Amended February 27, 2017 State of Iowa v. Iowa District Court for Jones County ( 2016 )


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  •                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 15–0948
    Filed December 23, 2016
    Amended February 27, 2017
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff,
    vs.
    IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JONES COUNTY,
    Defendant.
    Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Lars G.
    Anderson, Judge.
    Iowa Department of Corrections appeals district court’s ruling
    reversing agency decision requiring inmate convicted of domestic abuse
    assault to participate in sex offender treatment program.              WRIT
    SUSTAINED AND CASE REMANDED.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John B. McCormally,
    Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.
    Mark    Smith,   State   Appellate     Defender,   and   John   Bishop,
    Cedar Rapids, until withdrawal, and then Anthony Burton Irvin pro se.
    2
    WATERMAN, Justice.
    In this appeal, we must decide whether the Iowa Department of
    Corrections (IDOC) violated an inmate’s rights by requiring him to
    participate in the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP). The inmate
    pled guilty to domestic abuse assault in a plea bargain that dismissed a
    related sex abuse charge. The IDOC initially relied on the dismissed sex
    abuse charge and the victim’s detailed, written statement included in a
    police report to refer him for mandatory SOTP.      An administrative law
    judge (ALJ) upheld that determination following an evidentiary hearing
    based on the inmate’s admission that he assaulted his girlfriend during
    oral sex and the victim’s statement. The district court reversed based on
    an unpublished, nonprecedential decision, Lindsey v. State, No. 13–
    2042, 
    2015 WL 568560
    (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015), which held the
    IDOC cannot use unproven charges to require SOTP.          We granted the
    IDOC’s request for a writ of certiorari.
    For the reasons explained below, we hold the IDOC may rely on the
    victim’s written statement in a police report for the initial classification
    requiring SOTP, provided the inmate is afforded due process, including
    an evidentiary hearing to challenge that classification. The ALJ, in turn,
    may uphold the classification based on the inmate’s own testimony
    admitting to a sexual component to the assault, along with other
    evidence, including hearsay such as the victim’s detailed account.
    Accordingly, we sustain the writ, reverse the judgment of the district
    court, and remand the case to reinstate the IDOC’s decision requiring
    this inmate’s participation in the treatment program.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    Anthony Irvin is an inmate at Anamosa State Penitentiary under
    the custody of the IDOC serving a prison sentence for domestic abuse
    3
    assault following his guilty plea.   The victim was his live-in girlfriend.
    The minutes of testimony, which incorporated by reference the police
    report with the victim’s detailed account, alleged that at 8:30 p.m. on
    October 28, 2012, Irvin became angry upon finding calls to another man
    made from his girlfriend’s phone. Irvin accused her of infidelity. When
    she attempted to explain, he grabbed her by the throat and threw her
    across the room. Irvin then began smoking crack cocaine and watching
    porn.    About 1:30 a.m., he forced his girlfriend to smoke crack and
    perform oral sex on him.    According to her statement, at around 3:30
    a.m., she told him she did not want to continue. Irvin ordered her to
    keep going. She stopped and pulled away. Irvin again grabbed her by
    the throat. She struggled, and Irvin put her in a headlock and strangled
    her until she passed out. When she awoke, she felt dizzy and found she
    had urinated on herself. She began sobbing, and Irvin threatened to kill
    her before she could call the police or neighbors. She laid in bed until
    morning, when she went to work. The police were contacted and came to
    her workplace. Her statement and photos of her injuries were taken that
    day. Police arrested Irvin at their home.
    The State charged Irvin with two counts: (1) domestic abuse
    assault by knowingly impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the
    blood of another person in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(2)(d)
    (2013); and (2) sexual abuse in the third degree for performing a sex act
    by force in violation of section 709.4. At that time, Irvin also had prior
    charges of domestic abuse assault and sexual abuse in the third degree
    pending for another incident with a different victim.
    On August 20, 2013, the State reached a plea agreement with
    Irvin, who pled guilty to two counts of domestic abuse assault in
    violation of section 708.2A(2)(d) in exchange for the dismissal of both
    4
    charges of sexual abuse in the third degree. The court sentenced Irvin to
    an indeterminate period of incarceration not to exceed two years on each
    offense, to be served consecutively, and imposed a $625 fine. Irvin was
    also sentenced on two unrelated theft charges.          Irvin’s cumulative
    sentence totaled six years. The sentencing order recommended that Irvin
    be enrolled in a batterer’s education treatment course. The district court
    made no finding that the crimes to which Irvin pled were sexually
    motivated and did not require Irvin to register as a sex offender.
    On October 14, shortly after Irvin arrived at the IDOC’s
    Mount Pleasant Correctional Facility (MPCF), his counselor, Kasey Bean,
    sent an email to Sean Crawford, the director of the SOTP. Bean’s email
    stated that based on Irvin’s original sexual abuse charge, she “believe[d]
    he may be eligible for SOTP.”     Crawford responded a few weeks later,
    stating, “Offender’s file has been reviewed and it is my opinion there is a
    sexual component involved in his current conviction. DOC will require
    SOTP.”
    On December 16, the IDOC notified Irvin that he had been
    classified as an offender required to complete sex offender treatment.
    The notice stated the classification “may affect [his] future accrual of
    earned time and tentative discharge date pursuant to Iowa Code
    § 903A.2(1)(a).” The notice set forth the reasons for his classification in
    a section entitled, “Classification Committee Justification/Evidence”:
    Offender Irvin is currently incarcerated on charges of
    domestic abuse and 3rd degree theft. Originally charged also
    with sex abuse 3rd, he ple[d] to the current charges. Along
    with beating his victim up, he forced the female to perform
    oral sex on him. Offender Irvin has never completed any
    type of sex offender treatment program and because of the
    sexual component to his crime the DOC/MPCF will require
    he do so.
    5
    The notice listed the evidence relied upon by the IDOC for Irvin’s
    classification, including the (1) program records, (2) email by Sean
    Crawford, (3) trial information, (4) police report, and (5) minutes of
    testimony. The police report was attached to the minutes and noted that
    Irvin “beat his victim up” and “force[d] her to perform oral sex.”         The
    police report quoted a detailed statement from the victim taken down the
    day after the assault.    The victim’s account was also quoted in the
    minutes.    Finally, the notice informed Irvin “that an in-person or
    telephonic hearing on your appeal of the sex offender treatment program
    requirements will be held on Wednesday, January 8,” before an ALJ. The
    notice stated that “[a]ll documents or other exhibits that you want
    considered at the hearing” must be submitted two business days before
    the hearing, and if Irvin did not appear, a judgment would be entered
    against him. At the bottom of the notice was a section an offender could
    sign to waive the hearing. On December 17, Irvin signed to waive the
    hearing.
    In February of 2014, Irvin was transferred from the MPCF to
    Anamosa State Penitentiary. On April 14, Irvin wrote a letter to John
    Baldwin, then director of the IDOC, and Jason Carlstrom, then chair of
    the Iowa Board of Parole. Irvin asserted that he should not be referred to
    SOTP because he “had never been convicted of a sex charge, only
    accused of one.”    He alleged the prosecutor dismissed the sex counts
    because,   during   the   course   of   trial   preparation,   the   prosecutor
    determined those charges to be unfounded.            Irvin noted neither the
    sentencing order nor the plea agreement recommended that he
    participate in SOTP, only that he participate in batterer’s education.
    Sheryl Dahm, then assistant deputy director at the IDOC, responded to
    6
    Irvin’s letter on April 22, stating that Irvin’s classification was based on
    IDOC policy.
    In June, Irvin received another classification notice.                The notice
    mentioned that, due to an error, Irvin’s accrual of earned time had not
    been halted since the first December classification notice.                 The June
    notice gave Irvin another opportunity for an ALJ hearing scheduled for
    July 16. Irvin acknowledged this notice, and this time did not waive the
    hearing. At the hearing, Irvin submitted his affidavit; a copy of the plea
    agreement; and a copy of Dykstra v. Iowa District Court, 
    783 N.W.2d 473
    (Iowa 2010). The hearing was unreported.
    On July 25, the ALJ affirmed the IDOC’s classification decision.
    The ALJ specifically found that due process requirements for the
    classification had been met: Irvin had been given notice of the hearing
    and presented evidence, the ALJ provided an explanation for the reasons
    behind the classification, and the ALJ “was not involved in the [initial]
    classification   decision   at   issue,       so   he   [could]   be   an    impartial
    decisionmaker in this matter.”        The ALJ examined the two domestic
    abuse convictions, one arising out of Irvin’s altercation with his girlfriend
    and the other arising from the separate incident with a different victim.
    The ALJ determined the allegations in the separate incident were “not
    sufficient to find that IRVIN needs SOTP” because the violence was
    unrelated to a sex act. The ALJ found the other charge involving Irvin’s
    girlfriend required SOTP because “[t]he evidence in the record indicates
    that IRVIN’s behavior shows that he currently suffers from a problem for
    which treatment is needed to rehabilitate him or that such treatment is
    needed to protect the community from him.”
    The ALJ determined that requiring SOTP would not violate Irvin’s
    plea agreement or sentencing order because both “were silent about
    7
    SOTP” and the IDOC retains the authority to establish treatment
    program policies for offenders. The ALJ rejected Irvin’s claim that the
    prosecutor had dropped the sex charge as unsubstantiated.          The ALJ
    noted Irvin produced no evidence to support that assertion, such as the
    deposition transcripts that he claimed existed.      The ALJ observed the
    plea agreement stated that “charges could be brought back if IRVIN
    raised challenges to the plea agreement.” In the ALJ’s view, this showed
    the prosecutor “still believed the charges could reasonably be brought
    again if need be.”      Finally, the ALJ weighed the victim’s detailed
    statement together with Irvin’s testimony on his version of events. The
    ALJ found the victim’s statement to be “credible” after testimony from
    Irvin that the victim “did not have to fabricate a story if she wanted him
    to leave because she could have simply told him to leave the house.” In
    the ALJ’s view, Irvin “indicate[d] that [the victim] did not have a reason to
    fabricate a story about what IRVIN did to her.” The ALJ also concluded
    that even under Irvin’s version of events, the conviction for domestic
    abuse still had a sexual component, and thus, Irvin should be required
    to complete SOTP:
    IRVIN’s version of events was that he pushed the
    victim away by the throat when she bit his penis while
    performing oral sex. As noted above, he pleaded guilty to
    “knowingly” impeding her airway. Thus, his plea indicated
    that he did not merely react, but purposely pushed her hard
    in the neck. According to IRVIN his action was because the
    sexual encounter he was having did not go as he expected.
    Reacting with violence during a sex act also raises the types
    of concerns that can properly be addressed in SOTP. The
    ALJ finds that even under IRVIN’s version of events (as
    modified by his guilty plea), he should still be required to
    take SOTP.
    On July 28, Irvin appealed the ALJ’s determination to the warden
    by completing the SOTP appeal form. See Iowa Code § 903A.3(2) (“The
    8
    orders of the administrative law judge are subject to appeal to the
    superintendent or warden of the institution, . . . who may either affirm,
    modify, remand for correction of procedural errors, or reverse an order.”).
    Irvin claimed the SOTP classification violated his procedural due process
    rights. On August 4, the warden affirmed the decision of the ALJ, ruling
    due process had been followed and the ALJ “considered [Irvin’s]
    statement and the evidence when making this decision.”
    Irvin filed an application for postconviction relief under Iowa Code
    section 822.2(1)(f) and (g) in the Iowa district court. Irvin claimed he was
    denied due process and equal protection of the law because the ALJ
    relied on the unproven factual allegations.            The district court held a
    hearing on April 15, 2015. On May 20, the district court found that it
    was error for the ALJ to rely on “unadmitted minutes of testimony and
    police reports in making its recommendation.” The district court relied
    on the unpublished decision of Lindsey, in which a divided Iowa Court of
    Appeals concluded the IDOC lacked authority to rely on unproven facts
    to require participation in SOTP. 
    2015 WL 568560
    , at *5. In addition,
    the district court relied on In re Detention of Stenzel, 
    827 N.W.2d 690
    ,
    708–10 (Iowa 2013), which disallowed expert testimony in a district court
    civil commitment trial when the expert relied on unproven facts in the
    minutes of testimony to support his opinion that the individual was a
    sexually violent predator. The district court concluded because the IDOC
    had   improperly     relied   on   the       minutes   in   making   the   initial
    recommendation, “[n]o hearing should have occurred in the first place.”
    The IDOC sought a writ of certiorari, which we granted.                 We
    retained the case.
    9
    II. Standard of Review.
    “We normally review certiorari actions for correction of errors at
    law.”    State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    801 N.W.2d 513
    , 517 (Iowa 2011).
    “Generally, postconviction relief proceedings are reviewed for correction
    of errors at law.” 
    Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 477
    . “We review questions of
    statutory construction, including . . . the proper interpretation of Iowa
    Code section 903A.2, for errors at law.”        
    Id. We review
    de novo the
    evidence relevant to a constitutional claim. Iowa Dist. 
    Ct., 801 N.W.2d at 517
    .
    III. Analysis.
    We must decide two related questions: (1) whether the IDOC
    properly relied on the victim’s detailed statement to initially refer Irvin for
    SOTP; and (2) whether the IDOC properly required Irvin’s participation in
    SOTP based on the ALJ’s finding that he admitted at his evidentiary
    hearing to assaulting his girlfriend during a sex act and based on the
    victim’s statement, police report, and Irvin’s guilty plea. We first address
    the IDOC’s broad discretion to refer inmates to SOTP and require their
    participation.   We next review the permissible uses by the IDOC of a
    victim’s statement in a police report.        We conclude that the IDOC
    properly rejected Irvin’s challenges to his initial referral to SOTP and the
    decision to mandate his participation following an evidentiary hearing.
    A. The IDOC’s Broad Discretion to Require SOTP. “SOTP was
    established for bona fide rehabilitative purposes.” 
    Id. at 519.
    There is a high rate of recidivism among untreated sex
    offenders and a broad range of agreement among therapists
    and correctional officers that clinical rehabilitation programs
    “can enable sex offenders to manage their impulses and in
    this way reduce recidivism.”
    10
    
    Id. at 519
    (quoting McKune v. Lile, 
    536 U.S. 24
    , 33, 
    122 S. Ct. 2017
    ,
    2024, 
    153 L. Ed. 2d 47
    , 56–57 (2002)).
    Iowa Code chapter 903A allows an inmate to “earn a reduction of
    sentence” based on good conduct and satisfactory participation in
    treatment programs identified by the IDOC director:
    An inmate of an institution under the control of the
    department of corrections . . . is eligible for a reduction of
    sentence equal to one and two-tenths days for each day the
    inmate demonstrates good conduct and satisfactorily
    participates in any program or placement status identified by
    the director to earn the reduction. The programs include but
    are not limited to the following:
    ....
    (4) A treatment program established by the director.
    Iowa Code § 903A.2(1)(a)(4).     Sex offender treatment is specifically
    addressed as follows: “However, an inmate required to participate in a
    sex offender treatment program shall not be eligible for a reduction of
    sentence unless the inmate participates in and completes a sex offender
    treatment program established by the director.” 
    Id. § 903A.2(1)(a).
    An
    inmate who fails to participate in sex offender treatment required by the
    IDOC risks losing his or her ability to obtain an earlier release from
    prison by accumulating earned time.
    Iowa Code section 903A.4 authorizes the IDOC to develop policies
    and procedures to implement these treatment programs with earned-
    time incentives:
    The director of the Iowa department of corrections
    shall develop policy and procedural rules to implement
    sections 903A.1 through 903A.3. The rules may specify
    disciplinary offenses which may result in the loss of earned
    time, and the amount of earned time which may be lost as a
    result of each disciplinary offense.      The director shall
    establish rules as to what constitutes “satisfactory
    participation” for purposes of a reduction of sentence under
    section 903A.2, for programs that are available or
    unavailable.
    11
    (Emphasis added.)
    The IDOC promulgated a policy that requires the department to
    review and refer offenders to the SOTP director who “are not incarcerated
    for a Sex Crime but have a sexual component to their crime.” Iowa Dep’t
    of Corr., Policy & Procedure, Sex Offender Program Referrals, OP–SOP–08
    (2014).   The director then reviews the “current conviction and
    circumstances     of    [the]   offense”    as   well    as   the   “minutes   of
    testimony/court        documents”    and     “prior     arrests/convictions”   to
    determine whether he or she will refer an offender to SOTP. 
    Id. From there,
    if the inmate has not been convicted of a sex offense, the matter
    proceeds to a hearing before an ALJ.                  If the ALJ upholds the
    classification requiring SOTP, the “inmate will no longer accrue any
    earned time after refusing to attend SOTP, but will not lose any
    previously accrued earned time.” 
    Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 478
    .
    The “legislative purpose of earned-time credits . . . is to encourage
    prisoners to follow prison rules and participate in rehabilitative
    programs.” Kolzow v. State, 
    813 N.W.2d 731
    , 738 (Iowa 2012). “[C]ourts
    are obliged to grant prison officials a wide berth in the execution of
    policies and practices needed to maintain prison discipline and security.”
    Office of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Edwards, 
    825 N.W.2d 8
    , 14 (Iowa
    2012) (quoting Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v. Grossheim, 
    498 N.W.2d 405
    , 407 (Iowa 1993)). We addressed the IDOC’s “broad discretion” to
    require SOTP for inmates convicted of nonsex offenses in 
    Dykstra. 783 N.W.2d at 479
    . John Dykstra pled guilty to a charge of simple assault
    after he was initially charged with third-degree sexual abuse. 
    Id. at 476.
    The IDOC recommended Dykstra participate in SOTP based on the
    circumstances underlying the assault, as gleaned from the minutes of
    testimony attached to the charging information.            
    Id. Because Dykstra
                                        12
    refused to attend SOTP, the IDOC determined he was no longer eligible to
    receive earned-time credit. 
    Id. at 477.
    Dykstra argued the IDOC lacked
    authority to require SOTP because he was not convicted of a sex offense.
    We disagreed, noting that “[t]he statute does not set criteria for which
    inmates will be ‘required to participate.’ ”    
    Id. at 478–79
    (quoting Iowa
    Code § 903A.2). We elaborated,
    The broad discretion granted to IDOC does not limit
    application of section 903A.2 to inmates serving sentences
    for particular crimes or crimes labeled as “sex offenses.”
    There is no statutory limitation that would prevent IDOC
    from recommending SOTP for an inmate convicted of a crime
    that is not facially considered a sex offense where the factual
    circumstances of the crime are of a sexual nature.
    
    Id. at 479.
    We held that the IDOC had authority to stop all accrual of
    earned time for refusal to participate in SOTP, even on sentences that
    were not served for a sex-offense conviction. 
    Id. (“Section 903A.2
    does
    not require that the ‘sentence’ be one connected to the reason IDOC has
    required the inmate to attend SOTP.”).         Thus, so long as SOTP was
    related to a “problem currently suffered” by the offender, the IDOC had
    statutory authority to require SOTP and halt the accrual of earned time.
    
    Id. at 479–80
    (quoting State v. Valin, 
    724 N.W.2d 440
    , 447 (Iowa 2006)).
    We   emphasized     in   Dykstra   that   the   IDOC’s   classification
    procedures must satisfy the Due Process Clauses of the Iowa and Federal
    Constitutions.   See 
    id. at 483.
      We acknowledged a liberty interest at
    stake in the initial SOTP classification because of “[t]he stigmatizing
    consequence of being labeled as a sex offender, the mandatory behavior
    modification treatment, and the revocation of the inmate’s ability to earn
    any time should he refuse to participate.” 
    Id. We adopted
    the procedural
    protections set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 
    94 S. Ct. 2963
    ,
    13
    
    41 L. Ed. 2d 935
    (1974), as a prerequisite for mandating SOTP. 
    Id. at 482.
    In Wolff, the Supreme Court evaluated what process was due in a
    proceeding to forfeit an inmate’s good-time 
    credits. 418 U.S. at 563
    –71,
    94 S. Ct. at 
    2978–82, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 955
    –59.               In Dykstra, we
    summarized the Wolff requirements as follows:
    (1) advance written notice of the claimed violation, (2) a
    written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied
    upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken, (3) a
    hearing, at which the inmate must be allowed to call
    witnesses and present documentary evidence, as long as it
    would not be unduly hazardous, and (4) a sufficiently
    impartial 
    decisionmaker. 783 N.W.2d at 482
    . We concluded the due process required by Wolff was
    satisfied when the inmate had been tried and convicted of a sex offense.
    
    Id. at 484;
    see also Holm v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    767 N.W.2d 409
    , 418 (Iowa
    2009) (concluding mandatory SOTP did not violate due process when
    inmate was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse).            However, for
    inmates who were not convicted of a sex crime, the IDOC must satisfy
    the Wolff procedural safeguards. 
    Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 484
    . We held
    the IDOC violated Dykstra’s due process rights by requiring his
    participation in SOTP based on “unadmitted factual allegations that did
    not result in a sex-offense conviction” without the required procedural
    safeguards.   
    Id. at 483.
       Specifically, Dykstra was not provided with
    “advance written notice, a written statement of reasons and findings by
    the factfinder, and a neutral factfinder.” 
    Id. 1 1We
     applied Dykstra in the companion cases of Reilly v. Iowa District
    Court, 
    783 N.W.2d 490
    (Iowa 2010), and Waters v. Iowa District Court, 
    783 N.W.2d 487
    (Iowa 2010). In Waters, we held that an inmate could be classified
    for SOTP even though at the time of classification he was only serving a
    sentence for operating while intoxicated (OWI) because he had “entered prison
    to serve two sentences: the five-year OWI sentence and a two-year sentence for
    14
    In contrast, Irvin was provided with the procedural protections
    required by Dykstra. See 
    id. Therefore, we
    turn to whether the IDOC
    may rely on the victim’s detailed statement in the police report to initially
    classify Irvin for SOTP and in the subsequent review by the ALJ.
    B. The IDOC’s Use of the Victim’s Statement.                   The district
    court, citing Lindsey, ruled the IDOC erroneously relied on unproven
    facts in the minutes of testimony when initially referring Irvin to SOTP.
    Donzell Lindsey was originally charged with first-degree burglary,
    domestic assault, and third-degree sexual abuse.                  Lindsey, 
    2015 WL 568560
    , at *1. He pled guilty under a plea agreement to domestic
    abuse and burglary, with the sexual abuse charge dismissed. 
    Id. The IDOC
    classified Lindsey for SOTP, concluding there was a “sexual
    component” to his crimes based on the facts alleged in the minutes of
    testimony. 
    Id. The district
    court vacated that decision and ordered the
    IDOC to restore his earned time.          
    Id. A panel
    of the court of appeals
    affirmed over the dissent of one judge. 
    Id. at *6.
    The majority held the
    IDOC lacked the authority to rely on the minutes of testimony when
    classifying    offenders,   stating,    “Dykstra does    not     extend   [IDOC’s]
    authority     to   promulgation    of   policies   and   rules    permitting   the
    consideration of unproven and unadmitted ‘facts.’ ”              
    Id. at *3.
       The
    _________________________
    assault with intent to commit sexual 
    abuse.” 783 N.W.2d at 489
    . In Reilly, we
    determined that removing an inmate from SOTP implicated a similar liberty
    interest—the right to accrue earned 
    time. 783 N.W.2d at 495
    . However, we
    gave less weight to the inmate’s liberty interest because removal was “a
    discretionary decision by prison officials . . . whereas the initial inmate
    classification addressed in Dykstra amounts to a specific factual determination
    that the inmate has engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior.” 
    Id. at 496.
    We decided that when “the inquiry draws more on the experience of prison
    administrators,” rather than “the search for specific facts,” “the full panoply of
    protections that would accompany a formal hearing” were unnecessary. 
    Id. at 496–97
    (first quoting Wilkinson v. Austin, 
    545 U.S. 209
    , 228–29, 
    125 S. Ct. 2384
    , 2397, 
    162 L. Ed. 2d 174
    , 193 (2005)).
    15
    majority observed that “even district courts may not rely on these types
    of ‘facts’ ” and pointed to decisions excluding the minutes from
    consideration in sentencing decisions. 
    Id. at *4.
    The dissenting judge
    stated, “I would conclude IDOC can rely on unadmitted-to facts when
    initially referring an inmate to SOTP, but, then, due process requires a
    hearing before an independent factfinder before participation in SOTP is
    required.” 
    Id. at *6
    (Vogel, P.J., dissenting). We now hold the IDOC’s use
    of the victim’s statement quoted in the police report did not exceed its
    statutory authority or violate Irvin’s due process rights.
    The court of appeals majority in Lindsey, and the district court in
    this case, erred by concluding the limitations on a district court’s use of
    minutes at trial or sentencing precluded an IDOC ALJ from relying on a
    detailed victim’s statement that happened to be attached to the minutes.
    The formal rules of evidence that govern trials in district court do not
    apply to hearings before an IDOC ALJ. See 
    Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 485
    (“Prison proceedings ‘are sui generis, governed by neither the evidentiary
    rules of a civil trial, a criminal trial, nor an administrative hearing. The
    only limitations appear to be those imposed by due process, a statute, or
    administrative regulations.’ ” (quoting 2 Michael B. Mushlin, Rights of
    Prisoners § 9.20, at 208 (3d ed. 2002))); see also 
    Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556
    ,
    94 S. Ct. at 
    2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951
    (“Prison disciplinary proceedings
    are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due
    a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”); Dailey v. Neb. Dep’t of
    Corr. Servs., 
    578 N.W.2d 869
    , 874 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he weight of
    authority in both federal and state cases is that the [formal] rules of
    evidence do not apply” in prison discipline proceedings.).      Indeed, we
    have affirmed prison discipline decisions that were based on hearsay in
    written reports of confidential informants. See, e.g., James v. State, 541
    
    16 N.W.2d 864
    , 874 (Iowa 1995). “Under the ‘some evidence’ standard, ‘the
    relevant [legal] question is whether there is any evidence in the record’
    that could support the committee’s decision.” 
    Id. (alterations in
    original)
    (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 
    472 U.S. 445
    , 455–56, 
    105 S. Ct. 2768
    ,
    2774, 
    86 L. Ed. 2d 356
    , 365 (1985)).
    The minutes of testimony set forth the factual circumstances
    giving rise to the charges against Irvin.        See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.5(3)
    (providing minutes shall contain “the name and occupation of each
    witness upon whose expected testimony the information is based, and a
    full and fair statement of the witness’ expected testimony”).           Minutes
    must “be approved by a district judge” who finds that the evidence
    contained in the minutes, “if unexplained, would warrant a conviction by
    the trial jury.” 
    Id. r. 2.5(4).
    The minutes provide a description, both to
    the reviewing judge and to the offender, of the circumstances alleged by
    the State to support the charge.
    Use of minutes of testimony is limited in district court.        District
    courts are not permitted to consider “additional, unproven, and
    unprosecuted charges” during sentencing, unless “the facts before the
    court show defendant committed those offenses or they are admitted by
    him.”    State v. Messer, 
    306 N.W.2d 731
    , 733 (Iowa 1981). 2           Similarly,
    2Nonetheless, facts set forth in the minutes can be relied upon in district
    court in certain instances. Courts may refer to the minutes of testimony to find
    a factual basis for a guilty plea. State v. Finney, 
    834 N.W.2d 46
    , 57 (Iowa 2013)
    (assessing whether counsel had been ineffective in allowing defendant to plead
    guilty and relying on the “entire record,” including evidence provided in
    minutes). District courts may rely on the charging documents of unprosecuted
    offenses in determining conditions of release, in which “the nature and
    circumstances of the offense charged” is the first factor the statute instructs
    courts to consider. See Iowa Code § 811.2(2); State v. Fenton, 
    170 N.W.2d 678
    ,
    679 (Iowa 1969) (setting bail based on defendant’s criminal history and “county
    attorney’s information” charging defendant with rape). At probation revocation
    hearings, we allow charged, but unconvicted, offenses to serve as the basis for
    17
    minutes of testimony “are not evidence” at trial. State v. De Bont, 
    223 Iowa 721
    , 723, 
    273 N.W. 873
    , 874 (1937).
    In Stenzel, when reviewing an appeal from a judgment committing
    the defendant as a sexually violent predator (SVP), we found expert
    testimony based on unproven facts in the minutes inadmissible as more
    prejudicial than 
    probative. 827 N.W.2d at 710
    . Because the minutes are
    “a statement of what the prosecution expected (at one point) to prove,” we
    “question[ed] the basic fairness of the State’s using materials that it
    generated exclusively to prosecute Stenzel criminally as a factual ground
    for committing him as an SVP at the conclusion of his sentence.”         
    Id. Stenzel applied
    the rules of evidence governing trials in district court.
    Stenzel is distinguishable from the present case because it was not a
    prison classification proceeding, but a formal trial to determine whether
    the defendant would be civilly committed at the conclusion of his prison
    sentence. See 
    id. at 692.
    Stenzel is further distinguishable because here
    the IDOC and ALJ relied upon the victim’s statement, not the allegations
    as drafted by a prosecutor.
    The district court misapplied Stenzel to the IDOC proceedings, in
    which use of hearsay is permitted. See Wilson v. Farrier, 
    372 N.W.2d 499
    , 502 (Iowa 1985) (affirming prison-discipline decision that relied on
    informant’s confidential statement). Here, we must decide whether this
    detailed victim’s statement, quoted in the police report, may be used to
    support the IDOC classification. We conclude the IDOC did not err in
    relying on the victim’s statement, either in its initial referral to SOTP or
    _________________________
    revocation when the State can show the defendant violated the law by a
    preponderance of the evidence. Rheuport v. State, 
    238 N.W.2d 770
    , 772 (Iowa
    1976).
    18
    in the ALJ’s decision to require participation. We address each phase in
    turn.
    1. The IDOC’s initial referral to SOTP. First, we conclude the IDOC
    may rely on a victim’s account in a police report prepared nearly
    contemporaneously with the incident in classifying inmates for SOTP.
    The IDOC’s initial classification is just that—initial. No earned time is
    withheld for lack of participation by an inmate who was not convicted of
    a sex offense unless and until the inmate is provided with the Wolff due
    process protections, including an evidentiary hearing before an ALJ.
    It is instructive to contrast the requirements for SOTP in Iowa Code
    section     903A.4   to    the   statutory    requirements       for   sex       offender
    registration. Iowa Code section 692A.103 requires a person to register as
    a sex offender if the person has been convicted of a “tier I, tier II, or tier
    III offense.” For certain offenses, the legislature has expressly required a
    factual determination that the offense was “sexually motivated” in order
    to qualify as a tier I, II, or III offense.                See, e.g., Iowa Code
    § 692A.102(1)(c)(19).     “Sexually motivated” means “one of the purposes
    for commission of a crime is the purpose of sexual gratification of the
    perpetrator of the crime.”       
    Id. § 229A.2(9);
    see also 
    id. § 692A.101(29).
    For certain convictions occurring after July 1, 2009, the statute
    expressly    provides     that   a   judge    or   jury   must    make       a    factual
    determination “beyond a reasonable doubt” that an offense was sexually
    motivated in order to require an individual to register. 
    Id. § 692A.126(1).
    No analogous requirements exist for SOTP.            Nowhere in chapter
    903A does the legislature require a judge or jury to make a factual
    finding that an offense was sexually motivated to refer an inmate to
    SOTP.     “[L]egislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by
    inclusion of statutory terms.” Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank,
    19
    
    808 N.W.2d 186
    , 193 (Iowa 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
    Freedom Fin. Bank v. Estate of Boesen, 
    805 N.W.2d 802
    , 812 (Iowa
    2011)). When the legislature selectively places language in one section
    and avoids it in another, we presume it did so intentionally. 
    Id. That the
    legislature expressly required a judge or jury to find sexual motivation
    beyond a reasonable doubt in chapter 692A but omitted such a
    requirement in chapter 903A tells us the legislature intended to allow the
    IDOC discretion to refer an inmate to SOTP without that level of proof.
    See 
    Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 484
    –85 (“We note . . . the standard for prison
    administrative decisions is ‘some evidence’ as opposed to the ‘beyond a
    reasonable doubt’ required in criminal trials.”); see also 
    Wilson, 372 N.W.2d at 501
    (“We hold that the requirements of due process are
    satisfied if some evidence supports the decisions by the prison
    disciplinary board to revoke good time credits.”).
    Practical concerns also support allowing IDOC to refer to factual
    accounts such as victim statements in police reports when making its
    initial classification.   Most criminal charges are resolved through plea
    bargains. 3   The sex abuse charges may be dismissed to secure a
    conviction on lesser assault charges, as happened here. The IDOC and
    ALJ lacked access to sealed deposition transcripts and Irvin did not
    provide them.     Inmates who need treatment would avoid SOTP if the
    information in the victim’s statement could not be used to trigger an
    evidentiary hearing. We conclude that the IDOC may refer an offender
    for SOTP based on a victim’s detailed account in a police report.
    3“An  estimated ninety-five percent of convictions are secured through the
    plea-bargaining process.” State v. Lopez, 
    872 N.W.2d 159
    , 161 n.1 (Iowa 2015)
    (quoting State v. Fannon, 
    799 N.W.2d 515
    , 520 n.2 (Iowa 2011)).
    20
    2. The ALJ’s determination requiring SOTP. We next address Irvin’s
    hearing before the IDOC ALJ. An ALJ in a prison disciplinary proceeding
    is an independent, impartial adjudicator. See 
    Edwards, 825 N.W.2d at 16
    –17 (noting IDOC ALJs report to and are supervised by the IDOC’s
    general counsel rather than the warden).           An ALJ’s decision in a
    disciplinary proceeding affecting earned-time credits will be affirmed so
    long as there is “some evidence” in the record to support it. Backstrom v.
    Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    508 N.W.2d 705
    , 710–11 (Iowa 1993) (“We further believe
    the federal constitution requires only that state prison disciplinary
    officials apply a ‘some evidence’ standard in their initial determination of
    disciplinary proceedings.”).
    In Hill, inmates challenged the decision of a prison disciplinary
    board finding them guilty of violating a prison rule prohibiting assault
    and revoking good-time 
    credits. 472 U.S. at 448
    , 105 S. Ct. at 
    2770, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 360
    . The Massachusetts Supreme Court, “[w]ithout deciding
    whether the appropriate standard of review [was] ‘some evidence’ or the
    stricter test of ‘substantial evidence,’ ” overturned the disciplinary court’s
    decision, finding the record failed to present even “some evidence . . .
    [that] would rationally permit the board’s findings.” 
    Id. at 449,
    105 S. Ct.
    at 
    2770, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 360
    (quoting Hill v. Superintendent, 
    466 N.E.2d 818
    , 822 (Mass. 1984)).        The United States Supreme Court addressed
    whether the “findings of a prison disciplinary board that result in the
    loss of good time credits must be supported by a certain amount of
    evidence in order to satisfy due process.” 
    Id. at 453,
    105 S. Ct. at 
    2773, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 363
    .    The Court noted its prior cases failed to specify
    what “quantum of evidence” was required “to support the factfinder’s
    decision” in a prison disciplinary proceeding. 
    Id. at 454,
    105 S. Ct. at
    
    2773, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 364
    .
    21
    The Hill Court determined that the “requirements of due process
    are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the disciplinary
    board to revoke good time credits.” 
    Id. at 455,
    105 S. Ct. at 
    2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 365
    .    The Court “decline[d] to adopt a more stringent
    evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement,” reasoning,
    Prison disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly
    charged atmosphere, and prison administrators must often
    act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient
    in less exigent circumstances. The fundamental fairness
    guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require
    courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that
    have some basis in fact. Revocation of good time credits is
    not comparable to a criminal conviction, and neither the
    amount of evidence necessary to support such a conviction,
    nor any other standard greater than some evidence applies
    in this context.
    
    Id. at 456,
    105 S. Ct. at 
    2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 365
    (citations omitted).
    The Court determined the “some evidence” standard would “prevent
    arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or
    imposing undue administrative burdens.” 
    Id. at 455,
    105 S. Ct. at 
    2774, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 364
    . Under this standard, the Court concluded that the
    prison board had been presented with sufficient evidence to find the
    inmates violated the disciplinary rule and revoke good-time credits. 
    Id. at 456,
    105 S. Ct. at 
    2774–75, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 365
    . The Court based its
    holding on testimony from the prison guard and evidence that no other
    inmates were in the area at the time of the assault. 
    Id. In Farrier,
    we adopted the “some evidence” standard as the
    appropriate    standard   of   judicial   review    for   prison   disciplinary
    
    proceedings. 372 N.W.2d at 501
    –02.              An inmate charged with
    committing a murder during an uprising inside the Iowa State
    Penitentiary was acquitted in his district court criminal trial. 
    Id. at 500.
    The prison disciplinary board, however, found him guilty of the offense
    22
    and forfeited all of his earned time. 
    Id. We adopted
    the “some evidence”
    standard followed by the Supreme Court and federal circuits and upheld
    the committee’s sanction. 
    Id. at 502.
    Eight years later, in Backstrom, we concluded the “some evidence”
    standard applied to an IDOC ALJ’s factual 
    findings. 508 N.W.2d at 710
    .
    An inmate challenged a disciplinary committee’s determination that he
    smuggled alcohol into the prison. 
    Id. at 708.
    The disciplinary report was
    based on testimony from a confidential informant.        
    Id. We concluded
    that the Supreme Court’s language in Hill “clearly refer[red] to the level of
    evidence used by prison administrators in their factual determinations,”
    not merely on judicial review. 
    Id. at 711.
    “Although the ‘some evidence’
    standard may seem harsh,” we noted it was sufficient to protect
    prisoners from retaliatory treatment.      
    Id. Under that
    standard, we
    decided the ALJ had properly found Backstrom guilty of the offense. 
    Id. We reaffirmed
    application of the “some evidence” standard a year later in
    Marshall v. State, 
    524 N.W.2d 150
    , 152 (Iowa 1994) (per curiam). Today,
    we reaffirm that the “some evidence” standard applies to making and
    reviewing factual findings in prison proceedings, including SOTP
    classification hearings.
    “The threshold for determining whether some evidence exists is
    low”; it can be satisfied by relying on hearsay statements, such as
    statements from officers or confidential informants.      Johnson v. State,
    
    542 N.W.2d 1
    , 2 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995); see Mahers v. State, 
    437 N.W.2d 565
    , 569–70 (Iowa 1989) (relying on a report from a correctional officer);
    
    Farrier, 372 N.W.2d at 502
    (relying on statement from confidential
    informant).   Still, the “some evidence” standard is not without teeth.
    When officials use hearsay statements from a confidential informant to
    meet the “some evidence” standard, the inmate’s “interest in a fair
    23
    hearing requires that there be some indication of the confidential
    informant’s reliability.” 
    James, 479 N.W.2d at 291
    . Specifically, “there
    must be sufficient information in the record to convince a reviewing
    authority that the [decision-maker] undertook such inquiry and correctly
    concluded that the confidential information was credible and reliable.”
    
    Id. We have
    recognized this standard can be satisfied by in camera
    review of material documenting credibility or corroboration with other
    statements or evidence. See 
    id. at 292
    (concluding informants reliable
    because they incriminated themselves by providing information, and
    other evidence corroborated their account); 
    Farrier, 372 N.W.2d at 502
    –
    03 (concluding informant was credible based on examination of
    documents in camera). We have also found the standard satisfied when a
    court determined “the confidential information contain[ed] a great many
    details . . . [, and t]here appear[ed] to be no bias motivating the source.”
    Key v. State, 
    577 N.W.2d 637
    , 641 (Iowa 1998). Our precedent allows an
    IDOC ALJ to rely on hearsay reports of confidential informants so long as
    there is an indicia of reliability such that the ALJ can determine the
    information is reliable and credible.    The same requirement applies to
    victim statements.
    We conclude that if the ALJ determines the victim’s statement from
    the underlying assault case to be reliable and credible, it may be used to
    satisfy the “some evidence” standard to classify the inmate for SOTP.
    See Gwinn v. Awmiller, 
    354 F.3d 1211
    , 1219, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004)
    (rejecting inmate’s challenge to his classification as a sex offender by
    hearing panel that “relied on a detailed written account from the victim of
    the alleged sexual assault” denied by the inmate); Vondra v. Colo. Dep’t of
    Corr., 
    226 P.3d 1165
    , 1169–70 (Colo. App. 2009) (affirming prison
    hearing panel’s determination requiring sex offender treatment based on
    24
    police reports and victim’s statements after offender was provided Wolff
    due process protections).       An ALJ may also use the inmate’s own
    testimony in the hearing, alone or as corroboration with the detailed
    victim statement, to decide whether SOTP should be required.
    We conclude the statement of Irvin’s victim bears a sufficient
    indicia of reliability. A police officer took the victim’s statement in Irvin’s
    underlying assault case on the morning after the incident; thus, it was a
    near-contemporaneous factual account of the events while the victim’s
    memory was fresh. It is a crime to file a false report with a police officer.
    See Iowa Code § 718.6(1) (“A person who reports or causes to be reported
    false information to . . . a law enforcement authority . . . knowing that
    the information is false . . . commits a serious misdemeanor . . . .”); 
    id. § 903.1
    (stating serious misdemeanors are punishable by a fine of at
    least $315 and imprisonment of up to a year).
    Police reporting documents such as citations have been relied
    upon in contested case administrative proceedings. Gaskey v. Iowa Dep’t
    of Transp., 
    537 N.W.2d 695
    , 696 (Iowa 1995) (relying upon “[t]he implied
    consent form, the notice of revocation, the request for hearing, a stay
    order, a computer printout of Gaskey’s driving record, and a copy of the
    citation issued to Gaskey” in license revocation proceeding before ALJ);
    see also Schmitz v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 
    461 N.W.2d 603
    , 607–08
    (Iowa    Ct.   App.   1990)   (discussing   use   of   hearsay   evidence   in
    administrative hearings). Iowa Code chapter 17A provides,
    A finding shall be based upon the kind of evidence on which
    reasonably prudent persons are accustomed to rely for the
    conduct of their serious affairs, and may be based upon
    such evidence even if it would be inadmissible in a jury trial.
    Iowa Code § 17A.14(1); see also 
    Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 482
    (“Generally,
    a person has a constitutional due process right to an evidentiary hearing
    25
    in accordance with contested case procedures . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
    (quoting Brummer v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 
    661 N.W.2d 167
    , 172 (Iowa
    2003))). Irvin does not contend the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act
    governs our review.   Nevertheless, we conclude this victim’s statement
    would be sufficiently credible and reliable to support the IDOC ALJ’s
    findings under section 17A.14(1) as well as the “some evidence”
    standard.
    Moreover, Irvin’s testimony at the hearing corroborated the victim’s
    statement. Irvin admitted during the hearing that he pushed the victim
    away by the throat after she did not perform oral sex in the way that he
    expected.   Irvin also testified at the hearing that the victim would not
    have to “fabricate a story if she wanted him to leave,” supporting the
    victim’s credibility. The ALJ properly relied on the victim’s statement set
    forth in the police report together with Irvin’s admissions and guilty plea,
    in which he acknowledged “knowingly” impeding his victim’s ability to
    breathe. We review that decision under the governing “some evidence”
    standard and uphold the ALJ’s factual findings that are supported by
    “any” evidence in the record. 
    Key, 577 N.W.2d at 641
    . Applying that
    standard of review here, we uphold the ALJ’s finding of a sexual
    component to Irvin’s assault conviction.
    For all these reasons, we reject the reasoning in Lindsey. We hold
    the ALJ properly relied on the victim’s detailed statement and Irvin’s own
    testimony and guilty plea to require Irvin to complete SOTP. The IDOC
    properly upheld the ALJ’s decision. The district court erred by reversing
    the IDOC’s determination.
    C. Irvin’s Due Process Claim. We next address whether the use
    of the victim’s statement to classify an offender for SOTP violates due
    process. “Procedural due process ‘act[s] as a constraint on government
    26
    action that infringes upon an individual’s liberty interest, such as the
    freedom from physical restraint.’ ”      
    Holm, 767 N.W.2d at 417
    (quoting
    State v. Seering, 
    701 N.W.2d 655
    , 662 (Iowa 2005)). However,
    [p]risoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty
    curtailed by definition, so the procedural protections to
    which they are entitled are more limited than in cases where
    the right at stake is the right to be free from confinement at
    all.
    
    Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225
    , 125 S. Ct. at 
    2395, 162 L. Ed. 2d at 191
    ; see
    also 
    Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556
    , 94 S. Ct. at 
    2975, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951
    (“[T]he
    fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way
    implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the
    nature of the regime to which they have been lawfully committed.”).
    “[T]he first step in any procedural due process inquiry is the
    determination of ‘whether a protected liberty or property interest is
    involved.’ ” 
    Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 480
    (quoting 
    Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665
    ).    If a liberty interest is involved, we analyze the following three
    factors:
    First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
    action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
    interest through the procedures used, and the probable
    value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
    safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including
    the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
    burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
    requirement[s] would entail.
    
    Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665
    (quoting Bowers v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of
    Supervisors, 
    638 N.W.2d 682
    , 691 (Iowa 2002)).
    Irvin argues that IDOC failed to provide due process for the initial
    SOTP classification because the IDOC relied on the victim’s statement in
    its recommendation to the ALJ.         In Dykstra, we recognized a liberty
    interest in the classification for SOTP based on the stigmatizing
    27
    consequence of being labeled a sex offender, the mandatory treatment,
    and the revocation of earned time. 
    Dykstra, 783 N.W.2d at 481
    . We also
    observed that when a factual inquiry outside “the face of the conviction”
    of the crime is necessary, “resort to some tribunal must be available to
    resolve disputes.” 
    Id. (quoting Kruse
    v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 
    712 N.W.2d 695
    ,
    700–01 (Iowa 2006)) (observing that to comply with due process tribunal
    must be available to resolve whether assault conviction required offender
    to register); 
    Brummer, 661 N.W.2d at 172
    (stating, if proceeding involves
    “adjudicative facts” particular to the parties, an evidentiary hearing is
    necessary). In Dykstra, the initial decision made by the IDOC regarding
    SOTP was also the final classification 
    determination. 783 N.W.2d at 482
    –83. Not so with Irvin. Rather, Irvin’s initial classification began the
    process.   Irvin was then provided the opportunity to challenge that
    classification through an evidentiary hearing.
    The IDOC has a significant interest in rehabilitating sex offenders
    before their release. See McKune, 536 U.S at 
    32–33, 122 S. Ct. at 2024
    ,
    153 L. Ed. 2d at 56–57. In Wolff, the Supreme Court stressed that for
    due process in prison discipline cases, “there must be mutual
    accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the
    provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.” 418 U.S.
    at 
    556, 94 S. Ct. at 2975
    , 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951.
    [T]here would be great unwisdom in encasing the
    disciplinary procedures in an inflexible constitutional
    straitjacket that would necessarily call for adversary
    proceedings typical of a criminal trial, very likely to raise the
    level of confrontation between staff and inmate, and make
    more difficult the utilization of the disciplinary process as a
    tool to advance the rehabilitative goals of the institution.
    28
    
    Id. at 563,
    94 S. Ct. at 
    2978, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 955
    . Irvin’s due process
    claim fails because the IDOC complied with the Wolff requirements. 
    Id. at 763–71,
    94 S. Ct. at 
    2978–82, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 955
    –59.
    In Gwinn, a case directly on point, the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment dismissing
    an inmate’s due process claims against Colorado correctional 
    officials. 354 F.3d at 1221
    . The inmate in state court initially was charged with
    sexual assault, but that charge was dropped in a plea bargain resulting
    in his conviction for robbery.    
    Id. at 1217.
      The presentence report
    included the victim’s detailed written account of the sexual assault. 
    Id. at 1217,
    1219. The inmate was provided a hearing consistent with Wolff.
    
    Id. at 1218–19.
    He submitted a written denial of the victim’s allegations.
    
    Id. at 1219.
    The prison hearing panel upheld his classification requiring
    treatment based on the victim’s statement. 
    Id. The federal
    district court
    upheld the classification and dismissed the inmate’s due process claims.
    
    Id. at 1221.
    The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding the inmate “received
    the procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause” because
    he “was afforded notice of the evidence against him and an opportunity
    to present evidence in his own behalf, and he received a written
    decision.” 
    Id. We reach
    the same conclusion as to Irvin.
    Irvin received advance notice of his hearing before the ALJ. At the
    hearing, he presented a factual statement signed by him, caselaw
    supporting his position, and documents from his underlying trial.      He
    was allowed to testify.   The ALJ was impartial.      See 
    Edwards, 825 N.W.2d at 16
    . The ALJ could find and did find Irvin’s version of events
    not credible in light of Irvin’s admissions and the victim’s detailed
    statement.   The ALJ relied on Irvin’s own admissions and testimony
    rather than relying solely on unadmitted factual allegations. The ALJ’s
    29
    factual findings of a sexual component to Irvin’s assault are clearly
    supported by “some evidence.”      See 
    Key, 577 N.W.2d at 641
    (“On
    appellate review of a prisoner’s challenge to the evidentiary support of a
    disciplinary matter, we ask whether the committee had ‘some evidence’
    to support its decision.” (quoting 
    Backstrom, 508 N.W.2d at 709
    ). After
    the hearing, Irvin received a written decision from the ALJ detailing the
    reasons for the classification and was allowed to appeal that decision to
    the warden. We conclude Irvin received the due process to which he was
    entitled under Dykstra.
    IV. Disposition.
    For those reasons, we sustain the writ, vacate the district court’s
    ruling, and remand this case with instructions to reinstate the IDOC’s
    determination requiring SOTP for Irvin.
    WRIT SUSTAINED AND CASE REMANDED.