State Of Iowa Vs. Kyle Anthony Marin ( 2010 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 07–2068
Filed September 24, 2010
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
KYLE ANTHONY MARIN,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Robert E.
Sosalla, Judge.
A defendant requests further review of a court of appeals decision
affirming his convictions for first-degree murder. DECISION OF COURT
OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D.
Hendrickson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass (until
withdrawal) and Elisabeth Reynoldson, Assistant Attorneys General,
Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Jason Burns, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
Although the defendant raised numerous issues on appeal, in the
exercise of our discretion we will only consider whether involuntary
intoxication is a complete defense to a crime. The court of appeals
decided the merits of this issue. Because the defendant failed to
preserve error as to whether involuntary intoxication is a complete
defense to any criminal liability and the jury instructions as given fairly
state the law as applied to the facts of this case, we vacate that part of
the court of appeals decision concerning the issue of involuntary
intoxication and affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On or about April 23, 2006, a father entered an apartment and
found his eighteen-year-old daughter and another relative‟s body lying
lifeless inside. The father immediately went outside and called 911 on
his cell phone. Responding officers did a protective sweep of the
apartment and discovered the victims‟ bodies, which were completely
naked, as well as large pools of blood in the bathroom and blood
elsewhere throughout the apartment. One of the officers noticed
instruments on the bathroom vanity that did not appear to belong in a
bathroom. It was evident from the scene that both victims had suffered
trauma and had numerous visible wounds on their bodies. Eventually
medical personnel arrived, checked the victims‟ vital signs, and
pronounced them dead.
Later that same day, Kyle Marin walked into the lobby area of the
Linn County Correctional Center. Debra Collins-Gallo was working that
night behind a window in the lobby area as a duty officer. Collins-Gallo
observed Marin in the lobby as she was helping some other individuals.
After Marin made eye contact with her several times, Collins-Gallo asked
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him if she could help him. Marin then approached the window and
stated, “My name is Kyle Marin, and I‟m here to turn myself in on two
murders.” Collins-Gallo was not sure if she understood Marin correctly
so she asked him again what he said, to which Marin replied, “I‟m
turning myself in for two murders.” Collins-Gallo then walked back to
sergeant John Davidson‟s office and informed him a person in the lobby
named Kyle Marin wanted to turn himself in for two murders. Davidson
told Collins-Gallo to call the Cedar Rapids Police Department (CRPD)
immediately and then went out to the lobby.
Shortly thereafter, three officers from the CRPD arrived. After a
discussion with Marin, the officers transported him to the CRPD
headquarters. Once Marin arrived at the headquarters, the officers took
him to the detective bureau and turned him over to the investigators.
After a detective interviewed Marin, he provided detailed facts confessing
his involvement in the deaths of the two victims.
On April 23 evidence was seized from the crime scene, including
but not limited to, blood samples, a hammer, a screwdriver, as well as a
number of knives and other utensils. On April 24 a search warrant was
executed on Marin‟s residence. On May 12 Marin was charged with two
counts of first-degree murder, to which he pleaded not guilty.
Trial commenced on October 22, 2007. On October 30 the district
court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury with regard to
whether or not involuntary intoxication is a recognized defense in Iowa
and, if so, what the enumerated elements of the defense should be. In
support of its position, the defense submitted the following proposed
instruction with regard to involuntary intoxication:
“Involuntary intoxication” means a mental condition
which does not allow the person to form a premeditated,
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deliberate, specific intent to kill, which are elements of the
State‟s burden of proof on the charge of First Degree Murder.
“Intoxication” is a state in which a person is affected
temporarily with diminished control over the physical and/or
mental powers, or is excited or stupefied by alcohol or a
drug, or a combination thereof, to the point of frenzy, or to
the point where physical or mental control is markedly
diminished.
Intoxication is involuntary when it results from:
1. Fraud, trickery, or duress of another; or
2. Accident or mistake on his own part; or
3. A pathological condition; or
4. Ignorance as to the effects of prescribed
medication.
You should determine from the evidence if the
defendant was capable of premeditating, deliberating, and
forming a specific intent to kill.
If you have a reasonable doubt the defendant was
capable of acting deliberately, with premeditation, and the
specific intent to kill, then the defendant cannot be guilty of
First Degree Murder. You should then consider the lesser
included charges.
After hearing arguments from both sides, the court told the parties
it would not give the jury a separate instruction with regard to
involuntary intoxication. Instead, the court gave the “intoxication as a
defense” instruction contained in the Iowa State Bar Association‟s
criminal instruction manual, which makes no distinction between
voluntary and involuntary intoxication. The instruction provided:
The defendant claims he was under the influence of
intoxicants and/or prescription drugs at the time of the
alleged crime. The fact that a person is under the influence
of intoxicants and/or prescription drugs does not excuse nor
aggravate his guilt.
Even if a person is under the influence of an intoxicant
and/or prescription drug, he is responsible for his act if he
had sufficient mental capacity to form the specific intent
necessary to the crime charged or had the specific intent
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before he fell under the influence of the intoxicant and/or
prescription drug and then committed the act. Intoxication
is a defense only when it causes a mental disability which
makes the person incapable of forming the specific intent.
Before closing arguments, the district court held a hearing with the
parties to review its proposed jury instructions. The defense objected to
the instructions due to the court‟s failure to include its requested
instruction pertaining to involuntary intoxication. The court overruled
the objection.
The jury found Marin guilty of first-degree murder for both victims‟
deaths. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court‟s rulings and held the district court
did not err in denying Marin‟s proposed jury instruction on involuntary
intoxication because substantial evidence did not support the court
giving the instruction. Marin filed an application for further review,
which we granted.
II. Issues.
Marin raises three issues on appeal. The first issue raised
concerns the jury instruction regarding the element of malice
aforethought. The second issue asks us to suppress certain statements
Marin made to the police and the evidence seized through the execution
of a search warrant as the fruit of the poisonous tree. The third issue
deals with the proposed jury instruction on involuntary intoxication.
On further review, we have the discretion to review any issue
raised on appeal. Hills Bank & Trust Co. v. Converse, 772 N.W.2d 764,
770 (Iowa 2009). In the exercise of our discretion, we choose only to
address the issue dealing with the proposed jury instruction on
involuntary intoxication. As to the other two issues raised in Marin‟s
brief, we will let the court of appeals opinion stand as the final decision
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in this appeal. State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa), cert. denied,
____ U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 1024, 175 L. Ed. 2d 627 (2009).
III. Standard of Review.
We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at
law. State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Iowa 2006); State v. Rohm,
609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. “We
review the related claim that the trial court should have given the
defendant‟s requested instructions for an abuse of discretion.” Summy v.
City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 340 (Iowa 2006). Error in giving or
refusing to give a particular instruction warrants reversal unless the
record shows the absence of prejudice. State v. Spates, 779 N.W.2d 770,
775 (Iowa 2010). “When the error is not of constitutional magnitude, the
test of prejudice is whether it sufficiently appears that the rights of the
complaining party have been injuriously affected or that the party has
suffered a miscarriage of justice.” State v. Gansz, 376 N.W.2d 887, 891
(Iowa 1985).
IV. Analysis.
Marin argues we should decide if involuntary intoxication is a
complete defense to any crime he may have committed. At common law,
if involuntary intoxication caused a defendant to become temporarily
insane, the involuntary intoxication was recognized as a complete
defense to any criminal liability. City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238
N.W.2d 851, 855–56 (Minn. 1976). When the legislature enacted Iowa‟s
Criminal Code, it did not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary
intoxication. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 701.5 (2005). Instead, in regards to
intoxication the Code provides:
The fact that a person is under the influence of
intoxicants or drugs neither excuses the person‟s act nor
aggravates the person‟s guilt, but may be shown where it is
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relevant in proving the person‟s specific intent or
recklessness at the time of the person‟s alleged criminal act
or in proving any element of the public offense with which
the person is charged.
Id.
We have never decided if a defendant can use involuntary
intoxication as a complete defense to his or her criminal liability. We left
the question unresolved in one of our decisions because substantial
evidence did not support the submission of a temporary insanity by
involuntary intoxication instruction. State v. Lucas, 368 N.W.2d 124,
127–28 (Iowa 1985). In this appeal, we do not reach this issue because
Marin never requested an instruction including a statement that
involuntary intoxication is a complete defense to any crime he may have
committed, and he never objected to the instruction as given on the
grounds it failed to state involuntary intoxication is a complete defense to
any crime he may have committed. See State v. Buckner, 214 N.W.2d
164, 169 (Iowa 1974) (holding a defendant does not preserve error when
he fails to request an instruction containing his legal issue or fails to
object to the instructions given for not containing his legal issue). In
fact, in a discussion with the court on the jury instructions, Marin‟s
counsel acknowledged he understood that involuntary intoxication is not
a complete defense to any crime Marin may have committed. Instead,
his requested instruction only asserts involuntary intoxication would
negate “premeditated, deliberate, specific intent to kill, which are
elements of the State‟s burden of proof on the charge of First Degree
Murder.”
The requested instruction further stated, “If you have a reasonable
doubt the defendant was capable of acting deliberately, with
premeditation, and the specific intent to kill, then the defendant cannot
be guilty of First Degree Murder. You should then consider the lesser
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included charges.” The requested instruction never informed the jury
that involuntary intoxication was a complete defense to any other crimes
Marin may have committed by taking the victims‟ lives, including the
lesser-included crimes of first-degree murder. It only advised the jury
that Marin‟s involuntary intoxication could negate his state of mind with
regard to the charge of first-degree murder.
The instruction given by the court allowed the jury to consider
Marin‟s intoxication in regards to the element of specific intent. The
court instructed the jury that specific intent was an element of the crime
of first-degree murder. The jury returned a verdict finding Marin guilty
of two counts of first-degree murder. Inherent in the verdict is a finding
that Marin acted with specific intent to kill. This means under the
instructions as given by the court, Marin‟s intoxication, whether
voluntary or involuntary, did not negate the state of mind necessary to
find Marin guilty of first-degree murder.
The rules pertaining to jury instructions in civil cases apply equally
to the trial of criminal cases. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(5)(f). Consequently,
the court is required to “instruct the jury as to the law applicable to all
material issues in the case . . . .” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.924. Moreover, the
court is required to give a party‟s requested instruction so long as it
“ „states a correct rule of law having application to the facts of the case
and when the concept is not otherwise embodied in other instructions.‟ ”
Summy, 708 N.W.2d at 340 (emphasis removed) (quoting Herbst v. State,
616 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2000)); accord State v. Proctor, 585 N.W.2d
841, 843 (Iowa 1998). In doing so, the court is not required to give any
particular form of an instruction; rather, the court must merely give
instructions that fairly state the law as applied to the facts of the case.
Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 642 (Iowa 2000).
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Finally, we see no difference in the outcome of the case even if the
court had given the instruction requested by Marin. The requested
instruction and the one given by the court informed the jury it could use
Marin‟s intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, to negate the
state of mind necessary to be convicted of first-degree murder. The
instruction given by the court on intoxication only included Marin‟s state
of mind to form the specific intent to kill. Marin‟s requested instruction
included acting deliberately and with premeditation in addition to
specific intent as the states of mind Marin‟s intoxication could negate.
However, in a separate instruction, the court instructed the jury on
diminished responsibility.
The diminished responsibility instruction allowed the jury to find
Marin suffered from a mental condition that would not allow him to form
a premeditated, deliberate, specific intent to kill. This instruction also
provided that if the jury found Marin had a mental condition that would
not allow him to form a premeditated, deliberate, specific intent to kill,
the jury cannot find him guilty of first-degree murder, but it should then
consider the lesser-included offenses. The court gave the diminished
responsibility instruction because the record contained evidence that
Marin‟s mental condition caused by his intoxication would not allow him
to form a premeditated, deliberate, specific intent to kill.
Jury instructions must be read in their entirety and not piecemeal.
Hagenson v. United Tel. Co. of Iowa, 209 N.W.2d 76, 83 (Iowa 1973). The
court instructed the jury that Marin‟s intoxication could prevent him
from forming a premeditated, deliberate, specific intent to kill. The
instructions given by the court also instructed the jury that, if they found
Marin‟s intoxication prevented him from forming a premeditated,
deliberate, specific intent to kill, its findings only went to the charge of
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first-degree murder, not the lesser-included charges. Thus, the
instructions given by the court contained the same law Marin requested
in his proposed instruction. Consequently, under the record made in
this case, the court did not err in refusing to substitute the proposed
instruction for the one it submitted to the jury.
V. Disposition.
We vacate that part of the court of appeals decision dealing with
Marin‟s involuntary intoxication claim, and find Marin did not preserve
the issue as to whether involuntary intoxication is a complete defense to
any criminal liability. With respect to the objection that was made, we
hold the jury instructions as given fairly state the law as applied to the
facts of this case. Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of
appeals in part, affirm it in part, and affirm the judgment of the district
court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART AND
AFFIRMED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Streit, J., who takes no part.