Cynthia Martinek Vs. Belmond-klemme Community School District ( 2009 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 07–0729
Filed February 6, 2009
CYNTHIA MARTINEK,
Appellee,
vs.
BELMOND-KLEMME COMMUNITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wright County, Paul W.
Riffel, Judge.
A school district seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
affirming the judgment of the district court reversing the school district’s
decision to terminate an administrator’s contract. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT DECISION
AFFIRMED.
Brian L. Gruhn of Gruhn Law Firm, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Charles Gribble of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Cook,
Parrish, Gentry, & Fisher, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellee.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
A school district seeks further review of a court of appeals decision
affirming the judgment of the district court reversing the school district’s
decision to terminate an administrator’s contract. We affirm the
judgment of the district court because neither Iowa Code section 279.24
(2005) nor the contract between the district and the administrator
authorize termination in the middle of the contract term. Although the
court of appeals also affirmed the district court, we vacate the court of
appeals’ decision because it affirmed the district court on the basis of a
statute not relied upon by the school district when it attempted to
terminate the administrator.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In 1993 Dr. Cynthia Martinek took a job as an elementary school
principal at Belmond-Klemme. The previous superintendent created
Martinek’s most current contract, which the parties entered into on
July 21, 2005. This contract stated that Martinek would serve as the
elementary school principal “for a two (2) year period commencing with
the 2005–2006 school year, consisting of ten and one-half calendar
months (220 days), commencing July 26, 2005 for the 2005–2006 school
year.”
In May 2006 before the end of the first year of the contract, the
school district notified Martinek that it was considering termination of
her contract “effective at the end of the current school year.” They listed
four reasons for termination: (1) declining enrollment, (2) budgetary
restrictions and problems, (3) reduction of position(s), and (4)
realignment of school organization.
Increasingly, the Belmond-Klemme school district faced serious
financial difficulties due to considerable enrollment decreases. Within a
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six-year span, the school district lost roughly 200 students. Belmond-
Klemme received less money from the state due to the low enrollment.
The superintendent, who had only been with the district since August of
2005, sought to cut $500,000 from the school’s budget. That
superintendent also recommended Martinek’s termination, intending to
fill the role himself. He planned to serve dual roles as superintendent
and as the elementary school principal.
Martinek contested her proposed termination and a hearing was
held before an administrative law judge. The administrative law judge
rendered a proposed decision that Martinek should not be dismissed.
The school district voted to review the administrative law judge’s
proposed decision, and it held a private hearing. On July 27, 2006, the
district decided to terminate Martinek’s contract under Iowa Code section
279.24. A majority of the school board concluded there was a
preponderance of evidence to support termination, and terminated the
contract effective June 30, 2006.
After receiving notice of her termination, Martinek appealed the
school district’s decision to the district court. The district court
disagreed with the school district’s decision. The court found the district
did not have statutory or contractual grounds to terminate Martinek’s
contract. The school district appealed. We transferred the case to the
court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the
district court. The school district petitioned for further review, which we
granted.
II. Issues.
The school district raises two issues on appeal: first, whether the
district had the authority to terminate Martinek’s contract under Iowa
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Code section 279.24; and second, whether the terms of her contract
allowed for her dismissal.
III. Scope of Review.
The Iowa Code provides specific guidelines to follow when
reviewing a school board’s decision to terminate an administrator’s
contract. The Code states:
The court may affirm the school board’s action. The
court shall reverse, modify, or grant any other appropriate
relief from the school board’s action, equitable or legal, and
including declaratory relief, if substantial rights of the
administrator have been prejudiced because the school
board’s action is any of the following:
a. In violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions.
b. In excess of the statutory authority of the school
board.
c. In violation of school board policy or rule.
d. Made upon unlawful procedure.
e. Affected by other error of law.
f. Unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence in
the record made before the school board when that record is
reviewed as a whole.
g. Unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, or
characterized by an abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Iowa Code § 279.24(6).
To decide this case, we must determine whether section 279.24
gives the school district authority to terminate Martinek’s contract when
it did. Therefore, we must construe section 279.24. Our review of
questions of statutory construction is for correction of errors at law.
Estate of Ryan v. Heritage Trails Assocs., Inc., 745 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa
2008).
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IV. Analysis.
A. Statutory Issue. When confronted with the task of statutory
construction, we must determine legislative intent. Auen v. Alcoholic
Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004). Legislative intent is
determined from the words chosen by the legislature, not by what it
should or might have said. State v. Dohlman, 725 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa
2006). When the legislature fails to include a statutory definition of a
word or there is not an established meaning in the law of a word, words
in the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by
considering the context within which they are used. Auen, 679 N.W.2d
at 590. We may not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of
a statute under the guise of construction. Id.
The relevant Code provisions of section 279.24, the statute upon
which the school district relied, provide:
An administrator’s contract shall remain in force and
effect for the period stated in the contract. The contract
shall be automatically continued in force and effect for
additional one-year periods beyond the end of its original
term, except and until the contract is modified or terminated
by mutual agreement of the board of directors and the
administrator, or until terminated as provided by this
section.
Iowa Code § 279.24(1).
The school board may, by majority vote of the
membership of the school board, cause the contract of an
administrator to be terminated. If the school board
determines that it should consider the termination of a
nonprobationary administrator’s contract, the following
procedure shall apply:
a. On or before May 15, the administrator shall be
notified in writing by a letter personally delivered or mailed
by certified mail that the school board has voted to consider
termination of the contract. The notification shall be
complete when received by the administrator.
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b. The notice shall state the specific reasons to be
used by the school board for considering termination which
for all administrators except superintendents shall be for
just cause.
Id. § 279.24(5)(a)–(b).
The plain and unambiguous language of section 279.24(1) requires
that “[a]n administrator’s contract shall remain in force and effect for the
period stated in the contract.” Id. § 279.24(1) (emphasis added). Section
279.24(1) also plainly and unambiguously states that at the end of the
term of the contract, by operation of law the contract remains in effect for
successive one-year terms, until by mutual agreement the parties modify
or terminate the contract. Id. Finally, section 279.24(1) is clear that the
school district has an option of unilaterally terminating the contract at
the end of its original term or at the end of a successive one-year term as
long as the school district follows the statutory procedures. Martin v.
Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist., 518 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Iowa 1994). Any
unilateral termination requires the school district to terminate for just
cause. Iowa Code § 279.24(5)(b).
We have held just cause to terminate an administrator as used by
the legislature in section 279.24 “include[s] legitimate reasons relating to
the district’s personnel and budgetary requirements.” Briggs v. Bd. of
Dirs. of Hinton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 282 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Iowa 1979).
Additionally, we have held just cause to terminate an administrator as
used by the legislature in section 279.24 also includes “faults
attributable to the administrator or teacher.” Id. The latter
characterization of just cause incorporates the definition of “good cause”
as used in the statute prior to the 1977 and 1979 amendments changing
the grounds for a teacher’s termination from “good cause” to “just cause.”
Id. “Good cause” or “faults attributable to the administrator or teacher”
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meant “ ‘incompetency, inattention to duty, (or) partiality.’ ” Id. (quoting
Hartman v. Merged Area VI Cmty. Coll., 270 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa
1978)).
Applying these principles to Martinek’s termination, we first note
that at the school board stage and the appellate stage of the proceedings
the school district only argued it had the right to terminate Martinek
under section 279.24 of the Code. The term of Martinek’s contract was
for two years, a length of term authorized by the legislature. See Iowa
Code § 279.23(1)(a) (authorizing school districts to enter into contracts
with non-superintendent administrators for a maximum period of two
years). Although the district’s financial situation was just cause to
terminate Martinek’s contract, the district had no authority under
section 279.24 to terminate the contract before the end of the two-year
term. Martin, 518 N.W.2d at 383.
Iowa Code section 279.25 allows the district to discharge an
administrator for just cause at any time during the contract year. Iowa
Code § 279.25. At no time did the district argue that “legitimate reasons
relating to the district’s personnel and budgetary requirements”
constitutes just cause under section 279.25. Briggs, 282 N.W.2d at 742.
While we have held just cause in section 279.25 “includes professional
incompetence and other faults attributable to the employee,” we have
never limited the meaning of “just cause” in section 279.25 to exclude
“legitimate reasons relating to the district’s personnel and budgetary
requirements.” Wedergren v. Bd. of Dirs., 307 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Iowa 1981)
(emphasis added); Briggs, 282 N.W.2d at 742. Because the school
district has not raised nor have the parties briefed the applicability of
section 279.25 to Martinek’s termination, we need not reach its
applicability to the facts of this case.
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The court of appeals affirmed the district court on the grounds that
Iowa Code section 279.25 could not be used to support Martinek’s
termination. Because the school district did not argue that it could
terminate the contract under section 279.25 and we have left that
question open for another day, we must vacate the decision of the court
of appeals, even though we are affirming the district court on the
statutory issue.
B. Contractual Issues. The contract entered into by Martinek
and the district contained the following paragraphs regarding
termination:
IT IS AGREED that throughout the terms of this contract the
Principal shall be subject to discharge or demotion for good
and just causes, provided however that the Board does not
arbitrarily or capriciously call for his/her dismissal or
demotion. The Principal shall have the right to service of
written charges, notice of hearing, and be afforded a private
and fair hearing before the Board.
IT IS FURTHER AGREED that the Principal shall have the
right of renewal prior to the end of each contract year for
additional years, except that the renewal of this contract
beyond the first year is contingent upon any realignment of
the type of school organization.
The legislature has authorized school districts to include such terms in
its contracts. See Iowa Code § 279.23(1)(e) (stating a contract may
include “[s]uch other matters as may be agreed upon”). The district
argues each paragraph gave them the right to terminate Martinek’s
contract prior to the expiration of its term.
1. Good-and-just-causes paragraph. The former superintendent of
the school district drafted the contract at issue. He was not called to
testify at the hearing. At the hearing, Martinek testified she read the
contract prior to signing it and understood that the phrase “good and
just causes” meant both good and just causes as required by law. The
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present superintendent of the school district testified at the hearing. His
position was that the financial situation of the school district constituted
“good and just causes” to terminate the contract.
On appeal, the school district only argues that notwithstanding the
contractual language, it is not required to show good cause because
neither Iowa Code section 279.24 nor section 279.25 uses the term “good
cause.”1 It makes this claim arguing its contract cannot include a term
not authorized by the statute.
The flaw with this argument is that we have already determined
that just cause as contemplated in section 279.24 includes the concept
of good cause as a subset of just cause. Briggs, 282 N.W.2d at 742.
Furthermore, we have previously held that just cause under section
279.25 also includes good cause. Wedergren, 307 N.W.2d at 20. Thus,
because good cause is included in sections 279.24 and 279.25 we cannot
write the term “good cause” out of the contract.
2. Realignment paragraph. The school district argues the
realignment paragraph allows the district to terminate Martinek’s
contract mid-term because the superintendent’s new position as
superintendent and elementary school principal for budget constraints is
a realignment as envisioned by the paragraph. We disagree.
1The school district conceded the contractual provision stating “the Principal
shall be subject to discharge or demotion for good and just causes” required the district
to prove both a good cause and a just cause to support the principal’s discharge.
(Emphasis added.) Therefore, we do not consider whether this contractual provision
should be interpreted using the “familiar rule of construction that the word ‘and’ is
sometimes construed as a disjunctive such as ‘or.’ ” Koethe v. Johnson, 328 N.W.2d
293, 299 (Iowa 1982) (construing statute); accord In re Detention of Altman, 723 N.W.2d
181, 187 (Iowa 2006).
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For this provision to apply a “realignment of the type of school
organization” must occur. The district’s definition of “the type of school
organization” is contained in the school’s policy manual. It provides:
The schools shall be organized into levels of instruction as
follows:
1. Elementary schools: the elementary school will consist of
Kindergarten and grades 1 through 6.
2. Junior-Senior High School: The junior-senior high school
shall consist of grades 7 through 12.
The manual clearly defines the “types of school organization” as
the levels of instruction offered by the district at the elementary schools
and those offered at the junior-senior high school. Therefore, to have a
realignment of the type of school organization, the levels of instruction in
the schools would have to change. Staff changes have nothing to do with
the types of school organization.
The superintendent claims despite the depiction in the policy
manual, that the policy manual description is obsolete. Even if the
policy manual description is obsolete, it was in effect at the time of
Martinek’s termination. Without a change in the levels of instruction in
the schools in the district, the provision making the renewal of
Martinek’s contract beyond the first year contingent upon any
realignment of the type of school organization is inapplicable to her
termination.
V. Disposition.
Because the school district did not have the authority under Iowa
Code section 279.24 or the contract to terminate Martinek before she
completed her two-year term under the contract, we affirm the judgment
of the district court. However, we must vacate the decision of the court
of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court, for the reason
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that the court of appeals used its interpretation of Iowa Code section
279.25 to affirm the district court’s judgment.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT DECISION AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.