State of Iowa v. Adam Christopher Dahl , 2016 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 8 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 14–2114
    Filed January 22, 2016
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellee,
    vs.
    ADAM CHRISTOPHER DAHL,
    Appellant.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, Donald E.
    Courtney, Judge.
    A defendant appeals a district court decision denying his request
    for an ex parte hearing to determine whether he is entitled to
    appointment of a private investigator at state expense. REVERSED AND
    REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
    Matthew G. Sease of Kemp & Sease, Des Moines, and John M.
    Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant
    Attorney General, and Douglas R. Hansen, County Attorney, for appellee.
    2
    WIGGINS, Justice.
    A criminal defendant appeals a district court ruling denying his
    request for an ex parte hearing on the merits of his application for
    appointment of a private investigator at state expense. We conclude the
    defendant was entitled to an ex parte hearing on the merits of his
    application.    Accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court
    denying the request for an ex parte hearing and remand the case with
    instructions.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    Adam Dahl’s ex-girlfriend accused him of entering her home and
    assaulting her. She further complained that he entered her vehicle and
    took several items from the vehicle. The State charged Dahl with first-
    degree burglary, third-degree burglary, and domestic abuse. See Iowa
    Code § 708.2A(1), .2A(3)(b) (2013); 
    id. §§ 713.1,
    .3(1)(c), .6A(2).   The
    district court appointed private counsel to represent Dahl after finding
    him to be indigent.    Dahl entered a written plea of not guilty on all
    counts.
    The facts that led to these underlying criminal charges are largely
    irrelevant to this appeal.   This appeal concerns the district court’s
    rulings on Dahl’s application for depositions at state expense and his
    application for appointment of a private investigator at state expense.
    Each application asserted the requested relief was necessary for Dahl’s
    counsel to provide him with a proper and effective defense.       In the
    application for appointment of a private investigator at state expense,
    Dahl named a proposed investigator and indicated he sought the
    investigator to review the case, conduct an investigation, and prepare a
    written report. He approximated the cost for these investigative services
    would be approximately $3000.
    3
    The district court granted the application for depositions at state
    expense.    However, the court did not rule on the application for
    appointment of a private investigator at state expense until the State had
    a chance to resist the application.       The State resisted the application,
    arguing it did not indicate the specific defense for which investigation
    was necessary to ensure an adequate defense and asserting our caselaw
    requires such specification.
    The district court ordered a hearing on the merits of the
    application for appointment of a private investigator at state expense.
    Dahl filed a motion requesting that the prosecutor not attend any portion
    of the hearing relating to the necessity of hiring a private investigator to
    ensure his adequate defense. He argued disclosing the basis of his need
    for an investigator in the prosecutor’s presence would permit the State a
    window into his trial strategy to which it was not entitled and violate his
    due process rights under the Sixth Amendment of the Federal
    Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution.
    At the hearing, the district court permitted defense counsel first to
    address the motion requesting the portion of the hearing concerning the
    merits of his application to be conducted ex parte.         Defense counsel
    indicated Dahl required an investigator to interview witnesses and
    submitted documents regarding the qualifications of the desired
    investigator and an estimate of the anticipated cost of hiring him.
    However, defense counsel refused to indicate the names of the witnesses
    Dahl sought to interview or why interviewing those witnesses was
    relevant to providing Dahl with an adequate defense.          Dahl’s counsel
    argued that to disclose such information in the presence of the
    prosecutor would disclose his trial strategy to the State and violate his
    ethical duty to zealously represent Dahl and maintain confidentiality
    4
    concerning attorney–client communications. Counsel also argued such
    disclosure would violate Dahl’s right to effective assistance of counsel
    under the Federal and State Constitutions.
    The district court orally denied the motion for an ex parte hearing
    concerning the merits of the application for appointment of a private
    investigator, ruling the State had a right to participate in the hearing on
    the merits of the application. Immediately thereafter, the court granted a
    request to suspend the hearing to permit Dahl to file this interlocutory
    appeal. The court also filed a written order denying the motion. In its
    written order, the court acknowledged Dahl was required to disclose
    specific information concerning what the private investigator would do
    during the course of his investigation and how the information obtained
    might be exculpatory for the court to grant his application. However, the
    court found that permitting defense counsel to disclose such information
    in an ex parte hearing outside the presence of the prosecutor to be
    inappropriate.
    Dahl applied to this court for permission to appeal the district
    court order in advance of a final judgment. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.104(1).
    We granted the application for interlocutory appeal and stayed the
    district court proceedings pending resolution of this appeal.
    II. Issue.
    This appeal raises the issue of whether a criminal defendant is
    entitled to an ex parte hearing in connection with an application for a
    private investigator under Iowa Code sections 815.7(1) and (5).       Dahl
    points out that courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted similar
    statutes and procedural rules to mandate ex parte hearings. He argues if
    we do not interpret section 815.7 to require ex parte hearings for indigent
    criminal defendants who request investigative services, we should find
    5
    criminal defendants have a right to an ex parte hearing under the United
    States and Iowa Constitutions.
    The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels us to construe
    statutes to avoid constitutional issues when possible. State v. Iowa Dist.
    Ct., 
    843 N.W.2d 76
    , 85 (Iowa 2014); Mall Real Estate, L.L.C. v. City of
    Hamburg, 
    818 N.W.2d 190
    , 200 (Iowa 2012); see Ashwander v. Tenn.
    Valley Auth., 
    297 U.S. 288
    , 345–48, 
    56 S. Ct. 466
    , 482–84, 
    80 L. Ed. 688
    , 710–12 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Accordingly, the issue we
    will decide is whether we can construe the procedure required under
    section 815.7 to allow for an ex parte hearing and avoid any
    constitutional issues that may arise under the statute if construed in a
    contrary fashion.
    III. Scope of Review.
    We review questions of statutory interpretation for correction of
    errors at law.   State v. Gonzalez, 
    718 N.W.2d 304
    , 307 (Iowa 2006).
    Moreover, the Iowa Constitution provides this court with “supervisory
    and administrative control over all inferior judicial tribunals throughout
    the state.”   Iowa Const. art. V, § 4.   In this capacity, this court may
    implement protocols to protect the rights of criminal defendants.     See
    State v. Cashen, 
    789 N.W.2d 400
    , 408–10 (Iowa 2010) (implementing a
    protocol to allow criminal defendants access to certain mental health
    records), superseded by statute, 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 8, § 2 (codified at
    Iowa Code § 622.10), as recognized in State v. Thompson, 
    836 N.W.2d 470
    , 490 (Iowa 2013); see also In re Judges of the Mun. Ct., 
    130 N.W.2d 553
    , 554 (Iowa 1964) (per curiam) (discussing this court’s duty to
    exercise its supervisory and administrative powers).
    6
    IV. Discussion and Analysis.
    The   Iowa   Code      establishes   a   procedure   whereby   indigent
    defendants may retain an investigator necessary for the defendant to
    present an adequate defense. The relevant statute states:
    1. An attorney who has not entered into a contract
    authorized under section 13B.4 and who is appointed by the
    court to represent any person pursuant to section 814.11 or
    815.10 shall be entitled to reasonable compensation and
    expenses.
    ....
    5. The expenses shall include any sums as are
    necessary for investigations in the interest of justice . . . .
    Iowa Code § 815.7(1), (5).
    In construing section 815.7, we start with the proposition that the
    Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires the State to
    pay for reasonably necessary defense services for which indigent
    defendants demonstrate a need in order to ensure such defendants
    receive effective assistance of counsel. English v. Missildine, 
    311 N.W.2d 292
    , 293–94 (Iowa 1981). However, this right is not limitless.
    Unless the trial court makes a finding that defense services,
    including expert or investigative services, are necessary in the interest of
    justice, an indigent defendant is not entitled to receive those services at
    state expense. State v. Leutfaimany, 
    585 N.W.2d 200
    , 208 (Iowa 1998).
    An indigent defendant bears the burden to demonstrate a reasonable
    need for such services. State v. Coker, 
    412 N.W.2d 589
    , 593 (Iowa 1987).
    We discourage courts from allowing the State to pay for defense services
    when an indigent defendant merely seeks to embark on a random fishing
    expedition in search of a defense. 
    Leutfaimany, 585 N.W.2d at 208
    .
    In order to prevent indigent defendants from using state funds for
    this sort of evidentiary exploration, we require the trial court to
    7
    independently review facts asserted by counsel and grant the application
    if those facts “reasonably suggest further exploration may prove
    beneficial to defendant in the development of his or her defense.” 
    Coker, 412 N.W.2d at 592
    . Thus, for the court to grant an indigent defendant’s
    application for appointment of a private investigator at state expense, the
    indigent defendant must inform the court of facts that demonstrate a
    reasonable need for investigative services.
    When an indigent defendant requests the appointment of a private
    investigator, the defendant needs to inform the trial court what the
    investigator will do in order to demonstrate a reasonable need for the
    services the investigator will provide. This may require the defendant to
    disclose facts that will reveal defense counsel’s trial strategy or thought
    processes.     Without this information, the court may be unable to
    determine if the facts asserted by counsel “reasonably suggest further
    exploration may prove beneficial to defendant in the development of his
    or her defense.” See 
    id. (emphasis omitted).
    If the trial court requires defense counsel to make a record of the
    facts supporting a defendant’s reasonable need for investigative services
    in the presence of the prosecutor, the State could deduce defense
    counsel’s trial strategy from those disclosures. Disclosure of the defense
    counsel’s trial strategy to the State impairs an indigent defendant’s right
    to effective assistance of counsel. Ex parte Moody, 
    684 So. 2d 114
    , 120
    (Ala. 1996).
    Congress foresaw this problem when it enacted 18 U.S.C.
    § 3006A(e)(1), the federal statute that addresses applications for defense
    services by indigent defendants accused of federal crimes.         Section
    3006A(e)(1) expressly permits indigent defendants to apply ex parte for
    investigative, expert, or other services necessary for their counsel to
    8
    provide adequate representation.           18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (2012).
    Legislative history indicates Congress intended the ex parte proceeding
    requirement to “prevent the possibility that an open hearing may cause a
    defendant to reveal his defense.”          H.R. Rep. No. 88–864 (1963), as
    reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990, 2990.
    “The right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
    counsel.” State v. Williams, 
    207 N.W.2d 98
    , 104 (Iowa 1973). However,
    we need not decide whether the trial court’s failure to provide an ex parte
    hearing on Dahl’s application for appointment of a private investigator
    violated any of Dahl’s constitutional rights because we agree with
    Congress that an open hearing may possibly cause a defendant to reveal
    his defense.
    Accordingly, we exercise our supervisory powers under article V,
    section 4 to articulate a protocol to balance the statutory right of an
    indigent defendant to the appointment of a private investigator under
    section 815.7 against his or her burden to present sufficient information
    to the trial court to support the granting of an application for
    appointment of a private investigator at state expense.           Trial courts
    should use this protocol in those rare circumstances when the State
    objects to the appointment of a private investigator for an indigent
    defendant.
    As     is   presently   done,   an   indigent   defendant   who   seeks
    appointment of a private investigator at state expense must file a timely
    application. The application should state the name of the investigator
    the defendant seeks to retain, an estimate as to what the requested
    services will cost and, if possible, a general description of what services
    the investigator will provide.    The court should then give the State an
    opportunity to resist the application. Generally, the State should resist
    9
    an application on the ground that granting the application will prejudice
    the administration of justice.   Examples of applications that may be
    prejudicial to the administration of justice include those that are
    untimely or filed to delay the proceeding. The State should not impede
    the right of an indigent defendant to fully investigate the case or develop
    a valid defense.    If the State resists the application, the prosecutor
    should have the right to appear and participate in a hearing regarding
    the application and the State’s resistance.
    When a trial court deems an indigent defendant’s application for
    appointment of a private investigator may have some merit but does not
    contain adequate information for the court to determine whether it
    should grant the application, the court should hold an ex parte hearing
    before ruling on the merits of the application. At that hearing, the court
    should require the defendant to provide additional information that will
    allow it to rule on the merits. If the court holds an ex parte hearing, the
    court must report the ex parte hearing. The court must also seal any
    transcript or order that would disclose defense strategy or work product
    and file a separate order announcing its decision to grant or deny the
    application.
    This protocol balances the statutory right of an indigent defendant
    to obtain a private investigator against his or her burden to present
    information to the trial court sufficient to support the granting of an
    application for appointment of a private investigator at state expense.
    This protocol also allows us to avoid deciding whether the failure of a
    court to hold an ex parte hearing implicates any of the defendant’s
    constitutional rights.
    10
    V. Disposition.
    We reverse the order of the district court denying Dahl’s request for
    an ex parte hearing and remand the case to the district court to follow
    the protocol contained in this opinion.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.