Kiandre Dominick Owens v. State of Indiana ( 2024 )

FILED
Nov 20 2024, 9:19 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Kiandre Dominick Owens,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
November 20, 2024
Court of Appeals Case No.
24A-CR-900
Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court
The Honorable Darcie L. Fawcett, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
53C09-2008-F1-737
Opinion by Judge Tavitas
Judges May and DeBoer concur.
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Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Kiandre Owens appeals his conviction for attempted murder, a Level 1 felony.
Owens argues: (1) the trial court erred by admitting DNA evidence obtained
from swabs taken from Owens’ hands and clothing because Owens was not
advised of his Pirtle 1 rights before law enforcement collected these swabs; and
(2) insufficient evidence supports Owens’ conviction. We disagree with these
arguments and, accordingly, affirm.
Issues
[2] Owens raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court erred by admitting DNA evidence
obtained from swabs taken from Owens’ hands and
clothing because Owens was not advised of his Pirtle rights
before law enforcement collected these swabs.
II. Whether sufficient evidence supports Owens’ conviction.
Facts
[3] Owens and Nariah Blount became friends in the summer of 2020 after meeting
through a mutual friend, Aleah Hamilton. Owens went by the name “Cali.”
Tr. Vol. II p. 9. On August 4, 2020, Owens was at Blount’s house in
1
Pirtle v. State, 323 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 1975).
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Bloomington and engaged in an argument about a gun with Blount’s brother
and others. Blount told Owens that he needed to leave, and she contacted
Hamilton to pick up Owens from the house.
[4] The evening of August 5, 2020, Blount was home alone when Owens knocked
on her front door. Blount could see that Owens was carrying a bottle of vodka.
Owens apologized to Blount for the argument from the previous night, and
Blount told him that he would need to apologize to her brother. Owens then
asked to use the restroom.
[5] Before Owens left, he thanked Blount for allowing him to apologize and asked
for a hug. As the two hugged, Blount saw Owens raise the vodka bottle and
strike her across the face. Owens continued to strike Blount on the head at least
thirteen times. At one point, Blount tried to get up and run, but she slipped in
blood, and Owens began stabbing her with a two-to-three-inch pocket knife.
Owens then put Blount in a headlock, dragged her across the living room,
“looked over [her] and then slit [her] throat.” Id. at 14.
[6] Blount “played dead,” and Owens left the house. Id. at 15. After waiting to
make sure Owens had gone, Blount left the house and lay in the road where she
was discovered by neighbors and a passing vehicle. First responders arrived
and transported her to the hospital. Blount told law enforcement officers at the
hospital that “Cali” was her assailant. Id. at 16.
[7] Blount had lacerations to her head, ear, eyebrow, lip, neck, chest, and
abdomen. Her colon was protruding through her skin. Fortunately, the
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lacerations to her neck only penetrated the muscle and did not puncture major
blood vessels or her airway. She required intensive surgery and was
hospitalized for approximately seven days.
[8] After the attack, Owens checked himself into the same hospital where Blount
had been admitted. Hospital staff informed law enforcement officers that
Owens was at the hospital, had a cut on his hand, and “could possibly be the
suspect” in Blount’s attack. Id. at 48. Bloomington Police Department
Detective Jeffrey Rodgers had an evidence technician take swabs of the blood
on Owens’ hands and clothing. Law enforcement later obtained a search
warrant to take a buccal swab of Owens to compare to the swabs taken from
Owens’ hands and clothing. DNA testing results from the swabs taken from
Owens’ hands and clothing each individually provided “very strong support for
the inclusion” of Blount’s DNA. Ex. Vol. III pp. 42-47.
[9] After Owens was treated for his injuries, he was taken for a custodial
interrogation, where he was advised of and waived his Miranda 2 rights. Owens
stated that he believed Blount and her friends were “going after [his] family”
and that he wanted to “kill everybody who got involved with it.” State’s Ex. 32
at 22:50, 40:00. He admitted that he went to Blount’s house, struck her with a
bottle, and stabbed her with a knife.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
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[10] Law enforcement conducted DNA testing on objects from the crime scene and
obtained the following results: (1) blood on the exterior front doorknob
provided “very strong support” for the inclusion of Owens; (2) blood on the
interior front doorknob provided “moderate support” for the inclusion of
Owens”; and (3) blood on the interior back doorknob provided “very strong
support” for the inclusion of Owens. Ex. Vol. II pp. 42-43.
[11] On August 7, 2020, the State charged Owens with attempted murder, a Level 1
felony. A bench trial took place on February 27, 2024. Blount testified
regarding her relationship with Owens and Owens’ attack upon her. She
identified Owens in court as her assailant.
[12] Detective Rodgers testified regarding the swabs taken from Owens’ hands and
clothing at the hospital. Detective Rodgers initially testified, upon questioning
by defense counsel, that he did not “ask [Owens] for consent to search” nor give
Owens a Pirtle advisement prior to obtaining the swabs. Tr. Vol. II p. 53. On
subsequent questioning, Detective Rodgers testified that he “did ask [Owens]
for a swab,” although he did not mention whether Owens consented to the
collection of the swabs. Id. at 56.
[13] The State sought to admit DNA testing results from the swabs of Owens hands
and clothing; however, Owens objected on the grounds that he was not advised
of his Pirtle rights prior to law enforcement’s collection of the swabs. The trial
court overruled Owens’ objection and admitted the DNA results. The trial
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court also admitted Owens’ statements from the custodial interview. The trial
court found Owens guilty as charged. Owens now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Pirtle advisements were not required for the swabs of Owens’ hands
and clothing at the hospital, and the trial court did not err by admitting
the DNA evidence obtained therefrom.
[14] Owens first argues that, because he was not advised of his Pirtle rights prior to
the collection of the swabs of his hands and clothing at the hospital, the trial
court erred by admitting the DNA results obtained from these swabs. We
disagree.
[15] We review the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse
of the trial court’s discretion. McCoy v. State, 193 N.E.3d 387, 390 (Ind. 2022).
“But when, like here, the trial court’s determination involves the
constitutionality of a search or seizure, that determination is a question of law
to which a de novo standard of review applies.” Id.[16] As our Supreme Court has explained,
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects” from unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. It requires police to obtain a
search warrant from a neutral, detached magistrate prior to
undertaking a search of either a person or private property. . . .
Our State Constitution offers citizens parallel protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures. For instance, Article 1,
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Section 11 provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
search or seizure, shall not be violated.”
M.D. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. 2018).
[17] Under the Fourth Amendment, a person’s valid consent to a search generally
eliminates the need for a search warrant. M.D., 108 N.E.3d at 304. In Pirtle v.
State, however, our Supreme Court held that Article 1, Section 11 of the
Indiana Constitution offers “broader protections” for individuals consenting to
a search. Id. at 304; Pirtle, 323 N.E.2d 634, 639-40 (Ind. 1975). Under Pirtle, a
person in custody generally has the right to consult with counsel regarding
whether to consent to a law enforcement search, and law enforcement “must
explicitly advise a person in custody of [his or] her right to consult with
counsel” prior to obtaining consent to search. M.D., 108 N.E.3d at 304.
[18] Pirtle rights also draw from Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution.
The Court in Pirtle noted that the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides the right to counsel “at any stage of the prosecution,
formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate
from the accused’s right to a fair trial,” and that Article 1, Section 13 of the
Indiana Constitution similarly guarantees “a defendant the assistance of
counsel for his defense.” Pirtle, 323 N.E.2d at 639. The right to counsel under
the Indiana Constitution attaches earlier than under the United States
Constitution because the right to counsel under the Indiana Constitution
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attaches “upon arrest, rather than only when formal proceedings have been
initiated.” State v. Taylor, 49 N.E.3d 1019, 1024 (Ind. 2016).
[19] The principle behind Pirtle is to “protect people from the most serious intrusions
into privacy.” Garcia-Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229, 1238 (Ind. 2011). Pirtle
itself involved the consensual search of a home, and in Sellmer v. State, 842
N.E.2d 358, 365 (Ind. 2006), our Supreme Court extended Pirtle to the
consensual search of a vehicle. Pirtle, however, does not apply to “minimally
intrusive searches.” M.D., 108 N.E.3d at 306. In determining whether Pirtle
advisements are necessary before obtaining consent for a given search, our
Supreme Court has explained:
[W]e need not contemplate whether a person has a legitimate
expectation of privacy, nor whether the State’s intrusion was
unreasonable. After all, those questions go to whether police
must obtain a warrant—a question not at issue here. Moreover,
a person may freely consent to even the most unreasonable of
intrusions; where such consent is valid, no warrant is required.
Rather, our concern in Pirtle, and in the ensuing cases, was that
consent to certain weighty intrusions carries a great risk of
involuntariness. This is especially true, as described by the Court
of Appeals in Ackerman [v. State], 774 N.E.2d [970, 981 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2022), trans. denied], for unlimited and general searches
where police are given carte blanche to search for unspecified
evidence. Searches of a home or a vehicle ordinarily require
officers to specify what they are looking for and their reasons for
believing that the suspect had those items in their home or in
their vehicle. A person who consents to a search gives up those
protections and subjects herself to a general search without
probable cause. Because a person in custody may not fully
appreciate the magnitude of what is at stake when authorizing
police to freely search a home or a vehicle, we require police to
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explicitly inform persons in custody of their rights under our
Constitution. Those concerns are not as strong when a search is
narrowly focused.
M.D., 108 N.E.3d at 306 (emphasis added).
[20] Because not all searches require Pirtle advisements, our courts have declined to
apply Pirtle to certain types of searches. See M.D., 108 N.E.3d at 307 (Pirtle
inapplicable to drug recognition exams); Garcia-Torres, 949 N.E.2d at 1239
(Pirtle inapplicable to buccal swabs); Wilkerson v. State, 933 N.E.2d 891, 894
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (Pirtle inapplicable to pat down search for weapons);
Datzek v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1149, 1158-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (Pirtle
inapplicable to chemical blood testing for blood alcohol content), trans. denied;
Schmidt v. State, 816 N.E.2d 925, 942-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (Pirtle inapplicable
to chemical breath tests), trans. denied; Ackerman, 774 N.E.2d 979-82 (Pirtle
inapplicable to field sobriety tests); but see Posso v. State, 180 N.E.3d 326, 336
(Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (applying Pirtle to search of cellphone).
[21] Here, Owens does not argue that the collection of the swabs violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. 3 Rather, Owens argues that, because he was not advised of
3
The State argued at trial that the collection of the swabs without a warrant did not violate Owens’ Fourth
Amendment rights because Owens’ treatment at the hospital could have destroyed the evidence; exigent
circumstances, thus, justified the search. Under the exigent circumstances doctrine, a search warrant is not
required “when exigent circumstances make law enforcement needs so compelling that a warrantless search
or seizure is objectively reasonable.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 (Ind. 2021); see Holder v. State, 847
N.E.2d 930, 938 (Ind. 2006) (“Possible imminent destruction of evidence is one exigent circumstance that
may justify a warrantless entry into a home if the fear on the part of the police that the evidence was
immediately about to be destroyed is objectively reasonable.”). Owens makes no argument that exigent
circumstances did not exist here.
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his right to counsel prior to law enforcement’s collection of the swabs, the
collection of the swabs constitutes a search in violation of his Pirtle rights under
the Indiana Constitution. Pirtle advisements are only necessary when the
defendant consents to a search while in custody, and it is not clear from the
record whether both of those circumstances coexist here. 4 Even if we assume
that Owens was in custody and consented to the collection of the swabs,
however, we hold that the collection of the swabs here was not the type of
search that triggers Pirtle protections.
[22] We find Garcia-Torres, 949 N.E.2d 1229, instructive. In that case, upon his
arrest, the defendant consented to a buccal swab without the advisement of his
Pirtle rights. Id. at 1231. Our Supreme Court held that the collection of the
buccal swab was not a search for which Pirtle advisements were required. Id. at
1238-39. The Court noted that the intrusion was “slight”; the swabbing
“caused no discomfort,” and the defendant had “virtually no legitimate interest
in concealing his identity following his lawful arrest.” Id. at 1239. The Court
analogized buccal swabs to “fingerprints and other identifying physical
4
The determination of whether a person is in custody is an “objective test” in which we ask whether
“reasonable persons under the same circumstances would believe they were in custody or free to leave.”
Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 601 (Ind. 2008). Here, several officers appear to have been present during
the collection of the swabs and, after Owens was treated, he was taken for a custodial interview. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that Owens was in custody. Even if Owens was in custody, however, Pirtle is
only applicable if Owens consented to the search. The State argues that there was no evidence that Owens
consented to the collection of the swabs here. Detective Rodgers initially testified that he did not “ask
[Owens] for consent to search,” Tr. Vol. II p. 53; however, he later testified that he “did ask [Owens] for a
swab,” id. at 56. Detective Rodgers did not mention whether Owens ultimately consented to law
enforcement’s collection of the swabs, and no further evidence was presented on this issue.
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information” which law enforcement are permitted to collect from lawfully
arrested persons. Id.
[23] The collection of the swabs here is essentially the same type of search as the
collection of the buccal swab in Garcia-Torres. In fact, the swabs here are
arguably less intrusive because they were collected from the surface of Owens’
hands and clothing rather than from within his oral cavity. Moreover, the
swabs here did not involve the type of “general search” of which Pirtle
protections are principally concerned. See M.D., 108 N.E.3d at 306. This was
not a search of a home or vehicle but was instead a limited search of the blood
on Owens’ hands and clothing for the purpose of determining whether Blount’s
DNA was present on Owens. Pirtle advisements were not required before the
swabs here were collected, and the trial court did not err by admitting the DNA
evidence obtained therefrom.
[24] Moreover, even if Pirtle advisements were required here, any error in admitting
the DNA evidence from the swabs of Owens’ hands and clothing was harmless.
Owens admitted during his interview with law enforcement that he fought
Blount with a bottle and a knife because he believed she and her friends were
“going after [his] family,” and he wanted to “kill everybody who got involved
with it.” State’s Ex. 32 at 22:50, 40:00. Blount identified Owens at the hospital
and in court as her assailant, and she testified regarding the injuries he inflicted
upon her. Additionally, the swabs of Owens’ hand and clothing were not the
only DNA evidence presented at trial; blood recovered from the crime scene
also indicated the presence of Owens’ DNA. Any error in the admission of the
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DNA evidence from the swabs of Owens’ hands and clothing was harmless.
See Torres v. State, 673 N.E.2d 472, 474-75 (Ind. 1996) (holding that, although
evidence should have been excluded due to law enforcement’s failure to give
Pirtle advisements prior to obtaining defendant’s consent to search, error in the
admission of the evidence was harmless based on witness testimony and DNA
evidence).
II. Sufficient evidence supports Owens’ conviction.
[25] Owens next argues that insufficient evidence supports his conviction. We
disagree. Sufficiency of evidence claims “warrant a deferential standard, in
which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Powell v.
State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020) (citing Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236,
1242 (Ind. 1994)). When there are conflicts in the evidence, the fact-finder must
resolve them. Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022). We consider
only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence. Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 262 (citing Brantley v. State, 91
N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). “We will affirm a conviction if there
is substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of
fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
at 263. We affirm the conviction “‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find
the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not
necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
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from it to support the verdict.’” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).
[26] Owens was convicted of attempted murder. A person who “knowingly or
intentionally kills another human being . . . commits murder, a felony.” Ind.
Code § 35-42-1-1(1). As for attempted murder, Indiana’s attempt statute
provides, in relevant part:
A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the
culpability required for commission of the crime, the person
engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward
commission of the crime. . . . [A]n attempt to commit murder is
a Level 1 felony.
Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1(a). The State must prove that the defendant specifically
intended to kill the victim in order for the defendant to be found guilty of
attempted murder. Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 11-12 (Ind. 2015).
[27] Owens argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that
he acted with the specific intent to kill Blount. “[I]ntent to kill may be inferred
from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or
serious injury.” Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 270-71 (Ind. 2020). Here,
Owens struck Blount at least thirteen times in the head, including with a glass
bottle. Using a small knife, he stabbed Blount’s face, chest, and abdomen,
causing Blount’s colon to protrude through her skin. Before leaving the house,
Owens “slit” Blount’s throat with the knife. Tr. Vol. II p. 14. Although Blount
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survived her injuries, she required intensive surgery and remained in the
hospital for approximately seven days.
[28] Owens recognizes that intent to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use of a
deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury; however,
Owens argues that this inference was “‘rebutted.’” Appellant’s Br. p. 15
(quoting Shutt v. State, 367 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (Ind. 1977) (“[M]alice may be
inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in such a manner as is
likely to cause death. . . . However, such inference may be rebutted.”). 5 Owens
argues that, although he entered the house with the bottle and knife, he “did not
attempt to obtain a more suitable instrument to inflict lethal force” and that
Blount did not suffer “great bodily injury.” Id. at 16. Blount’s injuries and the
horrible manner in which they were inflicted contradict Owens’ argument.
Sufficient evidence supports Owens’ conviction.
Conclusion
[29] The trial court did not err by admitting the challenged DNA evidence, and
sufficient evidence supports Owens’ conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.
[30] Affirmed.
5
More recent cases from our Supreme Court discussing the inference to be drawn from the use of a deadly
weapon no longer use this rebuttal language. See, e.g., Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 270-71 (“[I]ntent to kill may be
inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury.”);
Schuler v. State, 112 N.E.3d 180, 188 (Ind. 2018) (“Intent to kill may be inferred from the intentional use of a
deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury.”).
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[31] May, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Peyton M. Balasko
Kyle K. Dugger
Monroe County Public Defender Agency
Bloomington, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Samuel J. Dayton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
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