Beulah Zimmer, Administrator Of The Estate Of Ceil Creswell Vs. Walter Vander Waal, Sr., And Rolling View Farms, Inc., An Iowa Corporation ( 2010 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–0662
Filed April 9, 2010
BEULAH ZIMMER, Administrator
of the Estate of Ceil Creswell,
Appellant,
vs.
WALTER VANDER WAAL, SR., and
ROLLING VIEW FARMS, INC.,
an Iowa corporation,
Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, Duane E.
Hoffmeyer, Judge.
An estate appeals from a district court ruling finding a trailer is not
a motor vehicle under Iowa Code section 321.493. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT
AFFIRMED.
Michael J. Jacobsma of Jacobsma, Clabaugh & Freking P.L.C.,
Sioux Center, for appellant.
Sharese A. Manker and Douglas L. Phillips of Klass Law Firm,
L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellees.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
In this case, we must decide if the owners of a trailer can be held
vicariously liable under Iowa’s owner consent statute, Iowa Code section
321.493 (2003). Because the trailer involved in this collision is not a
motor vehicle under section 321.493, we affirm the decision of the court
of appeals and the judgment of the district court dismissing the plaintiff’s
claims against the trailer owners.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On or about November 17, 2004, Matthew Vander Waal was
operating a farm tractor with an attached trailer on Highway K-64 in
Sioux County when it collided with a motor vehicle operated by Ceil
Creswell, causing Creswell significant injuries and damages. At the time
of the collision, Hank Vander Waal owned the farm tractor and Rolling
View Farms, Inc. owned the trailer. Creswell’s conservators filed a
personal injury action on behalf of Creswell seeking damages against
Matthew Vander Waal, Hank Vander Waal, Joel Vander Waal, Walt
Vander Waal, Jr., and Progressive Insurance Company. During
discovery, the conservators learned that Walt Jr. did not own the trailer
in question. Instead, they discovered Rolling View Farms and/or Walter
Vander Waal, Sr. owned the trailer. Consequently, the conservators
added Rolling View Farms and Walter Sr. as defendants. The amended
petition alleged that Rolling View Farms, as owner of the trailer, was
liable for Matthew’s negligence pursuant to Iowa Code section 321.493
because its agent/officer, Walter Sr., had consented to Matthew’s use of
the trailer. The conservators also alleged, “[b]y attaching the trailer to
the farm tractor and operating the farm tractor on the public highway,
said trailer and tractor became one unit and one motor vehicle.”
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Additionally, the conservators alleged that Rolling View Farms and
Walter Sr. failed to maintain and equip the trailer in a safe manner.
The conservators filed a pleading seeking declaratory relief under
Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.1101 and 1.1102. The conservators
sought an order declaring the trailer was a motor vehicle under section
321.493 and thus, as owners of the trailer, Rolling View Farms and
Walter Sr. were vicariously liable for the actions of the driver. The
district court found the trailer was not a motor vehicle and as owners of
the trailer, Rolling View Farms and Walter Sr. were not vicariously liable
for the actions of the driver. Prior to the conclusion of the lawsuit,
Creswell died and the court substituted his estate as the plaintiff.
Rolling View Farms and Walter Sr. then filed a motion for summary
judgment arguing they were not liable for failing to maintain and equip
the trailer in a safe manner. The court agreed and entered judgment
against the estate. The estate filed a notice of appeal. We transferred the
case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court ruling that the owners of the trailer were not vicariously liable for
the negligence of the driver because the trailer is not a motor vehicle
under section 321.493. The estate then filed an application for further
review, which we granted.
II. Issue.
The only issue raised by the estate is whether the owners of the
trailer are vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver. The
resolution of this issue requires us to decide if the trailer is a motor
vehicle under Iowa Code section 321.493.
III. Standard of Review.
The estate is appealing from a ruling on its motion for declaratory
judgment under Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.1101 and 1.1102.
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Under these rules, a party cannot file a pretrial motion to obtain a
declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment is a type of action where
the “court declares the rights, duties, status, or other legal relationships
of the parties.” Dubuque Policemen’s Protective Ass’n v. City of Dubuque,
553 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Iowa 1996). However, we do not rely on the name
of a pleading in determining what type of motion it presents; rather, we
look to the pleading’s substance. Kagin’s Numismatic Auctions, Inc. v.
Criswell, 284 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1979). The substance of the
estate’s request for declaratory judgment appears to be a motion for
summary judgment and we will treat it as one.
A district court properly grants a summary judgment “when there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Robinson v. Fremont County, 744 N.W.2d
323, 325 (Iowa 2008). When no genuine issue of material fact exists, our
job is to determine whether the district court correctly applied the law.
Kragnes v. City of Des Moines, 714 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Iowa 2006). From
the pleadings filed, it appears no genuine issue of material fact exists in
that the trailer was not self-propelled and was being pulled by a farm
tractor at the time of the collision. Because no genuine issue of material
fact exists as to these facts, our decision will turn on the construction of
Iowa Code section 321.493. We review questions of statutory
construction for the correction of errors at law. Estate of Ryan v.
Heritage Trails Assocs., Inc., 745 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 2008).
IV. Analysis.
Iowa’s owner consent statute states in pertinent part: “[I]n all cases
where damage is done by any motor vehicle by reason of negligence of the
driver, and driven with the consent of the owner, the owner of the motor
vehicle shall be liable for such damage.” Iowa Code § 321.493(1)(a)
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(emphasis added). This statute is primarily a financial responsibility law.
Scott v. Wright, 486 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Iowa 1992). The legislature first
enacted the statute in 1919, and it has remained substantially
unchanged since that time. Moritz v. Maack, 437 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Iowa
1989). In enacting the owner consent statute, the legislature’s purpose
was to “protect third parties from the careless operation of motor vehicles
by making owners responsible for the negligence of operators to whom
they entrust their vehicles.” Scott, 486 N.W.2d at 43. It is essential to
liability under this statute that the instrumentality causing the injury fall
within the meaning of “motor vehicle.” See Iowa Code § 321.493(1)(a); 61
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 865, at 137 (2002).
To determine whether the trailer is a motor vehicle under section
321.493, we must engage in statutory construction.
“The goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative
intent. We determine legislative intent from the words
chosen by the legislature, not what it should or might have
said. Absent a statutory definition or an established
meaning in the law, words in the statute are given their
ordinary and common meaning by considering the context
within which they are used. Under the guise of
construction, an interpreting body may not extend, enlarge,
or otherwise change the meaning of a statute.”
State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Auen v.
Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (citations
omitted)). “The first step in ascertaining the true intent of the legislature
is to look at the statute’s language.” Estate of Ryan, 745 N.W.2d at 729.
When the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we will look no
further. Id. at 730. Thus, this court resorts to the rules of statutory
construction only when the terms of a statute are ambiguous. Id. “ ‘If
reasonable persons can disagree on a statute’s meaning, it is
ambiguous.’ ” Id. (quoting Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d at 541). Finally, “the
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legislature may define the terms it uses, and when it does, those
definitions are the foundation of our analysis.” State v. Kamber, 737
N.W.2d 297, 299 (Iowa 2007) (citing State v. Durgin, 328 N.W.2d 507,
509 (Iowa 1983)).
The legislature has defined the terms “vehicle,” “motor vehicle,”
and “trailer” for the purposes of chapter 321 of the Iowa Code. The
legislature defined “vehicle” as “every device in, upon, or by which any
person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway.”
Iowa Code § 321.1(90). The parties agree the trailer in this case qualifies
as a vehicle under section 321.1(90).
The legislature defined “motor vehicle” as “a vehicle which is self-
propelled, but not including vehicles known as trackless trolleys which
are propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires and
are not operated upon rails.” Id. § 321.1(42)(a). There is no doubt the
tractor in this case qualifies as a motor vehicle. See Scott, 486 N.W.2d at
42 (finding that for purposes of section 321.493, the term “motor vehicle”
includes a farm tractor); Hessler v. Ford, 255 Iowa 1055, 1059, 125
N.W.2d 132, 134 (1963) (stating, “[f]arm tractors by definition are motor
vehicles”). Thus, the only point of dispute is whether a trailer, when
attached to a tractor, qualifies as a motor vehicle.
The legislature defined “trailer” as “every vehicle without motive
power designed for carrying persons or property and for being drawn by a
motor vehicle and so constructed that no part of its weight rests upon
the towing vehicle.” Iowa Code § 321.1(85). The legislature also defined
“combination” or “combination of vehicles” as
a group consisting of two or more motor vehicles, or a group
consisting of a motor vehicle and one or more trailers,
semitrailers or vehicles, which are coupled or fastened
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together for the purpose of being moved on the highways as
a unit.
Id. § 321.1(9) (emphasis added).
From the plain language of these definitions, it is clear that a
trailer attached to a motor vehicle is a “combination of vehicles.” See id.
Moreover, on several occasions we have referred to a trailer coupled with
a tractor as a “combination of vehicles.” See, e.g., State v. Glenn, 234
N.W.2d 396, 398 (Iowa 1975) (stating the jury found Glenn guilty of
operating a “combination of vehicles,” which consisted of a truck and
attached trailer), superseded on other grounds by rule as recognized in
State v. Cullen, 357 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 1984); State v. Balsley, 242
Iowa 845, 848, 48 N.W.2d 287, 289 (1951) (stating, “[T]he appellant was
driving what is termed a combination vehicle on the highways of Iowa. It
consisted of a semitrailer and tractor combination.”). Because the
legislature clearly provides that a trailer attached to a motor vehicle
constitutes a “combination of vehicles,” it would be wrong for us to
construe the definition of “motor vehicle” as including a trailer attached
to a motor vehicle because to do so would render a portion of the
definition of “combination of vehicles” superfluous. See Miller v.
Westfield Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Iowa 2000) (recognizing a
fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a statute will not be
construed to make any part of it superfluous unless no other
construction is reasonably possible).
Iowa’s owner consent statute does not embrace all types of vehicles
within its coverage, but instead relates only to motor vehicles. See Iowa
Code § 321.493; accord Hennessy v. Walker, 17 N.E.2d 782, 784 (N.Y.
1938). The legislature has expressly classified a trailer attached to a
motor vehicle as a “combination of vehicles,” not as a “motor vehicle.”
See Iowa Code § 321.1(9). Had the legislature intended to include
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combination vehicles or trailers within the provisions of the owner
consent statute, it would have expressly referred to them by name. Its
failure to do so makes it clear that the legislature intended to exclude
those portions of combination vehicles that are not also motor vehicles
from the provisions of the owner consent statute.
The trailer at issue in this case, standing alone, qualifies as a
vehicle and a trailer under Iowa Code chapter 321. See Iowa Code
§ 321.1(85), (90). Upon attachment to a motor vehicle, the trailer
qualifies as a combination of vehicles. See id. § 321.1(9). Under either
scenario, attached or unattached, the trailer does not qualify as a motor
vehicle under chapter 321. See id. § 321.1(42)(a). Consequently, a
trailer attached to a motor vehicle does not meet the statutory definition
of a motor vehicle.
The estate also argues construing the definition of motor vehicle as
not including a trailer attached to a motor vehicle is contrary to the
purpose of Iowa’s owner consent statute. The legislature is generally free
to determine the extent to which it will address a perceived problem so
long as its line drawing does not violate a constitutional provision. Rudd
v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Iowa 1976). Moreover, we ascertain
legislative intent from the words the legislature used, rather than from
what one could argue it meant to say. Estate of Ryan, 745 N.W.2d at
730. We cannot expand the plain meaning of a statute under the guise
of construction. Id. If the legislature intended to include trailers or
combination vehicles in the owner consent statute, it could have easily
done so.
V. Conclusion and Disposition.
Rolling View Farms and Walter Sr., as the owners of the trailer in
this case, are not vicariously liable under Iowa’s owner consent statute,
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Iowa Code section 321.493, because the trailer involved in this collision
is not a motor vehicle under section 321.493. Therefore, we affirm the
decision of the court of appeals and the judgment of the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF
DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.