State Of Iowa Vs. Khrista Kay Erdman, Always Affordable Bail Bonds, Inc. And Ranger Insurance ( 2007 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 119 / 04-1661
Filed February 2, 2007
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
KHRISTA KAY ERDMAN,
Defendant,
ALWAYS AFFORDABLE BAIL BONDS, INC.
and RANGER INSURANCE,
Appellants.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Thomas R.
Hronek, District Associate Judge.
A surety company and its agent appeal from an entry of judgment on
an appeal bond. DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE
REMANDED.
Brent D. Rosenberg of Rosenberg, Stowers & Morse, Des Moines, for
appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephen H. Holmes, County Attorney, and Timothy C.
Meals, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
2
HECHT, Justice.
Ranger Insurance Company and its agent, Always Affordable Bail
Bonds, Inc., appeal from a judgment in the amount of $26,500 entered by a
district associate judge on an appearance bond. We conclude the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment. We therefore
vacate the judgment and remand to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
Khrista Kay Erdman was charged with two forgeries and two identity
thefts in Story County on July 8, 2004. She was arrested and then released
after posting an appearance bond in the amount of $26,500. The bond was
issued by Ranger through its agent, Always Affordable. While Erdman was
out on bond, she was arrested on other criminal charges and jailed in
Marion County.
Because she was in jail in Marion County, Erdman failed to appear as
scheduled in Story County District Court on July 26, 2004. That court
ordered the bond forfeited and scheduled for August 11 a hearing on the
entry of judgment. A district associate judge ordered entry of judgment
against Erdman and Ranger on August 11 after noting that “neither the
defendant nor [her] surety appear[ed].”
Always Affordable and Ranger hired counsel who filed a motion
requesting the judgment be set aside and alleging (1) the associate district
court was without jurisdiction to enter a judgment in excess of $10,000;
(2) the judgment in excess of the court’s jurisdiction was based on an
“irregularity” under Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1.1004(1) and 1.1012(2);
(3) the court abused its discretion in entering judgment on the forfeited
bond because Erdman’s failure to appear as ordered in Story County was
3
neither intentional nor willful; and (4) the court abused its discretion in
denying Dave Ellis, a non-lawyer sole shareholder and only officer of Always
Affordable, the opportunity to appear at the August 11 hearing as the agent
of Always Affordable and Ranger.
The court denied the motion to set aside the judgment, ruling that
(1) because the court had jurisdiction in the criminal case in which
Erdman’s bond was set and forfeited, the court also had jurisdiction to
enter judgment on the forfeited bond in excess of $10,000, and (2) judgment
was properly entered against Erdman and Ranger because (a) they failed to
appear at the August 11 hearing through Ellis, a non-lawyer, and (b) entry
of judgment on the forfeited bond was mandatory under Iowa Code section
811.6(1) because the defendant and her surety failed to appear. Always
Affordable and Ranger appeal, contending the court (1) lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to enter the judgment, and (2) abused its discretion in
precluding Ellis from participating in the August 11 hearing on behalf of
Always Affordable and in refusing to set aside the judgment.
II. Scope of Review.
Our scope of review of rulings on subject matter jurisdiction is for
correction of errors at law. Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512
(Iowa 1984).
III. Discussion.
“Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question
belongs.” Smith v. Smith, 646 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 2002). It is conferred
by the Iowa Constitution and by statute. Iowa Const. art. V, § 6 (conferring
jurisdiction upon the district court over civil and criminal matters as
prescribed by law); Iowa Code § 602.6101 (2003) (conferring upon the
4
district court all powers of a court of general jurisdiction); Powell v. Khodari-
Intergreen Co., 303 N.W.2d 171, 173 (Iowa 1981). The subject matter
jurisdiction of district associate judges in civil actions for money judgment
is limited to those cases in which the amount in controversy does not
exceed $10,000. Iowa Code § 602.6306(2).
In this case, the State sought and the district associate court entered
judgment well in excess of $10,000. The State contends the court had
jurisdiction to do so because (1) the judgment was not entered in a civil
action for a “money judgment” or “money damages;” and (2) the bond that
formed the basis for the judgment was issued in cases alleging two class “D”
felonies and two aggravated misdemeanors over which the court clearly had
jurisdiction. The State further contends it is implausible to suggest that the
court had jurisdiction to set and forfeit the bond, but could not enter
judgment on the bond to enforce the forfeiture. We disagree.
A proceeding in which the State seeks judgment on a bail bond is a
civil action. State v. Costello, 489 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1992); State v.
Zylstra, 263 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1978). The State’s objective in such an
action is clearly to reduce a forfeited bond to a money judgment. The
“controversy” in the action is, of course, whether the defendant and her
sureties can show cause why judgment should not be entered for the
amount of the bail bond. Iowa Code § 811.6(1). The “amount in
controversy” is therefore the amount of the forfeited bond. Although the
State correctly notes an action seeking such a judgment is different in some
respects from an action for money damages, the objective of each is the
same: a money judgment. We conclude that the associate district court’s
jurisdiction to enter judgment on forfeited bail bonds is confined to cases in
which the forfeited bond does not exceed $10,000. Id. § 602.6306(2).
 5
We are not persuaded that, by its grant of subject matter jurisdiction
in criminal cases alleging indictable misdemeanors and class “D” felonies,
the legislature intended to impliedly confer upon the associate district court
unlimited jurisdiction to enter judgment on bail bonds in excess of $10,000.
If the legislature had intended to confer such jurisdiction, it would have
done so expressly. See State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 2006)
(“ ‘We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the legislature,
not what it should or might have said.’ ” (quoting Auen v. Alcoholic
Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004))).
Having decided that the judgment entered in this case is void for lack
of jurisdiction, we must decide an appropriate disposition. The decision
whether to enter judgment for the amount of the forfeited bail bond depends
on whether Erdman, Ranger, or Always Affordable can show cause why
judgment should not be entered. Id. § 811.6(1). That decision is within the
district court’s exercise of discretion. 1 Costello, 489 N.W.2d at 738; Shell,
242 Iowa at 264, 45 N.W.2d at 854. Because we have decided to vacate the
judgment on the bond, and we do not expect the issue to recur on remand,
we do not reach the question of whether the district court erred in denying
Always Affordable and Ranger the opportunity to participate in the
August 11 hearing through their non-lawyer agent, Ellis. The judgment is
vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except Appel, J., who takes no part.
1 We express no opinion on the question of whether Erdman, Ranger, or Always
Affordable will be able to show cause why judgment should not be entered in the amount of
the forfeited bond. See State v. Shell, 242 Iowa 260, 264, 45 N.W.2d 851, 854 (1951); State
v. Dodd, 346 N.W.2d 42, 42 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).