In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship, S.K., Minor Child, T.K., Father v. Indiana Department of Child Services ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                                                                             FILED
    Dec 23 2019, 8:52 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Katharine Vanost Jones                                     Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Evansville, Indiana                                        Attorney General of Indiana
    David E. Corey
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Termination                           December 23, 2019
    of the Parent-Child Relationship,                          Court of Appeals Case No.
    S.K., Minor Child,                                         19A-JT-1797
    T.K., Father,                                              Appeal from the Vanderburgh
    Superior Court
    Appellant-Respondent,
    The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier,
    v.                                                 Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    Indiana Department of Child                                82D04-1811-JT-2170
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Brown, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019                           Page 1 of 12
    [1]   T.K. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his
    child, S.K. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Father is the biological father of S.K., born on June 30, 2004. (Exs. I 53) On
    June 17, 2016, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a
    petition alleging S.K. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). An entry
    dated June 21, 2016, in the chronological case summary (“CCS”) indicates that
    the court held a hearing, Father informed the court that S.K. was subject to the
    Jay Treaty 1 and that S.K.’s mother was Canadian, DCS indicated that it had
    not found the child or mother listed as Native American, and the court issued a
    detention order. 2 A CCS entry dated July 6, 2016, states that DCS determined
    that mother, while being a member of an Indian tribe in Canada, is not covered
    by the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”). A CCS entry dated April 26,
    2017, states that Father indicated that he retained counsel and planned on suing
    DCS in federal court because DCS never contacted the tribe of which the child
    was a member. In May 2017, DCS filed for termination of Father’s parental
    rights, but the matter was dismissed due to exceeding statutory timelines.
    1
    The Jay Treaty of 1794, officially titled the Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation between His
    Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, contains twenty-eight numbered articles and addressed
    British military posts located in America’s northwest territory and British interference with American trade
    and shipping. Father does not cite to the Jay Treaty on appeal.
    2
    S.K.’s mother is deceased.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019                            Page 2 of 12
    [3]   In February 2018, DCS filed a petition for termination of the parent-child
    relationship. A CCS entry dated March 14, 2018, indicates that the court held a
    hearing, Father’s counsel stated that S.K. was registered with “an Indian tribe
    out of Canada,” and “DCS says they have checked on this and the tribe is not
    federally recognized.” Exhibits Volume I at 227.
    [4]   At a hearing on September 20, 2018, Father’s counsel stated that S.K. was a
    registered member of a tribe “out of Canada” and that Father believed that “the
    tribal number of 189, which is on her Indian status card out of Canada,
    corresponds with the U.S. Federal tribe, therefore, making recognition of her as
    an Indian child as described and covered by the Indian Child Welfare Act”
    applicable. Id. at 47-48. The court admitted a document from the “Indigenous
    and Northern Affairs Canada,” titled “Temporary Confirmation of Registration
    Document,” which confirmed that S.K. was registered as an Indian under the
    Indian Act as of March 19, 2010, with the registration number 1890152601.
    Appellee’s Appendix Volume II at 2. DCS’s counsel stated that DCS did not
    dispute that S.K. was a registered member of a Canadian tribe, but asserted that
    the tribe was not federally recognized by the United States of America and that
    the ICWA did not apply. DCS’s counsel also referenced a letter from the
    United States Department of the Interior. In that letter dated March 19, 2018,
    the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the United States Department of the Interior
    acknowledged the official notice received by the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
    Eastern Region, by DCS with regard to S.K., a child who DCS believed may be
    covered by the ICWA. The letter states in part:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019   Page 3 of 12
    It appears you are trying to establish membership in a tribe for
    the child as you have reason to believe the child has Lac Des
    Mille First Nation of Canada heritage.
    The Lac Des Mille First Nation of Canada is not listed as a
    federally recognized tribe. The federal ICWA applies only if the
    Tribe is a federally recognized tribe.
    DCS Exhibit A. The termination cause was dismissed due to exceeding
    statutory timelines.
    [5]   On November 29, 2018, DCS filed a verified petition for involuntary
    termination of the parent-child relationship asserting that the court had
    jurisdiction under “I.C. 31-30-1-1, 31-21-5-1, 31-35-2-3, et al.” Appellant’s
    Appendix Volume II at 26.
    [6]   On December 3, 2018, Father filed a motion to dismiss alleging that S.K. was a
    member of a Canadian recognized tribe and that the Jay Treaty of 1794 and the
    ICWA applied. He asserted that he previously notified DCS and that DCS
    “informed the court that they were aware but that the children’s tribe was not a
    U.S. recognized tribe.” Id. at 32. He asserted that S.K. was a “registered
    member of the Lac Des Mille Lacs Canadian Tribe” which “is recognized
    through the Objawie and/or Chippewa native tribes in both the U.S. and
    Canada,” and that “[t]his tribe is also known as Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe or
    Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians with its homeland being Mille Lac
    Indian reservation in Minnesota.” Id. He also asserted that DCS stated on July
    6, 2016, that the tribe was Canadian and not federally recognized, that there
    was no record filed that DCS served notice upon the appropriate tribe within
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019       Page 4 of 12
    the CHINS case, that DCS sent a notice to Nashville, Tennessee, “to the
    Eastern Bureau of Indian Affairs, not the appropriate region for the tribe,” that
    he and S.K. constitute an Indian family pursuant to the ICWA and Indiana
    law, and that jurisdiction must be transferred to the tribal court pursuant to §
    1911(b) of the ICWA. Id. at 33. Father also asserted that, if the ICWA applies
    but the case remains in the court, then the burden of proof must be “beyond a
    reasonable doubt” in order to terminate a parent’s rights under the ICWA. Id.
    at 34.
    [7]   On February 25, 2019, the court held a hearing. Father’s counsel indicated that
    Father was not present and requested a continuance. DCS’s counsel objected
    to a continuance and asserted that the court previously ordered Father to be
    present, the case manager discussed the court dates with Father, called the local
    hospitals, checked with the local jail, and attempted to call Father at the last
    known phone numbers. The court ordered that Father was “defaulted.”
    Transcript Volume II at 5.
    [8]   DCS presented the testimony of Elizabeth Greenwell, the probation officer with
    Vanderburgh County Adult Felony Probation, court appointed special advocate
    Deborah Gamache (“CASA Gamache”), and family case manager Paula
    Wilson (“FCM Wilson”). DCS’s counsel then addressed Father’s motion to
    dismiss and asserted that the Department of the Interior Legal Affairs informed
    DCS that the tribe to which S.K. belongs was not federally recognized and that
    DCS submitted proof of this to the court in the prior matters. The court asked
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019     Page 5 of 12
    Father’s counsel if she had anything else, and she stated “No.” Id. at 24. The
    court denied the motion to dismiss.
    [9]    On February 27, 2019, Father’s counsel filed a motion to reconsider asserting
    that “Father’s friend contacted counsel and the Court today’s date to inform of
    being in-patient in Brentwood Meadows,” and that Father “requests the Court
    re-open the case to allow Father to be present for the presentation of evidence.”
    Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 35. A CCS entry dated March 22, 2019,
    provides that the court granted Father’s motion to reconsider, set aside Father’s
    default, and ordered the parties to appear on April 9, 2019. On April 9, 2019,
    Father appeared in custody by video, and the court scheduled a factfinding
    hearing for May 20, 2019.
    [10]   On May 20, 2019, the court continued the hearing. Father’s counsel indicated
    that Father was not present, noted that there were two active warrants for
    Father, and requested a continuance. DCS’s counsel objected to a continuance.
    The court stated that there did not appear to be a valid reason for Father’s
    absence and denied the motion for a continuance. DCS presented the
    testimony of FCM Wilson and CASA Gamache.
    [11]   On July 8, 2019, the court terminated Father’s parental rights to S.K. The
    court’s order states in part:
    INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT (ICWA)
    1. Father maintained throughout the CHINS case as well as the
    case herein that the child was a member of a registered Indian
    tribe and as such, DCS was required to comply with ICWA.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019    Page 6 of 12
    2. The evidence established that the child is a member of a
    Canadian Tribe, Lac Des Mille Lacs. The evidence was
    uncontroverted that the Tribe is recognized in Canada, but is not
    registered or recognized by the government of the United States.
    3. DCS made contact with relative members of the tribe, the
    child’s grandparents, seeking whether the grandparents would be
    willing to have placement of the child with them. The
    grandparents were unwilling to take placement, especially if the
    child did not want to move to Canada.
    Id. at 21. In a nineteen-page order, the court detailed Father’s incarceration,
    substance abuse, unsuitable housing, instability, criminal involvements, and
    failure to comply with services. The court concluded there was a reasonable
    probability that the conditions which resulted in S.K.’s removal and continued
    placement outside the home would not be remedied and that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to S.K.’s well-being, termination
    of the parental rights was in S.K.’s best interests, and there was a satisfactory
    plan for the care and treatment of the child.
    Discussion
    [12]   Father argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the ICWA. He
    asserts that “[t]he Lac Des Mille Lacs, also known as Mille Lacs Band of
    Ojibwe and Mille Lacs Band of the Chippewa Nation, is part of the Chippewa
    Nation whose homeland is in Minnesota.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. He
    contends that DCS failed to send notice to the Minnesota Chippewa Nation or
    the Minnesota Office of the Midwest Region of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
    Without citation to the record, he asserts that DCS was “presented with case
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019      Page 7 of 12
    law and tribal documentation identifying S.K.’s First Nations identity.” Id. at
    20. He also argues that the trial court erroneously applied the “clear and
    convincing evidence” standard instead of the more restrictive “beyond a
    reasonable doubt” standard required by the ICWA. Id. at 21.
    [13]   DCS argues that S.K. was not an Indian child for purposes of the ICWA and
    that the trial court therefore had jurisdiction to hear the matter and was not
    required to follow the ICWA’s requirements. It contends that Father failed to
    prove that the Minnesota tribe is the same as S.K.’s Canadian tribe. It argues
    that Father waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because he
    does not challenge any of the court’s findings or conclusions.
    [14]   “The ICWA is structured around the concern that ‘an alarmingly high
    percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted,
    of their children from them by nontribal public and private agencies[.]’” In re
    S.L.H.S., 
    885 N.E.2d 603
    , 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting In re T.R.M., 
    525 N.E.2d 298
    , 302 (Ind. 1988) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4)), reh’g denied, cert.
    denied, 
    490 U.S. 1069
    , 
    109 S. Ct. 2072
     (1989)). In passing the ICWA, Congress
    declared that the policy of this Nation is:
    [T]o protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote
    the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the
    establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of
    Indian children from their families and the placement of such
    children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique
    values of Indian culture . . . .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019     Page 8 of 12
    Thus, the power of state courts to conduct termination proceedings involving
    children of Indian ancestry may be subject to significant limitations under the
    ICWA. In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d at 612 (citing In re T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d at
    301).
    [15]   “Although a court, after a proper petition for transfer of the proceeding, is
    required to transfer to an Indian tribe’s jurisdiction any proceeding to terminate
    the parental rights of an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the
    reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b),[ 3] availability of
    this right to transfer is contingent on the applicability of the ICWA to the
    3
    25 U.S.C.A. § 1911 provides:
    (a) Exclusive jurisdiction
    An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody
    proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation
    of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing
    Federal law. Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall
    retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.
    (b) Transfer of proceedings; declination by tribal court
    In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental
    rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian
    child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such
    proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the
    petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child’s tribe: Provided, That
    such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.
    (c) State court proceedings; intervention
    In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental
    rights to, an Indian child, the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child’s tribe
    shall have a right to intervene at any point in the proceeding.
    (d) Full faith and credit to public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of Indian tribes
    The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States, and
    every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial
    proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the
    same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and
    judicial proceedings of any other entity.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019                                     Page 9 of 12
    proceeding sought to be transferred.” In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d at 612. “Thus,
    the party who seeks to invoke a provision of the ICWA has the burden to show
    that the act applies in the proceeding.” Id. (citing In re J.L.M., 
    234 Neb. 381
    ,
    
    451 N.W.2d 377
    , 387 (1990)).
    [16]   “Applicability of the ICWA depends on whether the proceedings to be
    transferred involve an ‘Indian child’ within the definition utilized in 25 U.S.C. §
    1903(4).” Id. at 612-613. Under the ICWA, an “Indian child” is defined as
    “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of
    an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
    biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C.A. 1903(4). An
    “Indian tribe” is defined as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized
    group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided
    to Indians by the Secretary because of their status as Indians, including any
    Alaska Native village as defined in section 1602(c) of Title 43.” 25 U.S.C.A
    1903(8).
    [17]   To the extent Father asserts that the Lac Des Mille Lacs tribe was “also known
    as Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe and Mille Lacs Band of the Chippewa Nation”
    and “is part of the Chippewa Nation whose homeland is in Minnesota,”
    Appellant’s Brief at 13, we note that he cites to page 222 of the Exhibits, which
    does not appear to support this statement. Rather, it contains a CCS entry
    dated June 21, 2016, which states in part: “Father states that child is subject to
    the Jay Treaty. DCS says they have not found child or mother listed as Native
    American. Father says mother was Canadian.” Exhibits Volume I at 222. He
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019    Page 10 of 12
    cites United States v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians, 
    229 U.S. 498
    , 
    33 S. Ct. 811
     (1913), which observed that the Mille Lac band was one of the Mississippi
    bands of Chippewas, but did not mention the Lac Des Mille Lacs tribe or
    Canada. 229 U.S. at 500, 33 S. Ct. at 812. He also cites
    www.mnchippewatribe.org, a website with a homepage which states that “[t]he
    Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, comprised of the Bois Forte, Fond du Lac, Grand
    Portage, Leech Lake, Mille Lacs, and White Earth reservations, is a federally
    recognized tribal government,” but does not mention the Lac Des Mille Lacs
    tribe. See www.mnchippewatribe.org (last visited December 12, 2019). While
    Father asserts that his counsel previously informed the court that S.K.’s tribal
    number corresponded with a federally recognized tribe, he does not point to the
    record or authority to support this proposition.
    [18]   The record reveals that DCS contacted the tribe in Canada after Father
    indicated that S.K.’s tribe was in Canada. The record also contains a letter
    dated March 19, 2018, from the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the United States
    Department of the Interior acknowledging the official notice received by the
    Bureau of Indian Affairs, Eastern Region, by DCS with regard to S.K. and a
    child who DCS initially believed may be covered by the ICWA. The letter
    states in part that “[t]he Lac Des Mille First Nation of Canada is not listed as a
    federally recognized tribe” and “[t]he federal ICWA applies only if the Tribe is
    a federally recognized tribe.” DCS Exhibit A. We also note that the Lac Des
    Mille Lacs tribe does not appear on the list of Indian entities recognized and
    eligible to receive services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs. See
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019     Page 11 of 12
    83 FR 4235-02. Based upon the record, we cannot say that Father has
    demonstrated that S.K. is an Indian child as defined by the ICWA or that the
    ICWA applies. See In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d at 614 (“Based on the foregoing,
    we conclude that Father failed to show that S.L.H.S. was an Indian child
    pursuant to the ICWA. Consequently, the ICWA does not apply to the
    underlying proceeding to terminate Father’s paternal rights to S.L.H.S., and the
    trial court properly determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the case.”).
    [19]   To the extent Father does not challenge certain findings of fact, the
    unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 
    875 N.E.2d 369
    , 373 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver
    of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied. Father
    does not challenge the trial court’s conclusions that there was a reasonable
    probability that the conditions which resulted in S.K.’s removal and continued
    placement outside the home would not be remedied and that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to S.K.’s well-being, that
    termination of the parental rights was in S.K.’s best interests, and that there was
    a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
    [20]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    [21]   Affirmed.
    Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JT-1797 | December 23, 2019     Page 12 of 12