ned-chiodo-v-the-section-4324-panel-consisting-of-secretary-of-state ( 2014 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 14–0553
    Filed April 15, 2014
    NED CHIODO,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    THE SECTION 43.24 PANEL CONSISTING OF: SECRETARY OF
    STATE MATTHEW SCHULTZ, AUDITOR OF STATE MARY MOSIMAN
    and ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS MILLER,
    Appellee,
    ANTHONY BISIGNANO,
    Intervenor-Appellee.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David L.
    Christensen, Judge.
    In an expedited appeal from a ruling on judicial review, the
    petitioner challenges the denial of his objection to the intervenor’s
    eligibility to seek elective office. AFFIRMED.
    Gary D. Dickey Jr. of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, P.L.C.,
    Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Thompson, Solicitor
    General, and Meghan L. Gavin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
    Joseph C. Glazebrook of Glazebrook, Moe, Johnston & Hurd, LLP,
    Des Moines, for intervenor-appellee.
    2
    Rita Bettis and Randall C. Wilson, Des Moines, for amicus curiae
    American Civil Liberties Union of Iowa Foundation, Inc.
    3
    CADY, Chief Justice.
    In this appeal, we must decide if the Iowa Constitution disqualifies
    a person who has been convicted of the crime of operating while
    intoxicated (OWI), second offense, from holding a public office. The state
    elections panel (Panel) found the intervenor in this case was not
    disqualified, as did the district court on judicial review of the Panel
    decision. On our review of the district court decision, we hold a person
    convicted of the crime of OWI, second offense, is not disqualified from
    holding a public office in Iowa.     We affirm the decision of the district
    court.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    On March 11, 2014, Anthony Bisignano filed an affidavit of
    candidacy for Iowa Senate in District 17 with the Iowa Secretary of State.
    District 17 covers a portion of Polk County, and Bisignano sought the
    Democratic nomination. Two days later, Ned Chiodo filed an objection to
    the affidavit of candidacy filed by Bisignano. Chiodo had previously filed
    an affidavit of candidacy for Iowa Senate in District 17. He also sought
    the Democratic nomination, along with another candidate, Nathan Blake.
    Blake is an assistant attorney general in the Iowa Department of Justice.
    In the objection, Chiodo claimed Bisignano was disqualified from
    holding public office based on his prior conviction of the crime of OWI,
    second offense.     Chiodo requested the Secretary of State not to place
    Bisignano’s name on the primary ballot.
    Bisignano was convicted in district court of OWI, second offense,
    on December 9, 2013.        The district court sentenced him to a term of
    incarceration not to exceed two years, but suspended all but seven days
    of the incarceration and placed him on probation with the Iowa
    Department of Correctional Services for two years.
    4
    The objection filed by Chiodo with the Secretary of State was heard
    by the three-person panel on March 19, 2014. On March 21, the Panel
    denied the objection.
    Chiodo filed a petition for judicial review of the decision of the
    Panel with the district court. On April 2, the district court affirmed the
    decision of the Panel.        Chiodo promptly filed a notice of appeal.              We
    granted expedited review.
    Chiodo raises two issues for review on appeal.                First, he argues
    Attorney General Thomas Miller was required to recuse himself from
    considering the objection as a part of the three-person panel due to a
    conflict of interest.      Second, he claims a criminal conviction for an
    aggravated     misdemeanor         constitutes     an    infamous      crime,    which
    disqualifies a person with such a conviction from holding office under
    article II, section 5 of the Iowa Constitution.
    We decline to consider Chiodo’s challenge to the Attorney General’s
    participation on the Panel. In oral argument, Chiodo acknowledged he
    does not assert this claim to seek a remedy in this case.                     We thus
    proceed only to consider Chiodo’s main contention that the Panel’s ruling
    that OWI, second offense, was not an infamous crime was contrary to the
    Iowa Constitution.
    II. Scope of Review.
    The Iowa Code authorizes judicial review of agency decisions that
    prejudice the “substantial rights” of the petitioner.1                     Iowa Code
    1In  the district court, the Panel argued the proper avenue for judicial review of
    its action was writ of certiorari. The district court apparently disagreed, reasoning we
    would employ the same standards to review a claim brought under either procedural
    mechanism. The Panel has not appealed this aspect of the district court’s decision, and
    its resolution is not germane to our determination in this expedited appeal.
    Accordingly, we assume, without deciding, the Panel and the Attorney General are
    agencies subject to the provisions of chapter 17A.
    5
    § 17A.19(1), (10) (2013); accord Renda v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 
    784 N.W.2d 8
    , 10 (Iowa 2010).     Among the grounds upon which a district
    court may grant relief is action that is “[u]nconstitutional on its face or
    as applied” or action “based upon a provision of law that is
    unconstitutional on its face or as applied.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(a).
    “[W]e review agency action involving constitutional issues de novo.”
    Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 
    830 N.W.2d 335
    , 344 (Iowa 2013).
    III. Discussion.
    The laws of this state provide that a person who seeks public office
    must be an “eligible elector.” Iowa Code § 39.26. An “eligible elector”
    under our law is a person who possesses the qualifications to be a
    registered voter. 
    Id. § 39.3(6).
    The qualifications to vote have roots in
    our Iowa Constitution and address concepts of citizenship, age, and
    residency. See Iowa Const. art. II, § 1. In short, a person who runs for
    public office in Iowa must be a person who can vote in Iowa.         Thus,
    restrictions on those who run for office are actually restrictions on those
    who can vote.
    Voting is a fundamental right in Iowa, indeed the nation.        See
    Devine v. Wonderlich, 
    268 N.W.2d 620
    , 623 (Iowa 1978). It occupies an
    irreducibly vital role in our system of government by providing citizens
    with a voice in our democracy and in the election of those who make the
    laws by which all must live. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 
    376 U.S. 1
    , 17, 
    84 S. Ct. 526
    , 535, 
    11 L. Ed. 2d 481
    , 492 (1964). The right to vote is found
    at the heart of representative government and is “preservative of other
    basic civil and political rights.” Reynolds v. Sims, 
    377 U.S. 533
    , 562, 
    84 S. Ct. 1362
    , 1381, 
    12 L. Ed. 2d 506
    , 527 (1964); accord Yick Wo v.
    Hopkins, 
    118 U.S. 356
    , 370, 
    6 S. Ct. 1064
    , 1071, 
    30 L. Ed. 220
    , 226
    (1866).
    6
    While our constitution underscores the importance and respect for
    the voting process that gives voice to democratic governance, it does not
    extend that voice to every person. As with all rights, the right to vote is
    not absolute. Instead, two classes of people in Iowa are disqualified from
    voting.   Under article II, section 5, “[a] person adjudged mentally
    incompetent to vote or a person convicted of any infamous crime shall
    not be entitled to the privilege of an elector.” Iowa Const. art. II, § 5.
    As with many other terms and phrases in our constitution, our
    founders did not give us a definition of the phrase “infamous crime.”
    From the beginning of our constitutional journey as a state, as now, the
    courts have been given the role to interpret the constitution and provide
    the needed definition so our constitutional principles can be applied to
    resolve the disputes we face today.        See Varnum v. Brien, 
    763 N.W.2d 862
    , 875 (Iowa 2009).      Our founders not only declined to list specific
    crimes that would disqualify people from participating in the election
    process, they did not use traditional classes or categories of crimes such
    as felony or misdemeanor to disqualify a voter. Instead, our founders
    gave us the phrase “infamous crime.” The foundational question we face
    today is whether the crime of OWI, second offense, is an infamous crime.
    We do not begin our resolution of this case on a clean slate. We
    have considered the meaning of the phrase “infamous crime” in the past
    and have given it a rather direct and straightforward definition. We have
    said “[a]ny crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary is an
    infamous crime.” State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 
    248 Iowa 978
    , 980, 
    83 N.W.2d 451
    , 452 (1957); accord Blodgett v. Clarke, 
    177 Iowa 575
    , 578,
    
    159 N.W. 243
    , 244 (1916) (per curiam); see also Flannagan v. Jepson,
    
    177 Iowa 393
    , 399–400, 
    158 N.W. 641
    , 643 (1916).
    7
    If this definition is applied to resolve the question in this case, we
    need little additional analysis. Our legislature has defined the crime of
    OWI, second offense, as an aggravated misdemeanor.                  Iowa Code
    § 321J.2(2)(b).   An aggravated misdemeanor has been defined by our
    legislature to be a crime punishable by imprisonment within our state
    correctional system. See 
    id. § 321J.2(4)(a);
    id. § 901.7. 
    Thus, under our
    existing interpretation of the phrase “infamous crime,” a strong argument
    exists that Bisignano is disqualified from running for public office, as
    well as participating in our democracy as a voter. He claims, however,
    our prior interpretation of the phrase “infamous crime” is incorrect. The
    Panel agreed with this claim, and we now proceed to consider it.
    Our   judicial   process   is   built   on   the   general   principle   of
    stare decisis. We normally build upon and follow our past cases. Yet,
    our experience has revealed times when our precedents must be
    overturned. State v. Miller, 
    841 N.W.2d 583
    , 586 (Iowa 2014). Within a
    system of justice, courts cannot blindly follow the past. Instead, we are
    obligated to depart from past cases when they were erroneously decided.
    Thus, we turn to review our prior cases that have interpreted the phrase
    “infamous crime” to determine if those cases were correctly decided.
    We first considered the phrase “infamous crime” outside the
    context of article II, section 5. In Flannagan, the defendant continued to
    maintain a “liquor nuisance” after the district court entered a decree
    enjoining him from doing 
    so. 177 Iowa at 395
    , 158 N.W. at 641.            In
    response, the district court held the defendant in contempt of court for
    failing to comply with the injunction and sentenced him to one year of
    hard labor in the state penitentiary. Id. at 
    395, 158 N.W. at 641
    –42.
    On appeal, we were required to address the procedural rights
    afforded under the constitution to a person found in contempt and
    8
    sentenced to the penitentiary for that contempt. See 
    id. at 398–402,
    158
    N.W. at 642–44. Because the Iowa Constitution limits the imposition of
    involuntary servitude to “punishment of crime,” Iowa Const. art. 1, § 23,
    the case turned on whether contempt was a crime. See 
    Flannagan, 177 Iowa at 399
    , 158 N.W. at 643.           To make this determination, we
    considered the “infamous crime” phrase found in the Fifth Amendment to
    the United States Constitution. See 
    id. at 399–401,
    158 N.W. at 643–44.
    In turn, we relied heavily on the case of Ex parte Wilson. See 
    id. See generally
    Ex parte Wilson, 
    114 U.S. 417
    , 422–23, 
    5 S. Ct. 935
    , 937–38,
    
    29 L. Ed. 89
    , 91 (1885).
    In Ex parte Wilson, the Court noted that two concepts of infamy
    existed prior to the Fifth 
    Amendment. 114 U.S. at 422
    , 5 S. Ct. at 
    937, 29 L. Ed. at 91
    . These two concepts addressed distinct circumstances.
    See 
    id. (citing Lord
    William Eden Auckland, Principles of Penal Law ch.
    VII, § 6, at 54 (London 1771)).    One concept focused on the mode of
    punishment for a person who commits an infamous crime; the other
    dealt with disqualification of a person who committed an infamous crime
    from being a witness. See 
    id. “[T]he infamy
    which disqualified a convict
    to be a witness depended upon the character of his crime, and not upon
    the nature of his punishment.” Id. at 
    422, 5 S. Ct. at 937
    –38, 29 L. Ed.
    at 91. The list of infamous crimes recognized at the time included
    treason, felony, forgery, and crimes injuriously affecting by
    falsehood and fraud the administration of justice, such as
    perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by
    bribery, conspiring to accuse one of crime, or to procure the
    absence of a witness, [but not] . . . private cheats, such as
    the obtaining of goods by false pretenses, or the uttering of
    counterfeit coin or forged securities.
    
    Id. at 423,
    5 S. Ct. at 
    938, 29 L. Ed. at 91
    . Because the latter definition
    of infamy—pertaining to disqualification—was “already established” at
    9
    the time the Fifth Amendment was ratified, the Supreme Court reasoned
    the Fifth Amendment’s definition must incorporate the infamous-
    punishment standard instead. See 
    id. at 422–24,
    5 S. Ct. at 
    937–38, 29 L. Ed. at 91
    .
    We followed the reasoning from Ex Parte Wilson that the right to be
    prosecuted by indictment for an “infamous crime” under the Fifth
    Amendment applied the concept of “infamous punishment,” not the
    particular type or character of the crime. See 
    Flannagan, 177 Iowa at 401
    , 158 N.W. at 643–44. Quoting Wilson, we said, “ ‘For more than a
    century, imprisonment at hard labor in the . . . penitentiary . . . has been
    considered an infamous punishment in England and America.’ ” 
    Id. at 400,
    158 N.W. at 643 (quoting Ex parte 
    Wilson, 114 U.S. at 428
    , 5 S. Ct.
    at 
    940, 29 L. Ed. at 93
    ).    Thus, we held in Flannagan that a person
    sentenced to a year of hard labor in the penitentiary was entitled to due
    process protections. 
    Id. at 401–02,
    158 N.W. at 644. Nevertheless, we
    made no effort to define an “infamous crime” under the Iowa Constitution
    for purposes of disqualifying persons from voting. We also did not decide
    if the punishment concept or the character-of-the-crime concept applied
    to the context of voting.
    A few months after we decided Flannagan, we decided Blodgett.
    Unlike Flannagan, Blodgett did implicate article II, section 5 of our
    constitution and required us to decide if forgery (as defined in Iowa Code
    section 4853 (Supp. 1913)) was an infamous crime. See 
    Blodgett, 177 Iowa at 578
    , 159 N.W. at 244. At the time, “the punishment prescribed
    by statute for forgery” was “confinement in the penitentiary not more
    than ten years.” 
    Id. Our unabridged
    reasoning regarding the definition
    of infamous crimes was: “Any crime punishable by imprisonment in the
    penitentiary is an infamous crime.” 
    Id. (citing Flannagan,
    177 Iowa at
    10
    
    400, 158 N.W. at 643
    ).      However, we provided no other analysis in
    explaining our decision. See 
    id. Our jurisprudence
    on infamous crimes following Blodgett sat
    dormant until 1957, when we decided Haubrich.             In Haubrich, the
    defendant had been convicted of income tax evasion under federal law,
    and the rights the parties assumed he had lost as a result of that
    conviction had been restored by the 
    governor. 248 Iowa at 979
    –80, 83
    N.W.2d at 452.    The case turned on two questions: whether a person
    loses citizenship upon a federal conviction for what would constitute an
    infamous crime if convicted under state law and whether the Governor of
    Iowa has the power to restore such a person’s rights under Iowa law,
    even if there has been no presidential pardon.        See 
    id. at 982–87,
    83
    N.W.2d at 453–56.     Identifying the constitutional context of the case,
    however, we reiterated the concept articulated in Blodgett and Flannagan
    that an infamous crime was punishable by imprisonment in the
    penitentiary.   See 
    id. at 980,
    83 N.W.2d at 452.        Thus, we did not
    undertake to define “infamous crime,” but only addressed the process
    and consequences that follow after a person is convicted of an “infamous
    crime.” We merely followed the path first taken forty-one years before
    and made no independent analysis.
    This background reveals that we have never engaged in a textual
    analysis of the meaning of “infamous crime” in article II, section 5. Our
    trilogy of cases never examined the specific language of article II, section
    5 and its surrounding context. We feel obligated to conduct this analysis
    before relying on those cases to resolve this case.
    In examining the text of article II, section 5, we observe that the
    language used by our founders limits disenfranchisement to persons
    “convicted of any infamous crime.” Iowa Const. art II, § 5. Under our
    11
    constitutional interpretation framework, we first look to the words used
    by our framers to ascertain intent and the meaning of our constitution
    and to the common understanding of those words. Rants v. Vilsack, 
    684 N.W.2d 193
    , 199 (Iowa 2004). We recognize, of course, that “words at
    best are mere messengers of the thoughts and ideas they are sent to
    convey.”    Rudd v. Ray, 
    248 N.W.2d 125
    , 129 (Iowa 1976).             Yet, the
    specific constitutional language at issue speaks of a conviction of a
    crime, not punishment for a crime.           Moreover, our founders knew the
    difference between the concepts of conviction and punishment.               In
    prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude under our constitution, our
    founders prohibited involuntary servitude “unless for the punishment of
    crime.”    Iowa Const. art. I, § 23.     Thus, between the two concepts of
    infamy discussed in Ex parte Wilson—conviction of a crime or
    punishment for a crime—the use of the word “convicted” in the infamous
    crime clause reveals our founders intended the concept of “infamous
    crime,” in the context of voter disqualification, to be aligned with the
    concept of conviction, not punishment.            There is simply no textual
    support for using punishment to define an “infamous crime.”
    It is also instructive that the obvious purpose of article II, section 5
    was to declare those classes of persons who would be disqualified to vote.
    We seek to interpret our constitution consistent with the object sought to
    be obtained at the time of adoption as disclosed by the circumstances.
    Redmond v. Ray, 
    268 N.W.2d 849
    , 853 (Iowa 1978). It is reasonable to
    conclude our founders intended to adopt the concept of infamy
    specifically   applicable    to   the   disqualification   of   persons   from
    participating in various aspects of the democratic process, not the
    concept of infamy applicable to punishment and procedural rights in
    criminal prosecutions.      In the context of the limitation of political and
    12
    civil rights, infamous described the nature of the crime itself, irrespective
    of punishment. See Snyder v. King, 
    958 N.E.2d 764
    , 773–76 (Ind. 2011)
    (reviewing the historical backdrop of its infamous crimes clause and
    concluding “[h]istory thus demonstrates that whether a crime is
    infamous . . . depends . . . on the nature of the crime itself”).
    It is also important to observe that the previous binary nature of
    punishment in Iowa has given way to a more complex and nuanced
    continuum of punishment. At the time of our constitutional convention,
    only two classifications of crimes existed—felonies and misdemeanors.
    Felons were sent to prison; misdemeanants were sent to jail. See Iowa
    Code § 2816 (1851) (“Public offenses are divided into felonies and
    misdemeanors.”); 
    id. § 2817
    (“A felony is an offense punishable with
    death, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary of this state.”); 
    id. § 2818
    (“Every other criminal offense is a misdemeanor.”).                 Aggravated
    misdemeanors did not exist in 1857 when our current constitution was
    drafted, see 
    id. §§ 2816–18,
    nor did they exist in 1916 when we decided
    Blodgett and Flannagan, see Iowa Code §§ 8533–36, 8538 (1919); see
    also Bopp v. Clark, 
    165 Iowa 697
    , 701, 
    147 N.W. 172
    , 174 (1914). The
    drafters of our constitution easily could have chosen to disqualify those
    convicted of crimes “punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary; the
    drafters of Oregon’s constitution certainly did. See Oregon Const. art. II,
    § 3 (“The privilege of an elector, upon conviction of any crime which is
    punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be forfeited, unless
    otherwise provided by law.” (Emphasis added.)). But, our drafters did
    not.
    We conclude Blodgett was clearly erroneous and now overrule it.
    We also disapprove of any suggestion in Flannagan or Haubrich that the
    mere fact that a crime is punishable by confinement in a penitentiary
    13
    disqualifies the offender from exercising the privilege of an elector.
    Consequently, Chiodo’s position quickly unravels from the threads of the
    three cases from which it was spun.        Yet, we must still decide the
    underlying question whether the crime of OWI, second offense, is an
    infamous crime. Our constitution is supreme, Iowa Const. art. XII, § 1,
    and if OWI, second offense, is an infamous crime, Bisignano is
    disqualified from office under our constitution.
    We begin our search for the meaning of the phrase “infamous
    crime” by observing that our legislature defined “infamous crime” in 1994
    to mean “a felony as defined in section 701.7 or an offense classified as a
    felony under federal law.” See 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1180, § 1 (codified at
    Iowa Code § 39.3(8) (1995)).     While the legislature may help provide
    meaning to the constitution by defining undefined words and phrases,
    the definition provided by our legislature itself must be constitutional.
    See Junkins v. Branstad, 
    421 N.W.2d 130
    , 134–35 (Iowa 1988) (noting
    the importance of a legislative definition of “appropriation bill,” but
    recognizing “it does not settle the constitutional question”); cf. Powell v.
    McCormack, 
    395 U.S. 486
    , 549, 
    89 S. Ct. 1944
    , 1978, 
    23 L. Ed. 2d 491
    ,
    532 (1969) (“Our system of government requires that federal courts on
    occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the
    construction given the document by another branch.”). The legislature
    may not add to or subtract from the voter qualifications under the
    constitution. See Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines, 
    138 Iowa 730
    , 737,
    
    117 N.W. 309
    , 311 (1908). In the end, it is for the courts to interpret the
    constitution. See 
    Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 875
    . This important principle
    has, more than any other, helped allow our democracy to advance with
    each passing generation with our constitutional beliefs intact.
    14
    The felony–misdemeanor distinction does offer a clean bright-line
    rule. The benefits of such a rule are obvious, and the allure is tempting.
    Yet, our role is to interpret our constitution by using the language found
    in the constitution. We perform this role with the presumption that the
    drafters of our constitution were careful and thoughtful in selecting each
    word to convey the meaning they intended would be carried forward. If
    the words of the constitution do not support a bright-line rule, neither
    can we.       Additionally, we recognize that we are dealing with a
    constitutional provision that disqualifies persons from voting.                Ease of
    application does not justify a rule that disenfranchises otherwise eligible
    voters.2
    A review of article II of our constitution reveals the framers clearly
    understood that an “infamous crime” and a “felony” had different
    meanings.      Most immediately, article II disqualifies an elector once
    convicted of an infamous crime. Iowa Const. art. II, § 5. Yet, in the same
    article, electors “in all cases except treason, felony, or breach of the
    peace” are privileged from being arrested “on the days of election, during
    their attendance at such election, [and] going to and returning
    therefrom.” 
    Id. art. II,
    § 2 (emphasis added). If the drafters intended the
    2The  real and substantial political equality we enjoy, and to which we all
    endeavor, owes in no small part to the universal suffrage among adult citizens.
    Denying the right to vote is a privation of our highest ideals as a society:
    Denying the right to vote to people who are living and working in
    the community runs counter to the modern ideal of universal suffrage.
    Under that ideal, each citizen is entitled to cast one vote, and each vote
    counts the same regardless of who casts it. Voting thus becomes a
    powerful symbol of political equality; full citizenship and full equality
    mean having the right to vote.
    Erika Wood, Brennan Center for Justice, Restoring the Right to Vote 4 (2009), available
    at http://www.BrennanCenter.org/Publication/Restoring-Right-Vote+ (last visited
    Apr. 15, 2014).
    15
    two concepts to be coextensive, different words would not have been
    used. This reading is bolstered by article III, section 11, which privileges
    members of the legislature from arrest during the session of the general
    assembly, or going to and returning from session “in all cases, except
    treason, felony, or breach of the peace.”          
    Id. art. III,
    § 11 (emphasis
    added). Our framers knew the meaning of felony and knew how to use
    the term. See In re Johnson, 
    257 N.W.2d 47
    , 50 (Iowa 1977) (“It is our
    duty, if fairly possible, to harmonize constitutional provisions.”). As with
    our reasoning dispensing with the infamous-punishment test, if our
    founders intended the infamous crimes clause to mean all felony crimes,
    we must presume they would have used the word “felony” instead of the
    phrase “infamous crime.” Cf. 
    Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 771
    (“[I]f the framers
    had intended the Infamous Crimes Clause to apply only to felonies, we
    presume they would have used the term ‘felony’ instead of ‘infamous
    crime.’ ”). Accordingly, the legislature’s decision to define an “infamous
    crime” as a “felony” cannot stand alone to define the constitutional
    meaning of “infamous crime” because the two terms unquestionably have
    different meanings.
    This analysis does not mean the legislative definition of “infamous
    crime” is not helpful in deciding the definition under article II, section 5.
    Cf. State v. Bruegger, 
    773 N.W.2d 862
    , 873 (Iowa 2009) (“Legislative
    judgments are generally regarded as the most reliable objective
    indicators of community standards . . . .”).         In fact, given the long-
    standing awareness of the possible interplay between aggravated
    misdemeanors and our holding in Blodgett that crimes punishable by
    confinement in a penitentiary are “infamous crimes,” Iowa Code section
    39.3(8) (2013) may represent an evolution in our shared understanding
    of   the   gravity   of   crimes   that   should    subject   an   offender   to
    16
    disenfranchisement. Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 
    356 U.S. 86
    , 101, 
    78 S. Ct. 590
    ,
    598, 
    2 L. Ed. 2d 630
    , 642 (1958) (looking to “the evolving standards of
    decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”); Ex parte 
    Wilson, 114 U.S. at 427
    , 5 S. Ct. at 
    940, 29 L. Ed. at 93
    (“What punishments
    shall be considered as infamous may be affected by the changes of public
    opinion from one age to another.”). Thus, we acknowledge the legislative
    definition as a factor and turn to consider the meaning of the phrase
    “infamous crime” under article II, section 5.
    The meaning of the word “infamous” in the mid-nineteenth century
    was “ ‘most vile; base; detestable.’ ” 
    Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 780
    (quoting
    Noah Webster, A Dictionary of the English Language 202 (rev. ed. 1850)).
    It captures a concept dating back more than 2000 years to ancient
    Greece, when “criminals who had committed certain heinous crimes were
    pronounced ‘infamous’ and thereafter ‘prohibited from appearing in
    court, voting, making speeches, attending assemblies, and serving in the
    army’ and thus prohibited from influencing public affairs.”       
    Id. at 773
    (quoting Walter Matthews Grant, et al., Special Project: The Collateral
    Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929, 941
    (1970)).
    In 1839, the territorial legislature adopted a statute that declared
    certain persons to be “infamous.” Additionally, the statute specifically
    applied to voting. It stated:
    Each and every person in this Territory who may hereafter
    be convicted of the crime of rape, kidnapping, wilful [sic] and
    corrupt perjury, arson, burglary, robbery, sodomy, or the
    crime against nature, larceny, forgery, counterfeiting, or
    bigamy, shall be deemed infamous, and shall forever
    thereafter be rendered incapable of holding any office of
    honor, trust, or profit, of voting at any election, of serving as
    a juror, and of giving testimony in this Territory.
    17
    The   Statute    Laws    of    the   Territory   of   Iowa,   Code    of   Criminal
    Jurisprudence, Tenth Div., § 109, at 182 (1839).               The 1839 statute
    provides us with a limited window into some specific understanding of
    the meaning of “infamous crime[s]” of the day.
    Of course, like Iowa Code section 39.3(8) (2013) today,3 this statute
    is not a constitutional test. See 
    Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 780
    (concluding
    an 1843 Indiana statute enumerating nine infamous crimes was not a
    present-day constitutional test); see also Green v. City of Cascade, 
    231 N.W.2d 882
    , 890 (Iowa 1975) (recognizing that while we give “respectful
    consideration     to   the    legislature’s   understanding     of   constitutional
    language,” we are the final arbiter of the meaning of the Iowa
    Constitution). Moreover, the judgment captured by the statute in 1839
    preceded our constitutional convention by nearly a generation, and it
    was repealed before 1851.
    More directly, it appears the drafters at our 1857 constitutional
    convention intended to deprive the legislature of the power to define
    infamous crimes. The proposed 1844 Iowa Constitution had contained a
    provision denying the privileges of an elector to “persons declared
    infamous by act of the legislature.”           Iowa Const. art. III, § 5 (1844)
    (emphasis added).        This language was removed in the 1846 Iowa
    Constitution.    See Iowa Const. art. III, § 5 (1846) (“No idiot, or insane
    3We recognize article II, section 5 was amended by Iowa voters in 2008.
    However, there is a reason none of the parties argued the amendment gave new
    meaning to the infamous crimes clause. Without any question, the amendment was
    technical and intended only to update descriptions of mentally incompetent persons we
    no longer use. There was no intention to update the substantive meaning of the
    infamous crimes clause, and the companion judicial interpretations accordingly
    continued in force unaffected by the amendment. In short, the amendment did nothing
    but what it was intended to do: replace offensive descriptions of people with new
    descriptions. Thus, we properly refrain from considering the amendment in our
    analysis.
    18
    person, or persons convicted of any infamous crime, shall be entitled to
    the privileges of an elector.”). While the 1846 constitution was modeled
    on the 1844 constitution, historical commentary regarding 1846
    convention reveals radically egalitarian and inclusive voices influenced
    the debate over our incipient fundamental law: “[A] strong effort [was]
    made to extend this political right to resident foreigners who had
    declared their intention of becoming citizens.” Benjamin F. Shambaugh,
    History of the Constitutions of Iowa 301 (1902).            This suggests its
    infamous crimes clause was meant to apply narrowly.
    The drafters at the 1857 constitutional convention did not reinsert
    the 1844 language.      Certainly, the drafters at our 1857 constitutional
    convention knew how to delegate authority over elections to the
    legislature. Indeed, the Indiana constitutional conventions of 1816 and
    1850 gave its general assembly authority to define infamous crimes.
    
    Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 774
    –75; see also Indiana Const. art. II, § 8 (“The
    General Assembly shall have power to deprive of the right of suffrage,
    and to render ineligible, any person convicted of an infamous crime.”).
    Our founders were aware of the 1851 Indiana Constitution, but clearly
    did not choose to adopt its language for article II, section 5.
    As recognized by other courts, infamous crimes clauses found in
    many state constitutional voting provisions are properly understood as a
    regulatory measure, not a punitive measure. See 
    Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 781
    .   Article II of the Iowa Constitution appears compatible with this
    approach.    Our framers devoted the entire article to voting.        Article II
    establishes the requirements to exercise the right to vote, Iowa Const.
    art. II, § 1; provides safeguards to the exercise of the right to vote, 
    id. art. II,
    §§ 2–3; and lists two classes of individuals not granted the right to
    vote, 
    id. art. II,
    § 5. The overall approach reveals our framers not only
    19
    understood the importance for Iowans to have a voice in our democracy
    through voting, but they further understood the fundamental need to
    preserve the integrity of the process of voting by making sure it was not
    compromised        by    voices    that   were      incompetent   to   meaningfully
    participate or voices infected by an infamous disposition. See 
    Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 781
    (“The most common regulatory justification for
    criminal disenfranchisement provisions is that they preserve the integrity
    of elections.”).
    Within this context and setting, the concept of disenfranchisement
    was not meant to punish certain criminal offenders or persons adjudged
    incompetent, but to protect “ ‘the purity of the ballot box.’ ” 
    Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 781
    (quoting Washington v. State, 
    75 Ala. 582
    , 585 (1884)); see
    also Otsuka v. Hite, 
    414 P.2d 412
    , 417 (Cal. 1966) (adopting the
    justification), abrogated on other grounds by Ramirez v. Brown, 
    507 P.2d 1345
    , 1353 (Cal. 1973) (en banc), judgment rev’d by Richardson v.
    Ramirez, 
    418 U.S. 24
    , 56, 
    94 S. Ct. 2655
    , 2672, 
    41 L. Ed. 2d 551
    , 572
    (1974). Our drafters wanted the voting process in Iowa to be meaningful
    so that the voice of voters would have effective meaning.                    Thus,
    disenfranchisement of infamous criminals parallels disenfranchisement
    of incompetent persons under article II, section 5. The infamous crimes
    clause incapacitates infamous criminals who would otherwise threaten to
    subvert the voting process and diminish the voices of those casting
    legitimate    ballots.        As     a    result,     the   regulatory   focus   of
    disenfranchisement under article II reveals the meaning of an “infamous
    crime” under article II, section 5 looks not only to the classification of the
    crime itself, but how a voter’s conviction of that crime might compromise
    the integrity of our process of democratic governance through the ballot
    box. See 
    Redmond, 268 N.W.2d at 863
    .
    20
    Any definition of the phrase “infamous crime” has vast implications
    and is not easy to articulate. However, we have said regulatory measures
    abridging the right to vote “must be carefully and meticulously
    scrutinized.” 
    Devine, 268 N.W.2d at 623
    . Similarly, the Supreme Court
    has said measures limiting the franchise must be “ ‘necessary to promote
    a compelling governmental interest.’ ” Dunn v. Blumstein, 
    405 U.S. 330
    ,
    343, 
    92 S. Ct. 995
    , 1003, 
    31 L. Ed. 2d 274
    , 884 (1972) (quoting Shapiro
    v. Thompson, 
    394 U.S. 618
    , 634, 
    89 S. Ct. 1322
    , 1331, 
    22 L. Ed. 2d 600
    ,
    615 (1969)). This context helps frame both the governmental interest at
    stake in protecting the integrity of the electoral process and the
    individual’s    vital    interest      in   participating   meaningfully     in    their
    government. The definition of “infamous crime” turns on the relationship
    particular crimes bear to this compelling interest.
    Some courts have settled on a standard that defines an “infamous
    crime”   as    an     “affront    to    democratic    governance   or    the      public
    administration of justice such that there is a reasonable probability that
    a person convicted of such a crime poses a threat to the integrity of
    elections.” 
    Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 782
    ; see also 
    Otsuka, 414 P.2d at 422
    (“[T]he inquiry must focus more precisely on the nature of the crime
    itself, and determine whether the elements of the crime are such that he
    who has committed it may reasonably be deemed to constitute a threat
    to the integrity of the elective process.”). Other courts limit the definition
    to a “felony, a crimen falsi offense, or a like offense involving the charge of
    falsehood      that     affects     the     public   administration     of     justice.”
    Commonwealth ex rel. Baldwin v. Richard, 
    751 A.2d 647
    , 653 (Pa. 2000).
    Still other courts establish the standard at crimes marked by “great
    moral turpitude.” 
    Washington, 75 Ala. at 585
    .
    21
    Considering the crime at the center of this case, we need not
    conclusively articulate a precise definition of “infamous crime” at this
    time. We only conclude that the crime must be classified as particularly
    serious, and it must be a crime that reveals that voters who commit the
    crime would tend to undermine the process of democratic governance
    through elections. We can decide this case by using the first part of this
    nascent definition.
    Throughout our history, we have separated the seriousness of
    crimes by felony and misdemeanor designations.          Crimes classified as
    felonies are serious offenses and misdemeanors are less serious. Within
    this framework, “infamous crime[s],” in light of its meaning throughout
    history, would at most extend to the area of serious crimes occupied by
    felonies. The concept of infamous crime is inconsistent with the concept
    of misdemeanor crime. It conveys a societal judgment not present in a
    misdemeanor,      especially   as   it   relates   to    the   concept    of
    disenfranchisement.     Even if a misdemeanor crime could theoretically
    include a crime with a nexus to the voting process, see, e.g., Iowa Code
    § 39A.3 (describing election misconduct in the second degree and making
    it an aggravated misdemeanor), the nexus would be too tenuous to
    support disenfranchisement if considered only a misdemeanor. Thus, an
    infamous crime first must be a crime classified as a felony.           As a
    misdemeanor crime, OWI, second offense, is not an “infamous crime”
    under article II, section 5.
    It will be prudent for us to develop a more precise test that
    distinguishes between felony crimes and infamous crimes within the
    regulatory purposes of article II, section 5 when the facts of the case
    provide us with the ability and perspective to better understand the
    needed contours of the test. This case does not. OWI, second offense, is
    22
    a crime that has never been considered by our legislature to be an
    infamous crime.        It is not aligned in any way with those crimes
    designated by the legislature in 1839 as infamous. It is viewed by our
    legislature as a misdemeanor crime.4 It is a crime that does not require
    specific criminal intent and lacks a nexus to preserving the integrity of
    the election process.
    Our conclusion that OWI, second offense, is not an infamous crime
    does not minimize its seriousness, or the seriousness of any other
    misdemeanor, but recognizes our framers sought only to limit the types
    of crimes that should disqualify a person from voting, and that limit was
    drawn at “infamous crime[s].” A crime that was not serious enough to be
    a felony a fortiori was not intended by our founding drafters to be an
    “infamous crime.”
    Our decision today is limited.          It does not render the legislative
    definition of an “infamous crime” under Iowa Code section 39.3(8)
    unconstitutional. We only hold OWI, second offense, is not an “infamous
    crime” under article II, section 5, and leave it for future cases to decide
    which felonies might fall within the meaning of “infamous crime[s]” that
    disqualify Iowans from voting.
    IV. Conclusion.
    We consider and reject all other claims and arguments asserted by
    Chiodo.    The crime of OWI, second offense, is not an infamous crime
    under article II, section 5 of the Iowa Constitution. The decision of the
    4Although an aggravated misdemeanor, it offers a special minimum sentence of
    local imprisonment of seven days, Iowa Code § 321J.2(4)(a), making it even less serious
    than other aggravated misdemeanors. Cf. 
    id. § 903.1(2)
    (providing a maximum term of
    imprisonment for aggravated misdemeanors when “a specific penalty is not provided”).
    23
    district court is affirmed. Anthony Bisignano’s name may appear on the
    ballot.
    AFFIRMED.
    All justices concur except Mansfield and Waterman, JJ., who
    concur specially; Wiggins, J., who dissents; and Appel, J., who takes no
    part.
    24
    #14–0553, Chiodo v. The Section 43.24 Panel
    MANSFIELD, J. (specially concurring).
    While I agree that Anthony Bisignano should not be disqualified
    from running for state senate, I cannot join the plurality opinion. I agree
    with the Panel, the district court, and Iowa’s elected representatives that
    felonies and only felonies are “infamous crimes” under article II, section
    5 of the Iowa Constitution.
    As the dissent correctly points out, the plurality throws out nearly
    a hundred years of this court’s precedents. Yet what is its replacement?
    That is hard to tell. Lacking a sound conceptual floor for its opinion, or a
    clear test, I think the plurality has unnecessarily introduced uncertainty
    and invited future litigation over voting rights. For example, I anticipate
    we will now see right-to-vote lawsuits from current prison inmates.
    The plurality’s assertion that its decision is “limited” does not
    make it so. Let’s review the plurality’s standards, which it admits are
    “nascent.”     The plurality says that only felonies falling within “the
    regulatory purposes of article II, section 5” disqualify a person from
    voting.   The plurality also says that only “particularly serious” crimes
    that “tend to undermine the process of democratic governance through
    elections” disqualify a person from voting.           The plurality adds, “The
    infamous crimes clause incapacitates infamous criminals who would
    otherwise threaten to subvert the voting process and diminish the voices
    of those casting legitimate ballots.”5
    5The plurality sows additional confusion by citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 
    405 U.S. 330
    , 342, 
    92 S. Ct. 995
    , 1003, 
    31 L. Ed. 2d 274
    , 284 (1972), and suggesting that a
    “compelling governmental interest” must support any disenfranchisement of a voter
    convicted of a crime. The plurality ignores the fact that two years after Dunn, the
    United States Supreme Court rejected the view that felon disenfranchisement must be
    supported by a compelling state interest, noting that the Fourteenth Amendment
    expressly contemplates the disenfranchisement of voters convicted of a crime. See
    25
    I think most people would agree these unrefined standards
    basically offer no guidance at all, therefore leaving the door wide open for
    future litigation. Notably, Iowa’s constitution, and the plurality opinion
    make no distinction between convicted felons who are presently
    incarcerated and those who have served their time.               Thus, under the
    plurality’s approach, even a person who is presently serving a lifetime-
    without-parole-sentence can argue that he or she should be able to vote
    from prison because barring him or her from voting would “undermine
    the process of democratic governance through elections.”                 When we
    overrule precedent that established a definite rule, we owe the public
    more than a welcome mat for future lawsuits.
    The plurality’s approach to whether a crime is “infamous” is an
    odd mix of half-hearted originalism and excessive fealty to a court
    decision from Indiana. Initially, the plurality draws on mid-nineteenth
    century sources to ascertain the meaning of “infamous.” According to
    this review, “infamous crime” does not mean “felony” nor is it based on
    the punishment for the crime. Rather, it is based on how bad the crime
    is. Thus, “infamous” seems to mean something like “heinous” according
    to this part of the plurality opinion. Accordingly, the plurality quotes an
    1839 Iowa territorial law listing infamous crimes that disqualify a person
    from voting. The Statute Laws of the Territory of Iowa, Code of Criminal
    Jurisprudence, Tenth Div., § 109, at 182 (1839).                Actually, this list
    ___________________________
    Richardson v. Ramirez, 
    418 U.S. 24
    , 54–55, 
    94 S. Ct. 2655
    , 2670–71, 
    41 L. Ed. 2d 551
    ,
    570–71 (1974); see also Madison v. State, 
    163 P.3d 757
    , 767–68 (Wash. 2007)
    (reviewing the caselaw that holds the right to vote is not fundamental for convicted
    felons).
    26
    appears to include most felonies.6            I would argue that this list, if
    anything, supports either of two viewpoints: (1) “infamous crime” was up
    to the legislature to define, or (2) “infamous crime” meant felony.
    The plurality then shifts gears and moves on to out-of-state
    precedent, primarily a 2011 decision of the Indiana Supreme Court. See
    Snyder v. King, 
    958 N.E.2d 764
    (Ind. 2011). That decision interpreted
    article II, section 8 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides, “ ‘The
    General Assembly shall have the power to deprive the right of suffrage,
    and to render ineligible, any person convicted of an infamous crime.’ ”
    
    Id. at 768
    & n.1 (quoting Ind. Const. art. II, § 8).           In its opinion, the
    Indiana court, like the plurality here, began with a review of historical
    sources. 
    Id. at 773
    –80.
    However, toward the end of its opinion the Indiana Supreme Court
    largely turned away from historical analysis.           Instead, it decided that
    article II, section 8 of the Indiana Constitution serves only a “regulatory”
    purpose and that it can apply only to crimes like “treason, perjury,
    malicious prosecution, and election fraud,” where the person who
    committed the crime “may be presumed to pose a bona fide risk to the
    integrity of elections.”    
    Id. at 781–82.
         In justifying this rather stark
    change in direction, the court relied on another clause of the Indiana
    Constitution as well as the placement of article II, section 8 within article
    II. 
    Id. at 781.
    As the court explained,
    [T]he Infamous Crimes Clause was not intended to be used
    primarily as a retributive or deterrent mechanism of
    punishment. It is a cardinal principle of constitutional
    interpretation that our Constitution should be interpreted as
    6Murder  is not in the list, but at that time murder was punishable by death,
    which made voting rights a moot point. See The Statute Laws of the Territory of Iowa,
    Code of Criminal Jurisprudence, First Div., § 2, at 150.
    27
    a whole. Article I, § 18, of the Constitution provides that
    “[t]he penal code shall be founded on the principles of
    reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” Ind. Const. art. I,
    § 18.     Interpreting the Infamous Crimes Clause as
    authorizing the General Assembly to use a particular
    punishment solely for the purpose of exacting vindictive
    justice would conflict with this provision of the Indiana Bill
    of Rights. And we will avoid reading such a conflict into the
    Constitution unless the document itself clearly requires us to
    do so.
    We think instead that the Infamous Crimes Clause is
    properly understood primarily as a regulatory measure.
    While    history     clearly   demonstrates    its    punitive
    characteristics, its primarily regulatory character is clearly
    demonstrated by its placement in Article II, which seeks to
    regulate suffrage and elections, and the justification
    underlying criminal disenfranchisement provisions generally.
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    My colleagues here largely track Snyder but back off from fully
    embracing it.     Thus, the plurality does not reach Snyder’s ultimate
    conclusion that violent serious felonies like murder and kidnapping
    cannot disqualify a person from voting. But the plurality’s quasi-Snyder
    jurisprudence has multiple problems as applied to Iowa.
    First, Iowa’s situation is different from Indiana’s.    Among other
    things, Iowa does not have a constitutional provision requiring that
    punishment be “founded on the principles of reformation.” Ind. Const.
    art. I, § 18. Also, as I discuss below, Iowa amended and reenacted its
    constitutional clause disenfranchising persons convicted of infamous
    crimes in 2008. Importing an Indiana decision into Iowa is flawed on
    this ground alone.
    In addition, I think some of Snyder’s premises are questionable.
    For example, I do not place much stock in the “placement” of article II,
    section 8 within the Indiana Constitution. Nor do I place much stock in
    the placement of article II, section 5 within the Iowa Constitution. These
    are the parts of those constitutions that relate to voting.     Where else
    28
    would you include a clause that authorizes denial of the vote to persons
    convicted of crimes? So I think it is a stretch to say that because these
    provisions appear in their respective constitutions under “suffrage,” we
    have to interpret them narrowly.
    Third, Snyder at least deals with the question of whether people in
    prison can vote even if their crime is not infamous.            Thus, Snyder
    concludes that the state can use its “police power” to deny a convicted
    person the right to vote during the term of imprisonment regardless of
    the crime committed. 
    Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 784
    –85. But Snyder cites
    no textual basis for this conclusion in the Indiana Constitution.          
    Id. Instead, Snyder
    relies on out-of-state cases, national “consensus,” and
    the historical practice in Indiana.      
    Id. Regardless of
    the merits of
    Snyder’s reasoning, the opinion at least has the virtue of clarifying that
    current inmates will not be able to vote.          The plurality opinion here
    leaves that highly important question unanswered.
    Finally, whatever its flaws, Snyder does establish a somewhat clear
    rule of law. Current prisoners cannot vote, whereas released prisoners
    can vote unless their crime was akin to “treason, perjury, malicious
    prosecution, and election fraud.”     
    Id. at 782,
    785.         My colleagues’
    opinion, by going only partway on Snyder, does not pass that clarity
    threshold and instead fosters uncertainty.
    I would grant that the plurality has done a good job of saying what
    the legal standard for disqualification isn’t.       It is not conviction of a
    felony, conviction of a misdemeanor, or conviction of a crime with the
    potential for incarceration in a penitentiary.       However, other than the
    indeterminate language I’ve quoted above, the plurality offers no further
    guidance as to what the standard is.           As I have already argued, this
    29
    standard is essentially no standard at all and will lead to more voting
    and ballot cases as we sort out the implications of today’s ruling.
    Having voiced my criticisms of the plurality, let me now explain
    how I would decide this case. As I discuss below, I think there are ample
    grounds for holding that our constitution, in its current form, disqualifies
    felons and only felons from voting and holding public office.
    Our constitution gives the right to vote to all citizens, Iowa Const.
    art. II, § 1, subject to the following exception: “[A] person convicted of any
    infamous crime shall not be entitled to the privilege of an elector.” 
    Id. art. II,
    § 5. Although article II, section 5 was amended and reenacted by
    the general assembly and the people of Iowa a few years ago, the
    prohibition on voting by persons convicted of infamous crimes dates
    back to our original constitutional history. Thus, our 1857 constitution
    contained this language, which it borrowed essentially verbatim from the
    1846 constitution. Compare Iowa Const. art. II, § 5 (1857), with Iowa
    Const. art. II, § 5 (1846).
    I agree with the plurality on two points it makes about the text of
    article II, section 5. First, “infamous” is rather vague language. It does
    not cry out with specificity.     Second, our framers’ use of the word
    “infamous” and especially the phrase “infamous crime” suggest that our
    interpretive focus should be on the category of crime, not the type of
    punishment.
    However, I think some additional lessons can be extracted from
    our early constitutional history.     I have already mentioned the 1839
    territorial legislation that more or less equates “infamous crime” for
    purposes of denying voting privileges with felony. See The Statute Laws
    of the Territory of Iowa, Code of Criminal Jurisprudence, Tenth Div.,
    § 109, at 182; see also Homan v. Branstad, 
    812 N.W.2d 623
    , 629 (Iowa
    30
    2012) (indicating that in construing a provision of the Iowa Constitution,
    “our mission ‘ “is to ascertain the intent of the framers” ’ ” (quoting Rants
    v. Vilsack, 
    684 N.W.2d 193
    , 199 (Iowa 2004))).                          Hence, I remain
    unpersuaded that “infamous crime” as used in article II, section 5 could
    not mean the same thing as felony, at least if the legislature made that
    choice.     The plurality reaches its conclusion based exclusively on the
    following syllogism:
    (1) Article II, section 2 of the Iowa Constitution
    provides that electors “shall, in all cases except treason,
    felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest on
    the days of election” and article III, section 11 provides that
    senators and representative “in all cases, except treason,
    felony, or breach of the peace, shall be privileged from arrest
    during the session of the General Assembly.”
    (2) Because the word “felony” is used in these other
    provisions of our constitution, and “infamous crime” is used
    in article II, section 5, infamous crime cannot mean the
    same thing as felony.
    This strikes me as a relatively weak argument. The obvious point
    it ignores is that the language in article II, section 2 and article III,
    section 11 is a direct borrowing from Article I, Section 6 of the United
    States Constitution.7 Given the specific source of these two provisions, I
    do not think we can use them as a lexicon for interpreting the rest of the
    Iowa Constitution. And by the way, does this mean that treason is not a
    felony?
    7Article   I, Section 6 of the United States Constitution states,
    The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason,
    Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
    Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
    returning from the same . . . .
    U.S. Const. art. I, § 6.
    31
    As noted by my colleagues, there has been considerable water
    under the bridge since 1857.       In 1916, we declared that any crime
    punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary was an infamous crime
    for purposes of article II, section 5. See Blodgett v. Clarke, 
    177 Iowa 575
    ,
    578, 
    159 N.W. 243
    , 244 (1916) (per curiam).             We reiterated that
    interpretation in 1957. See State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 
    248 Iowa 978
    ,
    980, 
    83 N.W.2d 451
    , 452 (1957).           However, when those cases were
    decided, “felony” and “crime punishable by imprisonment in the
    penitentiary” were synonymous. See Iowa Code §§ 5093–5094 (1897); 
    id. §§ 687.2,
    .4 (1954).      There was no such thing as an aggravated
    misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary.            Thus,
    like the Panel and the district court, I do not regard those precedents as
    controlling on whether a nonfelony that was potentially punishable by
    imprisonment in the penitentiary would disqualify a person from voting.
    Those cases do effectively hold that felons cannot vote or hold elective
    office under the Iowa Constitution. And for that proposition, I think they
    remain good law.
    Furthermore, in 1994, the legislature enacted the current law that
    specifically defines “infamous crime” for voting and elective office
    purposes to mean a felony. See 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1180, § 1 (codified at
    Iowa Code § 39.3(8) (1995)). This takes on particular significance, in my
    view, because our general assembly, in 2006 and 2007, and the voters of
    our state, in 2008, repealed the existing article II, section 5 and approved
    a new version. See 2006 Iowa Acts ch. 1188, § 1; 2007 Iowa Acts ch.
    223, § 1.
    The previous version of article II, section 5, dating back to 1857,
    read, “No idiot, or insane person, or person convicted of any infamous
    crime, shall be entitled to the privilege of an elector.” Iowa Const. art. II,
    32
    § 5 (1857).    The new version reads, “A person adjudged mentally
    incompetent to vote or a person convicted of any infamous crime shall
    not be entitled to the privilege of an elector.”   Iowa Const. art. II, § 5
    (amended 2008).
    It is clear that the legislature’s specific purpose in 2006 and 2007
    was to remove offensive and outdated language from article II, section 5.
    However, the legislature knew it was keeping in place the prohibition on
    voting by those convicted of infamous crimes and knew that its own laws
    at that time defined infamous crime as a felony. See Iowa Code § 39.3(8)
    (2007). It would be absurd to suggest the legislature intended to approve
    a constitutional amendment that struck down its own law—Iowa Code
    section 39.3(8). Therefore, when the legislature twice voted to repeal and
    replace the existing article II, section 5 with a new version, I believe it
    ratified its own existing interpretation of that provision under which
    infamous crime meant a felony.
    We have long adhered to this principle as it applies to statutory
    amendments.     “When the legislature amends some parts of a statute
    following a recent interpretation, but leaves others intact, this ‘may
    indicate approval of interpretations pertaining to the unchanged and
    unaffected parts of the law.’ ” State v. Sanford, 
    814 N.W.2d 611
    , 619
    (Iowa 2012) (quoting 2B Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer,
    Statutes and Statutory Construction § 49:10, at 144 (7th ed. 2008)); see
    also Jenney v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    456 N.W.2d 921
    , 923 (Iowa 1990); State ex
    rel. Iowa Dep’t of Health v. Van Wyk, 
    320 N.W.2d 599
    , 604 (Iowa 1982).
    Logic dictates that this rule should apply equally to constitutional
    amendments.
    A decision of the Kansas Supreme Court illustrates this principle.
    See In re Cent. Ill. Pub. Servs. Co., 
    78 P.3d 419
    (Kan. 2003). In that case,
    33
    several companies that distributed and sold natural gas, but not in
    Kansas, argued they were entitled to a constitutional tax exemption for
    their inventory of gas stored in Kansas. 
    Id. at 422.
    However, under a
    1992 amendment to the relevant section of the Kansas Constitution,
    merchants’ inventory for public utilities was denied an exemption. 
    Id. at 424.
      Yet, Kansas law as of 1992 limited the statutory definition of
    “public utility” to companies that were engaged in transporting or
    distributing natural gas to, from, or within the state of Kansas, or that
    were engaged in storing natural gas in an underground formation in
    Kansas.    
    Id. at 424–25.
       In concluding that this narrow statutory
    definition should apply, the court indicated among other things that the
    constitutional amendment should be construed consistently with “the
    statutes in existence at the time the . . . amendment was proposed and
    adopted.” 
    Id. at 426.
    Here too, where article II, section 5 was repealed
    and reenacted in 2006–2008, I believe the term “infamous crime” should
    be construed consistent with the statute in existence at that time, Iowa
    Code § 39.3(8). See also Cal. Motor Express v. State Bd. of Equalization,
    
    283 P.2d 1063
    , 1065 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (finding that reenactment of a
    constitutional provision “which has a meaning well established by
    administrative construction is persuasive that the intent was to continue
    the same construction previously recognized and applied”); Wakem v.
    Inhabitants of Town of Van Buren, 
    15 A.2d 873
    , 875–76 (Me. 1940) (“It is
    a general rule that a reenactment, in substantially the same language, of
    a constitutional provision which had been previously construed and
    explained by the court, carries with it the same meaning previously
    attributed by the court to the earlier provision, in the absence of
    anything to indicate that a different meaning was intended.”); Bodie v.
    Pollock, 
    195 N.W. 457
    , 458 (Neb. 1923) (“It is well settled in many, if not
    34
    most, of the jurisdictions of the country that, where a construction of
    constitutional provisions has been adopted and a constitutional
    convention thereafter re-enacts such provisions, it re-enacts not only the
    language of the provisions but the construction which has attached to
    the same.”).
    It was also no secret that Iowa law forbid voting by convicted felons
    when the proposed amendment went before the public at the 2008
    general election. For example, a contemporary editorial in Iowa’s largest
    newspaper said the following about the proposed revision of article II,
    section 5,
    It is worth thinking about whether an amendment belongs in
    the Constitution at all denying the vote to anyone based on
    diminished mental capacity, which is a relative thing. Also,
    in this section, the right to vote is denied to convicted felons,
    even those who have served their sentences, which is wrong.
    But those are questions for another day. For now, the
    language of the Iowa Constitution should be devoid of
    language that is seen as belittling.
    See Editorial, Change Harsh Wording in State Constitution, Des Moines
    Register, October 31, 2008, at A14.
    Personally, I agree with this editorial.     I believe that convicted
    felons who have served their sentence and paid their debt to society
    ought to be able to vote, without requiring dispensation from the
    governor. By permanently disenfranchising convicted felons, Iowa puts
    itself in a small minority of three states. But my personal views do not
    carry weight when it comes to interpreting the Iowa Constitution.
    Because the Iowa Constitution forbids convicted felons but not
    convicted misdemeanants from voting, I concur in the result in this case.
    Waterman, J., joins this special concurrence.
    35
    #103/14–0553, Chiodo v. The Section 43.24 Panel
    WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
    I respectfully dissent.       The plurality is rewriting nearly one
    hundred years of caselaw. I do not think we should do so at this time.
    Our constitution sets the qualifications of electors as follows:
    Every citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one
    years,8 who shall have been a resident of this state for such
    period of time as shall be provided by law and of the county
    in which he claims his vote for such period of time as shall
    be provided by law, shall be entitled to vote at all elections
    which are now or hereafter may be authorized by law. The
    general assembly may provide by law for different periods of
    residence in order to vote for various officers or in order to
    vote in various elections. The required periods of residence
    shall not exceed six months in this state and sixty days in
    the county.
    Iowa Const. art. II, § 1.
    After giving certain persons the right to vote, the constitution
    disqualifies certain persons from voting. 
    Id. art. II,
    § 5. It provides “a
    person convicted of any infamous crime shall not be entitled to the
    privilege of an elector.” 
    Id. We have
      consistently    defined   “infamous   crime”   under    our
    constitution as a crime for which the legislature fixed the maximum
    punishment as confinement in prison.         State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich,
    
    248 Iowa 978
    , 980, 
    83 N.W.2d 451
    , 452 (1957); Blodgett v. Clarke, 
    177 Iowa 575
    , 578, 
    159 N.W. 243
    , 244 (1916) (per curiam); Flannagan v.
    Jepson, 
    177 Iowa 393
    , 400, 
    158 N.W. 641
    , 643 (1916).                When the
    legislature adopted the legislative scheme to have three classes of
    misdemeanors in Iowa Code section 701.8, see 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245,
    8Amendment XXVI to the United States Constitution lowered the voting age
    applicable to the states to eighteen years of age. U.S. Const. amend. XXVI.
    36
    § 108 (codified at Iowa Code § 701.8 (1979)), it knew the constitutional
    definition of “infamous crime” was any crime for which the legislature
    fixed the maximum punishment as confinement in prison.                     Thus, by
    conscious choice, the legislature made an aggravated misdemeanor an
    infamous crime.
    Eliminating our bright-line rule is not only unnecessary, but also
    dangerous.      Now, we can no longer look to the crime’s penalty to
    determine who can vote and who cannot vote.                Rather, we now apply
    certain factors to make that determination.             The plurality’s approach
    does little to settle the law. I say this for a number of reasons.
    First, I agree with the plurality that the legislature cannot write a
    constitutional definition of “infamous crime” by its enactment of Iowa
    Code section 39.3(8) (2013).9 The legislature cannot disqualify a voter by
    defining “infamous crime” under our constitutional scheme because the
    constitution defines who is and who is not an eligible elector.                  See
    Coggeshall v. City of Des Moines, 
    138 Iowa 730
    , 744, 
    117 N.W. 309
    , 314
    (1908) (invalidating an election where the City of Des Moines did not
    allow women to vote). However, the plurality implies section 39.3(8) is a
    factor we should consider to determine if a crime is an infamous crime
    and relies heavily upon this factor to reach its conclusion in this case.
    The plurality should not use the legislature’s pronouncement in section
    39.3(8) to control our constitutional duty to interpret the Iowa
    Constitution.10
    9The legislature defines “infamous crime” as “a felony as defined in section
    701.7, or an offense classified as a felony under federal law.” Iowa Code § 39.3(8)
    (2013).
    10It also can be argued the 2008 amendment amending article II, section 5
    considered the legislature’s definition of “infamous crime” when the amendment passed.
    However, I think it is doubtful because the crux of the 2008 amendment was to replace
    37
    Second, the factors enumerated by the plurality are so imprecise
    that a citizen of this state who has committed a crime has no idea as to
    whether he or she is eligible to vote.                Under the plurality’s factor
    analysis, some persons convicted of a felony may be able vote, while
    some persons convicted of a misdemeanor may not be able to vote. The
    plurality’s factor analysis adds considerable uncertainty as to who can
    and who cannot vote. Is a person with a conviction for operating while
    intoxicated third, a felony, disqualified to vote? On the other end of the
    spectrum, is a person with a conviction for aggravated misdemeanor
    theft11 disqualified to vote?        This uncertainty will keep many qualified
    voters from the polls for fear of prosecution for voter fraud.
    Finally, our election officials will have the same problems as our
    citizens in determining who can and cannot vote. This uncertainty will
    lead to greater election day problems and the casting of an inordinate
    ___________________________
    the words “no idiot, or insane person” with “a person adjudged mentally incompetent.”
    Compare Iowa Const. art. II, § 5 (1857), with Iowa Const. art. II, § 5 (amended 2008). I
    believe the explanation to the house joint resolution confirms my doubts. When the
    committee on state government introduced the proposed amendment the explanation
    provided in relevant part:
    This joint resolution proposes an amendment to the Constitution of the
    State of Iowa relating to persons who are disqualified from voting or
    holding elective office. The resolution removes the words “idiot” and
    “insane” from the constitutional provision and substitutes the phrase
    “mentally incompetent to vote”.
    H.J. Res. 5, 81st G.A., 2nd sess. (2006).
    There is no indication in the official legislative history that the legislature considered
    the clause of article II, section 5 dealing with infamous crimes when it proposed the
    amendment. See City of Cedar Rapids v. James Props., Inc., 
    701 N.W.2d 673
    , 677 (Iowa
    2005) (“We give weight to explanations attached to bills as indications of legislative
    intent.”).
    11A person who steals property valued at $1000 commits an aggravated
    misdemeanor while a person who steals property valued at $1001 commits a felony.
    Iowa Code § 714.2(2)–(3).
    38
    amount of provisional ballots. See Iowa Code § 49.81 (providing for the
    casting of provisional ballots).
    For these reasons, I see no reason why at this time we should
    redefine the term “infamous crimes.” Today I fear we are abandoning a
    seaworthy vessel of precedent to swim into dangerous and uncharted
    waters.