Amended July 1, 2015 Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Kenneth J. Weiland, Jr. ( 2015 )


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  •                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 15–0156
    Filed May 1, 2015
    Amended July 1, 2015
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
    Complainant,
    vs.
    KENNETH J. WEILAND, JR.,
    Respondent.
    On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
    Supreme Court of Iowa.
    The grievance commission reports an attorney committed ethical
    misconduct     and    recommends   a   public   reprimand.   ATTORNEY
    REPRIMANDED.
    Charles L. Harrington and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, Des Moines, for
    complainant.
    Kenneth J. Weiland, Jr., Des Moines, pro se.
    2
    ZAGER, Justice.
    The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (Board)
    charged attorney Kenneth J. Weiland Jr. with violations of several of our
    ethical rules based on his actions in an appeal filed with this court. After
    a hearing, a division of the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court
    of Iowa found Weiland’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of
    justice in violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(d), and
    recommended we impose a public reprimand. Upon our de novo review,
    we concur in the commission’s finding that Weiland’s conduct was
    prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of rule 32:8.4(d).
    Additionally, we conclude Weiland failed to make reasonable efforts to
    expedite litigation consistent with the interests of his client in violation of
    Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:3.2. Ultimately, we agree with the
    commission that a public reprimand is appropriate.
    I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
    Weiland was admitted to practice law in Iowa in 1994.                 He
    currently works in Des Moines, as a solo practitioner.           His practice
    includes representing clients in a variety of matters, including family law.
    The Board’s complaint in this case stems from Weiland’s representation
    of Ryan Pierce in an appeal from a domestic relations case.
    Weiland’s representation of Pierce began in 2012 when Weiland
    agreed to represent Pierce in a domestic relations case.            The case
    proceeded to trial on December 17, 2012. The district court entered a
    decree in the matter on January 2, 2013.         After reviewing the decree,
    Weiland concluded the district court failed to address an issue he
    believed it was required to address.        Accordingly, Weiland informed
    Pierce that there were sufficient grounds to appeal the case. Based on
    3
    Weiland’s advice, Pierce elected to appeal the case. Weiland filed a notice
    of appeal on January 31.
    After filing the notice of appeal, Weiland failed to file and serve a
    combined certificate or pay the filing fee as required by our rules of
    appellate procedure.    See Iowa R. App. P. 6.702(1)(a) (establishing the
    filing fee for appeals and requiring the appellant to “pay the fee . . .
    within seven days after filing the notice of appeal”); 
    id. r. 6.804(1)
    (requiring the appellant to complete and file a combined certificate
    “within seven days after filing the notice of appeal,” and further requiring
    the appellant to “serve the combined certificate on all parties to the
    appeal and on each court reporter from whom a transcript was ordered”).
    On March 8, the clerk of the Iowa Supreme Court sent Weiland a notice
    of default informing him of the deficiency and assessing a $150 penalty
    against him.     The notice further informed Weiland that if he failed to
    remedy the default within fifteen days, the clerk would dismiss the
    appeal for want of prosecution. See 
    id. r. 6.1202(1)(a)
    (“If the appellant
    fails to cure the default, the clerk shall enter an order dismissing the
    appeal.”).
    On the morning of March 25, Weiland called the court reporter
    that had reported the trial, Lisa McCarville, and requested a transcript of
    the Pierce trial. Later that morning, McCarville sent Weiland a follow-up
    email in which she stated that after their phone conversation, she
    reviewed her records and determined the transcript would cost $220.50.
    The email further stated that she would need a copy of the combined
    certificate.   Additionally, the email stated, “I will get to work on the
    transcript as soon as I receive your deposit.” That same day, Weiland
    filed a combined certificate with the clerk in which he certified that “the
    4
    Transcript ha[d] been ordered.”     He did not serve McCarville with the
    combined certificate.
    On June 4, the clerk sent both Weiland and McCarville a notice of
    failure to timely file transcript notifying them that McCarville had not
    filed the transcript by the deadline. See 
    id. r. 6.803(3)(c)
    (establishing the
    deadline for filing transcript as forty days after service of the combined
    certificate). On June 5, McCarville filed a reporter’s application for an
    extension of time to file a transcript. In the application, she certified that
    she “ha[d] not received an order for transcript from . . . Weiland” because
    he had not served her with a copy of the combined certificate. See 
    id. r. 6.803(1)
    (requiring the “appellant [to] use the combined certificate to
    order in writing from the court reporter a transcript”). The application
    also noted that she had not received a deposit for the transcript.
    On June 17, this court filed an order requiring Weiland to “serve
    court reporter McCarville with the combined certificate and pay her
    required deposit” by June 27. The order further stated, “[F]ailure to pay
    [for] the transcript should be reported by the court reporter to this court,
    and will result in [the] appeal being dismissed for appellant’s failure to
    comply with the appellate rules.”         On July 8, eleven days after the
    deadline, McCarville filed a reporter’s report of nonpayment in which she
    certified that as of July 3, Weiland had not sent her a combined
    certificate or paid the deposit. Accordingly, on July 18, this court filed
    an order dismissing the appeal for failure to comply with our appellate
    rules and instructing the clerk to forward a copy of the order to the
    Board for further action. See 
    id. r. 6.1202(3)
    (“Following the dismissal of
    an appeal for failure to comply with an appellate deadline where the
    appellant was represented by an attorney, the clerk . . . shall forward
    5
    certified copies of the docket, the notice of default which resulted in
    dismissal, and the order of dismissal to the . . . Board.”).
    Based on these facts, the Board filed a complaint on August 11,
    2014. In its complaint, the Board alleged Weiland violated Iowa Rules of
    Professional Conduct 32:1.3 (requiring diligence), 32:3.2 (requiring
    reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), 32:3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting false
    statements to a tribunal), 32:3.4(c) (requiring compliance with the rules
    of a tribunal), 1 and 32:8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the
    administration of justice). Weiland filed his answer on September 10. In
    his answer, he admitted all the factual allegations in the Board’s
    complaint.      However, he denied that his conduct violated any ethical
    rules. Additionally, Wieland asserted that he communicated to Pierce the
    need for Pierce to provide him with funds for the transcript on multiple
    occasions, but that Pierce had failed to do so. He also asserted that the
    reason he failed to dismiss the appeal was that he wanted to give Pierce
    “every opportunity to appeal his case.”
    The commission conducted an evidentiary hearing in November.
    At the hearing, the following witnesses testified: Christine Mayberry,
    deputy clerk for the Iowa appellate courts; McCarville; and Weiland.
    Mayberry testified that between 1998 and 2014 Weiland has received
    forty notices of default for failing to comply with deadlines in various
    appeals. She testified that based on her fifteen years of experience as
    deputy clerk, this is an excessive number of notices of default.                    She
    1Priorto the hearing before the commission, the Board abandoned its claim that
    Weiland’s conduct violated rule 32:3.4(c). Accordingly, we do not consider whether
    Weiland’s conduct violated rule 32:3.4(c). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
    Keele, 
    795 N.W.2d 507
    , 511 (Iowa 2011) (declining to address rule violations abandoned
    by the Board on appeal).
    6
    further testified that when the clerk’s office is required to send default
    notices, it causes “a significant drain on [the office’s] workload.” 2
    McCarville testified that when a party files an appeal, the court
    reporter in the underlying matter typically receives a copy of the
    combined certificate. This combined certificate notifies the court reporter
    that a party has filed an appeal for which a transcript is needed and
    provides the court reporter with details as to the dates of future
    deadlines.     She testified that in Pierce’s case she did not receive a
    combined certificate. Instead, Weiland called her to request a transcript.
    She testified that after receiving the call from Weiland, she found the
    appeal online and discovered that Weiland had recently filed the
    combined certificate. She then emailed Weiland and requested that he
    send her a copy of the combined certificate and informed him of the cost
    of the transcript.
    McCarville gave conflicting testimony as to whether she considered
    the transcript ordered after speaking with Weiland on the phone on
    March 25. Initially, she testified that she requires the deposit to be paid
    prior to considering the transcript ordered.               She testified that she
    typically requires a deposit in advance because doing so ensures that she
    receives payment for her services. However, she then testified that after
    her conversation with Weiland, she “considered [Weiland to have] ordered
    the transcript verbally.”       She further testified that although she was
    waiting for both the combined certificate and her deposit, she probably
    2Weiland   objected to the admission of this testimony and to related documentary
    evidence. He argued the commission could not use this evidence to find he committed
    an ethical violation. However, he acknowledged the commission could use this evidence
    “in regards to any disposition if there is a finding [he] acted in an unethical manner.”
    Thus, as did the commission, we consider this evidence only as it relates to our
    consideration of the appropriate sanction.
    7
    began doing some preliminary work on the transcript to ensure she did
    not miss any deadlines.
    Weiland admitted that he failed to serve McCarville with the
    combined certificate. However, he maintained that he did not know our
    appellate rules required him to do so.     Additionally, he testified that
    when he spoke with McCarville on the phone on March 25, he believed
    he had ordered the transcript. He testified that when he certified in the
    combined certificate that he had ordered the transcript, he knew he had
    not paid McCarville. However, he believed that ordering the transcript
    and paying for the transcript were distinct concepts.     Accordingly, in
    certifying on the combined certificate that he had ordered the transcript,
    he “didn’t believe [he] was lying to the Court . . . or misrepresenting
    anything.”
    Weiland did not dispute receiving the various notices of default in
    Pierce’s appeal.   However, he testified that Pierce had been unable to
    supply him with the necessary funds for either the filing fee or the
    transcript.   He further testified that he advanced Pierce $150 for the
    filing fee and that Pierce eventually reimbursed him $100 of that
    amount. However, Pierce never provided him funds for the transcript,
    despite Weiland’s repeated requests that he do so. Weiland testified that
    he did not dismiss the appeal after the June 27 deadline because he
    believed Pierce still wanted to pursue it, and he hoped Pierce would
    “come up with [the] money.”      Accordingly, Weiland “wasn’t trying to
    cause the Court problems.”    Instead, he was trying to protect Pierce’s
    appeal rights by “gett[ing] as much time for him to [obtain the funds as
    possible].”
    Weiland expressed remorse for failing to dismiss Pierce’s appeal
    once he realized Pierce would not be able to obtain funds for the
    8
    transcript. He testified that when a client is unable to obtain funds for
    an appeal in the future, he will withdraw as counsel instead of repeatedly
    missing deadlines. He further noted that although he has a history of
    failing to meet appellate deadlines, he has recently improved his
    compliance with appellate deadlines.    Specifically, he highlighted that
    many of the notices of default he has received in the past occurred
    “closer to the early 2000s.” However, he admitted he received notices of
    default in two other appeals in 2014 for failing to file the required
    combined certificates.   Finally, Weiland acknowledged that the Board
    privately admonished him in 2003 for failing to dismiss an appeal after
    the client decided not to pursue it.     However, he distinguished the
    instant case from this prior misconduct, noting that in this case his
    client wanted to pursue the appeal, but was unable to obtain the
    necessary funds to do so.
    The commission issued its written findings of fact, conclusions of
    law, and recommended sanction on January 27, 2015. It concluded the
    Board failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate Weiland’s
    conduct violated rules 32:1.3 (requiring diligence), 32:3.2 (requiring
    reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), and 32:3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting
    false statements to a tribunal).    Specifically, it concluded Weiland’s
    failure to dismiss the appeal was an attempt to protect the interests of
    his client.   Additionally, it credited Weiland’s testimony that he had
    verbally ordered the transcript on March 25.            Accordingly, the
    commission concluded that Weiland had not neglected Pierce’s case or
    knowingly made a false statement in the combined certificate. However,
    the commission concluded Weiland’s conduct violated rule 32:8.4(d)
    (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
    Specifically, it reasoned that Weiland had a duty to dismiss the appeal by
    9
    the July 27 deadline once he realized Pierce would not be able to obtain
    funds for the transcript, instead of relying on the clerk to dismiss the
    appeal. The commission credited Weiland for taking responsibility for his
    actions. It also credited Weiland for his commitment to require clients to
    pay him filing and transcript fees in advance to avoid similar problems in
    the future. Finally, the commission credited Weiland for maintaining a
    law practice that allows persons of modest means to obtain access to the
    courts at a modest rate.    The commission recommended we publicly
    reprimand Weiland.
    II. Standard of Review.
    Our review of attorney disciplinary proceedings is de novo. Iowa
    Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conroy, 
    845 N.W.2d 59
    , 63 (Iowa
    2014).   The Board must prove attorney misconduct by a convincing
    preponderance of the evidence, a burden greater than a preponderance of
    the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.          Iowa
    Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 
    844 N.W.2d 111
    , 113 (Iowa
    2014).   We give the commission’s findings and recommendations
    respectful consideration, but we are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme
    Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ricklefs, 
    844 N.W.2d 689
    , 696 (Iowa 2014).
    “Upon proof of misconduct, we may impose a greater or lesser sanction
    than the sanction recommended by the commission.” Iowa Supreme Ct.
    Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 
    784 N.W.2d 761
    , 764 (Iowa 2010).
    III. Review of Alleged Ethical Violations.
    The Board alleged numerous violations of the Iowa Rules of
    Professional Conduct based on Weiland’s conduct in the Pierce appeal.
    Weiland admitted each of the factual allegations in the Board’s
    complaint. “Factual matters admitted by an attorney in an answer are
    deemed established, regardless of the evidence in the record.”       Iowa
    10
    Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 
    838 N.W.2d 528
    , 532 (Iowa
    2013). We turn now to address the individual rule violations alleged by
    the Board.
    A. Rule 32:1.3: Reasonable Diligence and Promptness. This
    rule requires a lawyer to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness
    in representing a client.”         Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3.             We have
    recognized that an attorney violates rule 32:1.3 when he or she neglects
    a client matter. 3 See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal,
    
    796 N.W.2d 910
    , 915 (Iowa 2011).                  Generally, neglect involves “ ‘a
    consistent failure to perform those obligations that a lawyer has
    assumed, or a conscious disregard for the responsibilities a lawyer owes
    to a client.’ ”    Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 
    786 N.W.2d 860
    , 867 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
    Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 
    683 N.W.2d 549
    , 551 (Iowa 2004)).
    “[O]rdinary negligence does not constitute neglect.”               Iowa Supreme Ct.
    Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Taylor, 
    814 N.W.2d 259
    , 265 (Iowa 2012). Thus,
    “[a] violation of this rule arises not from inadvertent acts or omissions or
    from missing a single deadline, but from consistently failing to perform
    functions required of an attorney or from repeatedly missing deadlines.”
    
    Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 64
    .
    We have previously held that “even if a client no longer wants a
    matter to be pursued, it is neglect for the attorney to allow the matter to
    languish, without terminating it.” 
    Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 915
    . We have
    explained:
    3“The   Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct no longer expressly refer to neglect.
    Nevertheless, we have continued to identify and sanction attorney neglect.” 
    Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 63
    (citation omitted). We do so under rule 32:1.3. See Iowa Supreme Ct.
    Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 
    809 N.W.2d 96
    , 102 (Iowa 2012). Thus, neglect
    cases under a prior version of our ethical rules provide “precedent for the interpretation
    and application of rule 32:1.3.” 
    Id. 11 Regardless
    of the client’s interest in the case, the onus is on
    the attorney to comply with the deadlines provided in the
    appellate rules. Unless the court relieves an attorney of his
    or her responsibility to the client on appeal, as an officer of
    the court, the attorney is required to file the appropriate
    documents and briefs. Anything less may be considered
    neglect. . . . [S]imply because a client does not want to
    pursue the case does not relieve the attorney from taking
    steps necessary to end the matter.
    Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen, 
    712 N.W.2d 101
    ,
    105 (Iowa 2006) (citations omitted).
    However, when an attorney fails to comply with appellate deadlines
    or dismiss an appeal to protect a client’s interests, we will not find such
    conduct amounts to neglect. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
    v. Wright, 
    758 N.W.2d 227
    , 230 (Iowa 2008).        For example, in Wright,
    after an attorney filed a notice of appeal, he contacted the court reporter
    in the underlying matter to order the transcript. 
    Id. at 228.
    The court
    reporter informed the attorney that she would not prepare the transcript
    until she received payment. 
    Id. The attorney
    contacted his client who
    reported that she did not have funds for the transcript, but that she
    would attempt to borrow them. 
    Id. at 228–29.
    The attorney then filed a
    combined certificate in which he certified that he would pay for the
    transcript in accordance with our appellate rules. 
    Id. at 229.
    However,
    he failed to serve the combined certificate on the court reporter. 
    Id. As a
    result, the court reporter did not prepare the transcript by the deadline.
    
    Id. The attorney
    then also failed to file the required proof brief and
    designation of the contents of the appendix by the deadline.             
    Id. Accordingly, the
    clerk sent the attorney a notice of default informing him
    that if he did not cure the various deficiencies within fifteen days, the
    appeal would be dismissed. 
    Id. The attorney
    again contacted his client,
    who was still unable to obtain funds for the transcript. 
    Id. The attorney
                                           12
    did not cure the default by the deadline, and the clerk dismissed the
    appeal. 
    Id. We concluded
    the attorney’s conduct did not amount to neglect.
    
    Id. at 230.
    We explained:
    [I]t was [the client’s] failure to pay for the transcript, not [the
    attorney]’s actions, that prevented [the client] from
    proceeding with the appeal. Under the facts presented here,
    we find the Board failed to prove [the attorney] neglected [the
    client]’s interests. [This attorney] in fact protected [his
    client]’s interest by commencing and maintaining the appeal
    notwithstanding her failure to pay his fee as she had agreed,
    and by allowing her time . . . to raise the funds to pay for the
    transcript.
    
    Id. In this
    case, as in Wright, we do not find Weiland’s conduct
    amounted to neglect in violation of rule 32:1.3. The commission credited
    Weiland’s testimony that his failure to comply with various appellate
    deadlines and timely dismiss the appeal was the result of his attempt to
    protect his client’s interests.     Specifically, the commission found that
    Pierce wanted to pursue the appeal through June and that Weiland
    wanted to afford Pierce every opportunity to obtain funds for the
    transcript.    We       give   deference    to   the   commission’s   credibility
    determination because the commission heard Weiland’s live testimony
    and observed his demeanor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
    v. Clarity, 
    838 N.W.2d 648
    , 659 (Iowa 2013).                 Thus, the record
    established that Weiland attempted to protect the interests of his client
    by commencing and maintaining the appeal, advancing Pierce funds for
    the filing fee, and allowing Pierce time to raise funds for the transcript.
    Under the facts presented here, we find the Board failed to prove Weiland
    violated rule 32:1.3.
    13
    B. Rule 32:3.2: Expedite Litigation. This rule provides, “A
    lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with
    the interests of the client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2. We require
    lawyers to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation because
    “[d]ilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”
    
    Id. cmt. [1].
      In failure-to-expedite cases, “[t]he question is whether a
    competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action
    as having some substantial purpose other than delay.” 
    Id. An attorney
    violates this rule when he or she fails to “file documents, pursue appeals,
    and meet deadlines.”     
    Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65
    .      “The Board is only
    required to prove the attorney’s intent if the sole allegation is an attorney
    engaged in particular conduct for the purpose of frustrating the judicial
    process.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 
    847 N.W.2d 466
    , 484 (Iowa 2014).
    The commission concluded that Weiland did not violate rule
    32:3.2. We disagree. The record showed Weiland failed to timely file the
    combined certificate as required by our appellate rules, failed to serve the
    combined certificate on the court reporter as required by our appellate
    rules and as ordered by this court, and ultimately allowed the appeal to
    languish and be administratively dismissed. We have found violations of
    this rule in similar situations.      See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Kieffer-Garrison, 
    847 N.W.2d 489
    , 493 (Iowa 2014)
    (finding the attorney’s “serial failures to comply with the requirements of
    this court’s procedural rules governing the timely presentation and
    progression of appeals constituted a violation of her obligation to
    demonstrate reasonable efforts to expedite numerous appeals consistent
    with her clients’ interests”); 
    Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65
    (collecting cases
    and finding a rule 32:3.2 violation when the attorney failed to cure
    14
    defaults in six appeals); 
    Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 914
    (finding a rule 32:3.2
    violation when the attorney failed to follow through with or dismiss
    appeals and disregarded default notices).             Although Weiland failed to
    comply with our appellate procedures in an effort to protect Pierce’s
    interests, the comments to the rule disclaim such motivation as a
    legitimate interest of a client. See Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2 cmt. [1]
    (“Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in
    litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.”); accord 2 Geoffrey C.
    Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law of Lawyering § 31.03, at 31-4 to -5 (4th ed.
    2015) (recognizing that a client’s interest in delay itself is not “entitled to
    weight in assessing the propriety of a lawyer’s tactics on behalf of the
    client”). Expediting an appeal by meeting deadlines, even when the client
    would benefit from delay, is consistent with the legitimate interest of the
    client and is therefore required by the rule. Here, Weiland elevated the
    client’s interests over his obligations to the court. Weiland violated rule
    32:3.2. 4
    C. Rule 32:8.4(d): Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration
    of Justice. This rule prohibits an attorney from engaging in “conduct
    that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”                Iowa R. Prof’l
    Conduct 32:8.4(d). “There is no typical form of conduct that prejudices
    the administration of justice.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
    Parrish, 
    801 N.W.2d 580
    , 587 (Iowa 2011).                 Acts we have generally
    considered prejudicial to the administration of justice have “hampered
    the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems
    upon which the courts rely.”            
    Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230
    (internal
    4As  the Board did not contend Weiland engaged in conduct for the purpose of
    frustrating the judicial process, we need not address whether he acted with such intent.
    See 
    Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d at 493
    n.2.
    15
    quotation marks omitted).     “Examples of conduct prejudicial to the
    administration of justice include paying an adverse expert witness for
    information regarding an opponent’s case preparation, demanding a
    release in a civil action as a condition of dismissing criminal charges,
    and knowingly making false or reckless charges against a judicial
    officer.” 
    Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 768
    . Most relevant here, “When an
    attorney’s failure to comply with appellate deadlines results in an
    administrative dismissal, his actions are prejudicial to the administration
    of justice.” 
    Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 914
    ; accord Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Tompkins, 
    733 N.W.2d 661
    , 668 (Iowa 2007) (finding
    an attorney acted in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice
    when he failed to prosecute or move to dismiss an appeal he believed to
    be without merit); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
    Daggett, 
    653 N.W.2d 377
    , 380 (Iowa 2002) (finding an attorney acted in a
    manner prejudicial to the administration of justice when he failed to
    comply with appellate deadlines).    This is so even when such conduct
    does not amount to neglect.      See 
    Taylor, 814 N.W.2d at 267
    (“[A]n
    attorney can be in violation of rule 32:8.4(d) when an appeal is
    administratively dismissed even though the attorney did not commit
    neglect in the handling of the appeal.”); 
    Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230
    –31
    (finding an attorney’s reliance on the clerk to dismiss an appeal when the
    client could not raise funds for the transcript was prejudicial to the
    administration of justice, despite the fact such conduct did not amount
    to neglect).
    The commission concluded Weiland’s failure to dismiss the appeal
    by the June 27 deadline established by this court’s June 17 order
    violated rule 32:8.4(d). We agree. Although Weiland’s conduct did not
    amount to neglect, Weiland was not relieved “ ‘from taking steps to end
    16
    the matter.’ ” 
    Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 231
    (quoting 
    Lesyshen, 712 N.W.2d at 105
    ). On June 17, this court ordered Weiland to “serve court reporter
    McCarville with the combined certificate and pay her required deposit” by
    June 27. The June 17 order further notified Weiland that “failure to pay
    [for] the transcript . . . [would] result in [the] appeal being dismissed.”
    Weiland knew by the June 27 deadline that Pierce would be unable to
    pay for the transcript, yet he took no action to dismiss the appeal. His
    inaction caused the clerk to prepare and file an order three weeks later
    accomplishing the dismissal.    “ ‘Our case law makes it clear that an
    attorney cannot use a default notice to dismiss an appeal in lieu of the
    attorney’s obligation to comply with our appellate rules.’ ”    
    Id. at 231
    (quoting 
    Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d at 669
    ). Weiland violated rule 32:8.4(d).
    D. Rule 32:3.3(a)(1): Candor Toward the Tribunal.          This rule
    prohibits a lawyer from “knowingly . . . mak[ing] a false statement of fact
    or law to a tribunal.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.3(a)(1). Because the
    lawyer must knowingly make the false statement, the lawyer must have
    “actual knowledge of the fact in question.”       Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
    32:1.0(f) (defining the term “knowingly”).   A lawyer can make a false
    statement to the court either orally or in writing. See Iowa Supreme Ct.
    Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McGinness, 
    844 N.W.2d 456
    , 462 (Iowa 2014).
    We found a violation of this rule when a lawyer falsely certified to the
    clerk of this court that she had filed an application for further review.
    
    Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d at 494
    . We have also found violations
    when a lawyer filed falsely notarized documents with the
    court, when a lawyer forged a guilty plea for a defendant he
    was representing, and when a lawyer filed a document with
    the court misrepresenting the marital status of a decedent.
    
    McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 462
    .
    17
    The Board alleges Weiland violated this rule by falsely certifying in
    the combined certificate he filed with the clerk that “the Transcript ha[d]
    been ordered.” In fact, he had not served McCarville with the combined
    certificate or made the necessary deposit at the time he filed the
    combined certificate.      The commission concluded the Board failed to
    show that Weiland possessed the requisite knowledge to have violated
    this rule.   Specifically, the commission credited the testimony of both
    Weiland and McCarville, each of whom testified that when Weiland
    contacted McCarville by phone on the morning of March 25, Weiland
    verbally ordered the transcript. Thus, the commission concluded that at
    the time Weiland certified in the combined certificate that he had ordered
    the transcript, he believed that he had done so.
    We agree with the commission that the Board failed to present
    sufficient evidence to establish a violation of this rule. Here again, with
    respect to the testimony of both Weiland and McCarville, we defer to the
    commission’s credibility determinations because it heard their live
    testimony and observed their demeanor. See 
    Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 659
    .
    At the hearing before the commission, McCarville gave conflicting
    testimony as to whether Weiland ordered the transcript during their
    phone conversation. However, she ultimately conceded she “considered
    [Weiland to have] ordered the transcript verbally.” Weiland testified he
    believed he had ordered the transcript at that time as well. Nothing in
    the email McCarville sent to Weiland is inconsistent with Weiland having
    placed a verbal order. Thus, the record showed that at the time Weiland
    certified in the combined certificate that he had ordered the transcript,
    he reasonably believed he had done so.       We find the Board failed to
    establish that Weiland possessed the requisite knowledge to have
    violated rule 32:8.4(d).
    18
    IV. Consideration of Appropriate Sanction.
    Having found the foregoing rule violations, we now consider the
    appropriate sanction. The commission found only a single violation of
    our rules and recommended we publicly reprimand Weiland.              We give
    respectful consideration to the commission’s recommendation. 
    Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 699
    .         However, the issue of appropriate sanction is
    exclusively within this court’s authority. 
    Id. “There is
    no standard sanction for a particular type of misconduct,
    and though prior cases can be instructive, we ultimately determine an
    appropriate sanction based on the particular circumstances of each
    case.”    Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 
    774 N.W.2d 301
    , 308 (Iowa 2009). As we have previously stated,
    In considering an appropriate sanction, this court considers
    all the facts and circumstances, including the nature of the
    violations, the attorney’s fitness to practice law, deterrence,
    the protection of society, the need to uphold public
    confidence in the justice system, and the need to maintain
    the reputation of the bar.
    
    McGinness, 844 N.W.2d at 463
    . “Where there are multiple violations of
    our disciplinary rules, enhanced sanctions may be imposed.”                Iowa
    Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Alexander, 
    574 N.W.2d 322
    ,
    327 (Iowa 1998).        Further, we “consider mitigating and aggravating
    circumstances, including companion violations, repeated neglect, and
    the attorney’s disciplinary history.” 
    Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66
    .
    In this case, Weiland failed to comply with appellate deadlines in a
    single matter and failed to dismiss his client’s appeal. Instead, Wieland
    allowed the appeal to be administratively dismissed.           Sanctions for
    conduct of this nature range from a public reprimand when the
    attorney’s misconduct is relatively isolated, to suspensions of several
    months when the conduct is egregious or accompanied by related
    19
    misrepresentations,       additional     violations,     or    other   aggravating
    circumstances. See, e.g., 
    Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d at 492
    , 494, 496
    (finding an attorney’s failure to comply with appellate deadlines in nine
    criminal cases resulting in receipt of twenty default notices warranted a
    six-month     suspension       when      the      attorney     also    persistently
    misrepresented that she had filed an application for further review to her
    client and this court); 
    Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 914
    , 920, 922–23 (finding
    an attorney’s failure to cure default notices in two appeals resulting in
    administrative dismissals warranted a thirty-day suspension when the
    attorney neglected two additional matters, committed trust-account
    violations,   and   had    a   history   of    failing   to   comply   with   court
    requirements); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 
    793 N.W.2d 525
    , 531–32 (Iowa 2011) (finding an attorney’s failure to cure a
    default notice in an appeal warranted a three-month suspension when
    the attorney also failed to file state income tax returns for two years in
    violation of ethical rules); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
    Hoglan, 
    781 N.W.2d 279
    , 282–83, 286–87 (Iowa 2010) (finding an
    attorney’s failure to prosecute four appeals resulting in their dismissal
    warranted a thirty-day suspension when each dismissal harmed the
    client and the attorney had previously been publicly reprimanded for
    similar misconduct); 
    Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 231
    (finding an attorney’s
    failure to dismiss an appeal after the client was unable to raise funds for
    a transcript warranted a public reprimand); 
    Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d at 669
    –70 (finding an attorney’s failure to dismiss an appeal warranted a
    public reprimand). Further, when such deficiencies result in harm to
    clients, increased sanctions are warranted.              See, e.g., 
    Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 922
    (considering harm to clients in crafting appropriate
    20
    sanction); 
    Hoglan, 781 N.W.2d at 286
    (same); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis, 
    749 N.W.2d 694
    , 704 (Iowa 2008) (same).
    We draw guidance from the following attorney discipline cases
    involving similar misconduct.    In Dolezal, we suspended an attorney’s
    license for thirty 
    days. 796 N.W.2d at 923
    . There, the attorney failed to
    cure default notices in two appeals leading to their dismissal. 
    Id. at 914.
    We concluded this conduct violated rules 32:1.3, 32:3.2, and 32:8.4(d).
    
    Id. at 914–15.
      In addition to rule violations related to the attorney’s
    failure to cure the default notices, we found the attorney neglected two
    other client matters, in one instance harming the client, and violated
    several of our rules governing an attorney’s management of the trust
    account. 
    Id. at 920.
    In crafting the appropriate sanction, we emphasized
    that while the attorney’s behavior “inconvenienced the court system, in
    two out of three instances it [did] not harm[] his clients.” 
    Id. at 922.
    We
    considered as aggravating factors that the Board had recently privately
    admonished the attorney for failing to respond to delinquency notices in
    another matter and that he had failed to comply with continuing legal
    education requirements in the past. 
    Id. at 920.
    In Hoglan, we suspended an attorney’s license for thirty days when
    he failed to prosecute four appeals resulting in their 
    dismissal. 781 N.W.2d at 282
    –83, 287.        We concluded this conduct violated rules
    32:1.3, 32:1.16(a)(2) (requiring withdrawal from representation if a
    physical or mental condition materially impairs a lawyer’s ability to
    represent the client), 32:3.2, 32:8.4(a) (finding it misconduct to violate an
    ethical rule), and 32:8.4(d). 
    Id. at 284.
    In crafting the proper sanction,
    we emphasized that the attorney neglected multiple client matters, each
    dismissal harmed the client, and the attorney had recently been publicly
    reprimanded for the dismissal of two other appeals due to neglect. 
    Id. at 21
    286–87.    We considered the attorney’s severe back problems as a
    mitigating factor. 
    Id. at 287.
    In Wright, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who failed to
    comply with appellate deadlines in a single client matter and failed to
    dismiss his client’s appeal, instead allowing it to be administratively
    
    dismissed. 758 N.W.2d at 230
    –31. We found the attorney’s reliance on a
    default notice to dismiss the appeal after his client could not raise funds
    for the transcript was prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
    Id. at 231
    .   However, we concluded this same conduct did not amount to
    neglect because the attorney was attempting to protect his client’s
    interests by allowing her time to obtain funds for the transcript. 
    Id. at 230.
      In crafting the proper sanction, we considered as aggravating
    factors that the lawyer had over twenty-five years of experience in the
    field, had been publicly reprimanded on one prior occasion, and that he
    had been privately admonished on two prior occasions. 
    Id. at 231
    .
    Finally, in Tompkins, we publicly reprimanded an attorney who
    neglected two client 
    matters. 733 N.W.2d at 669
    –70. In the first matter,
    the attorney neglected the client “by failing to communicate with [him]
    and respond to his inquiries.”    
    Id. at 669.
      In the second matter, the
    attorney allowed the client’s “appeal to be administratively dismissed,
    neglecting his client, and wasting judicial resources.” 
    Id. In crafting
    the
    proper sanction, we emphasized that little harm ultimately befell either
    client because they were unlikely to succeed on their claims.      
    Id. We considered
    as an aggravating factor that the attorney had been publicly
    reprimanded on two prior occasions. 
    Id. at 670.
    We believe this case is distinguishable from Dolezal and Hoglan. In
    those cases there were multiple instances of neglect, additional rule
    violations, and clients suffered harm. See 
    Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 920
                                        22
    (finding multiple instances of neglect, trust account violations, and harm
    to a client); 
    Hoglan, 781 N.W.2d at 286
    (finding multiple instances of
    neglect and harm to clients).    Here, Weiland’s misconduct stems from
    one instance in which he failed to meet appellate deadlines resulting in
    the administrative dismissal of an appeal. While we did find this conduct
    violated two of our rules of professional conduct, the Board has not
    alleged, and we have not concluded, that Weiland’s conduct resulted in
    any harm to the client. Thus, Wright and Tompkins are closer parallels.
    See 
    Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230
    (involving a single client matter and
    finding no harm to the client); 
    Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d at 669
    (finding no
    harm to clients).   Further, as in Wright, Weiland’s conduct did not
    amount to neglect. See 
    Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230
    (finding a failure to
    dismiss an appeal did not amount to neglect). Accordingly, we find these
    cases most instructive in crafting the proper sanction.
    Finally, in crafting the proper punishment we consider aggravating
    and mitigating factors.    
    Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66
    .        Here, several
    aggravating and mitigating factors warrant our consideration. We begin
    by addressing the aggravating factors. “[T]he prior disciplinary history of
    an attorney is [one] factor we must consider . . . .” 
    Parrish, 801 N.W.2d at 589
    .   “In so doing, we consider both prior admonitions and prior
    public discipline.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Baldwin,
    
    857 N.W.2d 195
    , 214 (Iowa 2014). “Prior misconduct is more suggestive
    of increased sanctions when it involves the same type of conduct as the
    conduct currently subject to discipline.” 
    Id. Weiland has
    been subject to discipline on four prior occasions.
    First, in 2003, the Board privately admonished Weiland for failing to
    respond to default notices in an appeal, ultimately resulting in its
    dismissal. This prior misconduct is an aggravating factor because it is
    23
    similar to the misconduct in this case. See 
    id. Also in
    2003, we publicly
    reprimanded Weiland for failing to provide competent representation to a
    client in a probate matter. We do not consider this as an aggravating
    factor because of the age of this prior discipline and because it is
    dissimilar to the misconduct in this case. See 
    Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 920
    (declining to consider prior discipline as aggravating factor when
    prior violations “occurred many years ago” and were not “similar to [the
    attorney]’s    more   recent   ethical   lapses”).    In   2008,   we   publicly
    reprimanded Weiland for violating several of our ethical rules when he
    overstated mileage expenses for reimbursements from the State Public
    Defender for his representation of indigent defendants in court appointed
    matters.      This prior misconduct is an aggravating factor because it
    occurred more recently.         See 
    id. Finally, in
    January 2014, we
    temporarily suspended Weiland’s license to practice law when he failed to
    respond to a Board inquiry in this matter.           We reinstated his license
    several days later, after he responded to the inquiry. We do not consider
    this most recent temporary suspension as an aggravating factor because
    we believe the temporary suspension we imposed was sufficient
    discipline for failing to respond to the inquiry. See 
    id. at 921
    (concluding
    “temporary suspension was adequate discipline for failing to respond to
    the [B]oard’s inquiry”).
    At the hearing, Wieland conceded that his notice-of-default track
    record could be considered as part of our determination of an
    appropriate sanction. We consider his track record to be an aggravating
    factor. We have previously recognized that using the clerk’s office as a
    private tickler system is unacceptable behavior for an attorney.            See
    
    Curtis, 749 N.W.2d at 699
    (characterizing an attorney’s use of the clerk’s
    office as a private tickler system as “deplorable”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
    24
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Moonen,       
    706 N.W.2d 391
    ,   400   (Iowa    2005)
    (disapproving an attorney’s use of the clerk’s office as a private tickler
    system).   Here, the record established that between 1998 and 2014,
    Weiland received forty notices of default for failing to meet various
    deadlines in eighteen appeals. As confirmed by the deputy clerk, this is
    an excessive number of default notices.           However, we lessen our
    consideration of this as an aggravating factor to an extent because the
    record also established that Weiland received a large majority of these
    notices of default much earlier in his career. In fact, Weiland received
    thirty-three of the forty notices of default between 1998 and 2007, and
    from 2008 to 2010 Weiland received no notices of default.         However,
    since 2011 Weiland’s use of the clerk’s office as a private tickler system
    seems to have reemerged, as evidenced by his receipt of seven notices of
    default in five separate matters between 2011 and 2014.                We are
    troubled by this recent trend.      Consequently, we consider it as an
    aggravating factor.
    We turn now to the mitigating factors. First, the record does not
    suggest that any clients suffered harm in this case. We consider this a
    mitigating factor. See 
    Ricklefs, 844 N.W.2d at 700
    (considering lack of
    harm to clients a mitigating factor).    Second, Weiland ultimately took
    responsibility for his actions before the commission, admitted that he
    should have dismissed the appeal once he realized Pierce would be
    unable able to obtain funds for the transcript, and expressed remorse for
    his failure to do so.   This is also a mitigating factor.   
    Id. (considering attorney’s
    taking responsibility for his actions as a mitigating factor).
    Third, Weiland testified that in the future he will require clients to
    advance the necessary costs for an appeal prior to proceeding. Further,
    he testified that if a client is unable to advance these costs after appeal,
    25
    he will withdraw as counsel and dismiss the appeal rather than miss
    deadlines and allow the appeal to be administratively dismissed. This is
    another mitigating factor. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
    Thomas, 
    794 N.W.2d 290
    , 295 (Iowa 2011) (considering an attorney’s
    implementation of new office procedures to ensure compliance with
    deadlines as a mitigating factor).      Finally, we note that Weiland
    maintains a law practice that allows persons of modest means to obtain
    access to our court system at a modest rate.             “Providing legal
    representation to an underserved part of the community is a significant
    mitigating factor.” 
    Taylor, 814 N.W.2d at 268
    .
    The commission recommended we publicly reprimand Weiland for
    his misconduct. Having considered the particular circumstances in this
    case, and after our de novo review of the record, we agree with the
    commission that a public reprimand is appropriate.
    V. Conclusion.
    We publicly reprimand Weiland.        Costs are taxed to Weiland
    pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.27.
    ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.
    All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who dissents.
    26
    #15–0156, Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland
    WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
    Kenneth Weiland’s prior disciplinary record and his forty prior
    delinquency notices from the clerk of the supreme court require a thirty-
    day suspension.