Amended March 9, 2016 Deborah E. McFadden, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Charles Walter Mcfadden, Jr. v. Department of Transportation, State of Iowa ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 14–1557
Filed January 22, 2016
Amended March 9, 2016
DEBORAH E. McFADDEN, Individually and as Administrator of the
Estate of Charles Walter McFadden, Jr., Deceased,
Appellant,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County,
Sherman W. Phipps, Judge.
A surviving spouse who is the administrator of her deceased
husband’s estate seeks further review after the district court and court of
appeals both concluded she failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies under the Iowa Tort Claims Act before filing a wrongful-death
lawsuit. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
CASE REMANDED.
Steven P. DeVolder of DeVolder Law Firm, Norwalk, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Robin G. Formaker,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
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HECHT, Justice.
After her husband Charles died in a motorcycle accident, Deborah
McFadden presented a wrongful-death claim to the state appeal board.
She alleged the Iowa Department of Transportation’s negligent
maintenance of the highway caused Charles’s death. The appeal board
took no action on the claim, so after waiting more than six months, she
withdrew it and filed suit in the district court. The district court
concluded McFadden had failed to exhaust administrative remedies
because she had not properly presented the estate’s claim to the appeal
board and dismissed the suit. On further review of the court of appeals
decision affirming the district court’s dismissal, we conclude McFadden
exhausted administrative remedies by complying with the appeal board’s
administrative requirements and providing the State with all the
information it sought. Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of
appeals, reverse the district court’s dismissal order, and remand for
further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Charles McFadden died on April 25, 2012, after he lost control of
his motorcycle while navigating a curve on Highway 69 in Warren
County. That June, the district court appointed Deborah the
administrator of Charles’s estate.
On October 30, 2013, McFadden filed a tort claim with the state
appeal board on a form prescribed by the department of management.
See Iowa Admin. Code rs. 543—1.3 to .4 (detailing form and content
requirements for tort claims presented to the appeal board). The claim
form named Deborah McFadden as the claimant and asserted a tort
claim against the State for wrongful death. The claim specifically alleged
the drop-off between the paved highway and the gravel shoulder at the
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site of the accident was too steep, and it further alleged the department
of transportation had failed to maintain the highway in a safe condition.
See id. r. 543—1.4(2) (requiring tort claimants to detail “all known facts
and circumstances attending the damage or injury” and state the cause
of the damage or injury). McFadden did not attach to the form evidence
of her appointment as administrator. The claim did not expressly allege
that it was made in McFadden’s capacity as administrator of the estate.
By May 2014, the appeal board had not made final disposition of
the claim or even contacted McFadden. Accordingly, McFadden withdrew
the claim from the appeal board and filed suit in the district court. See
Iowa Code § 669.5(1) (2013) (permitting suit “if the attorney general does
not make final disposition of a claim within six months after the claim is
made in writing”). The petition identified her as the plaintiff, both
“Individually and as Administrator” of Charles’s estate.
The State moved to dismiss the estate’s suit, asserting the Iowa
Tort Claims Act (ITCA) did not permit it because McFadden never
presented the estate’s claim to the appeal board. Instead, the State
contended, McFadden only presented a claim to the appeal board in her
individual capacity, and she had thus failed to exhaust administrative
remedies before filing suit as administrator of the estate. See In re Estate
of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1996) (“Improper presentment of a
claim, or not presenting one at all, has been considered a failure to
exhaust one’s administrative remedies, depriving the district court of
subject matter jurisdiction.”). The State’s motion also sought dismissal
of McFadden’s individual claim for loss of consortium on the ground that
this claim must be advanced by the estate. See Audubon-Exira Ready
Mix, Inc. v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Iowa 1983) (noting
an estate administrator, not the surviving spouse individually, must
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“bring the claim for . . . loss of post-death spousal consortium”). Lastly,
the State’s motion urged dismissal of the claim against the department of
transportation because the department is not a proper party defendant
in cases brought under the ITCA. See Iowa Code § 669.16; Jones v. Iowa
State Highway Comm’n, 207 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1973).
The district court relied on Voss and granted the State’s motion to
dismiss all claims asserted in the petition. McFadden appealed, 1 and we
transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals also
concluded McFadden failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the
estate’s claim. We granted McFadden’s application for further review.
II. Scope of Review.
Our review of the district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss is
for correction of errors at law. Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 880.
III. Analysis.
McFadden acknowledges she did not use the word “administrator”
in her appeal board claim form, but she asserts that omission is not fatal
to her district court action. In evaluating McFadden’s contention, we
must balance two competing principles.
“Our legal processes normally strive to resolve disputes on their
merits. Simply put, it is our preferred way.” MC Holdings, L.L.C. v. Davis
Cty. Bd. of Review, 830 N.W.2d 325, 328–29 (Iowa 2013) (citation
omitted). Obviously, dismissing McFadden’s action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies does not resolve the case on the merits.
However, we also recognize that “[r]ules, especially those which fix
jurisdictional matters, are . . . vital to the proper conduct of court
1McFadden does not appeal the dismissal of the consortium claim pressed by
her as an individual. Neither does McFadden appeal the dismissal of the Department of
Transportation as a named defendant.
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business.” Gordon v. Doden, 261 Iowa 285, 288–89, 154 N.W.2d 146,
148 (1967). As we explained more than fifty years ago:
The so-called technicalities of the law are not always what
they seem. When they establish an orderly process . . . ,
they serve a definite purpose and are more than technical;
they have substance, in that they lay down definite rules
which are essential in court proceedings so that those
involved may know what may and may not be done, and
confusion, even chaos, may be avoided. They are necessary;
without them litigants would be adrift without rudder or
compass. We have, and should have, no compunction in
following them when they are clear and definite.
Esterdahl v. Wilson, 252 Iowa 1199, 1208, 110 N.W.2d 241, 246 (1961).
A. The ITCA Appeal Board Process. “A tort claim against the
State must first be presented to the State Appeal Board pursuant to the
procedures detailed in Iowa Code chapter 669 . . . .” Voss, 553 N.W.2d
at 880; accord Schneider v. State, 789 N.W.2d 138, 145 (Iowa 2010)
(“[F]iling . . . a claim with the state appeal board is a prerequisite to suit
under the [ITCA].”); see also Iowa Code § 669.3(2) (“A claim made under
[the ITCA] shall be filed with the director of the department of
management . . . .”). 2 “We have characterized this claim process as an
‘administrative remedy’ that must be exhausted.” Schneider, 789 N.W.2d
at 145. “Exhaustion of the administrative process is jurisdictional, and a
suit commenced without complying with this process is subject to
dismissal.” Swanger v. State, 445 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Iowa 1989).
The attorney general “shall consider, ascertain, adjust,
compromise, settle, determine, and allow any claim” presented to the
appeal board. Iowa Code § 669.3(1). “The administrative process . . . is
2The state appeal board consists of “the auditor of state, treasurer of state, and
the director of the department of management.” Iowa Code § 73A.1; see id. § 669.2(6)
(“ ‘State appeal board’ means the state appeal board as defined in section 73A.1.”).
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intended to allow a prompt investigation of claims against the State and
facilitate an early settlement when possible.” Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 881;
accord Schneider, 789 N.W.2d at 145; see also Don R. Bennett, Handling
Tort Claims and Suits Against the State of Iowa, 17 Drake L. Rev. 189,
191 (1968) (noting the administrative process has in some cases made it
“unnecessary to participate in lengthy and expensive litigation”).
B. Voss. In Voss, the plaintiff’s son died in an automobile
accident. Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 879. Four months after the accident,
Voss presented a tort claim to the state appeal board even though she
was not the administrator of her son’s estate at the time. See id. The
board denied the claim. Id. More than a year after the denial, Voss
became the administrator of her son’s estate and filed a lawsuit in the
district court. Id. The State moved to dismiss the lawsuit and the
district court granted the motion. Id.
We concluded Voss had not exhausted her administrative remedies
because she was not the administrator of her son’s estate at the time she
submitted the administrative claim and she had not submitted a claim to
the appeal board once she became administrator. Id. at 882. We noted,
“The State should not be required to consider on the merits the claim of
any person who can articulate a tenuous connection to the deceased
when that person clearly has no legal capacity to recover in court.” Id. at
881. We further opined that “[r]equiring the Board to delay consideration
of a claim while waiting for the claimant to obtain the legal authority to
pursue it would defeat the statutory goal of prompt settlement.” Id. at
882. We affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the State’s motion
to dismiss. Id.
McFadden contends her case is distinguishable from Voss. In
McFadden’s view, the fatal flaw in Voss was that the decedent’s mother
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was not actually the administrator of the estate at the time she presented
the claim to the appeal board. See id.; see also Estate of Dyer v. Krug,
533 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Iowa 1995) (holding dismissal was proper because
“at the time th[e] action was commenced, [the plaintiff] did not have the
capacity to sue” because she was not the estate administrator). Here, by
contrast, although McFadden’s claim filed with the appeal board did not
include the word “administrator,” she was in fact the administrator at
the time she presented the claim. 3 We agree Voss is distinguishable and
conclude McFadden correctly identifies the reason.
In two cases decided more than eighty years ago, before the ITCA
was adopted, we concluded the district court should have dismissed
surviving spouses’ suits for wrongful-death damages because they were
not actually their decedents’ personal representative at the time of filing
even though their petitions alleged they were. Pearson v. Anthony, 218
Iowa 697, 702–03, 254 N.W. 10, 12–13 (1934); Gardner v. Beck, 195 Iowa
62, 70–71, 189 N.W. 962, 966 (1922). Together with Voss, these cases
illustrate that both before and after the adoption of the ITCA, the
claimant’s authority to act as personal representative is an essential
prerequisite in asserting wrongful death claims. Because McFadden
actually possessed representative capacity at the time she filed her claim
with the appeal board, Voss does not control our decision here.
C. Appeal Board Rules. The ITCA directs the appeal board to
“adopt rules and procedures for the handling, processing, and
3The cause of action for the death of Charles McFadden survived his death.
Iowa Code § 611.20. Because Deborah McFadden was appointed administrator of
Charles’s estate, she was the proper legal representative to assert a wrongful-death
claim in this case. Id. § 611.22; see also Audubon-Exira, 335 N.W.2d at 152 (holding
the administrator of a decedent’s estate is the proper party plaintiff for asserting a
surviving spouse’s loss of consortium claim).
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investigation of claims.” Iowa Code § 669.3(3). In turn, the appeal board
“has prescribed the form and content of tort claims.” Swanger, 445
N.W.2d at 350; see Iowa Admin. Code rs. 543—1.3 to .4. By rule, the
appeal board requires claimants to state “the name, address, telephone
number, and age of the person making the claim.” Iowa Admin. Code
r. 543—1.3(3). The rule does not specifically require claimants to list
their representative capacity. See id. But the State contends here that
express disclosure of representative capacity is an indispensable part of
the claimant’s “name” when they are seeking damages for wrongful
death. We disagree.
Under our civil procedure rules, an estate administrator is the real
party in interest when acting on the estate’s behalf and “may sue in that
person’s own name.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.201. Thus, because McFadden
was the duly appointed administrator of her deceased husband’s estate
at the time she presented her claim to the appeal board, she was entitled
to proceed in her own name. Her name is “Deborah McFadden,” not
“Deborah McFadden, administrator.” Furthermore, McFadden provided
all the other information rule 543—1.3(3) and the appeal board’s form
require. Her claim, while perhaps Spartan, was complete.
We conclude McFadden exhausted her administrative remedies
and properly presented her claim to the appeal board. We acknowledge
that the presentment requirement is not just a nettlesome hurdle for
claimants to trip over, but McFadden’s claim form answered all the
questions the State asked and contained all the information its
administrative rule requires. Of course, our decision today does not
mean every claim form submitted to the appeal board necessarily
satisfies the presentment requirement. See Allendorf v. Langman Constr.,
Inc., 539 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 1995) (“[W]e stop short of concluding
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that under no circumstances may a claim filed with the state appeal
board be so lacking in critical information as to be a nullity for purposes
of exhausting the administrative remedy.”). But McFadden’s claim form
complied with all the applicable requirements under the circumstances
presented here.
IV. Conclusion.
Words this court expressed nearly a century ago ring true again
today:
[R]ights must not be denied by too strict an application of
mere legal formality. The sword of Justice is not often made
more keen by the whetstone of technicality, and a right
secured by too rigid means may harden into a wrong. . . .
Not only must justice appear to be done, but it is the
function and duty of this court and of all courts to see that it
is done. Technicality should not become a Pegasus which, if
ridden by an expert legal jockey, may carry us far from the
true goal.
McMillan v. Osterson, 191 Iowa 983, 985, 183 N.W. 487, 488 (1921). The
appeal board’s rules and claim form did not require McFadden to allege
her representative capacity in presenting the tort claim in this case.
Because McFadden had been appointed administrator before presenting
her tort claim to the appeal board, she was entitled to present the claim
and file suit in her own name as the estate’s legal representative. We
vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the district court’s
dismissal order, 4 and remand for further proceedings.
4BecauseMcFadden did not appeal the dismissal of her individual consortium
claim or the dismissal of the Department of Transportation as a named defendant, our
decision today does not disturb the district court’s summary judgment ruling on those
matters.
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DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
CASE REMANDED.