Amended November 8, 2016 Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Michael Gerard Reilly ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 05–1365
Filed September 2, 2016
Amended November 8, 2016
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
MICHAEL GERARD REILLY,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
A former attorney whose license to practice law we previously
revoked submitted an application for reinstatement of his license to
practice law in Iowa. APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT
PROVISIONALLY GRANTED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS SET
FORTH IN THIS OPINION.
Tara van Brederode and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Michael G. Reilly, Council Bluffs, pro se.
2
PER CURIAM.
Ten years ago, we revoked the respondent’s license to practice law.
This matter comes before us on the respondent’s application for
reinstatement of his license to practice law under Iowa Court Rule
34.25(9). We provisionally grant the respondent’s application for
reinstatement of his law license subject to the conditions set forth in this
opinion.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
We admitted respondent Michael G. Reilly to practice law in Iowa
in June 1981, and the Nebraska Supreme Court admitted him to
practice law in Nebraska in September 1982. In 2006, we revoked his
license to practice law in Iowa. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Reilly, 708 N.W.2d 82, 82 (Iowa 2006). Thereafter, the Nebraska
Supreme Court disbarred him in a reciprocal disciplinary proceeding.
State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of Neb. Supreme Ct. v. Reilly, 712
N.W.2d 278, 278–79 (Neb. 2006) (per curiam). Prior to the revocation of
his law licenses, Reilly engaged in the private practice of law at a law firm
in Council Bluffs, Iowa. He had an excellent reputation as a diligent and
skilled trial attorney.
We revoked Reilly’s license to practice law in Iowa because he
misappropriated client funds. In November 2000, Reilly obtained a
settlement of $137,500 on behalf of the parents of a child who sustained
a serious eye injury and caused a conservatorship to be opened for the
child. Reilly, 708 N.W.2d at 83. Upon receiving the settlement funds,
Reilly deposited them in his firm’s trust account. Id. In addition to the
checks issued from the trust account to cover the contingent fee and
expenses associated with the case, Reilly deposited additional checks
totaling the remaining balance of the settlement funds in his personal
3
bank account rather than the conservatorship account in December
2000 and January 2001. Id. At the time, Reilly had an active gambling
addiction that caused him to be constantly in need of funds. Id. at 85.
In August and September 2001, after he unsuccessfully attempted
to secure a loan from a friend to repay the misappropriated funds, Reilly
wrote a series of kited checks between his personal accounts attempting
to float a check to the conservatorship account to replace the
misappropriated funds. Id. at 83. Eventually, a bank associated with
one of Reilly’s personal accounts honored a check he wrote to the
conservatorship account after a bank associated with another one of his
personal accounts honored a kited check he had written. Id. The
account with the second bank ended up $96,000 overdrawn because the
bank was unable to cash another check Reilly had written from yet
another account with insufficient funds. Id. By the time Reilly repaid
the bank the following year, it had already notified federal authorities.
Id.
After our client security and disciplinary commissions received a
letter from the United States Attorney recounting these events and the
Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board conducted an
investigation confirming them, the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa recommended we suspend Reilly from the
practice of law for three years. Id. at 82, 83–84. Instead, we concluded
consistency with our past decisions addressing misappropriation of client
funds and the protection of the public warranted a harsher sanction. In
January 2006, we revoked Reilly’s license to practice law in Iowa. Id. at
85.
In January 2009, Reilly filed an application for reinstatement of his
license to practice law in Iowa based on the progress he had made in
4
addressing his gambling addiction. The Board opposed reinstatement,
noting the Iowa Court Rules contained no provision addressing
reinstatement following a license revocation as opposed to a license
suspension. Though the Board acknowledged we had reinstated a
revoked license in the past, it insisted the standard for assessing
whether reinstatement was appropriate was set forth in Committee on
Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Brodsky, 487 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1992),
in which we stated,
License revocations are ordinarily permanent in Iowa.
Indeed our rules spell out no special procedure for applying
for readmission by a lawyer whose license has been revoked.
On occasion we nevertheless consider such
applications under our inherent power and, in extremely rare
cases, have granted them. These rare cases have arisen
where, in long retrospect, it appears the need for permanent
revocation was debatable, and where there has been a
demonstrated reformation on the part of the lawyer so that
the public interest would not be compromised by
readmission.
Id. at 675. Following a hearing, we issued an order in which we rejected
the application for reinstatement. In the order, we concluded Reilly had
not “carried his heavy burden of showing that the need for permanent
revocation was debatable and that he has undergone such a reformation
that the public interest would not be threatened by readmitting him to
the practice of law.”
In May 2015, following a period of public comment, we amended
Iowa Court Rule 35.14 to renumber existing provisions within the rule
and incorporate new provisions setting forth a procedure by which an
individual whose license to practice law has been revoked may apply for
its reinstatement. The amendments became effective September 1, 2015.
By subsequent amendment shortly thereafter, we moved the provisions
5
addressing reinstatement to Iowa Court Rule 34.25. 1 The purpose of the
amendment was to allow an attorney who has rehabilitated him or
herself the opportunity to petition the court for reinstatement and prove
to the court he or she has good moral character, is fit to practice law,
and is in all respects worthy of readmission to the Iowa bar.
Reinstatement under the rule is not meant to be automatic.
In November 2015, Reilly filed his second application for
reinstatement of his license to practice law in the State of Iowa with this
court. Prior to submitting the application, Reilly submitted a request for
preparation of a character and fitness report by the National Conference
of Bar Examiners (NCBE) and paid an administrative fee to the Iowa
Board of Law Examiners as required by Iowa Court Rule 34.25(8). In his
application for reinstatement, Reilly first reported that we admitted him
to the Iowa bar in June 1981 and revoked his license to practice law in
Iowa in January 2006. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.25(9)(b). Reilly next affirmed
that he had complied in all respects with all orders of this court
pertaining to his license revocation and the Iowa Court Rule governing
the notification of clients, opposing counsel, and courts upon revocation
of an attorney’s license to practice law. See id. Finally, he affirmed that
the Client Security Trust Fund expended no funds due to his conduct.
See id. r. 34.25(9)(e). Reilly attached a letter from the Office of
Professional Regulation confirming he had paid all fees set forth in the
rules governing the Client Security Commission, his annual continuing
legal education fees, and all costs associated with the disciplinary matter
that culminated in the revocation of his license to practice law. See id. r.
34.25(9)(d)–(e).
1The subsequent amendment became effective April 1, 2016, after Reilly filed his
second application for reinstatement.
6
With his application for reinstatement, Reilly submitted an affidavit
detailing his personal history, work history, and educational history
following his license revocation along with letters from six attorneys
currently practicing in the Fourth Judicial District of Iowa recommending
his license to practice law be reinstated. See id. r. 34.25(9)(c). In the
affidavit, Reilly indicated he received treatment for his compulsive
gambling addiction from April 2002 through November 2008. He also
indicated he has abstained from casino gambling since February 2002.
Reilly also described his work immediately following his license
revocation as a litigation consultant offering mediation services to law
firms and individual attorneys, as well as his current work providing
consulting services on insurance litigation and claims handling involving
insurance policies of various types issued to clients throughout the
country. Finally, Reilly indicated that although he has not received any
formal educational training since we revoked his license, he has
maintained his familiarity with current Iowa law by regularly reviewing
state and federal appellate court decisions as well as through his
employment, which requires him to deal with statutes, rules, and
regulations in most states.
The recommendation letters Reilly submitted from members of the
bar recommending his reinstatement described him as a particularly
diligent and skilled trial attorney who consistently accepted responsibility
for the actions that led to the revocation of his license and expressed
remorse for the harm they caused. The individuals who penned the
letters were practicing attorneys who knew Reilly when he was still in
practice and remained in close contact with him after we revoked his
license. Each expressed the opinion that Reilly is of good moral
character and fit to practice law. The letters also described how Reilly
7
aggressively pursued treatment for and overcame the gambling addiction
that motivated him to engage in the conduct for which we revoked his
law license. 2
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a
resistance to the application for reinstatement urging us to deny it.
Relying on Brodsky, the Board argued reinstatement is inappropriate in
this case because revocation is indisputably the appropriate sanction for
conduct involving the conversion of client funds to which an attorney has
no colorable future claim. Moreover, the Board argued the fact that
Reilly misappropriated client funds confirms that he lacks the
fundamental honesty and integrity necessary to be an attorney.
Although the Board acknowledged Reilly had an active gambling
addiction when he misappropriated client funds, it argued his addiction
is irrelevant to the question of whether reinstatement of his law license is
appropriate because no illness, regardless of its severity, can excuse an
attorney’s dishonest conduct. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Hansel, 558 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Iowa 1997). Finally, the Board
claimed we should not reinstate Reilly’s law license because the passage
of time, his payment of restitution, and his completion of a treatment
program did nothing to erase the harm to the public and the legal
profession that resulted from his conduct.
The board of law examiners also filed a report and
recommendation concerning the application for reinstatement. See Iowa
Ct. R. 34.25(13). The board noted that, with the exception of two
2After
Reilly filed his application for reinstatement, we subsequently received two
additional letters from district court judges in the Fourth Judicial District of Iowa
recommending his application to practice law in Iowa be reinstated. The letters were
substantially similar to the letters from attorneys that Reilly submitted with his
application for reinstatement.
8
foreclosure proceedings closely connected to the events leading up to the
revocation of his license, Reilly has had no significant involvement in any
criminal or civil proceedings since we revoked his license and has
maintained consistent employment since that time. Although the board
noted that Reilly appears to have made great strides in overcoming his
gambling addiction, a four-member majority of the board declined to
recommend reinstatement of his law license, concluding Reilly submitted
insufficient evidence concerning his rehabilitation to demonstrate he
presently has the requisite moral character to be worthy of readmission
to the bar. In particular, the majority noted the status of Reilly’s
gambling addiction had not been professionally evaluated since 2008.
The majority also noted Reilly did not submit an expert opinion
addressing the likelihood that his addiction would relapse or a copy of
his current credit report. Finally, the majority expressed concern that
Reilly indicated he has abstained from “casino gambling” in his
application for reinstatement but did not address whether he has
engaged in other forms of gambling. Two members of the board
dissented, concluding Reilly had met his burden of demonstrating he is
“of good moral character and in all respects worthy of readmission to the
bar” despite the seriousness of the conduct that led to the revocation of
his license. The dissenters noted Reilly’s character and fitness
examination revealed no information to suggest he would present a
danger to the public if we reinstated his license. 3 See id. r. 34.25(9)(c).
Following a hearing on the application for reinstatement in
January 2016, we ordered Reilly to provide copies of his complete credit
3The Iowa Board of Law Examiners consists of five persons admitted to practice
law in the state and two persons not admitted to practice law in the state. See Iowa Ct.
R. 31.1(1). One board member took no part in the board decision concerning the report
and recommendation.
9
report and a report evaluating the status of his gambling addiction
prepared by a qualified professional to this court and the board of law
examiners. See id. r. 34.25(11), (15). We further ordered the board of
law examiners to interview Reilly and file a supplemental report and
recommendation concerning his application for reinstatement upon
receipt of the credit report and evaluation. See id. r. 34.25(11). Finally,
we ordered the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board to file a
supplemental statement indicating whether reinstatement is warranted
under the facts of this case. See id. We held this matter in abeyance
pending our receipt of the requested documents from Reilly, the board of
law examiners, and the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary
Board.
Thereafter, Reilly filed a copy of his current credit report and a
written report evaluating the status of his gambling addiction prepared
by the licensed mental health provider and certified compulsive gambling
counselor who treated him from 2002 to 2008. The report concluded
Reilly has continually kept his casino gambling addiction in full
remission and requires no further treatment. Though it acknowledged
Reilly admitted to occasionally participating in an office pool, purchasing
a lottery ticket, or betting on a golf game, it indicated that none of these
forms of gambling were problematic in nature for Reilly. The credit
report Reilly submitted supports this conclusion, as it showed that Reilly
makes his payments on time, has little revolving debt, and has a credit
score in the very-good-to-exceptional range.
Upon receiving the evaluation and credit report, the board of law
examiners interviewed Reilly and prepared a supplemental report and
recommendation concerning his application for reinstatement. The
supplemental report and recommendation indicated a majority of the
10
board agreed Reilly had met his burden of demonstrating he is “of good
moral character and in all respects worthy of readmission to the bar.”
Thus, the board recommended we reinstate his license to practice law.
Id. r. 34.25(13). Two board members dissented without providing an
explanation. 4
In its supplemental statement, the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Board once again urged us to deny Reilly’s application for
reinstatement of his license to practice law. More precisely, the Board
argued any former attorney whose law license has been revoked due to
misappropriation of client funds with respect to which he or she had no
colorable future claim is ineligible for reinstatement because such
conduct is fundamentally dishonest and worthy of a permanent sanction,
not a temporary one. In his response to the supplemental statement,
Reilly pointed out the grievance commission did not find his character
beyond redemption or fundamentally unfit for the practice of law in 2006
when it concluded a three-year suspension, rather than revocation of his
license, was the appropriate sanction for his misconduct.
Upon receipt of the additional documents we requested from Reilly,
the board of law examiners, and the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Board, we took up the matter for resolution without further
oral argument.
II. Standards for Determining the Eligibility of an Applicant
Seeking Reinstatement of His or Her License to Practice Law in
Iowa.
Iowa Court Rule 34.25(15) states that a former attorney who
applies for reinstatement of his or her license to practice law in Iowa
4Once again, one board member took no part in the board decision concerning
the report and recommendation.
11
“bears the burden of demonstrating that the applicant is of good moral
character, is fit to practice law, and has complied in all respects with the
terms of the order or judgment of revocation.” It further indicates that
an applicant for reinstatement must submit “satisfactory proof that the
applicant is of good moral character and is in all respects worthy of
readmission to the bar.” Iowa Ct. R. 34.25(9)(c). Accordingly, an
applicant seeking reinstatement of his or her license to practice law must
demonstrate his or her moral character and fitness for the practice of law
by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. See In re Peterson, 439
N.W.2d 165, 166 (Iowa 1989) (concluding an applicant for admission to
the Iowa bar must demonstrate his or her moral fitness to practice law
by a convincing preponderance of the evidence before we will reverse a
decision of the board of law examiners denying him or her an
opportunity to sit for the bar because by rule the applicant bears the
burden of submitting “satisfactory proof” of his or her fitness to practice
law). “A convincing preponderance of the evidence is more than a
preponderance of the evidence, but less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d
596, 601 (Iowa 2012). Numerous subsections of the rule set forth
various prerequisites and procedural requirements associated with
submitting an application for reinstatement. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.25(7),
(8), (9), (15).
Our review of an application for reinstatement is de novo. Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stowe, 830 N.W.2d 737, 739 (Iowa
2013). In reviewing an application for reinstatement, we remain mindful
that the primary goal of attorney discipline is protection of the public, not
punishment of the attorney. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d 466, 487 (Iowa 2014). Therefore, our primary
12
task in considering an application for reinstatement is to assess whether
the applicant seeking reinstatement of his or her law license has proved
he or she has good moral character, is fit to practice law, and is in all
respects worthy of readmission to the Iowa bar. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.25(9),
(15).
We now contemplate the factors we will consider in making that
assessment. The American Bar Association has promulgated a model
reinstatement rule listing eight criteria for consideration in assessing an
application for reinstatement. See Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enf’t r. 25(E) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2002). 5 Similarly, some states in which
5The model rule states,
A lawyer may be reinstated or readmitted only if the lawyer meets
each of the following criteria, or, if not, presents good and sufficient
reason why the lawyer should nevertheless be reinstated or readmitted:
(1) The lawyer has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all
prior disciplinary orders except to the extent that they are abated under
Rule 26.
(2) The lawyer has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension or
disbarment.
(3) If the lawyer was suffering under a physical or mental disability or
infirmity at the time of suspension or disbarment, including alcohol or
other drug abuse, the disability or infirmity has been removed. Where
alcohol or other drug abuse was a causative factor in the lawyer’s
misconduct, the lawyer shall not be reinstated unless:
(a) the lawyer has pursued appropriate rehabilitative
treatment;
(b) the lawyer has abstained from the use of alcohol or
other drugs for at least [one year]; and
(c) the lawyer is likely to continue to abstain from alcohol
or other drugs.
(4) The lawyer recognizes the wrongfulnesss and seriousness of the
misconduct for which the lawyer was suspended or disbarred.
(5) The lawyer has not engaged in any other professional misconduct
since suspension or disbarment.
(6) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the lawyer was disciplined, the
lawyer has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law.
13
disbarred attorneys may be reinstated have adopted court or disciplinary
rules specifying the criteria to be considered in assessing applications for
reinstatement. See, e.g., Ill. Supreme Ct. R. 767(f); N.D. R. Lawyer
Discipline 4.5(F); Md. R. 19-752(h)(2). In states with less specific
reinstatement rules, courts “have adopted diverse ethical inventories to
assess an applicant for reinstatement.” In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d 297, 300
& n.3 (S.D. 1997) (surveying cases).
The myriad of factors relied upon in assessing applications for
reinstatement vary from state to state. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation,
Reinstatement of Attorney After Disbarment, Suspension, or Resignation,
70 A.L.R. 2d 268, §§ 11–18, at 283–93 (1960 & 2007 Later Case Service &
Supp. 2015). Furthermore, there is no clear consensus among state
supreme courts or disciplinary agencies as to how to weigh the relevant
factors. G.M. Filisko, The Rough Road to Redemption, 99 A.B.A. J. 46, 49
(2013). Nonetheless, the diverse ethical inventories and rules relied upon
in assessing the reinstatement applications of previously disbarred
attorneys generally serve a common purpose—to aid in determining the
likelihood that “the public can rely on the competence and integrity of
the previously disbarred attorney.” In re Cooke, 42 A.3d 610, 615–16
(Md. 2012) (quoting In re Murray, 558 A.2d 710, 711 (Md. 1989)).
_______________
(7) The lawyer has kept informed about recent developments in the law
and is competent to practice.
(8) In addition, a lawyer who has been disbarred must pass the bar
examination and the character and fitness examination.
Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enf’t r. 25(E). The accompanying commentary
instructs that the “presumption . . . should be against readmission.” Id. r. 25 cmt.
This presumption reflects the primary purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings—
protection of the public. In re Reinstatement of Wiederholt, 295 P.3d 396, 399 (Alaska
2013). It is also consistent with our conclusion that a lawyer seeking readmission
establish his or her entitlement to reinstatement by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence.
14
Undoubtedly, the protection of the public is of paramount
importance in evaluating an application for reinstatement. See Barnhill,
847 N.W.2d at 487; see also In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d at 299. As we have
often observed,
[a]ttorney disciplinary proceedings are not designed to
punish, but rather to determine the fitness of an officer of
[the] court to continue in that capacity, to insulate the
courts and the public from those persons unfit to practice
the law, to protect the integrity of and the public confidence
in our system of justice, and to deter other lawyers from
engaging in similar acts or practices.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Santiago, 869 N.W.2d 172, 181
(Iowa 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 378 (Iowa 2005)).
Though we acknowledge the important purposes served by attorney
disciplinary proceedings, we share the view of other state supreme courts
that “a fallen lawyer may rise again.” In re Cooke, 42 A.3d at 614
(quoting In re Murray, 558 A.2d at 711). In determining whether an
attorney previously disbarred for misconduct has demonstrated his or
her eligibility for reinstatement, one “major consideration . . . is whether
the disbarred attorney has overcome those weaknesses which produced
the earlier misconduct.” In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Rosellini,
739 P.2d 658, 660 (Wash. 1987); see In re Reinstatement of Robbins, 836
P.2d 965, 966 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc).
Mindful of the purposes attorney discipline serves, we conclude the
following factors are most relevant to assessing whether an applicant
seeking reinstatement of his or her license to practice law in Iowa has
proved his or her good moral character, fitness for the practice of law,
and worthiness of readmission to the bar:
15
1. The nature and character of the conduct that led us to revoke
the applicant’s license to practice law as well as the context in which the
applicant engaged in that conduct;
2. Whether the applicant recognizes the wrongfulness and
seriousness of the conduct that led us to revoke the applicant’s license to
practice law;
3. Whether the applicant has demonstrated candor and sincerity
in communications with this court and other entities assessing his or her
current moral character, fitness for the practice of law, and worthiness
for readmission to the Iowa bar;
4. Whether the applicant has demonstrated with respect to any
physical or mental condition such as addiction or substance abuse that
was a causative factor in the conduct that led to revocation of his or her
license:
a. That the applicant has completed appropriate rehabilitative
treatment from a qualified treatment provider;
b. That the applicant is presently abstaining from any behavior or
substance use believed by his or her qualified treatment provider to be
problematic for the applicant and has been abstaining from such
behavior or substance use for a significant period of time; and
c. That the applicant is likely to continue to abstain from any such
behavior or substance;
5. How much time has passed since the applicant’s license to
practice law was revoked and the nature of any activities the applicant
has engaged in during that time, including whether the applicant has
engaged in or attempted to engage in the unauthorized practice of law or
any other professional misconduct since the revocation of his or her
license;
16
6. The opinions of the attorneys recommending reinstatement of
the applicant’s license to practice law with respect to the question of his
or her moral character, fitness for the practice of law, and worthiness of
readmission to the Iowa bar; and
7. Any other matters shown by the evidence to bear on the
question of whether the applicant has good moral character, is fit to
practice law, and is in all respects worthy of readmission to the Iowa
bar. 6
6Indetermining which factors we find most relevant to evaluating applications
for reinstatement, we rely primarily on the criteria appearing in model reinstatement
rules promulgated by the American Bar Association and our prior caselaw in a similar
context. Specifically, in In re Peterson, we considered whether an applicant to the Iowa
bar with a prior criminal record had been wrongly denied the opportunity to sit for the
Iowa bar examination. 439 N.W.2d at 166. In determining whether the applicant had
demonstrated he had the requisite moral fitness for bar membership, we considered the
following factors:
1. The nature and character of the offenses committed.
2. The number and duration of offenses.
3. The age and maturity of the applicant when the offenses were
committed.
4. The social and historical context in which the offenses were
committed.
5. The sufficiency of the punishment undergone and restitution made in
connection with the offenses.
6. The grant or denial of a pardon for offenses committed.
7. The number of years that have elapsed since the last offense was
committed, and the presence or absence of misconduct during that
period.
8. The applicant’s current attitude about the prior offenses.
9. The applicant’s candor, sincerity and full disclosure in the filings and
proceedings on character and fitness.
10. The applicant’s constructive activities and accomplishments
subsequent to the criminal convictions.
11. The opinions of character witnesses about the applicant’s moral
fitness.
Id. at 169 (quoting In re Manville, 538 A.2d 1128, 1133 n.4 (D.C. 1988)).
In articulating the factors most relevant to assessing an application for
reinstatement, we also rely upon the decisions of other state supreme courts setting
17
It is within our discretion to place conditions on the reinstatement
of a license to practice law following its revocation. Iowa Ct. R.
34.25(16)(b). Preconditions on reinstatement may include, but are not
limited to, requiring the individual seeking reinstatement to pass the
Iowa bar examination. Id. Generally, if we determine an individual who
otherwise qualifies for reinstatement need not retake the bar
examination, we will require the individual to attend and report up to
100 hours of continuing legal education as a condition of reinstatement.
Id. Additionally, every individual seeking reinstatement of his or her
license to practice law in Iowa following its revocation must post a scaled
score of at least 80 on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam
(MPRE) as a precondition of reinstatement. Id.
Furthermore, we may subject the continued maintenance of a
reinstated law license to ongoing requirements not generally applicable to
members of the Iowa bar. See id. For example, we may find it
appropriate to reinstate a revoked license to practice law subject to the
attorney’s continued maintenance of malpractice insurance. If the
attorney fails to meet a condition we impose on the continued
maintenance of his or her reinstated license, we may summarily revoke it
without a hearing. Id.
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forth factors found to be relevant in this context. See, e.g., In re Reinstatement of
Wiederholt, 295 P.3d at 399–400; In re Reinstatement of Robbins, 836 P.2d at 966; In re
Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C. 1985); In re Application of Griffith, 913 P.2d 695,
700 (Or. 1996) (en banc); In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d at 300; In re Hart, 822 P.2d 264, 267
(Wash. 1992) (en banc). Likewise, we consider the reinstatement rules adopted in other
states setting forth specific criteria to be considered in assessing applications for
reinstatement as well as court decisions applying those rules. See, e.g., Ill. Supreme Ct.
R. 767(f); N.D. R. Lawyer Discipline 4.5(F); Md. R. 19-752(h)(2); In re Reinstatement of
Golden, 315 P.3d 377, 380 (Okla. 2013).
18
III. Analysis.
The evidence Reilly submitted indicates he complied with the terms
of the order revoking his license to practice law and all other procedural
requirements set forth in the rule governing reinstatement of a former
attorney’s law license following its revocation. See id. 34.25(7), (8), (9),
(15). Therefore, the question of whether Reilly is eligible for the
reinstatement of his law license turns on whether he has submitted
adequate evidence demonstrating his good moral character, fitness to
practice law, and worthiness of readmission to the Iowa bar. Id. r.
34.25(15).
In light of the evidence Reilly submitted in support of his
application for reinstatement, we conclude he has proved by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence that he has good moral character, is fit to
practice law, and is in all respects worthy of readmission to the Iowa bar.
Though the conduct that led us to revoke Reilly’s license to practice law
was egregious, it occurred during a relatively brief period following years
of bar membership during which Reilly earned a reputation as a
particularly diligent and skilled attorney. We find this notable given that
Reilly struggled with his casino gambling addiction for years. Although
his addiction does not obviate the seriousness of his improper conduct,
the evidence he submitted demonstrating his efforts to overcome it
supports his eligibility for reinstatement to the bar. For years before and
for years after we revoked his license, Reilly voluntarily underwent
treatment for his addiction with a licensed mental health provider and
certified compulsive gambling counselor. Furthermore, he has managed
to abstain from engaging in the behaviors his treatment provider has
advised him to avoid for more than fourteen years. Thus, his treatment
provider has concluded he requires no further treatment for his
addiction.
19
As his dedication to his recovery might suggest, Reilly has
consistently accepted responsibility for the impropriety of his conduct
and acknowledged the harm it caused his clients, the bank that reported
him to the federal government, and the bar. The members of the bar who
have recommended we reinstate Reilly uniformly attest to his good moral
character and fitness for the practice of law and express confidence that
he is presently equipped to exercise the responsibility and judgment bar
membership requires. Their letters commend Reilly for his outstanding
legal ability, his commitment to treating his casino gambling addiction,
and his acceptance of responsibility and remorse for the harm he caused.
Moreover, they confirm Reilly has held a position of executive
responsibility with his current employer for years without incident and
maintains a personal and professional support system that includes,
among others, many of his former colleagues in the bar. Based on our
careful examination of the evidence submitted, we believe Reilly has
established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that
reinstatement of his license to practice law poses no threat to the public
because he has good moral character, is fit for the practice of law, and is
in all respects worthy of readmission to the bar.
We note Reilly has maintained his familiarity with current law by
means of his subsequent employment and regular reviews of state and
federal appellate court decisions. Therefore, we decline to require him to
pass the Iowa bar examination as a precondition of the reinstatement of
his license to practice law. Nevertheless, given that Reilly has been
without a law license for more than ten years, we think it appropriate to
require him to report at least thirty hours of continuing legal education,
including at least three hours of continuing legal education dedicated to
legal ethics, as a precondition of its reinstatement. This is equivalent to
the minimum continuing legal education members of the Iowa bar must
20
report every two calendar years. See id. r. 41.3. Accordingly, all
continuing legal education courses Reilly has taken since January 1,
2015, shall be counted in satisfaction of this requirement. By rule, Reilly
must also post a scaled score of at least 80 on the MPRE as a
precondition of the reinstatement of his license to practice law. Id. r.
34.25(16)(b).
Upon Reilly’s demonstration that he has satisfied the preconditions
of reinstatement set forth in this opinion, we will order the reinstatement
of his license to practice law subject to his continued maintenance of a
malpractice insurance policy whenever he is engaged in the private
practice of law. Within thirty days of the reinstatement of his license to
practice law, Reilly shall provide the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Board with proof that he has obtained a malpractice
insurance policy or a report indicating he is not currently engaged in
private practice. Upon his subsequent entry into the private practice of
law, if applicable, he shall provide the Board with proof that he has
obtained malpractice insurance within thirty days.
IV. Disposition.
We provisionally grant Reilly’s application for reinstatement of his
license to practice law in Iowa subject to the conditions set forth in this
opinion. If Reilly has not met the preconditions of reinstatement set
forth in this opinion by July 30, 2017, we will deny his application for
reinstatement without further hearing unless he requests an extension of
time. See id.
APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT PROVISIONALLY
GRANTED SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS SET FORTH IN THIS
OPINION.
This opinion shall be published.