Lisa Kragnes v. City of Des Moines, Iowa , 2012 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 18 ( 2012 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 09–1473
Filed March 2, 2012
LISA KRAGNES, et al.,
Appellees,
vs.
CITY OF DES MOINES, IOWA,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D.
Novak, Judge.
City and plaintiff seek interlocutory appeal of district court’s
decision certifying a class and entering judgment in favor of plaintiff
class. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
Mark McCormick and Margaret C. Callahan of Belin McCormick,
P.C., Des Moines, and Bruce E. Bergman, Des Moines, and Mark
Godwin, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brad P. Schroeder of Hartung & Schroeder, Des Moines, and
Bruce H. Stoltze of Stoltze & Updegraff, P.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
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HECHT, Justice.
This case was remanded to the district court for determination of
whether a class should be certified and for determination of what, if any,
part of the City’s franchise fees for gas and electricity services are related
to its administrative expenses in exercising its police power. Kragnes v.
City of Des Moines, 714 N.W.2d 632, 643 (Iowa 2006) (Kragnes I). The
district court certified a class, found the franchise fees cannot exceed
$1,575,194 per year for the electric utility and $1,574,046 for the gas
utility, entered judgment in favor of the certified class against the City in
the amount by which such fees exceeded that amount for the period from
July 27, 1999, to May 26, 2009, and retained jurisdiction to determine
the amount of money to be refunded to members of the class, the
manner in which the refunds must be made, the fees to be paid to
counsel for the plaintiff class, and the costs of this action. The City
appeals and Kragnes cross-appeals. We affirm the judgment as modified
and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The background facts of this case are fully described in Kragnes I,
714 N.W.2d at 633–37. In 2004, the City of Des Moines considered
raising property taxes to hire more police and firefighters, maintain the
library’s hours, and rehabilitate certain deteriorating neighborhoods.
The City realized the state was phasing out sales and use taxes on
residential gas and electric services and determined that it would be
possible to increase the franchise fees on these services to raise revenue.
After deciding this source of revenue was preferable to an increase in
property taxes, the City renegotiated the franchise agreements with
MidAmerican Energy (MEC), which provided gas and electric service for
the city, and increased the franchise fee from 1% to 3% for both gas and
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electric services effective September 2004. Effective June 2005, the
franchise fees were increased to 5% for each utility.
Lisa Kragnes promptly filed a petition in equity on behalf of herself
and all others similarly situated challenging the franchise fees as illegal
taxes. She sought reimbursement for all illegal taxes paid through the
allowable statute of limitations and sought an injunction prohibiting the
City from charging such franchise fees in the future. The district court
granted Kragnes’s motion for summary judgment and the City appealed.
We concluded in Kragnes I that
a city has the authority to assess a franchise fee expressed
as a percentage of the gross receipts derived from the utility’s
sale of its services to the public, so long as the charge is
reasonably related to the reasonable costs of inspecting,
licensing, supervising, or otherwise regulating the activity
that is being franchised.
Id. at 642–43. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether all or part of the franchise fees were reasonably related to the
City’s administrative expenses in exercising its police power, we
remanded to the district court for the determination of whether a class
should be certified and for a trial on the merits. Id. at 643.
On remand, the district court certified a class consisting of all City
of Des Moines utilities customers who paid the electricity or gas
franchise fee from July 27, 1999, forward. The City filed three motions
to decertify the class, all of which were denied. After trial, the district
court determined that a portion of the franchise fee collected was
excessive. The court held the City must refund to the class, with
interest, the amount by which the franchise fees exceeded $1,575,194
per year for the electric utility and $1,574,046 for the gas utility. The
court retained jurisdiction to determine the details of how the refund
would be calculated and refunded to class members. The court also
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concluded injunctive relief was unnecessary because the legislature had
amended Iowa Code section 364.2(4)(f) to allow municipalities to impose
franchise fees in excess of the reasonable cost of inspecting, licensing,
supervising, or otherwise regulating utilities’ activities. See 2009 Iowa
Acts ch. 179, § 228 (codified at Iowa Code section 364.2(4)(f) (Supp.
2009)).
Both the City and Kragnes sought, and we granted, interlocutory
appeal. The City contends the district court should have granted its
motion to decertify the class for two reasons: (1) a fundamental conflict
exists between members of the class, and (2) class members are not
permitted to “opt out” of the litigation. In the alternative, if this litigation
is allowed to proceed as a class action and a remedy is owed, the City
contends the class should be divided into subclasses. The parties
disagree as to the categories and amounts of expenses that may be
counted as “reasonably related” to the administration of electric and gas
franchises during the relevant time period. The City contends the
district court erred in failing to include as proper components of the
franchise fee the lost value of its trees and certain indirect operating
costs attributable to the utility franchises and in undervaluing as fee
components certain “non-annual unpredictable expenses attendant to
the City’s police power responsibilities.” Kragnes contends in her cross-
appeal that the district court erred in allowing as franchise fee
components construction and engineering costs funded by federal and
state government appropriations or the Wastewater Reclamation
Authority, construction and overhead costs covered by sewer treatment
fees paid by users of the City’s sanitary sewer system, administrative
overhead in the amount of 12.78% added to construction and
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engineering expenses charged by contractors, and interest on
construction and engineering expenses.
The parties also hotly dispute the parameters of the remedy in this
appeal. The City contends the district court erred in concluding the
plaintiff class is entitled to a refund, while Kragnes contends a full
refund must be ordered and injunctive relief should be granted requiring
the City to amend its ordinances in compliance with the amended
legislation found in sections 364.2(4)(f) and 384.3A, including providing
public notice and identifying the City’s costs of regulating the franchises
and what amounts it seeks in excess of its regulation costs.
II. Scope of Review.
The parties agree as to the scope of review for the various issues
raised. We will review a district court’s rulings regarding the certification
of a class for an abuse of discretion. Vos v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co.,
667 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Iowa 2003). “This discretion has been characterized
as ‘broad.’ ” Vignaroli v. Blue Cross of Iowa, 360 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Iowa
1985) (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1785, at 134 (1972)). Because the case was
tried in equity, we will review de novo the district court’s conclusions
regarding which of the City’s claimed expenses were reasonably related to
the administration of the gas and electric franchises. Iowa R. App. P.
6.907; Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 2000).
We may give weight to the findings of the district court, but we are not
bound by them. Fencl, 620 N.W.2d at 811. Our review of the district
court’s decision to grant Kragnes and the class a full refund is also
de novo. We will review the district court’s application and interpretation
of statutes for errors at law. Beganovic v. Muxfeldt, 775 N.W.2d 313,
317–18 (Iowa 2009). To the extent the City’s argument that members of
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the plaintiff class must be allowed to opt out of the class raises a
constitutional claim, our review is de novo. Simmons v. State Pub.
Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 2010).
III. Discussion.
A. Should the Class Have Been Decertified Because of a
Conflict Among the Members? The City argues the district court
should have granted its motion to decertify the class because a conflict of
interest exists between Kragnes, as the class representative, and other
members of the class who will suffer economically as a result of a
judgment in favor of the class. Specifically, the City contends it imposed
the franchise fees in lieu of raising property taxes. The franchise fees
were paid by anyone in the city who utilized gas and electric service,
whether or not they owned property. Further, if the City is required to
refund the roughly $40 million in excess tax that was collected from
2004 until 2009, it will need to raise the revenue for this payment. The
City contends the most likely result of a refund is an increase of property
taxes. Because the burden of any prospective tax increase imposed to
finance the refund will be borne only by current property owners, the
City contends property owners will be required to pay a larger proportion
of the refund than they paid when the illegal tax was collected from all
utilities customers in the city. In other words, the City contends a
fundamental conflict exists between Kragnes and class members who are
property owners and who would tend to oppose Kragnes’s refund
objective because they benefitted from the collection of the excessive
franchise fees from payors who were not property owners. The district
court concluded the claimed conflict was speculative and denied the
City’s motion.
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One of the prerequisites for class certification is that the class
representative will “fairly and adequately . . . protect the interests of the
class.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.262(2)(c). The City contends Kragnes cannot
protect the interests of the certified class because she has a conflict of
interest in the maintenance of the class action. See id. r. 1.263(2)(b)
(providing assessment of whether the class representative “fairly and
adequately will protect the interests of the class” turns inter alia on a
finding that the representative has no conflict of interest). However,
“[n]ot every disagreement between a representative and other class
members will stand in the way of a class action suit. The conflict must
be fundamental, going to the specific issues and controversies.”
Vignaroli, 360 N.W.2d at 746 (citation omitted).
The City relies on two opinions from the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals to support its argument that the intraclass conflict in this case
is so fundamental as to preclude certification or require decertification.
In Pickett v. Iowa Beef Processors, a group of cattle producers filed an
antitrust suit against Iowa Beef Processors (IBP), a meat packer. 209
F.3d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 2000). The plaintiffs alleged IBP had used
forward contracts 1 and marketing agreements 2 to coerce producers
selling cattle on the spot markets to accept lower prices in violation of the
Packers and Stockyards Act. Id. at 1278. The plaintiffs specifically
asserted IBP had used the forward contracts and marketing agreements
1A “forward contract” is an agreement between a packer and a producer
establishing the price to be paid for the cattle weeks or months before the animals are
ready for slaughter. Pickett, 209 F.3d at 1278.
2“Marketing agreements” are “more extended versions of forward contracts.”
Under such agreements, the producer “promises to sell most of its cattle to a packer at
prices determined by a negotiated formula, which can be adjusted after slaughter
according to the quality of the beef.” Id.
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to create a “captive supply,” depress the market price at strategic times,
and force producers selling on the spot market to accept artificially low
prices for their fattened cattle. Id. The relief sought by the plaintiffs for
the class included damages and an injunction prohibiting IBP from using
such purchasing arrangements in the future. Id. at 1280. The district
court certified a class of all cattle producers who sold cattle directly to
IBP from February 1994 through and including the date of certification—
a class of at least 15,000 members including both producers who sold
cattle on the spot market and those who sold cattle under forward
contracts or marketing agreements. Id. at 1279. On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs
could not adequately represent a class consisting of both producers who
sold on the spot market and those who sold under forward contracts and
marketing agreements. Id. at 1280–81. The court reasoned that the
class could not include both the spot market producers who had
allegedly been harmed by the forward contracts and marketing
agreements and the producers who had benefitted from such marketing
vehicles and wished to continue doing so. Id. at 1280 (noting the
certified class “includes those who claim harm from the very same acts
from which other members of the class have benefitted”).
In Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a group of
pharmaceuticals wholesalers filed an antitrust action alleging the
defendant Abbott Laboratories made agreements with other defendant
drug manufacturers preserving Abbott’s monopoly position in the market
for the drug Hytrin (terazosin hydrochloride) and keeping less expensive
generic alternatives off the market. 350 F.3d 1181, 1183–84 (11th Cir.
2003). The district court certified a class including all entities who
purchased Hytrin from Abbott at any time during the periods
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commencing March 31, 1998, through August 13, 1999. Id. at 1186.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding
the plaintiffs had failed to prove they could adequately represent the
class that included some wholesalers who resold Hytrin on a cost-plus
basis and other wholesalers who utilized other pricing formulas. Id. at
1190. The court reasoned that a potential, significant conflict among the
class members was suggested by the disparate pricing schemes of the
class members. 3 Id. at 1190–91. Because the record on appeal
suggested those wholesalers who sold on a cost-plus basis would, unlike
other wholesalers in the class, lose both margin and volume from generic
competition preferred by other class members, the court reversed the
class certification order and remanded for development of the evidentiary
record as to the potential conflict. 4 Id. at 1192.
The City contends the economic conflict of interest among the class
members in this case is as fundamental as the conflicts perceived by the
courts in Pickett and Valley Drug. Suggesting many of the members of
the class are hostile to the refund because, as property taxpayers, they
will be adversely affected by it, the City asserts the district court abused
its discretion in certifying and refusing to decertify the class.
Kragnes denies the alleged intraclass conflict is fundamental.
First, she notes that the fact that some members of the class do not favor
the lawsuit is not sufficient to defeat certification of the class. Vignaroli,
3The defendants alleged that three national wholesaler class members whose
transactions with Abbot constituted over 50% of the class claims were among those who
sold Hytrin on a cost-plus basis and likely derived more profit from sales of branded
products than from sales of generic drugs. Valley Drug, 350 F.3d 1190–91.
4The need for the development of the evidentiary record was the result of the
district court’s ruling precluding “downstream discovery” on the subject of the
wholesalers’ sales practices bearing upon whether the cost-plus sellers achieved a net
gain as a consequence of the unavailability of the competing generics. Id. at 1192.
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360 N.W.2d at 747. She argues the “crux” of the case against the City is
the illegality of the franchise fee and there is no conflict among the
members as to that issue. She argues the nature and extent of the
refund of the illegal franchise fees collected by the City are secondary to
the liability issue. Because it is unknown how the City will choose to
fund the judgment against it in this case, Kragnes contends the fear that
some members of the class will suffer a loss as a result of any refund is
based on speculation. She points out that as of the time of trial, the City
had not decided how it was going to cover the cost of any refund and that
it had considered options other than raising property tax, such as
reducing administrative expenses, cutting or deferring capital
improvements, or obtaining funding through long-term debt. As a
property owner in Des Moines, Kragnes contends she is in the perfect
position to represent the interests of other property-owning class
members as she weighs the benefits of a refund against the potential
consequences.
We find no abuse of the district court’s broad discretion in
certifying and refusing to decertify the class. The heart of this case is the
illegality of the franchise fee imposed by the City, and we agree with
Kragnes that there is no fundamental conflict among the class members
as to that issue. See Vignaroli, 360 N.W.2d at 746–47. Each of the class
members paid fees that the City should not have collected and in this
fundamental respect their claims are identical, consistent, and
compatible.
Although the City claims an economic conflict exists among class
members, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching a
contrary conclusion. To the extent the City contends this lawsuit will
cause adverse consequences for property owners, we again note Kragnes
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herself is a property owner sharing that status with other property
owners in the city. 5 The City seeks to neutralize the significance of this
status shared by Kragnes and the other property-owning members of the
class with a retrospective and a prospective analysis of the alleged
economic conflict. In each of these analyses, however, the assertion of a
fundamental conflict is substantially based on speculation.
In its retrospective analysis of the claimed conflict, the City
contends the property owners would have preferred the City generate
revenue through franchise fees paid by both property owners and
nonowners alike rather than impose a property tax increase not directly
shared by nonowners. 6 But this contention is infused with speculation
as to whether and how much the City would have chosen to increase
property taxes if it had not imposed the illegal franchise fees. Although
the record indicates the City considered increasing property taxes to
raise funds for certain expenditures, it is impossible to know how much,
if at all, the City’s elected leaders would have increased property taxes
had they not chosen instead to utilize the illegal franchise fees to raise
revenue. Viewed from the precollection vantage point, the City’s conflict
argument assumes the City would have raised property taxes and would
have raised them in such an amount that at least some property owners
would have paid more in increased property taxes than they ultimately
5The federal cases cited by the City for the proposition that class certification is
improper when some members of the class benefited from the same conduct that
harmed other members do not involve a named representative who arguably benefited
from the conduct and thus shares the interest of the other class members who
benefited.
6The City’s contention that the interests of property owners and nonowners
conflict fundamentally because owners bear the burden of real estate taxes and
therefore have an aversion to tax increases not shared by nonowners is tinged with
speculation to the extent owners pass along property tax increases to nonowners
through rents.
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paid in franchise fees. We decline to engage in the retrospective
speculation undergirding the City’s assumption that the singular fiscal
alternative to increasing franchise fees was an increase in property taxes.
Other feasible precollection alternatives—including a decision against
raising additional revenue—were available to the City. Thus, from the
precollection vantage point, the contention that the interests of Kragnes
are misaligned or fundamentally in conflict with those of other class
members is speculative at best.
When the alleged conflict between the interests of Kragnes and
other property-owning members of the class is viewed prospectively from
the postcollection or “refund” vantage point, we again find an abundance
of speculation. Here the City’s conflict analysis assumes any refund will
be financed through a property tax increase in such an amount as will
cause at least some property owners to pay more in increased property
taxes than they will receive in refunded franchise fees. Although this
prospect cannot be ruled out, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to assume the refund will be financed solely through
a property tax increase. 7
In the last analysis, the City’s characterization of the conflict
between the interests of Kragnes and other class members is rife with
speculation—beginning with speculation about what City leaders would
have done in the past and ending with predictions about what City
7As we have already noted, the general assembly recently adopted legislation
untethering the amount of franchise fees from the municipality’s cost of inspecting and
maintaining the utility. See Iowa Code § 364.2(4)(f). Under the new regime, the amount
of franchise fees is instead limited prospectively to a maximum of 5% of the customer’s
utility bills. Id. We decline to speculate about whether the City will finance the refund
through this (or any other) revenue stream, through prospective budgetary and fiscal
alternatives, or from a combination of such policy choices. The district court will on
remand take evidence informing its decision on the appropriate structure of the refund
mechanism.
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leaders will do in the future. And in between is speculation about the
effect of hypothetical decisions on property owners. Did they pay less in
franchise fees than they would have paid in property taxes had the
franchise fees not been increased? Did some nonproperty-owning class
members pay more in increased franchise fees than they would have paid
through rent increases occasioned by property tax increases had the
franchise fees not been increased? How, if at all, will property tax rates
be affected by the refund remedy ultimately fashioned in this case? 8 See
Hispanics United of DuPage Cnty. v. Vill. of Addison, 160 F.R.D. 681, 690
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (claimed conflict of interest between class members whose
property would be destroyed by village’s redevelopment plan and class
members whose property would not be destroyed and might increase in
value was “dependent on myriad factors that cannot be forecast with any
degree of certainty” and did not defeat request for certification of class).
Furthermore, even if we assume without deciding that some
members of the class prefer to leave their right to a refund unremedied,
this does not mandate a determination that the district court abused its
discretion in certifying a class in this case. Probe v. State Teachers’ Ret.
Sys., 780 F.2d 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1986) (no abuse of discretion in
certifying class including retired teachers and teachers presently working
in action challenging use of sex-segregated actuarial tables in calculating
retirement benefits notwithstanding the prospect that if the suit were to
8Just as it is possible the City’s elected leaders who made the decision to collect
the fees in question might have chosen not to provide certain services instead of
collecting the fees had they understood their collection was illegal, we cannot know how
the current and future City leaders will choose to finance any refund that might be
required. We will not speculate whether the refund will be financed through spending
reductions, tax increases, fee enhancements, or some combination of these and other
alternatives, nor do we express an opinion as to how the refund should be structured in
view of the alternatives shown by the evidence on remand to be available under the
circumstances.
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result in higher benefits for some class members, larger contributions
would be required of presently working teachers); Lockwood Motors, Inc.
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 162 F.R.D. 569, 578 (D. Minn. 1995) (in action
brought by dealer challenging manufacturer’s imposition of an
advertising charge as unfair business practice, impermissible conflict
precluding class certification not shown by evidence that some class
members benefit from or prefer the marketing program); Martino v.
McDonald’s Sys., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 81, 85–86 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (concluding
defendant-franchisor’s assertion that most McDonalds’ franchisees were
content with the franchisor’s systems, saw no merit in plaintiff’s
antitrust claims, or preferred to leave the violation of their rights
unremedied did not preclude certification of a class of franchisees). We
acknowledge that other courts have declined requests for class
certification or affirmed such rulings on appeal in some cases based on
evidence tending to establish a strong opposition of some class members
to the objectives of the suit filed by the named plaintiffs. See, e.g., Gilpin
v. Am. Fed. of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., 875 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th
Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of certification of a class of all nonunion
employees in an action seeking restitution of agency fees on the ground
that one segment of the class wished to weaken or destroy the union and
the other segment of “free-riders” wished merely to shift as much of the
cost of union representation as possible to the union members); Alston v.
Va. High Sch. League, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 574, 579–80 (W.D. Va. 1999)
(declining request for certification of class in action seeking injunctive
relief where majority of members of the purported class opposed
disruption of the status quo that would result from the injunctive relief
sought by plaintiffs). As the applicable standard of review accords broad
discretion to the district court in this matter, however, we find no
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reversible error in the district court’s determination that no fundamental
conflict of interest between Kragnes and other class members precluded
certification or mandated decertification in this case. 9
As we have described in the past, our class action rules “are
remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to favor the
maintenance of class actions.” Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 696 N.W.2d
318, 320 (Iowa 2005). The goal of the class action rule is the
“efficient resolution of the claims . . . of many individuals in
a single action, the elimination of repetitious litigation and
possibly inconsistent adjudications involving common
questions, related events, or requests for similar relief, and
the establishment of an effective procedure for those whose
economic position is such that it is unrealistic to expect
them to seek to vindicate their rights in separate lawsuits.”
Id. (citation omitted).
The litigation of this case has resulted in two Supreme Court
opinions, a forty-nine page district court decision after a fourteen-day
bench trial involving the testimony of twenty-eight witnesses, including
eight experts—three for the City and five for Kragnes. The record fills five
bankers’ boxes. However, Kragnes’s claim standing alone would likely
fall within the jurisdictional limit of the small claims court. We think
this case demonstrates the very necessity and importance of class action
litigation both for the plaintiffs and for the City. The likelihood of a
plaintiff bringing such a complex suit requiring substantial resources to
litigate in small claims is highly unlikely. And if she, and scores of
thousands of others like her, did bring their claims individually, it could
easily overwhelm the legal department of the City and the resources of
9We express no opinion at this juncture whether further proceedings in this
matter will justify the division of the class into subclasses. See Iowa Rs. Civ. P.
1.262(3)(c), 1.265(1)(a).
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the Polk County district court, and would likely result in inconsistent
adjudications. We affirm on this issue.
B. Must Members be Allowed to Opt Out of the Class? Rule
1.263(1) provides a list of factors to be considered by the district court
when determining whether a class action should be permitted for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy, including:
a. Whether a joint or common interest exists among
members of the class.
b. Whether the prosecution of separate actions by or
against individual members of the class would create a risk
of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class that would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for a party opposing the
class.
c. Whether adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class as a practical matter would be
dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to
the adjudication or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.263(1). The district court specifically found that
multiple lawsuits over the subject matter of this case could cause
substantial harm to the rights of different class members because
different results might occur in the thousands of potential cases. The
court also noted this large number of claims could, if pursued
individually, overwhelm the City’s legal department. These findings have
special significance in the court’s determination of whether class
members may opt out of the class under rule 1.267(1).
Rule 1.267(1) provides that a member may not elect to be excluded
from the action if “[t]he certification order contains an affirmative finding
under rule 1.263(1)(a), (b), or (c).” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.267(1).
Notwithstanding the district court’s affirmative findings under each of
the subsections of rule 1.263(1), the City relies on Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985), for the
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proposition that individual members of a class have a due process right
to opt out of class litigation. Shutts involved a class action lawsuit
against Phillips Petroleum, a company that produced natural gas from
leased land in eleven different states. 472 U.S. at 799, 105 S. Ct. at
2967, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 633. The plaintiffs brought suit in Kansas
claiming to represent a class of 28,000 royalty owners from all fifty states
and several foreign countries with ownership interests in the leased
properties. Id. Phillips challenged the inclusion of nonresidents within
the class, contending “that unless out-of-state plaintiffs affirmatively
consent, the Kansas courts may not exert jurisdiction over their claims.”
Id. at 806, 105 S. Ct. at 2971, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 638. Phillips argued that
many of the members of the proposed class lacked minimum contacts
with Kansas and could not be bound, consistent with the due process
clause, by a judgment of the Kansas court. Id. After a discussion of the
development of and rationales for class action litigation, the Supreme
Court “reject[ed the] contention that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that absent plaintiffs affirmatively ‘opt
in’ to the class, rather than be deemed members of the class if they do
not ‘opt out.’ ” Id. at 812, 105 S. Ct. at 2974–75, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 642.
The Court concluded that the “procedure followed by Kansas, where a
fully descriptive notice is sent first-class mail to each class member, with
an explanation of the right to ‘opt out,’ satisfie[d] due process.” Id. at
812, 105 S. Ct. at 2975, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 642. Contrary to the City’s
understanding of the case, Shutts does not stand for the proposition that
the Due Process Clause mandates that all class members must have the
opportunity to opt out of a class action case.
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether an Alabama court’s certification of a class and
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approval of a settlement agreement resolving the claims of class members
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
all class members were not afforded the right to exclude themselves from
the class or the agreement. Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 85, 117
S. Ct. 1028, 1029, 137 L. Ed. 2d 203, 207 (1997). However, the Court
did not decide the issue as it determined certiorari was improvidently
granted because the parties did not raise the federal issue below. Id.
The Court noted that its decision in Shutts was limited to the
determination of whether the Kansas court had jurisdiction over out-of-
state class members. Id. at 88–89, 117 S. Ct. at 1030, 137 L. Ed. 2d at
209.
The Iowa rules regarding class actions were adopted in 1980 and
were based on the Model Class Actions Act. See Unif. Class Actions Act,
12 U.L.A. 93 (2008). The commissioners’ comment to section 8 of the
Model Act, which corresponds to Iowa rule 1.267(1), provides:
Under some circumstances members of a plaintiff
class cannot elect to be excluded because they are
indispensible parties. This would be determined by the
court in ruling on certification considering the criteria of
Section 3(a) [Iowa rule 1.263(1)]. Such situations might arise
in actions comparable to those under Federal Rule 23(b)(1);
see 3B Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶23.35. In most situations
members of a plaintiff class will be permitted to elect to be
excluded.
A class member aggrieved by an affirmative finding
under Section 3(a)(1), (2) or (3) might seek relief through one
of the extraordinary writs or through an interlocutory appeal
if authorized by the state practice.
Id. § 8 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 109. Similarly, class actions certified pursuant to
Federal Rule 23(b)(1) do not permit members of a plaintiff class to opt out
of the litigation. Certification pursuant to Federal Rule 23(b)(1) requires
the court to make findings nearly identical to the findings required by
19
Iowa rule 1.263(1).10 Members of a class certified pursuant to Federal
Rule 23(b)(1) are not provided an opportunity by the rule to exclude
themselves from the action. 7AA Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1786, at 496–97 (3d ed.
2005). Rather, “it is reasonably certain that the named representatives
will protect the absent members and give them the functional equivalent
of a day in court.” Id. at 496.
We believe the procedural safeguards in our rules of civil procedure
regarding class actions take into account due process concerns of all
parties involved—both the plaintiff class members as well as the
defendants. Accordingly, we reject the City’s contention that the district
court’s application of rule 1.267(1) violates due process because class
members are not given the option of excluding themselves from the
plaintiff class under the circumstances of this case.
C. Did the District Court Properly Determine What Costs Were
Allowable as Regulation of the Franchises? The district court
concluded that an annual amount of $1,575,194 should be allocated to
the City’s administrative expenses in maintaining and managing the
10Federal Rule 23 provides, in relevant part
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if Rule
23(a) is satisfied and if:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would
create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class member that, as a
practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other class
members not parties to the individual adjudications or would
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests[.]
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
20
electric utility and $1,574,046 should be allocated for the City’s
maintenance and management of the gas utility. These amounts
included increased construction costs due to the presence of utilities,
increased operating costs due to the presence of utilities, degradation
costs, disruption costs, the cost of the franchise fee study, and one-time,
unexpected acute costs. Both parties take issue with several of the costs
allowed, or not allowed, by the district court.
Our decision in Kragnes I directed the district court to “determine
what, if any, part of the franchise fees are related to the City’s
administrative expenses in exercising its police power, including the
costs associated with any incidental consequences of the franchised
services.” Kragnes I, 714 N.W.2d at 643. This does not require the City
to calculate its administrative expenses to a mathematical certainty. Id.
at 642. The district court concluded that Kragnes, as the plaintiff, bore
the burden of showing what, if any part of the franchise fees are not
related to the City’s administrative expenses and neither party challenges
on appeal this allocation of the burden. However, the parties disagree
with several specific costs the district court found the City should or
should not be able to recover through the franchise fee.
1. Lost value of trees. The district court did not include the lost
value of the City’s trees due to trimming and removal to accommodate
the utilities as an allowable incidental cost of the franchise. The City
contends this was error.
Both the City and Kragnes offered expert testimony appraising the
value of the trees located in the right-of-way which are trimmed or
21
removed by MEC 11 to accommodate electric lines. The City’s expert,
Keith Majors, conducted a survey of a portion of the City’s right-of-way,
attempting to count and value the trees that had been trimmed or
removed. Majors opined the City’s trees suffered approximately $5.2
million in damage each year due to MEC’s trimming. Although Kragnes
contends the loss of value of the trees in the right-of-way is not the type
of cost that should be considered part of the City’s administration of the
franchise, Kragnes also provided expert testimony from Jim Rock as to
the value of the trimmed and removed trees. Rock attempted to recreate
Majors’ survey and testified he was unable to verify Majors’ calculations
of the number, type, and size of private and public trees affecting the
right-of-way. Although Rock identified more trees affecting the right-of-
way than did Majors, his appraisal of the value of the damage sustained
by the City’s trees was significantly less than Majors’ estimate. He
concluded the annual loss of value was $622,981. Rock opined that
Majors’ calculations failed to account for the fact that the trees are only
trimmed, on average, once every five years and that the damage assessed
in Majors’ report was cumulative rather than annual.
The district court concluded the lost tree value was not the type of
incidental consequence that should be considered by the court in
calculating an appropriate franchise fee because it is “nothing more than
a theoretical concept.” The district court further noted if it were to
consider tree damage a cost related to the administration of the
franchise, it would accept Rock’s valuation of the damage.
11Trial testimony established that MEC did not perform the trimming itself
during the years at issue but contracted with Wright Tree Service for the maintenance
of all trees, publicly and privately owned, interfering with the electric lines.
22
The City contends the damage to the trees is analogous to the
damage done to sidewalks and streets as a consequence of the
maintenance of the utility, a degradation cost which was allowed by the
district court as a component of the franchise fee. As the City argues,
trees are valuable assets which are damaged when they are trimmed to
accommodate electric lines, no matter how carefully the trimming is
done. Although trees may be pruned to promote growth and health,
trees that are trimmed to accommodate electric lines are trimmed
without regard to the utility, function, and beauty of the tree. They are
trimmed only to provide sufficient clearance for the electric lines. Rock
agreed that the trees are damaged when they are trimmed but disagreed
that the City suffers a loss when the trees are trimmed because the City,
or any owner, also receives a benefit from the trimming of the trees—the
safe and reliable delivery of electrical service. This benefit offsets any
loss, argues Kragnes. 12
Our review of the record leads us to agree with the City that the
trees in the right-of-way are valuable assets and even when the trimming
done by the utility is done correctly and in accordance with the best
trimming practices, the trees are damaged in a quantifiable manner.
However, we find Rock’s valuation of the tree damage to be more credible
and conclude the amount of $622,981 should be allocated to the
maintenance of the electric utility.
2. Indirect operating costs. The City contends the district court
undervalued the indirect operating costs associated with maintaining
12Kragnes also elicited testimony at trial and argues in her brief that MEC enjoys
immunity for any damage sustained by the tree due to its trimming as long as the
trimming was in accordance with best practices. Kragnes, however, cites no authority
for its immunity argument and accordingly, we deem the argument waived. Iowa R.
App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3).
23
and managing the right-of-way in which the gas and electric utilities are
located. Kragnes and the City agree that a portion of the City’s operating
costs are appropriately included in the franchise fees. Specifically,
Kragnes agrees that to the extent the City’s costs to maintain the right-
of-way are increased because of the presence of the utilities, those
increased costs are appropriately included as a component of the
franchise fee. However, the City seeks to recover 6% of the total costs of
the general maintenance of the right-of-way—costs that would be
incurred whether or not the utilities were present in the right-of-way.
The City contends a portion of the total cost of maintaining the right-of-
way is nonetheless appropriately included as a component of the
franchise fees because the City incurs the cost of maintaining the right-
of-way through which the utilities run for the benefit of the general
public. The City contends all users of the right-of-way benefit from the
City’s maintenance and management of the right-of-way, including the
utility providers, so it is appropriate to recoup a portion of the cost of
maintaining and managing the right-of-way through the franchise fees.
We agree with Kragnes that the cost of maintaining the right-of-
way that would be incurred whether or not the utilities were present is
not appropriately included in the franchise fee amount. The costs the
City would incur to maintain the right-of-way even if the utilities were
not located there are not an incidental consequence of inspecting,
licensing, supervising, or otherwise regulating the franchised activity.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the allowable indirect
operating costs are $107,824 per year per utility.
3. Other/acute costs. The City argued that it is appropriate to
include an annual amount intended to cover the cost of unexpected,
acute costs related to managing or administering the franchise and
24
sought an allocation of $250,000 per year per utility. The City’s expert,
Nick Dragisich, conducted a study of the City’s expenses incurred due to
the management and maintenance of the gas and electric utility
franchises. Dragisich noted that study did not include or consider
“unforeseen and/or emergency costs” related to the franchise
management. The study noted that such unpredictable events did not
occur in the time frame covered by the study, from 2001 through 2006,
but cited as examples of such events “the ice storm [in] 1991 and the
snow storm of 1998” which caused “considerable damage” and resulted
in “considerable costs” to the City in cleaning the debris from the right-
of-way. The City also offered testimony of other one-time acute costs
including $1.625 million to bury electric lines at the City’s expense to
promote development and the City’s $1.6 million settlement of a tort
lawsuit for a pedestrian injured on a City grate providing access to a gas
line.
The district court concluded the franchise fee can recover
unexpected acute costs, but concluded $100,000 per year per utility was
an appropriate amount. Both the City and Kragnes appeal the district
court’s valuation of this component of the franchise fee. The City
contends the full $250,000 it requested for each utility should be
counted. Kragnes asserts no amount should be counted for unexpected
acute costs. In the alternative, Kragnes argues that even if it is
reasonable to count some amount for unexpected acute costs, the City
has failed to present evidence to support either the amount it requested
or the amount included in the franchise fee by the district court.
Although we agree the category of unexpected “acute” costs could
be counted as a component of a franchise fee in an appropriate case, we
conclude the record in this case provides inadequate support for its
25
inclusion here. The City offered general testimony tending to prove it
spent $1.6 million to bury electric lines, but we find such costs are in the
nature of capital expenses rather than acute costs. We further conclude
the settlement of the tort claim was not reasonably related to the cost of
inspecting, licensing, supervising, or otherwise regulating the activity
that is being franchised, and therefore the district court correctly
declined to count the item as a component of the franchise fee. Lastly,
the City produced testimony that various storms cost “hundreds of
thousands of dollars” to clean up. Although the City is not required to
account for its franchise-related administrative expenses to a
mathematical certainty, we conclude the evidence as to the cost of the
storm clean-up was not in sufficient detail to allocate a value to it.
Accordingly, we conclude the district court should not have included any
value to the claimed acute costs in the computation of the franchise fees.
4. Construction costs paid by the federal and state government.
Kragnes contends the district court erred in counting as a franchise fee
component an amount for certain increased construction costs.
Kragnes’s expert, Charles Finch, opined that to the extent some
construction projects receive funding from the state or federal
government, such construction costs are not actually incurred by the
city. Kragnes accordingly contends this component of the franchise fee
must be reduced by 35%, an amount calculated by Finch to account for
the portion of construction costs offset by state and federal funds. The
City, however, asserts Finch’s calculations do not bear out. The City’s
expert, Dragisich, testified that even if it is assumed that 35% of the cost
of a construction project affecting the right-of-way is offset by federal or
state funds, it does not necessarily follow that the state/federal funds are
actually allocated to the portion of the contract that accounts for the
26
increase in construction costs attributable to the presence of utilities in
the right-of-way. Further, the City argues that once state or federal
funds are received by the City, they become the City’s funds without
regard to their source. Simply put, the City contends the court must
focus on whether the City proved its construction costs attributable to
the presence of the utilities in the right-of-way are increased, and it
matters not in calculating the appropriate franchise fee what revenue
stream the City used to pay them. We agree. The source of the funds
used to pay for the increased construction costs attributable to the
utilities is not relevant to the determination of whether such costs are a
proper component of the franchise fee.
5. Construction costs paid by WRA/sewer users on WRA/sewer
projects. Kragnes contends the district court erred in including as
franchise fee components any increased construction costs resulting
from projects related to the Wastewater Reclamation Authority (WRA) 13
and sanitary sewer. Kragnes argues such costs should not be counted
because they are recouped by the City from the WRA and consumers of
sewer services.
However, the City’s expert explained that the method proposed by
Kragnes’s expert to “back out” the construction costs of WRA and sewer
projects shifts the increased cost of construction due to the presence of
gas and electric utilities almost entirely to the WRA and sewer users. He
instead opined it is more appropriate to require the customers of utilities
to bear their fair proportion of the increased costs and require the City to
13The WRA is a consortium of cities which provides waste treatment facilities
and services to the member municipalities, including the City of Des Moines. The cities
each maintain their own sanitary sewer systems for waste collection and connect their
systems to WRA facilities for treatment. As the operating contractor for the WRA, the
City of Des Moines manages the construction projects for the WRA.
27
in turn reimburse the WRA and sewer utility to avoid “double-dipping” by
the City. The district court credited the City’s expert. It did not reduce
this component of the franchise fee by the amount the City’s
construction costs are increased as a consequence of WRA and sewer
construction projects and it required the City to “negotiate some method
of reimbursement with the enterprise entities to avoid any double
recovery.”
We also find the City’s expert’s testimony on this issue credible
and agree with the resolution adopted by the district court.
6. Administrative overhead fee on construction and engineering
project bills. Kragnes asserts the district court erred in counting a
12.78% administrative fee as a component of the franchise fee. She
argues this is inappropriate because any increase in administration costs
incurred by the contractor due to the presence of utilities are accounted
for in the construction contract price. Kragnes further contends that to
the extent the 12.78% fee represents additional City personnel cost
attributable to administering payment of the construction contracts, it
has already been accounted for in the operating expense portion of the
district court’s calculation of the franchise fee. The City disagrees,
contending the administrative fee does not purport to cover additional
costs incurred by the construction company but rather addresses the
City’s additional administrative overhead. The City’s expert, Dragisich,
was questioned on this precise point and explained that he had taken
care to insure that costs were not double counted and that the
administrative fee on third-party contracts did not overlap with the
operating expenses calculated separately. Dragisich also described the
types of additional administrative costs incurred by the City on third-
party construction contracts due to the presence of utilities in the right-
28
of-way. He noted this cost component might include the time required to
notify the police and fire departments of the timing and location of road
closures and how to reroute emergency vehicles. This component might
also include the administrative costs associated with posting notices on
the City’s website or placing placards on properties informing the public
about road closures or temporary utility interruptions attributable to
construction.
We find credible Dragisich’s testimony that the City does incur
some additional administrative overhead in connection with construction
projects as a consequence of the presence of utilities. We find such
administrative costs have not been counted twice and were therefore
correctly included by the district court as a component of the franchise
fee.
7. Interest on the construction costs. Kragnes contends the district
court erred in counting bond expense/interest as an element of the
increased construction and engineering costs. She argues that because
franchise fees are received quarterly, the City does not need to borrow
money to pay construction costs. However, the City’s expert testified
that while Kragnes’s logic might work “in a perfect world,” it did not
necessarily work in reality. Even if it is assumed the City receives
franchise fees quarterly, it does not necessarily follow that the City will
always have funds in hand to pay construction contract payments when
they are due. The timing of construction projects and the payments due
on construction contracts are not necessarily aligned with the City’s
receipt of franchise fees. Further, as the City’s expert noted, the City’s
construction costs fluctuate greatly from year to year and franchise fee
receipts are not necessarily sufficient to cover this category of costs.
29
Accordingly, we conclude the district court committed no error in
counting this category of cost as part of the franchise fee.
8. Increased construction costs. Kragnes and the City disagreed as
to the amount of increased construction and engineering costs incurred
by the City for the accommodation of the gas and electric utilities.
Kragnes argues that construction costs were increased by 5% and
engineering costs were increased by 3.5% as a consequence of the
presence of utility structures and equipment in the right-of-way. The
City, however, offered testimony suggesting construction costs are
increased by 15% and engineering costs are increased by 20%. The
district court found the City’s evidence on this issue more persuasive.
The main issue of dispute involves a survey created and
implemented by the City’s expert. City employees were asked whether
their work was affected or increased due to the presence of utilities in the
right-of-way. Each employee was also asked how much his or her work
increased due to each utility (including gas, water, electric, cable, etc.).
The survey respondents assigned a percentage value for each factor. The
City’s expert, Dragisich, added the values of the increased work and
came up with a total increase in work, and concluded engineering costs
were increased by 20% and construction costs were increased by 15%.
Kragnes’s expert, Finch, concluded it was more appropriate to average
the increased work for all the utilities, producing a 3.5% increase in
engineering costs and 5% increased construction costs.
We note the City’s expert had extensive construction experience,
including the bidding of construction projects conducted in the right-of-
way. He is also a licensed engineer. Although this is a close issue, we
credit Dragisich’s opinion based on his relevant experience. We agree
with the district court’s findings that the increased engineering costs
30
should be valued at 20% and the increased construction costs should be
valued at 15%, and adopt them as our own.
D. Did the District Court Err in Ordering a Refund to all Class
Members? As we have already noted, the district court found the
appropriate annual franchise fee is $1,575,194 for the electric utility and
$1,574,046 for the gas utility and declared the plaintiff should have a
judgment against the City in the amount by which the franchise fees
collected during the period commencing July 27, 1999, and ending
May 26, 2009, exceeded the annual franchise fee. Citing McKesson Corp.
v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 110 S. Ct.
2238, 110 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1990), the district court concluded the Due
Process Clause affords the plaintiff class members a meaningful
opportunity to secure postpayment relief for their overpayment of
franchise fees. The court further reasoned there must be financial
consequences from the illegal taxation of the City’s residents
notwithstanding that the funds received from the illegal taxation of the
City’s residents were used wisely, legally, and with the best intentions for
the residents.
The court ordered relief in the form of a refund of the franchise fee
overpayments in an amount to be determined by the court based on
evidence adduced in further proceedings of the actual amount of
franchise fees collected during the subject period reduced by the annual
franchise fee determined by the court. The City contends that, even if it
did charge an excessive franchise fee, the district court erred in
concluding the class members are entitled to a refund of any amount
they were overcharged.
The City contends McKesson and Hagge v. Iowa Department of
Revenue and Finance, 504 N.W.2d 448 (Iowa 1993), are distinguishable
31
and provide no legal basis for ordering a refund in this case. We
acknowledge the City’s contention that the plaintiffs in those cases
claimed deprivation of a federal constitutional right (Commerce Clause
violation in McKesson and intergovernmental tax immunity in Hagge) in
addition to their due process claims. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22, 110
S. Ct. at 2242, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 26; Hagge, 504 N.W.2d at 449. While it
is true that the excessive fees in this case were not found to violate any
federal constitutional right, we conclude the reasoning stated in
McKesson and Hagge is compelling, and we therefore apply it in this
case.
Meaningful backward-looking relief is especially appropriate to
rectify the class members’ overpayments under the circumstances
presented in this case. “Because exaction of a tax constitutes a
deprivation of property,” procedural safeguards are generally required to
protect against “unlawful exactions in order to satisfy the commands of
the Due Process Clause.” McKesson, 496 U.S. at 36, 110 S. Ct. at 2250,
110 L. Ed. 2d at 35–36. However, because “[a]llowing taxpayers to
litigate their tax liabilities prior to payment might threaten a
government’s financial security,” states have been permitted to restrict
the ability of the taxpayer to challenge the lawfulness of the tax before it
is paid. Id. at 37, 110 S. Ct. at 2250, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 36. That was the
case here—Kragnes and the other members of the class had no
predeprivation remedy. Instead they were required to raise their
objections to fees in a postdeprivation refund action.
To satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause,
therefore, in this refund action the State must provide
taxpayers with, not only a fair opportunity to challenge the
accuracy and legal validity of their tax obligation, but also a
“clear and certain remedy,” for any erroneous or unlawful
32
tax collection to ensure that the opportunity to contest the
tax is a meaningful one.
Id. at 39, 110 S. Ct. at 2251, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 37 (footnote and internal
citation omitted).
We further note that Kragnes filed this action soon after the City
decided to commence collecting the franchise fees at issue here. On
notice of Kragnes’s claim that the franchise fees were excessive in
amount and therefore illegal, the City nonetheless collected them and,
during the pendency of this action, even increased the amount of the fees
collected. The failure of the City to respond differently after it was on
notice of Kragnes’s claim does not mitigate in favor of depriving Kragnes
and the class of a remedy for the unlawful taxation. See id. at 45, 110
S. Ct. at 2254–55, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 41 (noting State has available a range
of procedures to limit the financial impact of refunding taxes, including
refraining from collecting a tax which has been declared illegal during the
pendency of an appeal or placing disputed funds into an escrow account
or utilizing “other accounting devices such that the State can predict
with greater accuracy the availability of undisputed treasury funds”).
“[The City’s] failure to avail itself of certain of these methods of self-
protection weakens any ‘equitable’ justification for avoiding its
constitutional obligation to provide relief.” Id. at 45, 110 S. Ct. at 2255,
110 L. Ed. 2d at 41.
The City cites the Restatement (Third) of Restitution in support of
its contention that no refund of any overpayment should be ordered
under the circumstances presented here. Section 19(1) of the
Restatement states the general rule that a taxpayer who pays an illegally
assessed or collected tax, fee, or charge has a claim in restitution against
the government to prevent unjust enrichment in the absence of a
33
different rule imposed by statute. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment § 19(1), at 259 (2011). As has already been noted,
this court has ordered a refund when a taxpayer overpaid taxes to the
Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance. Hagge, 504 N.W.2d at 452.
The City contends the district court erred, however, in this case in failing
to apply section 19(2) of the Restatement allowing the court to consider
whether, under the circumstances of a particular case, a restitutionary
remedy should be denied on the ground it would “disrupt orderly fiscal
administration or result in severe public hardship.” Restatement (Third)
of Restitution § 19(2), at 259. Subject to constitutional limitations, the
rule stated in section 19(2) authorizes the court to limit relief to the
claimant to avoid either adverse governmental consequence. Id. § 19
cmt. b, at 260. The City directs us specifically to illustration 17:
City assesses a property tax on a nondiscriminatory basis.
The tax is subsequently determined to be improperly
authorized and void. In response to Taxpayers’ suit against
City to recover the tax collected from them, City
demonstrates that the revenues illegally collected were spent
exclusively on ordinary municipal services benefitting
Taxpayers among other residents. Under the circumstances,
the court may find that neither City nor its residents have
been unjustly enriched at Taxpayers’ expense.
Id. § 19 cmt. f, illus. 17, at 267.
This court rejected an equity-based argument opposing a tax
refund in Hagge. In that case, the State urged a refund should be denied
because such relief would impose an onerous fiscal burden. We
concluded, however, that “equity cannot override the clear commands of
the Due Process Clause.” Hagge, 504 N.W.2d at 452. As in Hagge, we
are not convinced that a properly structured refund in this case will
create an onerous fiscal burden on the City or create such disruption
34
and instability as to give rise to countervailing public interests weighing
against a refund.
Undaunted by our rejection of an equitable argument in Hagge, the
City offers up other equity-based reasons for denying a refund of the
excessive franchise fees. Among these reasons are the notion that
restitution of the excess fees should not be ordered when the excess fees
were paid by a broad-based group and the plaintiff class would
essentially recover from itself, and the equitable principle that no refund
will be ordered when the improper tax was collected from a broad
constituency and the funds were used for the general benefit of a similar
public constituency. We conclude the district court correctly declined
these equity-based entreaties to forego altogether a refund remedy in this
case. This conclusion is strongly influenced by the fact that the City
continued and increased its collection of the franchise fees after being
put on notice of the claim in this litigation that the fees exceeded the
amount authorized by law. Under these circumstances, equitable
principles will not shield the City from a refund. 14
14We note that although the general assembly ratified the City’s collection
of electric and gas franchise fees in excess of the cost of regulating the utilities,
the legislature declined to retroactively authorize the excessive fees although it
clearly knew how. In 2007, the general assembly enacted similar legislation
ratifying the imposition of franchise fees for cable television services. See Iowa
Code § 477A.7(5) (Supp. 2007); Zaber v. City of Dubuque, 789 N.W.2d 634, 637
(Iowa 2010). The general assembly explicitly provided that the ratification was
retroactive. Iowa Code § 477A.7(5); Zaber, 789 N.W.2d at 637. However, in this
instance, the legislature decided not to enact a retroactive ratification of
franchise fees, but instead made the ratification prospective only. In fact, an
early draft of the bill contained a retroactive provision, but that portion was
stricken in a vote on the floor of the House. See Senate Amendment 3328 to
S.F. 478, 83 G.A., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009) (providing in § 202 that any amount of
electric or gas franchise fees previously assessed that exceeds the city’s cost of
regulating the franchise is “declared to be authorized and legally assessed by
and paid to the city”); Journal of the House, Saturday, April 25, 2009, at pages
2072–2075 (motion by Oldson, offering amendment H–1780, which, among
other things, struck the ratification language then found in § 221); 2009 Iowa
35The City next contends that if a refund is to be required, it should
be limited to those class members who can show they would have paid
less if the City had raised the same amount of revenue through property
taxes. We disagree. We cannot assume the City would have chosen to
increase real estate taxes by an equivalent amount if the excessive
franchise fees had not been conceived and collected. In the last analysis,
the determination of what would have occurred had the excessive
franchise fees not been collected would require speculation in which the
court will not engage. We conclude the most fair remedy in this case is
the refund which will, to the extent possible, refund to members of the
plaintiff class the excess fees extracted from them and restore the parties
to the status quo ante. We also note the City has available to it the full
range of legal tax and fee options, budgetary measures, and spending
policy choices to cover the refund and its ongoing future expenses.
Comment f to section 19 makes clear that while “[s]ignificant
disruption and hardship are grounds to limit restitution . . . the mere
fact that relief will be expensive is not.” Restatement (Third) of
Restitution § 19 cmt. f, at 266. It further notes that a restitutionary
remedy may be fashioned in a way that minimizes the disruption to the
taxing authority, “such as by allowing refunds in the form of credits
against future assessments.” Id. § 19 cmt. f, at 267. Our disposition of
this appeal will allow the district court to structure the refund in a way
that balances the respective interests of the City and the members of the
plaintiff class.
________________________
Acts ch. 179 (amending Iowa Code ch. 364 regarding franchise fees without
provision for retroactive ratification of franchise fees). Such retroactive
ratification has been approved by this court. Zaber, 789 N.W.2d at 656. Thus,
the legislature also declined to shield the City from the financial impact of this
litigation.
36
E. Should the District Court Have Divided the Class Into
Subclasses for the Remaining Proceedings? The City argues that the
district court abused its discretion in not dividing the class into
subclasses for remedial purposes. Specifically, the City contends that
while the class members interests may be sufficiently alike for purposes
of the resolution of the legal issue in this case, they have significantly
different interests and preferences with regard to the determination of an
appropriate remedy. These different interests, the City contends,
requires the division of the class into subclasses. The district court
concluded the conflict perceived by the City was speculative and declined
to divide the class.
The City contends that as a remedial plan is put together, someone
must represent the interests of those class members that have an
interest in minimizing the amount of the refund. For example, the City
contends that the implementation of a remedy must be preceded by an
initial determination of whether or not potential class members must
submit a claim. The City also contends decisions must be made with
regard to the types of notice and information that are to be included with
any refund checks or claim forms because these should vary depending
on whether the class member favors or opposes the collection of
franchise fees as a source of revenue for the City. The City favors the
creation of subclasses because it harbors doubts that Kragnes “will
vigorously pursue the positions on these issues that are of greatest
advantage to those class members who benefit from revenue generation
through the franchise fee.”
Kragnes contends that to the extent that no conflict exists
warranting the decertification of the class, no conflict exists warranting
the creation of subclasses. She notes she is a property owner and thus a
37
member of the group the City contends would likely favor the generation
of revenue through franchise fees rather than real estate taxes. However,
clearly she does not favor the refund outcome the City predicts for her as
a property owner.
We conclude the City’s arguments for the creation of subclasses
are speculative on this record. We affirm the district court’s certification
of the class. As administration of this action proceeds on remand, the
district court shall exercise its discretion in ruling on motions, if any,
requesting the establishment of subclasses. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.262(3)(c).
F. Did the District Court Correctly Decline to Order the City
to Amend its Franchise Ordinances? Kragnes asserts the district
court erred in holding amendments of Iowa Code sections 384.3A and
364.2 do not require the City to amend its franchise fee ordinances.
Kragnes contends the City should be enjoined from collecting franchise
fees pursuant to the ordinances in effect at the time of this lawsuit until
the City enacts a new ordinance in compliance with sections 384.3A and
364.2, which became effective May 26, 2009.
A franchise fee assessed by a city may be based upon a
percentage of gross revenues generated from sales of the
franchisee within the city not to exceed five percent, without
regard to the city’s cost of inspecting, supervising, and
otherwise regulating the franchise. Franchise fees collected
pursuant to an ordinance in effect on May 26, 2009, shall be
deposited in the city’s general fund and such fees collected
in excess of the amounts necessary to inspect, supervise,
and otherwise regulate the franchise may be used by the city
for any other purpose authorized by law. Franchise fees
collected pursuant to an ordinance that is adopted or
amended on or after May 26, 2009, to increase the
percentage rate at which franchise fees are assessed shall be
credited to the franchise fee account within the city’s general
fund and used pursuant to section 384.3A. If a city franchise
fee is assessed to customers of a franchise, the fee shall not
be assessed to the city as a customer. Before a city adopts or
amends a franchise fee rate ordinance or franchise
ordinance to increase the percentage rate at which franchise
38
fees are assessed, a revenue purpose statement shall be
prepared specifying the purpose or purposes for which the
revenue collected from the increased rate will be expended. If
property tax relief is listed as a purpose, the revenue
purpose statement shall also include information regarding
the amount of the property tax relief to be provided with
revenue collected from the increased rate. The revenue
purpose statement shall be published as provided in section
362.3.
Iowa Code § 364.2(4)(f) (Supp. 2009).
The City’s ordinances currently in effect authorize the City to
collect franchise fees of 5%. However, Kragnes asserts the effect of this
lawsuit is “to lower the allowed percentage rate of franchise fee under the
City ordinances to the costs of regulation, which is less than 5%.”
According to Kragnes, if the City wishes to collect a 5% franchise fee, it
must enact a new ordinance “to increase the percentage rate at which
franchise fees are collected” and comply with the notice and revenue
statement requirements of section 364.2(4)(f) as well as the spending
limitations of section 384.3A for ordinances enacted after May 26, 2009.
The City contends the plain language of section 362.2(4)(f) allows it
to continue to collect a 5% franchise fee pursuant to its ordinances
which were in effect on May 26, 2009. The City points out that the
statute explicitly addresses how funds collected pursuant to ordinances
in effect on May 26, 2009, may be spent, clearly evidencing an intent to
“grandfather in” existing ordinances. The statute further distinguishes
between existing ordinances and ordinances enacted or amended after
May 26, 2009, and requires cities seeking to amend or enact ordinances
after May 2009 to comply with certain requirements.
We are not persuaded by Kragnes’s argument that the effect of this
lawsuit and our decision in Kragnes I is to rewrite the City’s franchise fee
ordinance. Our decisions simply render the ordinance unenforceable for
the designated time frame in excess of the costs to maintain and regulate
39
the franchise. We agree that the plain language of section 364.2(4)(f)
grandfathers in franchise fee ordinances in effect on May 26, 2009, and
authorizes the collection of up to a 5% franchise fee pursuant to those
existing ordinances. The district court correctly declined Kragnes’s
invitation to order the City to adopt a new franchise fee ordinance.
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
certifying and denying the City’s motions to decertify the class. We also
conclude the members of the plaintiff class have no due process right to
opt out of the class and the failure of the rules of civil procedure to allow
them to do so is not unconstitutional.
After our de novo review of the record, we conclude certain
amounts allocated or not allocated by the district court as proper
components of the franchise fees should be modified. Specifically, we
conclude the City should be able to include the lost value of trees due to
trimming and removal to accommodate electrical lines in the amount of
$622,981 each year for the electric utility franchise. We also conclude
the City shall not, based on this record, recoup any amount for
unpredictable, acute costs. We affirm in all other respects the district
court’s determination of the allowable amount of franchise fees. For ease
of reference, the franchise fees allowed are as follows.
Gas Utility Electric Utility
Degradation Costs $35,030.00/year $37,373.00/year
Construction Costs $1,314,563.00/year $1,314,563.00/year
Operating Costs $107,824.00/year $107,824.00/year
Disruption Costs $2,038.00/year $843.00/year
Franchise Fee Study $14,591.00/year $14,591.00/year
Lost Tree Value $0.00/year $622,981.00/year
Acute Costs $0.00/year $0.00/year
Total $1,474,046.00/year $2,098,175.00/year
40
We further conclude the district court properly ordered a refund of
fees in excess of the totals itemized above. We remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion, for findings as to the amounts
to be distributed to the members of the class, and for a determination of
the appropriate restitutionary arrangement by which such amounts shall
be paid. And, finally, we conclude the district court correctly denied
Kragnes’s request for an injunction preventing the City from collecting
franchise fees pursuant to the ordinances in effect on May 26, 2009.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except Cady, C.J., who dissents and Waterman
and Mansfield, JJ., who take no part.
41
#09–1473, Kragnes v. City of Des Moines
CADY, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. A basic and fundamental conflict exists
between the members of the class. This conflict is inimical to the
fundamental purpose of class actions and, under the law, does not
permit Kragnes to pursue her claim as a class action. I would hold the
district court erred in failing to decertify the class.
Several requirements must be met before our law permits class
certification. One basic prerequisite is the class representative must
“fairly and adequately” protect the interest of the class. Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.262(2)(c). This requirement relates to the associated rule that the
claim of the class representative be typical of that of the other class
members. When a conflict exists between class members that relates to
the issues and is fundamental to the case, class certification is improper.
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir.
2003).
The fundamental conflict in this case can be traced to the
fundamental economic reality of the relationship between a city and its
people. A city is its people, and a government is established by the
people to govern and provide public services and protection for the
benefit of the people. In turn, the people provide revenue to the
government so it can operate to carry out its vital public mission. Thus,
the public mission pursued by government is, one way or the other, paid
by the people.
In this case, the City of Des Moines sought to raise additional
revenue for the purpose of providing more public services in the form of
additional police and fire protection, enhanced public library access, and
42
needed repairs to deteriorating neighborhoods. A city is authorized to
raise revenue for such purposes. However, the particular means utilized
by the City to raise the revenue was ultimately found in this case to be
contrary to the law, but not until the revenue had been collected and
spent on the needed services that have been enjoyed by the public.
The representative plaintiff brought this lawsuit not only to force
the City to utilize a lawful means to collect its needed revenue, but also
to obtain a judgment on behalf of all people who paid the fee equal to the
total amount of the revenue that had been collected through the illegal
fee. Class certification allowed her to lump together all residents who
had paid the illegal tax to elevate the amount of the claim into a
substantial judgment. The judgment is so large that the City will now
need to raise additional revenue or reduce City services to refund the
improper fee to all the residents who paid it. This inevitable result is not
speculative. It is logic. It is also economic reality based on sound
economic principle. To pay the judgment to the class, the City will need
to use existing revenue belonging to the class, tax the class, or cut
services provided to the class. These consequences necessarily divide the
class and render its members antagonistic. There is little utility in suing
yourself, especially when the associated attorney fees and litigation
expenses of suing yourself will run into the millions of dollars. Most
people would be unwilling to pursue litigation under such
circumstances.
Accordingly, this case could not present a more basic conflict
between a representative plaintiff and those members of the class who
would not want to force city government to find additional revenue to pay
the judgment that will inevitably adversely affect most members of the
class. In other words, the lawsuit is a microcosm of the larger tension in
43
society between those who focus on immediate gratification and those
who seek to make decisions today with future consequences in mind.
This case forces the latter to join in the approach of the former. In this
case, the remedy seeks an immediate perceived benefit at a future cost
that makes the benefit an illusion. This sleight of hand is found at the
heart of the case and presents a most basic conflict that pits the
representative plaintiff, who advocates for a refund, against those class
members who understand the futility of a refund and would advocate
against it. It is simply unfair for our class action law to be used as a
vehicle to grow a judgment into an amount that will force the City to take
action adverse to the class. A plaintiff who pursues such a goal cannot
possibly represent the interest of the remaining class members.
This type of inherent conflict in a class is inconsistent with the use
of class action and is not permitted by our law. An analogous case that
best illustrates this point is Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d
566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815, 93 S. Ct. 66, 34 L. Ed. 2d
72 (1972). Like this case, Ihrke involved an action brought by a utility
customer on behalf of all utility customers. 459 F.2d at 567. The legal
claim alleged the regulations governing the termination of utility service
were unconstitutional because customers had been deprived of adequate
prior notice and a fair and impartial hearing prior to the termination of
utility services. Id. The court found the class was inherently
antagonistic because not all customers would be in support of a
pretermination hearing. Id. at 572. Instead, some customers would
“likely . . . feel” that the additional expense of providing a termination
hearing would “conceivably result in a rate increase to all customers.”
Id. at 572–73. As with the utility customers in Ihrke, many Des Moines
taxpayers would be reluctant for government to make expenditures when
44
they realize those expenditures come from their pocket, one way or the
other.
Other courts have expressed a slightly different principle that a
class action cannot be maintained when people in the class would
oppose the claim or the remedy sought. In Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d
1423, 1424 (9th Cir. 1997), two members of the Marine Corp. sought to
certify a class consisting of all members of the armed forces to challenge
the constitutionality of a Department of Defense requirement that all
soldiers provide a DNA sample for future analysis. The court found the
class to be antagonistic because there were “undoubtedly” people in the
class who would not oppose the DNA repository and who would want the
requirement enforced. Mayfield, 109 F.3d at 1427. In this case, there
are undoubtedly people in the class who do not oppose the illegal fee
used to enhance City operations.
Antagonism also exists in a class when the class consists of people
who utilize limited resources from a common pool, and named members
of the class seek a remedy that will result in a shift of these limited
resources. See Miller v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 241 F.R.D. 285, 290 (S.D.
Ohio 2006) (finding an inherent conflict precluding class certification
when female members of a university rowing team claimed the university
was violating Title IX and sought to establish a class consisting of all
female participants in university athletic programs because the remedy
of compliance with Title IX would not be amenable to all class members
because compliance would likely only be achieved by shifting resources
from one sport to another); see also Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United
States, 199 F.R.D. 357, 364–65 (E.D. Okla. 2001) (finding named
plaintiffs’ interests were antagonistic because the agency would be
required to reimburse money from limited appropriations in order to
45
make the required refund). There are undoubtedly many people in
Des Moines who would oppose a rather insignificant individual refund
that will only result in a substantial reallocation of resources or
additional taxation.
The conflict in this case is as fundamental as the legal principles
that demand the class to be decertified. Class actions are institutions of
representation, not opposition. They are institutions of social value and
public good, not personal gain. The class needs to have a sense of
mission so that all interests are represented. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 44, 61 S. Ct. 115, 119, 85 L. Ed. 22, 28 (1940) (holding plaintiff
seeking to enforce an agreement cannot represent class members who do
not want it enforced); see also 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1768, at 389 (3d ed.
2005). This case is as far from a class action as a case could be. A
single plaintiff should not be permitted to drag nearly an entire
community into a lawsuit that seeks a remedy akin to suing yourself.
Kragnes certainly had a right to challenge the government action.
She had a right to turn to the courts to force the City to use the proper
channels to raise city revenue. She was free as well to seek her own
refund. At times, the pursuit of principle alone might be worth the cost,
but a class action nevertheless requires the pursuit to be shared by the
class. When public monies or public sacrifice will be used to pay for a
public interest lawsuit, the representative class requirement for class
certification ensures that the public actually supports the effort.
Considering the marginal utility of the remedy sought, considering the
subsequent legislative adoption of the challenged fee, considering the
public benefit provided by the challenged government action, and
considering the substantial public expense of litigation, it is doubtful
46
many class members would share in Kragnes’s enthusiasm for her
lawsuit. One of the benefits of a class action is that it allows a plaintiff to
pursue a claim by giving an attorney a financial incentive to provide
representation. It also allows the court to dispose of a multiplicity of
identical individual claims in an economical manner. In this case,
however, there was no evidence that similar claims were filed or even the
fear of a multitude of similar claims. Moreover, while it is important to
provide a financial incentive for legal representation in meritorious
litigation, it should not, in the end, become the only benefit of a class
action.