all challenges to a defendant’s mens rea into the defense of
6
I also find Judge Bailey’s additional rationale unpersuasive, as the plain language of Ind. Code § 35-45-4-
2(b) limits the statutory affirmative defense of human trafficking to prosecutions for prostitution. The defense
is found in the statute defining the crime of prostitution; not within the series of statutes under Ind. Code
Chap. 35-41-3 setting out defenses relating to culpability. And it is of no moment that the State could have
charged Brooks-Brown with prostitution. If it had, evidence that Brooks-Brown was a victim of human
trafficking would have been admissible for the limited purpose of defending the prostitution charge, not to
excuse culpability for robbery or murder.
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insanity.” Slip op. at 12 (emphasis supplied). In my view, the Court was
speaking in terms of voluntariness, not mens rea. That is, in limited situations
where evidence of a mental condition (or mental state affected by a medical
condition) is used to establish unconscious, involuntary behavior committed by
a person of sound mind, the defendant need not proceed under an insanity
defense. See id. (“McClain staked out a small area of mental states, e.g.,
sleepwalking, epilepsy, and metabolic disorders, that are not attributable to any
mental disease or defect but nevertheless negate the voluntariness
requirement.”) (emphases supplied); McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 108-09 (holding
that automatism is not a species of the insanity defense and that evidence of
such may be presented to dispute whether the defendant engaged in voluntary
conduct, as required by Ind. Code § 35-41-2-1(a)); Reed v. State, 693 N.E.2d 988,
992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[B]ecause the State must prove that a defendant
engages in criminal conduct, voluntarily or by act of choice, in a conscious state
of mind, automatism is relevant to determine whether a defendant voluntarily
commits an offense.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[55] Brooks-Brown does not seek to present evidence of automatism or any other
condition that would cause her to engage in involuntary conduct. Rather,
through expert testimony, she seeks to show that she lacked criminal intent due
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to the circumstances and associated trauma of being a victim of human sexual
trafficking. 7 In my view, McClain does not apply here.
[56] Nor do I believe that we should look to Barrett v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1112 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied, to counsel our decision here. In Barrett, the
defendant sought to submit expert testimony regarding battered women’s
syndrome (BWS) to show that she did not knowingly or intentionally place her
child – who died at the hands of the defendant’s boyfriend – in a dangerous
situation. The Barrett panel determined that BWS evidence was relevant as a
defense to the mens rea element, explaining:
As part of its burden of proof, the State must show that the
accused was subjectively aware of a high probability that she
placed the dependent in a dangerous situation. Armour v. State,
479 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1985). Proof of this subjective
awareness requires resort to inferential reasoning to ascertain the
accused’s mental state. Hill v. State, 535 N.E.2d 153, 154
(Ind.Ct.App.1989). Therefore, evidence or testimony regarding
the accused’s mental state is relevant to determine whether the
7
In her report, Elizabth Schultz opines that Brooks-Brown was trafficked through “trauma-coerced
attachment” and “use of psychological manipulation.” Appendix at 99. Schultz notes that Brooks-Brown had
experienced suicidal ideation, which is “a common response of someone who has experienced significant
trauma” and is linked to “the emotional toll that sex trafficking can have on an individual, along with
depression, hopelessness, anger, and rage.” Id. at 103. Schultz also details violent episodes of battery that
Brooks-Brown allegedly suffered at the hands of Leftridge, her romantic partner. The report discusses
“pathological disassociation” and ultimately identifies Brooks-Brown as “a trafficking victim at the time of
the homicide” who “repressed severe trauma and terror to appear acquiescent and even complicit in the
crime” to avoid “life-threatening violence.” Id. at 106. Schultz explained: “The fawn response demonstrated
by [Brooks-Brown] is a learned response by victims to avoid further abuse by pleasing or acquiescing to the
offender.” Id.
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accused knowingly or intentionally placed the dependent in a
dangerous situation.
Here, Barrett offered the testimony of Gail Beaton, a social
worker, to explain how BWS can affect a person’s state of mind
and perception of danger to her dependent. This testimony was
relevant and necessary to determine Barrett’s mental state and,
therefore, whether she acted knowingly or intentionally in
neglecting her dependent. Thus, the trial court erred in refusing
to permit Barrett to present evidence regarding BWS.
Id. at 1116.
[57] The Indiana General Assembly responded to Barrett by enacting Ind. Code § 35-
41-3-11, commonly known as the effects-of-battery statute, with the intended
effect of requiring a defendant to comply with the insanity statute in order to
present BWS evidence as to a defendant’s mens rea. See Marley, 747 N.E.2d at
1128.
[58] In Marley, our Supreme Court noted that Barrett did not address whether the
BWS evidence “bore on a species of insanity that triggered the procedural
requirements of the insanity statute[.]” Id. at 1127. The Court observed that
“[t]he inability to form a subjective appreciation of the effect of neglect of a
dependant [sic] is within the literal terms of the insanity defense” and then held:
“To the extent that Barrett suggests that [BWS] evidence is admissible on the
issue of lack of intent or knowledge without compliance with the insanity
statute, it is superseded by the 1997 legislation.” Id. at 1127, 1128.
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[59] Turning to the common law, the Court then explained why requiring
defendants like Marley and Barrett to comply with the insanity statute made
sense:
Limiting the admissibility of [BWS] evidence in this manner is
consistent with well established principles of Indiana law. Over
one hundred years ago, this Court held that the current statutory
scheme did not recognize a middle ground between sanity and
insanity. Thus, insanity was recognizable as a defense, but not as
a mitigating circumstance. Similarly, our current statutory
scheme recognizes no middle ground between insanity and
sanity. More recently, this Court summarized this principle,
stating that, in Indiana we do not recognize degrees of insanity.
Rather, within the ambit of the terms comprising the definition of
legal insanity, complete mental incapacity must be demonstrated
before criminal responsibility can be relieved. In short, as a
general proposition Indiana has long held that a defendant may
not submit evidence relating to mental disease or defect except
through an insanity defense.
Id. (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
[60] The above language applies just as strongly here, where Brooks-Brown seeks to
present evidence that she lacked criminal intent due to the circumstances and
trauma of being a victim of human trafficking. To pursue this defense, I believe
she must proceed under the insanity defense.8 See Marley, 747 N.E.2d at 1128
8
The majority rejects the State’s contention that all trauma-induced mental conditions being used to
challenge the mens rea of a criminal allegation must be brought by way of an insanity defense. In this
regard, the majority notes that the effects-of-battery statute allows for use of evidence relating to the
psychological effects of battery to establish self-defense, not just insanity. I would note, however, that self-
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(“Marley’s claim of a ‘dissociative state’ as a result of battered women’s
syndrome ... is a claim that an abnormal condition has impaired the defendant’s
perception of the action taken.”); Green v. State, 65 N.E.3d 620, 633 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016).
[61] Accordingly, I would reverse and remand with directions that Brooks-Brown is
not permitted to offer expert testimony on the effects of human trafficking to
challenge her mens rea except through an insanity defense.
defense cases do not involve a challenge to the mens rea element; rather the defense provides a justification
for the crime, and “evidence which is clearly encompassed by the traditional bounds of an insanity defense is
still not suitable for a self-defense claim.” Higgason v. State, 183 N.E.3d 340, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)
(observing that under the effects-of-battery statute, “a defendant’s evidence that she does not appreciate the
wrongfulness of her conduct, such as in circumstances of manic-episodes, schizophrenic breaks, and similar
situations in which it is clear they are attempting to disprove their understanding of the wrongfulness of their
conduct, are still prohibited from use outside of an insanity defense”); see also Passarelli v. State, 201 N.E.3d
271, 278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.
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