Casimir R Starsiak, Jr. v. Janette T Starsiak ( 2024 )

FILED
Nov 04 2024, 8:57 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Casimir R. Starsiak, Jr.,
and Diane L. Hahn,
Appellants-Plaintiffs,
v.
Janette T. Starsiak,
Appellee-Defendant.
November 4, 2024
Court of Appeals Case No.
24A-PL-724
Appeal from the
Marion Circuit Court
The Honorable
Amber Collins-Gebrehiwet, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49C01-2310-PL-40136
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 1 of 14
Opinion by Senior Judge Shepard
Judges May and Crone concur.
Shepard, Senior Judge.
[1] Casimir R. Starsiak, Jr. (Casimir) and Diane L. Hahn (Diane) appeal from the
trial court’s order denying their motion to correct error. They asked the court
for permission to amend their complaint to add a count seeking relief under the
Declaratory Judgment Act and to amend their statutory claim to quiet title to
include a common law claim to quiet title in personal property. Casimir and
Diane now contend the trial court erred by denying their motion. Additionally,
they challenge the merits of the court’s underlying judgment, in which the court
held there is no statutory right in Indiana to quiet title to personal property and
that the probate court had already determined the ownership of the personal
property.
[2] We do not question that Casimir and Diane hold a bona fide belief that they
have a claim to the seemingly abandoned one-third share of their mother’s
estate. Based upon the record before us, however, they have no present claim
to their sister’s share and their request for relief is premature and based on
speculation. Thus, for reasons we explain below, we affirm the trial court’s
decision.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 2 of 14
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Mildred Starsiak died intestate on February 9, 2010. Mildred had three
surviving children, Casimir, Diane, and Janette Starsiak (Janette). Prior to
Mildred’s death, she held title to certain property. Casimir and Diane were
appointed co-personal representatives of Mildred’s estate. Casimir and Diane
each claimed their one-third share of Mildred’s estate as her surviving issue. See
Ind. Code § 29-1-2-1(d)(1) (2009). Janette, however, did not claim her one-third
share.
[4] On three separate occasions between May 2011 and November 2011, Casimir
and Diane, as personal representatives of the estate, sent a check by certified
mail to Janette in the amount of her share of the estate. Janette signed for all
three certified letters but she did not negotiate the checks. Casimir and Diane’s
counsel sent a letter to Janette advising her that her share would be deposited
with the clerk of the probate court if she did not claim it by September 12, 2011.
Janette signed for the certified letter, but did not claim her share.
[5] Casimir and Diane filed a motion on December 9, 2011, to pay the proceeds of
the unclaimed estate assets to the clerk of the court per Indiana Code section
29-1-17-12(b) (2008). In that motion, they conceded that this statute was
inapplicable here inasmuch as it applies to situations involving the inability to
locate an heir, distributee, or advisee. Here, Janette could be found but was not
cooperating. And the estate had remained open solely because Janette’s share
had not been distributed. The probate court issued its order granting the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 3 of 14
motion the same day. A subsequent motion led to a probate court order
providing that the proceeds be placed in an interest-bearing account. Mildred’s
estate was closed on January 31, 2012.
[6] Janette’s share of Mildred’s estate remains in the account and as of October 16,
2017, had grown to $231,665.97.
[7] Eleven years later, on May 10, 2023, Casimir and Diane attempted to reopen
Mildred’s estate to address Janette’s unclaimed share. They requested to be
named co-personal representatives to equally distribute between them Janette’s
share held by the probate court clerk in the interest-bearing account. On May
12, 2023, the probate court issued an order declining to reopen the estate. Next,
Casimir and Diane filed a motion to correct error from the probate court’s
order. The probate court denied the motion to correct error on September 8,
2023, concluding, “After a hearing, the Court finds that the estate was closed
eleven years ago and the property was divided. The court does not find good
cause to reopen the estate. The court does not find [Janette] to be an absentee
1
individual. The property will remain where it is until claimed by owner or her
death.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 22. Casimir and Diane did not appeal the
probate court’s order.
1
Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(2)(c), we may judicially notice the existence of records of a court of
this state. Casimir and Diane’s motion to reopen Mildred’s estate in Cause Number 49D08-1007-ES-31567,
sought to have Janette declared an absentee person under Indiana Code section 29-2-5-1 (2003) (five years
absence; presumption of death). In the motion, Casimir and Diane conceded that Janette was alive and they
provided an address for her in Illinois.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 4 of 14
[8] On October 12, 2023, Casimir and Diane filed a “Complaint To Quiet Title”
against Janette, any successors, assigns, and any other person claiming a right,
title, or interest in the property in a different court. Id. at 6. Their attorney
attached an affidavit as required by Indiana Code section 32-30-3-14(e) (2002),
for quieting title in real estate. They obtained service of process on Janette, but
she did not appear or file a responsive pleading. Casimir and Diane then filed
an application for a default judgment and moved for a quiet title decree.
[9] The Court held a hearing at which Janette did not appear. Casimir and Diane
argued that they had a right to quiet title to the unclaimed assets in equity under
common law. The trial court took the matter under advisement and requested
the submission of additional authority. Casimir and Diane filed a report with
the court, citing cases they believed supported their common law right to quiet
title to the personal property, in addition to citing to Indiana’s Declaratory
Judgment Act, which they claimed afforded them similar relief.
[10] On February 27, 2024, the court denied the motion to quiet title, concluding
that: (1) quiet title actions are controlled by Indiana Code section 32-30-3, et
seq.; (2) the quiet title statute applies to real property; (3) there is no statute
permitting actions to quiet title in personal property; (4) the case cited by
Casimir and Diane, Citizens National Bank v. State, 101 N.E. 620 (Ind. 1913), did
not quiet title to personal property, but held that the relatrix was always the
rightful owner of stock in question; (5) the probate court in 49D08-1007-ES-
31567 already determined that Casimir and Diane are not the rightful owners of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 5 of 14
the money; and (6) the quiet title statute would not be extended to personal
property. Appellants’ App. Vol. II, pp. 75-78 (emphasis added).
[11] Casimir and Diane filed a motion to correct error, requesting permission to
amend their complaint to add a count for declaratory relief under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, and tendered an amended complaint alleging the
same. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Casimir and Diane
“have not provided the Court a valid reason to set aside the original judgment
Denying the Motion to Quiet Title under Indiana Trial Rule 59 or 60. There is
no newly discovered evidence. [Casimir and Diane] have not alleged a legal
mistake. Thus, the Court denies [Casimir and Diane’s’] Motion to Amend the
original complaint, post judgment.” Id. at 94.
Discussion and Decision
[12] We observe at the outset that Janette has not filed a responsive brief. “Where
an appellee fails to file a brief, we do not undertake to develop arguments on
that party’s behalf; rather, we may reverse upon a prima facie showing of
reversible error by the appellant.” Ayers v. Stowers, 200 N.E.3d 480, 483 (Ind Ct.
App. 2022). “Prima facie error is error ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on
the face of it.’” Id. (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758
(Ind. 2014)). “This ‘prima facie error rule’ relieves this Court from the burden
of controverting arguments advanced for reversal, a duty which remains with
the appellee.” Ayers, 200 N.E.3d at 483.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 6 of 14
I. Propriety of Denial of Quiet Title to Personal Property
[13] Casimir and Diane argue that the trial court erred in denying their complaint
because “the trial court erroneously concluded there is no common law right to
quiet title to personal property in Indiana.” Appellants’ Br. p. 6. The court
concluded as follows:
20. Thus, the Quiet Title statute in Indiana applies specifically to
real property.
21. There is no statute in Indiana that permits actions to Quiet
Title for personal property.
Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 77. This is a correct statement of law. See I.C. 32-
30-3-1. There is no statute providing for an action to quiet title to personal
property.
[14] However, the substance of Casimir and Diane’s challenge concerns the court’s
implicit conclusion that there is no equitable action to quiet title in Indiana.
The court’s order along those lines stated the following:
22. Plaintiffs cite Citizens National Bank vs. State[, 101 N.E. 620(Ind. 1913)] to support their theory that quiet title actions can
apply to personal property.
23. However, in Citizens, the action was never purposed to be
brought under Indiana Code Section 32-30-3.
24. That case did not involve an action to quiet title to the stock,
the Court in that case ruled that the relatrix was always the
rightful owner of the stock.
Appellants’ App. Vol, II, p. 77.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 7 of 14
[15] Although the trial court correctly found that the action in Citizens (a 1913
decision) was not brought under the quiet title statute (which was not enacted
until many decades later), the claim in Citizens was an equitable action to
determine the ownership of shares of stock. In that case, the trial court had
concluded that the relatrix was the owner of the stock in question and it granted
the equitable remedy of mandate, commanding the bank to recognize her as the
owner of the stock in question. 101 N.E. at 623. On appeal, the Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court and, relying on cases from other jurisdictions,
found that the complaint “stated a good cause of action.” Id. at 626. And in
Whitman v. Whitman, 83 N.E. 520, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 1908), a “quiet title
action” was brought to determine whether the wife’s share under the will was
calculated before or after the payment of debts. The court interpreted the
language of the will and concluded that the wife’s share was to be paid
immediately and that the other legatees’ shares would be reduced by the
payment of their proportionate share of the debts. Id.[16] Furthermore, Trial Rule 75(A)(2), addresses preferred venue in the county
where the land is located or the chattels are regularly located or kept. “‘Chattel’
is defined as ‘[m]ovable or transferable property; personal property; esp[ecially], a
physical object capable of manual delivery and not the subject matter of real
property.’” Belcher v. Kroczek, 13 N.E.3d 448, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting
R & D Transp., Inc. v. A.H., 859 N.E.2d 332, 333 n.1 (Ind. 2006) (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (8th ed. 2004)) (emphasis added). And in
ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Residential Servs., LLC, 845 N.E.2d 209, 215
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 8 of 14
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006), a case involving an action to quiet title in real estate, we
observed that “longstanding common law predating the quiet title statute
provides an independent equitable basis for quieting title.” “The quiet title
statute supplements, but does not replace, the common law basis for quieting
title.” Id.[17] We conclude that a common law action to quiet title to personal property is a
viable cause of action in Indiana and that the enactment of the statutory
provision concerning quieting title to real estate did not eliminate such claims.
Therefore, to the extent the trial court appears to have implicitly said otherwise,
it erred.
[18] That said, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment if there is any legal ground
in the record supporting the judgment. See In re B.J.N., 19 N.E.3d 765, 770
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014). And the trial court also concluded that “the probate
Court in 49D08-1007-ES-031567 has already ruled that Plaintiffs are not the
rightful and/or legal owners of the money at issue.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, p.
78. The court further said, “Thus, this Court declines to extend the reach of the
quiet title statute to award Plaintiffs personal property, in this instance money,
that a prior Court has already ruled Plaintiffs are not legally entitled to.” Id.[19] The trial court was alluding to claim preclusion. “[C]laim preclusion[]applies
where a final judgment on the merits has been rendered and acts as a complete
bar to a subsequent action on the same issue or claim between those parties and
their privies.” Freels v. Koches, 94 N.E.3d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 9 of 14
Angelopoulos v. Angelopoulos, 2 N.E.3d 688, 696 (Ind. Ct. App, 2013), trans.
denied). “When claim preclusion applies, all matters that were or might have
been litigated are deemed conclusively decided by the judgment in the prior
action.” Id. “The following four requirements must be satisfied for claim
preclusion to apply as a bar to a subsequent action: (1) the former judgment
must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former
judgment must have been rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now in issue
was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy
adjudicated in the former action must have been between the parties to the
present suit or their privies.” Id.[20] Casimir’s, Diane’s, and Janette’s interests in Mildred’s intestate estate were
determined by statute. Each was entitled to a one-third share of Mildred’s
estate through intestate succession. Casimir and Diane fulfilled their fiduciary
duties to Janette as personal representatives by requesting an order to have
Janette’s share placed in an interest-bearing account due to her failure to claim
her share. Thus, ownership of Janette’s share was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the judgment determined ownership of Janette’s share
of the estate per the laws of intestate succession, and Casimir and Diane
proposed that Janette’s share be placed in an interest-bearing account in order
to close Mildred’s estate. Although Janette never appeared in this or the prior
action, the division of Mildred’s estate and the rights of her heirs were
determined in the prior action.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 10 of 14
[21] Casimir and Diane’s concerns about Janette’s share escheating to the State
should she continue to allow her share to be unclaimed are speculative and
premature. There is no evidence in the record to indicate conclusively whether
Janette has a spouse, has children, or has a will. And assuming she has none of
those, she nonetheless has heirs. Under the laws of intestate succession, should
Janette predecease Casimir and Diane, they are her heirs. And should either
Casimir or Diane predecease Janette, their heirs would be Janette’s heirs. This
illustrates that Casimir and Diane do not have a present interest in Janette’s
share and that their arguments are speculative and premature.
[22] Therefore, we conclude the trial court correctly denied Casimir and Diane’s
motion to quiet title in Janette’s share of Mildred’s estate.
II. Motion To Correct Error
[23] Casimir and Diane also appeal from the court’s order denying their motion to
correct error. “Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct error is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d
1236, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial
court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. “However,
where the issues raised in the motion are questions of law, the standard of
review is de novo.” Id.[24] Casimir and Diane’s motion to correct error requested permission to amend
their quiet title complaint to add a count seeking declaratory relief and to
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 11 of 14
amend the statutory quiet title count to include additional language seeking
equitable relief under common law to quiet title to the personal property. Their
motion acknowledged that the court’s order denying their motion to quiet title
under statutory law was a “final judgment” and explicitly stated that they filed
“their Motion to Correct Error for the purpose of amending their Complaint[.]”
Appellants’ App. Vol. II, pp. 79, 80.
[25] After the court entered its judgment denying their complaint to quiet title under
statutory law, Casimir and Diane cited Indiana Trial Rule 15(A), requesting
that they be allowed to amend their complaint. Rule 15(A) provides as follows:
(A) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading
is permitted, and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within thirty [30] days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and
leave shall be given when justice so requires. A party shall plead
in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining
for response to the original pleading or within twenty [20] days
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
They also cited cases holding that trial courts have broad discretion in allowing
parties to amend their pleadings, and contended that they have not
demonstrated factors trial courts consider when determining whether to grant
the request, such as undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure
to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 12 of 14
opposing party, or futility of the amendment. See In re Estate of Hurwich, 103
N.E.3d 1135, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (“The probate court has broad
discretion in granting or denying amendments to the pleadings[.]”); Palacios v.
Kline, 566 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“The substance of the abuse of
discretion analysis concerning proposed amendments is an evaluation of a
number of factors. These include undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on
the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiency by amendment
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the
amendment, and futility of the amendment.”).
[26] In this situation, however, Casimir and Diane filed their motion to amend their
pleading after final judgment was entered. We have held under principles of
finality of judgments that “‘a plaintiff may not seek to amend his complaint
after judgment unless he first has that judgment vacated or set aside under
either T.R. 59 or T.R. 60.’” Leeper Elec. Servs., Inc. v. City of Carmel, 847 N.E.2d
227, 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Jackson v. Russell, 491 N.E.2d 1017, 1020
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986)), trans. denied. In Leeper, we quoted the Seventh Circuit’s
view on that issue: “There isn’t anything left to amend. The judgment was
entered. You lost. So, if that was incorrect, then you have to change that, but
there’s nothing pending to amend.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Levy Organization
Dev. Co., Inc., 789 F.2d 601, 611 (7th Cir. 1986)).
[27] Here, Casimir and Diane filed their request to amend their pleadings in a
motion to correct error which did not allege legal error on the trial court’s part.
However, such was necessary to attempt to vacate the judgment and allow for
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 13 of 14
an amendment to their complaint. Thus, because the judgment stands, there is
nothing to amend.
[28] The trial court correctly denied the motion to correct error and stated that
Casimir and Diane “have not provided the Court [with] a valid reason to set
aside the original judgment Denying the Motion to Quiet Title under Indiana
Trial Rule 59 or 60. There is no newly discovered evidence. Plaintiffs have not
alleged a legal mistake.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 79. Consequently, we
find no error here.
Conclusion
[29] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The issue of the
legal ownership of Janette’s share of Mildred’s estate has already been
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. And the motion to correct
error was correctly denied because it sought relief which was unavailable after
final judgment and alleged no legal error.
[30] Affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
J. Alex Bruggenschmidt
Buchanan & Bruggenschmidt, P.C.
Zionsville, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-PL-724 | November 4, 2024 Page 14 of 14