State Of Iowa Vs. Jordan Heath Dentler ( 2007 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 122 / 06-1905
Filed December 7, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
JORDAN HEATH DENTLER,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wayne County, Arthur E.
Gamble, Judge.
The State appeals the district court order suppressing evidence
obtained subsequent to a violation of Missouri’s Fresh Pursuit Statute.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers and Mary E.
Tabor, Assistant Attorneys General, and Alan M. Wilson, County Attorney,
for appellant.
Dustria A. Relph of Chambers Law Firm, Corydon, for appellee.
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APPEL, Justice.
In this case, we must determine whether evidence of alcohol
intoxication should be excluded in a criminal proceeding where Iowa law
enforcement officers pursued a suspect into Missouri, arrested the suspect
in that state, returned the suspect directly to Iowa without first presenting
the accused to a Missouri magistrate as required by Missouri’s Fresh
Pursuit Statute, and thereafter obtained further incriminating evidence.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. Under the
facts of this case, we hold that the district court erred in applying the
exclusionary rule. The decision of the district court, therefore, is reversed.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
The facts in this case are not disputed. In the summer of 2006,
Jordan Dentler and a friend took Dentler’s newly repaired Camero race car
out for a test drive. Dentler drove the car along State Line Road in Wayne
County, where he “tested the speed of his car and how it was running” and
“peeled around.” Wayne County sheriff’s deputy Charles Henderson was
alerted to the scene by the roar of the engine, observed Dentler’s driving,
and pursued the vehicle. Although Henderson signaled with his lights and
siren, Dentler did not pull over until shortly after they passed into Missouri.
Henderson called for the assistance of Missouri authorities. Two
Missouri law enforcement officers arrived shortly thereafter and assisted in
“clearing” the vehicle. An open can of beer was found in the car, which was
consistent with a beer can Henderson observed along the side of the road
during the pursuit.
Another Wayne County sheriff’s deputy also arrived at the scene.
This deputy noticed a strong smell of alcohol on Dentler’s breath and
observed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery. The deputy also elicited
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an admission from Dentler that he had been drinking an unknown quantity
of beer.
At the scene, the Iowa and Missouri officers had a discussion about
who would retain Dentler. The Missouri deputies advised Henderson, “Well,
you can keep him.” Henderson then admitted, “I didn’t know how that
worked, since I chased him, do I get to keep him?” The Missouri deputy
then replied, “As far as I’m concerned, you can.” It appears that none of the
officers were aware of the proper procedures under Missouri law applicable
to the situation.
Henderson issued a citation to Dentler for reckless driving, open
container-driver, operating a motor vehicle without registration, and
violation of financial liability coverage. He read the defendant his Miranda
rights, placed him under arrest, and transported Dentler back to the Wayne
County Sheriff’s Department in Corydon, Iowa. There, Dentler performed
field sobriety tests and voluntarily submitted to a Datamaster Cdm test.
In addition to the traffic violations, the State charged Dentler with
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of
Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(b) (2005). Dentler then moved to exclude all
evidence obtained after his removal from Missouri. He argued that since he
was not presented to a Missouri magistrate prior to his removal as required
by Missouri’s Fresh Pursuit Statute, Missouri Revised Statutes section
544.155, all evidence obtained after his removal should be suppressed.
Finding Iowa law silent on the issue, the district court turned to cases
from other jurisdictions. The district court found the Pennsylvania case of
Commonwealth v. Sadvari, 752 A.2d 393 (Pa. 2000), which held that the
exclusionary rule applied where the out-of-state officers failed to present a
defendant to a magistrate in the state of arrest prior to extradition, the most
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persuasive. The district court, therefore, granted the motion to suppress.
We granted the State’s application for discretionary review to resolve this
issue of first impression in Iowa.
II. Standard of Review.
We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for
abuse of discretion. To “the extent admission of evidence turns on the
interpretation of a statute” or other legal issue, however, our review is for
correction of errors at law. State v. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d 195, 196 (Iowa 1994).
III. Discussion.
The sole issue presented in this case is whether the evidence obtained
by Iowa officials after Dentler’s arrest in Missouri should be excluded
because of the failure of Iowa authorities to present Dentler to a Missouri
magistrate. As noted by the district court, there is no Iowa case law on the
issue of whether violation of a magistrate provision in a fresh pursuit
statute requires application of the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained
after the violation. The courts in other states are split.
Some courts have applied the exclusionary rule. For instance, in
Sadvari, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the violation of the
magistrate provision of Delaware’s Fresh Pursuit Statute required
application of the exclusionary rule “as a demonstration of comity” and
vindication of Delaware’s “important state interest” in its “sovereignty.”
Sadvari, 752 A.2d at 399. The Sadvari court also believed that the
exclusionary rule was necessary in light of the “unlawful seizure” of the
defendant. Id.; see also People v. Jacobs, 385 N.E.2d 137, 140 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (suppressing evidence for failure to take defendant before an Iowa
magistrate as required by Iowa’s Fresh Pursuit Statute).
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Other courts, however, have refused to apply the exclusionary rule for
such violations. The leading case is State v. Ferrell, 356 N.W.2d 868 (Neb.
1984). In Ferrell, the defendant was arrested by Nebraska police officers in
Iowa, but was not presented to an Iowa magistrate as required by Iowa’s
Fresh Pursuit Statute, Iowa Code chapter 806. The Ferrell court
emphasized that the validity of the arrest was not affected by the failure to
present the accused to an Iowa magistrate. Ferrell, 356 N.W.2d at 871. The
court further held that the failure to comply with the magistrate provision
did not amount to a due process violation that required the exclusion of
evidence. Id.; see also State v. Bonds, 653 P.2d 1024, 1031 (Wash. 1982)
(en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831, 104 S. Ct. 111, 78 L. Ed. 2d 112
(1983) (holding that an arrest in Oregon by Washington officers and removal
to Washington without presentation to an Oregon magistrate did not require
exclusion of subsequently obtained evidence).
This court has not hesitated to apply the exclusionary rule where
fundamental constitutional rights have been violated. See State v. Bentley,
739 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 2007); State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2007). We
have embraced the exclusionary rule to ensure that fundamental
constitutional rights do not become dead letter, to deter future police
misconduct, and to prevent the integrity of the courts from being
undermined through the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence. Our
strong commitment to the exclusionary rule where constitutional violations
are present is further demonstrated by our unequivocal rejection of a good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule for violation of the Iowa
Constitution. State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 290 (Iowa 2000), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).
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Our older cases indicate that the exclusionary rule should ordinarily
apply only where there has been a constitutional violation or where a
statutory right has been violated and the statute itself specifically requires
exclusion. State v. Garrow, 480 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1992); State v.
Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417, 437 (Iowa 1982). The rationale for limiting the
statutory application of the exclusionary rule to occasions where the
legislature specifically required exclusion is based upon the notion that the
failure of the legislature to include an exclusionary requirement is
significant indication of legislative intent.
More recently, however, we have expanded the type of statutory
violations that may trigger application of the exclusionary rule. For
example, where statutory mandates involve fundamental rights, usually
with constitutional overtones, we have held that the exclusionary rule
should apply even though not expressly required by the legislature. See
State v. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667, 673–75 (Iowa 2005) (holding that the
exclusionary rule applies to violations of the statutory right to contact
family upon arrest); State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 45–46 (Iowa
2003) (holding that violation of the Vienna convention’s notification
requirements did not warrant exclusion because the defendant’s
fundamental rights were not implicated); see also Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
126 S. Ct. 2669, 2681, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557, 577 (2006) (noting that the
United States Supreme Court has suppressed evidence for statutory
violations that implicated important Fourth and Fifth Amendment
interests).
In addition, even where the statutory right might not be considered
fundamental, we have applied the exclusionary rule to statutory violations
involving police misconduct. For example, in State v. Kelly, 430 N.W.2d
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427, 430 (Iowa 1988), we held that a breath test given more than two hours
after arrest in violation of chapter 321J was admissible. In contrast, in
Kjos, we held that a breath test administered more than two hours after
arrest in violation of the same statute was subject to the exclusionary rule
because the police made the false threat of license revocation if the accused
failed to comply. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d at 197. See generally George F. Dix,
Nonconstitutional Exclusionary Rules in Criminal Procedure, 27 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 53, 74–109 (1989).
In this case, Dentler claims the exclusionary rule should apply
because his due process rights were violated by the failure of the deputies to
present him to a Missouri magistrate as required by Missouri’s Fresh
Pursuit Statute. Specifically, Dentler argues that if he had been presented
to a Missouri magistrate rather than simply being transported to Iowa, he
would have been released for lack of probable cause. State v. Lloyd, 513
N.W.2d 742, 743 (Iowa 1994) (concluding that law of asylum state applies in
determining legality of arrest under fresh pursuit statute).
We disagree. Prior to his transport to Iowa, officers observed Dentler
driving erratically. He then eluded officers for a time by driving into
Missouri. The deputies also discovered two open cans of beer. When
questioned, Dentler admitted to consuming an unknown quantity of beer.
His breath smelled of alcohol, and his eyes were watery. Under the law of
Missouri, we are convinced that the above facts would have supported a
finding of probable cause had Dentler been taken before a Missouri
magistrate. Rain v. Dir. of Revenue, State of Missouri, 46 S.W.3d 584, 587
(Mo. App. Ct. 2001).
Further, it is undisputed that Dentler was promptly taken before an
Iowa judge. Dentler was fully afforded the opportunity to test the validity of
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his arrest before a neutral magistrate promptly after his arrest. As a result,
we do not find a due process violation as claimed by Dentler. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116, 95 S. Ct. 854, 864, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 67 (1975); Six
Feathers v. State, 611 P.2d 857, 862 (Wyo. 1980). Instead, the real issue is
whether a violation of Missouri statutory law warrants exclusion of evidence
in this case. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61, 87 S. Ct. 788, 790, 17
L. Ed. 2d 730, 733 (1967) (noting that mere violations of state law do not
establish a due process claim).
In analyzing the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applies, the
first question under Iowa law is whether the statute specifically requires the
exclusion of evidence. An examination of the Missouri statute reveals that
there is no such specific language.
The next question under our case law is whether the statute involves
a fundamental right of the defendant. We conclude that the magistrate
provision, under the facts of this case, did not involve a fundamental right
of the defendant. We hold that in order for a statutory right to be
considered fundamental for purposes of the exclusionary rule, the right
must be grounded in fundamental fairness toward the accused.
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 492 N.E.2d 1142, 1145 (Mass. 1986); State v.
Burris, 679 A.2d 121, 127 (N.J. 1996). As a result, a statutory violation that
is at best only remotely related to the gathering of evidence does not
ordinarily trigger application of an exclusionary rule. Sanchez-Llamas, 126
S. Ct. at 2681, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 578.
Here, the main purpose of the magistrate provision in Missouri’s
Fresh Pursuit Statute is not to protect the individual from overreaching
evidence-gathering techniques by government prosecutors, but to vindicate
the sovereign rights of the State of Missouri. State v. Wagner, 359 N.W.2d
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487, 489 (Iowa 1984); Ferrell, 356 N.W.2d at 872. To the extent an ox is
being gored in this case, it belongs to Missouri, not Dentler. The magistrate
provision in Missouri’s Fresh Pursuit Statute does not implicate
fundamental, personal interests of the defendant.
Ordinarily, a party seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule may not
vicariously assert the rights of another. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148,
99 S. Ct. 421, 433, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 404 (1978); Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S. Ct. 961, 966–67, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176, 187 (1969).
Moreover, even if Dentler could vicariously assert the sovereign rights of the
State of Missouri, it is undisputed that the Missouri officers on the scene
acquiesced to the action. While such acquiescence by state law
enforcement officials may not give rise to waiver or estoppel as a matter of
law, it is a factor that militates against the need for application of the
exclusionary rule.
We also note that Dentler makes no claim that a magistrate would
have prevented Iowa authorities from proceeding against Dentler because of
some fundamental public policy of the State of Missouri that conflicted with
Iowa law. His sole claim is that Iowa officers lacked probable cause to
arrest him in Missouri and that if he had been presented to a Missouri
magistrate, he would have been released. As indicated above, we reject that
claim.
A final potential basis for application of the exclusionary rule to a
statute that does not explicitly require exclusion is police misconduct that
aggravates the underlying statutory violation. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d at 197.
Here, however, the record reveals no false representations of law designed to
obtain evidence, only confusion on the part of both Missouri and Iowa
constables regarding applicable legal requirements. The record also reveals
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no suggestion or implication that the magistrate provision in Missouri law
was willfully violated to advance the gathering of evidence against the
accused.
Because Dentler seeks to apply the exclusionary rule to a statutory
violation that does not involve fundamental rights, constitutional overtones,
or false representations of law or other similar police misconduct, Dentler
seeks an expansion of our current law regarding the application of the
exclusionary rule. The main argument in favor of such an expansion is
concern that without applying the exclusionary rule there will be
insufficient deterrence to avoid future violations.
Because the benefits of violating the magistrate provision are so
small, however, the incentive for future violations is not very high. If we are
proven wrong in this assessment, the Missouri legislature may withdraw its
authorization of Iowa peace officers to engage in fresh pursuit. Further,
because this opinion is narrowly based on the unique facts of this case, law
enforcement officials have no certainty that the exclusionary rule will be
held inapplicable under a different state of facts, particularly where the
record demonstrates willful misconduct. Finally, in the unlikely event that
such violations become a recurrent problem, this court reserves the right to
exercise its supervisory powers to exclude evidence in future cases. United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2446 n.7, 65 L.
Ed. 2d 468, 476 n.7 (1980); People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213, 217 (Colo. 1981);
Bonds, 653 P.2d at 1032.
IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, the suppression order of the district court is
reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.