Amended February 21, 2017 Residential and Agricultural Advisory Committee, LLC, an Iowa Limited Liability Company Matt Mescher Allan R. Demmer Catherine Demmer Wayne Ameskamp Sharon Ameskamp Vernon Boge Donald Boge Mary Ann Rubly John R. Rubly Dolores Thier Larry Thier Gary Burkle Cindy Burkle Wayne Vorwald Linda Vorwald Jeff Pape Gerald Wolf and Joanne Wolf v. Dyersvil ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 15–1413
Filed December 9, 2016
Amended February 21, 2017
RESIDENTIAL AND AGRICULTURAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LLC,
an Iowa Limited Liability Company; MATT MESCHER; ALLAN R.
DEMMER; CATHERINE DEMMER; WAYNE AMESKAMP; SHARON
AMESKAMP; VERNON BOGE; DONALD BOGE; MARY ANN RUBLY;
JOHN R. RUBLY; DOLORES THIER; LARRY THIER; GARY BURKLE;
CINDY BURKLE; WAYNE VORWALD; LINDA VORWALD; JEFF PAPE;
GERALD WOLF; and JOANNE WOLF,
Appellants,
vs.
DYERSVILLE CITY COUNCIL, MAYOR JAMES A. HEAVENS, MIKE
ENGLISH, MARK BREITBACH, ROBERT PLATZ, MOLLY EVERS, and
DAN WILLENBORG,
Appellees.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
Thomas A. Bitter, Judge.
Community members filed petitions for writ of certiorari
challenging city council’s decision that rezoned agricultural land to
commercial land. The district court annulled the writs. DECISION OF
DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED; WRITS ANNULLED.
Susan M. Hess and Philip F. Jensen (until withdrawal) of Hammer,
Simon & Jensen, P.C., East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellants.
Jenny L. Weiss and Douglas M. Henry of Fuerste, Carew
& Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, and Nicholas C. Thompson of Cottingham
& Butler, Inc., Dubuque, for appellees.
2
ZAGER, Justice.
The Dyersville City Council voted to rezone the area containing the
Field of Dreams movie site from A-1 Agricultural to C-2 Commercial in
order to facilitate the development of a baseball and softball complex.
Community members filed two writs of certiorari, now combined,
challenging the rezoning. The district court annulled both writs. The
community members appealed the decision of the district court arguing
that, since the city council acted in a quasi-judicial function, the actions
of the city council in passing each of the ordinances was invalid for a
number of reasons. They also argued there was sufficient opposition to
the rezoning to trigger a unanimous vote of the city council contained in
the Dyersville city code. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision
of the district court and annul the writs.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The 1989 Field of Dreams movie was filmed primarily at the
Lansing farm now located in Dyersville, in rural Dubuque County. 1 Due
to the popularity of the film, Donald and Rebecca Lansing kept the
baseball field and their white farmhouse intact for visitors and tourists.
The house and baseball diamond were a popular destination, and
thousands of tourists visited the Lansing property each year. In recent
years, however, tourist numbers have been declining.
The City of Dyersville has a comprehensive plan for the city that
has been in place for many years. In the early 1960s, the city enacted a
plan that included Dyersville City Zoning Ordinance No. 285, which
states purposes for rezoning, one of which includes:
1At the time the movie was filmed, the Lansing farm was not yet annexed into
the City of Dyersville.
3
WHEREAS, the City Council of City of Dyersville, Iowa deems
it necessary in order to lessen congestion in the streets; to
secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; to promote
health and the general welfare; to provide adequate light and
air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue
concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate
provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks,
and other public requirements; to conserve the value of
buildings and property; and to encourage the most
appropriate use of land throughout the City with reasonable
consideration, and in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
Dyersville, Iowa, Zoning Ordinance No. 285 (1962).
The comprehensive plan also states that any zoning regulations
enacted by the council “shall be made with reasonable consideration” as
to concerns such as the character of the area, the suitability of the area
for certain uses, the conservation of buildings and values, and the
encouragement of the most appropriate use of the land throughout the
city. Dyersville, Iowa Planning & Zoning Comm’n, Comprehensive Plan
for Dyersville, Iowa 91 (1962) [hereinafter Comprehensive Plan] (quoting
Iowa Code § 414.3 (1962)).
In 1974, Dyersville enacted a comprehensive development plan
that included goals for future land use. The development plan included
key policy goals and recommendations specific to commercial and
business development. One of the goals was to “discourage proliferation
of scattered commercial development throughout the residential
community.” Dubuque Cty. Metro. Area Planning Comm’n, Dyersville
Area Comprehensive Development Plan 51 (1974). Another
recommendation was to encourage the expansion of the already-existing
central business district through a coordinated design scheme. Id. at 52.
The plan also noted that the city should encourage businesses to be
located only in those areas that were easily accessible for water and
sewage services. In 1975, the city supplemented the plan with a
4
requirement for a detailed evaluation of water, sewage, and waste
systems. See Dyersville, Iowa, Planning & Zoning Comm’n, Dyersville
Area Comprehensive Development Plan Supplemental Section, Intro
(1975).
In 1991, the city drafted a community builder plan. This plan
expressly addressed the impact of the Field of Dreams movie on the city’s
tourism and concluded that the main concern was that “Dyersville must
become much more aggressive in guiding and encouraging its own
growth.” Dyersville, Iowa, Community Builder Plan: A Five Year Strategic
Plan, Intro 2 (1991) [hereinafter Community Builder Plan]. The 1991
plan listed twelve opportunities for growth in the city, one of which was
“continued (national/international) attention for Field of Dreams and
other tourist attractions.” Id. at 5. It also identified eleven threats to the
city’s growth, one of which was “loss of Field of Dreams or other major
tourist attraction.” Id. The plan concluded that, without any changes,
Dyersville’s three main tourist attractions would continue to attract a
consistent number of tourists. Id. at 6. In 1997, the city supplemented
the community builder plan to evaluate which goals had been met and
how to pursue the remaining goals. Dyersville, Iowa, Community Builder
Plan (1997).
In 2003, the City of Dyersville drafted a future annexation plan
that identified areas of nearby land that were likely to be annexed into
the city in the future. The annexation plan grouped areas of land into
those likely to be annexed within five years, five to ten years, or ten to
twenty years. At that time, the Field of Dreams property was not
included in any of these annexation estimates.
In 2010, the Lansings listed their property for sale. Their property
included the baseball diamond and white farmhouse, and an additional
5
193 acres that are used as farmland. Ultimately, the Lansings signed a
purchase agreement with Mike and Denise Stillman. The sale was
contingent upon the property being rezoned for commercial use, among
other things. The Stillmans intended to create All-Star Ballpark Heaven
on the land, a baseball and softball complex with up to twenty-four fields
to be used for youth baseball and softball. They intended to continue to
maintain the farmhouse and original baseball diamond as a tourist
attraction.
The Dyersville City Council met on November 21, 2011. One of the
action items on the agenda was “Authorize City Administrator to Sign IIW
Proposal for Professional Services for Field of Dreams Utilities Extension
Feasibility Study 2011.” The proposal provided that the City of Dyersville
would pay IIW Engineering approximately $9625 to prepare a utilities
extension feasibility study. This study would determine the cost and
logistics of providing water and sewer services to the Field of Dreams site.
The feasibility study was discussed for approximately nineteen minutes,
with the mayor, 2 the city administrator, 3 and various city council
members weighing in. Jacque Rahe, the director of the Dyersville
Economic Development Corporation (DEDC) also discussed how to
secure funding for the project so the city could avoid any taxpayer
burden. She discussed talking to state officials to secure funding and a
future meeting with the Governor. The motion to approve the study was
passed unanimously by the city council. On December 5, the city
council held a special meeting immediately following the regular city
council meeting. The sole agenda item for the special meeting was a
2The mayor of Dyersville at the time of the meeting was James Heavens.
3The city administrator of Dyersville at the time of the meeting was Michael
Michels.
6
presentation by the Stillmans, entitled “Future Development of Field of
Dreams.”
In December, the Stillmans organized a bus trip to Des Moines for
the purpose of meeting with legislators and other state officials to discuss
financing the All-Star Ballpark Heaven project. The mayor and two city
council members joined the Stillmans on the bus trip to Des Moines, and
they also attended a group dinner. A member of the planning and zoning
commission also participated in the bus trip to Des Moines. The
Stillmans presumably funded both the bus trip and the dinner. The
purpose of the trip and the dinner was to begin lobbying state officials for
financial assistance in developing the project.
In early 2012, the Strategic Economics Group from Des Moines
completed an economic and fiscal impact study report regarding the
proposed project. The report analyzed the proposed project, the general
Dubuque County area, and the potential economic impact of the project.
The report predicted the project would result in the creation of 1400 new
jobs by its eighth year of operation. The report also estimated $34.1
million in additional payroll and $102 million in additional goods and
services for the State of Iowa, in addition to increases in local tax
revenue.
The city council met again on February 20, 2012, and one of the
agenda items was the “Field of Dreams Extension.” A number of the
petitioners and other community members attended the meeting and
were able to speak about the proposed All-Star Ballpark Heaven complex.
Petitioner Wayne Vorwald expressed concerns about having open-range
cattle in the area if the project were completed because of the
juxtaposition of urban and farming areas. Petitioners Jeff Pape and
Wayne Ameskamp mentioned concerns with runoff into the nearby creek
7
and flooding. Ron Oberbroeckling was worried about the project
interfering with deer hunting in the area. A number of community
members talked about growing up on family farms and wanting to
maintain those farms and values for their own families. Petitioner Matt
Mescher discussed traffic concerns because one of the most dangerous
intersections in the state is located in Dyersville. He also stated that his
“neighbors do not want ball fields in the middle of their cornfields.”
Petitioners Mescher and Vorwald both proposed moving the project to the
Dyersville business park.
Denise Stillman and several community members spoke in favor of
the proposed project. Jacque Rahe stated that the DEDC supported the
project because its mission is to make Dyersville “a better place to live,
work and play.” She also expressed concern about being left out of
neighborhood meetings about the project and urged the community to
include the DEDC.
At the April 2 city council meeting, an engineer from IIW
Engineering introduced his conceptual water and sewer evaluation report
and discussed the details of how to provide water and sewer services to
the Field of Dreams area. The report estimated it would cost
approximately $1.1 million to run water to the complex and
approximately $2.9 million to provide sewer service. Council members
and at least one community member asked questions about the report.
One nearby resident expressed concerns she and her neighbors had
about the impact on their wells.
At the May 7 city council meeting, council member Molly Evers
expressed concerns about how the project would affect the community
and requested more information about the timeline. She also mentioned
she had received a number of phone calls and other correspondence from
8
community members about the project. She urged them to speak up and
asked when the council would hold a public hearing in order to permit
members from the community to speak. Two other council members
agreed that they wanted to know what the citizens of Dyersville were
thinking, and stated that they had also heard from a number of
community members about the proposed project.
On May 21, the council met again and one of the agenda items was
to receive a file and presentation by Joe Scherrman in support of the All-
Star Ballpark Heaven project. Scherrman operates a business near
Dyersville. He opined that the best way to preserve the original movie
site was to expand and build extra fields around it. Council member
Evers again expressed concern about input from the community and
asked when a public hearing would be set. At least one of the petitioners
was present at the meeting. Petitioner Ameskamp expressed concerns
about flooding, water runoff, and traffic. He also asked what would
happen to the land if the project failed and there were not enough kids in
and around Dyersville to support twenty-four new baseball and softball
fields. He was also concerned about the impact the project would have
on his ability to hunt on his own land.
At the June 4 city council meeting, one of the council members
moved to table Resolution 31-12. The resolution was an application by
the Lansings and several other Dubuque County property owners who
were seeking to voluntarily annex their property into the City of
Dyersville. 4 The annexation of the Lansing property into the city was one
of the conditions of the Stillmans’ purchase agreement for the Lansing
4The property owners who were seeking to annex their property into Dyersville
were Donald L. Lansing, Rebecca L. Lansing, Gerald Deutmeyer, Alice M. Deutmeyer,
John E. Rahe, Nicole Rahe, Keith G. Rahe, Jacque K. Rahe, and Dorothy Meyer.
9
farm. Because the application still needed the signature of one of the
property owners, the resolution was tabled.
On June 11, a special meeting of the Dyersville City Council was
held with the mayor and all council members present. A number of
community members spoke about the proposed project, both in favor of
and against. A number of community members continued to express
concerns about traffic, water runoff, hunting, and rural family values.
Several members of the public who spoke were undecided, but were
upset with some of the false information that was being spread by
community members who were opposed to the project. A handful of the
community members present expressed a desire for a referendum or vote
on the issue of the proposed project and any necessary zoning change.
The council members also discussed Resolution 31-12 and unanimously
voted to set the date to consider the annexation request for July 2.
On June 18, the city council met in a regular session to discuss
Resolution 35-12, which was a resolution requesting approval of a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the City of Dyersville
and Go the Distance Baseball, LLC. 5 The MOU was signed by the mayor
and the developers. It set forth components that were key to the
anticipated development agreement to create the All-Star Ballpark
Heaven. The key points were
I) Annexation
The City will put forth its best effort to annex all of the
property the Company has under contract (the “Property”) in
Dubuque County into the city limits by October 1, 2012.
The Company will provide reasonable assistance that shall
not require out-of-pocket costs to meet this goal.
5Go the Distance Baseball, LLC is a limited liability company in Iowa. Denise
Stillman is a part owner of Go the Distance, and Go the Distance is the company that
would complete and manage the proposed All-Star Ballpark Heaven.
10
II) TIF and Zoning
The City will put forth its best effort to undertake the process
of adding the Property to the Urban Renewal Area,
establishing the Property as a tax increment financing
district. Furthermore, the City agrees to use its best efforts
to rezone the Property to commercial use or other
appropriate use to allow the Company to use it for its
intended purpose.
III) Infrastructure Project
The Company agrees to construct the Infrastructure Project
to connect the Property to the city’s water and sewer services
for an estimated cost of $2.48M and in accordance with the
specifications of the City. The Infrastructure Project shall be
completed by no later than December 30, 2014.
IV) Fund Obligation and Payments
The City will undertake the authorization of a development
agreement under which the City would agree to make
economic development payments (the “Payments”) to the
Company for a period not to exceed 15 years. The amount of
Payments to be made under the agreement will be subject to
future negotiation amongst the parties. The City anticipates
funding Payments in an amount equal to the actual costs of
the Infrastructure Project without annual appropriation
contingencies. Furthermore the City anticipates considering
the provision of additional Payments provided that such
payments are made subject to annual appropriation by the
City Council. In any event all Payments will be funded
exclusively from incremental property tax (TIF) revenues
received by the City which are attributable to the Property.
During this meeting, the city attorney for Dyersville was asked to explain
the MOU. He explained that it merely contained the intention of the
parties so both parties would know that they were “headed in the same
direction and that there’s no road blocks that somebody may throw up.”
He further explained that the vote on the resolution would simply allow
the council to take a vote on annexation, rezoning, and approval of the
development agreement. If any of those items failed a vote, then the
project would be done.
11
A number of residents spoke at the June 18 meeting, both in
support of and in opposition to the project. Denise Stillman also spoke
at the meeting and discussed the possibility of creating a dome over the
fields for year-round play and a dormitory building for coaches and
players to stay during tournaments. The council unanimously voted to
approve the resolution.
On July 2, the council met to discuss the resolution regarding the
voluntary annexation of property into the City of Dyersville. The mayor
and all five city council members were present, in addition to the city
attorney. A number of community members were present. A few
community members, some of whom are petitioners in this case,
appeared at the meeting with their attorney, Susan Hess. A television
crew from KCRG Channel 9 news was present at the meeting.
Stillman spoke first in support of the project. She then introduced
Ron Kittle, a former professional baseball player. He spoke about the
impact of baseball in his life and the benefits the project could bring to
Dyersville. The council then opened the meeting up to community
members who spoke against the proposed project. Petitioner Mescher
spoke about funding concerns and the impact on taxpayers. He also
spoke about growing division in the small community and how the
council should be taking noise and pollution into account in addition to
economic benefits. Jack Mescher, son of petitioner Mescher, also spoke
against the annexation. He said the city had not done the requisite
hydraulic, traffic, or pollution studies. Attorney Hess stated that the
citizens of Dyersville wanted to vote on the issue. 6
6The city attorney responded that the application for voluntary annexation was
considered by the council, not a public vote, under Iowa Code section 368.7.
12
Director of the DEDC, Jacque Rahe, spoke in support of the
voluntary annexation. She pointed to the reports that estimated the
project would provide twenty-four full time, year-round jobs for the
citizens of Dyersville. Eric Schmechel from the Dubuque Soil and Water
Conservation District spoke to address concerns about watershed
management. The council members asked him questions about storm
water and watershed management practices. He opined that, if done
correctly, the project could actually improve the location’s water runoff
problems. When the motion came to a vote, the council voted 4–1 to
approve the resolution. Evers was the sole council member voting no.
The council also voted on Resolution 38-12, which was a
resolution to refer the rezoning of the property from A-1 Agriculture to C-
2 Commercial to the planning and zoning commission. The city
administrator explained that the proposal for rezoning was for
conditional use
for the preservation of the existing white farmhouse with
wrap-around porch overlooking the Field of Dreams, the
preservation of the existing Field of Dreams, and the creation
and construction of All-Star Ballpark having a complex
featuring 24 baseball and softball fields targeted for
competition and training for youth 8 to 14 and incidental
uses thereof.
The city council unanimously voted to send the resolution to the zoning
commission. On July 3, the zoning commission sent a notice to
interested property owners about the public hearing it would hold
regarding the proposed rezoning.
On July 8, the zoning commission hosted a work session at the
Dyersville Social Center. The agenda listed the work session as a
“community overview meeting” regarding the project, which would
include a presentation followed by an opportunity for the community
13
members to ask questions. The overview was provided by Denise
Stillman.
The zoning commission met the following day to discuss rezoning
the Field of Dreams property from agricultural to commercial. The city
administrator began by providing an overview to the zoning commission
about the proposed rezoning. He described the area to be rezoned, which
included a 200-foot buffer zone on three sides of the area that would
remain agricultural. He explained that the buffer zone was “created to
protect adjoining property owners” and would prevent concerns about
children playing baseball right up against the adjoining property lines.
He also described how the buffer zone would allow the adjacent farms to
continue to spread manure and engage in other farming activities
without interrupting the baseball and softball facilities. He informed the
zoning commission that the city council had looked into the impact on
property values, storm water and drainage issues, and crime.
A number of the petitioners also attended the meeting and were
able to offer their opinions to the zoning commission. Petitioner Mescher
expressed concerns that the proposed 200-foot buffer zone was designed
to prevent the neighboring property owners from objecting, since the new
commercial zoning area would not directly touch their land. His son also
spoke about the buffer zone and concerns about the impact on water
issues in the area. Several other community members had the
opportunity to offer their opinions of the project, both in favor of and in
opposition to the project.
Two members of IIW Engineering spoke about the study and report
their group had completed. One engineer offered information about the
wastewater study and how the generated wastewater would be used.
Another spoke about the traffic concerns that had been raised by
14
community members and how the roads would be affected by increased
traffic to the baseball and softball complex. After everyone was offered
the opportunity to speak, the zoning commission unanimously voted to
approve a positive recommendation in favor of the proposed rezoning.
On July 16, the city council met to consider Resolution 47-12,
which recommended setting a date for the council to consider the
proposed rezoning. The city council unanimously voted to approve the
resolution and set the date for August 6. On July 25, the council
published a notice in the local newspaper. On August 3, the agenda for
the meeting was posted in the directory at Dyersville City Hall and on the
Dyersville city website. The agenda was also sent to the Cedar Rapids
Gazette, the Telegraph Herald, and the Dyersville newspapers. The
agenda was additionally provided to the Dyersville Police Department and
two radio news stations, KDST and KMCH.
The agenda listed the first action item as a public hearing “to
approve the rezoning of certain property from A-1 Agricultural to C-2
Commercial.” The second item action was Ordinance 770, which
included the legal description of the land to be rezoned as
SW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 22, Township 89 North,
Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque
County, Iowa, except for the Northerly 200 feet thereof;
SW 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 23, Township 89 North,
Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque
County, Iowa, except for the Northerly and Easterly 200 feet
thereof;
NE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of Section 27, Township 89 North,
Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque
County, Iowa, except for the South 200 feet of the West 200
feet and the West 200 feet of the South 200 feet thereof;
NW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of Section 26, Township 89 North,
Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque
County, Iowa, except for the Southerly 200 feet of the East
400 feet and the Easterly 200 feet thereof;
15
Lot 1 of the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of Section 26, Township
89 North, Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in
Dubuque County, Iowa, except for Southerly and Easterly
200 feet thereof; and
Lot 2 of Trinity Acres of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of Section
27, Township 89 North, Range 2 West of the 5th Principal
Meridian in Dubuque County, Iowa, except for the Southerly
and Westerly 200 feet thereof.
At the August 6 city council meeting, attorney Hess spoke first.
She urged the council to remain impartial and stated it was acting in a
quasi-judicial manner and therefore was required to remain impartial.
She noted concerns with the planning and zoning commission and
opined that it had failed to remain impartial because the members
attended a work session presentation put on by the developer. She
asked the council not to vote on the rezoning at the meeting and to table
the topic for a later meeting. She also referred to a letter she wrote that
she had been unsuccessful in delivering to the council earlier that day.
The city attorney informed the council members that he would review the
letter Hess wrote on behalf of a group of concerned Dyersville citizens.
He also advised the council members that a unanimous vote was not
required for the proposed rezoning.
A number of the petitioners attended the meeting, in addition to
other community members. There was approximately thirty minutes of
discussion before the citizens at the meeting stopped volunteering to
speak. Council member Evers moved to close the public hearing, which
was seconded. She then moved to table the discussion of Ordinance
770, but received no second. The city council voted to approve the first
reading of the ordinance, and the motion passed in a vote of 4–1, with
council member Evers voting no. Evers then read a written statement
and expressed community concerns about the project. She stated that
more members of the community opposed the project than favored it.
16
The council moved to waive the second and third readings of the
ordinance. The motions passed with votes of 4–1. Evers was the sole
council member voting no.
On September 4, 2012, the Residential and Agricultural Advisory
Committee, L.L.C. and twenty-three other individuals 7 (petitioners) filed a
petition for writ of certiorari and a request for a stay and injunction
against the Dyersville City Council, the mayor of Dyersville, and the
individual city council members (city council). The petitioners resisted
the rezoning of the Field of Dreams property from A-1 Agricultural to C-2
Commercial. They argued the city council acted in violation of both Iowa
law and Dyersville city ordinances; in excess of its authority; arbitrarily
and capriciously; and against public safety, health, morals, and the
general welfare.
The district court set a one-hour hearing for September 25. After
the hearing was set, Go the Distance filed a petition to intervene. Shortly
thereafter, F.O.D. Real Estate, L.L.C.; Field of Dreams Movie Site, Inc.;
and Donald and Rebecca Lansing also filed petitions to intervene. On
September 21, the city council filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It
claimed the Residential and Agricultural Advisory Committee lacked
standing, and further, the city council had been acting in a legislative
capacity and was immune from suit. The petitioners responded by filing
a request to hold a later hearing because additional testimony and
discovery was necessary “to determine the legality of the City Council’s
action.” On September 25—the day the hearing was scheduled—the city
council filed a second motion to dismiss, this time claiming the petition
7Two of the individuals later dismissed their claims.
17
for writ of certiorari failed to state a claim. The petitioners resisted the
city council’s motion to dismiss.
On October 9, the district court issued its order denying the
petition for writ of certiorari. In the order, the district court concluded,
Clearly, the Dyersville City Council had jurisdiction to
hear and decide the proposed rezoning of the property in
question. The Defendants have complied with any and all
procedural requirements pertaining to the rezoning of the
property. Proper due process rights have been afforded the
Plaintiffs. The Defendants heard and considered numerous
issues and concerns associated with the rezoning of the
property. The Zoning and Planning Commission voted 8–0 in
favor of recommending the proposed zoning change. The
Court finds no illegality in the rezoning of the property. The
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits.
The petitioners then filed an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion
to enlarge, amend, or modify the order. They claimed the district court
should not have determined the legality of the rezoning at the hearing
because the hearing was only to determine whether a writ of certiorari
should issue and not the merits of the case. The petitioners also argued
the district court did not follow proper procedure for issuance of a writ of
certiorari or consider all of the issues raised in the petition. The
petitioners requested that the district court enter an order granting their
request for additional testimony and discovery. The district court denied
the 1.904(2) motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. We transferred the
appeal to the court of appeals.
While this appeal was pending, the council became aware that
Ordinance 770 contained an error in the legal description of the land.
The ordinance described part of the land as “SW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of
Section 22, Township 89 North, Range 2 West of the 5th Principal
Meridian in Dubuque County, Iowa, except for the Northerly 200 feet
18
thereof.” (Emphasis added.) The correct description should have listed
the property as “SE 1/4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 22, Township 89 North,
Range 2 West of the 5th Principal Meridian in Dubuque County, Iowa,
except for the Northerly 200 feet thereof.” (Emphasis added.) At the May
6, 2013 city council meeting, the council voted 4–1 to approve Ordinance
777, which corrected the description of the land contained in Ordinance
770. The public was invited to speak on the issue, but no one
volunteered. The city attorney classified the mistake as a typo and noted
that the prior public hearing had given fair notice to the public and
everyone knew which parcel of land was being discussed at the rezoning
hearing.
Thereafter, a second petition for writ of certiorari was filed on May
15, 2013. This second writ of certiorari was filed in response to the city
council’s vote approving Ordinance 777 correcting the description of the
rezoned land. The district court directed that this writ issue on May 23,
and the writ was returned on June 10. Trial on the second writ was set
to begin on January 6, 2014.
The court of appeals issued its decision on the first writ of
certiorari on November 6, 2013. 8 The court of appeals concluded that
the district court had improperly decided the merits of the petition for
writ of certiorari, rather than confine its decision to whether the writ
should be issued. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the
district court and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings.
On November 8, the petitioners filed a motion to consolidate the
two writs of certiorari and continue the trial. The district court granted
8Residential
& Agric. Advisory Comm., L.L.C. v. Dyersville City Council, 2013
WL5951191 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2013).
19
the motion to consolidate and set a hearing for January 6, 2014. On
January 3, Go the Distance withdrew its motion to intervene.
The pending matters came before the district court for hearing on
January 6. The district court heard four issues: (1) the city council’s
motion to dismiss the individual city council members and mayor, (2) the
petitioners’ 1.904(2) motion, (3) the petitioners’ request for an injunction,
and (4) the petitioners’ motion for discovery. The district court issued its
order on January 21 and denied the motion to dismiss the individual city
council members, the 1.904(2) motion, and the request for an injunction.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss the individual council
members because legislative immunity would only apply if the council
acted in a legislative capacity, which it concluded was a question of fact.
The district court denied the 1.904 motion because it raised arguments
that petitioners were required to appeal to the Board of Adjustment, but
had failed to do. The district court denied the request for an injunction
to halt development because none of the named respondents owned the
property, and therefore the injunction would be meaningless. 9 The
district court allowed the petitioners to continue with discovery.
On May 1, the petitioners filed a motion for issuance of writ. The
court of appeals decision from November 6, 2013, required the district
court to either order a writ or take other action on remand. At the time
the petitioners filed the motion, the district court had yet to issue a writ
or take any other action on remand. The district court issued the writ on
May 29, and the writ was returned on June 12. The district court set the
consolidated cases for trial.
9Neither the Lansings nor the Stillmans were ever a party to the proceedings. By
the time the district court issued this order, the closing had occurred and the Stillmans
owned the Field of Dreams site.
20
Trial was held between February 16 and February 24, 2015. The
district court issued its order on May 21, holding that the actions of the
Dyersville City Council were sustained and the writs with respect to
Ordinances 770 and 777 were annulled. Petitioners filed a motion to
enlarge, which the district court denied on July 24. The petitioners filed
an appeal, which we retained.
II. Analysis.
On appeal, the petitioners raise a number of issues. They argue
the district court applied the incorrect standard of review to the city
council’s rezoning of the land. They argue the council’s actions were
quasi-judicial in nature rather than legislative, triggering a different
standard of review. They allege Ordinance 770 is invalid for a number of
reasons. They also argue there was sufficient opposition to the
ordinance from adjacent landowners to trigger Dyersville Code section
165.39(5). They assert Ordinance 777 is invalid because it purported to
rezone property without following proper procedure. Last, they assert
equal protection and due process violations. We address each issue in
turn.
A. Correct Standard of Review of the City Council’s Actions.
We must first address the proper standard of review in this action. The
petitioners argue the district court applied the wrong standard of review
to the city council’s actions in rezoning the Field of Dreams site. They
argue the council’s actions were quasi-judicial in nature rather than
legislative. The district court order concluded that, for purposes of
determining whether certiorari was available, the council was acting in a
quasi-judicial manner. However, the underlying decision to rezone was a
legislative function and the council was therefore not required to make
21
findings of fact or provide for a more formal proceeding similar to a
judicial proceeding.
In chapter 335 of the Iowa Code, the legislature grants the county
boards of supervisors the authority to determine zoning matters in the
counties. Iowa Code §§ 335.1, .3 (2015); see also Perkins v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2001). This includes the power to
designate areas into districts and to regulate the use of land within those
districts. Iowa Code §§ 335.3, .4. “The board of supervisors shall
provide for the manner in which the regulations and restrictions and the
boundaries of the districts shall be determined, established, and
enforced, and from time to time amended, supplemented, or changed.”
Id. § 335.6.
Chapter 414 goes on to provide specific rules, powers, and duties
related to city zoning. Iowa Code section 414.4 provides that the city
council “shall provide for the manner in which the regulations and
restrictions and the boundaries of the districts shall be determined,
established, and enforced, and from time to time amended,
supplemented, or changed.” Id. § 414.4. To do so, the city council must
also follow proper procedure. Id. The council must give the community
members published notice of the time and place of a public hearing with
at least seven days’ notice. Id.; see also id. § 362.3. The council must
hold a public hearing during which community members are offered the
opportunity to offer opinions regarding the proposed zoning or rezoning.
Id. § 414.4. Iowa Code section 414.5 provides specific voting rules for
situations where an ordinance would change land from one zoning
district to another. Id. § 414.5. In this situation, if twenty percent or
more of the owners of property located within 200 feet of the proposed
rezoning area file a written protest, the council is required to approve the
22
rezoning ordinance by a vote of at least three-fourths of the members.
Id.
The statutory scheme set forth in the Iowa Code mirrors the
general rule that zoning determinations are a legislative function of a city
council or board of supervisors. 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning
§ 2, at 18–19 (2016). Likewise, we have long recognized that “[z]oning
decisions are an exercise of the police power to promote the health,
safety, order and morals of society.” Montgomery v. Bremer Cty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 1980). A city council or board of
supervisors exercises its delegated police power through zoning decisions
so long as the decisions are “made in accordance with a comprehensive
plan and designed . . . to encourage efficient urban development patterns
. . . [and] to promote health and the general welfare.” Iowa Code § 414.3;
id. § 335.5; see also Molo Oil Co. v. City of Dubuque, 692 N.W.2d 686, 691
(Iowa 2005). A zoning decision or regulation is an exercise of delegated
police powers so long as it is
made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as
to the character of the area of the district and the peculiar
suitability of such area for particular uses, and with a view
to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the
most appropriate use of land throughout [the] city.
Iowa Code § 414.3(2). However, we have also recognized that there are
some situations in which a zoning decision can take on a quasi-judicial
nature that may necessitate a different standard of review than the
normally limited standard of review we utilize when reviewing zoning
decisions. See, e.g., Sutton v. Dubuque City Council, 729 N.W.2d 796,
797 (Iowa 2006).
Some historical perspective helps in our analysis. In Buechele v.
Ray, we laid out the test to determine whether an action is judicial or
23
quasi-judicial, which we noted is a difficult determination. 219 N.W.2d
679, 681 (Iowa 1974). The pertinent rule of procedure states “[a] party
may commence a certiorari action when authorized by statute or when
the party claims an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial
functions, or a judicial magistrate exceeded proper jurisdiction or
otherwise acted illegally.” Iowa R. Civil P. 1.1401; see also Buechele, 219
N.W.2d at 681. 10 The term “judicial functions” as utilized in this
particular rule is not construed strictly or technically and can apply if
the underlying act is quasi-judicial. Buechele, 219 N.W.2d at 681.
Other courts have found that a body that is not a court exercises a
judicial function when “(1) the questioned act involves a proceeding in
which notice and opportunity to be heard are required; or (2) a
determination of rights of parties is made which requires the exercise of
discretion in finding facts and applying the law thereto.” Id. While our
analysis of judicial function is not as restrictive, we afford weight to the
listed judicial attributes. Id. We also consider “whether or not the
challenged act goes to the determination of some right the protection of
which is the peculiar office of the courts.” Id. However, merely
exercising judgment or discretion is not sufficient to constitute a quasi-
judicial act. Id.
In Buechele, we were asked to determine whether the State
Executive Council’s decision to employ an attorney to defend a state
representative in a slander action constituted a quasi-judicial act. Id. at
680. The petitioners brought the action in a writ for certiorari. Id. The
council argued on appeal that its act was not a judicial or quasi-judicial
function, and therefore certiorari review was not appropriate. Id. at 681.
10At the time the Buechele case was decided, the same rule was contained in
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 306.
24
We held that the council’s action was a discretionary, executive decision
and not the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Id. at 682.
In reaching this decision, we noted that none of the council’s actions had
any of the attributes normally associated with judicial functions: the
council was not required to give notice, hold a hearing, take evidence,
engage in fact finding, or make legal conclusions. Id.
In Montgomery, perhaps the most analogous case to the one before
us now, the board rezoned two parcels of land from agricultural to
industrial after two rezoning petitions were filed. 299 N.W.2d at 691.
Following the rezoning petitions, the board gave notice, held a public
hearing, and heard from both proponents and opponents of the rezoning
proposal. Id. The board unanimously approved both rezoning requests.
Id. Opponents of the rezoning brought petitions for writ of certiorari in
the district court, which were later combined. Id.
On appeal, we addressed the question of the proper scope of review
for a certiorari proceeding challenging a board of supervisors’ rezoning
decision. Id. at 692. We confirmed that a writ of certiorari was the
proper procedure for challenging the board’s amendments to the
rezoning ordinance. Id. We found that the zoning decision by the board
was an exercise of its delegated police power and held that “the generally
limited scope of review applicable to this case is to determine whether the
decision by the Board to rezone is fairly debatable.” Id.
In Sutton, the city council passed an ordinance that amended the
city’s existing zoning code. 729 N.W.2d at 797. The ordinance
reclassified property from a commercial recreation district to a planned
unit development (PUD) district. Id. The ordinance passed with a vote of
four to three, and two objectors brought a challenge to the rezoning
decision with a petition for writ of certiorari. Id. The action was
25
dismissed as untimely, and the objectors then brought an action for
declaratory judgment. Id. The city argued the claims were barred
because certiorari was the exclusive remedy and the time limitation for
bringing a certiorari challenge had already passed. Id. We ultimately
held that the opponents of the rezoning decision were required to bring a
writ of certiorari and therefore were precluded from bringing the
declaratory judgment action. Id. at 799.
We also discussed the standards for determining whether a zoning
decision has remained a legislative function or evolved into a quasi-
judicial function. Id. at 798. We expanded on the two-part test from
Buechele by citing to factors identified by the Washington Supreme Court
in determining whether zoning activities are quasi-judicial in nature or
legislative in nature:
(1) rezoning ordinarily occurs in response to a citizen
application followed by a statutorily mandated public
hearing; (2) as a result of such applications, readily
identifiable proponents and opponents weigh in on the
process; and (3) the decision is localized in its application
affecting a particular group of citizens more acutely than the
public at large.
Id.; see also Fleming v. Tacoma, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (Wash. 1972) (en
banc)). While we cited these factors with approval, we had the
opportunity to review the entirety of the Fleming case and did not choose
to adopt the Washington court’s holding in that case that all public
zoning hearings should be classified as adjudicatory. 11 Sutton, 729
N.W.2d at 798; see also Fleming, 502 P.2d at 331.
11While the Washington court held in Fleming that all zoning hearings should be
classified as adjudicatory, the decision was later overruled in Raynes v. City of
Leavenworth, following a legislative amendment. 821 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Wash. 1992) (en
banc). In Raynes, the court held that the particular board decision amending a zoning
ordinance was a legislative function. Id. at 1208.
 26
The Sutton case dealt with a different situation than many of our
previous zoning cases because it involved PUD zoning. Sutton, 729
N.W.2d at 798. We noted that the “quasi-judicial character of municipal
rezoning is particularly evident in matters involving PUD zoning.” Id. We
discussed the distinction between traditional rezoning and PUD zoning:
[Creating] zoning districts and rezoning land are legislative
actions, and . . . trial courts are not permitted to sit as
“super zoning boards” and overturn a board’s legislative
efforts.
....
The planned unit development concept varies from the
traditional concept of zoning classifications. It permits a
flexible approach to the regulation of land uses. Compliance
must be measured against certain stated standards. . . .
. . . [S]ince the Board was called upon to review an
interpretation and application of an ordinance . . . and the
ordinance was not challenged per se, the Board’s decision
was “clearly quasi-judicial.”
Id. (quoting Hirt v. Polk Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 578 So. 2d 415, 417
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
We find the situation we decide today to be much more analogous
to the one we faced in Montgomery than in Sutton. In this case, the city
council was acting in a legislative function in furtherance of its delegated
police powers. The council was not sitting to “determin[e] adjudicative
facts to decide the legal rights, privileges or duties of a particular party
based on that party’s particular circumstances.” Montgomery, 299
N.W.2d at 694. The city council decision to rezone was not undertaken
to weigh the legal rights of one party (the All-Star Ballpark Heaven)
versus another party (the petitioners). The council weighed all of the
information, reports, and comments available to it in order to determine
whether rezoning was in the best interest of the city as a whole. See,
27
e.g., Iowa Code § 414.3(1) (describing the delegated police powers to
include making decisions to promote health and the general welfare of
the community). We therefore hold that the proper standard of review in
this case is “the generally limited scope of review” we utilize in order “to
determine whether the decision by the Board to rezone is fairly
debatable.” Montgomery, 299 N.W.2d at 692.
Zoning regulations carry a strong presumption of validity. Molo
Oil, 692 N.W.2d at 691. A zoning regulation “is valid if it has any real,
substantial relation to the public health, comfort, safety, and welfare,
including the maintenance of property values.” Id. (quoting Shriver v.
City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Iowa 1997)). If the reasonableness
of a zoning ordinance is “fairly debatable,” then we decline to substitute
our judgment for that of the city council or board of supervisors. Id. The
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is “fairly debatable” when
for any reason it is open to dispute or controversy on
grounds that make sense or point to a logical deduction, and
where reasonable minds may differ; or where the evidence
provides a basis for a fair difference of opinion as to its
application to a particular property.
Id.; see also Neuzil v. City of Iowa City, 451 N.W.2d 159, 163–64 (Iowa
1990).
B. Validity of Ordinance 770. The petitioners allege Ordinance
770 is invalid for a number of reasons. They assert the city council was
not impartial; the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable;
the rezoning was contrary to the city’s comprehensive plan; and the
ordinance constitutes illegal spot zoning. We discuss each of the
petitioners’ arguments in turn.
1. Partiality of the city council. The decision to rezone the Field of
Dreams site was subject to fair debate. See Molo Oil, 692 N.W.2d at 691.
28
Members of the community came to multiple public hearings and
multiple council meetings. A number of community members—not
limited to the petitioners in this case—were against the rezoning.
However, other community members were unsure whether they
supported the rezoning and requested more information. Still others
expressed support for the rezoning and the new baseball and softball
complex. While it is true that several council members viewed the
rezoning and the project as an opportunity for the city, each council
member attended all meetings, read reports, listened to citizens speak for
and against the project, asked questions, and investigated issues
regarding water, sewage, crime, traffic, and other issues. Further
demonstrating that the issue was subject to fair debate is the final vote
on the decision to rezone. The final vote was 4–1, with one council
member voting against rezoning.
There is nothing in the record that demonstrates that any council
member or the mayor had any family or financial interest in the project.
The petitioners claim that members of the city council and mayor could
not be impartial or unbiased due to the mayor signing the MOU with the
developers, and several members participating in an economic
development bus trip to Des Moines to discuss the project with
legislators and state officials. We disagree. The mere participation in
such activities for the potential benefit of the city does not establish
partiality or bias. Rather, this is more akin to the council members
upholding their public duty by performing their due diligence in
determining what state aid might be available to help with the project
before any formal action was undertaken. The city council made its
decision based on what it believed was best for the community after a full
29
and open discussion of the issues over many months. We agree with the
district court that the city council was impartial in its rezoning decision.
2. Arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The party attacking the
validity of a zoning regulation carries the burden of demonstrating the
zoning is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. Id. A
regulation is arbitrary and unreasonable when it is not authorized by
statute or is contrary or unsupported by the facts. Baker v. Bd. of
Adjustment, 671 N.W.2d 405, 413 (Iowa 2003).
The city council’s decision to rezone the Field of Dreams site was
supported by the facts and was not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. The city council made its decision after a full and lengthy
consideration of the overall welfare of the city. The city council
investigated water, sewage, traffic, crime, and water runoff. It received
economic reports detailing increased jobs and revenue for the state and
city. Each member of the city council attended meetings, read reports,
asked questions, participated in public hearings, listened to the opinions
of community members, and considered the economic benefits and
impact on the city.
The petitioners also contend it was unreasonable for the mayor to
enter into the MOU. We have generally analyzed challenges to these
types of agreements to determine whether they are unreasonable,
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. See, e.g., Blumenthal Inv. Trusts
v. City of West Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 266 (Iowa 2001). While the
council members considered the MOU, they were not bound by it. See,
e.g., Marco Dev. Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa
1991). The MOU was simply an agreement whereby the council agreed
to consider a rezoning proposal partially due to the incredibly unique
circumstances surrounding the Field of Dreams land. Given the unique
30
parcel of land and the juxtaposition of agriculture and commercial land
that already existed, it was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious for
the city to agree to consider the possibility of rezoning the area.
3. Relationship to the city’s comprehensive plan. Iowa Code section
414.3 requires that any zoning regulations adopted by a city council or
board of supervisors “shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive
plan.” Iowa Code § 414.3. The party challenging a zoning decision on
the basis that it was not made in accordance with the city’s
comprehensive plan carries a heavy burden that requires the party to
counter the “strong presumption of validity accorded zoning decisions.”
37 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 383 (1996 & Supp. 2016), Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2016). This requirement was adopted to prevent
haphazard zoning. Wolf v. City of Ely, 493 N.W.2d 846, 849 (Iowa 1992).
The purpose of the comprehensive plan requirement is to ensure a board
or council acts rationally in applying its delegated zoning authority. Id.
at 849.
In the context of rezoning, we have held that “compliance with the
comprehensive plan requirement merely means that zoning authorities
have given ‘full consideration to the problem presented, including the
needs of the public, changing conditions, and the similarity of other land
in the same area.’ ” Iowa Coal Min. Co. v. Monroe County, 494 N.W.2d
664, 669 (Iowa 1993) (quoting Montgomery, 299 N.W.2d at 695). A
board’s zoning decision is not static, and the fact that a board or council
may have failed to predict that an area of land could be rezoned for a
different use is not enough to demonstrate that it acted without
considering the comprehensive plan. See, e.g., Montgomery, 299 N.W.2d
at 695.
31
The district court found that the rezoning was passed in
accordance with and in furtherance of the comprehensive plan, despite
none of the council members expressly linking their votes to the plan.
We agree. The council members gave full consideration to “the needs of
the public, changing conditions, and the similarity of other land in the
same area.” Id. The council held multiple meetings and the appropriate
public hearing during which community members were able to offer
differing viewpoints. All council members attended these meetings,
listened, and asked questions. The city council requested and reviewed
reports about water, sewage, water runoff, traffic, crime, and increased
economic benefits. The council considered the unique nature of the Field
of Dreams site and potential tourism benefits.
The city’s comprehensive plan notes that rezoning should be made
with consideration of the unique character of the area, the suitability of
the land for the proposed use, the conservation of buildings or values,
and the encouragement of the most appropriate use of the land.
Comprehensive Plan at 91. All of these goals were considered by the
council. The Field of Dreams site is a unique parcel of land unlike any
other land in that area. The council considered the distinctiveness of the
land and whether the proposed rezoning would be the best use of the site
for the benefit of the community, including its impact on tourism. The
council considered whether the proposed rezoning would be for the
overall health and welfare of the community as a whole, and whether it
would preserve the property for the benefit of its citizens. The city
council concluded that it would be consistent with its comprehensive
plan.
The city’s community builder plan also specifically addresses the
importance of preserving the Field of Dreams site in order to maintain
32
and increase tourism. The plan stated that a main concern for the city
was to “become much more aggressive in guiding and encouraging [the
city’s] growth.” Community Builder Plan at 2. It identified the loss of
tourism to the Field of Dreams site as one of the main threats to the city’s
growth. Id. at 5. We hold that the petitioners did not meet their burden
of demonstrating that the rezoning did not meet the requirements of the
city’s comprehensive plan.
4. Spot zoning. “Spot zoning is the creation of a small island of
property with restrictions on its use different from those imposed on
surrounding property.” Perkins, 636 N.W.2d at 67. Not all spot zoning is
illegal, however, and we have created a three-prong test for determining
whether spot zoning is valid. Id. Under this test, we consider
(1) whether the new zoning is germane to an object within
the police power; (2) whether there is a reasonable basis for
making a distinction between the spot zoned land and the
surrounding property; and (3) whether the rezoning is
consistent with the comprehensive plan.
Id.; see also Little v. Winborn, 518 N.W.2d 384, 388 (Iowa 1994). When
there is spot zoning, “there must be substantial and reasonable grounds
or basis for the discrimination when one lot or tract is singled out.”
Perkins, 636 N.W.2d at 67 (quoting Fox v. Polk Cty. Bd. of Supervisors,
569 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Iowa 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by
Sutton, 729 N.W.2d at 799).
As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge that the rezoning appears
to constitute spot zoning. The property surrounding the new commercial
area is agricultural land. The rezoning created a commercial “island” of
property amidst land zoned as agricultural. See, e.g., Little, 518 N.W.2d
at 388. However, that does not end our inquiry. The next step is to
determine whether the spot zoning was valid. See id.
33
First, we have already determined that the rezoning was made
within the scope of the city council’s general police power. The decision
to rezone the area for the project was made in consideration of the
general health and welfare of the community. Second, the council had a
reasonable basis for its decision to rezone the land despite the
surrounding property. The Field of Dreams property has been a unique
site for years. The baseball field on the Lansing farm has been used in
the community for baseball and softball games, in addition to local and
national tourism. Part of the location’s charm is simply that it is a
baseball field surrounded by farmland. The council made the decision to
rezone and allow for more baseball fields to capitalize on this unique site
and increase tourism for the City of Dyersville. Last, as we already
concluded, the spot zoning is consistent with the overall comprehensive
plan. The city’s community builder plan expressly mentions the
necessity of maintaining the Field of Dreams site and increasing tourism
for the city. We agree with the decision of the district court and hold that
this was not illegal spot zoning.
C. Triggering of Dyersville Code. The petitioners allege that
there was sufficient opposition to the proposed rezoning contained in
Ordinance 770 to trigger a unanimous vote under Dyersville Code of
Ordinances § 165.39(5). The code section provides,
Council Vote. If the [Zoning and Planning] Commission
recommends against, or if a protest against such proposed
amendment, supplement, change, modification or repeal is
presented in writing to the Clerk, duly signed by the owners
of twenty percent (20%) or more either of the area of the lots
included in such proposed change, or of those immediately
adjacent in the rear thereof extending the depth of one lot or
not to exceed two hundred (200) feet therefrom, or of those
directly opposite thereto, extending the depth of one lot or
not to exceed two hundred (200) feet from the street frontage
of such opposite lots, such amendment, supplement,
34
change, modifications, or repeal shall not become effective
except by the favorable vote of all members of the Council.
Dyersville, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 165.39(5) (2011). Based on this
code section, the petitioners contend that a unanimous vote of the
council was required for the rezoning.
On the day of the hearing on the rezoning, the petitioners’ attorney
faxed a letter to the city clerk purporting to include the signatures of the
required twenty percent of landowners needed to trigger the unanimous
council vote. The opposition letter included the signatures of a number
of individuals; however, only two of the signatories owned small amounts
of property adjacent to the property to be rezoned. The petitioners did
not provide a letter that included the requisite twenty percent of adjacent
land owners at the time of the meeting, nor did they provide a letter or
other document at trial. Accordingly, there was no formal or valid
protest which would invoke the requirement of a unanimous vote.
D. Use of 200-Foot Buffer Zone. The ordinance that rezoned the
Field of Dreams property included a 200-foot buffer zone of agricultural
land that surrounded the property that was rezoned to commercial. The
petitioners challenge the use of this 200-foot buffer zone. They argue
that the buffer zone was put in place in order to prevent the nearby
property owners from objecting to the project under the procedure
outlined in Iowa Code section 414.5. The council asserts that the
purpose of the 200-foot buffer zone was to address some of the concerns
raised about manure spreading, farming activities, and children playing
baseball up against the property line of adjoining owners.
At first blush, the 200-foot buffer zone can appear to be unfair, as
it limits the number of adjacent landowners who can object to the
rezoning. However, it does provide a benefit to adjacent landowners by
35
addressing their expressed concerns with the rezoning. A number of
petitioners raised concerns about hunting, spreading of manure, and
grazing if their farming property was directly adjacent to the new
ballfields. The buffer zone provides a solution to those concerns.
Additionally, a number of other courts have held that a council
may avoid a supermajority vote requirement by creating a buffer zone
between the property to be rezoned and the land of adjacent property
owners. See, e.g., Schwarz v. City of Glendale, 950 P.2d 167, 170 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the use of buffer zones is the majority
approach and upholding the use of a 150-foot buffer zone to avoid the
triggering of a supermajority vote); St. Bede’s Episcopal Church v. City of
Santa Fe, 509 P.2d 876, 877 (N.M. 1973) (upholding a 100-foot buffer
zone utilized to avoid the triggering of a supermajority vote); Eadie v.
Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 854 N.E.2d 464, 467–68 (N.Y. 2006)
(upholding a 100-foot buffer zone used to avoid triggering a
supermajority vote); Armstrong v. McInnis, 142 S.E.2d 670, 679 (N.C.
1965) (upholding a buffer zone of 101 feet that avoided triggering a
statutory supermajority vote). Some courts require a finding that the
imposition of a buffer zone was for the town’s general welfare and was
not made for arbitrary or capricious reasons. See, e.g., Town of Beech
Mountain v. Genesis Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc., 786 S.E.2d 335, 345 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2016) (noting it was proper for the district court to allow factual
evidence regarding the question of whether a 200-foot buffer zone was
arbitrary or capricious).
Nevertheless, even if the petitioners had established the
requirement of a supermajority vote under Iowa Code section 414.5, the
requirement was met. The statute requires the pertinent ordinance to
pass by a vote of three-fourths of all members of the council, or seventy-
36
five percent. Iowa Code § 414.5. The rezoning of the Field of Dreams site
passed by a vote of 4–1, or eighty percent.
E. Validity of Ordinance 777. While the first appeal was
pending, it was determined that Ordinance 770, and the corresponding
notices regarding the rezoning, contained an incorrect legal description.
In an attempt to correct the incorrect legal description, the city council
passed Ordinance 777, which rezoned the subject property with the
correct legal description. The petitioners allege Ordinance 777 is invalid
because it rezoned property without the appropriate notice, public
hearing, and due process requirements of Gorman v. City Development
Board, 565 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1997).
In Gorman, the Roemig family requested the voluntary annexation
of approximately 120 acres of their property into the City of Cedar
Rapids. Id. at 608. The Roemigs erred in describing their property,
which resulted in the description they provided to the city including forty
acres of land owned by a neighbor and leaving out eighty acres owned by
the Roemigs. Id. The city followed the proper notice protocols, but
included the incorrect legal description. Id. The city council held a
public meeting and unanimously adopted a resolution approving the
annexation of the Roemig property. Id. The Linn County Board of
Supervisors approved the annexation and, at the same time, corrected
the error in the legal description. Id. A resident of Cedar Rapids,
Gorman, sought judicial review. Id. We ultimately held that the
Roemigs’ application for voluntary annexation did not substantially
comply with the statutory requirements because the applicable statute
required a legal description of the property. Id. at 610.
We reached this conclusion for a number of reasons. First, the
statute required the legal description of the property. Id. Second, the
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statute required published notice, and we found that this implied a
requirement that the property be legally descripted. Id. Last, the
description was relied upon throughout the proceedings and therefore
did not provide proper notice to the public or other potentially interested
parties regarding which property was meant to be annexed. Id. at 611.
Failing to comply with every word of a statute is not fatal in every
situation. Id.; see also City of Des Moines v. City Dev. Bd., 473 N.W.2d
197, 200 (Iowa 1991). What we require is substantial compliance, which
we have defined as “compliance in respect to essential matters necessary
to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute.” Gorman, 565 N.W.2d
at 610 (quoting Burnam v. Bd. of Review, 501 N.W.2d 553, 554 (Iowa
1993)). We noted that, when we determine “whether the erroneous
description satisfies the requirement of substantial compliance, we
consider the impact of the error upon the proceedings.” Id. at 610. The
error in this case was significant because two-thirds of the property the
Roemigs intended to annex into the city was not included in the legal
description and forty acres were included that were never owned by the
Roemigs. Id. at 611–12.
We have also decided other cases that included errors in the legal
description of property. In Incorporated Town of Windsor Heights v.
Colby, the legal description was listed as “Walnut Creek” when the
proper description should have been “North Walnut Creek.” 249 Iowa
802, 804–05 89 N.W.2d 157, 158 (1958). We held this was a “technical
misdescription” and was not substantial. Id. at 806–07, 89 N.W.2d at
159. The error did not mislead any of the parties. Id. In Wall v. County
Board of Education, a lengthy description of a parcel of real estate
included one typographical error. 249 Iowa 209, 221–22 86 N.W.2d 231,
238–39 (1957). We held that the error did not mislead and did not
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adversely affect the reorganization of school districts at issue. Id.
Generally, substantial compliance requires that a statute or rule “has
been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which it was
adopted.” Bontrager Auto Serv., Inc. v. Iowa City Bd. of Adjustment, 748
N.W.2d 483, 488 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Brown v. John Deere Waterloo
Tractor Works, 423 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Iowa 1988)). Thus, we must
determine whether the purpose of the statute or rule has been
accomplished. Id.
In this case, neither the Iowa Code nor the Dyersville City Code of
Ordinances require notice of the legal description of property. Iowa Code
§ 414.4 (requiring hearing and a notice of the time and place of the
hearing but not requiring any particular description of the land); id.
§ 414.5 (noting that the same notice requirements apply equally to
changes and amendments, and not requiring a legal description); id.
§ 414.6 (establishing a zoning commission responsible for recommending
boundaries, but not requiring a legal description before a public hearing);
Dyersville, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 165.39(1) (requiring a clear
description of the land, but not a legal description). Further, none of the
members of the public were misled about the property the council voted
to rezone. The intent of the notice statute requires a public hearing
during which concerned citizens may be heard. Iowa Code § 414.4. The
statute provides a procedure for providing published notice of a time and
place of a public hearing, which was followed by the city council. Id.
Many members of the community came to the public hearing and voiced
their concerns about the rezoning of the Field of Dreams site. Many of
the notices contained maps and drawings regarding the proposed
property to be rezoned. There was no reasonable confusion regarding the
property which was being considered for rezoning under ordinance 770.
39
Likewise, after the correction was included in ordinance 777, the city
counsel provided notice to the public. No community members spoke at
the city counsel meeting during which ordinance 777 was discussed and
passed. We agree with the decision of the district court and find that the
proceedings before the city council substantially complied with the
statutory requirements. Ordinance 777 is valid.
F. Equal Protection and Due Process. The petitioners assert
that the rezoning violated the equal protection and due process clauses
of the Iowa Constitution. For purposes of the equal protection clause,
they argue that all of the surrounding neighbors of the rezoned area are
similarly situated, but the 200-foot buffer surrounding three sides of the
area prevented those neighbors from exercising the same right to object
as the neighbors whose property does not have a buffer. For purposes of
procedural due process, they assert that they were not provided a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.
The Iowa Constitution guarantees “[a]ll laws of a general nature
shall have a uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to
any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Iowa Const. art. I,
§ 6. In practice, this means that “laws treat alike all people who are
‘similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purposes of the law.’ ”
McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 830 (Iowa 2015) (quoting
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009)). Zoning and land
use ordinances that do not impact a suspect classification must only
meet the rational relationship test. 16C C.J.S. Building and Zoning
Regulations § 1590, 160–61 (2015); see also Blumenthal, 636 N.W.2d at
268.
40
We generally consider the federal and state equal protection
clauses to be “identical in scope, import, and purpose.” War Eagle Vill.
Apartments v. Plummer, 775 N.W.2d 714, 719 (Iowa 2009) (quoting State
v. Bower, 725 N.W.2d 435, 441 (Iowa 2006)). The Supreme Court has
succinctly articulated the rational basis test under the Federal
Constitution as a “question [of] whether the classifications drawn in a
statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.” Bierkamp v. Rogers, 293
N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa 1980) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 191, 85 S. Ct. 283, 288, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222, 228 (1964)). We use this
test as a guiding principle in our analysis of the rational basis test under
the Iowa Constitution. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald (RACI),
675 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2004) (“It was this enunciation of the rational
basis test that our court said in Bierkamp was appropriate for analyzing
a claim based on the Iowa equality provision found in article I, section 6
of the Iowa Constitution.”); Bierkamp, 293 N.W.2d at 580 (“We have long
found a standard similar to that of McLaughlin to flow from Article I,
section 6.”).
Based on the principles of the federal test, we have developed a
three-part framework to assist our analysis when we evaluate whether
the rational-basis test has been met under the Iowa Constitution. See,
e.g., McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 831; Horsfield Materials, Inc. v. City of
Dyersville, 834 N.W.2d 444, 458–59 (Iowa 2013); RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 7–
8. First, we must determine whether there was a valid, “realistically
conceivable” purpose that served a legitimate government interest.
McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 831 (quoting RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 7); see also
Horsfield, 834 N.W.2d at 458. To be realistically conceivable, the
ordinance cannot be “so overinclusive and underinclusive as to be
irrational.” Horsfield, 834 N.W.2d at 459 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 757
41
N.W.2d 431, 439 (Iowa 2008)). Next, we decide whether the identified
reason has any basis in fact. McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 831. Last, we
evaluate whether the relationship between the classification and the
purpose for the classification “is so weak that the classification must be
viewed as arbitrary.” Id. (quoting RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 8).
We also recognize that the rational-basis test is a deferential test.
Horsfield, 834 N.W.2d at 458; Ames Rental Prop. Ass’n v. City of Ames,
736 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Iowa 2007). Under the rational-basis test, we
presume that the ordinance is constitutional unless the challenging
party is able to meet its burden to “negat[e] every reasonable basis that
might support the disparate treatment.” Horsfield, 834 N.W.2d at 458
(quoting Ames Rental Prop. Ass’n, 736 N.W.2d at 259). We will not
declare something unconstitutional under the rational-basis test unless
it “clearly, palpably, and without doubt infringe[s] upon the constitution.”
RACI, 675 N.W.2d at 8 (quoting Glowacki v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs,
501 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 1993)).
The rezoning decision here clearly meets the rational-basis test.
The council made the decision to rezone the Field of Dreams site in
consideration of the best interests of Dyersville. It considered the
economic impact of increased tourism and investigated any water,
sewage, traffic, and crime issues the rezoning could create. The decision
was made with the overall zoning scheme of the city in mind, as one of
the main goals of the comprehensive plan is to expand tourism to
Dyersville via the Field of Dreams site. There was a “realistically
conceivable” purpose for the rezoning that served a legitimate
government interest, because the council believed the rezoning could
increase tourism to the city. See, e.g., McQuistion, 872 N.W.2d at 831.
The council’s determination that the ballpark could increase tourism to
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the city and could lead to more jobs and to the tax base of the city was
based on facts presented to and considered by the council. See, e.g., id.
The council ordered studies done regarding the financial impact on the
city and listened to the opinions of multiple community members.
Additionally, the use of the 200-foot buffer zone was a reasonable
solution to the concerns of the community members and was not
arbitrary or capricious. Last, as we determined above, the reason for the
rezoning was not arbitrary. See, e.g., id. There was no equal protection
violation in this case.
The due process clause commands that “no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Iowa
Const. art. I, § 9. “The requirements of procedural due process are
simple and well established: (1) notice; and (2) a meaningful opportunity
to be heard.” Blumenthal, 636 N.W.2d at 264; see also Aluminum Co. of
Am. v. Musal, 622 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Iowa 2001) (“The two fundamental
principles of due process are (1) notice and (2) the opportunity to
defend.”).
We have held that procedural due process does not require a
formal evidentiary hearing before the city council in the context of
rezoning. Montgomery, 299 N.W.2d at 693. “Even if we assume that
neighbors to a rezoned area have a life, liberty or property interest which
requires some type of hearing, the statutorily required comment-
argument hearing . . . is sufficient to meet due process.” Id. The
petitioners were given adequate notice of the parcel of land that was
proposed to be rezoned and adequate notice of the time and place of city
council meetings and hearings. Further, they were actually heard on
numerous occasions, as a number of the petitioners attended both
regular city council meetings and the public hearing on the issue of
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rezoning. All community members in attendance who wished to speak
were allowed. The petitioners in this case were afforded procedural due
process.
III. Conclusion.
We conclude that the district court was correct in annulling the
writs of certiorari. The city council acted in its proper legislative function
when it rezoned the Field of Dreams property. Both ordinances were
validly passed, and no procedural or substantive errors affected the
decisions of the city council in its rezoning decisions.
DECISION OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED; WRITS
ANNULLED.
All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who concurs specially.
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#15–1413, Residential & Ag. Advisory Comm. v. Dyersville City Council
WIGGINS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the majority decision. Our decision does not mean
that the actions of the city council are not beyond the reach of the
persons they were elected to serve. At the next election, the council’s
actions are subject to review by the electorate. Under the separation-of-
powers doctrine, “electoral control [is] an important restraint on
legislative conduct.” Teague v. Mosley, 552 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Iowa
1996).