Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Mark A. Templeton ( 2010 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 10–0255
Filed July 2, 2010
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
MARK A. TEMPLETON,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission reports respondent has committed ethical
infractions and recommends a two-year suspension of respondent’s
license to practice law. LICENSED SUSPENDED.
Charles L. Harrington and Amanda K. Robinson, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Mark McCormick, Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, for
respondent.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a
complaint against the respondent, Mark A. Templeton, with the
Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa alleging Templeton
committed various violations of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct.
The commission found Templeton’s conduct violated three provisions of
the rules and recommended we suspend Templeton’s license to practice
law with no possibility of reinstatement for a period of two years. On our
de novo review, we find Templeton violated one rule that requires us to
impose sanctions. Accordingly, we suspend Templeton’s license to
practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for a period
of three months.
I. Scope of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hoglan, 781 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa
2010). The board has the burden of proving an attorney’s ethical
misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id. “This
burden is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the
preponderance standard required in the usual civil case.” Iowa Supreme
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa
2004). Upon proof of misconduct, we may impose a greater or lesser
sanction than the sanction recommended by the commission. Id.II. Findings of Fact.
On our de novo review, we find the following facts. Mark
Templeton was fifty years old at the time of the grievance commission
hearing. He is a graduate of Drake University Law School and became a
licensed lawyer in January 1986. He practiced law until 2000. In 2000
Templeton took inactive status and began managing a newspaper
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distribution business. In 2007 he distributed newspapers in four states
and personally delivered the newspapers in the Des Moines area.
Through his newspaper deliveries, he became aware of a house in
the Des Moines area where three single women lived. The owner of the
house, Mary Doe, was eighty years old at the time of the incident that led
to this proceeding. The tenants were Jane Roe, a twenty-four-year-old
nurse, and Paula Poe, a twenty-one-year-old intern at a local church. 1
Beginning in March 2007, Roe began to hear what she thought
was someone walking across the crushed landscape rocks outside her
master bedroom and bathroom windows. These noises began to occur
more frequently throughout the month of March. In April, as Roe turned
off the bathroom lights, she looked out the window and saw a man duck,
run from the window to a silver car parked in the street, and drive away.
Roe observed this activity happen four to six times. Each time she saw
the man, she called the police.
After repeated reports by Roe and her roommates, the police set up
a surveillance camera to try to capture images of the man. The camera
malfunctioned and failed to record any images of the trespasser. After
the surveillance camera set up by the police failed, one of Roe’s family
members installed a motion-detection camera used for deer hunting on a
tree outside of the house in an attempt to capture images of the person
coming to Roe’s windows.
On June 24 Roe’s family was staying with her at the house. In the
morning, Roe and her family were planning to go to the airport and leave
for a vacation. Around midnight, Roe was in her bedroom packing for
the trip when she noticed the motion-detection camera was flashing,
1We have changed the names of the three women pursuant to Iowa Court Rule
21.28 in order to keep their identities confidential.
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meaning something in front of the house had triggered it. Roe looked
outside, but saw no one. Approximately five minutes later, a car pulled
up in front of the house and turned its lights off but shortly thereafter
sped away. After the car left, Roe and her family removed the camera
from the tree, downloaded the pictures it had taken onto Roe’s laptop
computer, and discovered the camera had captured pictures of a white
male with facial hair and glasses wearing a dark blue or black baseball
hat, t-shirt, and khaki shorts. Roe notified the police she had pictures of
the person looking into her windows.
At five o’clock the next morning, Roe’s family left for the airport.
On the way to the airport, the family passed a neighborhood gas station.
Roe’s brother observed a man filling his car with gas who fit the
description of the man in the photographs the motion-detection camera
had taken the night before. The family obtained the license plate
number of the vehicle and relayed this information to the police. A
detective traced the license plate back to the registered owner, who
informed the detective he had recently sold the vehicle to a friend, Mark
Templeton. The detective searched for Templeton’s driver’s license in the
department of transportation’s database and located what he believed
was Templeton’s license. The detective compared Templeton’s driver’s
license photograph with the photographs captured by Roe and concluded
they were a match.
After determining Templeton was the primary suspect, the
detective and Templeton talked on the phone. The detective informed
Templeton that he had been identified as the individual who had
repeatedly been looking into Roe’s windows. Templeton admitted he had
visited the house approximately four or five times to look into Roe’s
windows while he was in the area delivering newspapers. Templeton told
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the detective he has had a problem with window peeping his whole life
and was relieved he had been caught because otherwise this behavior
probably was not going to stop. Templeton also admitted he received
sexual gratification from looking into Roe’s windows but denied ever
masturbating while doing so. We agree the evidence does not support a
finding that Templeton was masturbating while looking into the windows.
Templeton promised to seek help and not engage in this type of
conduct again. The detective informed Templeton he would talk with the
victims before proceeding any further, but he could not guarantee the
State would not pursue criminal charges.
During the time Templeton was looking in Roe’s windows, Doe,
Roe, and Poe were terrified. The women felt they were being stalked and
were concerned the person looking into their windows was there to do
them harm. Doe was so concerned about her safety she would call the
police almost daily to inquire if the police had caught the perpetrator.
Roe felt the perpetrator was invading her privacy and she was being
taken advantage of as a woman. When she came home alone at night,
she would call ahead so her roommates would be at the door when she
arrived home. Roe also put blankets over her windows and began
dressing and undressing in a closet that did not have any windows. Poe
was so terrified by the incidents she quit her internship, moved home
with her parents, and refused to participate in any proceedings against
Templeton.
The State charged Templeton with one count of criminal trespass
and one count of invasion of privacy. The county attorney later amended
the charges to six counts of invasion of privacy—nudity, a serious
misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.21 (2005). During
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the course of the proceedings, Templeton sought treatment for the
behavior resulting in his arrest.
On September 18 Templeton met with a sex-offender-treatment
specialist who conducted a two-hour clinical interview, administered
different risk assessment tests, and completed a risk
assessment/amenability-to-treatment evaluation of Templeton. The
specialist concluded Templeton presented a low level of risk for repeated
abusive behavior and suggested that he participate in outpatient sex-
offender treatment.
On November 7 Templeton pleaded guilty to all six counts of
invasion of privacy—nudity. The district court sentenced Templeton to a
period not to exceed one year for each of the six counts of invasion of
privacy—nudity, to run consecutively, suspended this sentence, placed
Templeton on probation for a period of six years, and ordered Templeton
to complete sex-offender treatment as an added condition of probation.
Subsequently, the attorney disciplinary board filed its complaint
against Templeton. The complaint invoked issue preclusion with regard
to Templeton’s conviction and alleged Templeton’s window-peeping
behavior and subsequent conviction violated Iowa Rules of Professional
Conduct 32:8.4(a) (violating or attempting to violate the Iowa Rules of
Professional Conduct), 32:8.4(b) (committing a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects), and 32:8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice).
At the time of the hearing, Templeton had completed the first two
phases of a four-phase sex-offender-treatment program. He is scheduled
to complete the fourth phase of the treatment program in 2012.
Templeton suffers from major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder,
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voyeurism, and exhibitionism. He has met all expectations with regard
to his compliance and performance during his course of treatment.
Templeton’s risk of recidivism is relatively low. In order to further his
recovery and ensure he is complying with his probation, Templeton has
voluntarily chosen to continue to wear his monitoring ankle bracelet.
On February 12, 2010, the grievance commission filed its findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation. The commission
concluded the board had proved Templeton’s conduct violated Iowa Rules
of Professional Conduct 32:8.4(a), (b), and (d). After weighing the
aggravating and mitigating factors in the case, the commission
recommended this court suspend Templeton’s license to practice law for
two years without any possibility of reinstatement. The commission
further recommended upon Templeton’s application for reinstatement he
shall:
1) have the burden of proving he has continued to
successfully comply with all conditions of his probation,
including the sex offender treatment program; 2) have the
burden of proving he is compliant with any medication
regimens recommended by his counselors and physicians;
3) include with his application for reinstatement reports of
two treating physicians regarding his progress and
prognosis; and 4) have the burden of proving he has
developed a “safety net” of assistance he can turn to should
he encounter problems with depression or anxiety disorder
while engaged in the practice of law.
Neither party appealed the commission’s recommendation.
Therefore, we are reviewing the recommendation pursuant to Iowa Court
Rule 35.10(1).
III. Analysis.
We have the authority to take disciplinary action against an
attorney even though the attorney’s license is inactive and the attorney is
not actively engaged in the practice of law. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
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Ethics & Conduct v. Mulford, 625 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Iowa 2001). This is
true even if at the time of the misconduct the attorney was not acting as
a lawyer. Id. Thus, even though Templeton’s law license was on inactive
status and his conduct was unrelated to his representation of clients or
any other facet of the practice of law, we still have the authority to
sanction him upon a finding that he has engaged in misconduct in
violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct.
The commission found Templeton violated Iowa Rule of
Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b). Rule 32:8.4(b) provides, “It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(b). A comment
to the rule states: “Illegal conduct can reflect adversely on fitness to
practice law. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor
significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal
obligation.” Id. cmt. 2 (emphasis added). The mere commission of a
criminal act does not necessarily reflect adversely on the fitness of an
attorney to practice law. 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law of
Lawyering § 65.4, at 65-8 to 65-9 (3d ed. 2009 Supp.) [hereinafter “The
Law of Lawyering”]. The nature and circumstances of the act are
relevant to determine if the commission of the criminal act reflects
adversely on the attorney’s fitness to practice law. Id. § 65.4, at 65-8.
Oregon’s DR 1–102(A)(2) provides: “[I]t is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to ‘commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law.’ ” In re
Conduct of White, 815 P.2d 1257, 1265 (Or. 1991) (quoting Or. Code of
Prof’l Responsibility DR 1–102(A)(2)). Oregon’s rule, in effect at the time
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the Supreme Court of Oregon decided White, is similar to our rule
32:8.4(b).
In applying DR 1–102(A)(2) to a criminal act of an attorney, the
Supreme Court of Oregon noted:
To some extent, every criminal act shows lack of
support for our laws and diminishes public confidence in
lawyers, thereby reflecting adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to
practice. DR 1–102(A)(2) does not sweep so broadly,
however. For example, a misdemeanor assault arising from
a private dispute would not, in and of itself, violate that rule.
Each case must be decided on its own facts. There must be
some rational connection other than the criminality of the
act between the conduct and the actor’s fitness to practice
law. Pertinent considerations include the lawyer’s mental
state; the extent to which the act demonstrates disrespect for
the law or law enforcement; the presence or absence of a
victim; the extent of actual or potential injury to a victim;
and the presence or absence of a pattern of criminal
conduct.
Id. at 1265 (citation omitted). Oregon’s analysis as to when a criminal
act reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law is reasonable
and is the analysis we now adopt to apply in our own disciplinary cases.
Here, Templeton engaged in a pattern of criminal conduct by
repeatedly looking into the victims’ windows. In doing so, he violated
Doe’s, Roe’s, and Poe’s privacy, and caused them to suffer emotional
distress. Although his conduct was compulsive, the record also
establishes he intentionally and knowingly invaded the privacy of these
women. This conduct also raises serious misgivings about whether
Templeton understands the concept of privacy and respects the law
protecting individuals’ privacy rights. For these reasons, we find
Templeton’s criminal acts of invading Doe’s, Roe’s, and Poe’s privacy
reflects adversely on his fitness to practice law in violation of rule
32:8.4(b). See In re Haecker, 664 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ind. 1996),
reinstatement granted, 693 N.E.2d 529 (Ind. 1998) (finding attorney’s
10
clandestine act of voyeurism of the occupants of his rental property
constituted a crime that reflected adversely on his fitness as an attorney
in other respects). Therefore, we agree with the commission that
Templeton violated rule 32:8.4(b).
The commission also found Templeton violated rule 32:8.4(d).
Rule 32:8.4(d) states: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . .
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). This rule is similar to former DR 1–
102(A)(5). DR 1–102(A)(5) provided that: “A lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” The
debates of the ABA House of Delegates clearly indicate the purpose for
incorporating this “prejudicial to the administration of justice” language
from past rules, such as our former DR 1–102(A)(5), into the ABA’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct was “to address violations of well-
understood norms and conventions of practice only.” 2 The Law of
Lawyering § 65.6, at 65-16. We have adopted the ABA’s proposed model
rule 8.4(d) as our rule 32:8.4(d). Examples of conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice include paying an adverse expert witness for
information regarding an opponent’s case preparation, demanding a
release in a civil action as a condition of dismissing criminal charges,
and knowingly making false or reckless charges against a judicial officer.
See id. at 65-16 to 65-18; see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Weaver, 750 N.W.2d 71, 90–91 (Iowa 2008) (holding falsely
accusing a judge of being dishonest concerning a sentencing decision
was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
We have interpreted our former DR 1–102(A)(5) in a similar
fashion. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Howe, we
stated:
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Although “there is no typical form of conduct that prejudices
the administration of justice,” actions that have commonly
been held to violate this disciplinary rule have hampered
“the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of
ancillary systems upon which the courts rely.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 373
(Iowa 2005) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Steffes, 588 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1999)).
In the past, we have found the mere fact a lawyer was convicted of
an OWI, third offense, was conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 774 N.W.2d
496, 498–99 (Iowa 2009) (finding a lawyer’s third OWI conviction was a
violation of rule 32:8.4(d)); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dull,
713 N.W.2d 199, 204 (Iowa 2006) (finding a lawyer’s third OWI conviction
was a violation of DR 1–102(A)(5)). We now believe, under rule 32:8.4(d),
the mere act of committing a crime does not constitute a violation of this
rule because the rule does not simply prohibit the doing of an act.
Rather, rule 32:8.4(d) specifically prohibits an act that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice by violating the well-understood norms and
conventions of the practice of law. To hold otherwise would be contrary
to the intent of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct when it
proposed the model rule, which we adopted in rule 32:8.4(d) without
change. Therefore, we overrule our prior cases holding otherwise.
Nevertheless, criminal conduct may violate other rules contained in our
rules of professional conduct. See, e.g., Johnson, 774 N.W.2d at 499(finding a lawyer’s third OWI conviction was a violation of the rule
providing it is professional misconduct to commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects); Dull, 713 N.W.2d at 204 (finding a lawyer’s
third OWI conviction was a violation of the rule providing a lawyer shall
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not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to
practice law).
Applying these principles to this record, there is nothing in the
record to indicate Templeton’s criminal conduct was prejudicial to the
administration of justice by deviating from the well-understood norms
and conventions of practice. Templeton complied with every order and
time deadline in his criminal proceeding. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis, 749 N.W.2d 694, 699 (Iowa 2008) (holding
failure to meet appellate deadlines in a postconviction relief action was
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). He did nothing to
impede the progress of his criminal proceeding and did not make any
statements falsely impugning the integrity of the judicial system.
Without any evidence showing Templeton’s criminal conduct violated the
well-understood norms and conventions of practice, the board did not
prove a violation of rule 32:8.4(d). Consequently, the board has failed to
prove Templeton’s conduct violated rule 32:8.4(d).
The commission also found Templeton violated rule 32:8.4(a)
providing: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate . . .
the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:8.4(a). It is true Templeton’s violation of rule 35:8.4(b) violates the
provision contained in rule 32:8.4(a) stating that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to violate the Iowa Rules of Professional
Conduct. The purpose, however, of including rule 32:8.4(a) in the Iowa
Rules of Professional Conduct is to give notice to attorneys that they are
subject to discipline for violating the rules. Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct
32:8.4, cmt. 1. The purpose of rule 32:8.4(a) was not to create a
separate violation. Therefore, once the board proves a violation of the
Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, we will not discipline an attorney for
13
violating rule 32:8.4(a). Accordingly, although we find Templeton’s
conduct violated rule 32:8.4(a), we will not consider it as a separate
violation for purposes of determining his sanction. In the future, the
board need not file a complaint alleging a violation of rule 32:8.4(a)
providing it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate the Iowa
Rules of Professional Conduct. Proof of a violation of another rule is
sufficient for us to consider the proper sanction.
IV. Sanction.
We have no standard sanction for misconduct of this type. Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 270
(Iowa 2010). Nevertheless, we try to achieve consistency with our prior
cases when determining the proper sanction. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 767 (Iowa 2010). In
determining the proper sanction
“we consider the nature of the violations, protection of the
public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, the
lawyer’s fitness to practice, and the court’s duty to uphold
the integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public. We
also consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances
present in the disciplinary action.”
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 726 N.W.2d 397, 408
(Iowa 2007) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Iversen, 723 N.W.2d 806, 810
(Iowa 2006)). The goal of our disciplinary system is “to maintain public
confidence in the legal profession as well as to provide a policing
mechanism for poor lawyering.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
There are a number of aggravating circumstances in this case.
First, we cannot overlook the serious, egregious, and persistent nature of
Templeton’s misconduct and the effect it had on his victims. See, e.g.,
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Tompkins, 415 N.W.2d 620, 623
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(Iowa 1987) (stating, “the more egregious and persistent the conduct, the
more debased the character of the offender”). From March through June
2007, Templeton visited the women’s house and looked through their
bedroom and bathroom windows on multiple occasions. Templeton’s
victims did not know if or when he would return, whether his conduct
would escalate to violence, or if they were safe in or outside their home.
The victims were terrified and one roommate quit her internship, moved
out of the house, and refused to participate in any criminal proceedings
just to escape Templeton’s harassment.
Second, Templeton has admitted to a long history of compulsive
and deviant sexual behavior. See, e.g., Tompkins, 415 N.W.2d at 623(refusing to allow the compulsiveness of an attorney’s illness to serve as
a mitigating factor); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Vesole, 400
N.W.2d 591, 593 (Iowa 1987) (considering an attorney’s history of
morally reprehensible and compulsive acts when determining an
appropriate sanction). Templeton admitted he has struggled with
compulsive sexual behavior his whole life. He has admitted an addiction
to pornography, together with a history of exposing himself and window
peeping.
Third, Templeton was well aware of what he was doing, understood
he could seek help for his problems, but chose not to do so until he was
caught and confronted with the consequences of his actions. See
Tompkins, 415 N.W.2d at 623 (considering the fact that an attorney knew
he could get help for his problem but chose not to do so until faced with
serious consequences when determining an appropriate sanction). In
fact, when first confronted by the detective, Templeton was relieved and
admitted his window peeping probably would not have stopped absent an
intervention.
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In addition to the aggravating circumstances, there are a number
of mitigating circumstances present. Templeton’s sex-offender-treatment
specialist diagnosed Templeton with major depressive disorder, anxiety
disorder, voyeurism, and exhibitionism for which he takes numerous
prescription medications. “While illnesses do not excuse misconduct,
they can be mitigating factors and can influence our approach to
discipline.” Hoglan, 781 N.W.2d at 287.
Additionally, Templeton continues to receive treatment for his
disorders and illnesses. Templeton has complied with his treatment and
his performance has met expectations. Templeton’s risk of recidivism is
relatively low and if he continues his treatment he may be able to
continue to practice law. Moreover, Templeton has voluntarily chosen to
continue to wear his monitoring ankle bracelet to ensure he complies
with his probation. Thus, it appears Templeton is taking affirmative
steps to rehabilitate himself and change his destructive behavior.
Finally, Templeton has claimed responsibility and shown remorse for his
conduct.
A review of prior cases involving sexual misconduct and/or other
criminal convictions reveal that the length of the suspension varies from
two months to three years based on the circumstances of the case. See,
e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Blazek, 739 N.W.2d 67,
70 (Iowa 2007) (revoking attorney’s license due to enticement of a minor
for sex and child pornography felony convictions); Iversen, 723 N.W.2d at
812 (suspending attorney’s license for one year due to fraudulent
practice felony and aggravated misdemeanor convictions); Mulford, 625
N.W.2d at 685–86 (citing cases imposing sanctions ranging from a public
reprimand to a two-year suspension for misconduct resulting from
criminal conduct); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
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Thompson, 595 N.W.2d 132, 136 (Iowa 1999) (suspending attorney’s
license for two months due to his convictions for two simple
misdemeanors); Steffes, 588 N.W.2d at 125 (citing cases suspending
attorneys’ licenses for three months to three years for sexual
misconduct); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Barrer, 495 N.W.2d
756, 760 (Iowa 1993) (suspending attorney’s license for two years for
making sexually obscene phone calls to teenage boys); Tompkins, 415
N.W.2d at 624 (suspending attorney’s license for two years due to
conviction for trespass in relation to attorney’s unlawful entry into homes
to search for women’s undergarments); Vesole, 400 N.W.2d at 593(suspending attorney’s license for three years due to repeated convictions
for indecent exposure); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Floy, 334
N.W.2d 739, 740 (Iowa 1983) (suspending attorney’s license for eighteen
months due to his conviction of telephone harassment in relation to
sexually obscene phone calls made to young women).
Considering the nature of Templeton’s violations, the protection of
the public, deterrence of similar misconduct by others, Templeton’s
fitness to practice, our duty to uphold the integrity of the profession in
the eyes of the public, aggravating circumstances, mitigating
circumstances, and the sanctions we have given in similar cases, the
appropriate sanction for Templeton’s conduct is to suspend his license to
practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for three
months. Prior to any application for reinstatement, Templeton must
provide this court with an evaluation by a licensed health care
professional verifying his fitness to practice law.
V. Disposition.
We suspend Templeton’s license to practice law in this state
indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for three months. This
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suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See Iowa Ct. R.
35.12(3). Prior to any application for reinstatement, Templeton must
provide this court with an evaluation by a licensed health care
professional verifying his fitness to practice law. Upon any application
for reinstatement, Templeton must establish that he has not practiced
law during the suspension period and has complied in all ways with the
requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.13. Templeton shall also comply
with the notification requirements of Iowa Court Rule 35.22. We tax the
costs of this action to Templeton pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.26.
LICENSE SUSPENDED.