City of Carmel v. Department of Local Government Finance ( 2024 )


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  • ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER:                      ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT:
    NATHAN J. HAGERMAN                             THEODORE E. ROKITA
    ASHLEY M. ULBRICHT                             ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA
    TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP                STEPHEN J. REEN
    Indianapolis, IN                               TRENT D. BENNETT
    DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL
    Indianapolis, IN
    IN THE
    INDIANA TAX COURT
    CITY OF CARMEL,                                  )
    )
    Petitioner,                               )                                       FILED
    )
    v.                                 ) Cause No. 24T-TA-00003           Oct 17 2024, 11:14 am
    )                                       CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL                      )                                      Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    GOVERNMENT FINANCE,                              )
    )
    Respondent.                               )
    ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DETERMINATION OF
    THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE
    FOR PUBLICATION
    October 17, 2024
    BAKER, Special J.
    The City of Carmel appeals the final determination of the Indiana Department of
    Local Government Finance denying Carmel’s 2024 shortfall excess property tax levy
    appeal. Carmel argues that the Department’s denial was based on an unsupported
    restrictive interpretation of the type of excess levy shortfall that may be claimed under
    Indiana Code section 6-1.1-18.5-16(a). Upon review, the Court affirms the Department’s
    final determination.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On December 19, 2023, Carmel filed an appeal with the Department for a 2024
    shortfall excess levy in the amount of $1,001,538 due to a shortfall for the 2018 through
    2023 budget years. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 3-15.)
    On January 2, 2024, the Department issued a final determination approving
    $224,915 of the requested shortfall appeal and denying $776,623 of the requested
    shortfall appeal. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 95-100.)
    On January 9, 2024, Carmel filed a request for reconsideration with the
    Department, which the Department responded to by reaffirming its previous decision on
    January 12, 2024. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 110-38, 140.)
    Carmel then filed this original tax appeal on February 16, 2024.
    FACTS
    Carmel appealed to the Department for a 2024 shortfall excess levy in the
    amount of $1,001,538 for a shortfall it claimed for the 2018 through 2023 budget years.
    (See Cert. Admin. R. at 6-10, 18.) Of this amount, the Department approved an excess
    levy of $224,915, the sum of the shortfalls the Department determined for the 2022 and
    2023 budget years ($170,326 and $54,589 respectively). (See Cert. Admin. R. at 100.)
    The Department denied $538,828 of the request because it had already
    approved an excess property tax levy for those shortfalls. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 95-
    100.) Those shortfalls were $199,520 for budget year 2018, $131,014 for budget year
    2019, $141,032 for budget year 2020, and $67,262 for budget year 2021. (See Cert.
    Admin. R. at 95-100.)
    According to its brief, $575,503 of Carmel’s $1,001,538 claim resulted from the
    cumulative difference between the certified net assessed value (the certified levy) and
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    the abstract net assessed value (the abstract levy) from 2018 to 2023. (Pet’r Br. at 3.)
    The Department denied this amount because, in its view, the deficiency did not result
    from errors described in I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16(a). (Resp’t Br. at 8-10.)
    The parties agree on the underlying facts and amounts in dispute. (Pet’r Br. at 3,
    15; Pet’r Reply Br. at 2; Hr’g Tr. at 6.) They differ on whether the difference between the
    certified levy and the abstract levy constitutes a shortfall under I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16(a).
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The party challenging the propriety of the DLGF’s final determination bears the
    burden of demonstrating its invalidity. City of Greenfield v. Indiana Dep’t of Loc. Gov’t
    Fin., 
    22 N.E.3d 887
    , 891 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014). Accordingly, Carmel must show the Court
    that the Department’s final determination is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. Since the parties
    here agree on the underlying facts and amounts in dispute, the sole question for the
    Court is whether the Department’s final determination is contrary to law.
    ANALYSIS
    Statutory Scheme and Request Procedure
    The Indiana General Assembly has established a statutory process for local
    governments to request permission from the Department to apply an excess property
    tax levy to recover shortfalls in expected revenue from the collection of property taxes in
    previous years. The potential recoverable shortfall consists of errors as defined in I.C. §
    6-1.1-18.5-16(a) and successful property tax appeals under I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16(b). The
    combined amount that may be recovered from these two sources is limited by I.C. § 6-
    1.1-18.5-16(c) to the remainder of the civil taxing unit’s property tax levy for the
    3
    particular calendar year as finally approved by the Department (the certified levy) minus
    the actual property tax levy collected for that particular calendar year.
    A civil taxing unit may request permission from the department to impose
    an ad valorem property tax levy that exceeds the limits imposed by
    chapter 3 of this chapter if:
    (1) the civil taxing unit experienced a property tax revenue shortfall
    that resulted from erroneous assessed valuation figures being
    provided to the civil taxing unit;
    (2) the erroneous assessed valuation figures were used by the civil
    taxing unit in determining its total property tax rate; and
    (3) the error in the assessed valuation figures was found after the
    civil taxing unit’s property tax levy resulting from that total rate
    was finally approved finally approved by the department of
    local government finance.
    However, a civil taxing unit may not make a request described in this
    subsection on account of a revenue shortfall experienced in excess of five
    (5) years from the date of the most recent certified budget, tax rate, and
    levy of the civil taxing unit under IC 6-1.1-17-16.
    IND. CODE § 6-1.1-18.5-16(a) (2024).
    If the department determines that a shortfall described in subsection (a) or
    (b) has occurred, the department of local government finance may find
    that the civil taxing unit should be allowed to impose a property tax levy
    exceeding the limit imposed by section 3 or 25 of this chapter, as
    applicable. However, the maximum amount by which the civil taxing unit’s
    levy may be increased over the limits imposed by section 3 or 25 of this
    chapter, as applicable, equals the remainder of the civil taxing unit’s
    property tax levy for the particular calendar year as finally approved by the
    department of local government finance minus the actual property tax levy
    collected by the civil taxing unit for that particular calendar year.
    I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16(c).
    I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-12 establishes the process for a civil taxing unit to appeal
    for an excess levy and how the Department reviews such an appeal. I.C. § 6-1.1-
    18.5-12(c) grants the Department, among other powers, the power to require a
    4
    civil taxing unit to provide relevant records and books for its review. IND. CODE §
    6-1.1-18.5-12(c) (2024).
    Pursuant to I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-12, the Department has established a
    shortfall excess levy appeal template that specifies the relevant records a
    requesting civil taxing unit must provide for the Department’s consideration of the
    appeal. Among the required records are a Register of Certificates of Error (Form
    127-CER), a Certificate of the County Auditor of Tax Refund Claims (Form 17-
    TC), and a County Auditor’s Certificate of Tax Distribution (Form 22). (Resp’t Br.
    at 13.) These forms correspond respectively to the information the Department
    needs to determine the shortfall under I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16(a) and I.C. § 6-1.1-
    18.5-16(b) and the maximum permissible excess levy under I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-
    16(c).
    The Department’s Action
    The Department construed error and erroneous assessed valuation under
    I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16(a) to be those errors in valuation claimed on the Register of
    Certificates of Error (Form 127-CER) civil taxing units must submit as part of their
    request for an excess levy. (Resp’t Br. at 13.) It, therefore, denied Carmel’s claim
    of the shortage between the abstract levy and the certified levy amount as a
    permissible shortfall under I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16(a). (See Cert. Admin. R. at 95-
    100.)
    Carmel’s Appeal
    Carmel contends that the difference between the certified levy and the
    abstract levy it seeks to recover inherently arises from errors in valuation, and
    5
    thus this amount constitutes a recoverable shortfall for purposes of I.C. § 6-1.1-
    18.5-16(a). (Pet’r Br. at 8.) Carmel argues that the Department is inappropriately
    using the ceiling on the amount that the levy may be increased provided in I.C. §
    6-1.1-18.5-16(c) to restrict the types of errors that qualify under I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-
    16(a). (Pet’r Br. at 9; Pet’r Reply Br. at 8.)
    The legislative policy behind the excess levy statute, Carmel argues, is to
    allow local governments to recover the deficit from the property tax revenue the
    applied tax rate was assumed to collect and the actual revenue collected. (Pet’r
    Reply Br. at 8.) The Department’s restrictive interpretation of error under I.C. § 6-
    1.1-18.5-16(a) undermines this purpose.
    Determination
    The language in I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16(a) does not directly answer the
    question of whether the amount resulting from the difference between the
    abstract levy and the certified levy Carmel claims is an error for purposes of
    calculating the permitted shortfall. The context and the rest of I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-
    16, however, strongly indicate that this was not the type of error contemplated by
    the legislature.
    Nowhere in the statute is abstract levy or the total amount billed taxpayers
    mentioned. To the extent that a general revenue difference is mentioned by the
    statute, it is the difference between the certified abstract and the actual
    collections. Even here, however, this amount serves as the ceiling on the excess
    levy. The statute still requires specific valuation errors and refund claims under
    sections 16(a) and 16(b) to constitute a shortfall. If the legislature intended for a
    6
    general deficit for any reason to be a permissible shortfall, there would be no
    need for sections 16(a) and 16(b) delineating specific reasons for that deficit.
    The Court addressed a related question of whether a revenue shortfall deriving
    from a calculation using the amount billed is a recoverable shortfall under I.C. § 6-1.1-
    18.5-16(a) in a 2013 case. Indianapolis Pub. Transp. Corp. v. Indiana Dep’t of Loc. Gov’t
    Fin. (IndyGo), 
    988 N.E.2d 1274
     (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013). There, IndyGo requested that the
    Department permit it to impose an excess property tax levy based on the amount of tax
    charged (the abstract levy) versus the amount of tax paid. The Department rejected the
    use of the amount billed as the starting point for the shortfall determination and denied
    IndyGo’s request, “explaining that the DLGF calculates shortfalls by subtracting the
    actual collections figure from the certified levy figure[.]” 
    Id. at 1276
     (citation omitted).
    The Court affirmed the Department’s final determination. The Court notes that the
    Department’s application of section 16 is long-standing and that the legislature did not
    amend the statute after the Court’s affirmation of the Department’s methodology in
    IndyGo.
    The legislature also has granted the Department broad discretion in
    administering the excess levy appeal process. This discretion likely derives from the
    legislature’s intent that the Department serve as a gatekeeper to ensure that tax
    increases are properly justified. To this end, a civil taxing unit appealing for an excess
    levy “must state that it will be unable to carry out the governmental functions committed
    to it by law unless it is given the authority that it is petitioning for. “The civil taxing unit
    must support these allegations by reasonably detailed statements of fact.” I.C. § 6-1.1-
    18.5-12(a). Furthermore, even if a permissible shortfall under the statute exists, the
    7
    legislature has given the Department the authority to decide whether to permit an
    excess levy. Section 16(c) provides that “[i]f the department determines that a shortfall
    described in subsection (a) or subsection (b) has occurred, the department of local
    government finance may find that the civil taxing unit should be allowed to impose” an
    excess property tax levy. I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16(c) (emphasis added).
    The Court agrees with the Department’s interpretation of the statute. The Court
    further notes that even if it found the valuation errors Carmel claims to be a permissible
    shortfall under subsection 16(a), the Department has the discretion to grant or deny
    Carmel’s excess levy appeal under subsection 16(c).
    CONCLUSION
    The Court finds that the Department appropriately applied I.C. § 6-1.1-18.5-16
    and AFFIRMS the Department’s final determination.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 24T-TA-00003

Filed Date: 10/17/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/12/2024