State Of Iowa Vs. James Howard Bentley ( 2007 )


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  •                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 75 / 06-1000
    Filed September 28, 2007
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    JAMES HOWARD BENTLEY,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Benton County and Linn
    County, Denver D. Dillard, Judge.
    State appeals from the district court’s pre-trial ruling that admission
    of a ten-year-old child’s videotaped statements at trial would violate the
    defendant’s right to confront a witness against him under the Sixth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution. AFFIRMED.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney
    General, David C. Thompson, Benton County Attorney, Harold Denton, Linn
    County Attorney, and Nicholas Maybanks, Assistant Linn County Attorney,
    for appellant.
    Thomas J. O’Flaherty of O’Flaherty Law Firm, North Liberty, for
    appellee.
    Alice A. Phillips of American Prosecutors Research Institute,
    Alexandria, Virginia, for amicus curiae.
    2
    HECHT, Justice.
    The issue presented in this interlocutory appeal is whether the
    videotaped statements of J.G., a ten-year-old child, are admissible under
    the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution at James
    Bentley’s trial on sexual abuse charges.             Because we conclude J.G.’s
    statements are testimonial, J.G. is unavailable to testify at trial, and
    Bentley had no opportunity for cross-examination, we affirm the district
    court’s ruling that the videotaped statements are inadmissible under the
    Confrontation Clause.
    I.     Factual Background.
    On November 16, 2004, J.G. was interviewed by Roseanne Matuszek,
    a counselor at St. Luke’s Child Protection Center (CPC). 1 The interview was
    arranged by Officer Ann Deutmeyer, an investigator employed by the Cedar
    Rapids Police Department, and Pam Holtz, a representative of the Iowa
    Department of Human Services (DHS).                Officer Deutmeyer and Holtz
    watched and listened to the interview through an “observation window.”
    During the videotaped interview, J.G. made numerous statements alleging
    James Bentley sexually abused her. Bentley’s brother murdered J.G. on or
    around March 24, 2005. Other facts relevant to the disposition of this
    appeal will be presented below in our analysis of the legal issue presented.
    II.    Procedural Background.
    Two days after J.G.’s interview at the CPC, the Linn County Attorney
    charged Bentley with the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree, in
    violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1 and 709.3 (2003). Soon afterward, the
    Benton County Attorney filed similar charges against Bentley.
    1Matuszek  holds a Master’s Degree in counseling and has interviewed nearly 3,000
    children during her fourteen years of service at the CPC.
    3
    Bentley filed in both cases a motion for a preliminary determination of
    the admissibility of J.G.’s videotaped interview under the Confrontation
    Clause of the United States Constitution.             The district court ruled
    admission of the videotape would not violate the Confrontation Clause.
    After we denied Bentley’s application for review of that ruling, he filed a
    motion in limine seeking to prevent the videotape’s admission at trial.
    After a hearing on the motion in limine, the district court held
    admission of the videotape would violate Bentley’s constitutional right to
    confront a witness against him. 2           The State filed an application for
    discretionary review, which we granted.          We stayed the district court
    proceedings pending resolution of this matter.
    III.   Standard of Review.
    We review de novo claims involving the Confrontation Clause. State v.
    Hallum, 
    606 N.W.2d 351
    , 354 (Iowa 2000).
    IV.    Analysis.
    The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution
    guarantees to Bentley the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against
    him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
    , 
    158 L. Ed. 2d 177
    (2004), the United States Supreme Court
    held tape-recorded statements police officers elicited during a custodial
    interrogation of the defendant’s wife were inadmissible at the defendant’s
    trial because they were testimonial, the declarant was unavailable at trial,
    and the defendant had no prior opportunity for 
    cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 38
    –40, 
    68–69, 124 S. Ct. at 1357
    , 
    1374, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 184
    –85,
    203. The Court reasoned that the text and history of the Sixth Amendment
    support two inferences: (1) “[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation
    2By agreement of the parties, the hearing and ruling on the motion in limine
    pertained to both the Linn and Benton County cases.
    4
    Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
    particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
    accused”; and (2) “[T]he Framers would not have allowed admission of
    testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he
    was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity
    for cross-examination.” 
    Id. at 50,
    53–54, 124 S. Ct. at 1363
    , 
    1365, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 192
    , 194. Because the parties agree that J.G. is, tragically,
    “unavailable,” and Bentley had no prior opportunity to cross-examine J.G.,
    the admissibility of J.G.’s videotaped statements depends on whether they
    are “testimonial” if offered against Bentley in this case. If the statements
    are testimonial, they are inadmissible against Bentley at trial; but if they are
    nontestimonial, the Confrontation Clause does not prevent their admission.
    Prior to Crawford, the government bore the burden of proving
    constitutional admissibility in response to a Confrontation Clause
    challenge.   United States v. Arnold, 
    486 F.3d 177
    , 213 (6th Cir. 2007)
    (Nelson Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 
    497 U.S. 805
    , 816, 
    110 S. Ct. 3139
    , 3147, 
    111 L. Ed. 2d 638
    , 652 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 
    448 U.S. 56
    , 74–75, 
    100 S. Ct. 2531
    , 2543, 
    65 L. Ed. 2d 597
    , 613 (1980)). It does
    not appear that Crawford altered this allocation of the burden of proof. 
    Id. Accordingly, we
    conclude the government bears the burden of proving by a
    preponderance of the evidence that J.G.’s statements are nontestimonial.
    The Court’s view expressed in Crawford that the Framers intended
    the Confrontation Clause to preclude admission of “testimonial” statements
    made by unavailable witnesses who have not been subjected to cross-
    examination was based, in part, on the Confrontation Clause’s express
    reference to “witnesses against the accused”—that is, to those who “bear
    testimony” against the accused, whether in court or out of court. Crawford,
    
    5 541 U.S. at 51
    , 124 S. Ct. at 
    1364, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 192
    (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted).      One who “bears testimony” makes “[a]
    solemn declaration or affirmation . . . for the purpose of establishing or
    proving some fact.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted).
    The Court identified in Crawford “[v]arious formulations of th[e] core
    class of ‘testimonial’ statements” that the Confrontation Clause was
    intended to address: “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
    equivalent,” “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized
    testimonial   materials,”   and   “statements     that   were   made    under
    circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
    that the statement[s] would be available for use at a later trial.” 
    Id. at 51–
    52, 124 S. Ct. at 1364
    , 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193 (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted).   Although the Court did not offer a comprehensive
    definition of “testimonial statement,” its opinion noted that even if a “narrow
    standard” is used to determine whether statements are testimonial,
    “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations,” such
    as the declarant’s statements in Crawford, are testimonial. Id. at 
    52, 124 S. Ct. at 1364
    , 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193.
    As the court noted in Crawford, “one can imagine various definitions
    of 
    “interrogation.” 541 U.S. at 53
    n.4, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 
    n.4, 158 L. Ed. 2d
    at 194 
    n.4. Using the term in its colloquial sense, as the court did in
    Crawford, see 
    id., we conclude
    the interview of J.G. was essentially a
    substitute for police interrogation at the station house. Representatives of
    the police department and DHS were present and participated in the
    interview. J.G. was informed at the outset of the conversation that a police
    officer was present and listening. The questions posed were calculated to
    elicit from J.G. factual details of the past criminal acts that Bentley had
    6
    allegedly perpetrated against her. When the interview was concluded, the
    officer left the CPC with a videotaped copy of the interview which she
    considered evidence to be used against Bentley. The recorded interview
    conducted with the participation of a police officer is in our view a “modern
    practice[] with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation
    Clause was directed.” 
    Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68
    , 124 S. Ct. at 
    1374, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203
    .
    Upon our de novo review, we conclude the government has not met its
    burden of proving the recorded statements of J.G. identifying Bentley as her
    abuser and describing his acts of alleged sexual abuse are nontestimonial.
    The extensive involvement of a police officer in the interview leads us to
    conclude J.G.’s statements were in effect “taken by [a] police officer[] in the
    course of [an] interrogation[].” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
    52, 124 S. Ct. at 1364
    ,
    158 L. Ed. 2d at 193.
    A “community task force steering committee,” which included some
    law enforcement personnel, organized the CPC. The record discloses a
    close, ongoing relationship has persisted between the CPC and
    representatives of local law enforcement agencies. The CPC acknowledges
    that one of its objectives is to provide centralized access to services,
    including law enforcement services.       The police department’s standard
    operating procedure calls for the referral of child victims of sexual abuse to
    the CPC for “forensic interviews.”        Law enforcement officials make
    continuing education workshops available to CPC employees, and Matuszek
    has attended such seminars.
    Holtz and Officer Deutmeyer arranged the appointment for J.G.’s
    interview at the CPC. Immediately before and after J.G.’s interview, a
    “multi-disciplinary team,” which included Officer Deutmeyer, met to discuss
    7
    the case.    Such meetings of CPC team members routinely include
    discussions of whether crimes have been committed against the child-
    interviewee and the identities of the perpetrators of those crimes.
    Officer Deutmeyer confirmed that CPC interviews with children
    generally focus “on the alleged crime.” In fact, the interview of J.G. in this
    case illustrates the typical CPC interview protocol.       Matuszek briefly
    engaged in casual “rapport building” as the interview began, but the subject
    of her questions and J.G.’s answers soon shifted and focused primarily on
    the specific acts of sexual abuse Bentley allegedly perpetrated against J.G.
    The participants in the interview have acknowledged that the
    interview served an investigative function for the State. Matuszek’s written
    “patient interview report” described the interview as an “evidentiary
    interview.” Officer Deutmeyer accurately described Matuszek’s conversation
    with J.G. as a “forensic interview” and an “investigative tool.” J.G. was
    informed of the involvement of the police department on three separate
    occasions during the interview. Matuszek opened the interview by telling
    J.G. a police officer and a DHS representative were listening on the other
    side of the observation window. When J.G. subsequently indicated she
    wanted to discontinue the interview, Matuszek specifically implored J.G. to
    continue because “it’s just really important the police know about
    everything that happened.” At a later point in the interview, Matuszek
    encouraged J.G. to provide additional details because the police were
    “probably going to want to know just a little bit more” about the
    arrangement of Bentley’s apartment, where some of the alleged acts of
    sexual abuse occurred.
    Officer Deutmeyer’s involvement in the interview was not limited to
    mere observation. Toward the end of the interview, Matuszek told J.G. she
    8
    was going next door to talk with the police officer and a representative of
    DHS about whether she “forgot to ask . . . some questions.” When she
    returned to the interview room, Matuszek asked J.G. additional specific
    questions about Bentley’s conduct.         According to Officer Deutmeyer,
    questions posed to the interviewee after such mid-interview consultations
    between CPC staff and representatives of law enforcement are typically
    directed toward obtaining more “specific information because the child has
    given [the police] enough to believe that a crime has been committed,” but
    the police need more evidence to substantiate the allegations and decide
    what course to pursue in future investigations. After J.G.’s interview, the
    CPC followed its protocol by giving a copy of the tape to Officer Deutmeyer.
    The tape of the interview was marked as “evidence” and placed in the police
    department’s evidence storage room. These factual circumstances make it
    objectively apparent that “the purpose of the [recorded interview] was to nail
    down the truth about past criminal events.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S.
    ____, _____, 
    126 S. Ct. 2266
    , 2278, 
    165 L. Ed. 2d 224
    , 242 (2006).
    Indicia of “formality” surrounding J.G.’s statements reinforce our
    determination that J.G.’s statements were the product of a police
    interrogation. J.G. spoke in a calm environment responding to a series of
    structured questions posed by Matuszek. The statements constituted a
    historical account of past events, deliberately provided in response to
    questioning regarding past events.        The statements were made in an
    environment designed and equipped to facilitate forensic interviews
    calculated to collect evidence against those suspected of abusing children.
    As we have already noted, the interview room included an observation
    window that enabled police officers to watch and participate in the
    9
    interview, and video equipment that was used to make a record of the
    interview for use by law enforcement officers.
    The State asserts J.G.’s statements are nontestimonial because a
    reasonable child of J.G.’s chronological age (10) and functional age (7)
    would not have understood her statements would be used to prosecute the
    defendant. We conclude, however, an analysis of the purpose of the
    statements from the declarant’s perspective is unnecessary under the
    circumstances presented here. J.G.’s testimonial statements lie at the very
    core of the definition of “testimonial,” and fall within the category of ex parte
    examinations against which the Confrontation Clause was directed. 3
    We also reject the State’s assertion that Bentley’s right to
    confrontation in this case should yield to the interests of J.G. and the State
    because the Confrontation Clause is not inflexibly applied. The United
    States Supreme Court has concluded that “[a] State’s interest in the
    physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be
    3We  leave for another day the decision whether statements made by children during
    interrogations conducted by forensic interviewers without police participation are
    testimonial. As in Crawford, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
    , 
    158 L. Ed. 2d 177
    and Davis,
    547 U.S. ____, 
    126 S. Ct. 2266
    , 
    165 L. Ed. 2d 224
    , our holding today makes it unnecessary
    to decide whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement
    personnel are “testimonial.” Courts addressing this question have reached disparate
    conclusions. Compare United States v. Bordeaux, 
    400 F.3d 548
    , 556 (8th Cir. 2005) (child
    sex abuse victim’s videotaped statements made to a forensic interviewer were testimonial);
    Rangel v. State, 
    199 S.W.3d 523
    , 533–36 (Tex. App. 2006) (child’s statements made two
    months after alleged abuse to child protective services investigator were testimonial); State
    v. Buda, 
    912 A.2d 735
    , 745–46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (child’s statements to
    government-employed social worker were testimonial); State v. Hopkins, 
    154 P.3d 250
    , 257–
    58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (same), with People v. Geno, 
    683 N.W.2d 687
    , 692 (Mich. Ct. App.
    2004) (statement to director of children’s assessment center was nontestimonial because
    the interrogator was not “a government employee”); State v. Bobadilla, 
    709 N.W.2d 243
    ,
    254–56 (Minn. 2006) (child’s statements to protective service worker during risk
    assessment interview were nontestimonial); State v. Sheppard, 
    842 N.E.2d 561
    , 566–67
    (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (statement to private clinical counselor in mental health interview was
    nontestimonial); Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 
    924 A.2d 1215
    , 1222–24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
    (child abuse victim’s statements to county youth services caseworker at the child’s home
    were nontestimonial).
    10
    sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s
    right to face his or her accusers in court.” Maryland v. Craig, 
    497 U.S. 836
    ,
    853, 
    110 S. Ct. 3157
    , 3167, 
    111 L. Ed. 2d 666
    , 683 (1990). In Craig, the
    Court held the Confrontation Clause does not “categorically prohibit[]”
    testimony via closed circuit television by a child victim of sexual abuse if in-
    court testimony would be traumatic for the child. 
    Id. at 840,
    110 S. Ct. at
    
    3160, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 675
    . Although Craig does stand for the proposition
    that the circumstances of the confrontation may be modified to protect
    children, it does not support the State’s assertion that the right of
    confrontation may be dispensed with altogether if the declarant is a child.
    In Craig, the child victim testified under oath during trial and was subjected
    to cross-examination through closed-circuit television. The circumstances
    in the case now before the court are quite different, as J.G. is deceased and
    therefore unavailable to testify against Bentley, who has no opportunity to
    subject J.G.’s recorded statements to cross-examination. Bentley’s right to
    confront a witness against him need not yield to the State’s interest under
    the circumstances of this case.
    Our conclusion that J.G.’s statements are testimonial is consistent
    with the decisions of other courts. L.J.K. v. Alabama, 
    942 So. 2d 854
    , 861
    (Ala. 2005) (statements of four-year-old and six-year-old children to a state-
    employed child abuse investigator were testimonial); T.P. v. State, 
    911 So. 2d 1117
    , 1123 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (child’s statements to a social worker in
    the presence of a police investigator were testimonial); People v. Sisavath, 
    13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753
    , 757–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (child’s statement to
    interview specialist at a private victim assessment center, made in the
    presence of the prosecuting attorney and district attorney’s investigator,
    was testimonial); People v. Sharp, 
    155 P.3d 577
    , 579–82 (Colo. Ct. App.
    11
    2006) (five-year-old’s videotaped interview with private forensic interviewer
    was testimonial where a police detective arranged the interview and
    interviewer asked questions requested by the detective); In re Rolandis G.,
    
    817 N.E.2d 183
    , 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (statements to private child abuse
    investigator while police officer watched through one-way glass were
    testimonial); State v. Henderson, 
    160 P.3d 776
    , 789–90 (Kan. 2007)
    (statements made by child sexual abuse victim to social worker and police
    detective were testimonial); State v. Snowden, 
    867 A.2d 314
    , 325 (Md. 2005)
    (child sex abuse victims’ statements during interview with DHS sexual
    abuse investigator arranged by police detective were testimonial); Flores v.
    State, 
    120 P.3d 1170
    , 1178–79 (Nev. 2005) (statements made by a child
    describing child abuse to police investigator and child protective services
    worker were testimonial); State v. Blue, 
    717 N.W.2d 558
    , 564 (N.D. 2006)
    (statements to private forensic interviewer working “in concert with or as
    agent of” the police were testimonial); State v. Mack, 
    101 P.3d 349
    , 352–53
    (Or. 2004) (statements made by three-year-old during interviews with DHS
    caseworker were testimonial, where police officers arranged the interviews
    as a substitute for police interrogation, were present during the interviews,
    and videotaped them); State v. Pitt, 
    147 P.3d 940
    , 944–45 (Or. Ct. App.
    2006) (statements made to private forensic child interviewer while police
    officer videotaped interview through one-way glass were testimonial), opinion
    adhered to on reconsideration at 
    159 P.3d 329
    (Or. Ct. App. 2007); In re S.R.,
    
    920 A.2d 1262
    , 1264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (child sex abuse victim’s
    statements made to a forensic interview specialist while police officer
    watched through one-way glass were testimonial).
    We credit the State’s assertion that the CPC performs very important
    and laudable services in furtherance of the protection of children. The
    12
    child-friendly CPC facility includes a waiting room and play area with toys,
    games, books, a fish aquarium, and a television.        The interview room
    includes drawing supplies and is equipped to maximize children’s comfort.
    It is beyond dispute that information gathered from J.G. in such a child-
    friendly, safe environment could have been very useful in the treatment of
    her well-documented psychological conditions. The work of the CPC and
    the team of professionals who took J.G.’s statement is not impugned by our
    characterization of J.G.’s statements as “testimonial.” The actors were
    doing important work intended to investigate past alleged crimes and
    prevent future crimes. Although one of the significant purposes of the
    interrogation was surely to protect and advance the treatment of J.G., as we
    have discussed above, the extensive involvement of the police in the
    interview rendered J.G.’s statements testimonial. Therefore, the district
    court correctly ruled the admission of the statements would violate
    Bentley’s rights under the Confrontation Clause under the circumstances of
    this case.
    V.     Conclusion.
    Bentley’s right to confront witnesses against him is an essential
    constitutional right, and we must be vigilant in guarding against its erosion.
    On this point, we share the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote:
    I know of no principle in the preservation of which all are more
    concerned. I know none, by undermining which, life, liberty
    and property, might be more endangered. It is therefore
    incumbent on courts to be watchful of every inroad on a
    principle so important.
    See 
    Crawford, 541 U.S. at 73
    , 124 S. Ct. at 
    1377, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 206
    (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Burr, 
    25 F. Cas. 187
    ,
    193 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694)). Under the circumstances of this case,
    the district court correctly concluded J.G. was a witness who bore
    13
    testimony against Bentley in the recorded interview. Because Bentley has
    no opportunity to cross-examine J.G., the admission of her testimonial
    statements would violate Bentley’s right to confront witnesses against him.
    We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling.
    AFFIRMED.