State Of Iowa Vs. John Joseph Kramer ( 2009 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 07–1202
Filed January 30, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
JOHN JOSEPH KRAMER,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County,
James E. Kelley, Judge.
The State appeals a district court’s grant of defendant’s motion for
acquittal of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated, first offense.
AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, Gary Allison, County Attorney, and Alan R. Ostergren,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Thomas G. Reidel, Muscatine, for appellee.
2
BAKER, Justice.
The State appeals the trial court’s dismissal of this criminal case
on double jeopardy grounds. Initially, the court orally granted the
defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of the
evidence, but then immediately reversed this ruling upon being informed
that the evidence thought lacking was in the record. Upon the
defendant’s objection that this reversal violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the court dismissed the case. We are asked to decide: (1)
whether a court may immediately revise an oral ruling on a motion for
judgment of acquittal without offending double jeopardy principles, and
(2) whether double jeopardy bars retrial when the court sustains a
judgment of acquittal on double jeopardy grounds based on the
erroneous belief that it cannot immediately correct an erroneous
judgment of acquittal. Although we determine the court’s initial ruling
was subject to immediate revision without offending double jeopardy, we
affirm the final dismissal because to reinstate the case now after the jury
has been dismissed and the acquittal entered on the docket would violate
double jeopardy.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The defendant, John Kramer, was arrested for operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated. The Muscatine County Attorney filed a trial
information accusing Kramer of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated, second offense, but later filed a supplemental information
changing the charge to operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, first
offense. A jury trial was held on June 6, 2007. At the close of the State’s
case, outside the presence of the jury, Kramer’s attorney moved for a
“judgment of acquittal. . . [claiming] that the State ha[d] failed to present
sufficient evidence regarding the driver of the vehicle for the Court to
3
allow this matter to go further.” In response, the district court ordered “a
directed verdict of acquittal on the defendant’s motion,” declaring the
“evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State would not
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
operating a motor vehicle at the time and place as alleged.” The court
went on to state: “Now, at that point the Court orders a directed verdict
of acquittal on the defendant’s motion.” The State then pointed out
evidence that Kramer admitted he was driving. After reviewing the court
transcript and determining that Kramer had actually admitted to driving,
the court revised its previous ruling stating: “With that in the record, the
Court revises its ruling, and the Court overrules the motion for directed
verdict of acquittal,” stating, “[t]here is just barely sufficient evidence to
take this to a jury.”
After the court’s revision, the defense protested that “when the
Court uttered the words ‘the motion for acquittal is granted,’ that that
attached immediately to the defendant, and that said ruling was not
subject to revision.” The court agreed with the defense, stating: “Good.
Take it up. It’s directed. Goodbye. We’re done.” The prosecution then
inquired of the court as to what had just happened and argued that the
court had the ability to correct its mistake, also noting that if the ruling
stands jeopardy attaches. The court then stated: “Well mark this one up
for me. My mistake. But I’m going to say the ruling stands.”
It is not clear at what point the jury was discharged; however, no
further proceedings occurred after this discussion. The court calendar
entry for June 6, 2007, states “[t]he Court orders this case dismissed.”
The combined general docket also states that the defendant’s motion for
directed verdict was granted and the case dismissed. The State appeals,
claiming: (1) that the trial court erred in initially granting the directed
4
verdict of acquittal; (2) that the trial court erred in claiming that it could
not immediately correct its oral grant of acquittal before the judgment
was entered; and (3) that double jeopardy principles do not prevent
retrial of this matter.
II. Scope of Review.
A verdict of acquittal cannot be reviewed, whether for error or
otherwise, without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. State v. Taft,
506 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 1993) (citing United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 1354, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642,
651 (1977)). Therefore, we do not address the State’s claim that the trial
court erred in initially granting the verdict of acquittal on insufficiency of
the evidence grounds. On the State’s claim that the court erred in ruling
that it could not immediately correct an oral grant of acquittal without
offending double jeopardy, this is a constitutional claim, and the
appropriate standard of review is de novo. State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d
564, 567 (Iowa 2001) (citing State v. Washburne, 574 N.W.2d 261, 263
(Iowa 1997) (other citations omitted)). On the State’s claim that the
defendant can be retried based on the court’s error, this too is a double
jeopardy issue, and the appropriate standard of review is de novo. Id.
III. Double Jeopardy Principles.
The State appeals the district court’s dismissal of the State’s case
on double jeopardy grounds, arguing the court erroneously determined
that it could not correct an oral ruling granting a judgment of acquittal at
the close of the prosecution’s case without violating the defendant’s
double jeopardy rights. It contends that oral rulings are not final until
entered in writing, are subject to change before entry, and therefore do
not terminate a defendant’s jeopardy.
5
In ultimately granting Kramer’s motion for directed verdict of
acquittal, the district court accepted his argument that “when the Court
uttered the words ‘the motion for acquittal is granted’ that [double
jeopardy] attached immediately to the defendant and that said ruling was
not subject to revision.” The district court did not clarify whether this
decision was based upon the United States Constitution Double
Jeopardy Clause, the Iowa Constitution double jeopardy provision, or
both.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution “is
applicable to state criminal trials through the Fourteenth Amendment
due process provision.” State v. Franzen, 495 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Iowa
1993) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794–95, 89 S. Ct. 2056,
2063, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707, 715–16 (1969)). The same constitutional
standards for determining when double jeopardy attaches must be used
in both federal and state courts. Id. at 715–16 (citing Crist v. Bretz, 437
U.S. 28, 32, 98 S. Ct. 2156, 2159, 57 L. Ed. 2d 24, 29 (1978)).
Therefore, we will analyze this case under federal double jeopardy
standards.
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against: (1) a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for
the same offense. Taft, 506 N.W.2d at 760 (citing North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 664–
65 (1969)). We have previously stated:
The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
was “designed to protect an individual from being subjected
to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than
once for an alleged offense.” It is based upon the principles
of finality and the prevention of prosecutorial overreaching.
The principle reflects a concern that a state should not be
6
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense.
Franzen, 495 N.W.2d at 716 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187, 78 S. Ct. 221, 223, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 204 (1957)) (other
citations omitted). The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are
implicated only when the accused is actually placed in jeopardy. Martin
Linen, 430 U.S. at 569, 97 S. Ct. at 1353, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 650 (citing
Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1062, 43 L.
Ed. 2d 265, 274 (1975)). “This state of jeopardy attaches when a jury is
empaneled and sworn, or, in a bench trial, when the judge begins to
receive evidence.” Id. (citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471, 93
S. Ct. 1066, 1073, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425, 435 (1973) (White, J., dissenting)).
It terminates when the jury reaches a verdict or the trial judge enters a
final judgment of acquittal. United States v. Byrne, 203 F.3d 671, 673
(9th Cir. 2000) (citing Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143, 82 S.
Ct. 671, 672, 7 L. Ed. 2d 629, 631 (1962)). The question, therefore, is
when an acquittal is considered a final judgment.
The State asserts that “[a] judgment is not valid and final until the
clerk enters the court’s order in the record book.” Thus, it argues, before
entry of final judgment, the court’s rulings are interlocutory, and the
court remains free to correct an erroneous grant of acquittal. Kramer
argues that the moment the district court uttered the words “the motion
for acquittal is granted,” jeopardy terminated, and the ruling could not
be revised.
The United States Supreme Court declared, “we have long held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it prohibits
reexamination of an acquittal by jury verdict.” Smith v. Massachusetts,
7
543 U.S. 462, 467, 125 S. Ct. 1129, 1133, 160 L. Ed. 2d 914, 922
(2005). The Court defines an acquittal as an order that “actually
represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged.” Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571, 97
S. Ct. at 1354, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 651 (emphasis added). The Court also
stated:
[A] judgment of acquittal is a substantive determination that
the prosecution has failed to carry its burden. Thus, even
when the jury is the primary factfinder, the trial judge still
resolves elements of the offense in granting a . . . motion [for
a directed verdict of acquittal].
Smith, 543 U.S. at 468, 125 S. Ct. at 1134–35, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 923. In
this case, the district court judge initially stated “the Court orders a
directed verdict of acquittal on the defendant’s motion.”
We are first asked to decide what is a final judgment under the
Double Jeopardy Clause, i.e., whether the district court can reconsider
an oral acquittal or if the acquittal became final upon utterance.
Because of our ultimate resolution of this case determining that Kramer
cannot be retried, this issue is moot. Where, however, an issue is of
broad public importance and likely to recur, we may still consider the
issue.
In determining whether we should review a moot
action, we consider four factors. These factors include: (1)
the private or public nature of the issue; (2) the desirability
of an authoritative adjudication to guide public officials in
their future conduct; (3) the likelihood of the recurrence of
the issue; and (4) the likelihood the issue will recur yet evade
appellate review.
State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 234 (Iowa 2002). We have
noted that the last factor is the most important. Id. We find that the
issue of whether an oral grant of acquittal can be immediately revised is
such an issue.
8
We determine the mere utterance of the words did not preclude
revision of the initial acquittal under the facts of this case. Although we
have not determined by rule or statute what constitutes a final judgment
in a criminal matter, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.959 provides: “All
judgments and orders must be entered on the record of the court and
clearly specify the relief granted or the order made.” There is no
comparable provision in the criminal rules. We have, however, long
allowed the correction of an order before its entry on the docket. State v.
Manley, 63 Iowa 344, 344, 19 N.W. 211, 211 (1884) (“What precedes the
entry of record is the mere announcement of the judge’s mental
conclusion, and is not the court’s action.”).
This is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s
discussion in Smith of the ability of a court to correct an erroneous
announcement of acquittal.
Double-jeopardy principles have never been thought to bar
the immediate repair of a genuine error in the announcement
of an acquittal, even one rendered by a jury. And of course
States can protect themselves still further against the
“occasional errors” of law that the dissent thinks
“inevitabl[e]” in the course of trial, by rendering midtrial
acquittal nonfinal. . . .
Prosecutors are not without protection against ill-
considered acquittal rulings. States can and do craft
procedural rules that allow trial judges “the maximum
opportunity to consider with care a pending acquittal
motion,” including the option of deferring consideration until
after the verdict. Moreover, a prosecutor can seek to
persuade the court to correct its legal error before it rules, or
at least before the proceedings move forward. Indeed, the
prosecutor in this case convinced the judge to reconsider her
acquittal ruling on the basis of legal authority he had
obtained during a 15-minute recess before closing
arguments. Had he sought a short continuance at the time
of the acquittal motion, the matter could have been resolved
satisfactorily before petitioner went forward with his case.
9
Smith, 543 U.S. at 474–75, 125 S. Ct. at 1138, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 927
(quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 574, 97 S. Ct. at 1356, 51 L. Ed. 2d at
653) (other citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Although the court in Smith found double jeopardy to bar the
correction of an erroneous grant of acquittal, the facts are
distinguishable from this case. In Smith, the defendant was charged with
three counts. The defendant sought acquittal on one charge which was
allegedly erroneously granted. The court found this acquittal to be “a
facially unqualified midtrial dismissal on one count.” Id. at 463, 125 S.
Ct. at 1132, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 920. The defendant then proceeded with
his defense on the remaining charges. At the end of the trial, however,
the judge reversed herself and submitted the dismissed count. On
appeal, the Court found that to allow reinstatement of the charge would
prejudice Smith who had proceeded in his defense under the assumption
that one of the charges was dismissed. The Court also noted that
Massachusetts has no rule or case authority on the ability to change
midtrial rulings. Under those circumstances, reinstatement of the
dismissed count was barred. Id. at 462–63, 125 S. Ct. at 1131–32, 160
L. Ed. 2d at 919–20.
This case would have presented a much different fact situation had
the court merely revised its ruling before further proceedings. The
acquittal had not been entered on the docket, and there is Iowa case
authority which would allow the judge to amend his ruling prior to entry
on the docket. The proceedings had not moved forward, and there was
only a slight delay before the reconsideration. Kramer would have
suffered no prejudice. The United States Supreme Court has noted that
“as a general matter state law may prescribe that a judge’s midtrial
determination of the sufficiency of the State’s proof can be reconsidered.”
10
Id. at 470, 125 S. Ct. at 1136, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 925. To the extent we
have not done so previously, we now hold that a judge may amend an
erroneous directed verdict of acquittal where the ruling is corrected
immediately and prior to any further proceedings. Therefore, had the
court stood by his corrected ruling and resumed the trial, double
jeopardy would not have been offended.
The ultimate resolution in this case, however, turns on the fact
that the trial judge reinstated the initial judgment of acquittal after the
defendant claimed that to overrule that judgment of acquittal would
violate double jeopardy. The trial transcript shows that immediately
following the judge’s pronouncement that the acquittal stood, the
proceedings ended, and the jury was dismissed. It is this second
acquittal that bars retrial notwithstanding its erroneous underpinning.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted under analogous
circumstances,
To this extent, we believe the ruling below is properly to be
characterized as an erroneous evidentiary ruling, which led
to an acquittal for insufficient evidence. That judgment of
acquittal, however erroneous, bars further prosecution on
any aspect of the count and hence bars appellate review of
the trial court’s error.
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 68–69, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 2181, 57
L. Ed. 2d 43, 56–57 (1978). Similarly, in Taft, we stated:
The United States Supreme Court has long held that a
verdict of acquittal cannot be reviewed for any reason
without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. And, this
perhaps has been the most fundamental rule in the history
of double jeopardy jurisprudence. The rule is so jealously
guarded, that a review is not permitted even if “the acquittal
was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.”
Taft, 506 N.W.2d at 760 (quoting Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143, 82 S. Ct. at
672, 7 L. Ed. 2d at 631) (other citations omitted). Thus, where the trial
11
judge noted the acquittal on the docket and dismissed the jury, because
of an erroneous belief that he could not revise his initial ruling without
offending double jeopardy, jeopardy terminated, and Kramer cannot be
retried.1
V. Disposition.
We hold that the trial judge erred in declaring that he could not
amend his initial grant of acquittal. We find, however, that when the
trial judge dismissed the case a second time, entered the dismissal on
the docket, and dismissed the jury, jeopardy terminated. Therefore, the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution bars retrial of
this matter.
AFFIRMED.
1We do not decide today what form the acquittal must take before it is effective
for double jeopardy purposes. In Taft, we noted that a court could not recall a jury
without violating double jeopardy. 506 N.W.2d at 760. Some state courts have held
that a court-directed judgment of acquittal is not effective until it is signed and entered
in the docket. See Harden v. State, 287 S.E.2d 329, 331 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); see also
Watson v. State, 410 So. 2d 207, 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (not final until the
motion hearing is concluded); State v. Collins, 771 P.2d 350, 353 (Wash. 1989) (not final
until a form order is issued).