David Taft v. Iowa District Court for Linn County ( 2013 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–1714
Filed March 15, 2013
DAVID TAFT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR LINN COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Stephen B.
Jackson, Jr., Judge.
The district court held that a civilly committed sex offender was
not entitled to a final hearing to determine his eligibility for discharge or
transitional release. Sex offender filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.
WRIT ANNULLED.
Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for plaintiff.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John B. McCormally,
Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
2
HECHT, Justice.
A person detained by the State as a sexually violent predator
sought a final hearing on his request for discharge or for placement in a
transitional release program. In this petition for writ of certiorari, we are
asked to decide whether the district court erred in denying the request
for a final hearing. We annul the writ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Taft was arrested in December 1987 for lascivious acts with a
minor, based on allegations that he sexually molested his sister and
committed other criminal sexual offenses. He was convicted and
sentenced to two five-year terms and a two-year term to run
concurrently. He served this sentence and was discharged on May 31,
1991.
Seven days after his discharge from prison, Taft reoffended by
sexually assaulting two girls who were unknown to him—one who was
eight years old and the other who was ten. He was arrested and charged
with second-degree sexual abuse, assault causing injury, and burglary.
He was convicted and sentenced to prison. Taft was discharged from
prison for these offenses on January 10, 2005.
Proceedings were commenced for Taft’s commitment as a sexually
violent predator (SVP) pursuant to the Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators Act, Iowa Code chapter 229A on March 30, 2005. At the
commitment trial, the State’s expert opined that Taft suffered from mixed
personality disorder (anti-social personality disorder) and pedophilia. A
jury found Taft suffered from a mental abnormality which made it more
likely than not that he would reoffend, and he was therefore committed
to the Civil Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (CCUSO) under the
provisions of Iowa Code chapter 229A.
3
The State filed a notice of annual review for 2010 and a report
submitted by staff at the CCUSO. See Iowa Code § 229A.8(2), (3) (2011)1
(requiring annual examination of committed person’s mental abnormality
and report to the court). The report expressed the conclusion that Taft’s
mental abnormality persisted and he remained unfit for discharge or
transitional release. Taft thereafter submitted a petition seeking a final
hearing on whether he should be discharged from the CCUSO or placed
in its transitional release program. See id. § 229A.8(4).
In May 2011, before the district court had ruled on Taft’s 2010
petition, the State submitted its notice of annual review for 2011. This
notice included a report prepared by the CCUSO staff asserting there was
as of that time “no evidence of any change in Mr. Taft’s mental
abnormality” constituting a ground for his discharge. This assertion as
to the persistence of Taft’s mental abnormality was based in part on the
result of an assessment that the staff interpreted as “clinically significant
for sexual interest in minors.” The staff report further alleged six major
disciplinary reports issued to Taft in the preceding six months
disqualified him from eligibility for the transitional discharge program.
The six disciplinary reports cited Taft for two instances of lying to staff,
two instances of inciting disruptiveness, one instance of disrespecting
the CCUSO staff, and one boundary violation.
Taft filed a petition requesting a final hearing on his 2011 annual
review and his claims for either outright discharge or placement in the
transitional release program. As Taft’s request for a final hearing on the
2010 annual review had not yet been adjudicated, it was consolidated
with the 2011 proceedings by agreement of the parties. Taft supported
1All references are to the 2011 Code unless otherwise indicated.
4
his prayer for relief with a report prepared by Dr. Craig Rypma, a
licensed clinical psychologist. Dr. Rypma’s report, based on his review of
the reports generated by the CCUSO staff and a clinical evaluation,
suggested Taft was no longer more likely than not to reoffend if
discharged and recommended that Taft at least be placed in a
transitional release program. In addition to Dr. Rypma’s report, Taft
submitted in support of his request for a hearing several exhibits
including the major discipline reports he received at the CCUSO facility
during 2010 and 2011.
After weighing the evidence presented by the parties, the district
court concluded Taft had failed to produce a preponderance of relevant
and reliable evidence tending to prove a final hearing should be held to
determine whether Taft’s mental abnormality had so changed that he
was no longer likely, if discharged, to engage in predatory acts
constituting sexually violent offenses. The court further concluded Taft
had failed to produce a preponderance of relevant and reliable evidence
tending to prove a hearing should be held to determine whether he was
suitable for placement in the CCUSO’s transitional release program.
Taft filed an application for writ of certiorari with this court,
claiming the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in weighing
the expert reports presented at the annual review hearing. Additionally,
he contends section 229A.8A(2)(e) as applied in this case violated his
right to due process by disqualifying him from placement in the
transitional release program as a consequence of the disciplinary reports
issued for infractions that did not involve sexual misconduct. See id.
§ 229A.8A(2)(e) (listing a major disciplinary report within six months of
the annual report as one of many grounds for denying placement in
transitional release program).
5
II. Standard of Review.
We review certiorari actions for correction of errors at law. State
Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 745 N.W.2d 738, 739 (Iowa 2008). We
“examine only the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality of its
actions.” Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998).
“Illegality exists when the court’s factual findings lack substantial
evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law.”
Id.
III. Discussion.
A. Procedural Background of Annual Review Process. Iowa
Code chapter 229A entitled “Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators,”
was enacted by the general assembly in 1998. 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1171
(codified at Iowa Code ch. 229A (1999)). Legislative findings expressed in
the first section of the statute noted the existence of “a small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators” who need “very
long-term” specialized treatment that is unavailable in other settings.
Iowa Code § 229A.1. We have acknowledged that Iowa Code chapter
229A allows for the commitment of SVPs in order “ ‘to protect the public,
to respect the needs of the victims of sexually violent offenses, and to
encourage full, meaningful participation of sexually violent predators in
treatment programs.’ ” Johnson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 756 N.W.2d 845, 847
(Iowa 2008) (quoting Iowa Code § 229A.1 (2007)).
Recognizing that civil commitment proceedings must comport with
the Due Process Clause, the general assembly established a protocol for
periodic reviews of the status of each committed person. Id. at 848
(citing Iowa Code § 229A.8). The protocol includes an annual
examination of a committed person’s mental abnormality. Iowa Code
§ 229A.8(2). A report of the results of each annual examination must be
6
submitted to the court that ordered the committed person’s commitment.
Id. § 229A.8(3). A committed person may present evidence including
expert opinions for the court’s consideration in the annual review. Id.
§ 229A.8(2).2 The committed person may, as part of the annual review
procedure, petition the court for discharge or placement in a transitional
release program. Id. § 229A.8(4).
The court’s annual review of the committed person’s status may be
based “only on written records.” Id. § 229A.8(3). If requested by either
the attorney general or the committed person, the court may schedule a
hearing on the annual review and receive arguments from counsel for the
parties. Id. § 229A.8(5)(d). This hearing may also be “conducted in
writing without any attorneys present.” Id.
B. Legal Standard for Annual Review Decisions. Chapter 229A
raises a rebuttable presumption in favor of extending a civil commitment.
Id. § 229A.8(1). This presumption may be rebutted at the annual review
stage
when facts exist to warrant a hearing to determine whether a
committed person no longer suffers from a mental
abnormality which makes the person likely to engage in
predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if
discharged, or the committed person is suitable for
placement in a transitional release program.
Id. § 229A.8(1) (emphasis added). The committed person can rebut the
presumption at the annual review stage by producing a preponderance of
evidence that facts exist to warrant a further hearing referred to in the
2The committed person “may retain, or if the person is indigent and so requests,
the court may appoint a qualified expert or professional person” to conduct an
examination and review “all records concerning the person.” Iowa Code § 229A.8(2).
7
statute as a “final hearing.” Id. § 229A.8(5)(e)(1).3 We now turn to the
questions of what the committed person must prove at the annual review
stage in order to satisfy this burden and what analytical framework is
required under the statute for determining whether a final hearing is
“warranted.” Id. § 229A.8(3) (“The court shall conduct an annual review
and, if warranted, set a final hearing . . . .”).
We recently were called upon in Johnson to interpret an earlier
version of section 229A.8, which entitled a committed person to a final
hearing upon production of “ ‘competent evidence which would lead a
reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be held.’ ” Johnson,
756 N.W.2d at 848 (quoting Iowa Code § 229A.8(5)(e) (2007) (emphasis
added)). We reasoned that “competent evidence” as used in that earlier
version of the statute meant admissible evidence, not necessarily
evidence more persuasive than evidence controverting it. Id. at 851 n.4
(citing Black’s Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed. 2004)). Explaining the district
court’s role at the annual review stage in evaluating the evidence and
deciding whether a final hearing should be held, we noted that our
interpretation of the statute d[id] not foreclose the district
court from evaluating the evidence presented by the
committed person to determine whether the evidence could
support a reasonable doubt finding and whether a
reasonable person would conclude that this evidence, if
believed, could lead to release. It d[id] not, however, permit
3A “final hearing”—if granted—is on the merits of whether the committed person
is entitled to discharge or placement in the transitional release program. See Iowa Code
§ 229A.8(5)(e)(2) (requiring a final hearing on the committed person’s entitlement to
discharge or placement in transitional release program within sixty days after the
district court orders a final hearing be held). The State bears the burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt at the final hearing either that the committed person’s
mental abnormality remains such that the person is likely to engage in predatory acts
that constitute sexually violent offenses if discharged or is not suitable for placement in
a transitional release program. Id. § 229A.8(6)(d). A jury trial may be demanded by the
committed person or by the State. Id. § 229A.8(6)(a), (c).
8
the district court to conduct a mini-hearing on the issue of
whether the committed person still suffer[ed] from a mental
abnormality.
Id. at 850–51 (emphasis added).
We concluded in Johnson that the version of section 229A.8 in
effect at that time did not authorize the district court to weigh the
evidence and decide at the annual review stage whether the committed
person had proved by a preponderance of the evidence his eligibility for
either discharge or placement in the transitional release program if a
final hearing were held. Id. at 850. We reasoned that the legislature did
not intend to condition the committed person’s entitlement to a final
hearing on proof that he would prevail if such a hearing were held. Id.
Thus, we articulated in Johnson the following standard for determining
at the annual review stage whether the committed person is entitled to a
final hearing:
[I]f the committed person presents admissible evidence that
could lead a fact finder to find reasonable doubt on the issue
of whether his mental abnormality has changed such that he
is unlikely to engage in sexually violent offenses, then the
committed person should be granted a final hearing.
Id. at 850 (emphasis added).
Shortly after our ruling in Johnson, the legislature amended
section 229A.8(5)(e). See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 116, § 1. Section
229A.8(5)(e) as amended reads as follows:
e. (1) The court shall consider all evidence presented by
both parties at the annual review. The burden is on the
committed person to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that there is relevant and reliable evidence to rebut
the presumption of continued commitment, which would
lead a reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be
held to determine either of the following:
(a) The mental abnormality of the committed person
has so changed that the person is not likely to engage in
9
predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if
discharged.
(b) The committed person is suitable for placement in
a transitional release program pursuant to section 229A.8A.
Iowa Code 229A.8(5)(e) (2011) (emphasis added).
C. The Arguments of the Parties. Taft contends the general
assembly’s 2009 amendment of section 229A.8(5)(e) did not significantly
change the legal standard controlling a committed person’s entitlement
to a final hearing. According to Taft, the committed person’s burden
after the amendment—just as before—is to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that a reasonable person would believe a final hearing
should be held. The standard for evaluating the evidence at the annual
review stage was not significantly changed, Taft posits, by either (l) the
new directive that the district court “shall consider all of the evidence
presented by both parties at the annual review” or (2) the substitution of
“relevant and reliable evidence” in place of the former “competent
evidence.” See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 116, § 1.
Now, in Taft’s view, a committed person must prove by a
preponderance that—just as before the 2009 amendment— “a reasonable
person would think . . . there might be doubt as to whether” the
committed person’s mental abnormality persists to a point that he
remains likely to reoffend if released or as to whether he is a suitable
candidate for the transitional release program. If such doubt exists, Taft
argues, a reasonable person would believe a final hearing is warranted at
which the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
the grounds for the committed person’s continued commitment. Thus,
Taft asserts the new requirement that the district court shall consider all
of the evidence presented in making these decisions at the annual review
10
stage affects what evidence must be considered by the court when
deciding the issues, but not the legal standard utilized in deciding them.
Likewise, Taft argues, the amendment’s substitution of the
requirement that evidence be “relevant” rather than “competent” signals
no intent to change significantly the court’s analytical framework as both
terms merely refer to evidence that is admissible. And although Taft
advances no explanation of the general assembly’s intended meaning for
the word “reliable” in the 2009 amendment, he asserts the term does not
demonstrate legislative intent to require that the court weigh the relative
credibility of the parties’ evidence at the annual review stage in deciding
whether a final hearing should be held. In sum, Taft contends the 2009
amendment did not substantially change either the committed person’s
burden of proof or the court’s analytical framework for evaluating
whether a final hearing is warranted at the annual review stage.
In Taft’s view, the analytical framework prescribed by the statute,
as amended, for deciding whether a committed person is entitled to a
hearing, is similar to the one courts commonly apply in deciding motions
for summary judgment. In deciding whether a fact question exists for
trial at the summary judgment stage, the court does not weigh the
admissible evidence tending to prove a fact against the admissible
evidence opposing it in deciding whether a genuine issue of fact exists for
trial. See, e.g., Butler v. Hoover Nature Trail, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 85, 88
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Similarly, inferences raised from the admissible
evidence tending to prove or disprove a fact are not weighed against each
other at the summary judgment stage, but instead are weighed against
“the abstract standard of reasonableness, casting aside those which do
not meet the test and concentrating on those which do.” Id. Analogizing
to these summary judgment principles, Taft describes the analytical
11
framework mandated by our decision in Johnson and the statute as
amended as follows: After reviewing all of the evidence submitted at the
annual review stage, could a reasonable person find by a preponderance
of the evidence that doubt exists as to (1) whether the committed
person’s mental abnormality still makes it likely that he will reoffend if
released or (2) whether the committed person is suitable for the
transitional release program? A committed person satisfies this burden
and is entitled to a hearing, Taft posits, if the evidence presented at the
annual review could lead a reasonable person to believe “a committed
person could come close to showing doubt on either of the two factors.”
Under this interpretation of section 229A.8(5)(e)(1) favored by Taft, a
report from a qualified expert supporting the committed person’s position
on either of these two propositions would entitle the person to a final
hearing on the merits.4
The district court erred, Taft argues, in denying the request for a
final hearing on the ground that Dr. Rypma’s report was not reliable
when weighed against the State’s evidence. Simply put, Taft contends
the district court—by weighing the competing opinions of the experts one
against the other—and finding the State’s experts’ opinions more
persuasive than those of Dr. Rypma—engaged in the type of mini-trial on
the nature and extent of his continuing dangerousness prohibited by
Johnson and not countenanced by the general assembly in its 2009
amendment of section 229A.8(5)(e)(1).
4Taft concedes the statutory requirement that evidence be reliable authorizes the
district court as gatekeeper to “discount evidence that is not credible on its face” or that
is “directly contradicted by objective and undisputed evidence.” However, he contends
that “if a qualified expert’s report supports the committed person’s release, that person
should get a final hearing.”
12
The State urges a different view of the proper interpretation of the
statute. As the 2009 amendment was adopted soon after our decision in
Johnson, the State contends it was intended to effect “a substantial shift
in the court’s role” at the annual hearing stage. The State contends the
close temporal relationship between our decision in Johnson and the
general assembly’s amendment of the statute should lead us to conclude
the amendment was prompted by a belief that our interpretation of
section 229A.8(5) in Johnson set the bar too low for committed persons
seeking a final hearing. 756 N.W.2d at 851. Pointing specifically to the
amendment’s addition of the requirement that the presumption of
continued commitment be rebutted by “relevant and reliable evidence,”
the State perceives a legislative intent to set a significantly “higher hurdle
for the committed person desiring a final hearing” than existed under our
holding in Johnson. Under the interpretation of the statute favored by
the State, the district court functions as a gatekeeper weighing the
opinions of opposing experts and denying a request for a final hearing
upon a finding that the committed person’s evidence supporting
discharge or transitional release is less persuasive than the State’s
evidence opposing it.
In the State’s view, if the district court finds the opinions of the
State’s expert(s) more persuasive than the opinions of the committed
person’s expert(s), the court may reject the latter as unreliable and
conclude the committed person is not entitled to a final hearing.
Contending the district court properly engaged in a proper weighing of
the competing expert opinions in this case and properly found
Dr. Rypma’s opinions less persuasive and reliable than those of the
State’s experts, the State urges this court to conclude the district court
properly interpreted and applied the statute as amended.
13
D. Interpretation of Section 229A.8(5)(e) as Amended.
Ambiguity may appear in a statute as a consequence of either the
particular words chosen by the legislature or the general scope and
meaning of the statute when all of its provisions are examined. Carolan
v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996). We conclude section
229A.8(5)(e)(1) as amended is ambiguous because the plain language of
the statute leaves room for more than one reasonable interpretation of
the district court’s role at the annual review stage. Although both before
and after the 2009 amendment the burden to prove an entitlement to a
final hearing by a preponderance of the evidence has been allocated to
the committed person, the precise contours of what must be proved to
“lead a reasonable person to believe a final hearing should be held” is
unclear and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Iowa
Code § 229A.8(5)(e)(1).
In Johnson, we held a final hearing must be held if “the committed
person presents admissible evidence that could lead a fact finder to find
reasonable doubt on the issue of whether [the committed person’s]
mental abnormality has changed such that he is unlikely to engage in
sexually violent offenses.” 756 N.W.2d at 851. The arguments of the
parties require us to answer several questions. Did the general assembly
intend by its 2009 amendment to nullify or substantially modify our
holding in Johnson? Does the amendment authorize the district court to
weigh the competing evidence at the annual review stage and determine
whether the committed person has proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is not likely to reoffend if discharged or that he is
suitable for placement in the transitional release program? Alternatively,
did the general assembly intend by its 2009 amendment that the
committed person must prove as a condition of obtaining a final hearing
14
it is more likely than not that a fact finder, having reviewed all of the
relevant and reliable evidence presented at the annual review stage,
could find a fact question remains as to whether the committed person
remains likely to reoffend if discharged or as to whether he is more likely
than not suitable for placement in the transitional release program?
When confronted with ambiguity, we may consider among other
factors:
“(1) the object sought to be attained, (2) the circumstances
under which the statute was enacted, (3) the legislative
history, (4) the common law or former statutory provisions,
including laws upon the same or similar subjects, (5) the
consequences of a particular construction, (6) the
administrative construction of the statute, [and] (7) the
preamble or statement of policy.”
Carolan, 553 N.W.2d at 887 (quoting Iowa Code § 4.6).
When a statute is amended soon after controversy has arisen as to
the meaning of ambiguous terms in an enactment, the court has reason
to believe the legislature intended the amendment to provide clarification
of such terms. Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc. v. Midwest Auto. I., L.L.C., 679
N.W.2d 606, 610 (Iowa 2004). “Where the language is of doubtful
meaning, or where an adherence to the strict letter would lead . . . to
absurdity, or to contradictory provisions, the duty of ascertaining the
true meaning devolves upon the court.” Case v. Olson, 234 Iowa 869,
872, 14 N.W.2d 717, 719 (1944); accord 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D.
Shambie Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 45:12, at 101 (7th
ed. 2007). “ ‘Among the most venerable of the canons of statutory
construction is the one stating that a statute should be given a sensible,
practical, workable, and logical construction.’ ” Walthart v. Bd. of Dirs. of
Edgewood-Colesburg Cmty. Sch. Dist., 667 N.W.2d 873, 877–78 (Iowa
15
2003) (quoting Van Baale v. City of Des Moines, 550 N.W.2d 153, 155
(Iowa 1996)).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the interpretation of
section 229A.8(5)(e)(1) as amended. We conclude the general assembly
did not intend by its 2009 amendment to require a mini-trial on the
evidence presented at the annual review on the questions that would be
decided at a final hearing, if granted. As we suggested in Johnson, it
would be illogical to require a committed person to prove by a
preponderance at the annual review stage that he will win on the merits
at a final hearing at which the State must prove the converse beyond a
reasonable doubt. 756 N.W.2d at 850 (stating “[i]t would be illogical . . .
to interpret section 229A.8(5)(e) to require the committed person to
disprove the State’s final-hearing case in order to obtain a final hearing”).
Although we conclude the general assembly did not intend by the
2009 amendment to require a mini-trial at the annual review stage on
the merits of the issues to be presented in any requested final hearing,
we believe the amendment changed two aspects of the court’s analysis.
First, the district court must consider all of the evidence in deciding
whether the committed person has satisfied the burden of proof. This
change was, we believe, in response to our conclusion in Johnson that
the determination of whether the committed person was entitled to a
final hearing was limited to the question of whether “the committed
person present[ed] admissible evidence that could lead a fact finder to
find reasonable doubt on the issue of whether his mental abnormality
has changed.” 756 N.W.2d at 851 (emphasis added). The 2009
amendment clarified that the court must not limit its inquiry to evidence
submitted by the committed person. The amendment also clarified that
not all admissible evidence presented in support of a request for a final
16
hearing will count in the determination of whether the presumption in
favor of continuing the commitment has been rebutted. Only “reliable”
evidence will count. Thus, we conclude the amendment did not change
either the allocation to the committed person of the burden (proof by a
preponderance of the evidence) or the legal standard (whether a
reasonable person would be led by the evidence to believe a final hearing
should be held) controlling whether entitlement to a final hearing has
been demonstrated. The amendment did, however, enhance the level of
scrutiny applied by the district court in making the decision on a request
for a final hearing. The court must now consider all of the evidence
presented and in deciding whether the committed person has met his
burden, weigh only evidence that is reliable.
Thus, under section 229A.8(5)(e)(1), a committed person is entitled
to a final hearing if the court, upon consideration of all the evidence
presented at the annual review, finds the committed person has proved
by a preponderance of the relevant and reliable evidence that a
reasonable person would believe a hearing should be held to determine
whether (a) the mental abnormality of the committed person has so
changed that the person is not likely to engage in predatory acts
constituting sexually violent offenses if discharged or (b) the committed
person is suitable for placement in a transitional release program. This
standard for determining whether a final hearing is required is satisfied if
a reasonable person would find, from the relevant and reliable evidence
presented at the annual review stage, that the committed person has
17
more likely than not generated a fact question on either of the issues
enumerated in section 229A.8(5)(e)(1)(a) or (b).5
Our interpretation of the statute as amended would be incomplete
without a discussion of what the general assembly intended in adding
the requirement that evidence must be reliable if it is to count in meeting
the committed person’s burden of proving an entitlement to a final
hearing. As we have noted, the former version of the statute required
only that evidence rebutting the presumption of continued commitment
at the annual review stage be competent. In Johnson, we decided the
general assembly intended the word “competent” to mean “admissible”
evidence. 756 N.W.2d at 851 n.4. As we have already noted, the 2009
amendment substituted the words “relevant and reliable” for the word
“competent.” In considering the meaning of these words in the context of
section 229A.8(5) as amended, we first note the Iowa Rules of Evidence
5A preliminary determination under section 229A.8(5)(e)(1) that a committed
person has made a showing at the annual review stage entitling him to a final hearing
must be distinguished from the adjudication of the merits of a committed person’s
request for discharge or placement in a transitional release program after a final
hearing. A preliminary determination—based on the entire written annual review
record alone—that a reasonable person could find a final hearing is warranted is not
tantamount to a finding that the State will be unable to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt at the final hearing that the committed person has failed to rebut the
presumption of continued commitment. Stated another way, we leave room for the
possibility that a preliminary showing that satisfies the committed person’s burden to
prove a reasonable person would, after examining the entire annual review record, find
a preponderance of the evidence supports a determination that a factual question
remains regarding either the committed person’s request for discharge or placement in
a transitional release program is not dispositive of the different issues or claims
submitted for determination at the final hearing. As we have noted, the annual review
and final hearing adjudications are based on different records. Compare § 229A.8(5)(a)
(committed person not entitled to be present at the annual review hearing), with id.
§ 229A.8(6)(a) (entitling the committed person to a jury trial of the final hearing issues
and all other constitutional rights, including the right to be present and present
evidence, that are guaranteed at the original commitment proceeding). Furthermore,
unlike at the annual review stage, at the final hearing the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the committed person is not ready for discharge or placement in
a transitional release program is allocated to the State.
18
do not apply to an annual review. Iowa Code § 229A.8(5)(b). Yet, the
general assembly allocated to the court in terms (relevant and reliable)
commonly used in judicial proceedings the function of deciding whether
a committed person has satisfied a prescribed burden of proof. Thus,
although the rules of evidence are not controlling at the annual review
stage, we conclude the general assembly attached to the words “relevant
and reliable” meanings commonly assigned to them in our jurisprudence.
In the realm of expert opinion testimony, evidence is relevant only
if it is reliable and helpful to the fact finder. Johnson v. Knoxville Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Iowa 1997) (noting unreliable evidence
“cannot assist a trier of fact”). The reliability of experts’ opinions based
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is generally
assured by the district court’s enforcement of rule 5.702 requiring
experts be qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.702. When expert opinions are based on
novel or complex scientific matters, however, a “more expansive judicial”
assessment of reliability is justified. See Ranes v. Adams Labs., Inc., 778
N.W.2d 677, 686–87 (Iowa 2010). When expert opinions are instead
based on nonnovel scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
our “conventional rule [5.]702 analysis is appropriate.” Johnson, 570
N.W.2d at 639 (concluding admissibility of expert opinion testimony on
the subject of whether a child’s obsessive compulsive disorder traits were
caused by head trauma was not based on scientific knowledge of a type
requiring heightened scrutiny as to reliability).
E. Application of Standard to Taft’s Claim for Discharge. We
now consider whether the district court erred in finding (1) Dr. Rypma’s
opinions were unreliable and (2) Taft failed to satisfy his burden of
proving he was entitled to a final hearing on the question of his fitness
19
for discharge. Like the testimony of the neuropsychiatrist in Johnson,
Dr. Rypma’s opinions regarding Taft’s mental abnormality are clearly
based on his expertise as a licensed clinical psychologist and his
education and professional experience, and cannot be classified as “novel
scientific testimony.” Id. at 639. Accordingly, the reliability of
Dr. Rypma’s opinions is evaluated under conventional rule 5.702
analysis.
In assessing the reliability of Dr. Rypma’s report, the district court
was authorized to: (1) “determine if the testimony ‘w[ould] assist the trier
of fact’ in understanding ‘the evidence or to determine a fact in issue’ ”
and (2) “determine if the witness [wa]s qualified to testify ‘as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’ ” Ranes, 778
N.W.2d at 685 (quoting Iowa R. Evid. 5.702). Although the State did not
challenge the reliability of Dr. Rypma’s opinions against this standard,
the district court nonetheless found Dr. Rypma’s opinions unreliable.
The court’s ruling stated in relevant part:
Dr. Rypma seems to minimize the major rule violations that
have been consistently reported in all of the evidence
presented to the Court. . . . The Court believes that the
weight of the evidence shows that these major rule violations
are significant as to the factors that are examined to shed
light on the likelihood of reoffending. As such, on this basis
Dr. Rypma’s report is less credible.
....
When weighing the evidence presented by the parties,
the Court does not find Dr. Rypma’s report to be reliable.
Specifically, Respondent’s two mental abnormalities,
specifically, pedophilia and dissocial/anti-social personality
disorder (or a mixed personality disorder NOS) have not
changed according to the outcome measures used at
CCUSO. Dr. Rypma does not offer an objective measure for
his assumption that the Respondent’s risk to offend has
reduced. The only factors noted by Dr. Rypma are that time
has passed and that the Respondent reports that he feels he
is ready for a discharge. The Court does not find these
20
factors to be reliable. In addition, as noted above,
Dr. Rypma’s discussion of and lack of significance given to
the Respondent’s incident reports detracts from the
credibility and, therefore, reliability of his report and
recommendation.
Based upon all of the above, when weighing the
evidence of the parties, the Court does not find that the
Respondent has shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that there is relevant and reliable evidence to rebut the
presumption of continued commitment.
(Emphasis added.)
Taft contends the district court erred in assessing the reliability of
Dr. Rypma’s opinions without regard to the expert’s qualifications or the
tendency of his opinions to assist the court in understanding the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Taft further contends the
portion of the district court’s ruling quoted above clearly reveals the
court erred in making its reliability determination based on its
perceptions of the relative persuasiveness of Dr. Rypma’s opinions when
weighed against the opinions of the State’s experts on the question of
Taft’s continuing dangerousness and eligibility for discharge. Taft argues
that the function of assigning relative weight to the opinions of the
parties’ experts’ opinions is not properly exercised by the court at the
annual review stage. The weighing function, he argues, is instead to be
performed by the fact finder at the final hearing.
In this case, the district court was authorized at the annual review
stage to determine whether Dr. Rypma’s opinions met the threshold level
of reliability for technical or other specialized knowledge. See Iowa R.
Evid. 5.702. If the opinions met this threshold of reliability, the court’s
next inquiry under section 229A.8(5)(e) was whether the evidence raised
a factual question regarding Taft’s continuing dangerousness or his
suitability for transitional release. The appropriate inquiry at that stage
was not, however, whether the persuasive force of Dr. Rypma’s opinions
21
exceeded that of the opinions offered by the State’s experts on the merits.
Cf., IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 631 (Iowa 2000) (noting that
the appropriate fact finder must “determine[] the weight to be given to
any expert testimony”). In determining at the annual review stage
whether a genuine issue of material fact warranting a final hearing
exists, it is “not the court’s role . . . to weigh such evidence against the
countervailing evidence in the record.” Cf. Kern v. Palmer Coll. of
Chiropractic, 757 N.W.2d 651, 661 (Iowa 2008); Mercy Hosp. v. Hansen,
Lind & Meyer, P.C., 456 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Iowa 1990) (noting that it is a
function of the fact finder “ ‘to decide which of the experts was more
credible, which used the more reliable data, and whose opinion—if any—
the [fact finder] would accept’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Grenada Steel
Indus., Inc. v. Ala. Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 889 (5th Cir. 1983))).
We, therefore, agree with Taft’s contention that the district court
erred in its method of assessing the reliability of Dr. Rypma’s opinions.
Nonetheless, assuming without deciding that Dr. Rypma’s report met the
threshold level of reliability for the annual review stage under section
229A.8(5)(e), we find no error in the district court’s finding that Taft
failed to meet his burden to prove he is entitled to a hearing on his
discharge claim.
The summary and recommendations section of Dr. Rypma’s report
read in relevant part:
Mr. Taft has now completed his 5th year of treatment. He
has achieved progress in all areas of treatment and it is
abundantly clear that he now is ready for advancement to the
transitional release phase of the program. This advancement
would benefit the community, as well as provide the patient
with continued opportunities to demonstrate additional
progress and emotional growth. . . .
It is therefore the opinion of this evaluator, within a
reasonable degree of professional certainty, that Mr. Taft is
22
now at a point of his therapeutic process that advancement to
the transitional release, phase is at least appropriate. This
client feels he is now ready for discharge, and given that he
has achieved the age of 40, and given that his last sexual
crime occurred some 19 years ago, it is reasonable to assume
that his risk has now fallen below the stat[utory] threshold of
more likely than not.
Should the Court decide that discharge, is not appropriate for
this client, he has demonstrated that he is ready for this
advancement to transitional release, and this advancement
will allow Mr. Taft to continue to demonstrate continued
therapeutic progress. Furthermore, advancement to Track A
of the Transitional Release Phase will require that this client
remains confined; it is this evaluators understanding that
those in Track A simply are permitted to move into their own
private room and any outings would be chaperoned.
(Emphasis added.)
In its ruling, the district court noted “it is not clear from
Dr. Rypma’s report whether he is recommending that the Respondent is
ready for discharge. Rather, Dr. Rypma indicates that the Respondent
feels that he is ready for discharge.” We agree with the district court’s
finding that Dr. Rypma’s report did not include an unequivocal opinion
that Taft should be discharged. In the absence of such evidence, we
affirm the district court’s determination that Taft failed to satisfy his
burden of proof at the annual review stage on his claim for discharge.
F. Application of the Standard to Taft’s Transitional Release
Claim. Taft alternatively contends the district court erred in denying
him a final hearing on the question of his eligibility for transitional
release. Transitional release is a treatment phase in which the
committed person “is gradually given increasing opportunities to live in
less restrictive settings. The patient is monitored closely, assessed
clinically, and provided support as the patient takes on increasing
responsibility for the patient’s own care.” Swanson v. Civil Commitment
Unit for Sex Offenders, 737 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Iowa 2007).
23
A committed person is statutorily ineligible for transitional release
if he has been issued any “major discipline reports” within a period of six
months. Iowa Code § 229A.8A(2)(e). The district court concluded Taft
was statutorily ineligible for transitional release based primarily upon his
incurring six major disciplinary reports within the six-month review
period. See id. We agree with that conclusion. Taft does not deny he
received the disciplinary reports. Although Dr. Rypma discounted the
significance of the reports because they were not based on allegations of
sexual misconduct by Taft, the plain language of section 229A.8A(2)(e)
disqualifies from transitional release any committed person who has
received any major disciplinary report during the previous six months.
The undisputed evidence at the annual review stage clearly established
Taft was not eligible for placement in the transitional release program.
Taft contends the application of section 229A.8A(2)(e) under the
facts of this case violates his right to due process because it “imposes a
precondition on release that is not related to dangerousness or mental
illness.” We do not reach this argument, however, because it was not
adequately raised and was not decided in the district court. Even issues
implicating constitutional rights must be presented to and ruled upon by
the district court in order to preserve error for appeal. State v. Biddle,
652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002).
At the hearing on his petition for final review, Taft’s counsel argued
that “given the criteria for major reports at the CCUSO unit,” section
229A.8A(2)(e) constituted “an unconstitutional imposition of a limitation
on a less restrictive placement.” While we generally oppose the
“elevat[ion of] form over substance” in conducting error preservation
analysis, we note Taft did not cite a specific constitutional principle or
provision in support of his challenge to section 229A.8A(2)(e). Office of
24
Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280,
283–84 (Iowa 1991) (noting that error was preserved on a due process
argument where the party cited the Fourteenth Amendment but not the
Due Process Clause in support of its constitutional challenge); see also
City of Muscatine v. Northbrook P’ship Co., 619 N.W.2d 362, 368 n.2
(Iowa 2000) (holding a party failed to preserve error on its constitutional
due process argument concerning notice when they did not cite any state
or federal constitutional provision to the trial court or otherwise explain
how lack of notice violated their constitutional rights). A party cannot
preserve error for appeal by making only general reference to a
constitutional provision in the district court and then seeking to develop
the argument on appeal. Kartridg Pak Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 362
N.W.2d 557, 561 (Iowa 1985).
Furthermore, the district court did not rule on the constitutionality
of section 229A.8A(2)(e). The district court simply determined Taft was
statutorily ineligible for transitional release based primarily on the major
disciplinary reports and made no mention of a constitutional claim in its
ruling. Taft did not file a motion to enlarge or amend the court’s ruling.
See State v. Mitchell, 757 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Iowa 2008) (noting that when
the district court fails to address a constitutional argument raised by the
defendant the defendant must “file a motion to enlarge the trial court’s
findings or in any other manner have the district court address th[e]
issue”). Because Taft’s due process argument was not adequately raised
or ruled upon by the district court, we conclude it was not preserved for
our review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It
is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily
be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide
them on appeal.”).
25
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm the district court’s determination that Taft failed to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to a
final hearing on either discharge or placement in a transitional release
program.
WRIT ANNULLED.