State Of Iowa Vs. Christopher Lawrence Valin ( 2006 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 99 / 05-0781
    Filed December 1, 2006
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellee,
    vs.
    CHRISTOPHER LAWRENCE VALIN,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Cynthia M.
    Moisan, Judge.
    Appeal from conditions of probation. REVERSED.
    Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer,
    Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant
    Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Ramonda
    Belcher Ford, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
    2
    CADY, Justice.
    In this appeal we must decide if special conditions of probation not
    directly related to the crime of conviction, but related to a prior
    conviction, may be imposed as a part of a sentence.       We reverse the
    decision of the district court.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    Christopher Valin was convicted of operating while intoxicated
    (OWI), second offense, following his arrest in September of 2004. In April
    2005, the district court sentenced Valin to a term of imprisonment not to
    exceed two years and suspended all but seven days of the term.        The
    court imposed a fine of $1500, and placed Valin on probation for two
    years. He was also required to undergo a substance abuse evaluation
    and treatment program, and attend a weekend class offered by the
    Des Moines Area Community College for OWI offenders.           Valin was
    placed under the supervision of the department of correctional services
    (DCS). The sentencing order specifically required Valin to “submit to the
    supervision of DCS during probation and . . . comply with all terms
    imposed by the assigned probation officer, including any additional
    programs and classes not set forth herein.” Valin filed a notice of appeal
    on May 10, 2005.
    Valin signed a DCS probation agreement on May 19, 2005.           It
    contained several standard rules and conditions, but also contained the
    following “special conditions”:
    401. I shall participate in a sex offender or mental
    health counseling program as directed by my supervising
    officer.
    403. I shall successfully complete the Fifth Judicial
    District Department of Correctional Services Sex Offender
    Treatment Program and comply with any treatment
    recommended as a result of the program.
    3
    404. I shall not initiate, establish, or maintain contact
    with victim(s) unless approved by my supervising officer.
    405. I shall not initiate, establish, or maintain contact
    with any minor child (under the age of 18) unless approved
    by my supervising officer.
    406. I shall not initiate, establish, or maintain contact
    with my children unless approved by my supervising officer.
    408. I shall not reside with my children unless
    approved by my supervising officer.
    409. I shall avoid any verbal or physical contact with
    any child or groups of children. I shall avoid contact with
    establishments, groups or organizations whose primary
    purpose is the care of minor children unless I have the prior
    written approval of my supervising officer.
    411. I shall not be in possession of any sexually
    explicit materials, videos, books, magazines, pictures,
    posters, letters, etc., without express written approval from
    my supervising officer and a sex offender treatment team.
    412. I will not subscribe, nor will I attempt to access,
    to the internet without prior approval from my supervising
    officer. I also will not engage in or visit computer-generated
    chat rooms under any circumstances.              [Handwritten:]
    internet banking, check email-ONLY
    801. I shall participate in the Fifth Judicial District
    Department of Correctional Services Sex Offender Treatment
    Program unless my supervising officer determines otherwise.
    Valin objected to the special terms of probation and filed a motion
    in the district court for the court to “determine” the terms of his
    probation. 1 Valin primarily objected to the requirement that he undergo
    1Even   though Valin had already filed his original notice of appeal for his
    conviction, the district court did not lose jurisdiction to determine the terms of his
    probation. See State v. Mallett, 
    677 N.W.2d 775
    , 776–77 (Iowa 2004) (“Generally, an
    appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction. Restoration of district court jurisdiction
    may be accomplished by only two means: the litigants’ stipulation for an order of
    dismissal or an appellate court’s order for limited remand. Neither means applies here.
    Moreover, a district court maintains jurisdiction over disputes between the parties that
    are merely collateral to the issues on appeal. An example of a collateral matter as to
    which a trial court retains jurisdiction is the modification of an order for restitution in a
    criminal case.” (citing State v. Jose, 
    636 N.W.2d 38
    , 46 (Iowa 2001); Shedlock v. Iowa
    Dist. Ct., 
    534 N.W.2d 656
    , 658 (Iowa 1995))). However, a statute “may authorize the
    4
    sex offender treatment. At a hearing on the motion, the DCS justified the
    special conditions based on Valin’s conviction in 1999 for assault with
    intent to commit sexual abuse. The offense arose from an incident when
    Valin was in college during a night of excessive consumption of alcohol.
    Specifically, Valin fondled and groped the breasts and vaginal area of an
    adult female student without her consent after the two ended up at an
    apartment. Valin was placed on probation following the conviction and
    was required to complete sex offender treatment.                   Valin successfully
    completed the treatment, and was discharged from probation in 2001.
    Notwithstanding, the DCS recommended Valin complete sex offender
    treatment again because the DCS had a policy that required such
    treatment and special terms of probation when persons have previously
    been convicted of a sex offense. The policy is based on the proposition
    that a person who has committed a sex offense always has the potential
    to commit a sex offense again in the future. 2 The treatment begins with
    a relapse assessment, which allows the DCS to “assess how much [the
    defendant has] learned in previous treatment.” The relapse assessment
    is followed by after-care treatment or more aggressive treatment,
    depending upon the results of the relapse assessment.
    ________________________
    trial court to enter further orders notwithstanding the taking of an appeal.” 5 Am. Jur.
    2d Appellate Review § 421, at 171 (1995); accord United States v. D’Amario, 
    412 F.3d 253
    , 255 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he district court has plenary jurisdiction to supervise a
    convicted defendant’s release, including the jurisdiction to modify the conditions of
    supervised release, even though an appeal from a revocation of supervised release may
    be pending.”); see Iowa Code § 907.8 (2005) (stating jurisdiction over persons on
    probation “shall remain with the sentencing court”).
    2At the hearing, the probation officer stated, “Our philosophy is that once they’ve
    committed a sex crime, they always have the potential to commit another one.” In
    addition, the district court noted it was the DCS’s policy to require sex offender
    treatment “when a person has committed a sex offense in the past and is later convicted
    of another offense—whether or not the later offense is a sex crime.”
    5
    After the hearing to determine the terms of Valin’s probation, the
    court entered an order requiring Valin to comply with all terms except
    one.   Because there did not “appear to be any ‘evidence’ that would
    require a limitation of [Valin’s] contact with minor children,” the court
    permitted Valin “to have contact with minor children unless a
    psychological evaluation or other testing” indicated otherwise. However,
    the court held Valin must complete his sex offender treatment. It found
    the sentencing order clearly stated Valin must submit to the supervision
    of the DCS, it was in the best interests of the community for Valin to
    undergo treatment, and there was a strong nexus between Valin’s
    substance abuse and his criminal activity.       Valin then filed a second
    notice of appeal on July 19, 2005.
    Following the hearing, the DCS required Valin to submit to a penile
    plethysmograph (PPG) test as part of his relapse assessment. This test
    measures deviant sexual arousal.         It requires the subject to place a
    gauge on his penis while he is shown images and told sexual stories.
    The gauge then records computerized results based on the subject’s
    responses to the visual and audio stimuli. It takes anywhere between
    ninety minutes and two hours to complete, and the defendant must
    contribute $250 for the procedure. Typically, the DCS requires a PPG
    the first time a defendant receives sex offender treatment in order to
    determine if the offender has any other paraphilias, or areas of sexually
    deviant arousal.   Such a test is then usually relied upon by the DCS
    during the probationer’s participation in relapse assessment.        Valin,
    however, was not given this procedure during his first treatment because
    the DCS did not have a sufficient budget at the time to perform the test.
    As a result, the DCS wanted to perform it now, during his relapse
    6
    assessment, to help evaluate other possible areas of sexual deviancy and
    to specifically determine whether Valin should be allowed contact with
    minor children, including his own newly born child.
    Valin refused to submit to the PPG test and requested a hearing
    before the district court.   The hearing revealed that Valin successfully
    completed the prior treatment program.        Furthermore, there was no
    evidence presented that Valin had engaged in any sexually deviant
    behavior following his prior conviction, or had ever engaged in any
    inappropriate contact with children, although the use of alcohol was
    identified during his prior sex abuse treatment as a potential relapse
    factor. Nevertheless, the court required Valin to submit to the PPG test
    as a part of his treatment program.        Although the court found no
    evidence that he was a threat to his child, it required that visitation with
    the child be supervised pending the outcome of the sex offender
    treatment.
    All three of his appeals have been consolidated.       The issue on
    appeal is whether Valin is subject to his special conditions of probation,
    including the PPG test.
    II. Standard of Review.
    We have articulated two different standards of review when a
    defendant challenges his or her sentence on appeal. Depending upon the
    nature of the challenge, the standard of review is for the correction of
    errors at law or for an abuse of discretion. Compare State v. Freeman,
    
    705 N.W.2d 286
    , 287 (Iowa 2005) (“We review the district court’s
    sentence for correction of errors at law.” (citing State v. Kapell, 
    510 N.W.2d 878
    , 879 (Iowa 1994); Iowa R. App. P. 6.4)), and State v. Shearon,
    
    660 N.W.2d 52
    , 57 (Iowa 2003) (noting that the appellant challenged “the
    7
    legality of his sentencing,” and that “[o]ur review is for the correction of
    errors at law”), with State v. Alloway, 
    707 N.W.2d 582
    , 584 (Iowa 2006)
    (“We normally review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.”
    (citing State v. Evans, 
    671 N.W.2d 720
    , 727 (Iowa 2003))), and State v.
    Jose, 
    636 N.W.2d 38
    , 41 (Iowa 2001) (stating we review a sentence that
    does not fall outside the statutory limits for an abuse of discretion (citing
    State v. Cooley, 
    587 N.W.2d 752
    , 754 (Iowa 1998))), and State v. Neary,
    
    470 N.W.2d 27
    , 29 (Iowa 1991) (“When a sentence is imposed within
    statutory limits, it will be set aside only for an abuse of discretion.”).
    Ultimately, however, we review a defendant’s sentence for the correction
    of errors at law. See State v. Thomas, 
    547 N.W.2d 223
    , 225 (Iowa 1996);
    Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Nevertheless, in some circumstances it is necessary
    to determine whether legal error occurred because the district court
    abused its discretion. Such a circumstance occurs when the sentence
    imposed is within the statutory limits or the defendant’s challenge to his
    or her sentence does not suggest it is outside the statutory limits. See
    
    Neary, 470 N.W.2d at 29
    (noting that when the sentence imposed is
    within the statutory limits it is reviewed for an abuse of discretion);
    
    Thomas, 547 N.W.2d at 225
    (noting that when “a defendant does not
    assert that the imposed sentence is outside the statutory limits, the
    sentence will be set aside only for an abuse of discretion”).
    In this case, Valin challenges his sentence as illegal. However, he
    is not challenging the district court’s authority to sentence him to, inter
    alia, two years of formal probation whereby he “shall submit to the
    supervision of DCS during probation and shall comply with all terms
    imposed by the assigned probation officer, including any additional
    programs and classes not set forth herein.” Iowa law clearly allows the
    8
    district court to do so. See Iowa Code § 907.3(3) (2005) (empowering the
    sentencing court in circumstances such as these to “place the defendant
    on probation upon such terms as it may require including . . .
    commitment of the defendant to the judicial district department of
    correctional services for supervision or services under section 901B.1 at
    the level of sanctions which the district department determines to be
    appropriate”).   Instead, Valin is challenging the specific probation
    conditions imposed by the DCS, and approved by the district court, as
    unreasonable.
    When a defendant challenges the terms of probation, “[i]t has long
    been a well-settled rule that trial courts have a broad discretion in
    probation matters which will be interfered with only upon a finding of
    abuse of that discretion.” State v. Rogers, 
    251 N.W.2d 239
    , 243 (Iowa
    1977) (citing United States v. Alarik, 
    439 F.2d 1349
    , 1351 (8th Cir. 1971)
    (“The granting of probation, and the conditions upon which it is granted
    as well as its revocation are matters purely within the discretion of the
    trial court and are reviewable only upon abuse of discretion.”)). Thus, we
    review Valin’s sentence for an abuse of discretion, and note that any
    abuse of discretion necessarily results in a legal error. State v. Ogle, 
    430 N.W.2d 382
    , 383 (Iowa 1988) (per curiam) (reviewing the probation
    condition that the appellant reside at a certain residential facility for an
    abuse of discretion); accord United States v. Jalilian, 
    896 F.2d 447
    , 449
    (10th Cir. 1990) (“If the sentence is legal, we review probation
    determinations for abuse of discretion.”).
    Regarding an abuse of discretion standard, we have said:
    In applying the abuse of discretion standard to
    sentencing decisions, it is important to consider the societal
    goals of sentencing criminal offenders, which focus on
    rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the
    9
    community from further offenses. It is equally important to
    consider the host of factors that weigh in on the often
    arduous task of sentencing a criminal offender, including the
    nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age,
    character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of
    reform. The application of these goals and factors to an
    individual case, of course, will not always lead to the same
    sentence. . . . Yet, this does not mean the choice of one
    particular sentencing option over another constitutes error.
    Instead, it explains the discretionary nature of judging and
    the source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.
    Judicial discretion imparts the power to act within
    legal parameters according to the dictates of a judge’s own
    conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment of others. It is
    essential to judging because judicial decisions frequently are
    not colored in black and white. Instead, they deal in
    differing shades of gray, and discretion is needed to give the
    necessary latitude to the decision-making process. This
    inherent latitude in the process properly limits our review.
    Thus, our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision
    made by the district court, but to determine if it was
    unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.
    State v. Formaro, 
    638 N.W.2d 720
    , 724–25 (Iowa 2002) (citations
    omitted).    In short, there is an abuse of discretion when “there is no
    support for the decision in the . . . evidence.” Rath v. Sholty, 
    199 N.W.2d 333
    , 336 (Iowa 1972).
    III.    Applicable Law.
    We have noted that “[t]he legislature has given the courts broad,
    but not unlimited, authority in establishing the conditions of probation.”
    State v. Jorgensen, 
    588 N.W.2d 686
    , 687 (Iowa 1998) (per curiam)
    (citations omitted).   Our courts derive this authority from Iowa Code
    section 907.6, which states:
    Probationers are subject to the conditions established
    by the judicial district department of correctional services
    subject to the approval of the court, and any additional
    reasonable conditions which the court or district department
    may impose to promote rehabilitation of the defendant or
    protection of the community.
    10
    Iowa Code § 907.6. 3 Thus, our district courts are authorized to impose
    “any reasonable conditions” that either “promote rehabilitation of the
    defendant or the protection of the community.” 4 
    Jorgensen, 588 N.W.2d at 687
    (citing Iowa Code § 907.6; State v. Akers, 
    435 N.W.2d 332
    , 335
    (Iowa 1989)); 
    Ogle, 430 N.W.2d at 383
    (per curiam) (stating probation
    conditions “shall promote the rehabilitation of the defendant and the
    protection of the community” and “must not be unreasonable or
    arbitrary”); 
    Rogers, 251 N.W.2d at 243
    (stating “conditions of probation
    cannot be unreasonable or arbitrary” and “should relate to the
    rehabilitation of the convicted criminal or the protection of the
    community, or both”); see also 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal
    Procedure § 26.9(a), at 833 (2d ed. 1999) (“In order to be valid, probation
    conditions must be reasonably related to the offense involved, the
    3We   recognize section 907.6 does not qualify what conditions the DCS may
    originally impose. Instead, it states “[p]robationers are subject to the conditions
    established,” and qualifies “any additional” conditions imposed by requiring them to be
    “reasonable” and either “promote the rehabilitation of the defendant or protection of the
    community.” Iowa Code § 907.6. It would be illogical, however, to read from this
    provision that the DCS may impose any conditions it wants—reasonable or not—the
    first time around. After all, those conditions are “subject to the approval of the court.”
    
    Id. The proper
    construction is that any condition of probation must be reasonable and
    either rehabilitate the defendant or protect the community. We have always required
    conditions of probation to meet this test. See, e.g., 
    Jorgensen, 588 N.W.2d at 687
    .
    4We   also recognize Iowa Code section 907.7 states that the purposes of
    probation are “to provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant
    and to protect the community from further offenses by the defendant and others.”
    Notably, this provision uses the conjunctive “and,” whereas section 907.6 uses the
    disjunctive “or.” Compare Iowa Code § 907.7 (stating “for the rehabilitation of the
    defendant and to protect the community” (emphasis added)), with 
    id. § 907.6
    (stating
    “to promote rehabilitation of the defendant or protection of the community” (emphasis
    added)). Section 907.7, however, is simply recognizing the purposes of probation, and
    not the authority of the court to impose conditions of probation. Thus, to be valid,
    conditions need not (in addition to being reasonable) promote the defendant’s
    rehabilitation and the protection of the community, but simply one or the other, or
    both. See 
    Rogers, 251 N.W.2d at 243
    .
    11
    rehabilitation of the defendant, the protection of the public, or another
    legitimate punitive purpose.”).
    A condition of probation promotes the rehabilitation of the
    defendant or the protection of the community when it addresses some
    problem or need identified with the defendant, see 
    Rogers, 251 N.W.2d at 244
    (“The sentencing court’s probation conditions might well be tailored
    to deter defendant from further offenses and thus contribute towards his
    rehabilitation.”), or some threat posed to the community by the
    defendant, see 
    Ogle, 430 N.W.2d at 383
    (per curiam) (“As the defendant
    posed a threat to the community because of his willingness to drive while
    under the influence, the court was well within its discretion to reject the
    Antabuse option and to order the defendant to reside in the residential
    facility [as a condition of probation].”). A condition is reasonable when it
    relates to the defendant’s circumstances in a reasonable manner, see
    United States v. Friedberg, 
    78 F.3d 94
    , 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (“A condition of
    probation is not reasonable if it is found to be ‘unnecessarily harsh or
    excessive in achieving these goals [of rehabilitating the defendant and
    protecting the public].’ ” (quoting United States v. Tolla, 
    781 F.2d 29
    , 34
    (2d Cir. 1986))), and is justified by the defendant’s circumstances, see
    
    Jorgensen, 588 N.W.2d at 687
    (finding the imposition of a batterer’s
    education program condition unreasonable because the defendant was
    acquitted of domestic abuse and had no history of such conduct). Thus,
    the inquiry into the reasonableness of a condition of probation boils
    down to whether the statutory goals of probation are reasonably
    addressed. See, e.g., Sobota v. Willard, 
    427 P.2d 758
    , 759 (Or. 1967) (“In
    testing the reasonableness of conditions imposed as part of a probation
    plan, it is necessary to bear in mind the various purposes sought to be
    12
    served by probation . . . .”); 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 907, at 171–
    73 (1998) (“[C]onditions that are found to be vindictive, vague, or
    overbroad, or unreasonable, will be stricken from the probation order.
    Moreover, conditions of probation which have no relationship to the
    crime of which the offender was convicted, relate to conduct which is not
    in itself criminal, and require or forbid conduct which is not reasonably
    related to future criminality, do not serve the statutory ends of probation
    and are invalid.”). As a result, whether a condition meets the statutory
    goals of probation and whether it is reasonable are questions that are
    best addressed together.
    IV.   Discussion.
    Although this case involves three appeals, there is essentially one
    issue presented. The question is whether special conditions of probation
    relating to the treatment and prevention of sexual abuse can be imposed
    as terms of probation for a person convicted of OWI with Valin’s history.
    In particular, Valin objects to the requirement that he participate in a sex
    abuse treatment program and submit to a PPG test as a part of an
    evaluation to determine the level of treatment and his ability to maintain
    contact with children.
    Normally, the crime of conviction serves as the circumstance to
    support the conditions of probation.       However, we have previously
    recognized that a defendant’s background and history is also relevant
    when determining the conditions of probation.         See 
    Jorgensen, 588 N.W.2d at 687
    , 687 n.1 (striking a condition of probation because, inter
    alia, “there was no indication she had a prior history” associated with
    such conditions, and no evidence in the record suggested such
    conditions were appropriate). Other states have also recognized that a
    13
    defendant’s history, as opposed to the defendant’s present conviction,
    may form the basis for conditions of probation.        See, e.g., State v.
    Solomon, 
    111 P.3d 12
    , 26 (Haw. 2005) (holding sex-offender treatment
    was a valid probation condition, even though the conviction was not for a
    sex offense, because the defendant had a history of sex-offending); State
    v. Cyr, 
    751 A.2d 420
    , 424 (Conn. Ct. App. 2000) (conviction need not be
    for enumerated sex offense in order to warrant sex-offender treatment as
    a probation condition); Miyasato v. State, 
    892 P.2d 200
    , 201–02 (Alaska
    Ct. App. 1995) (“[A] condition of probation need not directly relate to the
    offense for which the defendant stands convicted.”).        Thus, a prior
    conviction can provide the needed history to justify a special condition of
    probation. Yet, it is axiomatic that such history is insufficient unless it
    reveals a problem currently suffered by the defendant relating to the
    need to rehabilitate the defendant or protect the community from the
    defendant.
    In this case, there is an insufficient nexus between Valin’s present
    conviction and his special conditions of probation to advance the goals of
    probation. The State suggests a sufficient nexus exists for two primary
    reasons. First, the DCS maintains a policy that requires all probationers
    with a prior sex abuse conviction to participate in sex abuse treatment.
    The policy is based on the proposition that sex offenders always have the
    potential to reoffend. See McKune v. Lile, 
    536 U.S. 24
    , 32–33, 
    122 S. Ct. 2017
    , 2024, 
    153 L. Ed. 2d 47
    , 56–57 (2002) (observing that sex offenders
    who have re-entered society are “much more likely than any other type of
    offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault”). Second, the
    use of alcohol was recognized as a component of Valin’s relapse cycle
    during his prior sex abuse treatment, which means the current
    14
    conviction gives rise to a current potential for relapse. We address each
    reason separately.
    The DCS policy and its rationale are too broad to establish the
    necessary relationship between the conditions of probation in this case
    and either the current needs of rehabilitation of the defendant or the
    current protection of the public from the defendant. The policy gives rise
    to the need for the DCS to normally consider and inquire into the
    potential need for sex abuse treatment for a probationer, but the policy
    does not make treatment reasonable in each case. The reasonableness of
    sex abuse treatment as a condition of probation for an unrelated crime of
    conviction must be supplied by the individual facts or evidence in each
    case. The DCS policy paints with a brush that is too broad, and covers
    all defendants with a prior record of conviction for sex abuse, without
    individually considering the actual or current need for rehabilitation or
    public protection. See United States v. Scott, 
    270 F.3d 632
    , 636 (8th Cir.
    2001) (“The government presented no evidence that [the defendant] has a
    propensity to commit any future sexual offenses, or that [the defendant]
    has repeated this behavior in any way since his [previous] conviction.”).
    The problem with using the policy to establish a relationship
    between the conditions of probation and the goals of probation is best
    revealed by the other special conditions of probation imposed by the DCS
    in this case, such as the no-contact-with-children provision.         This
    condition of probation restricts Valin’s contact with children, including
    his own child, even though he has no history of sexual assault involving
    children and there are no facts that give rise to a reasonable fear that
    such behavior could occur. Consequently, the effect of the policy is to
    treat Valin as a current sex offender solely because of his prior offense.
    15
    In turn, the policy has the effect of imposing greater restrictions on an
    offender than reasonably needed to achieve the goals of probation. This
    is a consequence that probation must avoid. See Iowa Code § 907.9(4)
    (“[A] person who has been discharged from probation shall no longer be
    held to answer for the person’s offense.”). Accordingly, we turn to the
    second reason offered by the State.
    Alcohol abuse is a common factual connection between the prior
    and current convictions that could support the current need for sex
    abuse treatment. However, the common factor of alcohol relied on by the
    district court in this case to justify the need for sex abuse treatment as a
    condition of probation is simply too tenuous. There is no evidence in the
    record to show the degree to which the use of alcohol is a factor of
    relapse into sexual abuse, or even the degree to which alcohol abuse is a
    current part of Valin’s life. The record only establishes a conviction that
    shows Valin used alcohol five years after his conviction for sexual
    assault, which, without additional evidence, does not reasonably support
    the imposition of sex abuse treatment. The imposition of a treatment
    program based on this one common circumstance between two unrelated
    convictions is premature.
    The record in this case shows that the sexual abuse treatment
    program was to begin with an evaluation to determine the level of
    treatment. Yet, the evaluation was not imposed to determine if treatment
    should be required as a condition of probation, but what level of
    treatment should be imposed. Thus, the condition of probation imposed
    on Valin was a treatment program, not an evaluation. Regardless, any
    condition of probation—whether a treatment term or an evaluation
    term—must satisfy the critical inquiry that a reasonable relationship
    16
    exists between the condition of probation and the statutory goals as
    related to the current situation of the probationer.     The inquiry must
    reveal specific evidence that such a reasonable relationship exists.
    We conclude there is no reasonable relationship between Valin’s
    required participation in the sex offender treatment program, the
    imposition of the other special terms of probation, and the goals of
    probation for Valin’s current OWI conviction.        Thus, the trial court
    abused its discretion by imposing unreasonable special conditions of
    probation, and this abuse of discretion resulted in legal error.
    V. Conclusion.
    We conclude the district court abused its discretion by ordering
    the special conditions of probation, as well as the requirement that Valin
    submit to the PPG.     Therefore, we reverse the decision of the district
    court that imposed the special conditions of probation, including the PPG
    test, without prejudice to the State to impose additional terms and
    conditions of probation in the future.
    REVERSED.
    All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.