Gertrude K. Godfrey Vs. State Of Iowa ( 2008 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 94 / 05–1691
Filed June 20, 2008
GERTRUDE K. GODFREY,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F.
Staskal, Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of district court’s dismissal of her claim
for lack of standing. AFFIRMED.
Mark S. Soldat, West Des Moines, and Martin Ozga of Max Schott
& Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Julie F. Pottorff, Deputy
Attorney General, and Grant K. Dugdale, Assistant Attorney General, for
appellee.
Richard J. Sapp and John T. Clendenin of Nyemaster, Goode,
West, Hansell & O’Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for amicus curiae,
Christopher J. Rants, as Speaker of the Iowa House of Representatives,
Eighty-First General Assembly.
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CADY, Justice.
This appeal involves a claim by a litigant that the Iowa legislature
violated the single-subject rule of the Iowa Constitution in enacting a
comprehensive statute during a special extraordinary legislative session
in 2004. The district court concluded the litigant had no standing to
assert the claim and dismissed the action without addressing the merits.
On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On September 7, 2004, the Iowa General Assembly met at the
State Capitol for a special one-day, extraordinary legislative session. See
Iowa Const. art. IV, § 11 (“[The governor] may, on extraordinary
occasions, convene the general assembly by proclamation, and shall
state to both houses, when assembled, the purpose for which they shall
have been convened.”). The legislature promptly approved House File
2581, 80th G.A., 1st Extraordinary Sess., § 11, and the measure was
signed into law by Governor Thomas J. Vilsack. See 2004 Iowa Acts ch.
1001.
The special session followed our decision in Rants v. Vilsack, 684
N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 2004). In that case, we held the governor had no
authority under the constitution to line-item veto portions of a bill
passed by the legislature in 2003. Rants, 684 N.W.2d at 207–10. We
further held that the exercise of the power by the governor operated,
under our constitution, to veto the entirety of the bill. Id. at 210–12.
The background of the bill (H.F. 692) was chronicled in our decision, and
the bill was widely considered to be an important governmental initiative
to stimulate and develop the state’s economy. Id. at 197–98. The
legislation was complex and lengthy, but generally created and funded
an Iowa values fund and included provisions for tax and regulatory
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reform. Id. The values fund was the focal point of the legislation. The
provisions vetoed by the governor mostly dealt with changes in the tax
code, products liability legislation, and workers’ compensation, as well as
various provisions the governor believed would disrupt the operation of
the Department of Economic Development and the governor’s office. Id.
On August 27, 2004, two months after we declared the 2003 bill
never passed into law due to the exercise of the line-item veto, Governor
Vilsack issued a proclamation for an extraordinary session of the General
Assembly to address the Iowa Values Fund and matters relating to the
economic security of Iowa. The governor outlined the items—to be
addressed at the special session—that he would sign into law.
Ultimately, a single bill was proposed through a compromise and the
efforts of the governor and the General Assembly. The bill covered nine
points or divisions: (1) The Endow Iowa Grants Program; (2) statutes
governing supersedeas bonds; (3) workers’ compensation laws; (4) the
Iowa Consumer Credit Code; (5) the Loan and Credit Guarantee Program;
(6) interest earned on the Unemployment Compensation Reserve Fund;
(7) marketing strategies to expand and stimulate the state economy; (8)
accelerated bonus depreciation and expensing allowance for businesses;
and (9) re-creation of the Grow Iowa Values Board, the Economic
Development Marketing Board, and the Loan and Credit Guarantee
Advisory Board. 2004 Iowa Acts ch. 1001.
A separate appropriation bill funded contracts under the special
legislation and approved the projects previously approved by the Iowa
Values Fund Board prior to the date House File 692 was declared
unconstitutional.
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The title to the bill read:
AN ACT concerning regulatory, taxation, and statutory
requirements affecting individuals and business relating to
economic development, workers’ compensation, financial
services, unemployment compensation employer surcharges,
income taxation bonus depreciation and expensing
allowances, and civil action appeal bonds, and including
effective date, applicability, and retroactive applicability
provisions.
Id. The division of the bill dealing with workers’ compensation included a
provision that changed compensation benefits for successive injuries. Id.
§ 11.
On October 4, 2003, Gertrude K. Godfrey filed a petition for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in district court against the
State. Godfrey is a resident of Sioux City and a taxpayer in this state.
She also received workers’ compensation benefits in the past based on
two prior work-related injuries. She sustained an injury to her knee in
2001 and an injury to her lower back in April 2004. Godfrey claimed
House File 2581 violated the single-subject rule of article III, section 29
of our state constitution. She asked the law be declared unenforceable.
The district court denied injunctive relief and ultimately dismissed
her petition. It held Godfrey had no standing to bring the claim, and the
court refused to rule on the merits of her claim that the bill was
unconstitutional in violation of the single-subject rule.
Godfrey filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, she claims she had
standing to bring the action based on her status as a citizen, taxpayer,
and a potential workers’ compensation claimant. She also asserts she
should be exempted from the general requirement of standing based on
the important public interest presented by her claim. In addition,
Godfrey asks the merits of her claim be addressed on appeal.
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II. Standard of Review.
We review claims based on a violation of our state constitution
de novo. Kistler v. City of Perry, 719 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Iowa 2006). We
review a decision by the district court to dismiss a case based on the lack
of standing for errors at law. Birkhofer ex rel. Johannsen v. Birkhofer,
610 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Iowa 2000).
III. Justiciability of a Claim the Legislature Violated the
Single-Subject Rule of the Iowa Constitution in Enacting a Statute.
Courts have traditionally been cautious in exercising their
authority to decide disputes. As a result, a variety of rules of self-
restraint have been developed over the years, one of which has surfaced
in this case. Generally, courts refuse to decide disputes presented in a
lawsuit when the party asserting an issue is not properly situated to seek
an adjudication. See Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Iowa
2005). This doctrine is now called standing, although it began to develop
as a doctrinal rule long before a designation of its title.1 Today, the
doctrine not only serves to limit which persons may bring a lawsuit, but
1Our first case to use the word “standing” in the context of a challenge to the
right to sue was Iowa Life Insurance Co. v. Black Hawk County, 190 Iowa 777, 180 N.W.
721 (1921). In that case, we applied the rule that a party who seeks to challenge a
statute must show the statute infringed upon a personal right. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 190
Iowa at 782, 180 N.W. at 722–23. However, the word “standing” was actually used only
as a synonym for the “right” to sue, not as a doctrinal heading. Id. The substantive
rule was developed in earlier cases without using the word “standing.” See State v.
Nebraska Tel. Co., 127 Iowa 194, 197, 103 N.W. 120, 121 (1905) (expressing rule that a
party cannot challenge the constitutionality of a statute unless personal rights were
affected). Similarly, the doctrine of standing developed in federal courts prior to the
time it developed its doctrinal label. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing,
98 Yale L.J. 221, 225–26 (1988). One of the first cases to use the word “stand” in a
context of the right to sue was Mississippi & Missouri R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 45,
491 (1862). In that case, the defendant argued the plaintiff did not “stand” in a position
to bring the lawsuit. As with federal law, the origins of our modern doctrine of standing
can be traced to the administrative law movement that surfaced in the last half of the
twentieth century, as well as the accompanying growth of public-interest litigation—
primarily geared at the enforcement of constitutional values—that began to sweep the
country. Fletcher, 98 Yale L.J. at 225–28.
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it has developed into a larger cultural doctrine, concerned with the “ ‘role
of the courts in a democratic society.’ ” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
750, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 569 (1984) (quoting Worth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 354
(1975)).
We have frequently described our test for standing by identifying
two elements. A plaintiff “ ‘must (1) have a specific personal or legal
interest in the litigation and (2) be injuriously affected.’ ” Alons, 698
N.W.2d at 864 (quoting Citizens for Responsible Choices v. City of
Shenandoah, 686 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Iowa 2004)). While these two
elements frame the essence of our standing doctrine, they were derived
from earlier cases involving challenges to administrative agency action
and do not fully capture the later development of our doctrine, especially
as to actions to enforce public constitutional values by private
individuals. See City of Des Moines v. PERB, 275 N.W.2d 753, 759 (Iowa
1979) (adopting the twofold test of standing derived from administrative
agency cases involving statutes modeled after the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act); John C. Reitz, Standing to Raise
Constitutional Issues, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 437, 442–43 (2002). We have
frequently supplemented and elaborated on these elements by drawing
on the federal law on standing. See Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 869
(recognizing federal authority on standing to be persuasive); Sanchez v.
State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 821 (Iowa 2005) (citing federal test for standing
with approval). In fact, our doctrine on standing parallels the federal
doctrine, even though standing under federal law is fundamentally
derived from constitutional strictures not directly found in the Iowa
Constitution. See Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 867, 869 (recognizing the power
of federal courts to decide cases is restricted by the “cases” and
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“controversies” clause of article III). Most all jurisdictions around the
country share prudential restrictions on judicial action based on policy
grounds that help explain a general, compatible approach to standing.
See Reitz, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. at 459–61 (recognizing “most states”
essentially follow the federal-standing doctrine, but also citing differences
in state and federal law). Thus, we return to our general two-prong test
of standing to consider how it has been more fully augmented by parallel
federal law, as well as our own cases, over the years.
We have previously recognized our two elements of standing are
separate requirements. Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 864 (“Having a legal
interest in the litigation and being injuriously affected are separate
requirements.”). However, we acknowledge these elements have much in
common and often are considered together. The first element—the
plaintiff has a specific personal or legal interest—is aligned with the
general concept of standing that a party who advances a legal claim must
have a special interest in the challenged action, “as distinguished from a
general interest.” City of Des Moines, 275 N.W.2d at 759. The second
requirement—the plaintiff must be injuriously affected—means the
plaintiff must be “injured in fact.” United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14, 93 S. Ct. 2405,
2417 n.14, 37 L. Ed. 2d 254, 270 n.14 (1973) (stating “injury in fact”
reflects the requirement under the administrative procedure act that the
person be “adversely affected,” and “it serves to distinguish a person with
a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation—even though small—from a
person with a mere interest in the problem”). This requirement
recognizes the need for the litigant to show some “specific and
perceptible harm” from the challenged action, distinguished from those
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citizens who are outside the subject of the action but claim to be affected.
Id.
This two-prong Iowa test parallels the landmark test established in
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 90 S. Ct. 827, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970). In that case, the Court
abandoned the traditional “legal interest” test for standing. Data
Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S. Ct. at 830, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 188. This
restrictive test essentially required a litigant to satisfy standing by
showing some personal interference with a common-law, statutory, or
constitutional right. Id. In its place, the Court adopted a more expansive
twofold test for the complaining litigant to allege both an “injury in fact”
and that “the interest sought to be protected by the complainant to be
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id.
Since Data Processing, the Supreme Court has mentioned the
“zone of interest” portion of the test infrequently, and has instead
developed an expansive body of law of standing under the injury-in-fact
component of the test. See Fletcher, 98 Yale L.J. at 257–58. The corpus
of law surrounding the injury-in-fact element has essentially identified
the various types of injuries that support standing under this criterion.
See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93
Cornell L. Rev. 275, 276–77, 290–99 (2008). Nevertheless, it is clear the
“zone of interest” element is not a continuation of the old “legal interest”
test for standing, and this element does not relate to the legal merits of
the claim. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153, 90 S. Ct. at 830, 25
L. Ed. 2d at 188. If anything, the approach followed by the United States
Supreme Court reveals the injury-in-fact requirement is frequently
suitable to resolve most constitutional claims, while the zone-of-interest
9
test continues to influence administrative agency claims. See Clarke v.
Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16, 107 S. Ct. 750, 758 n.16, 93
L. Ed. 2d 757, 769 n.16 (1987) (observing “zone of interest” test is
infrequently used outside claims under the administrative procedure
act).
Although we continue to spotlight both elements of the test when
presented with an issue of standing, we have slightly altered the first
requirement of our two-prong test to show a personal or legal interest to
better conform to the federal test. Prior to Citizens for Responsible
Choices, the first element required the plaintiff to have a specific,
“personal, and legal interest.” Hawkeye Bancorp. v. Iowa Coll. Aid
Comm’n, 360 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Iowa 1985) (emphasis added).
Consequently, we began to refer to claims by litigants to enforce public
interests as an exception to the “personal and legal interest”
requirement. See Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 864–65. However, in Citizens for
Responsible Choices, we changed the conjunctive “and” to “or,” which
correctly revealed that the interest involved can either be personal or
legal. See id. at 863–64. This change aligned our test with the approach
taken in Data Processing that standing does not depend on the legal
merits of a claim. See Citizens for Responsible Choices, 686 N.W.2d at
475. Instead, the legal-interest component of the test remains a part of
our Iowa law on standing, but only as an alternative to the personal-
interest component of the test.
A consequence of identifying alternative tests under our first
element of standing is that it is unnecessary for us to continue to
consider standing involving claims to enforce public rights as a “public
interest” exception to our former narrow rule (requiring that a litigant
must establish both a personal interest and a legal interest to establish
10
standing). See Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 865–69. Instead, cases involving
actions by private persons to enforce public rights may be brought under
the personal-interest alternative to the first element. In other words, this
approach brings our rule into alignment with the approach taken by
federal courts and allows us to focus on the factual-injury element of
standing by considering the types of injuries a litigant must show to
satisfy the test. This approach has been especially significant in cases
involving actions to vindicate the public interest through challenges to
governmental action. We no longer require the litigant to allege a
violation of a private right and do not require traditional damages to be
suffered. Instead, we require the litigant to allege some type of injury
different from the population in general. A good example of our approach
is found in Hurd v. Odgaard, 297 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1990).
In Hurd, two lawyers who were users of the county courthouse
brought a mandamus action to compel the county to repair the
crumbling, decaying building. 297 N.W.2d at 356. In addressing
standing, we flatly rejected the notion that monetary or traditional
damages were required to be shown by a private litigant to support
standing to enforce the public interest at stake. Id. at 357. Instead, we
found that the factual-injury component to support standing could be
derived from intangible, noneconomic interests. Id. at 358. While the
lawyers were identified as citizens and taxpayers with an interest in the
safety and maintenance of the building, their status as users of the
building is what actually gave rise to the identifiable injury to support
standing. Id. As citizens who use the courthouse “to pay taxes, obtain
licenses, record instruments, and attend court,” the lawyers had an
individual interest in the safety and conservation of the building that was
directly affected by the alleged inaction by the county. Id. Thus,
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litigants who share intangible interests “in common with all other
citizens” must also identify some individual connection with the affected
subject matter to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. This injury
component, of course, captures more than economic loss and includes
conservational and other intangible interests.
This same broad approach to the injury requirement can be
observed in cases involving claims by private litigants of illegal action by
government that theoretically results in marginally higher taxes to the
litigant or some similar tax burden. In Richards v. Iowa Department of
Revenue & Finance, 454 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 1990), we held a taxpayer had
standing to challenge a decision to grant a property tax exemption to a
private, nonprofit community living center for the elderly because the
decision had the effect of placing a greater tax burden on the litigant.
454 N.W.2d at 576. Similarly, in Elview Construction Co. v. North Scott
Community School District, 373 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 1985), we held an
individual taxpayer who lived in the school district had standing to
challenge the actions of a school district in awarding construction
contracts allegedly in violation of bidding procedures. 373 N.W.2d at
142. Even though the bidding statutes exist to protect the public in
general, an individual injury to support standing is recognized to exist for
taxpayers who pay for the construction project. Id.
On the other hand, our recent case of Alons illustrates that not all
intangible interests satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. In that case,
we held that a general, abstract grievance concerning the authority of the
district court to terminate a civil union between two women was
insufficient to support standing in an action by married citizens,
taxpayers, a pastor and church, and state and federal legislators. Alons,
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698 N.W.2d at 870. The claimants only identified a general interest in
the issue, not an injury in fact.
The United States Supreme Court has also drawn the line at
“abstract” claims. In particular, the Court has consistently rejected
standing based on the general interest of a litigant in having government
act pursuant to the law. Allen, 468 U.S. at 754, 104 S. Ct. at 3326, 82
L. Ed. 2d at 571 (denying standing to bring a claim for an “ ‘abstract
injury in nonobservance of the Constitution’ ” (quoting Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 n.13, 94 S. Ct.
2925, 2933 n.13, 41 L. Ed. 2d 706, 720 n.13 (1974))). Such claims
present only a generalized grievance because “ ‘all citizens [have an
interest] in constitutional governance.’ ” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 160, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1725, 109 L. Ed. 2d 135, 148 (1990) (quoting
Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217, 94 S. Ct. at 2930, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 716)
(holding citizen had no standing to bring an Eighth Amendment
challenge to the execution of another person because the lawsuit only
alleged a general interest in government acting in compliance with the
Constitution). Likewise, psychological and mental injuries caused by the
failure of government to obey the Constitution do not support standing.
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485–86, 102 S. Ct. 752, 765–66, 70 L. Ed. 2d
700, 718 (1982); see Bermudez v. TRC Holdings, Inc., 138 F.3d 1176,
1180 (7th Cir. 1998) (“If unease on observing wrongs perpetrated against
others were enough to support litigation, all doctrines of standing and
justiciability would be out the window.”). A specific invasion of a right
“must be suffered” by the litigant. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 224 n.14, 94
S. Ct. at 2394 n.14, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 721 n.14.
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While both Iowa and federal case law on the application of
standing to public-interest litigation has largely focused on the type of
factual injury required to support standing, federal law has also
developed additional elements that are particularly applicable when the
“asserted injury arises from government’s allegedly unlawful regulation
(or lack of regulation) of someone else,” as opposed to cases in which the
“plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or foregone action) at issue.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62, 112 S. Ct. 2130,
2137, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364–65 (1992). Under such a circumstance,
the plaintiff must establish “a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of” and that the injury is “ ‘likely,’ as opposed to
merely ‘speculative,’ to be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Id. at
561–62, 112 S. Ct. at 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 364–65 (quoting Simon v. E.
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41–42, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1926, 48
L. Ed. 2d 450, 460 (1976)). These two additional considerations largely
relate to the prudential concerns we have recognized, and we too have
relied on them to resolve standing claims in the past. For example, in
Citizens for Responsible Choices, we were presented with an action by a
group of citizens who sought a declaration that a public-improvement
project was illegal because the bonds to finance the project were allegedly
issued in violation of the law. 686 N.W.2d at 472. The project included
the construction of a recreational lake and park on land owned or rented
by the citizens. Id. We held the citizens group had no standing to
challenge the action in the issuance of the revenue bonds because the
injury claimed came from the project itself, not the governmental action
in the issuance of the bonds. Id. at 475. To borrow from the federal
language, the injury was not “fairly traceable” to the challenged action.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S. Ct. at 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 364.
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With this legal framework in mind, we turn to the arguments
raised by Godfrey to support standing. Godfrey first characterizes her
claim as one to seek redress for a personal injury based on the
substantive workers’ compensation provisions contained in the
legislation claimed to have been enacted by the legislature in violation of
our constitution. She claims these provisions will limit any future
amount of benefits she would recover in the event she sustains another
work-related injury in the future. Thus, she presents herself as the
object of the legislative action. She claims this action caused a personal
injury and that the injury can be redressed by declaring the statute to be
unconstitutional.
Godfrey acknowledges the impact and meaning of the statute at
issue is uncertain and that her claim of a future injury is based on her
own interpretation of the statute.2 She admits the courts must
2The statute, Iowa Code section 85.34, provides:
7. Successive disabilities.
a. An employer is fully liable for compensating all of an
employee’s disability that arises out of and in the course of the
employee’s employment with the employer. An employer is not liable for
compensating an employee’s preexisting disability that arose out of and
in the course of employment with a different employer or from causes
unrelated to employment.
b. If an injured employee has a preexisting disability that was
caused by a prior injury arising out of and in the course of employment
with the same employer, and the preexisting disability was compensable
under the same paragraph of section 85.34, subsection 2, as the
employee’s present injury, the employer is liable for the combined
disability that is caused by the injuries, measured in relation to the
employee’s condition immediately prior to the first injury. In this
instance, the employer’s liability for the combined disability shall be
considered to be already partially satisfied to the extent of the percentage
of disability for which the employee was previously compensated by the
employer.
If, however, an employer is liable to an employee for a combined
disability that is payable under section 85.34, subsection 2, paragraph
“u”, and the employee has a preexisting disability that causes the
employee’s earnings to be less at the time of the present injury than if
the prior injury had not occurred, the employer’s liability for the
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ultimately interpret the meaning of the statute, and she makes no claim
of injury based on a denial of an opportunity to challenge the
interpretation of the statute in the future in the event she actually
suffers another work-related injury. This circumstance can impact a
variety of factors, including the speculativeness of the injury now alleged.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the loss of workers’
compensation benefits by a litigant is the type of injury that would give
rise to standing. We also recognize that we have said, “[o]nly a likelihood
or possibility of injury need be shown” to support standing. Iowa
Bankers Ass’n v. Iowa Credit Union Dep’t, 335 N.W.2d 439, 445 (Iowa
1983). Yet, the injury cannot be “conjectural” or “hypothetical,” but
must be “concrete” and “actual or imminent.” Alons, 698 N.W.2d at 867–
68. In Iowa Bankers Ass’n, the injury alleged to support standing
involved the competitive interests of banks affected by agency rules that
were claimed to give a competitive advantage to credit unions. 335
N.W.2d at 444. The likelihood of injury was demonstrated by allegations
that some banks had actually lost business in the past as a result of the
agency rules. Id. Importantly, the prior loss of business supported the
likelihood of an imminent injury to support standing. Id. at 444–45.
In this case, Godfrey claims a future injury based solely on her
status as a worker with a prior work-related injury covered by the
combined disability shall be considered to be already partially satisfied to
the extent of the percentage of disability for which the employee was
previously compensated by the employer minus the percentage that the
employee’s earnings are less at the time of the present injury than if the
prior injury had not occurred.
c. A successor employer shall be considered to be the same
employer if the employee became part of the successor employer’s
workforce through a merger, purchase, or other transaction that
assumes the employee into the successor employer’s workforce without
substantially changing the nature of the employee’s employment.
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workers’ compensation statute. Yet, this status does nothing to establish
the likelihood of an actual or immediate threat of another covered injury.
There is nothing to show that the future injury is not merely theoretical.
In fact, the injury asserted by Godfrey is the same type of future injury
that fell short of establishing standing in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983). There, the Court
found a plaintiff who had been arrested by police and subjected to a life-
threatening choke hold that had been approved for use by police under a
department policy had no standing to seek an injunction to prohibit the
future use of the choke hold by police. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111, 103
S. Ct. at 1670, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 690. The Court found the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate any immediate or continuing injury based on the prior
injury. Id. As in Lyons, Godfrey’s claim of injury lacks any immediacy to
support standing to raise a constitutional claim. The important fact is
that Godfrey’s prior status as a worker who has suffered a prior work-
related injury does not make it any more likely that she will suffer
another injury in the future.
Godfrey next asserts standing to challenge the alleged
constitutional deficiency in the legislation as a citizen and a taxpayer.
Godfrey claims citizens are legally injured when the legislature passes a
statute in violation of the constitution. In the same way, she argues her
status as a taxpayer allows her to vindicate the public interest in seeing
that the laws are properly enacted without demonstrating any pecuniary
damage.
While some legal challenges to governmental action can be
examined under theories of citizen and taxpayer standing, the litigant
must still demonstrate some personal injury connected with the alleged
unconstitutional act. A litigant cannot claim standing to challenge the
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actions of government based only on his status as a citizen. Alons, 698
N.W.2d at 865. In Hurd, the citizen-taxpayer litigants at least
established they were users of the government resource allegedly subject
to damage by inaction of the county. 297 N.W.2d at 358. The user
status of the litigants is what linked them to the affected building so as
to establish the necessary individual injury to support standing. A
general interest shared by all citizens in making sure government acts
legally is normally insufficient to support standing without such a link.
See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179–80, 94 S. Ct. 2940,
2948, 41 L. Ed. 2d 678, 689–90 (1974) (holding citizens lacked standing
to challenge statute when all citizens affected in the same way).
Similarly, a taxpayer acquires standing by showing some link between
higher taxes and the government action being challenged. See, e.g.,
Elview Constr. Co., 373 N.W.2d at 142.
While a citizen or taxpayer does not need to show pecuniary
damage, or some other traditional damage, some personal injury must be
demonstrated. In this case, Godfrey claims nothing more than the
general vindication of the public interest in seeing that the legislature
acts in conformity with the constitution. This is an admirable interest,
but not one that is alone sufficient to establish the personal injury
required for standing.
Godfrey next argues she has standing as a private litigant to assert
the rights of nonparty workers’ compensation claimants who are, in fact,
injured under the statute. She argues she is the only litigant in Iowa
who is able to assert a constitutional challenge to the statute because the
window of opportunity for other litigants to file a single-subject challenge
has passed. See State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Iowa 1990)
18
(holding no single-subject challenge to a statute may be brought after the
act is codified).
Third-party standing normally requires a litigant to establish the
parties not before the court, who have a direct stake in the litigation, are
either unlikely or unable to assert their rights. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 410, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 425 (1991). Even if
we assume the expiration of the narrow window of time to assert a
single-subject challenge meets this test, standing to bring actions on
behalf of third parties still requires the litigant to establish a personal
injury or stake in the application of the challenged statute. Id. at 410–
11, 111 S. Ct. at 1370–71, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 425 (providing that to
establish third-party standing, litigant must have suffered an “injury in
fact” so as to give the litigant a sufficient concrete interest in the outcome
of the dispute); ICLU v. Critelli, 244 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 1976) (holding
Iowa Civil Liberties Union and lawyers lacked standing to maintain
action to challenge a supervisory order of the court pertaining to the trial
of criminal cases—only defendants in the criminal cases had standing).
This critical element is not eliminated in third-party standing cases and
has not been demonstrated in this case.
Finally, Godfrey asks that we create an exception to our standing
doctrine that waives the requirement of standing in exceptional
circumstances involving issues of great public importance. Godfrey
claims her case presents such an exceptional circumstance and that we
should decide the constitutional question presented based on the
fundamental necessity of ensuring that the executive and legislative
branches of government do not overstep their constitutional limitations
and suppress the liberties of the people.
19
While Iowa, like many states, essentially follows the federal
doctrine on standing, states generally have greater freedom to develop
exceptions or to otherwise modify the doctrine on public-policy grounds.
As a self-imposed rule of restraint we, like other states, are free to shape
the doctrine into a form that best meets the concerns and ideals of our
role in the overall operation of government. See Hawkeye Bancorp., 360
N.W.2d at 802.
A number of states do permit litigants to raise issues of great
importance and interest to the public as a narrow exception to the
standing requirement. See Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1020 n.11
(Ariz. 1998) (citing additional jurisdictions); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of
Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); Sloan v.
Wilkins, 608 S.E.2d 579 (S.C. 2005). At least one state has even applied
the exception to a challenge to a broad economic development statute
claimed to be enacted in violation of the single-subject requirement of the
state constitution. Sloan, 608 S.E.2d at 583.
We believe our doctrine of standing in Iowa is not so rigid that an
exception to the injury requirement could not be recognized for citizens
who seek to resolve certain questions of great public importance and
interest in our system of government. In fact, we have previously
expressed a willingness to recognize a public-policy exception at the time
our standing rule was viewed to require a legal injury. Alons, 698
N.W.2d at 864–65; see Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787,
790 (Iowa 1994) (mentioning an argument based on the great public
importance exception to standing, but not considering it). Moreover, our
doctrine of self-imposed restraint was not created to keep us from
deciding critical public issues of the day, but was built upon a
foundation of prudential policies to promote the effective operation of our
20
courts and to define the proper role of the courts within our democratic
society. Thus, an exception to standing that conforms to the underlying
rationale for the doctrine should be recognized. On the other hand, we
cannot allow standing to transform into a loose doctrine. A principled
approach is required. Accordingly, the question in this case is whether
the circumstances alleged by Godfrey are sufficient to support such an
exception.
We begin our consideration of an exception to the standing
requirement cognizant of the policies that drive the standing rule. In a
broad sense, standing is deeply rooted in the separation-of-powers
doctrine and the concept that the branch of government with the
ultimate responsibility to decide the constitutionality of the actions of the
other two branches of government should only exercise that power
sparingly and in a manner that does not unnecessarily interfere with the
policy and executory functions of the two other properly elected branches
of government. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750, 104 S. Ct. at 3324, 82 L. Ed.
at 569. While this policy of standing has no specific constitutional basis
in Iowa, as it does in federal law, it is compatible with the overall
constitutional framework in this state and properly reflects our role in
relationship to the other two coequal branches of government. This
ultimate power to decide disputes between the other branches of
government and to determine the constitutionality of the acts of the other
branches of government does not exist as a form of judicial superiority,
but is a delicate and essential judicial responsibility found at the heart of
our superior form of government. We have the greatest respect for the
other two branches of government and exercise our power with the
greatest of caution.
21
Additionally, standing exists to ensure litigants are true
adversaries, which theoretically allows the case to be presented to the
court in the most effective manner. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678 (1962); Fletcher, 98 Yale
L.J. at 222. Similarly, standing helps ensure that the people most
concerned with an issue are in fact the litigants of the issue. Fletcher,
98 Yale L.J. at 222. Standing also ensures that a real, concrete case
exists to enable the court to feel, sense, and properly weigh the actual
consequences of its decision. Id. These policies drive our application of
standing and must be kept in the forefront as we consider circumstances
to support an exception or waiver of the standing requirement.
We next examine the issue presented. The claim in this case is
that the legislature violated the single-subject rule of article III, section
29 in enacting House File 2586. The constitutional provision at issue
provides, in part:
Every act shall embrace but one subject, and matters
properly connected therewith; which shall be expressed in
the title.
Iowa Const. art. III, § 29. This single sentence contains two separate
provisions derived from independent historical bases. Long v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 258 Iowa 1278, 1286, 142 N.W.2d 378, 383 (1966); see 1A
Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 17:1, at 5 (6th
ed. 2000) (“The prohibition against the inclusion of more than one
subject or object in the same act is invariably joined in the same
constitutional passage, often in the same sentence, with a requirement
that the subject or object be expressed in the title. They are, however,
separate and independent provisions, serving distinct constitutional
22
purposes.”) [hereinafter Singer]. Each provision serves distinct
constitutional purposes. Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383.
The first provision is referred to as the single-subject requirement.
It exists to “facilitate concentration on the meaning and wisdom of
independent legislative proposals or provisions.” Singer, at 5; Giles v.
State, 511 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Iowa 1994) (single-subject requirement
keeps legislators apprised of pending bills); Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142
N.W.2d at 383 (single-subject rule provides for an orderly legislative
process and allows the legislature to better grasp and more intelligently
discuss legislative proposals). The requirement forces “each legislative
proposal to stand on its own merits by preventing the ‘logrolling’ practice
of procuring diverse and unrelated matters to be passed as one
‘omnibus’ ” due to “the consolidated votes of the advocates of each
separate measure, when no single measure could have been passed on
its own merits.”3 Singer, at 5; see Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d
at 383. Likewise, the single-subject rule “prevents the attachment of
undesirable ‘riders’ on bills certain to be passed because of their
popularity or desirability.”4 Singer, at 5–6; see Giles, 511 N.W.2d at 625
(explaining the single-subject rule discourages passage of unfair
3
Unlike most state constitutions, the United States Constitution does not
contain a single-subject rule. See Brent R. Appel, Item Veto Litigation in Iowa: Marking
the Boundaries Between Legislative and Executive Power, 41 Drake L. Rev. 1, 5 (1992).
Consequently, “logrolling” is most commonly associated with federal legislation, under
additional labels of “earmarks” and “pork barreling.” Evidence of this practice is
frequently exposed by public interest groups. See Stephanie Hauffer & Travis McDade,
Of Disunity and Logrolling: Ohio’s One-Subject Rule and the Very Evils it Was Designed
to Prevent, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 557, 558 n.11 (2004).
4In Giles, we indicated that another purpose of the single-subject rule was to
“alert[] citizens to matters under legislative consideration.” 511 N.W.2d at 625. This
reason, however, is more closely aligned with the rationale for the companion rule that
the subject of a bill must be expressed in its title and is not identified as a primary
reason for the single-subject rule in our earlier cases. See Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142
N.W.2d at 383. Instead, the single-subject rule is viewed to complement and assist the
title-requirement purpose of eradicating stealth legislation. Id.
23
legislation on the coattails of more favorable proposals); Long, 258 Iowa
at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383.
The second provision requires the subject of a bill to be expressed
in the title. The primary purpose of this provision is to provide
reasonable notice of the purview of the act to the legislative members and
to the public. Giles, 511 N.W.2d at 625; Singer, at 40–41. The title
provides an easy “means for concerned parties to find out what a bill or
act is about without reading it in full.” Singer, at 5. The provision
ultimately serves to prevent surprise and fraud from being visited on the
legislature and the public. Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383.
Thus, the title requirement is directed more to the integrity of the
legislative process by preventing laws from being surreptitiously passed
with “provisions incongruous with the subject proclaimed in the title.”
Singer, at 50; see Long, 258 Iowa at 1286, 142 N.W.2d at 383 (title
provision primarily directed at legislative process). It surfaced as a
constitutional requirement as a result of public demand derived from a
prevailing sense that bills giving substantial grants to private parties
were often “smuggled through the legislature under an innocent and
deceptive title.” Long, 258 Iowa at 1287, 142 N.W.2d at 383.
Importantly, Godfrey does not challenge the title requirement of
article III, section 29. In fact, the title of House File 2581 is detailed and
comprehensive and identifies each provision of the bill. Instead, Godfrey
only challenges the single-subject requirement of article III, section 29 by
claiming the individual provisions of House File 2581 do not relate to the
same subject. Thus, Godfrey does not seek to vindicate any perpetration
of fraud or deceit on the legislature or the public that can occur by
infirmities in the title of a bill, but seeks to uphold the internal workings
of the legislative process that promotes and encourages legislators to
24
understand and debate the merits of each separate subject. We believe
this limited challenge by Godfrey plays a significant role in deciding
whether or not to waive standing.
While standing generally limits the exercise of our powers except
as to matters that are “strictly judicial in nature,” Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 819, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2317, 138 L. Ed. 2d 849, 858 (1997), we
become especially hesitant to act when asked to resolve disputes that
require us to decide whether an act taken by one of the other branches of
government was unconstitutional. Id. at 819–20, 117 S. Ct. at 2317–18,
138 L. Ed. 2d at 858. Without an individual injury by the complainant
under such circumstances, we risk assuming “a position of authority”
over the acts of another branch of government. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 574,
112 S. Ct. at 2143, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 373. We must avoid such a result.
Thus, standing should be waived only when the issue is of utmost
importance and the constitutional protections are most needed. We
therefore turn to consider if the claim raised by Godfrey is of great public
importance.
The absence of an allegation or claim by Godfrey that implicates
fraud, surprise, personal and private gain, or other such evils
inconsistent with the democratic legislative process diminishes our need
to intervene to determine if the legislature has violated a constitutional
mandate. The claim by Godfrey only permits her to argue that some of
the provisions of House File 2581 may not have been passed as separate
bills if the provisions had not been grouped together into one bill.
Moreover, there is no allegation that the provisions were purposely
placed into one bill to engage in logrolling. In fact, House File 2581 was
a joint effort by the executive and legislative branches to reenact
legislation determined by the third branch of government to have failed
25
in its prior enactment, and the General Assembly gathered for a special
extraordinary session with the understanding of the scope of the session
as outlined by the governor. These circumstances minimize our need to
interfere with the affairs of another branch of government.
The absence of a claimed violation of the title requirement also
diminishes the importance of the constitutional issue presented. While
the subject and title requirement rules are separate constitutional
principles, they operate together to prevent greater harm than when the
single-subject requirement is the only violation claimed. While we strive
to protect people from all constitutional violations, we do not respond to
all violations the same, or even provide a remedy for every violation. See,
e.g., Kain v. State, 378 N.W.2d 900, 902–03 (Iowa 1985) (engaging in a
cost-benefit analysis of excluding evidence obtained in violation of state
and federal constitutions, and refusing to remedy the violation). In the
broad scheme of constitutional violations, the constitutional issue
presented in this case is not one of great public importance to support
the waiver of our standing rule.
On the whole, we conclude Godfrey failed to present an issue of
great public importance that convinces us we should waive the
requirement of standing. This conclusion, of course, is not a statement
on the merits of the claim, but our determination that the particular
claim presented by a litigant without standing is not important enough to
require judicial intervention into the internal affairs of the legislative
branch of government. While the single-subject claim asserted in this
case presents legitimate concerns of public importance, these concerns
on balance do not trump the greater interest sought to be protected by
our doctrine of standing.
26
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm the decision of the district court. Godfrey failed to
establish standing to assert her claim, and we decline to waive the
standing requirement under the claim presented.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., who dissent,
and Appel and Baker, JJ., who take no part.
27
#94/05–1691, Godfrey v. State
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. Specifically, I believe we should waive our judicially
created standing doctrine in this case and allow Godfrey to challenge
House File 2581, 80th General Assembly, First Extraordinary Session,
section 11, as violative of the single-subject clause of article III, section
29 of the Iowa Constitution.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial
power of the federal courts to the resolution of cases and controversies.
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. _____, _____, 127
S. Ct. 2553, 2562, 168 L. Ed. 2d 424, 437 (2007). The federal standing
doctrine enforces article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S. Ct. 1854,
1861, 164 L. Ed. 2d 589, 602 (2006). The Iowa Constitution does not
contain a case-or-controversy requirement. Hawkeye Bancorp. v. Iowa
College Aid Comm’n, 360 N.W.2d 798, 801–02 (Iowa 1985). Nevertheless,
this court has adopted a standing requirement that is similar to the
federal requirement. Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 869 (Iowa
2005).
The majority was correct when it found Godfrey does not have
standing, under our judicially created standing requirement, to bring this
action. The majority was also correct when it held we are free to waive
the judicially created standing requirement if we determine the
circumstances require us to do so. See Hawkeye Bancorp., 360 N.W.2d
at 802. I disagree, however, with the majority’s analysis regarding
whether the great-public-importance doctrine requires us to waive the
standing requirement and allow Godfrey to maintain this action. I find
28
the majority’s analysis, holding that the title clause of article III, section
29 of the Iowa Constitution trumps the single-subject clause, to be
neither principled nor workable.
The majority’s analysis is unprincipled and unworkable because
the application of the great-public-importance doctrine by the majority is
dependent on whether one clause of article III, section 29 has more
importance than another clause. The reason our court requires a party
to have standing is to avoid issuing advisory opinions. Alons, 698
N.W.2d at 864. The analysis of whether a person has standing to bring a
lawsuit must be made independent from the merits of the claim.
Otherwise, a court will issue an advisory opinion on the merits of a claim
in deciding the standing issue. This is exactly what the majority did in
this case. The analysis employed by the majority allowed it to decide a
violation of the single-subject clause of article III, section 29 is akin to
harmless error if there was not a violation of the article’s title clause, and
there was no fraud or deception in the enactment of the legislation. Had
the majority found standing, I assume it would use the same analysis to
defeat standing as it would use to defeat the claim on its merits. Thus,
the majority effectively issued an advisory opinion on the merits of the
claim.
A principled and workable analysis to determine whether to apply
the doctrine of great public importance to waive standing first requires
us to establish under what circumstances the doctrine should apply.
The application of the doctrine should not be dependent on the merits of
a claim.
This case appears to be the first opportunity for our court to grant
a waiver of standing based upon the doctrine of great public importance.
See Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Iowa 1994)
29
(stating it is unnecessary for the court to consider the great-public-
importance doctrine because the general rules of standing apply). In an
earlier case involving an item veto, we came close to adopting the great-
public-importance doctrine. State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway
Comm’n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 148 (Iowa 1971). There we stated, “The issue
of interpretation of the item veto is an important matter and to dismiss
this action would not serve the interests of either intervenors or
defendants.” Id. However, in that case we appeared to say the
intervenors had standing because they were taxpayers. Id.
Finally, in a recent item-veto case brought by state legislators
individually and in their capacity as state legislators, we found the
legislators had standing to maintain the action. Rants v. Vilsack, 684
N.W.2d 193, 198 (Iowa 2004). In Rants, we did not distinguish between
the legislators’ status as state officials or taxpayers when we decided the
standing issue. Id. In doing so, we cited the Turner decision. One could
argue by citing the Turner decision, we implicitly recognized the doctrine
of great public importance and waived the standing requirement for state
legislators to file an action contesting an item veto.
Regardless of whether we previously recognized the doctrine of
great public importance, I agree with the majority that we can and
should be able to waive the standing requirement under the doctrine. I
contend the proper circumstances to apply the doctrine occur in the
exceptional case where a citizen claims a branch of government violated
a provision of the Iowa Constitution that presents a clear threat to the
essential nature of state government as guaranteed by the constitution.
See Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Ariz. 1998) (holding the court
should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional
circumstances); see also State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277,
30
1284 (N.M. 1999) (stating the doctrine has been applied in cases that
“generally involved clear threats to the essential nature of state
government guaranteed to New Mexico citizens under their
[c]onstitution—a government in which the ‘three distinct departments,
. . . legislative, executive, and judicial,’ remain within the bounds of their
constitutional powers” (citation omitted)).
The single-subject clause prevents logrolling, the practice whereby
the legislature joins two or more unconnected matters in one bill to
coerce legislators who support one of the matters into voting for the
entire bill so they can secure passage of the individual matter they favor.
Logrolling is not only inducive of fraud, it also makes it difficult to
ascertain whether the legislature would have passed either of the matters
had they been voted on separately. State ex rel. Clark v. State
Canvassing Bd., 888 P.2d 458, 461 (N.M. 1995).
The federal Constitution does not contain a single-subject clause.
However, the framers of the Iowa Constitution thought a single-subject
clause was important enough to include in both the 1846 constitution
and our present-day constitution. See Iowa Const. art. III, § 26 (repealed
1857); Iowa Const. art. III, § 29. The single-subject clause is an essential
constitutional restriction on the power of the legislature to enact laws.
To disallow a citizen legal redress to contest a law on the grounds that it
violates the single-subject clause is a clear threat to the essential nature
of the operation of the legislative branch of state government as
guaranteed by the constitution. The joinder of two or more unconnected
matters in a bill is no mere irregularity. The single-subject clause goes to
the heart of the legislative process mandated by the people of the State of
Iowa when they adopted our constitution. Therefore, I would apply the
doctrine of great public importance, waive the requirement of standing,
31
and allow Godfrey’s challenge to proceed. See Sloan v. Wilkins, 608
S.E.2d 579, 583 (S.C. 2005) (holding the doctrine of great public
importance allows a citizen to challenge a bill under the single-subject
clause of the South Carolina Constitution).
Consequently, I would reverse the judgment of the district court
and remand the case for a trial on the merits.
Hecht, J., joins this dissent.