McClain Museum, Inc. v. Madison County Assessor ( 2019 )


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  • ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER:                           ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
    JONATHON T. COOK                                   CURTIS T. HILL, JR.
    SANSBERRY DICKMANN BUILTA & COOK                   ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
    Anderson, IN                                       REBECCA L. McCLAIN
    WINSTON LIN
    ALEKSANDRINA P. PRATT
    DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL
    Indianapolis, IN
    IN THE                                          FILED
    Nov 07 2019, 4:07 pm
    INDIANA TAX COURT                                     CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    )
    MCCLAIN MUSEUM, INC.,                             )
    )
    Petitioner,                                )
    )
    v.                          ) Cause No. 18T-TA-00001
    )
    MADISON COUNTY ASSESSOR,                          )
    )
    Respondent.                                )
    ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DETERMINATION OF
    THE INDIANA BOARD OF TAX REVIEW
    FOR PUBLICATION
    November 7, 2019
    WENTWORTH, J.
    McClain Museum, Inc. challenges the final determination of the Indiana Board of
    Tax Review holding that its real property did not qualify for either the educational purposes
    exemption or the charitable purposes exemption for the 2014 tax year. Upon review, the
    Court affirms in part and reverses in part the Indiana Board’s final determination.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The McClain Museum, located in Anderson, Indiana, exhibits military equipment
    that was used by the United States’ armed forces in various conflicts ranging from World
    War I through Desert Storm. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 98, 102, 151-64, 191-257,
    1054-55, 1404-13.) Founded in 1989 by Joseph McClain, a local Vietnam War veteran,
    the Museum was established as an Indiana not-for-profit corporation and granted an
    exemption from federal income taxation pursuant to IRC § 501(c)(3). (See Cert. Admin.
    R. at 99, 118-19, 1044, 1092.) The Museum’s purpose, as stated in its Bylaws, is:
    (1) To acquire and conserve motorized and non-motorized vehicles
    and equipment for historical preservation.
    (2) To exhibit the collection of vehicles and equipment for purpose of
    educating visiting public.
    (3) To collect, restore and exhibit military armored equipment.
    (4) To conduct research in the area of motorized and non-motorized
    vehicles and equipment and collect information for future preservation.
    (5) To acquire, rebuild, and rent vehicles and equipment for public
    use and display.
    (6) Establish a facility for display of vehicles and equipment.
    (7) To acquire and conserve historical items of Madison County’s
    industrial and manufacturing history for an in-house, outreach and
    traveling exhibits.
    (8) To use the historical collection to educate and preserve Madison
    County’s natural and cultural history and technological
    accomplishments.
    (9) To use the collection for scholarly research.
    (10) Solely in furtherance of the aforesaid purposes to transact any
    and all lawful business for which a not-for-profit corporation may be
    incorporated under the Indiana Business Corporation Law, provided
    such business is not inconsistent with the corporation being organized
    and operated exclusively for charitable, educational, vocational and
    scientific purposes.
    (Cert. Admin. R. at 102.) The Museum is recognized by the United States Army as a
    historical preservation site for military equipment. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 135, 1066-74.)
    The Museum’s property consists of two buildings and a parking lot situated on
    approximately 18 acres of partially wooded land. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 150-90,
    2
    699-700.) The larger of the two buildings, at approximately 88,600 square feet, is divided
    into several discrete sections:
    (1) an exhibition area and library where retired military tanks, vehicles,
    equipment, artillery-related items, uniforms, photographs, manuals
    and books are displayed for public viewing;1
    (2) a restoration area where military vehicles are serviced, repaired
    and maintained;
    (3) a storage area where exhibit items and excess vehicle parts are
    housed when not on display or in use;
    (4) a reception/meeting hall known as the “Officer’s Club.”
    (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 150, 191-340, 1124-28, 1198-99, 1315-19.) (See also
    generally Cert. Admin. R. at 1194-1233 (testimony describing the approximately 200
    photographs of the subject property).) The smaller building, at approximately 5,400
    square feet, is used entirely for military vehicle storage. (Cert. Admin. R. at 150.) (See
    also Oral Arg. Tr. at 3.)
    During the year at issue, the Museum was open to the general public Wednesday
    through Friday from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 567, 662-63.) Nevertheless,
    the Museum was open upon request and guided tours were available by appointment.
    (See Cert. Admin. R. at 567, 662-63, 1093-94, 1375.) Guided tours were conducted for
    various veterans groups, school groups, scouting groups, police groups, and groups
    interested in military communications. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 567, 1370-77.) With
    1
    McClain loaned several rebuilt tanks and retired military vehicles from his own personal
    collection to the Museum when it first opened. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1100-03.) In 2014,
    however, all but one of the military vehicles exhibited at the Museum were on loan from either the
    federal government or other individuals’ private collections. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 143-
    49, 1065-67, 1164-65.) Uniforms and other military-related mementos and paraphernalia were
    typically on loan to the Museum from the private collections of local individuals. (See Cert. Admin.
    R. at 1079.)
    3
    volunteer participation, the Museum also performs military reenactments for the public
    using some of its equipment and vehicles. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1381-83.)
    To make it economically accessible to all, the Museum did not charge admission
    fees during the year at issue; it did, however, accept donations.2 (Cert. Admin. R. at 1057,
    1078, 1080.) (But see Cert. Admin. R. at 1388-89 (indicating that while the Museum
    sought a small admission fee for scheduled guided tours, it nonetheless waived the fee
    for those who could not afford to pay).) To defray some of its operating costs,3 the
    Museum rented out a portion of its storage area (comprising approximately 9% of the
    larger building’s total square footage) to individuals to store their boats. (See, e.g., Cert.
    Admin. R. at 150, 341-68, 1033, 1095-97, 1181-88, 1190-93, 1282-83.) Moreover, the
    Museum rented out the Officer’s Club for social events like wedding receptions and
    parties, as well as to Yellowbook Inc. to store its Yellow Pages books. (See, e.g., Cert.
    Admin. R. at 150, 369-448, 1033, 1193-94, 1238-41, 1245-51, 1282-83, 1309-14, 1357-
    58.) In addition, the Museum also permitted the Anderson and Madison County Historical
    Societies to house, free-of-charge, some of their exhibits that they did not have room to
    store themselves. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 150, 1086, 1189-90 (indicating that the
    societies occupied approximately 1,100 square feet of the Museum’s storage space, or
    approximately 1% of the Museum’s total square footage).)
    Apart from its bookkeeper, the Museum employed and paid only one staff member,
    2
    The founder of the Museum often made substantial donations to cover the Museum’s operating
    costs. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1083-84, 1252-53, 1258-60.)
    3
    Once the federal government approved the Museum’s application to receive a vehicle on loan,
    the Museum was required to cover all subsequent costs associated with transporting, restoring,
    maintaining, and securing the vehicles. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 1068-74, 1077.)
    4
    a facilities manager. (Cert. Admin. R. at 1361-62.) That person performed the restoration
    work on the military equipment, conducted tours, and provided round-the-clock security
    services. (Cert. Admin. R. at 1361-64, 1367, 1370.) (See also Cert. Admin. R. at 1070,
    1076-77, 1362-63, 1387-88 (indicating that given the stringent security measures the
    Museum had to take to protect the vehicles that were on loan from the government, the
    facilities manager lived on the premises).) Nevertheless, numerous unpaid volunteers,
    along with Joseph McClain and his daughter Melissa, assisted with the day-to-day
    operation of the Museum. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 1380-87.)
    In May of 2014, the Museum applied for the educational purposes exemption
    provided for in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-10-16. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 37-41.) The
    Madison County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals denied the exemption
    application. (Cert. Admin. R. at 46-47.) The Museum subsequently appealed to the
    Indiana Board, claiming entitlement to both the educational purposes exemption and the
    charitable purposes exemption. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 4-5.)
    The Indiana Board held a hearing on the Museum’s appeal on June 11, 2015. On
    November 21, 2017, the Indiana Board issued its final determination in which it found that
    the Museum’s real property did not qualify for either exemption.4 (Cert. Admin. R. at 923-
    59.)
    On January 5, 2018, the Museum initiated an original tax appeal. The Court heard
    the parties’ oral arguments on April 11, 2019. Additional facts will be supplied when
    4
    In its final determination, the Indiana Board also stated that while the Museum also sought an
    exemption for its personal property, it failed to specifically identify through either its evidence or
    argument what personal property it claimed to be exempt. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 950 ¶ 54 n.3.)
    Given that the certified administrative record does not contain information about personal property
    on appeal, the Indiana Board’s final determination with respect to this issue stands.
    5
    necessary.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The party challenging an Indiana Board final determination bears the burden of
    demonstrating its invalidity. See Johnson Cty. Prop. Tax Assessment Bd. of Appeals v.
    KC Propco LLC, 
    28 N.E.3d 370
    , 374 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2015). Accordingly, the Museum must
    demonstrate to the Court that the Indiana Board’s final determination is either arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to
    constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of or short of statutory
    jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; without observance of procedure required by law; or
    unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence. See IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e)(1)-(5)
    (2019).
    LAW
    In Indiana, all tangible property is subject to taxation. IND. CODE § 6-1.1-2-1 (2014).
    Nevertheless, the Indiana Constitution provides that the Legislature may exempt certain
    categories of property from taxation. See IND. CONST. art X, § 1. Pursuant to that grant
    of authority, the Legislature enacted Indiana Code § 6-1.1-10-16, which exempts real and
    personal property that is owned, occupied, and used for, among other things, an
    “educational” or “charitable” purpose. See generally IND. CODE § 6-1.1-10-16(a), (c), (e)
    (2014).
    Determining whether an exemption applies is a fact-sensitive inquiry. Hamilton
    Cty. Assessor v. SPD Realty, LLC, 
    9 N.E.3d 773
    , 777 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014). The taxpayer
    has the burden to prove entitlement to an exemption by providing evidence that meets
    every element of the exemption sought. See Fraternal Order of Eagles # 3988, Inc. v.
    6
    Morgan Cty. Prop. Tax Assessment Bd. of Appeals, 
    5 N.E.3d 1195
    , 1200 (Ind. Tax Ct.
    2014). Any ambiguity will be strictly construed in favor of taxation and against exemption.
    Hamilton Cty. Prop. Tax Assessment Bd. of Appeals v. Oaken Bucket Partners, LLC, 
    938 N.E.2d 654
    , 657 (Ind. 2010).
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, the Museum argues that the Indiana Board’s determination to deny it
    the educational purposes exemption or the charitable purposes exemption must be
    reversed because it constitutes “an abuse of discretion and [is] otherwise not in
    accordance with [the] law.” (See, e.g., Pet’r Br. at 15-16, 18, 20, 29.) The Madison
    County Assessor, however, contends that the Indiana Board’s final determination must
    be affirmed because the Museum “has failed to show that its contribution to the Madison
    County community justifies the loss of tax revenue” sufficient to award either exemption.
    (See, e.g., Resp’t Br. at 5.)
    The Educational Purposes Exemption
    The    educational purposes exemption is       designed     “‘to   encourage      non-
    governmental entities to provide educational services for ‘the public welfare.’” Dep’t of
    Local Gov’t Fin. v. Roller Skating Rink Operators Ass’n, 
    853 N.E.2d 1262
    , 1265 (Ind.
    2006) (citation omitted). In order to qualify for the exemption, an applicant must show
    that through the use of its property it provides a benefit to the public sufficient to justify
    the loss in tax revenue. See 
    id. The Indiana
    Supreme Court has explained that an
    applicant can meet that burden by showing that it provides the public with either the same
    educational training that would otherwise be furnished in Indiana’s tax-supported schools
    or that it provides educational courses that are related to those found in tax-supported
    7
    public schools, but not necessarily provided by them. 
    Id. The Museum
    argues on appeal that the Indiana Board clearly erred in its denial of
    the educational purposes exemption because military history “is both directly and
    indirectly related to subjects taught at our tax supported schools[.]” (Pet’r Br. at 19.)
    Indeed, the Museum continues, military history
    is an integral part of the curriculum in Indiana’s local state funded
    elementary and secondary schools as well as the State supported
    institutions of higher learning[.] Wars, and specifically the U.S.
    involvement in those wars, take center stage in subjects like Social
    Studies, U.S. History, Government, and Western Civilization.
    Moreover, the affects [sic.] of those wars are tangentially apart [sic.]
    of other subjects such as Economics, American Literature, Philosophy
    and Political Science[.] . . . There is no question that war, and the way
    those specific wars were fought, is taught in various subjects offered
    in the curriculum at Indiana colleges, universities and tax supported
    public elementary and secondary schools, and . . . is at least
    “related” to those courses.
    (Pet’r Br. at 18-19.)
    In finding that the Museum did not qualify for the educational purposes exemption,
    the Indiana Board explained that
    [t]he McClain Museum is not a school. It does not offer courses on
    historic preservation or military history. [It] has made no showing of
    “instruction and training equivalent to that provided by tax-supported
    institutions of higher learning and public schools.” [It] offered no
    evidence of any type of curriculum or teaching plan.
    (Cert. Admin. R. at 954 ¶ 64 (internal citation omitted).) Upon review, the Court will not
    disturb the Indiana Board’s finding. While there is no doubt that the public is educated
    and its knowledge enhanced about military history through the Museum’s displays, the
    Museum has nonetheless made no showing – as is required by the aforementioned case
    law – that it conducts educational services, training, or coursework related to that topic.
    (See generally Cert. Admin. R.) Moreover, the Museum has made no showing that the
    8
    state’s burden to provide military history education is relieved or would be increased if it
    were not for the Museum. (See generally Cert. Admin. R.) Consequently, the Indiana
    Board’s final determination that the Museum’s property did not qualify for the educational
    purposes exemption is affirmed.
    The Charitable Purposes Exemption
    With respect to this exemption, the term “charitable purpose” is defined and
    understood in its broadest constitutional sense. Starke Cty. Assessor v. Porter-Starke
    Servs., Inc., 
    88 N.E.3d 814
    , 817 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2017). Generally speaking, a charitable
    purpose will be found to exist when “1) there is evidence of relief of human want . . .
    manifested by obviously charitable acts different from the everyday purposes and
    activities of man in general; and 2) there is an expectation of a benefit that will inure to
    the public by the accomplishment of such acts.” SPD 
    Realty, 9 N.E.3d at 775
    (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    In denying the Museum a charitable purposes exemption, the Indiana Board stated
    that
    The McClain Museum is named after the owner of the original
    collection, and it appears that he and his daughter run the place as
    they see fit. . . . While the facilities are regularly open to the public, it
    is predominately used by a select number of persons who utilize the
    facility for storing and maintaining equipment. The record does not
    indicate significant efforts to advertise to the public or increase the
    number of visitors.
    ****
    We conclude that more than anything the McClain Museum is focused
    on Mr. McClain’s hobby, collecting items related to military history.
    The totality of the evidence shows that whatever public benefits might
    result are merely incidental to that main focus.
    ****
    9
    In the context of property tax exemption, “human want” is not just
    human desire, but a need based on lack of a vital necessity. “Charity”
    is not explicitly defined by statute, but the Tax Court has defined it in
    part as an attempt to advance mankind in general, or those in need of
    advancement and benefit in particular. [While the Indiana Board finds
    the Museum’s] efforts in regard to veterans are certainly charitable and
    relieve human want . . . these activities are . . . incidental relative to
    the overall use of the property.
    (Cert. Admin. R. at 953-55 ¶¶ 60-61, 66 (internal citation omitted).) Now, on appeal, the
    Museum argues that the Indiana Board’s stated rationale fails “to properly interpret and
    ultimately apply” the terms “charity” and “human want.” (See Pet’r Br. at 8-11.) The Court
    agrees.
    As previously stated, the term “charity” is to be broadly construed and thus
    encompasses more than simply providing relief to the needy. To that end, this Court has
    defined charity as:
    a gift for, or institution engaged in, public benevolent purposes. [It is
    a]n attempt in good faith, spiritually, physically, intellectually, socially
    and economically to advance and benefit mankind in general, or those
    in need of advancement and benefit in particular, without regard to
    their ability to supply that need from other sources and without hope
    or expectation, if not with positive abnegation, of gain or profit by donor
    or by instrumentality of charity.
    Raintree Friends Hous., Inc. v. Indiana Dep’t of State Revenue, 
    667 N.E.2d 810
    , 813-14
    (Ind. Tax Ct. 1996) (citation omitted). Moreover, the Court has also explained that
    “‘charity is not confined solely to the relief of the needy and destitute, but comprehends
    as well activities which are humanitarian in nature and rendered for the general
    improvement and betterment of mankind[.]’” College Corner, L.P. v. Dep’t of Local Gov’t
    Fin., 
    840 N.E.2d 905
    , 909 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006) (citation omitted). And as the Indiana Court
    of Appeals has recognized,
    10
    [a] purpose is charitable if its accomplishment is of such social interest
    to the community as to justify permitting the property to be devoted to
    the purpose in perpetuity. There is no fixed standard to determine
    what purposes are of such social interest to the community; the
    interests of the community vary with time and place.
    State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Methodist Home for the Aged of the Indiana Conference of
    the Methodist Church, Inc., 
    241 N.E.2d 84
    , 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1968) (citation omitted).
    With this in mind, it is clear that through the Museum’s ownership, occupation, and
    use of its property, it conveys a gift for the benefit of the general public that is charitable
    in nature. Indeed, the Museum provides a place where members of the general public
    can learn about our country’s military history and heritage as well as pay homage to its
    veterans and their families for the sacrifices they made in defending our freedoms. (See,
    e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 138-40, 142, 255, 528, 1390-92.) At the Museum, visitors can
    view actual helicopters, tanks, and artillery equipment and understand how they were
    operated. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 155-64, 206-07, 213, 1405-13.) From other
    exhibits and displays, visitors can learn how members of our military were trained,
    uniformed and learn how important battles were fought. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at
    191, 196-200, 208-12, 222-55.) Many of the Museum’s war mementos and paraphernalia
    on display belong to local persons who served in our armed forces. (See, e.g., Cert.
    Admin. R. at 1079, 1165.) The Museum provides the public with access to its library of
    books and manuals for use in their own military research or restoration work. (See, e.g.,
    Cert. Admin. R. at 1124-28.) All of these activities enhance the public’s knowledge and
    understanding of a part of the American experience. In this way, the Museum’s use
    “comprehends . . . activities which are humanitarian in nature and rendered for the general
    11
    improvement and betterment of mankind” and thus qualifies it for a charitable exemption.
    See College 
    Corner, 840 N.E.2d at 909
    (citation omitted).
    Property Use Supports Less Than a 100% Exemption
    Because the Museum property is used for both exempt and non-exempt purposes,
    Indiana Code § 6-1.1-10-36.3 instructs how the charitable purposes exemption is to be
    applied. It provides in relevant part:
    (a) For purposes of this section, property is predominantly used or
    occupied for [a charitable purpose] if it is used or occupied for [a
    charitable purpose] during more than fifty percent (50%) of the
    time that it is used or occupied in the year that ends on the
    assessment date of the property.
    (b) The determination under subsection (c) of:
    (1) the use or occupation of the property; and
    (2) the application of an exemption;
    applies separately to each part of the property identified under I.C. 6-
    1.1-11-3(c)(5).
    (c) If a section of this chapter states one (1) or more purposes for
    which property must be used or occupied in order to qualify for an
    exemption, then the exemption applies as follows:
    (1) Property that is exclusively used or occupied for [a charitable
    purpose] is totally exempt[;]
    (2) Property that is predominantly used or occupied for [a
    charitable purpose] by a church, religious society, or not-for-profit
    school is totally exempt[;]
    (3) Property that is predominantly used or occupied for [a
    charitable purpose] by a person other than a church, religious society,
    or not-for-profit school is exempt . . . on the part of the assessment . .
    . that bears the same proportion to the total assessment of the
    property as the amount of time that the property was used or occupied
    for [the charitable purpose;]
    (4) Property that is predominantly used or occupied for a purpose
    other than one (1) of the stated purposes is not exempt from any part
    of the property tax.
    IND. CODE § 6-1.1-10-36.3(a)-(c) (2014).
    12
    The Museum’s exhibition area, restoration area, and the majority of its storage
    area are all exclusively used for its charitable purpose.5 Accordingly, those spaces are
    entitled to a 100% exemption. See I.C. § 6-1.1-10-36.3(a)-(c)(1). Nonetheless, the
    Museum used specific portions of its storage space and its Officer’s Club for the non-
    charitable activities of boat storage, Yellowbook storage, and non-Museum related social
    events. 
    See supra
    at p. 4. To exempt those spaces, the Museum was required to present
    evidence demonstrating that they were used for exempt purposes more than they were
    used for non-exempt purposes. See, e.g., Hamilton Cty. Assessor v. Duke, 
    69 N.E.3d 567
    , 570 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2017) (citing both I.C. § 6-1.1-10-36(a) and State Bd. of Tax
    Comm’rs v. New Castle Lodge #147, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc., 
    765 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1262-
    63 (Ind. 2002)), review denied).)
    The Museum’s evidence demonstrates that approximately 9% of its total square
    footage was used to store boats seven months out of the year. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin.
    R. at 150, 341-68, 1182-88, 1190-93.) As a result, that space was not predominately
    used for charitable purposes during 2014 and therefore ineligible for an exemption. See
    I.C. § 6-1.1-10-36.3(a)-(c). The Museum’s evidence also indicates that during the year
    at issue, the Officer’s Club, which occupies 15% of the Museum’s total square footage,
    was rented “somewhere between” 14 and 28 times for social events and to store yellow
    5
    In its final determination, the Indiana Board concluded that the Museum’s property is “much
    larger than necessary to support the museum[.]” (Cert. Admin. R. at 951 ¶ 57.) This conclusion
    is not, however, supported by the evidence in the certified administrative record. (See, e.g., Cert.
    Admin. R. at 162-80, 206-07, 215-22 (all indicating how large the vehicles are), 1116 (indicating
    that exhibits are periodically rotated and thus, when not on display, vehicles had to be stored),
    1378-81 (indicating the amount of space necessary to move and/or disassemble large vehicles
    like tanks), 1382-83 (indicating that reenactments using the large motorized vehicles were
    conducted outside on the grounds).)
    13
    pages for approximately one month. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 150, 372-73, 441-48,
    1193-94, 1245-51, 1309-14, 1357-58.) That evidence does not demonstrate that the
    Officer’s Club was predominately used for any charitable purposes.                  Finally, the
    Museum’s evidence indicates that the Anderson and Madison County Historical Societies
    used approximately 1% of the Museum’s total square footage, free-of-charge, for its own
    storage. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 150, 1086, 1189-90.) Again, without anything more, the
    Court cannot find that the space was predominately used for a charitable purpose.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Indiana Board’s final determination that the
    Museum’s property did not qualify for an educational purposes exemption is AFFIRMED.
    The Indiana Board’s final determination that the Museum’s property did not qualify for a
    charitable purposes exemption, however, is REVERSED. The evidence contained in the
    administrative record supports the Court’s finding that the Museum’s property is eligible
    for a 75% exemption.6 The matter is therefore REMANDED to the Indiana Board to
    ensure that the Madison County Assessor complies with the Court’s instructions
    contained in this opinion. See, e.g., Switzerland Cty. Assessor v. Belterra Resort Indiana,
    LLC, 
    130 N.E.3d 672
    , 675-76 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019).
    6
    The Museum has argued that because its property received a 100% exemption in 1996,
    collateral estoppel mandates that it receive the same exemption now. (See Pet’r Br. at 31-34.)
    The Court rejects this argument. See, e.g., Hamilton Cty. Assessor v. SPD Realty, LLC, 
    9 N.E.3d 773
    , 777 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014) (explaining that determining whether an exemption applies is a fact-
    sensitive inquiry); Fleet Supply, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 
    747 N.E.2d 645
    , 650 (Ind. Tax
    Ct. 2001) (indicating that each assessment year, and thus each exemption request, stands alone),
    review denied.
    14