State of Iowa v. Edna Jean Wilson ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 20–0371
Submitted October 20, 2021—Filed January 14, 2022
Amended January 19, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
EDNA JEAN WILSON,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel,
District Associate Judge.
The defendant challenges the denial of her motion to suppress evidence
obtained during a warrantless search of her apartment to investigate a
misdemeanor charge and conviction of interference with official acts. DECISION
OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Appel, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined.
2
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Special Counsel, for
appellee.
3
APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we consider whether evidence obtained by law enforcement
after a warrantless entry into an apartment for a misdemeanor charge passes
constitutional muster under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. For the reasons
below, we conclude that the warrantless entry into Wilson’s apartment to arrest
her was unlawful. Therefore, evidence related to her conviction of possession of
cocaine obtained from the unlawful entry must be suppressed. We also conclude,
however, that Wilson’s conviction of interference with official acts is sufficiently
attenuated from the unlawful entry to permit admission of evidence of her own
illegal conduct under the “new crime exception” to the exclusionary rule. So,
Wilson’s conviction for possession of cocaine is reversed, while her conviction of
interference with official acts is affirmed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
A. Investigation and Arrest. Based on our review of the record, including
the transcript of the suppression hearing and the exhibits, including bodycam
videos of the incident,1 we make the following findings of fact.
On July 5, 2019, Jamie Miller, a uniformed Ames police officer, was
dispatched to a fourplex apartment building in Ames to investigate a noise
1We note that the bodycam videos were extremely helpful in determining the facts in this
case and prevented the factual disputes in this case from descending into a swearing match
between police officers and criminal defendants. As will be apparent in this opinion, the
bodycams cut both for and against Wilson. The bodycams support her contention that the
warrantless entry into the apartment was unlawful. On the other hand, the bodycams support
the State’s contention that by hindering her arrest, Wilson interfered with official acts.
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complaint in violation of an Ames municipal ordinance. Once Miller arrived, he
could hear noise while he was in the common hallway of the fourplex apartment.
Miller, however, did not have equipment to measure the sound level necessary
to determine if there was a violation of the noise ordinance but admitted that the
level required for such a violation was “very high.” Instead, Miller proceeded to
knock on the door to the apartment. A woman came to the door and opened it
between six to twelve inches in a guarded fashion in response to the knock. Miller
identified himself as a police officer, explained that there had been a noise
complaint, and proceeded to ask the woman for her name and some
identification. Wilson initially refused to provide Miller with a name, stating she
did not have to do so. Miller repeated his request several times, and eventually
Wilson provided Miller with the name “Ebony.”
Miller continued to press Wilson, asking for her complete name. After an
unproductive exchange in which Wilson stated several times that she wanted her
lawyer called, Wilson attempted to shut the door to her apartment. In response,
Miller put his left hand on the doorway and his foot six inches across the
threshold to prevent Wilson from shutting the door. Wilson asked Miller to
remove his foot from her door six times, which Wilson refused to do. Wilson
asked Miller where his warrant was, drawing a reply from Miller that he did not
need a search warrant for her name.
Miller admitted that when he put his left hand on the door and foot six
inches into the apartment, he had not determined that Wilson had provided a
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false name, nor did he have reason to believe that Wilson possessed weapons or
was engaged in drug violations.
After Miller prevented Wilson from closing her door, Wilson then provided
Miller with a different name—Destiny Miller—after she glanced at Miller’s name
tag. Another uniformed Ames police officer on the scene, Adam McPherson, used
the police database but was unable to find a “Destiny Miller” with the same birth
date as provided by Wilson. In order to determine the true name of the occupant
of the apartment, McPherson used his computer to search utilities records and
determined that the person responsible for utilities at the apartment was Edna
Wilson. When Miller confronted her with the name of Edna Wilson, Wilson
confirmed that it was her name.
Upon confirmation that her name was Edna Wilson, and not Destiny
Miller, Miller decided to arrest Wilson for obstruction of justice by providing the
police with a false name. Miller advised Wilson that she was under arrest,
stepped further into the apartment, and began the process of placing her in
handcuffs. As the officers entered the apartment to arrest Wilson, McPherson
saw Wilson throw an object from her hand. A close look at the bodycam video
shows that the object was thrown around the time when the two officers grasped
Wilson’s arms to effectuate the arrest. Miller first held Wilson’s left arm while
McPherson was approaching Wilson. Then, as McPherson was getting closer,
Wilson quickly stretched out her free right hand to toss away the vial.
Immediately after Wilson threw the object away, McPherson was able to grab and
handcuff Wilson’s right hand. After both hands were handcuffed, she started to
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twist, making it hard for the officer to secure her arrest. The officers later
observed a white powdery residue on the floor and a small vial. They also located
a marijuana joint and a baggie containing two grams of marijuana.
During the arrest, Wilson protested using profanity, accused the police of
harassment, and asked others in the apartment to call her lawyer. She was not
generally cooperative as Miller and McPherson tried to handcuff her behind her
back, twisting her body and arms in a fashion that made the arrest more difficult
than it needed to be. Miller suffered a cut and scrape to his left arm as a result
of his effort to handcuff Wilson. After Wilson’s arrest, McPherson applied for a
search warrant for the apartment based upon what officers observed inside the
apartment. The search warrant was issued, and the police executed the warrant.
The white substance in the vial later tested as .6 grams of cocaine salt.
The State charged Wilson with interference with official acts causing bodily
injury, possession of marijuana, second offense, and possession of cocaine, first
offense. The cocaine charge was later amended to a second offense. Wilson
pleaded not guilty and waived speedy trial.
B. Motion to Suppress. Wilson filed a motion to suppress, alleging that
the officer made an illegal warrantless entry into her home, and then used the
information obtained from the illegal entry to obtain a search warrant. Wilson
argued that a warrantless entry into the home was unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution. The State countered that Miller had no reasonable expectation of
privacy because she opened the door of the residence and was in plain view when
7
the officers determined to arrest her. The State further asserted that the evidence
was admissible under the new crime exception to the exclusionary rule.
According to the State, the new crime was interference with official acts when
Wilson hindered or resisted her arrest.
The district court denied the motion to suppress. The district court found
that there was no question that by placing his hand on the door and foot past
the door threshold, the officer broke the plane of Wilson’s apartment. Relying on
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), however, the district court found
that Wilson had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the entryway to the
apartment. Further, the district court observed that a crime was being
committed in the presence of the police officers, namely, harassment of public
officials by providing a false name. As a result, the officers had a right to arrest
Miller.
After the motion to suppress was denied, Wilson submitted to a bench trial
pursuant to an agreement with the State. The State amended count I to
interference with official acts, a simple misdemeanor, and agreed to dismiss the
possession of marijuana charge. The trial court found Wilson guilty of the count I
interference charge and of the count III charge of possession of cocaine, second
offense.
C. Appeal. Wilson appealed, arguing that the district court erred in
denying her motion to suppress and that there was insufficient evidence to
support the State’s interference charge. We transferred the case to the court of
appeals. The court of appeals assumed, without deciding, that the initial entry
8
by Miller violated the Fourth Amendment. But when Wilson resisted arrest, the
court of appeals observed that “she created probable cause that she was
committing a new crime.” According to the court of appeals, when Wilson resisted
arrest, she provided law enforcement with new grounds to arrest her.
Consequently, the court of appeals held that the narcotics discovered as a result
of Miller’s lawful arrest were not subject to suppression and affirmed the district
court’s judgment.
Wilson sought further review, which we granted.
II. Standard of Review.
“When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or federal constitutional right,
our standard of review is de novo.” State v. Coffman, 914 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Iowa
2018) (quoting State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 2017)). “We examine
the whole record and ‘make an independent evaluation of the totality of the
circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 144). “Each case must be
evaluated in light of its unique circumstances.” State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270,
272 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Iowa 2011)).
In seeking to sustain an exception to the warrant requirement, the state bears
the burden of proof. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–87 (1980).
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III. Analysis.
A. Positions of the Parties.
1. Wilson. Wilson asserts that Miller entered her apartment without a
warrant when he put his hand on the door and foot past the door jamb into the
apartment. She asserts that the intrusion into her home by Miller violated her
reasonable expectation of privacy in her apartment. According to Wilson, she
only opened the door as necessary to respond to the knock on the door by the
police. In so doing, she claims she did not expose her apartment to public view
and did not abandon her right of privacy in her residence.
Wilson recognizes that in Santana, the United States Supreme Court held
that a person in her open doorway when the police observed her cannot claim a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 427 U.S. at 42. Wilson, however, maintains
she was not standing in an open doorway when the police arrived but only
opened the door so far as to respond to the knock of the police. When she
attempted to terminate the encounter, Miller then intruded into the residence by
preventing her from closing the door. Under these circumstances, Wilson
suggests, there is no surrender of the reasonable expectation of privacy of the
home. See Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 686 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that opening the door very slightly at the request of the police does not constitute
exposing oneself to the public view and therefore there was no surrender of
legitimate expectation of privacy).
Wilson also argues that the case State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763 (Iowa
2001)—relied on by the State—is distinguishable. In Legg, an officer followed the
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defendant into her garage after she failed to stop for a traffic violation. Id. at 765.
The Legg court found the officer’s warrantless entry unreasonably invaded her
protected privacy interests. Id. at 771–74. But according to the Legg court, the
arrest was not unreasonable because the officer had probable cause to arrest
her for a serious misdemeanor (OWI). Id. at 773. Further, the probable cause to
arrest for an OWI was supported by exigent circumstances because Legg could
have accessed alcohol in an effort to impair the reliability of test results. Id. at
772. Here, Wilson argues that the crime that is advanced to support the
warrantless arrest of Wilson was a simple misdemeanor, not a serious
misdemeanor. Further, the police identified no exigent circumstances requiring
the arrest of Wilson.
Wilson recognizes that the officers were investigating a noise complaint
and that Wilson eventually provided a false name to the officers. But Wilson
maintains that there was no evidence that the noise ordinance of the City of
Ames was violated. Further, according to Wilson, the interference arising from
the giving of a false name is a simple misdemeanor. These are not the kind of
“grave offenses” that justify a warrantless intrusion of the home.
In support of her claim that the officers lacked a basis for warrantless
entry of Wilson’s home based on minor crimes, Wilson cites Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740. She also cites one of this court’s first search and seizure cases,
McClurg v. Brenton, we stated: “No amount of incriminating evidence, whatever
its source, will supply the place of such warrant. At the closed door of the home,
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be it palace or hovel, even bloodhounds must wait till the law, by authoritative
process, bids it open.” 98 N.W. 881, 882 (Iowa 1904).
Wilson recognizes that Miller may have had probable cause regarding the
noise complaint and the provision of a false name to the officers. But, according
to Wilson, there were no exigent circumstances or other exceptions to the
warrant requirement available to justify a warrantless search of Wilson’s home
for these minor offenses. See State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 108–10 (Iowa
2001).
Finally, Wilson addresses the State’s contention that even if the initial
entry was unlawful, Wilson committed a new crime when she resisted arrest,
and the evidence of drug possession was admissible as a result of the search
arising from it. Wilson points us to the language of Iowa Code section 719.1(1)(a)
(2019), regarding interference with official acts. The language of this Code section
specifically requires that in order to commit the crime of interference with official
acts, the act must be “within the scope of the lawful duty or authority” of the
officer. Id. Wilson argues that at the time of the further warrantless intrusion
into Wilson’s apartment, the officers were not acting “within the scope of the
lawful duty or authority” of the police, and as a result, no interference occurred
under the statute. This statutory argument appears not to have been raised in
State v. Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551 (Iowa 1995)—another case relied upon by the
State.
In the alternative, Wilson asserts that the record lacks substantial
evidence that Wilson resisted or obstructed her arrest. Citing Lawyer v. City of
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Council Bluffs, 361 F.3d 1099, 1107 (8th Cir. 2004), Wilson asserts that “the key
question is whether the officer’s actions were hindered.” While Wilson may have
been “yelling and screaming” during the arrest, Wilson asserts that objecting or
even passively failing to cooperate does not establish interference. Instead,
asserts Wilson, there must be evidence of active interference with law
enforcement. See Small v. McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997, 1004–05 (8th Cir. 2013).
2. Position of the State. The State argues that because Wilson opened the
door to police when they knocked and stood on the threshold of her home that
she had no reasonable expectation of privacy needed to trigger the special
protections afforded to the home under the Fourth Amendment. See Santana,
427 U.S. at 42. The State also finds support in a number of federal appellate
court cases. See United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding
when a door is voluntarily opened by an occupant, the Fourth Amendment’s
protection of the home were not implicated); United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d
1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding the arrest was effected before the agents
entered the room, therefore there was no protectable expectation of privacy at
the time of the arrest). Because Wilson was in a public place, the State argues,
police officers were free to arrest her “for an offense committed or attempted in
their presence,” including disorderly conduct (the noise emitting from her
apartment) and providing false identification information. See Iowa Code
§ 804.7(1); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1976)
(holding warrantless public arrests on probable cause do not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
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In the alternative, the State maintains that even if Santana and its progeny
do not apply, the officers had probable cause to arrest Wilson for the ongoing
crimes of disorderly conduct and interference with official acts. The State claims
that Welsh applies only to civil infractions and not to crimes that involve
imprisonment. The State asserts that the crimes of disorderly conduct, providing
false information, and interference with official acts are simple misdemeanors
punishable by a fine or imprisonment not to exceed thirty days. See Iowa Code
§§ 719.1(1)(a) (interference with official acts), .1A (false identification); id.§ 723.4(1) (disorderly conduct); id. § 903.1 (simple misdemeanor punishment).
As a result, the State claims they are outside the scope of the categorical rule in
Welsh.
Finally, the State asserts that even if the police entry were unlawful, the
evidence need not be suppressed because Wilson committed a new crime when
she resisted arrest. In support of its argument, the State cites Dawdy,
533 N.W.2d 551. In Dawdy, the court declared: “Even though an initial arrest is
unlawful, a defendant has no right to resist the arrest. If the defendant does so,
probable cause exists for a second arrest for resisting. A search incident to the
second arrest is lawful.” Id. at 555. The rationale of the rule is that a defendant
should not be given carte blanche to commit further criminal acts simply
because the causal chain began with police misconduct. See United States v.
Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1016–18 (11th Cir. 1982).
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B. Overview of Search and Seizure Principles.
1. Invasion of the home: chief evil at the core. We start with a basic
proposition that police intrusion into the home implicates the very core of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of
the Iowa Constitution.2 On the eve of the American Revolution, Lord Chief
Justice Pratt declared that “ ‘[t]o enter a man’s house’ without a proper warrant
. . . is to attack ‘the liberty of the subject’ and ‘destroy the liberty of the
kingdom,’ ” Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2021) (quoting Huckle v.
Money (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769). The lessons of recent English precedents
were incorporated into the United States Constitution through the Fourth
Amendment. “[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 585–86
(quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). “Freedom” in
one’s own “dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 587 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385,
389 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc)). At the “very core” of the Fourth Amendment
“stands ‘the right of a [resident] to retreat into [one’s] own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ ” Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct.
1663, 1670 (2018) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)). “[W]hen it
2Wilson brings her search and seizure claim under both the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. She does not suggest
that the Iowa Constitution should be interpreted in a fashion different from the federal
framework. We therefore consider both claims but apply the federal framework, reserving the
right to apply that framework in a fashion different from federal law. King v. State, 797 N.W.2d
565, 571 (Iowa 2012); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).
15
comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.” Jardines,
569 U.S. at 6.
Because interests in privacy and security3 in the home are so fundamental,
the United States Supreme Court has declared that “a firm line” is drawn for
search and seizure principals at the entrance to the home. Payton, 445 U.S. at589–90. “[A]ny physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a fraction
of an inch’ [i]s too much.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). A violation occurs when a
lawfully present officer moves a turntable only “a few inches.” Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (“[T]aking action, unrelated to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment
or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent’s privacy . . . .”).
The magisterial terms of the classic search and seizure are based on what
we all know: the home is a remarkable place. It is a place of solitude and group
activity, love and tears, arguments and forgiveness, grace and selfishness,
individual expression and collective decisions, couch surfing and weight lifting,
fine wine and bad beer, live goldfish and dead pizza, clothing that is too loose,
clothing that is too tight, diaries and personal notes, and prescription drugs and
3Wilson does not specifically mention “secure” or “security” in her appellate brief, but
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution utilize the term in their text. The concept of security in search and seizure law
historically has not received much attention. That may be beginning to change. See generally
David H. Gans, “We Do Not Want to be Hunted”: The Right to Be Secure and Our Constitutional
Story of Race and Policing, 11 Colum. J. Race & L. 239 (2021) (providing a comprehensive account
of the text, history, and original meaning on the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitations on
policing); Luke M. Milligan, The Forgotten Right to be Secure, 65 Hastings L.J. 713 (2014)
(discussing the “to be secure” text of the Fourth Amendment and arguing for a broader
interpretation as an alternative method to control the costs of regulatory delay).
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intimate items. It is the place where we learn to crawl and where we want to be
when we die, where marriages prosper and fail, where family problems are
discussed over the kitchen table, and where the new in-laws come seeking, and
sometimes getting, acceptance. And on and on. The precedents demonstrate that
privacy of the home is fortified by strong constitutional protection.
2. Jealously guarding the home by drawing lines: trespass and reasonable
expectation of privacy. In State v. Wright, we recently noted that a search and
seizure violation under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution may occur
“when, without a warrant, the officer physically trespasses on protected
property.” 961 N.W.2d 396, 416 (Iowa 2021). This notion fits comfortably with
the declaration of the Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States that an invasion
of even an inch in the home is a constitutional violation. 533 U.S. at 37. In the
alternative, we also have recognized that a defendant may establish a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises searched. State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d
547, 553–54 (Iowa 2006); Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 106–07. Whether a person has
a legitimate expectation of privacy is decided on a case-by-case basis. Naujoks,
637 N.W.2d at 106–07.
3. Exigent circumstances supporting warrantless misdemeanor arrests:
rare. Exigent circumstances have been recognized as one of the “narrowly and
jealousy drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement” that applies even to entry
of homes. State v. Day, 168 P.3d 1265, 1267 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (quoting
State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 438 (Wash. 1986) (en banc), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Valdez, 224 P.3d 751 (Wash. 2009) (en banc)). Exigent
17
circumstances include a risk of serious injury, a threat to officer safety, and a
likelihood of destruction of evidence. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006).
The United States Supreme Court considered whether the mere fact that
a person has committed a misdemeanor permits law enforcement to enter the
home without a warrant to arrest the offender in Welsh, 466 U.S. 740—the key
United States Supreme Court case in this area. In the Welsh case, the state
engaged in a warrantless search of a home to arrest an OWI offender. Id. at 742–
43. Under Wisconsin law, the OWI offense in Welsh was nonjailable. Id. at 754.
The central question in Welsh was whether the warrantless seizure could be
considered justified by exigent circumstances. Id. at 750.
The Supreme Court said no. Id. at 753. The Welsh Court noted that in
Payton v. New York, warrantless arrests of felons was found to be prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances. Id. at 749. Such exigent
circumstances are not likely to be found where minor crimes are involved. Id. at
750. Welsh cited the famous words of Justice Jackson in his concurrence in
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), stating that law enforcement
seeking to avoid the warrant requirement in the context of the case involving a
minor offense showed
a shocking lack of proportion. Whether there is reasonable necessity
for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends
somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to be in progress
as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it. . . . It
is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters in
a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any
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suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that
involve no violence or threats of it.
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750–51 (quoting McDonald, 335 U.S. at 459 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)). Justice Jackson further commented in McDonald on the lack of a
magistrate’s involvement in finding probable cause to search a home, stating:
“When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a
position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious
consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant.” 335 U.S. at 460.
The Welsh Court made clear that the minor nature of a crime is a major
factor to consider in determining whether exigent circumstances are present.
466 U.S. at 753. The Welsh Court declared that “application of the exigent-
circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be
sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . .
has been committed.” Id.The question of warrantless searches for misdemeanors came back to the
United States Supreme Court in Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011. In Lange,
an obnoxious driver who was signaled to pull over by the police drove for four
seconds to his driveway and went into his attached garage. Id. at 2016. The
patrol officer followed him into the structure to make an arrest. Id. The state
defended the warrantless arrest on the ground that the Fourth Amendment
always permits law enforcement to enter the home to arrest a fleeing
misdemeanor defendant. Id.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument. Id. at 2018–24. The Lange
Court noted that the exigent-circumstances exception was designed for
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situations presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure
a warrant.” Id. at 2017 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013)).
The exigent-circumstances exception, according to the Lange Court, was “case
specific.” Id. at 2018.
Each year, millions of Americans are prosecuted for misdemeanors. Many
commentators have noted, generally unfavorably, about the presence of
misdemeanor crimes in every aspect of the American life. See, e.g., Issa Kohler-
Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 611,
629–39 (2014) (outlining and discussing the data demonstrating the dramatic
rise in misdemeanors beginning in the mid-1990s in New York City); Sandra G.
Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson, Misdemeanors by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L.
Rev. 971, 1014–19 (2020) (discussing her takeaways from misdemeanor data,
including that misdemeanor systems affect a tremendous number of people and
disproportionately affect people of color). Given the ubiquity of misdemeanor
offenses, a low bar to warrantless entry of the home would give police discretion
that resembles a general warrant and is subject to arbitrary enforcement. As
noted in a recent federal appellate court case, “[I]f the presumption against
warrantless entries stemming from minor crimes is to have any meaning, the
exigency must be a serious one in that context.” Smith v. Stoneburner, 716 F.3d
926, 931 (6th Cir. 2013). Otherwise, simple misdemeanors could lead to millions
of home invasions for, say, violation of a noise ordinance. Bash v. Patrick, 608 F.
Supp. 2d 1285, 1290 (M.D. Ala 2009).
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4. Does opening the door to the home open the door to a warrantless search
of misdemeanants? An important issue percolating through the search and
seizure cases is whether a resident who opens the door to respond to the knock
of officers surrenders the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment or similar
state constitutional provisions where the officers have probable cause to believe
the resident has committed a misdemeanor.
Recent court cases have focused on Santana, 427 U.S. 38. In Santana,
police drove to the home of Santana and found her in the doorway of her home.
Id. at 40. When they got out of their vehicles, Santana retreated into her home’s
vestibule. Id. The officers followed her into the house and discovered heroin. Id.The Santana Court upheld the warrantless search. Id. at 43. The Santana
Court emphasized, however, that the case involved “a realistic expectation that
any delay would result in destruction of evidence.” Id. Further, the case involved
a felony. Id. at 41. Finally, because of the location of Santana standing in her
doorway looking, the incident “ha[d] been set in motion in a public place.” Id.Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Lange addressed the
meaning of Santana in the context of whether it should be broadly construed to
permit warrantless entry into the home to arrest misdemeanants. Lange,
141 S. Ct. at 2019. The Lange Court answered the question in the negative. Id.
at 2019–20. The Lange Court emphasized that in Santana, the crime that
generated the pursuit involved a felony, not a misdemeanor. Id. at 2020. Further,
the Lange Court reasoned that the facts in Santana showed exigent
circumstances because there was an appreciable risk of destruction of evidence.
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Id. at 2018. But the Lange Court held that Santana did not authorize warrantless
entry to arrest misdemeanants. Id. at 2020. According to Lange, the members of
the Court “are not eager—more the reverse—to print a new permission slip for
entering the home without a warrant.” Id. at 2019.
5. New crime exception to the exclusionary rule. The exception to the
exclusionary rule urged by the State in this case is the new crime exception. As
explained in Dawdy, under the new crime exception: “Even though an initial
arrest is unlawful, a defendant has no right to resist the arrest. If the defendant
does so, probable cause exists for a second arrest for resisting. A search incident
to the second arrest is lawful.” Id.
The new crime exception has not been universally endorsed. Two cases are
worthy of note. In Jones v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected
application of the new crime exception in a case where the new crime was
resisting arrest. 745 A.2d 856, 873–74 (Del. 1999). According to the Jones court,
to contend that evidence that was obtained pursuant to an unlawful Terry-type
stop is admissible because of events that occurred because of the illegal conduct
is “a bootstrap analysis.” Id. at 873. Similarly, in State v. Beauchesne, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court rejected application of the new crime exception where
an officer unlawfully grabbed a defendant who then threw something away.
868 A.2d 972, 975, 983–84 (N.H. 2005). Subsequent search of the defendant’s
person revealed cocaine. Id. at 975. The Beauchesne court engaged in a
balancing analysis, concluding that the interest in enforcing the law regarding
resisting arrest had to be weighed against the abuse that could occur if evidence
22
obtained as a result of an illegal arrest was used against a defendant. Id. at 983–
84.
C. Discussion. We begin by considering whether Wilson had a
constitutional interest in protecting her home under the facts presented. We
conclude that she did. Wilson only opened the door as necessary to respond to
Miller’s knock. She did not expose herself or her apartment to the public in plain
view. And, she sought to close the door, as she was entitled to do, after an
unproductive exchange with Miller. It is hard to see how such conduct
surrendered Wilson’s expectation of privacy and permitted police to enter her
apartment to effect a custodial arrest. See Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 27
(1st Cir. 2017) (finding no surrender of privacy when answering door in response
to a knock); United States v. Allen, 813 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[W]here law
enforcement officers have summoned a suspect to the door of his home, and he
remains inside the home’s confines, they may not effect a warrantless ‘across the
threshold’ arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances.”); LaLonde v. County
of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no surrender of privacy
where officers were standing at the doorway and the defendant was a few feet
inside door answering questions and holding that subsequent crossing of
threshold was an illegal entry); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1387
(7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the right to privacy is not surrendered by answering
the door in response to a knock and recognizing that the right to close the door
to one’s dwelling and exclude people from entering is one of the most important
elements of personal privacy); United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d at 229 (4th Cir.
23
1990) (holding that partially opening a door to determine the identity of persons
knocking on the door does not surrender privacy in the home); State v. Maland,
103 P.3d 430, 435 (Idaho 2004) (recognizing that there is no surrender of
expectation of privacy when opening a door in response to a knock); see also
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 470 (2011) (“[E]ven if an occupant chooses to
open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not allow the
officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer any questions at any
time.”).
We think Santana is not applicable in this case. In Santana, when the
suspect spotted police coming toward her home to conduct an arrest without a
warrant, she retreated to the confines of her home. 427 U.S. at 40. Further, when
they arrested the defendant, the defendant was standing on her threshold and
was thus in a “public” place where “[s]he was not merely visible to the public but
was as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been
standing completely outside her house.” Id. at 42. Here, Wilson was not standing
outside her home when the encounter began and was not standing on the
threshold of her home when she was arrested. She was inside her home and only
opened the door a crack when she heard a knock at the door. She then sought
to terminate the encounter. We do not believe under these circumstances that
Wilson abandoned any privacy of the home beyond what police officers could see
through the partially opened doorway.
Further, the reasonable expectation of privacy test is not the only test to
determine whether the officers acted unlawfully when they entered the
24
apartment. In Wright, we stated that “[w]ithin the meaning of article I, section 8,
an officer acts unreasonably when, without a warrant, the officer physically
trespasses on protected property.” 961 N.W.2d at 416. Here, the officers violated
article I, section 8 when they committed a trespass. As Miller’s body camera
footage clearly shows, he put his foot in the door so Wilson could not close it. He
was asked by Wilson to remove his foot from her home six times. When asked to
show her a search warrant authorizing his presence at her home, Miller told
Wilson “I don’t need a warrant.” And, finally, the officers proceeded to enter the
apartment to arrest Wilson, clearly without her consent.
The next question is whether probable cause that Wilson committed minor
crimes was sufficient to justify a warrantless search of her apartment. We think
not. In Welsh, the Supreme Court declared it is a categorical rule that only
“rarely” should a misdemeanor support the warrantless search of the home.
466 U.S. at 753. The Supreme Court in Lange made it clear that the
proportionality theme in Welsh was not limited to civil infractions but to “minor”
infractions. Lange, 141 S. Ct. at 2020–22.
We do not find that Santana supports the State’s position. In Santana, the
entry into the defendant’s house was justified by the exigent circumstance of
“hot pursuit” of a fleeing felon. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42–43. There was no hot
pursuit of a fleeing felon in this case. Wilson committed only a simple
misdemeanor. Further, while on appeal, the State claims that there was
reasonable suspicion that Wilson was engaged in disorderly conduct, a
misdemeanor, that issue was not presented to the district court and is not
25
preserved on appeal. In any event, a different misdemeanor does not change our
analysis of Welsh and Santana.
In short, there were two unlawful invasions of Wilson’s home. The first
occurred when the officer put his hand on the door and foot past the threshold.
The second occurred when Miller and McPherson entered the apartment to make
the arrest on Wilson.
Finally, we consider the new crime exception to the exclusionary rule. The
new crime exception is a relatively obscure and rarely invoked exception to the
exclusionary rule. This court first recognized the exception in 1995 in Dawdy,
533 N.W.2d 551. Dawdy involved an automobile stop that the defendant alleged
was unlawful. Id. at 552. In Dawdy, this court assumed that the initial stop was
unlawful. Id. at 553. After the stop, the defendant resisted arrest. Id. at 554. The
Dawdy court declared: “Even though an initial arrest is unlawful, a defendant
has no right to resist the arrest. If the defendant does so, probable cause exists
for a second arrest for resisting. A search incident to the second arrest is lawful.”
Id. at 555.
The Dawdy court stated that strong policy reasons underlie this rule,
noting that a contrary rule would virtually immunize a defendant from
prosecution for all crimes the defendant might commit that have a sufficient
causal connection to the police misconduct. Id. Further, extending the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from arrest for a new crime
gives the defendant an intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts
so long as they are sufficiently connected to the chain of causation started by
26
the police misconduct. Id. The Dawdy court reasoned that this result is too far-
reaching and too high a price for society to pay in order to deter police
misconduct. Id.Wilson does not respond to the State’s assertion that federal law recognizes
a new crime exception to the Fourth Amendment. Further, she does not suggest
that a different standard than that found in the federal caselaw should be applied
under the Iowa Constitution. Under these circumstances, we use the standards
for the new crime exception under federal law, but we reserve the right to apply
the exception in a different fashion. See NextEra Energy Res. LLC v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 815 N.W.2d 30, 45 (Iowa 2012); State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 650
(Iowa 2012); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).
Wilson also advances the statutory argument that her conduct did not fall
within the scope of Iowa Code section 719.1(1)(a) because her initial arrest
violated the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8. Because her arrest was
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8, Wilson reasons
that the arrest was not “within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of [the]
officer.” Iowa Code § 719.1(1)(a). She further suggests that, in any event, there
was insufficient evidence to support her conviction of interference with official
acts.
We first address the question of whether interference with official acts
occurred when the officers made an unlawful entry. The precise question, at least
in Wilson’s appellate brief, is whether officers are acting “within the scope of their
lawful duties and authorities” when they enter an apartment to make an arrest
27
that turns out to be an unconstitutional seizure. This specific question was not
addressed in Dawdy.
The question is impacted—if not controlled—by State v. Thomas,
262 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1978). In Thomas, this court considered whether a
defendant could be convicted of resisting arrest even though the arrests were
illegal. Id. at 610–11. Assuming the arrest to be illegal, we declared that “we
[were] not prepared to endorse or excuse their resistance []hereto.” Id. at 610. We
noted that Iowa had enacted a statute expressly stating that “[a] person is not
authorized to use force to resist an arrest, either of [the person’s self] or another[,]
. . . by a peace officer . . . , even if the person believes that the arrest is unlawful
or the arrest is in fact unlawful.” Id. at 611 (quoting Iowa Code § 804.12 (Supp.
1977)). Further, we overruled our prior cases regarding common law immunity
for resisting unlawful arrests. Id. at 610–11. Although the Thomas case is not a
model of clarity, it appears to endorse the notion that when the statute refers to
“legal authority” to make arrests, it does not exclude arrests that later turn out
to be unlawful under and seizure principles. Id. at 611.
Notwithstanding the above, our examination of the transcript of the
hearing on the motion to suppress and the order of the district court reveals that
the question of interpretation of the statutory language in Iowa Code
section 719.1(1)(a) was not presented to or decided by the district court. As a
result, the question is not preserved. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532,
537–41 (Iowa 2002).
28
The next question is whether Wilson was actually engaged in interference
with official acts by resisting arrest. Examination of the bodycam video footage
is the key. At the outset, we note that the standard for establishing a violation of
the interference with official acts statute is generally fairly low. As noted in
Lawyer, “[t]he key question is whether the officer’s actions were hindered.”
361 F.3d at 1107; see also State v. Donner, 243 N.W.2d 850, 864 (Iowa 1976)
(stating that evidence is sufficient where the person charged engaged in actual
opposition to the officer to the use of actual or constructive force). In our view,
the bodycam videos reveal that Wilson did hinder the arrest, not by her language,
her calls for a lawyer, or her profanity, but by her twisting and jostling around
while officers attempted to place handcuffs on her. It may be that the handcuffs
were originally uncomfortably placed, but she was not cooperative as police tried
to deal with the situation. It took several minutes to make the arrest. Given the
rather low standard for interference with official acts, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to support her conviction.
We now consider the application of the new crime exception to this case.
Based on our review of the record, Wilson threw the vial of cocaine on the floor
prior to her resisting arrest. The bodycam video of McPherson shows that he had
only approached Wilson and was at the very early stages of subduing her when
the drugs were thrown. Prior to throwing of the cocaine, there is no evidence yet
that Wilson was resisting arrest. Thus, McPherson saw the drug thrown prior to
the new crime of interference with official acts.
29
Whether the cocaine evidence was discovered prior to Wilson’s beginning
the new crime of interference as a result of the illegal entry of the officers raises
a timing question that has been considered by at least one federal court. In
United States v. Gaines, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether
the defendant’s commission of a crime after discovery of a gun by police is
admissible under the new crime exception. 668 F.3d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 2012).
The court said no. Id. at 174. The court employed the attenuation analysis of
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1963). Gaines, 668 F.3d at173–75. Where the new crime was committed after the discovery of the gun, the
new crime did not amount to an intervening act that severed the relationship of
the discovery of the gun to prior police illegality. Id. at 174–75. As a result, the
evidence of the gun was suppressed. Id. at 176. A similar approach was applied
in United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 730–31 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that
the exclusionary rule applied where police discovered a gun after an illegal
search but before the defendant shoved the police officer), and United States v.
Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 573–75 (6th Cir. 2011) (excluding evidence
discovered by police subsequent to illegal police action but before new crime of
attempted flight).
We find the analysis in Gaines persuasive. In this case, the white powder
and vial were not uncovered as a result of a new crime of interference, but as a
result of the original illegal entry. Because the discovery of the throwing of the
substance was not linked to the new crime but to the illegal entry, we conclude
it should have been suppressed.
30
This case involved a trial on the minutes. The minutes included reference
to the cocaine that should have been excluded. We think the job of excising
evidence that should have been suppressed from the minutes and considering
whether there is substantial evidence to support the conviction based on the
minutes is a question to be considered by the district court in the first instance.
We therefore vacate Wilson’s conviction of possession of cocaine and remand the
case to the district court for further proceedings.
IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, we affirm Wilson’s conviction of interference with
official acts but vacate Wilson’s conviction of possession of cocaine and remand
the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.