State Of Iowa Vs. Michael Leroy Anderson ( 2010 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 09–0418
Filed May 14, 2010
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL LEROY ANDERSON,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Carl D.
Baker, Judge.
Appellant appeals district court decision delaying implementation
of a special sentence under Iowa Code section 903B.2. DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Reynolds,
Assistant Appellate Defender, and Jordan T. Smith, Student Legal Intern,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, William A. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, and Jennifer Miller, County Attorney, for appellee.
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STREIT, Justice.
Michael Anderson was ordered to serve a special sentence of ten
years pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.2. He argues this sentence
should have begun to run when he discharged the sentence for the
offense that triggered imposition of the special sentence. The State
argues the special sentence should not begin to run until Anderson
discharges a concurrent and separate prison sentence. Based on the
language of the statute, the special sentence should have begun when
Anderson discharged the sentence for the underlying criminal offense,
regardless of his concurrent and unrelated sentence.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Michael Anderson pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor in
violation of Iowa Code section 728.12(3) (2007) in Marshall County. He
was sentenced to two years in prison, with the sentence to run
concurrently with two consecutive five-year sentences imposed in Story
County. In Story County, Anderson had been convicted of two counts of
enticing away a minor in violation of Iowa Code section 710.10(2) (2005)
and was sentenced to two sentences of up to five years in prison, to be
served consecutively.
Based on the Marshall County conviction, Anderson was also
ordered to serve a special sentence of ten years pursuant to Iowa Code
section 903B.2 (2007). Section 903B.2 imposes a special sentence for
certain offenses and requires that the special sentence be served “under
supervision as if on parole.” Essentially, section 903B.2 requires
Anderson to serve an additional ten-year period of parole. Violation of
parole may result in a two-year revocation for the first offense and a five-
year revocation for subsequent violations.
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Anderson discharged the Marshall County two-year sentence while
he still had time remaining on the two consecutive five-year Story County
sentences. Anderson filed a motion with the district court asking the
court to order the State to implement the ten-year special sentence
because Anderson had discharged the underlying Marshall County
sentence. The district court first ordered that the sentence be
implemented, but on a motion for reconsideration by the State, held it
should not be implemented until after Anderson discharged the
concurrent Story County sentences. Anderson appealed.
II. Scope of Review.
“ ‘We review the district court’s construction of [a] statute for
correction of errors at law.’ ” State v. Booth, 670 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa
2003) (quoting In re Detention of Swanson, 668 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa
2003)).
III. Merits.
Anderson was sentenced to a ten-year special sentence pursuant
to Iowa Code section 903B.2.
Section 903B.2 states:
A person convicted of a misdemeanor or a class “D”
felony offense under . . . section 728.12 shall also be
sentenced, in addition to any other punishment provided by
law, to a special sentence committing the person into the
custody of the director of the Iowa department of corrections
for a period of ten years, with eligibility for parole as provided
in chapter 906. The special sentence imposed under this
section shall commence upon completion of the sentence
imposed under any applicable criminal sentencing provisions
for the underlying criminal offense and the person shall begin
the sentence under supervision as if on parole. The person
shall be placed on the corrections continuum in chapter
901B, and the terms and conditions of the special sentence,
including violations, shall be subject to the same set of
procedures set out in chapters 901B, 905, 906, and 908,
and rules adopted under those chapters for persons on
parole. The revocation of release shall not be for a period
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greater than two years upon any first revocation, and five
years upon any second or subsequent revocation. A special
sentence shall be considered a category “A” sentence for
purposes of calculating earned time under section 903A.2.
Iowa Code § 903B.2 (2007) (emphasis added). 1
Both parties focus on the italicized sentence. Anderson argues
that under section 903B.2, the special sentence should have begun when
he discharged the sentence for the underlying offense in Marshall County
that led to imposition of the special sentence. He argues the statutory
language “underlying criminal offense” is unambiguous and compels the
court to order that the special sentence be implemented from the date on
which Anderson discharged the two-year Marshall County sentence.
The State argues the special sentence should not begin to run until
Anderson discharges the separate and longer concurrent sentences from
Story County. The State first argues the language of the statute is
unambiguous because it refers to “any applicable criminal sentencing
provisions” and should therefore be interpreted as applying to any
concurrent sentences. In the alternative, the State argues the statute is
ambiguous, and, therefore, this court must look to legislative intent. The
State points to the court of appeals decision in Popejoy v. State, 727
N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006), which held a similar statute
imposing a two-year special sentence did not require imposition of the
special sentence when the sentence for the underlying offense was
completed, but instead when the defendant was released from prison
after serving any longer, concurrent sentence.
1Iowa Code section 903B.2 was amended during the 2009 legislative session to
clarify that the special sentence may also be served on work release, in addition to
parole. The amendment added the sentence, “The board of parole shall determine
whether the person should be released on parole or placed in a work release program.”
2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119, § 60 (codified at Iowa Code § 903B.2 (Supp. 2009)). The
amendment also added the words “or work release” after all references to parole. Id.
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In interpreting section 903B.2, “our primary goal is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature.” In re Detention of Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d
280, 283 (Iowa 2006). “That intent is gleaned from the language of ‘ “the
statute as a whole, not from a particular part only.” ’ ” Id. (quoting State
v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa 2001)). “In determining
what the legislature intended . . . we are constrained to follow the
express terms of the statute.” State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa
1990). “When a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not
permitted to search for meaning beyond its express terms.” State v.
Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). In determining plain meaning,
“[s]tatutory words are presumed to be used in their ordinary and usual
sense and with the meaning commonly attributable to them.” State v.
Royer, 632 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Iowa 2001).
If the language of a statute is ambiguous, “ ‘the manifest intent of
the legislature is sought and will prevail over the literal import of the
words used.’ ” State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 633 N.W.2d 280,
283 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. McSorley, 549 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Iowa
1996)). We also note the rule of statutory construction that penal
statutes “are to be strictly construed, with any doubt resolved against the
State and in favor of the accused.” Byers, 456 N.W.2d at 919.
The language of Iowa Code section 903B.2 is unambiguous. The
statute states the ten-year special sentence “shall commence upon
completion of the sentence imposed under any applicable criminal
sentencing provisions for the underlying criminal offense and the person
shall begin the sentence under supervision as if on parole.” Iowa Code
§ 903B.2 (emphasis added). The words “underlying criminal offense” are
a specific reference to the offense which led to the imposition of the ten-
year special sentence, here, the Marshall County conviction. The only
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way this sentence could be read to allow the special sentence to begin
after Anderson completes the concurrent Story County sentences would
require this court to ignore the words “underlying criminal offense.”
The State argues the words “any applicable criminal sentencing
provisions” suggest section 903B.2 be read to apply to any concurrent
sentences. However, these words are modified by the phrase “for the
underlying criminal offense” and therefore are limited to any sentencing
provisions “for the underlying criminal offense,” here, the Marshall
County sentence.
The State questions how one can be in prison and on parole at the
same time. Iowa Code section 906.1 defines parole as “the release of a
person . . . , which release occurs prior to the expiration of the person’s
term, is subject to supervision by the district department of correctional
services, and is on conditions imposed by the district department.”
Although the language of section 903B.2 indicates the special sentence
should be served on parole, the specific language states it should be
served “as if on parole.” Iowa Code § 903B.2 (emphasis added). Use of
the phrase “as if” allows the State to formulate a special sentence of
parole, although the defendant is not necessarily being released from
another sentence early. Similarly, the legislature’s use of the words “as if
on parole” indicate the requirement is compatible with a special sentence
beginning while a defendant is serving a separate concurrent offense.
This clarifies that the “special” parole contemplated could be served while
in prison—it is “as if” the inmate is on parole.
The State also argues the statute’s references to parole
demonstrate the legislative intent for the special sentence to begin after
any concurrent sentences. We disagree. We must determine legislative
intent based on the language chosen by the legislature. Byers, 456
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N.W.2d at 919; see also Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996)
(“[W]e should not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart
from the wording used in the statute.”). The legislature’s use of the
words “as if on parole” could suggest two alternate interpretations of the
legislature’s intent. First, as the State suggests, the intent behind
section 903B.2 could be “to provide a controlled, gradual, supervised
release into the community.” Popejoy, 727 N.W.2d at 387. In Popejoy,
the court of appeals held a two-year special sentence would begin to run
only after the defendant served a separate concurrent sentence. Id.Popejoy considered Iowa Code section 709.8 (2001), a different statute
than section 903B.2. Although the two are similar because both created
a special sentence, the language used by the legislature is not identical.
Section 709.8 referred to the “preceding sentence,” which the court of
appeals interpreted to include a concurrent sentence, id., whereas
section 903B.2 refers to the “underlying criminal offense.”
The second potential rationale behind section 903B.2 is that those
required to serve a special sentence be supervised for an additional ten-
year period. As this court stated in State v. Tripp, 776 N.W.2d 855, 858
(Iowa 2010), “Parole is a lenient form of punishment that monitors a
person’s activities to ensure the person is complying with the law.” If a
defendant begins to serve the ten-year sentence while still imprisoned on
a separate concurrent sentence, the defendant will still be supervised
and monitored during that time.
Given the two possible rationales behind section 903B.2, we must
rely on the language chosen by the legislature. The language of section
903B.2, which states that the special sentence “shall commence upon
completion of the sentence imposed under any applicable criminal
sentencing provisions for the underlying criminal offense and the person
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shall begin the sentence under supervision as if on parole,” cannot be
read to include a separate and concurrent sentence. We hold the ten-
year special sentence should have begun to run when the sentence for
“the underlying criminal offense,”—Anderson’s Marshall County
sentence—was completed.
IV. Conclusion.
Iowa Code section 903B.2 requires that a special sentence begin to
run when the sentence for the underlying criminal offense is discharged,
even if the defendant is serving a longer concurrent sentence.
Anderson’s ten-year special sentence should be calculated as if it began
when he discharged the Marshall County sentence—the sentence for the
underlying criminal offense.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.