Upon The Petition Of Jeremy Rhyan ( 2008 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 92 / 06–1490
Filed August 15, 2008
Upon the Petition of
JEREMY RHYAN,
Appellant,
and Concerning
KELLIE PASCHKE,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T.
Schemmel, Judge.
A mother seeks further review of court of appeals decision granting
father primary physical care of minor child. DECISION OF COURT OF
APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Jane Odland and Lee M. Walker of Walker & Billingsley, Newton,
for appellant.
Alexander R. Rhoads of Babich, Goldman, Cashatt & Renzo, P.C.,
Des Moines, and Lora L. McCollom of Skinner, Nielsen & McCollom,
P.L.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.
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PER CURIAM.
This case came before the district court on the father’s petition for
a determination of paternity and custody. Because paternity was not
disputed, the district court promptly adjudged the father, Jeremy Rhyan,
to be the actual and legal father of the minor child, Olivia Paschke. The
custody issue was, however, vigorously disputed. Rhyan requested joint
legal custody with primary physical care awarded to him, while the
mother, Kellie Paschke, sought sole legal custody of Olivia with only
visitation to Rhyan. The district court, having heard the testimony and
reviewed the file, applied the factors set forth in Iowa Code section
598.41(3) (2005) in determining the best interests of the child and
awarded joint legal custody to both parties and primary physical care to
Paschke with liberal visitation to Rhyan. In addition, the court rejected
the father’s request to change the child’s surname to Rhyan.
The father appealed the district court’s decision. We transferred
the appeal to the Iowa Court of Appeals. A divided panel of that court
reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case to the district
court. Rhyan v. Paschke, No. 8–007 (Iowa Ct. App. May 14, 2008). While
the panel was unanimous in its determination that joint physical care
was not a viable option, the majority determined Rhyan should be
awarded primary physical care and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with that opinion.1
Like the district court, the court of appeals concluded both parents
were suitable caretakers for Olivia. It noted the conclusion reached by a
custody evaluator that “each of these parents is, by the vast majority of
1The panel was also unanimous in its opinion that the district court was correct
in denying Rhyan’s request to change Olivia’s surname to Rhyan. Rhyan has not
sought further review on this issue.
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standards, truly exemplary in their parenting abilities.” The problem lay
in the parents’ relationship with each other. Upon its de novo review of
the record, the majority of the court of appeals concluded Paschke
“significantly impeded Rhyan’s relationship with his daughter.”
Specifically, it found Paschke’s actions sought to control Rhyan’s contact
with the child through the placement of unwarranted conditions on
visitation and that such actions were contrary to the best interests of the
child. As a result, the majority concluded Paschke’s actions warranted
physical placement of Olivia with Rhyan.
We agree with the lower courts that joint physical care is not an
option in this case. The record abounds with examples that support the
conclusion the parents are unable to work together and communicate to
the degree necessary to make joint physical care work. See In re
Marriage of Hynick, 727 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Iowa 2007) (“The critical
question in deciding whether joint physical care is . . . appropriate is
whether the parties can communicate effectively on the myriad of issues
that arise daily in the routine care of a child.”). We disagree, however,
with the court of appeals’ reversal of the district court’s award of primary
physical care to Paschke. Upon our de novo review, we are persuaded
that this case represents a “prime example of a close custody case where
we should defer to the trial court’s detailed fact-findings and credibility
assessment.” Rhyan, No. 8–007, at 15 (Vogel, J., dissenting). As
succinctly stated by the dissent:
As with so many custody disputes, there are two sides
to every story and this record is replete with conflicting
testimony from [Rhyan] and [Paschke] as to their rendition of
various events. For every negative point the majority makes
concerning [Paschke]’s behavior, a balancing explanation
exists. The district court recognized this back-and-forth
evidence and found that the parties’ testimony “did little to
aid the court in determining custody and visitation, other
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than to highlight the continuing difficulties and distrust
between the parties.”
Id.
Moreover, we agree with the following observation:
Both parents love Olivia, but have not learned how to
work with each other in a mature fashion for the benefit of
their daughter. The record demonstrates that each has
contributed to the ongoing discord without one being
assigned more responsibility for the conflict than the others.
Id. at 22.
The district court properly considered all the appropriate factors
under Iowa Code section 598.41(3) when it made its custody
determination. In applying these factors, the district court was guided in
large part by its credibility assessments as explicitly stated in the ruling:
“The court relies upon its own observations as well as the custody
recommendation of [the licensed custody evaluator] in determining
custody.” Because the district court had the opportunity to observe the
parties and witnesses and concluded that it was in Olivia’s best interests
to grant primary physical care to Paschke, we decline, on such a close
case, to reverse that judgment. See In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737
N.W.2d 97, 101 (Iowa 2007) (discussing that both parents were suitable,
but the district court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses).
Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the
district court’s custody determination. Furthermore, under the facts of
this case, we decline Paschke’s request, made for the first time upon
application for further review, to award appellate attorney fees.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Wiggins and Baker, JJ., who take no
part.
This opinion shall not be published.