Amended November 29, 2016 State of Iowa v. Patrick Daniel White ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 14–2104
Filed November 18, 2016
Amended November 29, 2016
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
PATRICK DANIEL WHITE,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County,
Marsha A. Bergan, Judge.
The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
Davis L. Foster of Foster Law Office, P.C., Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant
Attorney General, Janet M. Lyness, County Attorney, and Elizabeth
Dupuich, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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PER CURIAM.
This appeal presents the question whether a seizure occurred
when a police officer pulled his patrol car into a defendant’s driveway
with its emergency lights flashing, approached the defendant on foot, and
directed the defendant to step down from his front porch onto the
driveway. The district court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress
finding no seizure. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. On
our de novo review, we conclude the interaction was not consensual and
therefore vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the district
court judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
On October 7, 2013, police officer Alex Stricker was dispatched at
approximately 11:30 p.m. in response to a reported hit-and-run collision.
Because the caller provided a license plate number and description of the
fleeing vehicle, Officer Stricker began driving toward the address listed
on that vehicle’s registration.
As Officer Stricker approached the home in his patrol car, he saw a
vehicle backed into an open garage that matched the description of the
vehicle reportedly involved in the collision. Officer Stricker saw the
defendant, Patrick White, standing outside the driver’s side door of the
vehicle. Officer Stricker observed White leave the garage and begin
walking toward the front door of the home. As White stepped onto his
front porch, Officer Stricker pulled into the driveway, activated his
emergency lights, and parked his patrol car.
White did not go inside his home and instead remained on the
porch. Officer Stricker exited the patrol car and started asking White
questions. Officer Stricker was in uniform and displayed a badge and
firearm. Officer Stricker then asked, “Can you step down here and talk
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to me?” Receiving no immediate response, Officer Stricker took one step
onto the porch and said, “I need you to step down here and talk to me,
OK?” White followed Officer Stricker back onto the driveway. Officer
Stricker used a flashlight on the ground to show where he wanted White
to proceed.
Officer Stricker then questioned White about the reported collision.
Officer Stricker detected the scent of an alcoholic beverage and noticed
other signs of intoxication. White admitted to having consumed three
drinks after work. Officer Stricker asked White to perform field sobriety
tests in the driveway. Based on the results of those tests, White was
arrested for operating while intoxicated.
White was charged by trial information with operating while
intoxicated, third offense, a class “D” felony. See Iowa Code
§ 321J.2(2)(c) (2013). White filed a motion to suppress any evidence
obtained after Officer Stricker directed him to step off the porch and onto
the driveway. White argued the officer’s conduct amounted to an
unlawful seizure in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution.
Following a hearing, the district court denied White’s motion to
suppress. The court rejected White’s constitutional argument that he
was seized by Officer Stricker on his front porch, finding instead that “a
reasonable person would not have felt compelled to yield to Officer
Stricker’s request and statement to step off the porch to the driveway to
speak with the officer.” The court reasoned,
Officer Stricker did not act to compel Mr. White to step down
to the driveway. Officer Stricker was the only officer at the
scene at that time. He had not drawn his weapon. He did
not shine a flashlight in Mr. White’s face. He did not touch
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Mr. White. He did not speak in a loud or demanding tone.
He made no threats. Mr. White was close to the door of his
house. He is a larger man than Officer Stricker. He was at
his home. Mr. White could have turned around and entered
the house and locked the door. The Court finds that,
instead, Mr. White chose to step down to the driveway as
requested just as he had earlier chosen not to enter his
home when the squad car pulled into the driveway.
Following a trial to the court on the minutes of testimony, White
was convicted of operating while intoxicated, third offense. He was
sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed five years with all but
thirty days suspended and was placed on probation for a period of three
years.
White appealed, arguing that his motion to suppress should have
been granted. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court
of appeals affirmed. It essentially agreed with the district court and
determined that “[u]p to the point where Officer Stricker observed White
exhibiting signs of intoxication, the interaction between Officer Stricker
and White was consensual and not a ‘seizure.’ ” One judge on the court
of appeals panel dissented.
We granted White’s application for further review.
II. Standard of Review.
“We review alleged violations of the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures de novo.” State v. Lindsey, 881
N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 2016). “In conducting our de novo review, we
independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances as shown by the
entire record.” Id. “[W]e will give deference to the factual findings of the
district court, but we are not bound by them.” State v. Lowe, 812
N.W.2d 554, 566 (Iowa 2012). Notably, in this case, the moment when
White contends he was seized was recorded by a dash cam in Officer
Stricker’s patrol car.
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III. Analysis.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution also guarantees
the right of Iowans “to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable seizures and searches.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. “We
jealously guard our right to construe a provision of our state constitution
differently than its federal counterpart, though the two provisions may
contain nearly identical language and have the same general scope,
import, and purpose.” State v. Jackson, 878 N.W.2d 422, 442 (Iowa
2016). Nevertheless, it is only necessary to reach the Fourth Amendment
to decide this appeal. As we have recognized,
The Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable intrusions on a person’s liberty arises when an
officer seizes a person. A seizure occurs when an officer by
means of physical force or show of authority in some way
restrains the liberty of a citizen.
State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2004) (quoting State v.
Pickett, 573 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa 1997)).
“Whether a ‘seizure’ occurred is determined by the totality of the
circumstances.” State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Iowa 2008) (citing
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2113, 153
L. Ed. 2d 242, 255 (2002)). “The Supreme Court has long recognized
that not all police contacts with individuals are deemed seizures within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d
542, 546 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Pliska v. City of Stevens Point, 823 F.2d
1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)); cf. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d at 82 (“Police
questioning by itself, however, is generally not a seizure.”). Such
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encounters remain consensual “[s]o long as a reasonable person would
feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’ ” Lowe, 812
N.W.2d at 570 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 683 N.W.2d at 547).
We have recognized the presence of several factors that might suggest a
seizure has occurred, which include
the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person
of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be
compelled.
Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 842–43 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980)
(plurality opinion)). In other words, “objective indices of police coercion
must be present to convert an encounter between police and citizens into
a seizure.” Id. at 843; see also State v. Gully, 346 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Iowa
1984) (“[T]here must be something uttered or done which would amount
to an objective indication that the officer exercised some dominion over
the person seized.”).
On our de novo review, having considered the suppression hearing
testimony and the video evidence, and giving appropriate deference to the
findings of the district court, we conclude that White was seized within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Stricker directed
White to step off of the front porch and onto the driveway. We reach this
conclusion for several reasons.
First, the flashing red and blue emergency lights on the top of
Officer Stricker’s patrol car remained on from the time Officer Stricker
pulled into White’s driveway until the time the field sobriety test was
later conducted. While we have recognized that the use of emergency
lights is not per se coercive, we have observed that emergency lights,
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unlike ordinary headlights, can be coercive in the sense that they “invoke
police authority and imply a police command to stop and remain.”
Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 844; see also State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270,
280–81 (Iowa 2012) (discussing an officer’s activation of his patrol car’s
emergency lights).
Second, Officer Stricker parked his vehicle in the middle of White’s
driveway before approaching White on foot. The patrol car blocked
White’s vehicle in the garage and was parked approximately ten to fifteen
feet from the front porch. In the past, we have considered the location of
a patrol car in relation to the defendant’s vehicle. See Wilkes, 756
N.W.2d at 844; see also Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 277.
Third, after Officer Stricker approached White in uniform while
displaying a badge and firearm, he asked—and then insisted—that White
return to his driveway and talk to him: “I need you to step down here and
talk to me, OK?” The officer’s tone and step onto the defendant’s front
porch would have indicated to a reasonable person that he could not
proceed into his home and that compliance with Officer Stricker’s
directive was now mandatory—especially in conjunction with the flashing
emergency lights and nearby patrol car. This result is consistent with
Fourth Amendment caselaw. Compare I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
219–21, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1764–65, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 257–58 (1984)
(concluding that no seizure occurred where federal agents “only
question[ed] people” and took no additional steps to obtain answers), and
Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 571 (reasoning that no seizure occurred in part
because “[t]here were no ‘commands’ ” and “only requests for
information”), with Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494, 501–02, 103
S. Ct. 1319, 1322, 1326, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 234, 239 (1983) (finding that
a seizure occurred when two officers’ request “to accompany them to a
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room” from a public concourse was made in conjunction with an
indication that the defendant was not free to leave), United States v.
Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 566–67 (6th Cir. 2011) (concluding that, after
the defendant had twice indicated he did not want to speak with police, a
seizure occurred once he was instructed to “turn around and walk
toward the officer”), United States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286, 1288–89 &
n.4 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that an officer’s second request to speak with
an individual was “command,” based on “the tone of voice [the officer]
used,” and amounted to a seizure), and Parker v. Commonwealth, 496
S.E.2d 47, 51 (Va. 1998) (concluding that a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment occurred when the officer drove his police cruiser
from the street onto private property and stopped the cruiser “at the
location where the defendant was standing”).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Officer Stricker seized
White near the commencement of their encounter. This does not
necessarily mean the motion to suppress should have been granted.
Additional arguments were presented below that a seizure of White would
have been justified based on the report he had committed a
misdemeanor. However, the State does not present them to us as
grounds for affirmance so we decline to address them. 1
IV. Conclusion.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that White was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution at
the time when Officer Stricker directed White to step off of the front
porch and onto the driveway. We therefore vacate the decision of the
1The State does argue in a paragraph of its brief that any error in denying the
motion to suppress would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However,
we are not persuaded on this record.
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court of appeals, reverse the district court judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
This opinion shall be published.