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State of Iowa v. Khasif Rasheed White ( 2017 )


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  •                                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-0829
    Filed September 14, 2016
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
    vs.
    KHASIF RASHEED WHITE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey D. Farrell,
    Judge.
    A juvenile offender appeals his sentence claiming it was unconstitutional
    SEP 14, 2016
    and the district court lacked statutory authority to impose it. AFFIRMED.
    Jane M. White of Jane White Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant.
    ELECTRONICALLY FILED
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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    VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
    Khasif White appeals his sentence for three counts of robbery in the
    second degree—crimes committed as a juvenile—asserting the district court
    erred in its consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, which resulted in an
    unconstitutional sentence. He also claims the court lacked statutory authority to
    sentence him to a minimum term of imprisonment. Because we conclude the
    district court properly considered the Miller/Lyle1 sentencing factors and had
    statutory authority to sentence White to a minimum sentence, we affirm.
    I.     Background Facts and Proceedings
    White entered an Alford plea to three counts of second-degree robbery, in
    violation of Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.3 (2009). In conjunction with a
    plea agreement, White was sentenced to ten years on each count to be served
    concurrently. White’s sentence also included a seven-year mandatory minimum.
    At the time the crimes occurred, White was seventeen years old.
    Following our supreme court’s decision in Lyle, White filed a motion to
    correct illegal sentence.   White sought resentencing in accordance with the
    factors addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller, 132 S. Ct. at
    2468, as synthesized in Lyle.     Following a hearing, the district court denied
    White’s motion and left all aspects of the prior sentencing order in place,
    including the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence.                  In both its
    pronouncement on the record and written order, the court discussed the
    Miller/Lyle sentencing factors. Ultimately, the court decided the original sentence
    1
    See Miller v. Alabama, 
    132 S. Ct. 2455
    , 2468 (2012); State v. Lyle, 
    854 N.W.2d 378
    ,
    404 n.10 (Iowa 2014).
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    3
    was appropriate stating, “Removal of the mandatory minimum sentence is neither
    justified by the Lyle factors nor the general interests of protection of the public
    and defendant’s rehabilitation.” White appeals.
    II.    Standard of Review
    The applicable standard of review when a defendant challenges a
    sentence depends on the specific nature of the challenge. State v. Seats, 
    865 N.W.2d 545
    , 552–53 (Iowa 2015). When a defendant challenges the legality of
    the sentence on constitutional grounds, we review the sentence de novo. Id. at
    553.   However, when a defendant challenges the legality of a sentence on
    nonconstitutional grounds, such as a lack of statutory authority to impose a
    sentence, we review the sentence for correction of errors at law. Id.
    III.   Consideration of Miller/Lyle Factors
    White argues the district court erred in its consideration of the Miller/Lyle
    factors. Specifically, White claims the district court failed to fully consider some
    of the factors and improperly considered other factors as aggravating rather than
    mitigating. The State asserts the district court properly weighed all the Miller/Lyle
    factors and imposed a sentence within constitutional parameters.
    In Miller, the Supreme Court held mandatory life without parole sentences
    for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment. 
    132 S. Ct. at 2469
    . The
    Court mandated sentencing courts consider the differences between juvenile and
    adult offenders, including the individual distinctions in defendants and crimes. 
    Id. at 2469
    . Specifically, the Court pointed to:
    (1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful behavior,
    such as ‘immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
    consequences’; (2) the particular ‘family and home environment’
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    that surround the youth; (3) the circumstances of the particular
    crime and all circumstances relating to youth that may have played
    a role in the commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for
    youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and
    (5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.
    Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (citation omitted) (listing the Miller factors). In
    State v. Null, 
    836 N.W.2d 41
    , 74–75 (Iowa 2013), our supreme court discussed
    the Miller factors in detail and adopted them as factors to be considered when
    sentencing juvenile offenders in our state.
    In Lyle, our supreme court held all mandatory minimum sentences for
    juveniles unconstitutional under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. 854
    N.W.2d at 400. The court focused primarily on the differences between adults
    and juveniles. Id. at 402 (“Mandatory minimum sentencing results in cruel and
    unusual punishment due to the differences between children and adults.”). While
    the court prohibited the mandatory imposition of a minimum sentence to juvenile
    offenders, the court did not preclude the possibility of a sentencing judge
    ordering a minimum period of incarceration for juvenile offenders. Id. at 402–03.
    In describing the parameters sentencing judges must consider in resentencing
    juveniles previously sentenced under the mandatory minimum statute, the Lyle
    court endorsed the factors outlined in Miller. Id. at 404 n.10.
    Because White was a juvenile when the crimes he pled to were
    committed, the district court was required to consider the five Miller/Lyle factors
    in resentencing White. See id. The court acknowledged its duty to apply the
    Miller/Lyle factors and specifically weighed each factor in resentencing White.
    The court noted that: (1) the three separate and distinct robberies committed by
    White weighed against a finding of immaturity and impetuosity; (2) White’s home
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    and family life was difficult due to his father’s negative influence; (3) White had
    committed three separate offenses—two which were described as shoplifting and
    one which was more of a “classic” robbery; (4) White faced some challenges in
    navigating the criminal justice system but was represented by “experienced and
    respected” counsel; and (5) White’s disciplinary record in prison showed “an
    unwillingness to change and lack of rehabilitation.” Between the written order
    and the record from the hearing, it is clear the court specifically considered each
    of the Miller/Lyle factors in resentencing White.
    Further, the district court did not improperly treat factors as aggravating
    rather than mitigating the punishment. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402 n.8 (“Clearly,
    these are all mitigating factors, and they cannot be used to justify a harsher
    sentence.” (emphasis in original)). Nothing in the court’s order indicates that the
    Miller/Lyle factors were used to impose a harsher sentence against White.
    Rather, the court determined that some factors did militate in favor of White, but
    the court explained that a majority of factors did not. Factors that do not mitigate
    the punishment are not necessarily factors that aggravate the punishment; the
    court simply concluded the factors did not mitigate in favor of a lesser sentence.
    Because the court properly considered each of the Miller/Lyle factors and
    because it considered the factors as mitigating, rather than aggravating, we
    conclude White’s sentence was constitutional.
    IV.    Statutory Authority to Impose a Minimum Sentence
    White next claims the district court lacked statutory authority to impose a
    minimum sentence because he asserts section 902.12—the mandatory minimum
    statute—was declared unconstitutional in Lyle and is no longer available.
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    White’s claim misconstrues Lyle. Section 902.12 was not declared categorically
    unconstitutional in Lyle; rather, the constitutional infirmity arose when the statute
    was applied mandatorily to juvenile offenders.        Id. at 402.   The Lyle court
    explicitly held a minimum sentence could still be imposed on juvenile offenders
    after an individualized sentencing hearing:
    It is important to be mindful that the holding in this case does not
    prohibit judges from sentencing juveniles to prison for the length of
    time identified by the legislature for the crime committed, nor does it
    prohibit the legislature from imposing a minimum time that youthful
    offenders must serve in prison before being eligible for parole.
    Article I, section 17 only prohibits the one-size-fits-all mandatory
    sentencing for juveniles.
    Id. at 403. The district court followed the precise procedure outlined in Lyle and
    left White’s minimum sentence in place. We conclude the court had statutory
    authority to impose a minimum sentence.
    V.     Conclusion
    As we conclude the district court properly considered all of the Miller/Lyle
    factors in resentencing White and had authority to impose a minimum sentence,
    we affirm the district court’s ruling and White’s sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
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    State of Iowa Courts
    Case Number                     Case Title
    15-0829                         State v. White
    Electronically signed on 2016-09-14 08:23:04
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Document Info

Docket Number: 15-0829

Filed Date: 10/27/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/8/2018