Amended August 1, 2017 State of Iowa v. Jesus Angel Ramirez ( 2017 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 15–1807
    Filed May 25, 2017
    Amended August 1, 2017
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellee,
    vs.
    JESUS ANGEL RAMIREZ,
    Appellant.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
    George L. Stigler, Judge.
    The defendant appeals his convictions following a jury trial on drug
    offenses, arguing among other things that the results of a search
    performed under a federal search warrant should have been suppressed.
    AFFIRMED.
    David A. Cmelik of David A. Cmelik Law PLC, Hiawatha, for
    appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Genevieve Reinkoester,
    Assistant Attorney General, Brian Williams, County Attorney, and Brad
    Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
    2
    MANSFIELD, Justice.
    Federal agents intercepted a package containing a hidden cache of
    methamphetamine as it entered this country from Mexico.        A federal
    agent then decided to make a controlled delivery of the package to its
    intended recipient in Waterloo, Iowa.      He obtained from a federal
    magistrate judge a federal “anticipatory” search warrant authorizing a
    search to be conducted once the package reached its intended recipient.
    With assistance from local law enforcement, federal agents
    proceeded with the controlled delivery. The recipient of the package was
    detained and federal agents searched his apartment.      Ultimately, the
    federal government decided to turn the case over to Iowa for prosecution,
    and the recipient of the package was convicted in the Black Hawk
    County District Court of possession of methamphetamine with intent to
    deliver and drug stamp violations. See Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(b)(7); 
    id. § 453B.12
    (2014).
    The defendant now appeals, arguing among other things that
    Iowa’s search warrant statutes do not authorize anticipatory warrants.
    We agree, but hold that where the federal government conducts a search
    pursuant to a valid federal search warrant for purposes of a federal
    investigation, the mere fact that such a warrant would not have been
    statutorily authorized in Iowa does not compel the results of the search
    to be suppressed in the Iowa courts. For this reason, and because we
    also find the defendant’s other claims of error to be without merit, we
    affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    On May 15, 2014, a package shipped from Mexico and destined for
    Waterloo arrived in this country at the FedEx hub in Memphis,
    Tennessee.   It was addressed to Jessy Robles, 1013 Mulberry Street,
    3
    Waterloo, and contained a phone number for contact purposes with a
    319 area code.
    United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers
    opened and inspected the parcel on arrival in Memphis. They found that
    it contained three heavy mirrors.      Inside the mirror frames they
    discovered approximately one to two pounds of an unknown white
    substance.    Upon field testing, the substance turned out to be
    methamphetamine.
    A CBP officer in Memphis contacted Tyler Mower, a Homeland
    Security Investigations (HSI) special agent based in Cedar Rapids. HSI is
    part of the United States Department of Homeland Security and
    investigates “anything that comes in or out of the country illegally.”
    Mower agreed to perform a controlled delivery of the package to its
    intended recipient. Accordingly, the package was forwarded by FedEx to
    Mower’s office in Cedar Rapids.
    Once Agent Mower received the package, he and other HSI agents
    reopened and reinspected it. The declared value of the mirrors was $90,
    whereas Mower determined from FedEx that the shipping charge alone
    would have been between $170 and $225. The HSI agents confirmed the
    presence of the methamphetamine.
    Mower performed a records check through Waterloo police.        He
    determined that an individual named Jesus Angel Ramirez, currently on
    parole, had the same cell phone number listed as the contact number on
    the package and lived at 1013 Mulberry Street, #2.      Additionally, the
    records check revealed that Ramirez used several different aliases
    including Jose Robles and Jesse Ramirez.
    Agent Mower decided that Ramirez was the intended recipient of
    the package and made plans to proceed with the controlled delivery. On
    4
    May 16, Mower applied for an anticipatory search warrant with the
    United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.       The
    application was reviewed by a federal magistrate judge in Cedar Rapids
    and approved at approximately 10:21 a.m. The warrant was based on
    the following condition precedent:
    CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR ANTICIPATORY SEARCH
    WARRANT[ ]
    . . . The search warrant will be executed only upon
    satisfaction of a condition precedent described as follows:
    The parcel will be delivered to 1013 Mulberry Street,
    Apartment 2, Waterloo, Iowa, with delivery being completed
    only when accepted by a person. The package will not be left
    on the porch or outside this residence. Once delivery of the
    parcel has been accepted by a person, I believe probable
    cause exists to believe the items listed on Attachment B will
    be located in 1013 Mulberry Street, Apartment 2, and the
    condition precedent for executing the search warrant will
    have been met.
    After obtaining the search warrant, Mower and three other HSI
    agents drove from Cedar Rapids to Waterloo with the package, which
    they had repacked. A postal inspector also placed a transmitter inside
    the package that would alert agents once the package had been opened.
    In Waterloo, the HSI agents met with members of the Tri-County Drug
    Enforcement Task Force, a group of state law enforcement officials, to
    assist with the controlled delivery.      These members included Jason
    Feaker, the lieutenant in the Waterloo police department whom Mower
    had spoken with when performing the records check the previous day.
    It was determined that Nicholas Berry, a Waterloo police officer
    and member of the task force, would pose as a FedEx delivery person
    and make the actual delivery.        Meanwhile, the HSI agents and other
    members of the Tri-County Task Force would perform surveillance.
    That afternoon, Berry walked into the apartment building and
    knocked on the door of Apartment #2, the closest door to the building’s
    5
    main entrance. A man opened the door, indicated he was expecting the
    package, and confirmed to Berry that he was Robles, later identified as
    the defendant, Jesus Ramirez. Ramirez accepted the package and signed
    for it as “Jesse Robles” on a waybill used by Officer Berry. Berry then left
    the apartment building.
    The plan had been to wait for the transmitter in the package to be
    triggered. Within a few minutes, though, Ramirez was spotted exiting the
    apartment, walking around to the front of the apartment, looking
    around, and then returning inside. A woman was observed leaving the
    apartment around the same time. Several minutes later, Ramirez again
    came out of the apartment, taking a bag of trash to a dumpster. Shortly
    after that, Ramirez departed from the apartment a third time and began
    walking toward downtown Waterloo.
    Two HSI agents followed Ramirez and detained him. Ramirez was
    later placed under arrest and Mirandized.      When questioned, Ramirez
    denied knowing anything about the package even when confronted with
    the facts that he had signed for it and his name and phone number were
    listed on the package.
    Once Ramirez had been detained, Mower decided to execute the
    warrant. Task Force members had been assigned to do the initial entry.
    They approached the apartment, announced their presence, and forced
    their way in. They found the apartment empty and the package sitting
    on a bed, unopened.       After the Task Force members had secured the
    residence, HSI agents conducted the search pursuant to the warrant.
    HSI agents seized various documents connecting Jose Robles and Jesus
    Ramirez to the 1013 Mulberry, Apartment #2 residence.           One of the
    documents also showed Ramirez as having the same 319 area code
    number contained on the FedEx package.
    6
    Other than the package itself, HSI took the items seized pursuant
    to the warrant into its custody.                  HSI allowed the package and its
    contents to be turned over to the Task Force so testing could be
    performed by the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation.                  Almost one
    kilogram of methamphetamine was eventually recovered from inside the
    mirror frames.
    At some point, the United States Attorney’s Office decided to let the
    State of Iowa prosecute the case. On May 27, a trial information was
    filed in the Black Hawk County District Court charging Ramirez with
    possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, a class “B” felony
    in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(7), and drug tax stamp
    violation, a class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code section 453B.12.
    Because Ramirez had prior convictions for possession with intent to
    deliver     methamphetamine            and    marijuana,     his   sentence    on    the
    methamphetamine charge was subject to enhancement. See Iowa Code
    § 124.411(1). Ramirez pled not guilty and filed a written arraignment on
    June 6.
    Ramirez filed a motion to suppress, claiming the initial search of
    the package and the validity and execution of the search warrant violated
    his rights under the United States and Iowa Constitutions as well as
    Iowa Code chapter 808. 1 Following an evidentiary hearing, the district
    court denied the motion to suppress. After a change of counsel, Ramirez
    then filed a motion for reconsideration of the suppression ruling. In that
    motion, he claimed that an anticipatory warrant, like the one issued to
    Agent Mower in this case, was invalid under Iowa Code chapter 808 and
    1The   issues raised by Ramirez in this motion to suppress were not advanced on
    appeal.
    7
    therefore suppression was required. See State v. Gillespie, 
    530 N.W.2d 446
    , 449 (Iowa 1995). The court disagreed, concluding:
    Defendant’s Application for Reconsideration is premised
    upon case law stating quite clearly that Iowa does not permit
    anticipatory search warrants. The search warrant herein
    was issued to a federal law enforcement agent by a federal
    judge and executed by federal agents with the assistance of
    Iowa law enforcement. None of the cases cited by the
    defense would mean, to the court’s observation, that Iowa’s
    prohibition[] on anticipatory search warrants would apply in
    this case.
    On May 22, 2015, Ramirez waived in writing his right to a speedy trial
    within one year of arraignment. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(c).
    Ramirez’s case proceeded to trial in September.     During Berry’s
    testimony, the State offered as an exhibit the audio recording of the
    conversation that had occurred between Berry and Ramirez during the
    controlled delivery. Ramirez objected that portions of the recording had
    been deleted or altered, a contention disputed by the State. The court
    overruled the objection and admitted the recording. The recording was
    then played for the jury.
    At the conclusion of Berry’s testimony, Ramirez clarified his
    objection outside the presence of the jury:
    The copy of the audiotape that I had received contained a lot
    of what was on that recording. However, the recording that I
    received from the police department, although it says it’s a
    certified copy, does not have those last 15 or 20 seconds of
    the conversation between Investigator Berry and other
    members of the people that were conducting surveillance
    with regards to the property.
    Specifically, when one of the persons on the radio
    indicated they saw a woman in white leaving the apartment,
    that was not included in the copy of the audiotape that we
    had received.
    In other words, Ramirez’s concern was that the version played for the
    jury included an additional fifteen or twenty seconds at the end that had
    8
    not appeared on the version that Ramirez received in discovery—
    although this material related to subsequent surveillance discussion
    among the law enforcement agents, not to the actual controlled delivery.
    Although the court agreed Ramirez should have been provided the
    full audio recording, it found that nothing in the additional material at
    the end would either exonerate or inculpate Ramirez, nor would its
    contents have come as a surprise to him.                The court emphasized that
    Ramirez had received a complete copy of the actual conversation between
    himself and Officer Berry, which it described as “the critical situation.”
    Later in the trial, a CD of photographs taken by HSI agent Stephen
    Allen was admitted into evidence without objection.                  The photographs
    depicted the package both as it arrived to the HSI office in Cedar Rapids
    and later as it appeared in the apartment when the search warrant was
    executed.
    After Allen finished testifying, Ramirez’s counsel informed the
    court that out of the approximately twenty or twenty-five photographs
    contained on the disk, and shown to the jury, Ramirez had received only
    three of them on the zip file emailed to his counsel as part of the
    prosecution’s pretrial disclosures. Ramirez claimed that his inability to
    review the remaining photographs before trial had put him at a
    disadvantage and moved for a mistrial.                 The trial court declined to
    declare a mistrial, again similarly acknowledging that while Ramirez
    should have received all the photographs, he could not demonstrate any
    resulting prejudice. 2
    2The    State maintained that whether or not the photographs were missing from
    the zip file, they would have been available for review at the prosecutor’s office pursuant
    to the county attorney’s open-file policy in criminal cases.
    9
    At the close of the State’s evidence, Ramirez moved for judgment of
    acquittal. The court denied the motion. The case was submitted to the
    jury, which found Ramirez guilty on both charges.
    Following the trial, Ramirez filed a motion in arrest of judgment
    and a motion for a new trial. The trial court denied the motions prior to
    sentencing.   The court imposed a fifty-year indeterminate sentence on
    the possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine offense and a
    five-year indeterminate sentence on the drug tax stamp violation, with
    the sentences to run consecutive to one another.
    Ramirez appealed, raising four issues: (1) whether his trial counsel
    had been ineffective for failing to move to dismiss the trial information
    following a one-year speedy trial information, (2) whether the evidence
    was sufficient to sustain his conviction, (3) whether his motion to
    suppress should have been granted because Iowa law does not authorize
    anticipatory warrants, and (4) whether the district court abused its
    discretion in his denying his motions for mistrial and for a new trial. We
    retained the appeal.
    II. Standard of Review.
    Because Ramirez’s speedy trial claim is raised in the context of an
    ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, our review is de novo.        In re
    Detention of Blaise, 
    830 N.W.2d 310
    , 315 (Iowa 2013).         Sufficiency of
    evidence claims are reviewed for correction of errors at law, and we will
    uphold a verdict if substantial evidence supports it. State v. Reed, 
    875 N.W.2d 693
    , 704 (Iowa 2016).       “Evidence is considered substantial if,
    when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince a
    rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. at 704–05
    (quoting State v. Thomas, 
    847 N.W.2d 438
    , 442 (Iowa 2014)).
    We review a district court’s denial of a mistrial based on late disclosure of
    10
    evidence for abuse of discretion.   State v. Piper, 
    663 N.W.2d 894
    , 901
    (Iowa 2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 
    790 N.W.2d 545
    , 551 (Iowa 2010).
    Ramirez argues that the anticipatory federal search warrant in this
    case would not have been authorized under Iowa search warrant
    statutes. In Ramirez’s view, use of evidence obtained from a warrant that
    did not meet state statutory standards resulted in a constitutional
    violation.   Ramirez thus urges we should review the matter de novo
    whereas the State argues we should review for correction of errors at law.
    Compare State v. Breuer, 
    808 N.W.2d 195
    , 197 (Iowa 2012) (reviewing de
    novo a constitutional challenge to a search conducted pursuant to
    warrant), with State v. Beckett, 
    532 N.W.2d 751
    , 753 (Iowa 1995)
    (reviewing for correction of errors at law when the defendant “challenges
    only the statutory sufficiency of the warrant and not its constitutional
    validity”). Because it does not affect our decision, we accept Ramirez’s
    position for purposes of this appeal and perform a de novo review.
    III. Analysis.
    A. Other Issues.      To begin, we will address Ramirez’s other
    issues.   We will then turn to the search-and-seizure question that we
    think represents the heart of this appeal.
    We do not find that Ramirez’s trial counsel was ineffective in
    allowing him to sign a waiver of the one-year speedy trial deadline on
    May 22, 2015.     At that time, a year had not passed since Ramirez’s
    “initial arraignment pursuant to rule 2.8.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(c).
    Although the waiver referred to “initial appearance,” the relevant date for
    purposes of this rule is the initial arraignment on the trial information,
    which occurred on June 6, 2014.       See State v. Hempton, 
    310 N.W.2d 11
    206, 207–08 (Iowa 1981) (finding that the one-year period starts with
    arraignment). Less than a year had elapsed.
    We also find sufficient evidence to sustain Ramirez’s convictions.
    The package, which contained a large quantity of methamphetamine,
    was addressed personally to Ramirez at his address. It also listed his cell
    phone number.     Ramirez accepted and signed for the package while
    acknowledging that he was expecting a delivery. Ramirez then surveyed
    the scene around his apartment, seemingly to make sure he wasn’t being
    watched by anyone.      When Ramirez was arrested, he falsely denied
    knowing anything about the package. A reasonable jury could find that
    Ramirez possessed the methamphetamine with intent to deliver it.
    Nor do we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
    denying a mistrial or a new trial based on deficiencies in the State’s
    pretrial disclosures. The missing fifteen to twenty seconds of audiotape
    on the copy produced to Ramirez’s counsel did not concern the delivery
    itself and were not consequential.       Any failure to produce certain
    photographs of the package did not prejudice Ramirez either.            As
    Ramirez’s own counsel acknowledged, “[A] lot of these photographs are
    fairly routine in nature and describe mostly what was being testified to
    previously.” The essential facts were undisputed: methamphetamine had
    been packed inside metal mirror frames in Mexico, a package was
    addressed to Ramirez and sent via FedEx, Ramirez took delivery of the
    package but had not opened it at the time of his arrest.
    B. The Search of the Apartment. This brings us to the central
    issue in the case, whether the district court should have granted
    Ramirez’s motion to suppress the results of a search conducted pursuant
    to a federal warrant where the warrant was valid under federal law but
    would not have been valid under state law.
    12
    The warrant here was an anticipatory search warrant—that is, “a
    warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some
    future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at
    a specified place.” United States v. Grubbs, 
    547 U.S. 90
    , 94, 
    126 S. Ct. 1494
    , 1498 (2006) (quoting 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
    Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.7(c), at 398 (4th ed. 2004)). “Most
    anticipatory   warrants   subject   their   execution    to   some   condition
    precedent other than the mere passage of time—a so-called ‘triggering
    condition.’ ” 
    Id. In this
    case, the triggering condition was “[o]nce delivery
    of the parcel has been accepted by a person”—i.e., Ramirez.
    In Grubbs, the United States Supreme Court held unanimously
    that   anticipatory   warrants   are    constitutional   under    the   Fourth
    Amendment.      
    Id. at 95–97,
    126 S. Ct. at 1499–1500.           As the Court
    explained,
    Because the probable-cause requirement looks to whether
    evidence will be found when the search is conducted, all
    warrants are, in a sense, “anticipatory.” In the typical case
    where the police seek permission to search a house for an
    item they believe is already located there, the magistrate’s
    determination that there is probable cause for the search
    amounts to a prediction that the item will still be there when
    the warrant is executed. . . .
    Anticipatory warrants are, therefore, no different in
    principle from ordinary warrants.        They require the
    magistrate to determine (1) that it is now probable that
    (2) contraband, evidence of a crime, or a fugitive will be on
    the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed.
    
    Id. at 95–96,
    126 S. Ct. at 1499–1500.
    The Court emphasized there is one wrinkle with anticipatory
    warrants:
    It should be noted, however, that where the anticipatory
    warrant places a condition (other than the mere passage of
    time) upon its execution, the first of these determinations
    goes not merely to what will probably be found if the
    condition is met. (If that were the extent of the probability
    13
    determination, an anticipatory warrant could be issued for
    every house in the country, authorizing search and seizure if
    contraband should be delivered—though for any single
    location there is no likelihood that contraband will be
    delivered.)    Rather, the probability determination for a
    conditioned anticipatory warrant looks also to the likelihood
    that the condition will occur, and thus that a proper object
    of seizure will be on the described premises. In other words,
    for a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the
    Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause, two
    prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. It must be
    true not only that if the triggering condition occurs “there is
    a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
    be found in a particular place,” but also that there is
    probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur.
    The supporting affidavit must provide the magistrate with
    sufficient information to evaluate both aspects of the
    probable-cause determination.
    
    Id. at 96–97,
    126 S. Ct. at 1500 (citation omitted) (quoting Illinois v.
    Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238, 
    103 S. Ct. 2317
    , 2332 (1983)). In Grubbs, the
    Court found that both prongs of probable cause were satisfied. 
    Id. at 97,
    126 S. Ct. at 1500. The occurrence of the triggering condition “would
    plainly establish probable cause for the search,” and “the affidavit
    established probable cause to believe the triggering condition would be
    satisfied.” 
    Id. Here, too,
    both elements were met. The affidavit explained that the
    package containing hidden methamphetamine had been intercepted en
    route from Mexico to Jessy Robles a/k/a Jesus Ramirez, with the
    package bearing both Ramirez’s address and his phone number.            In
    addition, once the triggering condition—i.e., acceptance of the parcel by a
    person at this address—took place, there clearly would be probable
    cause for a search. Thus, there is no dispute that the warrant was a
    valid federal warrant. In fact, the LaFave treatise observes, “The most
    typical situation arises when customs agents, upon inspection of
    international mail coming into the United States, determine that there
    are drugs concealed in a particular piece of mail”—exactly what occurred
    14
    here. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
    Amendment § 3.7(c), at 497–98 (5th ed. 2012) [hereinafter LaFave].
    LaFave adds, “If it is believed desirable that whenever possible the police
    should obtain advance judicial approval before making a search of
    private premises, then there is good reason to uphold the anticipatory
    warrant procedure.” 
    Id. at 499.
    However, we have held that Iowa Code sections 808.3 and 808.4 do
    not authorize anticipatory warrants in Iowa. See 
    Gillespie, 530 N.W.2d at 448
    –50. In Gillespie, a cooperating informant told law enforcement he
    had purchased cocaine from the defendant. 
    Id. at 447.
    Law enforcement
    and an assistant county attorney went to a Polk County district judge
    and obtained an anticipatory warrant to search both the defendant’s
    residence and another location where the cocaine sales to the informant
    had allegedly occurred. 
    Id. According to
    the warrant, probable cause
    would be established and the searches could occur once the informant
    had made a controlled buy from the defendant and returned to the
    agents either with cocaine or a substance that appeared to be cocaine.
    
    Id. We reversed
    the defendant’s conviction. 
    Id. at 450.
    We concluded
    “our search warrant statutes do not allow [anticipatory] warrants
    because the statutes do not refer to future events. 
    Id. at 448.
    We quoted
    the first sentence of Iowa Code section 808.3, emphasizing the second
    half of the sentence:
    A person may make application for the issuance of a
    search warrant by submitting before a magistrate a written
    application, supported by the person’s oath or affirmation,
    which includes facts, information, and circumstances tending
    to establish sufficient grounds for granting the application,
    and probable cause for believing that the grounds exist.
    15
    
    Id. (quoting Iowa
    Code § 808.3 (1991)). We also quoted part of the first
    sentence of Iowa Code section 808.4, emphasizing the initial words:
    “Upon a finding of probable cause for grounds to issue a search warrant,
    the magistrate shall issue a warrant . . . .”              
    Id. (quoting Iowa
    Code
    § 808.4). We then reasoned, “[T]he language ‘probable cause for believing
    that the grounds exist’ in section 808.3 suggests that probable cause
    must exist at the time the warrant is issued and not at some future
    time.” 
    Id. Similarly, we
    found, “The language ‘facts, information, and
    circumstances’ for probable cause in section 808.3 also supports our
    conclusion because the language suggests matters that are in existence.”
    
    Id. In sum,
    we concluded that “sections 808.3 and 808.4 do not
    contemplate future acts or events as constituting probable cause.” 
    Id. 3 Although
    the warrant in this case was issued by a federal court at
    the request of federal authorities, Ramirez warns of a “reverse silver
    platter” problem.          As Ramirez explains, state search-and-seizure
    protections could be intentionally circumvented by prearranging for a
    federal search, then using the results of the federal search in state court.
    We do not question the legitimacy of this concern, but it does not arise in
    the present case.
    3A  handful of other state courts have found a lack of statutory authority in their
    jurisdictions for anticipatory warrants. See, e.g., Ex Parte Oswalt, 
    686 So. 2d 368
    , 373–
    74 (Ala. 1996) (per curiam); People v. Poirez, 
    904 P.2d 880
    , 883 (Colo. 1995) (en banc);
    Kostelec v. State, 
    703 A.2d 160
    , 165 (Md. 1997); Dodson v. State, 
    150 P.3d 1054
    , 1057–
    58 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). We are not aware of any state supreme court declaring
    such warrants to be per se unconstitutional. See State v. Moran, 
    791 So. 2d 1065
    ,
    1068, 1071 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (finding an anticipatory warrant valid in Alabama
    following amendment of the rule at issue in Oswalt); State v. Curtis, 
    394 P.3d 716
    , 725–
    26, 
    2017 WL 2061691
    , at *9 (Haw. May 15, 2017) (upholding an anticipatory warrant
    against a challenge under the Hawaii Constitution); 
    Dodson, 150 P.3d at 1056
    (rejecting
    a challenge under the Oklahoma Constitution to anticipatory warrants).
    16
    The record is devoid of any suggestion that any party was trying to
    circumvent Iowa search and seizure law. This case began as a federal
    investigation when CPB officers in Memphis found methamphetamine
    hidden in an international shipment.                 It continued as a federal
    investigation when HSI officers took over the matter in Cedar Rapids and
    obtained the warrant from a federal magistrate judge.                 An HSI officer
    (Mower) then led the joint federal–state team that carried out the
    controlled delivery and the execution of the search warrant. Although
    state officials were recruited to work on the matter, an HSI officer made
    the decision to enter the premises, and HSI officers actually conducted
    the search itself.
    It is true that the case was ultimately turned over for state
    prosecution.      But there is no indication in the record that such a
    determination had been made before the search warrant was obtained
    and the search was carried out. Nor does the record suggest there would
    have been any obstacle to a federal prosecution of Ramirez. 4
    4Inclosing argument, Ramirez’s trial counsel tried to suggest that the jury could
    draw an inference from the decision by the federal government to let the State prosecute
    the case:
    Who did all of the leg work in this case? It was the agents from the
    Department of Homeland Security. They’re the ones that followed up
    with Fed Ex to determine whether the address on the return address was
    the actual address or not. It was a real address and not a fake address,
    as the agent had testified to, that oftentimes most of those packages have
    a fake address, but this one actually had a real address.
    They’re the ones that did the search of the apartment. They’re
    the ones that took the photos of the apartment. They’re the ones that
    looked through the trash. They’re the ones that followed up with the
    documents that were found at the scene to determine whether or not
    those had any additional evidentiary value. Then the question to you
    would be why then didn’t they keep this case? Why did they let it go to
    the state system?
    Noteworthy here is trial counsel’s acknowledgment that the search was, in all these
    respects, a federal search.
    17
    In State v. Davis, 
    679 N.W.2d 651
    (Iowa 2004), we confronted a
    related issue. In that case, the defendant who lived on the Missouri side
    of the Iowa–Missouri border was suspected of committing acts of
    vandalism in Wayne County on the Iowa side. 
    Id. at 654.
    The Wayne
    County sheriff met with a Missouri prosecutor who prepared two
    successive warrant applications. 
    Id. at 654–55.
    The sheriff presented
    both applications to a Missouri judge who then issued the warrants. 
    Id. at 655.
      Both Missouri and Iowa law enforcement participated in the
    ensuing searches, which netted evidence of the defendant’s involvement
    in vandalism. 
    Id. Later, the
    Wayne County District Court granted the defendant’s
    motion to suppress. 
    Id. It concluded
    the results of the searches could
    not be used in an Iowa case because the searches did not comply with
    law of the jurisdiction where they were performed.      
    Id. In particular,
    Missouri law did not permit warrant applications to be verified by an out-
    of-state law enforcement official and, although they could be verified by
    the local prosecutor, in this instance the prosecutor was not under oath
    when he signed them. 
    Id. The court
    further reasoned that Iowa does not
    recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for warrants
    subsequently determined to be defective. 
    Id. On the
    State’s appeal, we reversed. 
    Id. at 658–59.
    We pointed out
    that while Iowa had rejected the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
    rule, Missouri had adopted it. 
    Id. at 659.
    Thus, a Missouri court would
    have allowed the evidence from the two searches to be used if the case
    had been pending in Missouri. See 
    id. We concluded,
    We see no reason to give greater protection to the integrity of
    the Missouri statutes than the Missouri courts do under
    similar circumstances. For these reasons, we believe that
    the good faith exception as recognized by the Missouri courts
    18
    applies to the Missouri searches, and the district court
    should have overruled defendant’s motion to suppress.
    
    Id. This case
    presents a similar conceptual question: Should Iowa
    invalidate a search that would not have been invalidated under the law of
    the jurisdiction pursuant to which it was conducted? As in Davis, we
    conclude Iowa should not invalidate the search. In some respects, Davis
    was a harder case.      There the Missouri search was unlawful under
    Missouri law, but we relied on a Missouri good-faith warrant exception
    even though Iowa refuses to recognize the same exception.         Here, by
    contrast, the search was lawful under federal law. Moreover, in Davis,
    unlike in the present case, the investigation was being led by Iowa law
    enforcement—yet we held they were not bound by Iowa’s exclusionary
    rule.
    Courts in a number of states have concluded that evidence lawfully
    obtained by federal officials, under a federal investigation meeting federal
    standards, may be used in a subsequent state prosecution even though
    state law would not have permitted the same type of search. See Morales
    v. State, 
    407 So. 2d 321
    , 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); People v. Fidler,
    
    391 N.E.2d 210
    , 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Basham v. Commonwealth, 
    675 S.W.2d 376
    , 379 (Ky. 1984); Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    925 N.E.2d 845
    ,
    849–51 (Mass. 2010); State v. Mollica, 
    554 A.2d 1315
    , 1327–28 (N.J.
    1989); State v. Toone, 
    823 S.W.2d 744
    , 747 (Texas Ct. App. 1992); King v.
    State, 
    746 S.W.2d 515
    , 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Coburn, 
    683 A.2d 1343
    , 1347 (Vt. 1996); State v. Dreibelbis, 
    511 A.2d 307
    , 308 (Vt.
    1986); State v. Bradley, 
    719 P.2d 546
    , 549 (Wash. 1986) (en banc); State
    v. Gwinner, 
    796 P.2d 728
    , 731–32 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990); see also People
    v. Blair, 
    602 P.2d 738
    , 747–48 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (finding evidence
    19
    admissible that had “been legally seized under federal law and under the
    law of Pennsylvania, [even though] the seizure would have violated article
    I, section 13, of the California Constitution if it had occurred in this
    state”).
    One frequently cited decision is Mollica. See 1 LaFave § 1.5(c), at
    239 (stating that the approach in Mollica “makes good sense”).                        In
    Mollica, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) received information
    that the defendants were operating an illegal bookmaking enterprise in
    Atlantic 
    City. 554 A.2d at 1318
    .              The FBI then “initiated its own
    independent investigation” based on this information. 
    Id. at 1319.
    The
    FBI obtained telephone records from a hotel in Atlantic City, out of which
    the operation was allegedly run, without a warrant. 
    Id. Later, the
    FBI
    turned     over    all   information       from        the   investigation,   “including
    [information] reflected in the telephone toll records,” to state law
    enforcement.      
    Id. “Based on
    this evidence, and its own independent
    confirmation of the fact that [the defendants] were again occupying
    rooms at [the hotel], the State Police obtained warrants to search these
    rooms.” 
    Id. State police
    discovered evidence of illegal bookmaking as a
    result of the search and charged the defendants with state-law crimes.
    
    Id. The trial
    court originally ruled that hotel phone records related to
    an occupant’s use of a hotel room “were protected under the State
    Constitution from unreasonable searches and seizures.” 
    Id. On appeal,
    the supreme court agreed, noting that “the seizure of these telephone
    records    is   critically    vulnerable     to    a    challenge   under     the   State
    Constitution.”     
    Id. at 1323.
            However, that issue was obviated by the
    court’s    conclusion        on   its    next     issue,     “namely,   whether     state
    constitutional      protections         against        unreasonable      search      and
    20
    seizure . . . encompass the conduct of federal officers.” 
    Id. at 1319.
    The
    court noted, “Because federal officers necessarily act in the various
    states, but in the exercise of federal jurisdictional power, pursuant to
    federal authority and in accordance with federal standards, state courts
    treat such officers as officers from another jurisdiction.” 
    Id. at 1327.
    Other opinions track the reasoning of Mollica.       In Gwinner, the
    Washington Court of Appeals concluded that evidence lawfully obtained
    by federal officials could be admitted in state criminal proceedings “even
    when evidence obtained in a similar manner by state officers would
    violate state constitutional 
    strictures.” 796 P.2d at 729
    .    In Gwinner,
    state police received information implicating the defendant, which they
    relayed to a federal task force at an airport. 
    Id. The defendant
    and his
    truck were seized and cocaine was found in the truck. 
    Id. On appeal,
    the court observed that “the forfeiture in this case was
    justified under federal law.” 
    Id. at 730.
    The court noted, however, that
    “we would probably reach a different result” under the Washington
    Constitution. 
    Id. The question,
    then, became “whether federal officers
    acting under the belief that they are enforcing 21 U.S.C. § 881 must
    conform their actions to the requirements of state constitutional law.”
    
    Id. at 731.
    In refusing to suppress the evidence, the court noted that the
    federal officials were not acting under color of state law and were not
    merely acting on behalf of the state police. See 
    id. at 731–32.
    The court
    therefore found that suppressing the evidence “would not advance any
    legitimate state interests in protecting the privacy rights of citizens
    under” the Washington Constitution, nor would it “deter our state
    officers from unlawful conduct, since we are not examining the conduct
    of state officers.” 
    Id. at 732.
                                        21
    Likewise, in Fidler, the Illinois Appellate Court found that evidence
    lawfully obtained by federal officers was admissible in a state court
    proceeding although the search would not have been permitted under an
    Illinois 
    statute. 391 N.E.2d at 211
    . In Fidler, federal employees tapped
    the phone of an informant and, with the consent of that informant,
    recorded a phone conversation with the defendant. 
    Id. at 210.
    Based on
    information from this wiretap, a United States postal inspector then
    obtained a search warrant from a federal magistrate for the defendant’s
    home. 
    Id. at 211.
    Federal officers searched the house while state law
    enforcement officials stood outside the residence “[f]or security.”     
    Id. Thereafter, the
    federal officers found controlled substances, for which the
    defendant was prosecuted in state court. 
    Id. On appeal
    from a denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, the
    court noted it was “undisputed that the wiretap was lawful under [federal
    law] . . . and that the procedure employed did not violate the fourth
    amendment.” 
    Id. at 210–11.
    The court also observed it was “clear that
    the postal authorities did not comply with the requirements” of a similar
    Illinois statute authorizing wiretapping.   
    Id. at 211.
      The court then
    reasoned,
    It has been held that a failure by the police and State’s
    attorney to follow the procedures of the [Illinois] statute,
    taints any evidence obtained [as] a result of the
    eavesdropping, regardless of whether the procedure
    employed violated the defendant’s fourth amendment rights
    or not. People v. Porcelli (1974), 25 Ill.App.3d 145, 
    323 N.E.2d 1
    .
    The difference between this case and Porcelli is that in
    this case the eavesdropping was conducted entirely by
    federal officers who complied with the applicable federal
    statute, and acted pursuant to an investigation of a violation
    of federal law.
    The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter law
    enforcement officers from violating the constitutional rights
    22
    of citizens by removing the incentive for disregarding such
    rights. The suppression order in this case did not serve this
    end, however, since the actions of the federal postal
    authorities, pursuing a wholly federal investigation, were
    entirely lawful, and the record contains no hint of collusion
    between federal and state authorities seeking to avoid the
    limitations of the Illinois Eavesdropping Statute. The only
    result of the entry of the suppression order in this case is
    that it prevents highly probative evidence from being
    available to the finder of fact in a criminal trial. In our view,
    the order constituted an unwarranted extension of the
    exclusionary rule and must therefore be reversed.
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
      This reasoning has since been approved by the
    Illinois Supreme Court. See People v. Coleman, 
    882 N.E.2d 1025
    , 1032
    (Ill. 2008) (“We reaffirm the rule from our appellate court that electronic
    surveillance evidence gathered pursuant to federal law, but in violation of
    the eavesdropping statute, is not inadmissible absent evidence of
    collusion between federal and state agents to avoid the requirements of
    state law.”).
    In King, a decision that predated Mollica, the Texas Court of
    Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that evidence must be
    suppressed when Federal Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agents
    were issued two successive search warrants for the same property, a
    practice prohibited by state court rule.    
    See 746 S.W.2d at 519
    .        The
    court explained,
    In this case the federal searches made pursuant to
    federal warrants were lawful when conducted, and the
    evidence seized would have been readily admissible in
    federal courts. This Court concludes that no deterrent effect
    is gained by excluding from a state court proceeding
    evidence rightly seized under federal law. Since we hold that
    the evidence lawfully seized under the second federal
    warrant was admissible in the state court, we overrule
    appellant’s third point of error.
    
    Id. In Toone,
    the Texas Court of Appeals later reasoned that “the
    application of our state constitution to the officers of another jurisdiction
    23
    would disserve the principles of federalism and comity without properly
    advancing legitimate state 
    interests.” 823 S.W.2d at 748
    .      The court
    therefore held that “evidence lawfully obtained by federal officers acting
    under a valid federal search warrant is admissible in state criminal
    proceedings.” 
    Id. A recent
    case on point is 
    Brown, 925 N.E.2d at 845
    . There, the
    question arose “whether an audio–video tape recording of the defendant’s
    conversation in the home of a cooperating witness was properly admitted
    in evidence at . . . trial, where it was the product of a Federal
    investigation    in   which   Massachusetts   law   enforcement   personnel
    participated.”    
    Id. at 847.
      The Massachusetts Constitution prohibits
    warrantless wiretaps in private homes. 
    Id. at 850.
    The Massachusetts
    Supreme Judicial Court took note of the trial judge’s findings that the
    United States Drug Enforcement Agency had initiated and led the
    investigation, assisted by members of local law enforcement.       
    Id. The court
    therefore concluded that suppression of the recording was not
    warranted. 
    Id. It elaborated
    that
    [o]ne of the purposes justifying [application of the
    exclusionary rule] is the deterrence of police conduct that
    unlawfully intrudes on the rights of privacy and security
    guaranteed our citizens under art. 14, through the
    preclusion of the fruits of that conduct. Another is the
    protection of judicial integrity through the dissociation of the
    courts from unlawful conduct. Where those purposes are
    not furthered, rigid adherence to a rule of exclusion can only
    frustrate the public interest in the admission of evidence of
    criminal activity. In the present case, there is no unlawful
    conduct to deter. The recordings were made in a federally
    run investigation in accordance with Federal law, and fell
    properly within the exemption for the conduct of Federal
    investigations under State law. To the extent that the
    conduct of State officials is the object of deterrence, our
    rulings excluding similar evidence obtained through
    investigations that are essentially State investigations
    operating under a Federal moniker are sufficient. Judicial
    integrity, in turn, is hardly threatened when evidence
    24
    properly obtained under Federal law, in a federally run
    investigation, is admitted as evidence in State courts. To
    apply the exclusionary rule in these circumstances as the
    defendant urges would plainly frustrate the public interest
    disproportionately to any incremental protection it might
    afford.
    
    Id. at 851
    (citations omitted).
    We find the reasoning in the foregoing cases persuasive. When a
    bona fide federal investigation leads to a valid federal search, but the
    evidence is later turned over to state authorities for a state prosecution,
    we do not believe deterrence or judicial integrity necessarily require a
    reexamination of the search under standards that hypothetically would
    have prevailed if the search had been performed by state authorities.
    It is true that a few state jurisdictions have declined to allow
    evidence seized in a warrantless federal search to be admitted in a state
    proceeding where the search would have violated the state constitution.
    See State v. Torres, 
    262 P.3d 1006
    , 1021 (Haw. 2011); State v. Cardenas-
    Alvarez, 
    25 P.3d 225
    , 233 (N.M. 2001); People v. Griminger, 
    524 N.E.2d 409
    , 412 (N.Y. 1988).      Yet the present case is different.      Although
    Ramirez raises article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution in his briefing,
    he does not claim that the search itself would have violated the Iowa
    Constitution.    Rather, he maintains only that Iowa statutes do not
    authorize this type of search and, therefore, it would violate the Iowa
    Constitution to admit the results of the search in an Iowa court.        We
    disagree with that broad proposition.
    Here a valid search warrant was issued by a federal magistrate
    judge to federal officers conducting a federal investigation. Cf. State v.
    Kern, 
    831 N.W.2d 149
    , 164 (Iowa 2013) (noting that warrantless invasion
    of the home was the “chief evil” that article I, section 8 sought to
    address). Although state officers were later enlisted to help, this was not
    25
    an attempt to bypass the requirements of Iowa law. Cf. State v. Brown,
    
    890 N.W.2d 315
    , 327 (Iowa 2017) (holding that warrantless searches
    performed by an off-duty police officer were motivated by a “legitimate”
    private interest, were therefore not covered by article I, section 8, and
    could be used in a state-court prosecution). While Iowa law would not
    have authorized the type of warrant issued, no argument is raised that
    the search—if statutorily authorized—would have violated the Iowa
    Constitution.    Cf. State v. Cline, 
    617 N.W.2d 277
    , 293 (Iowa 2000)
    (declining to adopt a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for
    unconstitutional searches because “[t]o do so would elevate the goals of
    law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional rights”), abrogated on
    other grounds by State v. Turner, 
    630 N.W.2d 601
    , 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).
    Under this combination of circumstances, we cannot say that the
    admission of the results of the May 16, 2015 search either rewarded
    unlawful police conduct or undermined the integrity of our courts.
    Rather, it accorded a proper recognition to the bona fide actions of the
    federal government pursuant to that government’s lawful authority,
    including the official acts of a federal magistrate judge.
    IV. Conclusion.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ramirez’s conviction and
    sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
    Cady, C.J., and Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this opinion.
    Wiggins, J., files a dissenting opinion in which Hecht and Appel, JJ.,
    join.
    26
    #15–1807, State v. Ramirez
    WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
    I respectfully dissent.   The court should have suppressed the
    evidence obtained in Iowa for use in an Iowa court.
    The majority bases its opinion on cases that subscribe to the
    reverse silver-platter doctrine. The majority finds these cases persuasive.
    However, in finding these cases persuasive, the majority fails to examine
    the underpinnings of the silver-platter doctrine as originally established
    and abandoned by the federal courts. The majority also fails to reconcile
    its position with the reasons why we apply the exclusionary rule in Iowa.
    In Iowa, we should not decide an issue by color matching the facts from
    other jurisdictions.   Rather, we should look behind the facts of those
    cases and determine if the reasoning of those cases comport with our
    Iowa precedent.
    I start my analysis by examining the silver-platter doctrine and
    federal jurisprudence. The silver-platter doctrine describes the situation
    in which federal courts admit evidence in federal court seized as a result
    of an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers. Elkins v. United
    States, 
    364 U.S. 206
    , 208, 
    80 S. Ct. 1437
    , 1439 (1960).         In the past,
    federal courts accepted the doctrine and admitted the evidence in federal
    court. See Weeks v. United States, 
    232 U.S. 383
    , 398, 
    34 S. Ct. 341
    , 346
    (1914). In Elkins, the United States Supreme Court rejected the silver-
    platter doctrine. 
    Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208
    , 80 S. Ct. at 1439.
    In rejecting the silver-platter doctrine, the Court sought to
    preserve the judicial integrity of the federal court system. 
    Id. at 222,
    80
    S. Ct. at 1447. As the Court noted,
    There it was held that “a conviction resting on evidence
    secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure
    which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand
    27
    without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful
    disobedience of law.” Even less should the federal courts be
    accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they
    are sworn to uphold.
    
    Id. at 223,
    80 S. Ct. at 1447 (quoting McNabb v. United States, 
    318 U.S. 332
    , 345, 
    63 S. Ct. 608
    , 615 (1943)). As I explain in this dissent, Iowa
    precedent supports the same proposition—Iowa courts should not be
    accomplices in violations of state law.
    The reverse silver-platter doctrine refers to a situation in which
    state courts admit evidence obtained by federal officers in a manner that
    does not violate federal law, but violates state law or the state
    constitution. At least three other states have refused to adopt the reverse
    silver-platter doctrine. State v. Torres, 
    262 P.3d 1006
    , 1020 (Haw. 2011);
    State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 
    25 P.3d 225
    , 233 (N.M. 2001); People v.
    Griminger, 
    524 N.E.2d 409
    , 412 (N.Y. 1988). New York and New Mexico
    courts rely on the principle espoused in Elkins to reject the reverse silver-
    platter doctrine. Citing Elkins, the Court of Appeals of New York stated,
    “Since defendant has been tried for crimes defined by the State’s Penal
    Law, we can discern no reason why he should not also be afforded the
    benefit of our State’s search and seizure protections.”      
    Griminger, 524 N.E.2d at 412
    . The New Mexico Supreme Court stated its rationale as
    follows: “Although we do not claim the authority to constrain the
    activities of federal agents, we do possess the authority—and indeed the
    duty—to insulate our courts from evidence seized in contravention of our
    state’s constitution.” 
    Cardenas-Alvarez, 25 P.3d at 233
    .
    If I were to color match the facts, I might make the statement that
    I find the New York and New Mexico courts more persuasive. However,
    that is not what courts do. Our obligation is to look behind the facts and
    determine if the reasoning of the cases from other jurisdictions is
    28
    consistent with Iowa precedent.            The fact that other state court cases
    adopt a position is not determinative of Iowa law. State v. Halstead, 
    791 N.W.2d 805
    , 811 (Iowa 2010).             When deciding Iowa law questions, we
    determine the persuasiveness of other authorities by the quality of the
    analysis. 
    Id. I believe
    the exclusionary rule analysis done by the Hawaii
    Supreme Court is most persuasive and the one we should follow in this
    case.
    In Hawaii, before rejecting the reverse silver-platter doctrine, the
    supreme court applied an exclusionary rule analysis. 
    Torres, 262 P.3d at 1013
    . The use of the exclusionary rule analysis began trending in courts
    by 1988. Tom Quigley, Do Silver Platters Have a Place in State-Federal
    Relations? Using Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions, 20
    Ariz. St. L.J. 285, 322 (1988). The exclusionary rule analysis requires
    “the court first identif[y] the principles to be served by the exclusionary
    rule, and then evaluate[] how the principles would be served by
    exclusion.” 
    Torres, 262 P.3d at 1013
    –14 (quoting State v. Bridges, 
    925 P.2d 357
    , 365 (Haw. 1996), overruled by 
    Torres, 262 P.3d at 1021
    ). 5
    In Iowa, we have identified three principles the exclusionary rule
    serves. First, it preserves the integrity of the judicial process. State v.
    Prior, 
    617 N.W.2d 260
    , 268 (Iowa 2000). Next, it protects the privacy of
    individuals by providing redress for the invasion of an individual’s
    privacy interest.       State v. Cline, 
    617 N.W.2d 277
    , 289 (Iowa 2000),
    abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Turner, 
    630 N.W.2d 601
    ,
    5The  Hawaii Supreme Court recently decided anticipatory search warrants are
    allowed under Hawaii law. See State v. Curtis, 
    394 P.3d 716
    , 725–26 (Haw. 2017).
    However, this decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court does not change the fact that the
    Iowa legislature does not allow anticipatory search warrants under Iowa law, nor does
    Curtis undermine the exclusionary rule analysis in State v. Torres. 
    Id. at 728
    (“This
    holding is consistent with the purposes underlying Hawaii’s exclusionary rule: judicial
    integrity, protection of individual privacy, and deterrence of illegal police misconduct.”).
    29
    606 n.2 (Iowa 2001). Third, the rule serves to deter police misconduct.
    
    Id. The judicial
    integrity purpose of the exclusionary rule is based on
    the proposition that “[b]y admitting evidence obtained illegally, courts
    would in essence condone the illegality by stating it does not matter how
    the evidence was secured.”     
    Id. The majority
    concludes the judicial
    integrity purpose only applies to evidence obtained in violation of the
    Iowa Constitution and not evidence obtained in violation of Iowa statutes.
    This is a misreading of Iowa law.
    In Iowa, we protect the integrity of the judicial system by enforcing
    our search and seizure statutes. See State v. Beckett, 
    532 N.W.2d 751
    ,
    755 (Iowa 1995).    In Beckett, a magistrate failed to make a finding
    required under Iowa Code section 808.3 as to the informant’s credibility
    before issuing a search warrant. 
    Id. at 751.
    The district court refused to
    suppress the evidence obtained by that search warrant by applying the
    good-faith exception doctrine established in United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 905, 
    104 S. Ct. 3405
    , 3411 (1984). 
    Id. On appeal,
    we reversed
    the district court and suppressed the evidence to protect the integrity of
    the judicial system and our search and seizure statutes. 
    Beckett, 532 N.W.2d at 755
    . In doing so, we stated,
    The statutory requirement is the legislature’s unambiguous
    expression of its desire that a magistrate issuing a search
    warrant shall make a determination that the informant is
    credible and state the reason or reasons for that finding.
    Adopting a good faith exception to the statutory requirement
    would effectively defeat the purpose of the statute because
    failure to comply with the statute would be of no
    consequence. In light of the clear purpose of section 808.3,
    permitting a good faith exception to failure to comply with
    the statute would be tantamount to judicial repeal of the
    statute.
    30
    
    Id. The Iowa
    legislature has not authorized anticipatory search
    warrants under Iowa Code sections 808.3 and 808.4. State v. Gillespie,
    
    530 N.W.2d 446
    , 448–50 (Iowa 1995). Sections 808.3 and 808.4 are the
    very same sections involved in Beckett. If we allow the State to admit the
    evidence obtained by the anticipatory search warrant in our state court,
    it would violate the same search and seizure statues we were unwilling to
    weaken in Beckett. I find that by allowing the State to admit the evidence
    in our state courts, we implicate the integrity of our judicial system.
    Thus, the exclusion of the evidence in this case serves the judicial
    integrity purpose of the exclusionary rule.
    The privacy purpose of the exclusionary rule is rooted in the
    expectations a person has in the laws of the state of Iowa to protect a
    person’s privacy. Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution contains
    the expectations of a person’s constitutionally protected privacy rights in
    the context of a search and seizure. Iowa Code chapters 808, 808A, and
    808B contain the expectations of a person’s statutorily protected privacy
    rights in the context of a search and seizure. A person living in Iowa
    expects that the State cannot use evidence obtained in violation of Iowa
    law in a criminal prosecution in our Iowa courts. Thus, the exclusion of
    the evidence in this case also serves the privacy purpose of the
    exclusionary rule.
    The deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police
    officials from violating our constitution or state laws when it comes to
    search and seizures.     We apply the exclusionary rule to statutory
    violations. 
    Gillespie, 530 N.W.2d at 450
    . Here, Iowa law enforcement
    was involved in the search.     The application of our exclusionary rule
    serves the purpose in this case and future cases to deter any federal and
    31
    state cooperation to evade our state laws. See 
    Torres, 262 P.3d at 1020
    (holding the exclusion of the evidence obtained by the federal authorities
    would deter future violations of state law even though no state actors
    were involved in the present search).
    Finally, I contend the majority’s reliance on State v. Davis, 
    679 N.W.2d 651
    (Iowa 2004), is also misplaced. In Davis, a Missouri judicial
    officer issued a search warrant to search property located in Missouri
    and owned by a Missouri resident.       
    Id. at 654.
      The issuance of the
    search warrant violated a Missouri statute because an Iowa peace officer
    verified the application. 
    Id. at 657–58.
    Even with this violation of the
    Missouri statute, the state of Missouri would not suppress the evidence
    discovered in the search because the Missouri courts recognize an
    exception to the exclusionary rule when an officer executing a search
    warrant relies on the warrant in good faith. 
    Id. at 658.
    In allowing the
    state to admit the evidence seized in Missouri from a Missouri resident
    on Missouri property in our court, we gave two reasons as to why the
    evidence was admissible. First, we noted,
    The search warrants met all the requirements of the Fourth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
    section 8 of the Iowa Constitution because they were issued
    on probable cause, supported by the oath of Sheriff Davis,
    and particularly described the place to be searched and the
    things to be seized. We do not have any concerns regarding
    the trustworthiness of the evidence seized.
    
    Id. at 659.
    Second, we decided we should not “give greater protection to
    the integrity of the Missouri statutes than the Missouri courts do,”
    because Missouri had adopted the good-faith exception. 
    Id. The case
        before   the court today is factually and legally
    distinguishable from Davis.     A pertinent factual difference is that
    Ramirez is an Iowa resident whereas Davis was a Missouri resident.
    32
    Additionally, the court in this case issued the search warrant to search
    property located in Iowa. In Davis, the property was located in Missouri.
    These are important differences when attempting to draw a comparison
    between the analysis in Davis and this case.
    In Davis, we said that by the Missouri courts adopting the good-
    faith exception to the exclusionary rule, it had no interest in protecting
    the integrity of its search and seizure statutes. 
    Id. On the
    other hand,
    “[i]n Iowa we refuse to apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary
    rule when a defect exists in the application for a warrant to protect the
    integrity of the statutes passed by our legislature.” Id.; see also 
    Beckett, 532 N.W.2d at 755
    . These important differences affect the legal analyses
    of the two cases. Thus, I would conclude, Davis does not support the
    majority’s opinion.
    Accordingly, I would hold evidence obtained by a search warrant
    issued by the federal court to search property located in Iowa and owned
    by an Iowa resident would be subject to the exclusionary rule in an Iowa
    prosecution.      This does not mean the federal government cannot
    prosecute Ramirez for his alleged criminal conduct in federal court.       I
    recognize the supremacy of the federal government.        I also encourage
    federal authorities to continue to enforce and prosecute the law in a
    manner as the Federal Constitution permits.         However, we should not
    abandon our constitutional and statutory protections afforded to persons
    in Iowa to affirm a conviction that should have taken place in federal
    court.
    Hecht and Appel, JJ., join this dissent.