State Of Iowa Vs. Jeffrey Alan Fischer ( 2010 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 09–0338
Filed July 23, 2010
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant,
vs.
JEFFREY ALAN FISCHER,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, John S.
Mackey, Judge.
Interlocutory appeal from a decision by the district court granting
a motion to suppress the results of a breath test. REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant
Attorney General (until withdrawal), and then Bridget A. Chambers,
Assistant Attorney General, and Karen R. Kaufman Salic, County
Attorney, for appellant.
R.A. Bartolomei of Bartolomei & Lange, PLC, Des Moines, for
appellee.
2
CADY, Justice.
In this appeal, we must decide if a law enforcement officer can use
a computer screen to make a “written request” to withdraw a bodily
substance for testing from a driver suspected of operating while
intoxicated. We conclude a computer screen satisfies the statutory
requirement of a “written request.” We reverse the decision of the district
court and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On October 6, 2008, at approximately 7:40 a.m., State Trooper
Joseph Scott stopped a vehicle driven by Jeffrey Alan Fischer in Crystal
Lake, Iowa, because Fischer was not wearing his seat belt. After coming
into contact with Fischer, Trooper Scott made several observations
leading him to conclude that Fischer had been drinking alcohol prior to
driving. Trooper Scott placed Fischer under arrest and transported him
to the Hancock County Sheriff’s Office.
At the sheriff’s office, Trooper Scott used the laptop from his car to
complete the processing of the arrest using the Traffic and Criminal
Software (TraCS) program. 1 The laptop monitor displayed the form
Trooper Scott was completing, entitled “Request and Notice Under Iowa
Code Chapter 321J/Section 321.208,” also referred to as “Form MOWI.”
The laptop was also connected to the DataMaster breath test machine
located at the sheriff’s office. Trooper Scott sat in front of the computer
screen while Fischer sat to Trooper Scott’s right approximately three to
1TraCS is a program that is on the computers used in patrol cars in the state of
Iowa. The program contains different types of forms necessary for patrol officers,
including tickets, warnings, commercial motor vehicle inspections, and OWI paperwork.
Trooper Scott testified that he received extensive training on the system and uses it
every day. Trooper Scott also testified that the OWI report form on the TraCS system
containing the request for specimen at issue in this case is the same as the printed
forms.
3
four feet from the computer screen. The computer screen faced Trooper
Scott. He testified at the hearing that the screen was not hidden or
shielded from Fischer as he implemented the implied-consent
procedures. In implementing the procedures, Trooper Scott read Fischer
the “Implied Consent Advisory” from the computer screen. He next read
Fischer the “Request for Specimen,” also displayed on the computer
screen. The request contained the following language: “Having read to
you the appropriate implied consent advisory, I hereby request a
specimen of your Breath for chemical testing to determine the alcohol or
drug content.” The trooper had checked the box on the computer screen
indicating he was requesting a breath sample rather than a blood or
urine sample and had inputted the date and time. The trooper then
prompted the appearance of a pop-up window of text on the screen of the
laptop in front of him.
The pop-up window did not consume the entire computer screen
and contained an enlargement of the text following the “Request for
Specimen” language from the form the trooper was completing. The form
remained in the background of the screen while the pop-up window was
active. The text in the window read: “Having been read the Implied
Consent Advisory, I . . . to submit to the withdrawal of the specimen(s)
requested.” Two boxes and a signature line also appeared in the window
following the text. The first box was labeled “consent,” and the second
box was labeled “refuse.” Using a stylus, Fischer checked the box
marked “consent” on the touch screen laptop monitor and signed his
name. After checking the box, the word “consent” appeared to fill in the
textual space between “I” and “to submit.” Fischer’s decision to consent
to a breath test and his signature were instantly recorded and appeared
within the form after the pop-up window disappeared.
4
After Fischer checked the box next to “consent” and signed his
name, Trooper Scott took a sample of Fischer’s breath using the
DataMaster. The test reported a blood-alcohol level of .157. The trooper
completed the form by signing and dating the form on the screen to
certify the form’s truth and accuracy. Trooper Scott testified a driver is
able to withdraw consent to a breath test prior to administration of the
test, but after the breath test is complete the information entered in the
form on the computer becomes permanent. Fischer was not given a
printed version of the “Request for Specimen” before the breath test was
administered.
Fischer was charged with operating while intoxicated, second
offense. He filed a motion to suppress his breath-test results, alleging
the TraCS system’s electronic version of the form containing the “Request
for Specimen” did not meet the “written request” requirement of Iowa
Code section 321J.6(1) (2007). The district court granted the motion to
suppress Fischer’s breath-test results. The court determined Trooper
Scott did not comply with the “written request” requirement because
neither the computer screen he used to read the pertinent request nor a
paper copy of the form was shown to Fischer prior to the administration
of the test. The State sought, and we granted, discretionary review of the
district court ruling.
II. Standard of Review.
The district court granted Fischer’s motion to suppress based on
its interpretation of Iowa Code section 321J.6(1). We review a district
court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress based on its interpretation
of a statute for errors at law. State v. Stratmeier, 672 N.W.2d 817, 820
(Iowa 2003).
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III. Overview of Iowa Implied-Consent Law.
It has been a crime to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated in
Iowa since 1911. See 1911 Iowa Acts ch. 72, § 24 (codified at Iowa Code
§ 1571–m23 (Supp. 1913)). Since that time, the operating-while-
intoxicated laws have evolved in a number of ways, including the
adoption of the implied-consent procedure based on the premise that
persons who drive vehicles are deemed to consent to a chemical test to
determine the alcohol or drug content of their blood when reasonable
grounds exist to believe they were driving while intoxicated. Rachel
Hjelmaas, Legislative Services Agency, Legislative Guide to Operating
While Intoxicated (OWI) Law in Iowa 1 (2007), available at
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/Central/Guides/OWI.pdf. The underlying
rationale of the law is that the operation of a motor vehicle on public
streets is a privilege, not a right, subject to reasonable regulation.
Tina Wescott Cafaro, Fixing the Fatal Flaws in OUI Implied Consent Laws,
34 J. Legis. 99, 102 (2008) [hereinafter Cafaro]. Thus, under the
implied-consent law, drivers impliedly consent to submit to chemical
testing “in return for the privilege of using the public highways.” State v.
Hitchens, 294 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Iowa 1980).
In 1953, New York became the first state in the nation to enact an
implied-consent law. 2 Cafaro at 103 & n.25 (referring to codified version
of New York’s implied-consent law, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1194
(McKinney 2001) (originally enacted by L. 1953, c. 854)). The concept
2Theconcept of implied consent was conceived after prosecutors began using
chemical-test evidence in the 1940s to convict impaired drivers and scientific
instruments to measure blood alcohol content started to emerge as an alternative to the
withdrawal of blood as a method to scientifically detect the presence of alcohol in the
body. Cafaro at 102. The first stable instrument for measuring blood alcohol from a
breath sample, the Drunkometer, was invented in 1938. Id. at 103 n.24. The
Breathalyzer brand was invented in 1954. Id.
6
was first proposed in Iowa in 1957 when a bill modeled after the
New York statute was introduced in the House of Representatives. H.F.
257, 57th G.A., Reg. Sess., Explanation of House File 257 (Iowa 1957)
(stating the bill is “patterned after the New York statute, which was
enacted a few years ago, but is an improvement on this earlier
legislation”).
The procedures were subsequently introduced in the Senate and
enacted by the General Assembly in 1963. 3 See S.F. 437, 60th G.A., Reg.
Sess. § 34 (Iowa 1963); 1963 Iowa Acts ch. 114, §§ 36–50 (codified at
Iowa Code ch. 321B (1966)). The implied-consent procedures were
originally enacted as a part of an overall administrative effort to regulate
the control, sale, and use of alcohol and were not included as an organic
part of the 1966 criminal operating while intoxicated (OWI) laws. See
1963 Iowa Acts ch. 114 (entitled “Liquor Control, Sale and Use”). The
General Assembly declared its policy in enacting chapter 321B was “to
control alcoholic beverages and aid the enforcement of laws prohibiting
operation of a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.” Iowa
Code § 321B.1 (1966). Thus, although enacted and codified separately
from the criminal OWI chapter, the legislature intended for the section to
have an administrative effect as well as aid in the enforcement of OWI
laws. In 1986, the implied-consent statutes from chapter 321B were
combined with the criminal OWI laws. 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1220 (codified
at Iowa Code ch. 321J (1987)). The chemical test results and refusals
3In1967, the Secretary of Transportation began to issue national uniform
standards for highway safety programs throughout the country. See Cafaro at 104.
The programs were aimed at reducing traffic accidents due to persons driving while
under the influence of alcohol and included an implied-consent law. Id. By 1992,
implied-consent laws were enacted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Id.
7
are used today both for license revocation and for OWI criminal
prosecutions. See Iowa Code §§ 321J.2, .12 (2009).
Although the implied-consent law is based on the premise that all
drivers consent to the withdrawal of a body substance for testing if
suspected of driving while intoxicated, the law is tempered by giving
drivers the right to withdraw this implied consent and refuse the test.
State v. Massengale, 745 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Iowa 2008); see also Iowa
Code § 321J.9 (prohibiting a chemical test after a driver has refused the
officer’s request). Thus, the consent for a chemical test must ultimately
be “freely made, uncoerced, reasoned, and informed.” State v. Garcia,
756 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 2009). This voluntariness requirement is
captured by Iowa Code section 321J.8, which requires law enforcement
officers to advise suspects of all the consequences of a decision to submit
or refuse testing. See id. (recognizing section 321J.8 sets out a
voluntariness requirement and that consent is involuntary and invalid if
a driver is not reasonably informed of the consequences of refusal).
Viewing the advisory as an informational component in the procedure,
we adopted a reasonableness standard for the methods to be used by law
enforcement officers to convey the advisory. Id. at 222.
Pursuant to the implied-consent procedure, an officer who has
reasonable grounds to believe a driver is operating a vehicle while
intoxicated must first make a written request to withdraw the driver’s
blood, urine, or breath to determine the specific concentration of alcohol.
Iowa Code § 321J.6(1). Although not contained in the New York statute
used as a model for Iowa’s implied-consent law, the current “written
request” requirement was a part of Iowa’s original statute, Iowa Code
§ 321B.3 (1966), and requires that “[t]he withdrawal of the body
substances and the test or tests . . . be administered at the written
8
request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the
person was operating a motor vehicle” while intoxicated, Iowa Code
§ 321J.6(1) (2007) (emphasis added).
Our earlier decisions in Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 140
N.W.2d 866 (1966); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229 (Iowa 1975); and
State v. Meissner, 315 N.W.2d 738 (Iowa 1982), stand today as our
primary interpretations of the statutory “written request” requirement.
We have held that an oral request by an officer, followed by a written
request after the test has been administered, is not sufficient. Richards,
229 N.W.2d at 233. We have also held that “written request” does not
require the driver be in physical possession of the writing itself and that
the writing serves as a record of the request. Meissner, 315 N.W.2d at
740–41; Gottschalk, 258 Iowa at 1183, 140 N.W.2d at 872. Furthermore,
after a written request is properly given to the driver, a finding that the
test has been refused is premised on the statements and conduct of the
arrestee and police officer, as well as on all the surrounding
circumstances. Ginsberg v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 508 N.W.2d 663, 664
(Iowa 1993).
If a driver refuses the chemical testing under the implied-consent
procedure, the officer sends the department of transportation a certified,
sworn report that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
person was driving while intoxicated and that conditions existed to
perform a chemical test under section 321J.6. Iowa Code § 321J.9(1).
The refusal to submit to an officer’s request for a specimen sample will
then result in automatic revocation of the driver’s license for one year if it
is the driver’s first offense. Id. § 321J.9(1)(a). If the driver submits to the
chemical testing and the test shows a concentration of alcohol in excess
of the legal limit, the driver’s license will be revoked for 180 days if it is
9
the driver’s first offense. Id. § 321J.12(1)(a). Of course, the driver may
appeal the revocation by challenging the process on a number of
statutory grounds at a hearing before the department. Id.
§ 321J.13(2)(a)-(c).
IV. Interpretation of Written-Request Requirement.
The broad issue presented in this appeal is whether the use of a
computer screen, rather than a paper document, to make the request for
withdrawal of a bodily substance for testing satisfies the statutory
“written request” requirement of the implied-consent statute. We begin
our resolution of this issue with the simple recognition that our
legislature has specifically defined “written” in the chapter on general
rules of statutory construction. We recognize the legislature “may act as
its own lexicographer.” Henrich v. Lorenz, 448 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa
1989). When it does so, we are normally bound by the legislature’s own
definitions. Inter-State Nurseries, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 164
N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa 1969).
In relevant part, the legislature’s rules of construction provide:
In the construction of the statutes, the following rules shall
be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent
with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or repugnant
to the context of the statute:
....
39. Written—in writing—signature. The words “written” and
“in writing” may include any mode of representing words or
letters in general use, and include an electronic record as
defined in section 554D.103.
Iowa Code § 4.1(39) (first emphasis added).
In turn, “electronic record” is defined as any record “created,
generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.”
Id. § 554D.103(7). Although section 554D.103 was enacted as part of the
laws affecting commerce, its reference in the general definition section of
10
the Code reflects a clear intention of our legislature for the meaning of
“writing” to continue to evolve to recognize the realities of our information
age. In a rare articulation of legislative purpose, the General Assembly
wrote, in relevant part:
It is the intent of the general assembly in enacting this
chapter to effectuate all of the following purposes:
....
3. Facilitate electronic filing of documents with state
and local government agencies and promote efficient delivery
of government services by means of reliable electronic
records.
....
5. Promote public confidence in the integrity,
reliability, and legality of electronic records . . . .
2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1189, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 554D.102 (2003)).
The section was later repealed without explanation in 2004, 2004 Iowa
Acts ch. 1067, § 10, but the legislature retained the provisions from 2000
relating to discretionary governmental use of electronic records, 2000
Iowa Acts ch. 1189, §§ 19, 20 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 554D.119, .120
(2007)). Additionally, the fiscal note prepared for the 2000 legislation
indicates part of the purpose behind the enactment of the statute was to
reflect current government spending on technology from the general
fund. See H.F. 2205 Fiscal Note, 78th G.A., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2000).
Consequently, the statutory definition of the word “written” is an
important consideration in our resolution of whether a computer screen
can be used to satisfy the statutory “written request” requirement.
Clearly, the word “written” means any mode of representing words and
includes a record “communicated . . . or stored by electronic means.”
Iowa Code § 554D.103(7). The word “written” plainly includes words on
a computer screen under the definition provided by the legislature.
Nevertheless, our inquiry does not end with the statutory definition. As
11
directed by our legislature, the rules and definitions set out in section
4.6 do not apply if “inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general
assembly, or repugnant to the context of the statute . . . .” Iowa Code
§ 4.1; see also State v. Hopkins, 465 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa 1991)
(“Second, we look beyond the ordinary meaning of the statutory language
when a statute’s literal terms are in conflict with its general purpose.”).
We must, therefore, consider whether a construction of “written request”
that includes a computer screen would be inconsistent with the intent of
the legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute.
The legislature did not specifically articulate a purpose for the
“written request” requirement under the implied-consent law. We have,
however, explored the role of the “written request” requirement within the
Act as a whole in our prior cases. See State v. Charlson, 261 Iowa 497,
502, 154 N.W.2d 829, 831 (1967) (“[I]t is fundamental that in arriving at
the correct interpretation of any particular provisions of the [implied-
consent] Act and the intention of the legislature as expressed therein
courts should consider the entire Act and, so far as possible, interpret its
various provisions in the light of their relation to the whole.”). Several
helpful considerations can be derived from these cases.
We have found the written request requirement for the withdrawal
of a bodily substance for testing to be “procedural, rather than
substantive in character.” Charlson, 261 Iowa at 505, 154 N.W.2d at
833 (referring to section 321J.6 at its previous designation in section
321B.3 in the 1966 Code). The written-request requirement is one of
numerous procedural requirements found in section 321J.6. See Iowa
Code § 321J.6(1)(a)-(g). Each requirement has separate, but related,
purposes. In State v. Schlemme, we found the broad purpose of the
procedural requirements of the Act were “to protect the health of the
12
person submitting to the test and to guarantee the accuracy of the test
for use in judicial proceedings.” 301 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Iowa 1981). More
specifically, we have indicated “[t]he primary purpose of the request
[requirement] is ‘to provide a record of the relevant communication for
subsequent review.’ ” State v. McCoy, 603 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Iowa 1999)
(quoting Henry v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 426 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Iowa
1988)) (holding the procedural requirement of a written request was
sufficient, even when an officer asked for a breath sample and
inadvertently checked the box next to blood sample on the form, and the
record clearly shows the driver understood the real sample being
requested was breath); see also Meissner, 315 N.W.2d at 741 (“[T]he
writing provides a record of the relevant communication. This promotes
accuracy and furnishes a record for subsequent review.”). This written
“record” is important for trial because an involuntary chemical test is not
admissible in criminal proceedings. See Charlson, 261 Iowa at 506, 154
N.W.2d at 834 (highlighting importance of properly obtaining consent
prior to test). Moreover, the record must show the request was
administered prior to the test, not contemporaneously with or following
the test as a formality. See State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa
1975) (rejecting State’s argument that the written request may follow the
test and “ratif[y] what had been done”).
In past cases, the purpose of the “written request” requirement in
section 321J.6(1) was often tied to the advisory given to inform a
suspected drunk driver of the consequences of submitting to or refusing
a chemical test to enable the driver to make an educated decision under
section 321J.8. However, this integration of the two sections was a
result of law enforcement practice, not legislative policy. For example,
the “written request” in Meissner also contained language of advisory,
13
stating “ ‘I have been informed that my driver’s license for privilege to
operate a motor vehicle will be revoked for failing to provide a specimen of
a specified body substance for chemical testing,’ ” Meissner, 315 N.W.2d
at 740 (quoting text of request given to defendant) (emphasis added), and
the advisory in Gottschalk “plainly stated that a refusal to submit to a
chemical test would result in a revocation of plaintiff’s driver’s license for
a period of 120 days to a year.” 258 Iowa at 1175, 140 N.W.2d at 867.
Although it may seem intuitive to make a more detailed record of the
transaction by documenting the advisory within the signed request, this
is not statutorily required. Only the request needs to be in writing. As a
result, the policies behind the two separate procedural requirements can
be more clearly articulated: the advisory is meant to inform the driver of
the consequences to enable fair opportunity for decision making while
the written request requirement ensures an accurate and reliable record
that a pretest request was made.
Having identified the purpose of the “written request” requirement,
we turn to consider whether the use of a computer screen as the writing
would contravene the intent of the legislature in making the requirement
a part of the implied-consent law. As a general proposition, we recognize
our society is in the midst of a transformation to paperless commerce
and interaction between people. This transformation is even observable
in Iowa’s court system, which has begun the process of becoming a
totally paperless system. Additionally, many of our rules have been
modified to accommodate the use of computers to store and
communicate information. The paper-laden world of yesterday will be
much different tomorrow. This transformation is largely based on the
ability of computers to maintain accurate and reliable records, perhaps
better in many ways than paper.
14
In particular, the “TraCS system” used by Trooper Scott is “a
sophisticated data collection and reporting tool for the public safety
community to streamline and automate the capture of incident data in
the field and transfer the data from the local agency to a statewide
enterprise system.” Iowa Dep’t of Transp., TraCS, History of the National
Model, http://www.iowatracs.us/About/NationalModel.aspx (last visited
July 16, 2010). Moreover, some of the cited benefits of recording data at
the point of origination are improvements in accuracy, completeness, and
timeliness, in part because the system eliminates the need for duplicate
entries in local and state databases. Id. The system also facilitates a
greater electronic network within the State of Iowa: TraCS enables
electronic filings with and data transfers to the courts. Id. Thus, the
system used in this case is not only consistent with the legislature’s
purpose for written requests in OWI cases, it also appears to affirmatively
support it. Because using an electronic form of the written request for a
breath sample does not conflict with the legislative purpose behind the
requirement in section 321J.6(1), we apply the definition of “writing” in
section 4.1(39) and allow the use of the electronic form to meet the
statutory requirement.
Notwithstanding, Fischer more specifically argues that the purpose
of the “written request” requirement is broader than to merely maintain
accurate and reliable records. He asserts the requirement also exists to
allow a driver to view the request before making the decision to consent
to give a sample or refuse to give a sample and that the manner in which
the computer screen was used in this case, in conjunction with the way
the program operated, did not allow him to view the entire “written
request.” In particular, Fischer asserts the use of a computer screen
does not allow a driver to view the entire electronic record prior to signing
15
the signature line on the pop-up window. In this way, he claims the use
of the computer as a writing frustrates the purpose of the “written
request” requirement of the rule.
The record in this case revealed the written request portion of the
implied-consent procedures existed on the computer screen, but in small
font and at an angle from Fischer. The form on the screen was a work in
progress, requiring Fischer’s signature and selection of “consent” or
“refuse” on the “Request for Specimen” section of the form, along with
several unrelated inputs by the officer, before the form was “locked” in its
final version. Yet, the only portion of the “Notice and Consent” form at
issue in the case is the specific section requesting a specimen of the
driver’s breath. The request itself is the only portion that is statutorily
required to be in writing and signed by the driver prior to administration
of the test. See Iowa Code ch. 321J. It is undisputed that the relevant
request existed in writing on the computer screen at the time Fischer
signed the form. Moreover, the purpose of the “written request”
requirement is not as broad as claimed by Fischer. It is irrelevant that a
driver does not see the entire “Request and Notice” form because the
statute does not require the entire form to be given to or observed by a
driver prior to the test. The only component of the overall form required
to be “in writing,” as it pertains to a driver, is the “Request for Specimen.”
Fischer narrows his argument even further by asserting the statute
required the law enforcement officer in this case to make an affirmative
effort to draw his attention to the form that appeared on the computer
screen, so he could have reviewed it for himself to provide a better
opportunity for his decision making. However, the written-request
requirement of section 321J.6(1) is not concerned with providing
information to a driver to assist in assessing the available options under
16
the implied-consent law. Additionally, the language of the request
provides no alternative options for the driver to assess. Instead, the
relevant text simply recites a summary of the request that was made by
the officer. The policy behind Fischer’s concern for adequate
mechanisms to enable informed decision making is reflected within the
other procedural requirements of the implied-consent law that clearly
express this intention. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 321J.6(1) (reasonable
suspicion prerequisite), 321J.8 (statement of consequences of implied
consent); see also Garcia, 756 N.W.2d at 222 (reasonable methods must
be used to convey the advisory to “provid[e] the accused driver a basis for
evaluation and decision-making”); Voss v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 621
N.W.2d 208, 211–12 (Iowa 2001) (stating the clearly articulated purpose
of the implied-consent advisory is to benefit the driver). 4
We do not read a requirement into a statutory scheme when none
exists because “[i]t is not our province to write such a requirement into
the [implied consent] statute.” Gottschalk, 258 Iowa at 1183, 140
N.W.2d at 872. Further, the written request need not be given to the
driver for an opportunity to read it because the purpose is to create a
record of the relevant communication; such a record can be created with
the driver’s participation, but the driver’s permission to create or finalize
the record is not contained in section 321J.6(1). See id. (“[T]he statute
does not provide that the written request of the officer for a chemical test
be handed or given to the arrested motorist or served upon him in the
4Fischer does not argue the officer failed to make a request for a breath test
prior to administration of the test, a requirement that is implicit in the statute and
made explicit in our prior cases. See Richards, 229 N.W.2d at 233 (“The statute
requires the request to precede submission to the test.”). He also does not claim he
gave an equivocal response that constituted a refusal to the test, but was subjected to
the test anyway. Such allegations would produce concerns over the accuracy of the
written record and would be resolved by reference to other relevant extrinsic evidence.
17
manner of an original notice commencing a civil action.”). The request
must certainly exist in writing prior to the administration of the test, but
the purpose of section 321J.6(1) is to record the request, not to provide
notice of what was orally requested or an opportunity to alter the
document. We hold an electronic version of the written request satisfies
the requirement of section 321J.6(1). The request need not be printed
for the driver in order for the request to be adequately “written.” The
written-request requirement of section 321J.6(1) is satisfied by the use of
a computer screen. Additionally, we hold the officer does not need to call
the driver’s attention to the request that appears on the screen for the
request on the screen to satisfy the definition of “written.” The use of a
document appearing on a computer screen is consistent with the
legislative intent of the requirement and conforms to the context of the
statute.
We also recognize that electronic forms may be altered until they
are permanently saved. This is an improvement over the prior practice of
discarding paper in mass quantities when a mistake or change of heart
occurs in order to start over on a fresh page. The nature of computerized
documents allows for changes in documents without the consequence of
producing additional waste. This technological reality does not affect our
decision that, although alterable on the same screen, documents on a
computer constitute a “writing” for purposes of section 321J.6(1).
V. Conclusion.
We have considered all the claims raised on appeal. We reverse
the decision of the district court and remand the case for further
proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.