Capital Promotions, L.l.c. Vs. Don King Productions, Inc. ( 2008 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 97 / 07–0508
Filed September 26, 2008
CAPITAL PROMOTIONS, L.L.C.,
Appellant,
vs.
DON KING PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
Appellee,
and
DON KING and BILLY BAXTER,
Defendants.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D.
Novak, Judge.
Further review of court of appeals’ decision affirming summary
judgment for appellee based on lack of personal jurisdiction. DECISION
OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT
AFFIRMED.
Kenneth R. Munro of Munro Law Office, P.C., Des Moines, and
Joseph G. Bertogli, Des Moines, for appellant.
2
Mariclare Thinnes Culver of Duncan Green Brown & Langeness
PC, Des Moines, and Gerald G. Saltarelli and James A. Morsch of Butler
Rubin Saltarelli & Boyd LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for appellee.
3
TERNUS, Chief Justice.
The appellant, Capital Promotions, L.L.C., sued the appellee, Don
King Productions, Inc., for intentional interference with Capital’s
contractual relationship with boxer Tye Fields. The district court granted
King Productions’ motion for summary judgment, ruling Iowa courts did
not have personal jurisdiction over King Productions. The court of
appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of King Productions, and
we granted Capital’s application for further review. After reviewing the
record and considering the applicable legal principles, we agree with the
district court and the court of appeals that King Productions did not have
sufficient contacts with this state to support personal jurisdiction in
Iowa. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the
judgment of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Capital Promotions, L.L.C. is an Iowa limited liability company with
its principal place of business in Iowa. In 2000, it entered into a
promotional rights agreement with boxer Tye Fields. Fields, whose
hometown is Des Moines, Iowa, resided in Missouri when the contract
was signed. By the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, he
resided in Nevada. Billy Baxter became Fields’ manager sometime in
2003. Baxter also resided in Nevada.
Under the promotional rights agreement between Capital and
Fields, Capital had the exclusive right to promote Fields’ professional
boxing contests, including staging and selling tickets for such contests
and all marketing and merchandizing rights. By its terms, this
agreement was to be governed by the law of Iowa and was to terminate
on February 4, 2005. During the term of the contract, Capital arranged
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numerous fights for Fields. Several bouts were in Iowa, but the majority
of Fields’ fights were in other states.
Don King Productions, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Florida. Like Capital, King Productions is
in the business of promoting boxing matches. King Productions has
never promoted a fight in Iowa. It has never owned or rented property in
Iowa, has never had a bank account in Iowa, has never had an employee
located in Iowa, and has never had a registered agent in Iowa.
In January 2004, King Productions employee Eric Botcher called
Capital’s Des Moines office and spoke with Capital employee Bill McGee.
Botcher told McGee that King Productions was interested in taking over
the promotional rights for Fields. McGee advised Botcher that Capital
was Fields’ promoter and had no interest in relinquishing its rights.
A few months later, in the spring of 2004, Bobby Goodman,
another King Productions employee, called Capital in Des Moines and
spoke with Capital’s president, Paul Scieszinski. The purpose of this call
was to offer Fields an International Boxing Federation (IBF) world
heavyweight title fight with a King Productions fighter, Chris Byrd, who
was the reigning IBF heavyweight champion. One of the terms of the
proposed fight was that, if Fields beat Byrd, King Productions would be
allowed to assume Fields’ promotional rights. Scieszinski turned down
the offer and advised Goodman that Capital was not interested in
relinquishing its promotional rights to Fields.
In the summer of 2004, Goodman called Capital to negotiate a
fight between another King Productions fighter, Henry Akiwande, and
Fields. This conversation was prompted by the fact Fields had won the
United States Boxing Association (USBA) world heavyweight title in
September 2003. After this win, in December 2003, the chair of the
5
IBF/USBA office had written to Scieszinski, with a copy to Goodman,
stating Fields’ mandatory defense of his title was due by September 2,
2004, and suggesting Akiwande was the leading available contender.
The Akiwande/Fields bout was not scheduled, however, because Fields
had suffered an injury in late spring 2004 and was unable to fight.
There was no discussion of Capital’s promotional rights in Fields during
this phone conversation.
In the fall of 2004, Scieszinski spoke with Don King personally via
telephone. Scieszinski informed King that Capital had a promotional
rights contract with Fields and was not interested in sharing its rights
with King or King Productions. Capital does not contend this call was
initiated by King.
In January 2005, King Productions employee Botcher placed a
telephone call to a Capital fighter, Josh Gutcher, who was in Iowa at the
time. Botcher offered Gutcher a fight through King Productions and
mentioned King Productions was involved in negotiations for a February
2005 fight with another Capital fighter, Tye Fields. Gutcher rejected the
offer, telling Botcher he was a Capital fighter, as was Fields, and Botcher
would have to speak to Scieszinski regarding any fights.
After Gutcher talked to Botcher, Gutcher called Scieszinski and
told Scieszinski of the conversation. Scieszinski then called King
Productions employee Goodman and informed Goodman that Capital was
the exclusive promoter for Fields and Gutcher and that any attempts to
offer either man a fight would be viewed as an interference with Capital’s
promotional rights agreements with those fighters.
In February 2005, Scieszinski arranged a fight between Fields and
Vaughan Bean to take place on February 25, 2005, in Kansas City. The
proposed fight was canceled, however, after King Productions and
6
Baxter, Fields’ manager, arranged a February 5, 2005 boxing bout
between Fields and Ray Luncsford in St. Louis. The record shows Baxter
had approached Don King in Las Vegas, Nevada, with a request to put
Fields on the undercard of the Spinks v. Judah II event being promoted
by King Productions and scheduled to take place in St. Louis on
February 5, 2005. King agreed to do so, and on February 3, 2005, in St.
Louis, Missouri, Fields signed a bout agreement for the February 5 fight.
In that agreement, he represented that he was not under contract with
any other promoter. There is no evidence in the record showing that any
communication regarding this bout agreement occurred in the state of
Iowa.
On April 7, 2006, Capital filed this action against King
Productions, Don King, and Baxter, alleging they intentionally interfered
with its contractual relationship with Fields. Subsequently, King
Productions filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting the Iowa
district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it and that an exercise of
jurisdiction by the Iowa court would violate due process. Capital
resisted. After a hearing, the district court granted King Productions’
motion for summary judgment.
Capital filed this appeal. As noted earlier, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court’s ruling. We then granted Capital’s application
for further review.
II. Scope of Review.
King Productions raised the issue of personal jurisdiction in a
motion for summary judgment, rather than by a motion to dismiss. The
parties submitted this issue to the district court and on appeal under the
principles governing motions for summary judgment, including the rule
that the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
7
party, Capital. See Kelly v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 641
(Iowa 2000).
Ordinarily, however, issues of personal jurisdiction are raised in a
motion to dismiss, and the district court would make the necessary
factual findings to determine whether the court had personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Fidata Trust Co. N.Y., 452
N.W.2d 411, 413 (Iowa 1990) (stating “the hearing and disposition of a
motion involving personal jurisdiction is a special proceeding requiring
[the district court] to find facts and draw conclusions of law in its
decision”). See generally Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d
1187, 1192–93 (Colo. 2005) (discussing trial court procedure for
resolving issues of personal jurisdiction). Accordingly, those findings
would be binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.
Hodges v. Hodges, 572 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa 1997); Percival v. Bankers
Trust Co., 450 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Iowa 1990).
Due to the manner in which the jurisdictional issue was raised in
this case, the district court made no factual findings. Nonetheless, our
review of the record reveals no genuine dispute with respect to the
relevant facts. Therefore, we proceed to decide the legal issue: whether
the undisputed facts allow personal jurisdiction over King Productions.
We are not bound by the district court’s application of legal principles in
deciding whether personal jurisdiction is permissible. Hammond v. Fla.
Asset Fin. Corp., 695 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2005).
III. Discussion.
A. Governing Principles. “The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution limits the power of the
state to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to a
lawsuit.” Ross v. First Sav. Bank, 675 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Iowa 2004).
8
Iowa’s jurisdictional rule provides: “Every corporation, individual,
personal representative, partnership or association that shall have the
necessary minimum contact with the state of Iowa shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state. . . .” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.306. This
rule authorizes the widest jurisdictional parameters allowed by the Due
Process Clause. Hammond, 695 N.W.2d at 5.
Before a defendant can be made to defend a lawsuit in a foreign
jurisdiction, his or her contacts with the forum state must be such that
the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297,
100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 (1980). “The minimum
contacts must show ‘a sufficient connection between the defendant and
the forum state so as to make it fair’ and reasonable to require the
defendant to come to the state and defend the action.” Ross, 675 N.W.2d
at 815 (quoting Hodges, 572 N.W.2d at 551).
A sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum state
can exist as a general matter or merely with respect to the specific cause
of action. These two grounds for personal jurisdiction are known as
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction:
“Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of
action arising from or related to a defendant’s actions within
the forum state,” while “[g]eneral jurisdiction . . . refers to
the power of a state to adjudicate any cause of action
involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the
cause of action arose.”
Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Sondergard v. Miles, Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir. 1993)).
Capital contends Iowa courts have specific jurisdiction over King
Productions for purposes of its intentional-interference-with-contractual-
relationship claim.
9
Many of our cases rely on a five-factor test for the exercise of
specific jurisdiction, including the quantity of the defendant’s contacts
with the forum state, the nature and quality of those contacts, the source
of those contacts and their connection to the cause of action, the interest
of the forum state, and the convenience of the parties. See, e.g.,
Hammond, 695 N.W.2d at 5; Cascade Lumber Co. v. Edward Rose Bldg.
Co., 596 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 1999); Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785,
788 (Iowa 1980). It appears the five-factor test first appeared in Iowa in
Douglas Machine & Engineering Co. v. Hyflow Blanking Press Corp., 229
N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1975), and was borrowed from the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals. See Douglas Mach., 229 N.W.2d at 789 (stating “the
Eighth Circuit gleaned from the above cases five factors to be considered
in determining whether ‘fair play and substantial justice’ requirements
are satisfied” (citing Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th
Cir. 1965))). In Aftanase, the Eighth Circuit culled these factors from five
United States Supreme Court cases decided between 1945 and 1958.
343 F.2d at 195–96. Obviously, the parameters of specific jurisdiction
have continued to evolve since 1958. Although these five factors retain
their relevancy, they no longer provide a useful analytical framework for
determining personal jurisdiction under current case law.
More recently, in discussing the contact that will subject a
defendant to the jurisdiction of a state’s courts, the United States
Supreme Court has stated two requirements that must be shown by the
plaintiff:
Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction
over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit
there, [due process] is satisfied if the defendant has
“purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum
and the litigation results from alleged injuries that “arise out
of or relate to” those activities.
10
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73, 105 S. Ct. 2174,
2182, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 540–41 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 79 L. Ed. 2d
790, 797 (1984) (first quoted material); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.
Ed. 2d 404, 411 (1984) (second quoted material)); accord Archangel
Diamond Corp., 123 P.3d at 1194; see also Hammond, 695 N.W.2d at 6(stating “[t]here may be no specific jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant absent a claim arising from that defendant’s activities in this
state”).
Once the plaintiff has established the required minimum contacts,
the court must “determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King
Corp., 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S. Ct. at 2184, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 543 (quoting
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S. Ct. 154, 160, 90
L. Ed. 95, 104 (1945)). In making this determination, a court may
consider
“the burden on the defendant,” “the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies,” and the “shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”
Id. at 477, 105 S. Ct. at 2184, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 543 (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S. Ct. at 564, 62 L. Ed. 2d at
498). “These considerations sometimes serve to establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum
contacts than would otherwise be required.” Id. On the other hand,
“jurisdictional rules may not be employed in such a way as to make
litigation ‘so gravely difficult and inconvenient’ that a party unfairly is at
11
a ‘severe disadvantage’ in comparison to his opponent.” Id. at 478, 105
S. Ct. at 2185, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 544 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1917, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513, 525
(1972) (first quoted material); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 201, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223, 226 (1957) (second quoted
material)).
B. Sufficiency of King Productions’ Contacts with Iowa. In
determining whether King Productions had sufficient minimum contacts
with Iowa to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the Iowa
courts, we look for any purposeful conduct by King Productions directed
to Iowa. King Productions initiated four contacts with Iowa: (1) the
January 2004 phone call from Botcher to McGee in which Botcher
indicated King Productions’ interest in Fields’ promotional rights; (2) the
spring 2004 phone call from Goodman to Scieszinski in which Goodman
offered Capital a fight for Fields with the condition that, if Fields won,
King Productions would assume Fields’ promotional rights; (3) the
summer 2004 phone call from Goodman to Scieszinski in which
Goodman attempted to negotiate a fight between Fields and King
Productions fighter Akiwande; and (4) the January 2005 phone call from
Botcher to Capital fighter Gutcher in which Botcher offered Gutcher a
fight through King Productions.1 There was no discussion of Fields’
promotional rights in the summer 2004 Goodman/Scieszinski phone
conversation, so it has no connection to Capital’s cause of action. The
remaining three contacts relate to Capital’s cause of action insofar as
they could be used as evidence to establish King Productions’ knowledge
1We do not consider the two phone calls to King Productions initiated by the
plaintiff, as only the defendant’s purposeful forum-state contacts matter. Archangel
Diamond Corp., 123 P.3d at 1194; Tabor, Chhabra & Gibbs, P.A. v. Med. Legal
Evaluations, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 762, 772 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
12
that Capital held the promotional rights to Fields at the time of those
phone calls. These calls did not, however, constitute the interference of
which Capital complains in this lawsuit. Consequently, although these
calls have some relevancy to Capital’s cause of action, we cannot say that
Capital’s injuries arose out of or are related to those contacts so as to
support specific jurisdiction over King Productions. See IMO Indus., Inc.
v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 267–68 (3d Cir. 1998) (“a few calls or letters
into the forum may be of only marginal import if the dispute is focused
outside the forum”); Far W. Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1076
(10th Cir. 1995) (holding, in case claiming breach of contract and
intentional interference with contractual relationships, defendant’s fax to
plaintiff in forum state soliciting business relationship was too remote to
establish specific jurisdiction because it occurred three years before final
phase of negotiations leading to contract).
Capital contends that, even if King Productions’ telephone contacts
with the state of Iowa are not sufficient alone to support personal
jurisdiction, those contacts combined with the injuries sustained by
Capital in Iowa do support Iowa’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over
King Productions. Capital relies on the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d
804 (1984). In Calder, Shirley Jones brought suit in California against
the National Enquirer, its distributor, its editor, and a National Enquirer
reporter who wrote an allegedly libelous article concerning the plaintiff.
465 U.S. at 784–86, 104 S. Ct. at 1484–85, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 809–10. The
editor and reporter, who were residents of Florida and who had worked
on the article in Florida, challenged the California court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction over them. Id. at 785–86, 104 S. Ct. at 1485, 79
L. Ed. 2d at 809–10. The editor had been in California only twice, both
13
times for purposes unrelated to the article. Id. at 786, 104 S. Ct. at
1485, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 810. The reporter traveled to California frequently,
but the only contacts related to this article were phone calls to sources in
California for the information contained in the article and to the
plaintiff’s husband seeking comment on the article. Id. at 785–86, 104
S. Ct. at 1485, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 809–10.
In determining the individual defendants had sufficient minimum
contacts with California to support personal jurisdiction over them, the
Court relied on the following facts:
Here, the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the
defendants out of which the suit arises.
The allegedly libelous story concerned the California
activities of a California resident. It impugned the
professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was
centered in California. The article was drawn from California
sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of [the
plaintiff’s] emotional distress and the injury to her
professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum,
California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm
suffered.
Id. at 788–89, 104 S. Ct. at 1486, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 811–12. The court
concluded jurisdiction over the defendants was “proper in California
based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” Id. at 789,
104 S. Ct. at 1486–87, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 812 (citing World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297–98, 100 S. Ct. at 567–68, 62 L. Ed 2d
at 501–02).
Calder did not “carve out a special intentional torts exception to
the traditional specific jurisdiction analysis.” IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d
at 265; accord Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 535 (Minn. 2002). The
Calder “effects” test, as it has come to be known, “is but one facet of the
ordinary minimum contacts analysis, to be considered as part of the full
range of the defendant’s contacts within the forum.” Revell v. Lidov, 317
14
F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, a majority of courts have
interpreted Calder to require “more than a finding that the harm caused
by the defendant’s intentional tort is primarily felt within the forum.”
IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 265; accord Revell, 317 F.3d at 473 (stating
“the plaintiff’s residence in the forum, and suffering of harm there, will
not alone support jurisdiction under Calder”); Far W. Capital, Inc., 46
F.3d at 1079 (stating “the mere allegation that an out-of-state defendant
has tortiously interfered with contractual rights [and] allegedly injured a
forum resident does not necessarily establish . . . the constitutionally
required minimum contacts”); Percival v. Bankers Trust Co., 494 N.W.2d
658, 659–60 (Iowa 1993) (stating minimum-contacts requirement is “not
satisfied from a mere ‘effect’ felt by a plaintiff within his or her state of
residence”); Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 533 (“[C]ourts have consistently
refused to find jurisdiction based on Calder merely because the plaintiff
was located in the forum state and therefore felt the effects of the alleged
intentional tortious conduct there.”). As one court has noted, basing
jurisdiction solely on the fact the plaintiff felt harm in the forum
jurisdiction would make jurisdiction “depend on a plaintiff’s decision
about where to establish residence,” rather than “grounding jurisdiction
on a defendant’s decision to ‘purposely avail[] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum [s]tate,’ or on a defendant’s
activities ‘expressly aimed’ at the forum state.” ESAB Group, Inc. v.
Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625–26 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283,
1298 (1958) (first quoted material); Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S. Ct. at
1487, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 812 (second quoted material)).
Thus, even under the Calder effects test, “a court must undertake
a particularized inquiry as to the extent to which the defendant has
15
purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum’s laws.” Far W.
Capital, Inc., 46 F.3d at 1079. A defendant will be found to have met this
standard if the plaintiff shows
(1) the defendant’s acts were intentional; (2) these actions
were uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3)
the brunt of the harm was suffered in the forum state, and
the defendant knew the harm was likely to be suffered there.
Roquette Am., Inc. v. Gerber, 651 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002);
accord IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 265–66; Noonan v. Winston Co., 135
F.3d 85, 90 (1st Cir. 1998); Principal Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Big Fin. & Ins.
Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1060 (S.D. Iowa 2006).
Although the present case alleges an intentional tort and the
plaintiff claims to have suffered economic harm in Iowa, we do not think
the plaintiff has established that King Productions expressly aimed its
tortious activities at Iowa. The defendant is alleged to have interfered
with a contract between an Iowa company, Capital, and a Missouri
resident, Fields. But the acts alleged to constitute the interference were
directed toward Fields, who was by then a resident of Nevada, and
Baxter, his Nevada manager. These allegedly tortious acts took place in
Nevada and Missouri and were centered on a fight to take place in
Missouri. Thus, Iowa was not the focal point of the alleged tort. See
ESAB, Inc., 126 F.3d at 625 (stating the defendant’s actions “must be
directed at the forum state in more than a random, fortuitous, or
attenuated way”); Wolk v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 491, 506
(E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding no personal jurisdiction when nonresident
defendants “did not aim their conduct at [the forum state and the forum
state] was not the focal point of the alleged tortious interference with
prospective contracts”); see also Percival, 494 N.W.2d at 659–60 (stating
“[t]he minimum contacts requirements demand conduct having to do
16
with the state itself”). Capital’s location in Iowa was unrelated to King
Productions’ allegedly tortious conduct, and consequently, Iowa played a
fortuitous role in the alleged interference with Capital’s contractual
rights. See Tabor, Chhabra & Gibbs, P.A. v. Med. Legal Evaluations, Inc.,
237 S.W.3d 762, 775–76 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (holding no specific
jurisdiction when defendant’s acts of tortious interference occurred
outside forum state and forum state was not the focal point of those
acts).
The present case is distinguishable from a similar case decided by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in which the court found specific
jurisdiction of a nonresident defendant in a suit alleging intentional
interference with a contract. See Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 260
(3d Cir. 2001). The plaintiff in Remick was a Pennsylvania attorney who
sued his former client, Angel Manfredy, who was a professional boxer,
and Manfredy’s Illinois agent. Id. at 252. The plaintiff had contracted
with Manfredy to represent Manfredy “in the procurement and
negotiation of high profile and lucrative fights.” Id. at 252–53. Manfredy
later terminated the contract, claiming the plaintiff had not delivered on
his contractual promises. Id. at 253. In the subsequent lawsuit, the
plaintiff claimed Manfredy’s agent, the defendant, had intentionally
interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to perform his contractual obligations
to Manfredy, causing Manfredy to terminate the contract. Id. at 260.
The exact nature of the interference was not clear, although it included
the dissemination of defamatory information regarding the plaintiff’s
skills and ability. Id. The court of appeals concluded the defendant’s
alleged tortious conduct was expressly aimed at the plaintiff in
Pennsylvania, noting the majority of the plaintiff’s services under the
contract were rendered out of his Philadelphia office. Id. The court
17
distinguished its prior decision in IMO Industries, Inc., noting the object
of the interference in that case was not the resident plaintiff, but the
other party to the contract, a French company. Id.The case before us is also distinguishable from the Remick case. In
Remick, the contractual interference was conduct by the defendant that
made it difficult for the resident plaintiff to render his services in the
forum state. In comparison, the nature of the alleged interference here is
the negotiation and scheduling of a Missouri fight for Fields, activity that
did not involve or focus on Capital or Iowa. Consequently, we cannot
say, as did the court of appeals in Remick, that the defendant expressly
aimed his tortious activity at the forum state. See also Hicklin Eng’g, Inc.
v. Aidco, Inc., 959 F.2d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding no jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendant alleged to have intentionally interfered with
Iowa plaintiff’s prospective business advantage and contractual relations
by sending allegedly defamatory correspondence to the plaintiff’s
customers, noting none of the correspondence was published in Iowa
and it did not appear that the defendant’s actions “were targeted to have
an effect in Iowa”); Keystone Publishers Serv., Inc. v. Ross, 747 F.2d
1233, 1234 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding defendants did not have sufficient
minimum contacts with Iowa when their alleged interference with the
resident plaintiff’s contractual relations occurred outside Iowa,
notwithstanding that the defendants’ actions caused injury in Iowa);
Drayton Enters., L.L.C. v. Dunker, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183–85
(D.N.D. 2001) (holding Oklahoma defendant’s alleged out-of-state
interference with plaintiff’s confidentiality contract with former employee
did not support personal jurisdiction over defendant in North Dakota,
even though contract was entered into in North Dakota and injury was
sustained in North Dakota); cf. Noonan, 135 F.3d at 91 (holding no
18
specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendant who was alleged to have
misappropriated plaintiff’s image when defendant’s intentional acts were
not directed toward forum state).
IV. Conclusion.
Viewing the record made below most favorably to the plaintiff, we
conclude the defendant did not have the required minimum contacts
with Iowa to support personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this
state. The district court did not err in granting King Productions’ motion
for summary judgment, dismissing it from this lawsuit.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF
DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Appel and Baker, JJ., who take no part.