State of Iowa v. Marvis Latrell Jackson ( 2016 )


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  •                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 14–0067
    Filed April 29, 2016
    Amended May 2, 2016
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellee,
    vs.
    MARVIS LATRELL JACKSON,
    Appellant.
    On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Robert E.
    Sosalla, Judge.
    A defendant requests further review of a court of appeals decision
    affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained after a
    police officer searched a closed backpack.   DECISION OF COURT OF
    APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND
    CASE REMANDED.
    Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold
    (until withdrawal) and Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defenders,
    for appellant.
    2
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
    Attorney General, Janet M. Lyness, County Attorney, Anne M. Lahey,
    Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
    Alan R. Ostergren, Muscatine, for amicus curiae Iowa County
    Attorneys Association.
    3
    WIGGINS, Justice.
    A police officer conducted a warrantless search of a closed
    backpack belonging to the defendant. The officer relied on a third party’s
    consent in conducting the search.        The third party possessed actual
    authority to consent to a search of the bedroom the backpack was in but
    lacked actual authority to consent to a search of the backpack itself. The
    defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the backpack and
    the fruits of the search on the ground that the third party had neither
    actual authority nor apparent authority to consent to the search of the
    backpack. He argued the warrantless search violated his rights under
    the   Fourth   and   Fourteenth   Amendments      of   the   United   States
    Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. The district
    court denied the motion.
    The defendant now seeks further review of a decision by the court
    of appeals affirming his convictions on two counts of robbery in the
    second degree. We conclude the warrantless search violated the Fourth
    Amendment of the United States Constitution because the third party
    who consented to the search of the bedroom lacked apparent authority to
    consent to the search of the defendant’s backpack. Therefore, we vacate
    the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district
    court, and remand the case to the district court for a new trial.
    I. Background Facts.
    On our de novo review, we find the following facts. At 12:35 a.m.
    on December 31, 2012, the Iowa City Police Department dispatched
    Officer Michael Smithey to Gumby’s Pizza after receiving a report an
    armed robbery had just taken place. When Officer Smithey arrived on
    the scene, the robbery victim met him outside the restaurant. The victim
    reported he had been alone working in the kitchen when two black males
    4
    entered the restaurant wearing dark clothes, black hats, and black
    bandanas over their faces. One of the men had a gun and pointed it at
    the victim. The men ordered the victim to open the cash register. The
    victim complied and gave the men approximately $125 in small bills.
    After the men ran out of the store and headed northbound on Gilbert
    Street, the victim locked the door and called the police.
    As Officer Smithey stood outside the restaurant speaking with the
    victim, a man approached and asked if there had been a robbery. The
    man stated he had just been standing outside smoking a cigarette when
    he observed two black males wearing dark clothes walk by. He noted one
    of the men appeared to be holding a fistful of cash. He also stated when
    the men saw him, they took off running between some houses.
    Officer Smithey drove the witness to the location where he had last
    seen the men on foot. There was fresh snow on the ground, and Officer
    Smithey saw what appeared to be tracks in the snow. He then requested
    backup from a canine unit.
    When the canine unit arrived, the handling officer and the canine
    tracked the suspects to the southeast corner of the building on South
    Gilbert Street. Officer Smithey followed, joined by Officer Alex Stricker.
    The officers observed the lower floor of the building was a retail location,
    but the second story contained apartments with outside doors accessed
    by a common stairwell in the rear of the building. As the officers visually
    surveyed the exterior of the building, they saw the lights were on in one
    of the apartments and a tall black male who appeared to be very
    interested in what the officers were doing was looking out the window.
    The officers noticed the man appeared to match the descriptions of the
    suspects and quickly ducked out of sight when he saw the officers look
    up at him. The officers decided to approach the apartment. When they
    5
    arrived at the front door to the apartment, they noticed someone had
    turned the lights off inside. As they stood outside the apartment door,
    they heard it lock from the inside. Officer Smithey then knocked on the
    door and announced the officers’ presence.
    A tall black male named Wesley Turner answered the door. The
    officers explained why they were there, and Turner allowed them inside.
    The officers entered the living room where they encountered Turner’s
    girlfriend, Alyssa Miller, who also lived in the apartment.   Turner and
    Miller indicated the only other person in the apartment was their
    roommate, Gunner Olson. Turner told the officers Olson was asleep in
    his room but agreed to wake him so the officers could speak with him.
    After Turner knocked on the bedroom door, Olson, who was also a black
    male, emerged from his room.
    The officers decided to speak to the two men separately. Officer
    Stricker stepped outside to speak with Turner.        During their brief
    conversation, Turner indicated he had remained in the apartment since
    arriving home from work around nine and had not seen anything
    suspicious.
    Meanwhile, Officer Smithey stepped into the kitchen to speak with
    Olson. Olson confirmed he lived in the apartment along with Turner and
    Miller. Officer Smithey asked Olson if he could peek inside his bedroom.
    Only then did Olson tell Officer Smithey his cousin Marvis was sleeping
    in his bed. Olson told Officer Smithey that Marvis arrived sometime after
    he went to sleep earlier that evening. When asked, Olson indicated he
    did not know Marvis’s last name and explained they were not really
    cousins. Officer Smithey did not ask Olson if Marvis had been staying in
    the apartment.
    6
    Olson then led Officer Smithey back to his bedroom.                     Officer
    Stricker      looked   on   from   the   hallway,    having    just     finished   his
    conversation with Turner. Inside the room, the officers saw a shirtless
    black male in green pajama pants lying on the air mattress in the corner.
    The air mattress was the only mattress in the room.                   At the officers’
    request, Olson roused the man by shaking him, but the officers noticed
    that waking the man appeared to be considerably more difficult than it
    should have been.           The officers also noticed the shirtless man was
    sweaty, which they thought odd because no one else in the apartment
    was sweating.
    The man identified himself as Marvis Jackson. When asked if he
    had identification, Jackson indicated he did not. The officers had a brief
    conversation with Jackson, during which neither officer asked Jackson if
    he had been staying in the apartment, was an overnight guest, or had
    any personal belongings in the apartment. When the officers ran a check
    on Jackson’s name, they discovered an outstanding warrant for his
    arrest for another armed robbery that took place at a gas station in
    November. 1      Officer Smithey notified Jackson he was under arrest,
    handcuffed him, and walked him out of the room. By that time, other
    officers had arrived at the apartment. Officer Smithey passed Jackson
    off to another officer for transport before returning to the bedroom.
    While Officer Smithey was outside the bedroom passing Jackson
    off for transport, Officer Stricker spoke to Olson. Olson again indicated
    Jackson had arrived earlier that night after he had gone to sleep. Officer
    1The  court issued the arrest warrant after the owner received a tip that a man
    named “Juicy” had robbed the gas station and the detective in charge of the
    investigation learned from multiple sources Jackson went by the nickname “Juicy
    Jackson.”
    7
    Stricker did not ask Olson if Jackson had been staying in the apartment,
    but Olson clearly indicated Jackson did not permanently reside in his
    bedroom. When asked if there were any guns in the room, he replied
    oddly that there should not be or that he did not know of any.
    Officer Stricker then asked to search the bedroom for guns or any
    evidence of the robbery, and Olson consented to the search.        Officer
    Stricker waited for Officer Smithey to return to the room. When Officer
    Smithey arrived, Officer Stricker informed him that Olson had consented
    to the search, and Olson confirmed he did not mind if Officer Smithey
    conducted the search. Neither officer asked Olson whether any of the
    items in the room might belong to Jackson. Officer Stricker then stepped
    outside the room with Olson to accompany him to the kitchen to get a
    glass of water.
    Officer Smithey began searching Olson’s room. He first searched
    the area around the air mattress.    He searched under the sheets and
    blankets on top of the air mattress and then under the mattress itself.
    He then grabbed a backpack sitting a few feet away on the floor along the
    wall next to or partly inside the closet door, which was partially off its
    hinges. He placed the backpack on the chair sitting between the closet
    and the air mattress.   The backpack was closed and had no obvious
    identifying marks or tags on its exterior indicating who owned it. Officer
    Smithey opened the backpack. He reached inside and located a wallet,
    which he removed and laid on the chair without opening it. When Officer
    Smithey reached inside a second time, he located a pair of dark jeans.
    He noticed the jeans were wet at the hem along the bottom of each leg,
    which led him to believe they had recently been worn outside in the
    snow. He then removed the jeans from the backpack. Underneath the
    jeans, Officer Smithey saw a black handgun.
    8
    After removing the jeans and locating the handgun, Officer
    Smithey stopped removing items from the backpack.          He opened the
    wallet he had placed on the chair a few moments before and saw that it
    contained identification belonging to Marvis Jackson.      Officer Smithey
    took a photograph of the handgun inside the backpack to use in an
    application for a search warrant.        He then emerged from the bedroom
    and informed the sergeant who was the supervising officer on the scene
    it was time to lock down the apartment.           The officers conducted a
    protective sweep of the apartment and transported Olson, Turner, and
    Miller to the station for questioning.
    Back at the station, Officer Smithey completed a statement in
    support of an application for a search warrant. Detectives spoke with
    Miller, Turner, Olson, and Jackson in a series of interviews conducted
    between approximately 2:49 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.          Turner admitted to
    committing the armed robbery of the restaurant, and Olson admitted to
    cutting up a t-shirt to provide Turner and Jackson with the strips of
    fabric they used to cover their faces during the robbery.      After being
    informed the police had obtained confessions from Turner and Olson and
    retrieved a gun and cash from the apartment, Jackson also confessed to
    committing the restaurant robbery.
    In the morning, the detective investigating the gas station robbery
    conducted a second round of interviews beginning after 7:00 a.m.
    During those interviews, the detective showed Turner and Miller
    photographs of the gas station robber captured by a security camera.
    Both Turner and Miller indicated the gas station robber looked like
    Jackson and recognized the shoes the robber was wearing. Turner also
    indicated Jackson had told him he had robbed a gas station, and Miller
    recognized the cap the robber was wearing and told the detective where it
    9
    could be found in the apartment.         When the detective subsequently
    interviewed Jackson, he confessed to committing the gas station robbery.
    During the interviews conducted throughout the night and in the
    morning, Miller, Turner, and Jackson all confirmed Jackson had been
    staying at the apartment for weeks prior to December 31 and
    acknowledged he had personal belongings in the apartment. When the
    police executed the search warrant on the apartment in the morning,
    they recovered $129 in one-dollar bills, $45 in five-dollar bills, and pieces
    of the t-shirt described by the men during their interviews the night
    before. The police also recovered a black Yankees cap matching the one
    worn by the gas station robber.
    II. Prior Proceedings.
    The State charged Jackson with two counts of robbery in the
    second degree, including one count for the restaurant robbery and one
    count for the gas station robbery. See Iowa Code section 711.3 (2011).
    Jackson pled not guilty on both counts and filed a motion to suppress all
    evidence obtained as a result of the search of his backpack.          In his
    motion to suppress, Jackson argued the warrantless search of his
    backpack was unreasonable and violated his rights under the Fourth
    and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
    article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution because Olson had neither
    actual authority nor apparent authority to consent to the search of his
    backpack. Jackson further asserted the officers had a duty to inquire as
    to the ownership of the backpack before searching it because they had
    encountered an ambiguous situation that gave them reason to doubt
    whether Olson had authority to consent to a search of the backpack.
    The State resisted the motion.
    10
    Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion to
    suppress.    Jackson thereafter waived his right to a jury trial and
    stipulated to a trial on the minutes of testimony.      The district court
    found Jackson guilty of both counts of second-degree robbery and
    sentenced him to two concurrent indeterminate terms of incarceration
    not to exceed ten years with a mandatory minimum sentence of seven
    years of incarceration.
    Jackson appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of
    appeals. The court of appeals concluded Olson had apparent authority,
    but not actual authority, to consent to the search of the backpack. The
    court of appeals allowed Jackson to pursue his ineffective-assistance-of-
    counsel claim in a postconviction relief proceeding because it determined
    his trial counsel had not preserved his argument that the Iowa
    Constitution requires consent from a person with actual authority to
    authorize a warrantless search.
    Jackson filed an application for further review, which we granted.
    III. Issues.
    Jackson claims Officer Smithey violated his rights under the
    Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because Olson had
    neither actual authority nor apparent authority to consent to the search
    of his backpack. Alternatively, Jackson claims Officer Smithey violated
    his rights under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution because
    Olson did not have actual authority to consent to the search of his
    backpack. Finally, Jackson claims that if the search did not violate the
    federal constitution, his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for
    failing to argue a different standard determines the constitutionality of
    warrantless searches authorized by consent under the state constitution.
    11
    IV. Standard of Review.
    Jackson raises constitutional issues in this appeal.                   We review
    constitutional issues de novo.          State v. Kooima, 
    833 N.W.2d 202
    , 205
    (Iowa 2013).
    V. The Federal Doctrine of Consent by Apparent Authority.
    The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
    papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
    seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
    but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
    and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
    persons or things to be seized.
    U.S. Const. amend. IV.
    A warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment unless a
    warrant was not required to authorize it.                 See State v. Nitcher, 
    720 N.W.2d 547
    , 554 (Iowa 2006). The State bears the burden of proving by
    a preponderance of the evidence that a warrant was not needed to
    authorize a warrantless search.            See 
    id.
         In determining whether the
    State has met this burden, we use an objective standard to assess the
    conduct of the officer who performed the search. 
    Id.
    Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is not required to
    authorize a search performed pursuant to voluntary consent. State v.
    Pals, 
    805 N.W.2d 767
    , 777–82 (Iowa 2011). 2                  An officer may rely on
    third-party consent to authorize a warrantless search so long as the
    circumstances indicate the third party had actual authority to consent to
    a search of the location searched.              See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 326
    2We  have not determined whether voluntary consent authorizes a warrantless
    search under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, or whether article I, section 8
    requires a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights to authorize a warrantless search.
    See Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 782.
    
    12 N.W.2d 350
    , 352 (Iowa 1982); State v. Folkens, 
    281 N.W.2d 1
    , 3–4 (Iowa
    1979). To establish a third party had actual authority to consent to a
    search, the government may show the third party “possessed common
    authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects
    sought to be inspected.” Campbell, 326 N.W.2d at 352 (quoting United
    States v. Matlock, 
    415 U.S. 164
    , 171, 
    94 S. Ct. 988
    , 993, 
    39 L. Ed. 2d 242
    , 250 (1974)). Common authority to consent to a search derives from
    “mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or
    control for most purposes.” Matlock, 
    415 U.S. at
    171 n.7, 
    94 S. Ct. at
    993 n.7, 
    39 L. Ed. 2d at
    250 n.7; see State v. Bakker, 
    262 N.W.2d 538
    ,
    546 (Iowa 1978).
    Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may also rely on third-
    party consent to authorize a warrantless search based on the third
    party’s apparent authority to consent to the search. State v. Lowe, 
    812 N.W.2d 554
    , 576 (Iowa 2012).      The doctrine of consent by apparent
    authority allows the government to demonstrate an officer who
    conducted a warrantless search was authorized to do so because the
    officer “reasonably (though erroneously)” relied on the apparent authority
    of the person who consented to the search.        
    Id.
     (quoting Illinois v.
    Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. 177
    , 186, 
    110 S. Ct. 2793
    , 2800, 
    111 L. Ed. 2d 148
    ,
    160 (1990)).
    The State relies on the doctrine of consent by apparent authority to
    justify the officer’s warrantless search of the backpack found in the
    bedroom.   The doctrine has its genesis in the United States Supreme
    Court’s decision in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. 177
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 2793
    ,
    
    111 L. Ed.2d 148
    . In that case, an assault victim accompanied police
    officers to the defendant’s apartment, unlocked the door with a key she
    had, and let the officers into the apartment. 
    Id.
     at 179–80, 
    110 S. Ct. at
    13
    2796–97, 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at
    155–56. The officers did not have an arrest
    warrant for the defendant or a search warrant to search the apartment.
    
    Id. at 180
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2797
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at
    155–56. As the officers
    moved through the premises, they observed drug paraphernalia and
    containers filled with white powder later determined to be cocaine in
    plain view in the living room. 
    Id. at 180
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2797
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 156
    . They found additional containers filled with cocaine in two
    open attaché cases in the bedroom. 
    Id.
     After the officers arrested the
    defendant on drug charges, he moved to suppress the evidence seized at
    the time of his arrest on the ground that the victim no longer lived in the
    apartment and therefore had no authority to consent to the entry and the
    search. 
    Id.
    The Supreme Court determined the State failed to prove the victim
    had common authority over the premises to consent to the search. 
    Id.
     at
    181–82, 
    110 S. Ct. at
    2797–98, 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at
    156–57. This was not,
    however, the end of the Court’s inquiry. The Court stated the question of
    whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment turned on an
    objective factual determination as to whether the officers reasonably
    believed the woman had authority to consent to the entry.       See 
    id. at 188
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    . The Court thus concluded
    a warrantless search conducted pursuant to consent by a third party
    does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the facts available to
    the officers at the moment it occurred would “ ‘warrant a man of
    reasonable caution in the belief’ that the consenting party had authority
    over the premises.” 
    Id.
     at 188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
     (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 21–22, 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 1880, 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    , 906 (1968)).       “If not,” the Court explained, “then
    14
    warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority
    actually exists.” 
    Id.
    In concluding searches conducted pursuant to consent by
    apparent authority satisfy the Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned
    the Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to make reasonable,
    not perfect, factual determinations concerning the scope of authority
    possessed by a person who consents to a search:
    It is apparent that in order to satisfy the “reasonableness”
    requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally
    demanded of the many factual determinations that must
    regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is not
    that they always be correct, but that they always be
    reasonable. . . .
    We see no reason to depart from this general rule with
    respect to facts bearing upon the authority to consent to a
    search. Whether the basis for such authority exists is the
    sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement
    officials must be expected to apply their judgment; and all
    the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it
    reasonably. The Constitution is no more violated when
    officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably
    (though erroneously) believe that the person who has
    consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it
    is violated when they enter without a warrant because they
    reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit
    of a violent felon who is about to escape.
    
    Id.
     at 185–86, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2800
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at
    159–60.
    However, the Court cautioned that apparent authority does not
    necessarily exist merely because a person explicitly asserts a factual
    basis suggesting he or she has authority to consent.      
    Id. at 188
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    . Rather, a person could make such
    an assertion and “the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be
    such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it
    without further inquiry,” in which case “warrantless entry without
    further inquiry” would be unlawful unless the consenting party had
    15
    actual authority. 
    Id.
     at 188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    .
    Thus, the Court emphasized courts must use an objective standard to
    determine whether apparent authority exists. 
    Id. at 188
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    . In addition, the Court acknowledged the
    government bears the burden of establishing the effectiveness of third-
    party consent. 
    Id. at 181
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2797
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 156
    . The
    Court remanded the case for a determination as to whether the officers
    reasonably relied on apparent authority to authorize their entry into the
    apartment because the appellate court had not determined whether
    officers had reasonably believed the victim had authority to consent. 
    Id. at 189
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    .
    Rodriguez involved a circumstance in which officers discovered
    evidence in plain view after they entered a home without a warrant based
    on consent given by a person who lacked actual authority to consent to a
    search of the home. In contrast, this case requires us to consider how
    the doctrine of consent by apparent authority applies to a closed
    container found inside a home searched by officers relying on consent
    given by a person who had actual authority to consent to the search of
    the home but lacked actual authority to consent to a search of the
    container. The Supreme Court has yet to apply the doctrine of consent
    by apparent authority to a closed container found within a home under
    these circumstances. Nor is there agreement among the federal circuit
    courts of appeals concerning how the apparent-authority doctrine applies
    under such circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 
    600 F.3d 678
    , 685 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Snype, 
    441 F.3d 119
    , 136–37
    (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Waller, 
    426 F.3d 838
    , 847–49 (6th Cir.
    2005); United States v. Melgar, 
    227 F.3d 1038
    , 1041–42 (7th Cir. 2000);
    United States v. Salinas-Cano, 
    959 F.2d 861
    , 865–66 (10th Cir. 1992).
    16
    A. Circuits Concluding Officers Have a Duty to Inquire Before
    Searching a Closed Container if a Reasonable Officer Would
    Conclude the Authority of the Person Who Consented to a Premises
    Search is Ambiguous. The Tenth Circuit applied the apparent-authority
    doctrine in the context of a closed-container search in United States v.
    Salinas-Cano. After officers arrested the defendant following a drug buy,
    they asked his girlfriend for permission to search her apartment and
    indicated they were specifically interested in the defendant’s possessions.
    Salinas-Cano, 
    959 F.2d at 862
    . She consented and led the officers to the
    area of the apartment where the defendant kept his belongings. 
    Id.
     The
    officers opened a closed suitcase belonging to the defendant and found
    cocaine inside. 
    Id.
     The district court denied the defendant’s motion to
    suppress the evidence, and the defendant appealed. 
    Id. at 863
    .
    The Tenth Circuit reversed, emphasizing the government bears the
    burden of proving the effectiveness of third-party consent.    
    Id. at 862, 864
    .   The court concluded the government cannot meet this burden
    when officers faced with an ambiguous situation concerning the
    authority of the consenting party proceed to search without making
    further inquiry. 
    Id. at 864
    . The court determined a warrantless search
    is unlawful without further inquiry “if the circumstances make it unclear
    whether the property about to be searched is subject to ‘mutual use’ by
    the person giving consent.” See 
    id.
     (quoting United States v. Whitfield,
    
    939 F.2d 1071
    , 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The court reasoned that under
    Rodriguez, apparent authority exists only in “situations in which an
    officer would have had valid consent to search if the facts were as he
    reasonably believed them to be.” Id. at 865 (quoting Whitfield, 
    939 F.2d at 1074
    ).   The court therefore concluded the officer’s subjective belief
    that the girlfriend had authority to consent to a search of the suitcase
    17
    was insufficient to legitimize the search under the apparent-authority
    doctrine. Id. at 866.
    It is not enough for the officer to testify, as he did here, that
    he thought the consenting party had joint access and control.
    The “apparent authority” doctrine does not empower the
    police to legitimize a search merely by the incantation of the
    phrase.
    Id. at 865 (citation omitted).
    Based on Rodriguez, the Tenth Circuit concluded proper analysis
    of apparent authority “rests entirely on the reasonableness of the officer’s
    belief” that the consenting party had common authority over the
    container searched. See id. The officers had not asked any question that
    would have permitted them to determine whether the defendant’s
    girlfriend had mutual use of his suitcase and authority to consent to a
    search of it. Id. at 866. Therefore, because the information known to the
    officers was insufficient to support a reasonable belief that the girlfriend
    had actual authority to consent to a search of the defendant’s suitcase,
    the court concluded she did not have apparent authority to consent to
    the search. See id. According to the court, “To hold that an officer may
    reasonably find authority to consent solely on the basis of the presence
    of a suitcase in the home of another would render meaningless the
    Fourth Amendment’s protection of such suitcases.” Id.
    The Tenth Circuit subsequently confirmed officers have a “duty to
    investigate” when it is ambiguous whether the person who consents to a
    premises search has authority over the location to be searched before
    conducting a warrantless search of a closed container:
    Importantly, “where an officer is presented with ambiguous
    facts related to authority, he or she has a duty to investigate
    further before relying on the consent.”            Thus, the
    government cannot meet its burden of demonstrating a third
    party’s apparent authority “if agents, faced with an
    18
    ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without making
    further inquiry.”
    United States v. Cos, 
    498 F.3d 1115
    , 1128 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations
    omitted) (quoting United States v. Kimoana, 
    383 F.3d 1215
    , 1222 (10th
    Cir. 2004)).
    The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed whether a third party
    had apparent authority to consent to a search of a closed container in a
    similar manner in United States v. Waller. In Waller, officers arrested the
    defendant in the parking lot of an apartment complex where his friend
    was a tenant. 
    426 F.3d at 842
    . After the officers secured the defendant
    and proceeded to the apartment, the tenant told them the defendant had
    been storing some property there. 
    Id.
     The tenant consented to a search
    of the apartment. 
    Id.
     During the search, the officers opened a closed
    luggage bag they found in a bedroom closet and discovered a firearm. 
    Id.
    The officers asked the tenant and his girlfriend whether the luggage bag
    or the firearm belonged to either of them. 
    Id.
     Both individuals denied
    ownership of both the bag and the firearm. 
    Id.
     The defendant appealed
    his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 
    Id. at 843
    . He
    argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
    firearm evidence by ruling the officers had actual or apparent authority
    to search the luggage bag. 
    Id.
    After determining the tenant lacked common authority over the
    luggage bag, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the tenant had
    apparent authority to consent to the search of the bag. 
    Id.
     at 844–46.
    The court summarized the doctrine of consent by apparent authority
    established in Rodriguez as follows:
    “When one person consents to a search of property owned by
    another, the consent is valid if ‘the facts available to the
    officer at the moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable
    caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority
    19
    over the premises.’ ” Whether the facts presented at the time
    of the search would “warrant a man of reasonable caution”
    to believe the third party has common authority over the
    property    depends     upon    all  of   the   surrounding
    circumstances. The government cannot establish that its
    agents reasonably relied upon a third party’s apparent
    authority “if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation,
    nevertheless proceed without making further inquiry. If the
    agents do not learn enough, if the circumstances make it
    unclear whether the property about to be searched is subject
    to ‘mutual use’ by the person giving consent, ‘then
    warrantless entry is unlawful without further inquiry.’ ”
    Where the circumstances presented would cause a person of
    reasonable caution to question whether the third party has
    mutual use of the property, “warrantless entry without
    further inquiry is unlawful[.]”
    
    Id. at 846
     (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting United
    States v. Jenkins, 
    92 F.3d 430
    , 436 (6th Cir. 1996); then quoting
    Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 188
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    ;
    then quoting United States v. McCoy, Nos. 97–6485, 97–6486, 97–6488,
    
    1999 WL 357749
    , at *10 (6th Cir. May 12, 1999); and then quoting
    Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at
    188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    ).
    The court thus concluded the search of the bag was unlawful because
    under the circumstances it was unclear to the officers whether the
    tenant had common authority over it. Id. at 847, 849. Based on the
    facts known to the officers, the court concluded a reasonable officer
    would have found ambiguity existed with respect to the ownership of the
    bag and thus with respect to the question of common authority. Id. at
    849.
    In arriving at this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that in
    the context of a closed container, the existence of common authority to
    consent derives from “mutual use of the property by persons generally
    having joint access or control for most purposes.”      Id. at 845, 848–49
    (quoting Matlock, 
    415 U.S. at
    171 n.7, 
    94 S. Ct. at
    993 n.7, 
    39 L. Ed. 2d 20
    at 250 n.7).   Thus, the court emphasized that although officers might
    have believed the tenant had some level of control over the bag, in light of
    what the government would have had to prove to establish the tenant
    had common authority to consent to a search of it, a reasonable officer
    would have been “on notice of his obligation to make further inquiry prior
    to conducting a search.” 
    Id.
     at 848–49. In concluding the circumstances
    were sufficiently ambiguous to place a reasonable officer on notice that
    the tenant might not have had authority to consent to the search, the
    court found both the context of the search and its purpose to be relevant:
    The facts in this case are clear: the police never expressed an
    interest in [the tenant’s] belongings in [the tenant’s]
    apartment. The very purpose of the police presence was to
    search for (presumably) illegal possessions of [the
    defendant’s]. Why would the police open the suitcase if they
    reasonably believed it belonged to [the tenant]? The answer
    is that they would not have opened the bag. They opened
    the bag precisely because they believed it likely belonged to
    [the defendant]. The police knew [the defendant] was storing
    belongings at the [the tenant’s] apartment. Most people do
    not keep a packed, closed suitcase in their own apartment.
    Deliberate ignorance of conclusive ownership of the suitcase
    does not excuse the warrantless search of the suitcase,
    especially when actual ownership could easily have been
    confirmed.
    Id. at 849 (emphasis omitted).
    The Sixth Circuit concluded the district court erred in denying the
    defendant’s motion to suppress and reversed his conviction. See id. It
    did so because the officers failed to make inquiry before searching the
    bag despite being on notice the tenant might not have had authority to
    consent to a search of it. Id. at 848–49. The court thus concluded an
    officer has a duty to inquire before relying on consent in circumstances
    in which the authority of the consenting person is ambiguous.           Id. at
    846–47.    The court stressed its conclusion was consistent with the
    21
    Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez and decisions by other courts to
    consider such circumstances. Id. (citing cases).
    The Sixth Circuit revisited this issue in United States v. Taylor.
    There, officers arrested the male defendant in the apartment of his
    childless female friend. Taylor, 
    600 F.3d at 679, 682
    . The officers then
    asked the defendant’s friend for permission to search her apartment,
    which she granted. 
    Id. at 679
    . When the officers conducted the search,
    they found a closed shoebox for a pair of men’s basketball shoes partially
    covered by men’s clothes in the closet of a spare bedroom containing
    men’s clothes, children’s clothes, and children’s toys. 
    Id.
     Though the
    defendant’s friend lived alone in the apartment, the officers made no
    inquiry to determine whether she had authority to consent to a search of
    the closed shoebox before opening it. 
    Id.
     Inside the shoebox, they found
    a handgun and ammunition belonging to the defendant. 
    Id. at 680
    . The
    government charged the defendant with being a felon in possession of a
    firearm and ammunition. 
    Id.
     The district court granted the defendant’s
    motion to suppress the evidence, finding the defendant’s friend had
    neither common authority nor apparent authority to consent to the
    search of the shoebox. 
    Id.
    The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court decision granting the
    defendant’s motion to suppress.     
    Id. at 679
    .    In doing so, the court
    acknowledged the officers might have begun the search with a
    reasonable belief that everything in the apartment was subject to mutual
    use by its sole tenant. 
    Id. at 681
    . But the court concluded “a reasonable
    person would have had substantial doubts about whether the box was
    subject to mutual use” by the tenant based on both the location where it
    was found and the label indicating it was for a pair of men’s shoes. 
    Id. at 682
    .   The court stated its conclusion was reinforced by the fact the
    22
    district court found the officers likely would not have opened the shoebox
    if they had believed it belonged to the tenant, rather than the defendant.
    
    Id.
    B.   Circuits Concluding the Defendant Bears the Burden of
    Demonstrating Officers Had Reason to Question the Authority of the
    Person Who Consented to a Premises Search.            The Seventh Circuit
    considered apparent authority in the context of a closed-container search
    in United States v. Melgar. In Melgar, officers investigating the passing of
    counterfeit checks obtained consent to search a motel room from the
    woman who had rented it. 
    227 F.3d at
    1039–41. While conducting a
    search of the room, the officers found a purse with no identifying marks
    under the mattress of one of the beds. 
    Id. at 1040
    . Though the officers
    knew several other women were staying in the room, they opened the
    purse without asking any questions to determine whether it belonged to
    the woman who rented the room.           See 
    id.
     at 1039–40.     Inside, they
    discovered counterfeit checks and a fake identification bearing a
    photograph of the defendant, who was also staying in the room but had
    not consented to the search. 
    Id. at 1040
    . The defendant challenged the
    district court’s denial of her motion to suppress the evidence found
    inside the purse. 
    Id.
    The Seventh Circuit concluded that because the police had no
    reason to know the woman who consented to the search of the room
    could not consent to a search of the purse, the district court correctly
    denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.        
    Id. at 1041
    .     The court
    rejected the defendant’s argument the officers should have inquired as to
    the owner of the purse because they had matched the other purses in the
    room to the other women staying there. 
    Id.
     at 1040–41.
    23
    The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the lack of binding authority
    concerning the proper application of the apparent-authority doctrine to
    closed-container searches. See 
    id. at 1041
    . However, the court framed
    the question presented as follows:
    In a sense, the real question for closed container searches is
    which way the risk of uncertainty should run. Is such a
    search permissible only if the police have positive knowledge
    that the closed container is also under the authority of the
    person who originally consented to the search . . . , or is it
    permissible if the police do not have reliable information that
    the container is not under the authorizer’s control.
    
    Id.
    In concluding the district court correctly denied the defendant’s
    motion to suppress, the Seventh Circuit invoked the general rule that
    consent to search a space generally extends to a container within it so
    long as “a reasonable officer would construe the consent to extend to the
    container” and precedents governing the searches of containers found in
    automobiles.      
    Id.
     at 1041–42.         The court thus concluded apparent
    authority exists so long as the officer who conducts a warrantless search
    pursuant to third-party consent has no reliable information indicating
    the consenting party has no control over the container being searched.
    See 
    id.
     In other words, the court concluded an officer may reasonably
    construe a third party’s consent to search a premises to extend to all
    closed containers within that premises unless the officer has “reliable
    information” indicating a particular container is not within the third
    party’s control. 3 See 
    id. at 1041
    .
    3Incases decided both before and after Melgar, the Seventh Circuit expressly
    acknowledged officers have “a duty to inquire further as to a third party’s authority to
    consent to a search” before searching a closed container when “the surrounding
    circumstances make that person’s authority questionable.” United States v. Goins, 
    437 F.3d 644
    , 648 (7th Cir. 2006); Montville v. Lewis, 
    87 F.3d 900
    , 903 (7th Cir. 1996).
    Although the court has acknowledged “officers have a duty to inquire further as to a
    24
    The Second Circuit came to a similar conclusion in United States v.
    Snype. In that case, officers discovered the defendant on the floor in the
    bedroom of an apartment belonging to his friend’s girlfriend. Snype, 
    441 F.3d at
    126–27. After the officers arrested the defendant and removed
    him from the apartment, they obtained the girlfriend’s consent to search
    it. 
    Id. at 127
    . During the search, the officers opened a closed knapsack
    and a closed red plastic bag they found on the floor in the room from
    which they had just removed the defendant. 
    Id.
     The knapsack and the
    bag were sitting next to an open teller’s box filled with cash taken from
    the bank the defendant was accused of robbing.                   
    Id.
       The defendant
    appealed his conviction for conspiracy to commit bank robbery, arguing
    the district court improperly admitted the evidence found in the
    knapsack and the bag. 
    Id. at 125, 136
    .
    The    Second      Circuit    concluded      the    district    court   properly
    determined the voluntary consent of the host had authorized the
    warrantless search of the entire apartment and all items within it,
    including the knapsack and the bag belonging to the defendant. 
    Id. at 137
    . The court dismissed as conclusory the defendant’s argument that
    the officers “had no objectively reasonable basis for concluding” the
    tenant had any interest in the closed containers found beside him. See
    
    id.
     at 136–37. Although the court acknowledged the host’s open-ended
    ________________________
    third party’s authority” in some circumstances, it emphasizes “that is only true when
    the circumstances make the authority questionable in the first place.” United States v.
    Pineda-Buenaventura, 
    622 F.3d 761
    , 777 (7th Cir. 2010). To the extent these decisions
    seem inconsistent, that inconsistency may stem from the fact that the Melgar court
    concluded ambiguity concerning the authority of a third party exists only when an
    officer has “reliable information” a container is not within the control of the person who
    consents to a search. See Melgar, 
    227 F.3d at 1041
    . It is hard to see how ambiguity
    concerning who has authority over a container could exist only when an officer has
    “reliable information” concerning the answer to that very question.
    25
    consent could not authorize a search or seizure of items found within the
    apartment that “obviously belonged exclusively” to another person, it
    found the district court did not err in admitting the evidence found inside
    the knapsack and the red plastic bag.      Id. at 137.   Rather, the court
    concluded the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the
    defendant failed to adduce credible evidence demonstrating the knapsack
    and the bag “so obviously belonged exclusively to him that the officers
    could not reasonably rely” on the host’s unrestricted consent to search
    the premises. See id. at 136–37.
    C.   Determination of the Applicable Test. Under Rodriguez, a
    warrantless search of a closed container conducted pursuant to consent
    by a third party does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the
    person who consented had actual or apparent authority to consent to the
    search.    See Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at
    188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
     (quoting Terry, 
    392 U.S. at
    21–22, 
    88 S. Ct. at 1880
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d at 906
    ). The dispute among the federal circuit courts of appeal
    concerns the question of who bears the burden of proving third-party
    consent did or did not authorize a container search when the third party
    had actual authority to consent to a search of a premises but lacked
    actual authority to consent to a search of a container on that premises.
    The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have concluded the government bears the
    burden of demonstrating the officer inquired before searching a closed
    container if the circumstances would have alerted a reasonable officer
    that the person who consented to a search of the premises might not
    have had authority to consent to a search of a closed container.       See
    Taylor, 
    600 F.3d at 681
    ; Salinas-Cano, 
    959 F.2d at 864
    . The Second and
    Seventh Circuits have concluded the defendant bears the burden of
    adducing evidence to show the officer could not have reasonably relied
    26
    on third-party consent so long as the third party had authority to
    consent to a search of the premises. See Snype, 
    441 F.3d at
    136–37;
    Melgar, 
    227 F.3d at 1041
    .        For the following reasons, we find the
    reasoning of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits to be more persuasive than the
    reasoning of the Second and Seventh Circuits.
    First, we recognize a privacy interest in a closed container is not
    necessarily coextensive with a privacy interest in the surrounding
    location in which the container is located:
    A privacy interest in a home itself need not be
    coextensive with a privacy interest in the contents or
    movements of everything situated inside the home. This has
    been recognized before in connection with third-party
    consent to searches. A homeowner’s consent to a search of
    the home may not be effective consent to a search of a closed
    object inside the home. Consent to search a container or a
    place is effective only when given by one with “common
    authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises
    or effects sought to be inspected.”
    United States v. Karo, 
    468 U.S. 705
    , 725, 
    104 S. Ct. 3296
    , 3308, 
    82 L. Ed. 2d 530
    , 548 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Matlock,
    
    415 U.S. at 171
    , 
    94 S. Ct. at 993
    , 
    39 L. Ed. 2d at 250
    ). As the Indiana
    Supreme Court has pointed out, the Melgar court did not acknowledge
    third-party consent to search a premises may implicate privacy interests
    in a closed container that are distinct from those the third party had in
    the premises. See Krise v. State, 
    746 N.E.2d 957
    , 967–68 (Ind. 2001).
    We reject the notion that a guest assumes the risk the government might
    unreasonably intrude upon a privacy interest in a closed container
    merely by bringing the container into the home of another person. See
    
    id.
       As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “what is at issue
    when a claim of apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be
    free of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free of
    27
    unreasonable searches has been violated.” Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 187
    ,
    
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    .
    Second, both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized
    the home is entitled to special status in the Fourth Amendment context.
    See Kyllo v. United States, 
    533 U.S. 27
    , 31, 
    121 S. Ct. 2038
    , 2041, 
    150 L. Ed. 2d 94
    , 100 (2001); State v. Ochoa, 
    792 N.W.2d 260
    , 276–77, 287
    (Iowa 2010).      It does not square with the Fourth Amendment’s
    recognition of the sanctity of the home to suggest bringing an object into
    a home might diminish, rather than enhance, a person’s privacy interest
    in that object.   See Karo, 
    468 U.S. at 717
    , 
    104 S. Ct. at 3304
    , 
    82 L. Ed. 2d at 542
     (holding warrantless electronic monitoring of a beeper
    inside a drum brought inside a home violated the Fourth Amendment).
    Third, when a defendant moves to suppress evidence obtained
    when an officer conducted a warrantless search, the State bears the
    burden of proving the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
    Nitcher, 
    720 N.W.2d at 554
    .     The Supreme Court has indicated this
    burden remains with the government in the context of third-party
    consent. Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 181
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2797
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 156
    . Rodriguez made clear the government may meet its burden of
    proving the effectiveness of third-party consent by two possible means.
    
    Id. at 181
    , 188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2798, 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 156, 161
    .
    First, the government may demonstrate the person consenting to the
    search had actual authority to consent to a search of the location
    searched. 
    Id. at 181
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2798
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 156
    . Second,
    the government may demonstrate the facts available to the officer when
    the officer conducted the search would have warranted a person of
    reasonable caution in the belief that the person consenting had authority
    to consent to a search of the location searched. 
    Id.
     at 188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. 28
    at 2801, 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    . It would improperly reverse the burden of
    proof to require a defendant to disprove the effectiveness of the consent
    relied upon by officers who searched a closed container belonging to the
    defendant.
    Finally, to flip the presumption of unreasonableness that generally
    applies to warrantless searches merely because a third party explicitly
    granted consent to a premises search would be inconsistent with
    Rodriguez. As the Supreme Court recognized in Rodriguez, even when a
    person makes an assertion he or she has authority to authorize a search,
    “the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that a
    reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without
    further inquiry.” 
    Id. at 188
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    .
    The lesson of Rodriguez is that a warrantless search is not
    authorized when the circumstances would cause a reasonable officer to
    doubt whether the party consenting had authority to consent with
    respect to the location to be searched.    The mere fact that an officer
    subjectively relied on third-party consent does not render that reliance
    reasonable. See 
    id.
     at 188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    .
    Reliance on apparent authority to authorize a search is only reasonable
    when the authority of the person consenting is actually apparent with
    respect to the location to be searched.    Thus, when the totality of the
    circumstances indicates a reasonable officer would have conducted
    further inquiry to determine whether the person who consented to a
    premises search had authority to consent to a search of a closed
    container, the government must demonstrate the officer did just that in
    order to establish the search of the container was reasonable.
    The government bears the burden of proving a warrantless search
    was reasonable. Therefore, in determining whether a warrantless search
    29
    of a container was reasonable based on the apparent authority of the
    consenting party, the relevant question is not whether the defendant has
    adduced enough evidence to prove an officer’s reliance on third-party
    consent was unreasonable. 4            Rather, the question is whether the
    government has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
    circumstances existing when the container was searched would have
    warranted a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person
    who consented to a search of the premises also had authority over the
    container. Waller, 
    426 F.3d at 846
     (quoting Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 188
    ,
    
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    ).
    The government cannot demonstrate an officer reasonably relied
    on apparent authority to authorize a search if the officer proceeded
    without making further inquiry when faced with an ambiguity concerning
    the question of whether the container to be searched was subject to
    ownership or mutual use by the consenting party.                 See 
    id.
     at 846–47.
    When an officer faced with such ambiguity searches a closed container
    without a warrant and without inquiring enough to clarify whether the
    person who consented to a premises search had authority to consent to a
    search of the container, the search is unlawful. See Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at
    188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    ; Waller, 
    426 F.3d at 846
    .
    D. Analysis. As the district court noted, the State presented no
    evidence to indicate Olson had actual authority to consent to a search of
    Jackson’s     backpack.        In   addition,    the   State    conceded      Jackson
    4
    The defendant may prove it was unreasonable for an officer to rely on third-
    party consent by demonstrating the officer had reliable information indicating the
    consenting party lacked authority to consent to the search of a closed container or that
    it was obvious the container belonged exclusively to the defendant. Cf. Snype, 
    441 F.3d at
    136–37; Melgar, 
    227 F.3d at 1041
    .
    30
    maintained control over his backpack as a guest in Olson’s bedroom.
    Thus, we must determine whether Olson had apparent authority to
    consent to the search of Jackson’s backpack.
    The first step in our analysis is to determine whether the State
    proved by a preponderance of the evidence the facts and circumstances
    known to the officers when Jackson’s backpack was searched would
    have warranted a person of reasonable caution in the belief that Olson
    had authority over the backpack. If so, Officer Smithey reasonably relied
    on apparent authority to authorize the warrantless search without
    making further inquiry.    To answer this question, we must consider
    whether a reasonable officer would have found Olson’s authority to
    consent to a search of the backpack ambiguous based on the facts and
    circumstances known to the officers. See Waller, 
    426 F.3d at 847
    .
    The evidence shows the officers knew the following facts when
    Officer Smithey conducted the search of the closed backpack.          The
    officers initiated contact with the occupants of the apartment because
    they saw a black male observing them from the window and suspected
    he was involved in the robbery. The officers had just responded to a call
    about a robbery allegedly committed by two black males and followed
    footprints in the snow to the building in which the apartment was
    located.    They were not responding to a call originating inside the
    apartment. When the officers knocked on the front door, it was nearly
    1:00 a.m.    After Turner answered the door and let the officers inside,
    Turner and Miller told the officers they lived in the apartment with their
    roommate, Olson.
    Turner and Miller indicated Olson was the only other person
    present in the apartment, but that turned out to be untrue.         When
    Officer Smithey asked Olson if he could peek inside his bedroom, Olson
    31
    acknowledged Jackson was asleep in his bed.        Olson told the officers
    Jackson was not in the apartment when he went to sleep and he awoke
    to discover Jackson sleeping beside him, but he did not suggest he was
    alarmed to discover Jackson in his bed. No one suggested to the officers
    that Jackson had broken into the apartment or had recently arrived, and
    no one indicated anything suspicious had occurred that evening.
    Rather, Turner indicated he had been home since approximately
    9:00 p.m. and nothing suspicious had occurred since that time.         The
    officers did not ask Turner, Miller, or Olson if Jackson was staying in the
    apartment or if he had any belongings there.        Although the officers
    noticed Jackson was sweaty and difficult to rouse from slumber, they
    found him to be cooperative once he was awake.
    Before Officer Smithey informed Jackson of the outstanding
    warrant for his arrest and escorted him from the room, the officers did
    not ask him if he was staying in the apartment or had any belongings
    there. When the officers later asked Olson if there were any guns in his
    bedroom, he responded that there should not be or there were not any
    that he knew of. Olson then consented to a search of the room for guns
    or evidence of the robbery, but neither officer asked whether he owned
    the backpack or confirmed that everything in the room belonged to him.
    The backpack was sitting a few feet from the bed where Jackson had just
    been sleeping along the wall next to or partly inside the closet door,
    which was partially off its hinges.
    We conclude the circumstances existing when Officer Smithey
    conducted the search of the backpack would cause a person of
    reasonable caution to question whether the backpack belonged to
    Jackson or Olson and whether it was subject to mutual use by Olson.
    See 
    id. at 849
    .    First, although no one in the apartment referred to
    32
    Jackson as an overnight guest, the circumstances clearly suggested
    Jackson was an overnight guest.          When the officers arrived at the
    apartment in the middle of the night, Jackson appeared to be asleep in a
    bed. Olson stated he was not sure when Jackson arrived, but he was not
    alarmed when he awoke to discover Jackson partially clothed beside him
    in bed.     Obviously Olson and Jackson were familiar enough that
    Jackson’s presence in Olson’s room late at night was not an unusual
    occurrence. In fact, there was reason to believe Jackson had a key to the
    apartment because Turner and Miller did not appear to know Jackson
    was in the apartment and Olson indicated Jackson arrived when he was
    asleep.     In other words, the information available to the officers
    suggested Jackson arrived at the apartment when no one was home
    sometime after Olson went to sleep but before Turner arrived home from
    work.
    Second, the circumstances known to the officers were sufficient to
    alert them to the fact that Jackson had clothes other than the pajama
    pants he was wearing at the apartment. The officers knew it was cold
    enough outside that Jackson probably had some sort of warmer apparel
    at the apartment, as there was fresh snow on the ground and they had
    followed footprints in the snow to the apartment building. The floor plan
    of the apartment was such that Jackson would have had to enter it from
    outdoors.
    Third, the circumstances indicated it was likely the clothes
    Jackson was wearing when he arrived at the apartment were in Olson’s
    bedroom. Jackson was asleep on the bed in Olson’s bedroom wearing
    pajama pants when the officers arrived. Yet the statements Turner and
    Miller made to the officers indicated they did not know Jackson was in
    the apartment.     Had Jackson changed into the pajama pants in the
    33
    bathroom, kitchen, or living room and left his clothes there, Turner and
    Miller likely would have seen them and known Jackson was in the
    apartment. Thus, the fact that Turner and Miller did not know Jackson
    was in the apartment suggested he either changed into the pajama pants
    in Olson’s room or moved his clothes to Olson’s room after putting the
    pajama pants on. Moreover, a backpack is the sort of container a person
    staying overnight in a place other than his or her home might use to hold
    clothing and other personal items.
    Fourth, the statements Olson made suggested he knew there were
    items in his bedroom that did not belong to him. Olson did not answer
    definitively when asked whether there was a gun in the room.         Had
    everything in the room that could conceal a gun belonged to Olson, he
    could have stated with certainty that there was no gun in the room.
    Instead, Olson waffled. His uncertainty in response to a direct question
    suggested he knew there were items in the room that did not belong to
    him and knew that one of those items might be a container concealing a
    gun from plain view.
    Faced with these circumstances, we conclude a reasonable officer
    would have doubted whether Jackson owned the backpack and
    questioned whether Olson had authority to consent to a search of it. See
    
    id. at 848
    .     The State does not dispute the officers made no inquiry
    concerning who owned the backpack before Officer Smithey searched it.
    Nor does the State suggest either officer ever asked anyone whether
    Jackson was staying in the apartment or had any personal belongings
    there.     Had the officers asked questions intended to clarify whether
    Olson had authority to consent to the search of the backpack, Officer
    Smithey might have reasonably relied on the answers the officers
    received to proceed with a warrantless search based on Olson’s apparent
    34
    authority to consent. However, the officers asked no questions to clarify
    who owned or used the backpack before Officer Smithey searched it even
    though the circumstances indicated Olson’s authority to consent to a
    search of the backpack was ambiguous. Because the officers asked no
    such questions, Officer Smithey’s reliance on Olson’s consent to a search
    of his room to authorize a warrantless search of the backpack was
    unreasonable.     In short, because the circumstances were unclear and
    the officers sought no clarification, Officer Smithey could not reasonably
    rely on apparent authority to authorize a warrantless search of the
    backpack.
    The district court concluded the officers might have reasonably
    believed Jackson likely ran to the apartment after the robbery and
    feigned sleep.    We do not disagree.   However, the circumstances also
    suggested Jackson was either an overnight guest or staying in the
    apartment. The fact the officers might have reasonably thought one of
    these scenarios was more likely than the other does not eliminate the
    fact the circumstances were ambiguous.      Moreover, if Officer Smithey
    reasonably believed Jackson was one of the restaurant robbers when he
    searched the backpack, that suggests he did not reasonably believe
    Olson had authority over the backpack when he searched it. If the very
    purpose of the search was to find evidence linking Jackson to the
    robbery, Officer Smithey would have had no motivation to open the
    closed backpack unless he believed it might have belonged to Jackson.
    See 
    id. at 849
    .
    Finally, we note apparent authority is only a lawful basis for a
    search in “situations in which an officer would have had valid consent to
    search if the facts were as he reasonably believed them to be.” Salinas-
    Cano, 
    959 F.2d at 865
     (quoting Whitfield, 
    939 F.2d at 1074
    ). Thus, even
    35
    if Officer Smithey reasonably believed Jackson had just arrived in the
    apartment, he could only reasonably rely on apparent authority to justify
    the search of the backpack so long as he reasonably believed Olson
    owned it. In light of the facts known to the officers when Officer Smithey
    opened the backpack, after realizing it contained a wallet and clothing
    recently worn outside, a reasonable officer would have been on notice
    that the backpack might not belong to Olson.
    Nonetheless, when Officer Smithey removed the wallet from the
    backpack, he initially declined to open it. Instead, he reached into the
    backpack again, felt the wet hem on the jeans, and realized they had just
    been worn outside in the snow. At that point, if not before, a reasonable
    officer would have suspected the backpack likely belonged to Jackson.
    However, instead of stopping the search, Officer Smithey removed the
    jeans from the backpack and saw the gun beneath them. Only then did
    he open the wallet to confirm his suspicion that Jackson owned the
    backpack. The fact that he did so confirms he recognized it was unclear
    who owned the backpack by the time he removed the jeans from within
    it. Because Officer Smithey could not have reasonably believed it was
    certain that Olson owned the backpack, yet declined to open the wallet
    sooner despite the ambiguous circumstances, his continued reliance on
    Olson’s consent to authorize the warrantless search was unreasonable.
    Because   we   conclude    the    circumstances   were   sufficiently
    ambiguous to place a reasonable officer on notice of his obligation to
    make inquiry as to who had authority to consent to a search of the
    closed backpack prior to searching it, we conclude the warrantless
    search of the backpack was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. See
    Waller, 
    426 F.3d at 849
    .    Thus, the district court erred in failing to
    suppress the evidence found in the backpack and the fruits of the
    36
    unlawful search. See Wong Sun v. United States, 
    371 U.S. 471
    , 484–85,
    
    83 S. Ct. 407
    , 415–16, 
    9 L. Ed. 2d 441
    , 453–54 (1963).
    VI. The Defendant’s Claim Under the Iowa Constitution.
    Jackson also claims the State violated his rights under article I,
    section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.         Article I, section 8 of the Iowa
    Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
    persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
    searches shall not be violated.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 8.
    We jealously guard our right to construe a provision of our state
    constitution differently than its federal counterpart, though the two
    provisions may contain nearly identical language and have the same
    general scope, import, and purpose.        Kooima, 833 N.W.2d at 206; see
    Varnum v. Brien, 
    763 N.W.2d 862
    , 878 n.6 (Iowa 2009). We also reserve
    our right to independently apply a federal standard more stringently than
    federal    caselaw   when   construing     the   requirements   of    our   state
    constitution, whether or not a party has advanced a different standard
    applies under the state constitution. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d at 206; see
    Varnum, 
    763 N.W.2d at
    879 n.6.
    However, because we conclude the warrantless search violated the
    federal constitution, we need not decide whether independent analysis or
    a   more    stringent   application   of   the   federal   standard   governing
    warrantless searches is required under our state constitution.               See
    Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 267; cf. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald,
    
    675 N.W.2d 1
    , 4–7 (Iowa 2004) (describing this court’s obligation to
    independently evaluate constitutionality under our state constitution
    when conduct does not violate the federal constitution). Thus, we do not
    consider whether a warrantless search is valid under our state
    37
    constitution when the individual who consented to a search of a
    premises had apparent authority, but not actual authority, to consent to
    a search of a closed container on that premises. See, e.g., State v. Lopez,
    
    896 P.2d 889
    , 903 (Haw. 1995); State v. McLees, 
    994 P.2d 683
    , 690–91
    (Mont. 2000); State v. Wright, 
    893 P.2d 455
    , 460–61 (N.M. Ct. App.
    1995); State v. Will, 
    885 P.2d 715
    , 719–20 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). Nor do we
    consider whether Jackson’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective
    for failing to argue the state constitution permits a warrantless search of
    a closed container based on consent to a premises search only when the
    person who consented to the premises search had actual authority to
    consent to a search of the closed container.
    VII. Disposition.
    Because the State failed to prove Olson had apparent authority to
    consent to a search of Jackson’s backpack, we conclude the warrantless
    search was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
    Constitution without further inquiry. Because the district court erred in
    denying Jackson’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the
    backpack and the fruits of the unlawful search, we vacate the decision of
    the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and
    remand the case for a new trial.
    DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
    COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
    All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially, and
    Zager, Waterman, and Mansfield, JJ., who dissent.
    38
    #14–0067, State v. Jackson
    APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).
    I concur in the majority opinion. I would base the decision in this
    case, however, on article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
    First, article I, section 1 declares that men and women have
    certain “inalienable rights,” among those being “enjoying and defending
    life and liberty . . . .”   The general declaration of inalienable rights is
    given further definition in article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution,
    which provides,
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
    papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
    searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
    but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
    particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
    persons and things to be seized.
    The constitutional focus of article I, section 8 is on protecting personal,
    inalienable rights at the very heart of freedom, the right to be secure in
    one’s    home   and   personal    effects   from   unwarranted     government
    invasions. See State v. Young, 
    863 N.W.2d 249
    , 278 (Iowa 2015) (“The
    bill of rights of the Iowa Constitution embraces the notion of ‘inalienable
    rights’ . . . .”); State v. Short, 
    851 N.W.2d 474
    , 484 (Iowa 2014) (noting
    the role of article I, section 1 in this court’s decision in Coger v. Nw.
    Union Packet Co., 
    37 Iowa 145
     (1873), which rejected the notion that
    African Americans could be subjected to different treatment in public
    transportation); Joseph R. Grodin, Rediscovering the State Constitutional
    Right to Happiness and Safety, 25 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1, 22 (1997)
    (“[M]ost courts have assumed that the inalienable rights clauses have
    some judicially enforceable content.”).
    Second, the United States Supreme Court, in recent innovations,
    has undercut its own previous recognition of the traditional and
    39
    fundamental concept that search and seizure protections are personal
    rights. In Stoner v. California, the Court declared that the right to be free
    from a warrantless search was “a right . . . which only the petitioner
    could waive . . . either directly or through an agent.” 
    376 U.S. 483
    , 489,
    
    84 S. Ct. 889
    , 893, 
    11 L. Ed. 2d 856
    , 860 (1964). Consistent with the
    personal-rights theory of search and seizure protections, after Stoner, the
    Court held that search and seizure rights are personal rights which
    cannot be asserted by a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
    439 U.S. 128
    , 133–
    34, 
    99 S. Ct. 421
    , 425, 
    58 L. Ed. 2d 387
    , 391 (1978).         Although the
    Court significantly and unworkably undermined the concept of consent
    in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, consent was still described as a situation
    “where a person foregoes a constitutional right.” 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 245, 
    93 S. Ct. 2041
    , 2057, 
    36 L. Ed. 2d 854
    , 873 (1973).
    The Court, however, upset the logic and balance of its prior
    consent cases in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. 177
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 2793
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d 148
     (1990). In Rodriguez, the Court abandoned its focus on the
    personal nature of search and seizure protections and instead developed
    a new test of consent based on the reasonableness of police conduct. 
    Id. at 184
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2799
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 158
    ; see Christo Lassiter,
    Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 
    39 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1171
    , 1173
    (2007) (characterizing Rodriguez as “a new approach”).
    This new approach to consent embraced by the Court in Rodriguez
    stands in strong contradiction to its prior caselaw.        We should not
    embrace this new approach to consent under the Iowa Constitution,
    which protects inalienable rights, including those related to search and
    seizure in article I, section 8.          We have rejected “socio-juristic
    rationalizations” or “dilution” theories in search and seizure law. State v.
    Cullison, 
    173 N.W.2d 533
    , 536 (Iowa 1970).
    40
    Third, while the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez and
    other later cases has sought to shrink the warrant requirement through
    radiations emanating from a highly pliable reasonableness clause, we
    have declined to adopt this additional revision of traditional search and
    seizure law under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Instead,
    we have reaffirmed the primacy of the warrant requirement. See State v.
    Ochoa, 
    792 N.W.2d 260
    , 269 (Iowa 2010).
    We examined these developments at length in State v. Short, 
    851 N.W.2d 474
    .       As noted in Short, our constitutional jurisprudence has
    long emphasized the primacy of the warrant requirement. Id. at 503. In
    Short, we reiterated the traditional view that the constitutional workhorse
    of the search and seizure protections under article I, section 8 is the
    warrant requirement.         Id. at 506.     As explained in Short, the warrant
    requirement mandates not only that searches be approved by a neutral
    magistrate, but equally importantly that the scope of the search be well
    defined and that probable cause exists to support it.              Id. at 502–03.
    Short    firmly   rejected    the    view    that   a   freestanding   concept   of
    “reasonableness . . . [was] the touchstone of search and seizure law.” Id.
    at 501.     We stated in Short that such an approach eviscerated the
    protections available under search and seizure law. Id. at 501–02.
    There are, as recognized in Short, exceptions to the ordinarily
    required warrant based largely upon the impracticability of obtaining a
    warrant.     Id. at 496–97.         There is no claim in this case that the
    warrantless search here was supported by exigent circumstances or a
    search incident to arrest. The search is supported solely on the theory of
    consent. The question thus is whether the defendant here consented to
    forego the constitutional protections offered by the warrant requirement
    41
    under article I, section 8.    If a person grants consent to a search or
    seizure, the protections of article I, section 8 are inapplicable.
    Fourth, in evaluating consent, the sole focus is whether the
    individual has elected to forgo personal constitutional protections,
    thereby rendering constitutional limitations inapplicable.           The focus
    should laser in on the only relevant constitutional issues: Did the
    defendant give consent, and was the consent voluntary or coerced?
    We must thus separate the wheat from the chaff.                 Consent
    searches have nothing to do with the impracticability of obtaining a
    warrant.   Impracticability is beside the point.     Consent searches have
    nothing to do with the reasonability of police conduct. Otherwise, the
    personal search and seizure protections of article I, section 8 are turned
    upside down and subverted from providing personal protections into an
    enabling act allowing police to engage in warrantless searches without
    consent as long as the search meets some freewheeling post-hoc concept
    of reasonableness.      See Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by
    Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent,
    Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the
    Excusability of Police Error, 
    59 Tenn. L. Rev. 1
    , 6 (1991) [hereinafter
    Davies].
    Here, it is clear there was no actual consent.           Further, it is
    undisputed that no third party had actual authority to give consent.
    Under article I, section 8, a warrant is thus required to conduct the
    search, unless some exception to the warrant requirement is present.
    Because the State does not claim any other basis to support the search,
    the results of the search are based on an unauthorized third-party
    consent and must be suppressed.
    42
    In this case, counsel for Jackson did not argue that article I,
    section 8 of the Iowa Constitution should be construed differently from
    its federal counterpart.     In my view, Jackson received ineffective
    assistance of counsel because of his failure to raise the issue.    As we
    have previously stated, defense lawyers must “take pains to guarantee
    that their training is adequate and their knowledge up-to-date in order to
    fulfill their duty as advocates.”   State v. Vance, 
    790 N.W.2d 775
    , 785
    (Iowa 2010) (quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution
    Function and Defense Function 4-1.2(e) cmt., at 122–23 (3d ed. 1993)).
    Further, an effective attorney is one who “diligently devotes him or
    herself to scholarly study of the governing legal principles” implicated in
    a given case. Id. at 786 (quoting 16 Gregory C. Sisk & Mark S. Cady,
    Iowa Practice Series: Lawyer and Judicial Ethics, § 5:1(b), at 140 (2007)).
    A lawyer conforming to these standards would have been aware of the
    willingness of state courts, including Iowa’s, to depart from United States
    Supreme Court precedent in the search and seizure area, of the caselaw
    from other jurisdictions where state supreme courts have declined to
    follow Rodriguez, and of the academic literature criticizing the consent
    doctrine adopted in Rodriguez. See State v. Lopez, 
    896 P.2d 899
    , 901–02
    (Haw. 1995); State v. McLees, 
    994 P.2d 683
    , 691 (Mont. 2000); State v.
    Wright, 
    893 P.2d 455
    , 461 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Will, 
    885 P.2d 715
    , 719 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Morse, 
    123 P.3d 832
    , 838 (Wash.
    2005); Davies, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. at 8–10.
    For the above reasons, I would thus hold that the search in this
    case is constitutionally infirm under article I, section 8 of the Iowa
    Constitution.
    43
    #14–0067, State v. Jackson
    ZAGER, Justice (dissenting).
    I respectfully dissent.
    After thoroughly reviewing all of the evidence, the district court
    concluded that under the Fourth Amendment, Olson had apparent
    authority to consent to the search of the backpack located in his
    bedroom. I agree, and I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals
    and the judgment of the district court.
    As a preliminary matter, I agree with the conclusion reached by the
    majority that this case can be decided under the Fourth Amendment to
    the United States Constitution and the cases cited therein. See Illinois v.
    Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. 177
    , 186, 
    110 S. Ct. 2793
    , 2800, 
    111 L. Ed. 2d 148
    ,
    160 (1990).        However, I also think it is important to recognize the
    standard of review that must be utilized. Our review in this case is de
    novo. State v. Gaskins, 
    866 N.W. 2d 1
    , 5 (Iowa 2015). “Because this
    case concerns the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
    searches and seizures, our review of the district court’s suppression
    ruling is de novo.”      
    Id.
     (quoting State v. Watts, 
    801 N.W.2d 845
    , 850
    (Iowa    2011)).      “We   independently   evaluate   the   totality   of   the
    circumstances found in the record, including the evidence introduced at
    both the suppression hearing and at trial.” 
    Id.
     (quoting State v. Vance,
    
    790 N.W.2d 775
    , 780 (Iowa 2010)).
    I. General Search and Seizure Principles.
    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
    papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
    seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
    but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
    and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
    persons or things to be seized.
    44
    U.S. Const. amend. IV.     Both the Fourth Amendment and article I,
    section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect the right of individuals to be
    free from unreasonable searches and seizures.     Id.; Iowa Const. art. I,
    § 8.
    “Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable if they do not fall
    within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”
    State v. Tyler, 
    867 N.W.2d 136
    , 169 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Lowe,
    
    812 N.W.2d 554
    , 568 (Iowa 2012)).       Under the Fourth Amendment, a
    warrant is not required to authorize a search performed pursuant to
    voluntary consent. See State v. Pals, 
    805 N.W.2d 767
    , 777 (Iowa 2011).
    Likewise, we have recognized that an officer may rely on the consent of a
    third party to authorize a warrantless search, so long as the
    circumstances indicate the third party had actual authority to consent to
    a search of the location. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 
    326 N.W.2d 350
    ,
    352 (Iowa 1982).    The State has conceded that there was no actual
    authority for the third party—Olson—to consent to the search of the
    backpack.
    II. Apparent Authority to Consent to a Search.
    Under the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement officer is entitled
    to rely on the consent of a third party authorizing a warrantless search
    based on that third party’s apparent authority to consent to the search in
    question. Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 186
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2800
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 160
    .   The Supreme Court has made it clear that under the Fourth
    Amendment, law enforcement officers may conduct a search based on
    the consent of a party who does not have actual authority over the
    property to be searched, so long as the officers reasonably (though
    erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their entry
    had authority over the premises. 
    Id.
     In Rodriguez, the Court concluded
    45
    a warrantless search conducted after obtaining the consent of a third
    party does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the facts
    available to the officers at the time of the search occurred would
    “ ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the consenting
    party had authority over the premises.” 
    Id. at 188
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    ,
    
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
     (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 21–22, 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 1880, 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    , 906 (1968)). If not, “warrantless entry
    without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists.” 
    Id.
    at 188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    .              The Court
    cautioned that “surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such
    that a reasonable person would doubt [an individual’s assertion of
    authority] and not act upon it without further inquiry.” 
    Id. at 188
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    . As such, we utilize an objective
    standard to determine whether apparent authority existed at the time of
    a warrantless search. 
    Id.
    We have adopted these doctrines through our own case law. See,
    e.g., Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 576. Relying on Rodriguez, we confirmed that
    the authority to consent includes not only actual authority, but also
    apparent authority.   Id.   We also confirmed that apparent authority
    validates a search when officers “enter without a warrant because they
    reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has
    consented to their entry” had the authority to do so.       Id.     (quoting
    Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 186
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2800
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 160
    ).
    We apply an objective standard when analyzing consent and ask,
    “[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a
    [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had
    authority over the premises?” 
    Id.
     (second alteration in original) (quoting
    Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 188
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    ).
    46
    A. Apparent Authority Applied to Closed Containers.                As the
    majority properly notes, the Supreme Court has yet to apply the doctrine
    of consent by a third party to the search of another’s closed container
    under the theory of apparent authority. I also recognize that there is a
    split of authority as to the application of the doctrine among the federal
    circuit courts of appeals. However, what is clear is that any analysis of
    the doctrine is highly fact-specific. It is equally clear that it is only in
    those circumstances where ambiguity exists that it is reasonable to
    require that officers make further inquiry regarding the ownership of the
    closed container.      “Even when the invitation is accompanied by an
    explicit   assertion   that   the   person   lives   there,   the   surrounding
    circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would
    doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry.” Rodriguez,
    at 188, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    . While acknowledging a
    split of authority, a review of various decisions of the United States
    Courts of Appeal confirms several conclusions. First, the facts in those
    cases are distinguishable from the facts presented here. Second, there is
    no ambiguity relating to the authority of Olson to consent to the search
    of the backpack in this case. Therefore, the law enforcement officers had
    no duty to make further inquiry before they searched the backpack.
    1. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. In United States v. Salinas-Cano,
    the defendant was arrested following a controlled drug buy. 
    959 F.2d 861
    , 862 (10th Cir. 1992). After his arrest, police went to his girlfriend’s
    apartment and asked her for permission to search. 
    Id.
     The police told
    her they were specifically interested in Salinas-Cano’s possessions. 
    Id.
    She consented to the search and told the police where Salinas-Cano kept
    his belongings at her apartment. 
    Id.
     The police opened what they had
    47
    just been advised was Salinas-Cano’s closed but unlocked suitcase,
    where they discovered cocaine. 
    Id.
    In addition to the obvious differences between the facts of Salinas-
    Cano and the case presently before us, the legal arguments were also
    distinct.   In Salinas-Cano, the government primarily relied on the
    concepts of actual authority, joint access, and control in arguing for the
    admissibility of the evidence.    See 
    id. at 863
    .    The government also
    attempted to utilize the apparent authority doctrine because the officer
    testified he thought the consenting party—the girlfriend—had joint access
    and control. 
    Id. at 865
    . As properly concluded by the court, apparent
    authority “does not empower the police to legitimize a search merely by
    the incantation of the phrase.”    
    Id.
        The analysis should instead rest
    entirely upon the reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the apparent
    authority. 
    Id.
    There is no logical correlation between the facts in Salinas-Cano
    and the facts in the case now before us.         I would agree there may
    arguably be ambiguity under the facts presented in Salinas-Cano
    regarding actual authority, joint access, and control.       Under those
    circumstances, further inquiry by police would appear reasonable. The
    failure to make this further inquiry regarding actual authority, joint
    access, and control over what the officers knew was someone else’s
    property was unreasonable. However, the decision in that case bears no
    factual similarity to the facts of our case and does not help inform the
    outcome here.
    2. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case currently before us is
    also clearly distinguishable from the facts considered by the Sixth Circuit
    in United States v. Waller. 
    426 F.3d 838
     (6th Cir. 2005). After a falling
    out with the owners of his previous residence, Waller obtained
    48
    permission from a friend to store his personal belongings in the friend’s
    apartment. 
    Id. at 842
    . Waller kept a brown luggage bag, garbage bags of
    clothing, and food at the friend’s apartment. 
    Id.
     He also ate, showered,
    and changed clothes at the apartment, but he did not sleep there. 
    Id.
    Waller was later arrested in the parking lot of the apartment complex
    where the friend resided. 
    Id.
     After arresting Waller in the parking lot,
    the arresting officers proceeded to the apartment. 
    Id.
     Waller’s friend, the
    tenant, advised the officers that Waller had been storing some property
    in his apartment.     
    Id.
       The friend consented to the search of the
    apartment, and the police began searching for personal items belonging
    to Waller. 
    Id.
     One of the officers found the zipped brown luggage bag in
    the bedroom closet, opened it, and discovered two handguns. 
    Id.
    Relying on Rodriguez, the court stated, “[W]here the circumstances
    presented would cause a person of reasonable caution to question
    whether the third party has mutual use of the property, ‘warrantless
    entry without further inquiry is unlawful[.]’ ”   
    Id. at 846
     (alteration in
    original) (quoting Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at
    188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    ). The court concluded that “the circumstances made it
    unclear whether Waller’s luggage bag was ‘subject to mutual use by’ [his
    friend] and therefore the officers’ warrantless entry into that luggage
    without further inquiry was unlawful.” Id. at 847. As will be discussed
    below, ambiguous facts related to mutual use and apparent authority are
    not present in our case.
    3. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The facts considered by the
    Seventh Circuit in United States v. Melgar are most analogous to the
    facts before us now.        
    227 F.3d 1038
     (7th Cir. 2000).        In their
    investigation of the charges of passing counterfeit checks, officers
    obtained consent to search a motel room from the woman who had
    49
    rented it. 
    Id. at 1039
    . There were a number of other people in the room
    when the officers arrived. 
    Id.
     While conducting a search of the room, the
    officers found a purse with no identifying marks on it under the mattress
    of the hotel bed. 
    Id. at 1040
    . Without inquiring further as to which of
    the occupants owned the purse, the officers opened it. 
    Id.
     The court
    rejected the argument that the officers should have inquired further as to
    the actual ownership of the purse. 
    Id.
     at 1041–42. The court concluded
    that apparent authority exists so long as the officer who conducts a
    warrantless search pursuant to third-party consent has no reliable
    information indicating that the consenting party has no authority over
    the container being searched. 
    Id.
    The majority rejects the Seventh Circuit’s approach for requiring
    such “reliable information.”    However, I believe that requiring some
    reliable facts is the most logical approach. The facts are even stronger in
    our case. Olson, the sole tenant of the room, provided consent to search
    his bedroom.    After being granted consent to search, police had no
    reason to believe there was any limitation on the consent unless some
    information,   whether    expressed    by   someone   or   clear   from   the
    circumstances, alerted the officers that the authority to search a closed
    container in his bedroom may be in question. A simple “that purse isn’t
    mine” on the facts of Melgar, or a simple “that’s not my backpack” here,
    would seem to suffice. Simply standing mute does not.
    4. Second Circuit Court of Appeals.       The facts of the Second
    Circuit’s decision in United States v. Snype are so convoluted that even a
    full recitation would not, in my opinion, contribute to a principled
    resolution of our case.     See 
    441 F.3d 119
    , 125–27 (2d Cir. 2006).
    However, the one principle that does evolve from this opinion is the
    approach to apparent authority taken by the Second Circuit.               The
    50
    approach taken in Snype is that an open-ended consent to search an
    apartment by a lessee permits the search and seizure of any items found
    in the apartment with the exception of those that “obviously belonged” to
    another person.    
    Id. at 137
    .    This is a fact question to be decided
    objectively based on a review of the unique facts and circumstances of
    each case.
    III. Applicable Test.
    The majority spends a considerable number of pages attempting to
    decide who has the burden of proof in a case of apparent authority to
    search when consent is given by a third party.         There is really no
    question that the government bears the burden of proving that any
    search does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Under Rodriguez, when
    consent to a warrantless search is given by a third person, such consent
    must be based on actual or apparent authority. See Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at
    188–89, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    .         None of the
    authorities cited by the majority stand for the proposition that the
    defendant must come forward with evidence to show the officer could not
    have reasonably relied on the third-party consent. There is no burden
    placed on the defendant. Rather, an objective review of the facts of each
    case will speak for themselves. Likewise, the various competing interests
    discussed by the majority are already subsumed in the standards that
    the courts have been utilizing for decades.
    In Rodriguez, the Court clearly established that the government
    has two potential avenues for meeting its burden of proving the
    effectiveness of third-party consent.         First, the government may
    introduce evidence demonstrating that the person who consented to the
    search had actual authority to consent. 
    Id. at 181
    , 
    110 S. Ct. at 2798
    ,
    
    111 L. Ed. 2d at
    155–56.         Second, the government may introduce
    51
    evidence demonstrating that the facts available to the officer at the time
    of the search would have warranted a person of reasonable caution in
    the belief that the person whose consent had been obtained had the
    authority to consent to the search. 
    Id.
     at 185–86, 
    110 S. Ct. at 2801
    ,
    
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
    . Nothing in these standards shifts the burden of
    proof to the defendant.
    This brings us to the issue of ambiguity. The majority takes the
    position that any time there is a question of ownership of a container, no
    matter how remote or how attenuated it may be, an ambiguity exists
    which requires further inquiry by police.      Failing to make this further
    inquiry makes the search unlawful. However, this is not what the law or
    the Constitution requires.
    Rodriguez neither imposes a duty of exhaustive inquiry by
    police before apparent authority will be found to exist, nor
    credits willful ignorance; it requires that the officer’s belief in
    the consenter’s authority over the place or object be
    objectively reasonable.
    State v. Westlake, 
    353 P.3d 438
    , 442 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015). Police may
    not accept an invitation to search if the existing circumstances would
    cause a reasonable person to doubt the consenter’s authority, absent
    any further inquiry.      
    Id.
       The question here is whether a reasonable
    police officer, looking at all the facts available, would doubt that Olson
    had the authority to consent to the search of his bedroom and the
    contents of his bedroom, including the backpack.          The answer is that
    there is no reasonable doubt.        There is also no ambiguity requiring
    further inquiry. There was no Fourth Amendment violation here.
    IV. Analysis.
    The parties stipulated Olson did not have actual authority to
    consent to the search of Jackson’s backpack.          In addition, the State
    52
    conceded Jackson maintained control over his backpack located in
    Olson’s bedroom. We must therefore determine whether Olson had the
    apparent authority to consent to the search of Jackson’s backpack. Any
    analysis must begin with a full recitation of the facts.
    A. Facts. On November 13, 2012, Iowa City police officer Michael
    McKenna was dispatched to the On the Go BP gas station in Iowa City
    after a report of an armed robbery. The store clerk reported that a black
    male with a thin build, wearing a black mask and a red coat, entered the
    store, pointed a gun at him, and demanded the money in the cash
    register and a carton of Newport 100’s cigarettes.         Detective Scott
    Stevens of the Iowa City Police Department was the primary investigator
    for the On the Go BP robbery.             Detective Stevens watched the
    surveillance video of the robbery with the store owner. The video showed
    a medium height, black male enter the store wearing a red coat, a black
    face mask, and white tennis shoes. On December 13, the store owner
    called Detective Stevens and told him that a customer had identified the
    robber as a man with the street name “Juicy.” With this information,
    Detective Stevens was able to identify “Juicy” as Marvis Latrell Jackson.
    After unsuccessful attempts to reach Jackson, Detective Stevens
    obtained a warrant for his arrest.
    At 12:35 a.m. on December 31, Iowa City police officer Michael
    Smithey was dispatched to Gumby’s Pizza after a report of an armed
    robbery.   The Gumby’s employee told Officer Smithey that two black
    males had entered the restaurant wearing black hats and had black
    bandanas covering their faces. One of the men had pointed a handgun
    at him and demanded money from the cash register.           The employee
    complied and estimated that the robbers took $125 in one dollar bills,
    53
    $50 in five dollar bills, and one twenty dollar bill. The men ran out of the
    store and headed northbound on Gilbert Street.
    While Officer Smithey met with the employee, another man
    approached the officer and asked if there had been a robbery. The man
    stated he had just witnessed two black males walking away from the area
    and one of the men appeared to be holding a fistful of cash.        He also
    stated that when the men saw him, they took off running.             Officer
    Smithey drove the witness to the location where he had last seen the
    men on foot. Officer Smithey noticed footprints in the fresh snow and
    called for a canine unit.    Officer Brandon Faulkcon and his canine
    partner arrived and were able to track the scent and the footprints to the
    southeast corner of a building located on South Gilbert Street.          Also
    present were Officer Smithey and Officer Alex Stricker. The street level of
    the building was a retail establishment, while the second story contained
    apartments with outside doors accessible by a common stairwell in the
    rear of the building.   The officers visually surveyed the exterior of the
    building. They saw lights on in one of the apartments and observed a
    tall black male looking out of the window inquisitively.          The man
    appeared to match the description of one of the robbery suspects. When
    he saw the officers looking up at him, he quickly ducked out of sight.
    After this observation, the officers decided to approach the
    apartment. When the officers arrived at the front door, they noticed that
    the lights in the apartment had been turned off.          While they were
    standing outside the front door, they heard the apartment door lock from
    the inside. Officer Smithey knocked on the door and announced he was
    a police officer.   A tall black male answered the door and identified
    himself as Wesley Turner. The officers explained why they were there,
    and Turner allowed them inside the apartment. When officers asked who
    54
    else was present in the apartment, Turner answered that it was only
    him, his girlfriend Alyssa Miller, and their roommate Gunnar Olson.
    Turner told officers that Olson was asleep in his room, but he agreed to
    wake him so officers could speak with him. After Turner knocked on the
    bedroom door, Olson, who is also a black male, emerged from his room.
    The officers decided to speak with the men separately.      Officer
    Stricker continued to speak with Turner in the living room while Officer
    Smithey spoke with Olson in the kitchen. Turner said he had been in
    the apartment since he returned home from work at 9:00 p.m.           He
    reported he had not seen anything suspicious. When asked who lived in
    the apartment, Turner confirmed that he lived in the apartment with only
    Olson and Miller.
    In the kitchen, Olson also confirmed that the only residents of the
    apartment were himself, Turner, and Miller. Officer Smithey asked Olson
    if he could look in his room. Olson told him that he had been sleeping in
    his room after work and awoke to find his cousin, Marvis, sleeping next
    to him.   Upon further questioning by Officer Smithey, Olson admitted
    that he did not know Marvis’s last name and that they were not really
    cousins. When Officer Smithey entered Olson’s bedroom, he observed a
    black male—who he later identified as Jackson—lying on an air mattress,
    shirtless but wearing pajama bottoms.     Officer Smithey observed that
    Jackson’s neck and brow were sweaty, which he thought was odd since
    the apartment was not warm and no one else was sweating. Olson then
    attempted to wake Jackson.        Officer Smithey thought it seemed
    considerably more difficult than it should have been to wake him. After
    Jackson got up, he was asked for identification. Jackson stated that he
    did not have any identification, but identified himself as Marvis Latrell
    Jackson. The officers ran Jackson’s name through dispatch and were
    55
    advised of the outstanding warrant for his arrest.      Officer Smithey
    arrested Jackson and turned him over to another officer, who removed
    Jackson from the apartment.      Jackson did not indicate he had any
    personal possessions in the apartment or ask to retrieve any personal
    property.
    After Jackson was taken from the apartment, Officer Stricker
    continued to speak with Olson.      Olson repeated that Jackson had
    apparently arrived sometime earlier that evening after he had gone to
    sleep. He again confirmed that no one else lived in the apartment except
    for the three tenants. When Olson was asked whether there were any
    guns in the room, he replied that there should not be or that he did not
    know of any. Olson repeated that he lived in the bedroom alone. Officer
    Stricker asked Olson if he would consent to the search of his bedroom for
    guns or any evidence of the robbery.    Olson consented.   When Officer
    Smithey arrived, Officer Stricker informed him that Olson had consented
    to the search of his bedroom for guns and any evidence of the robbery.
    Officer Smithey confirmed with Olson that he consented to the search of
    his bedroom.
    Officer Smithey performed the search. He began the search of the
    bedroom by searching under and around the air mattress and on a chair.
    He then grabbed a backpack that was sitting on the floor in the doorway
    of the bedroom closet.   The backpack was closed and had no obvious
    identifying marks or tags. Officer Smithey opened the closed backpack
    and took out a wallet and placed it, unopened, on a nearby chair. Officer
    Smithey reached in a second time and retrieved a pair of dark jeans that
    were wet around the cuffs.   Upon removing the jeans, Officer Smithey
    saw a black handgun in the backpack. After discovering the handgun,
    Officer Smithey discontinued his search.
    56
    Officer Smithey then checked the wallet for identification and
    found that it contained identification belonging to Jackson.          Officer
    Smithey took a photograph of the handgun located inside the backpack
    to use in an application for a search warrant. He instructed the other
    officers to lock down the apartment so a search warrant could be
    obtained. After the officers locked down the apartment, they conducted a
    protective sweep. During the sweep, the officers observed a marijuana
    grinder and pipe, which they photographed and included in the search
    warrant application. Officer Smithey also included the photograph of the
    handgun in the application. Investigator Tom Hartshorn of the Iowa City
    Police Department applied for and obtained the search warrant for the
    apartment.    Investigator Hartshorn executed the warrant and found
    clothes matching the description of the Gumby’s robbers, in addition to
    money in an amount matching the description of the money taken from
    Gumby’s.
    B. Application. The threshold question in this case is whether,
    based on all of the facts presented, Officer Smithey reasonably relied on
    the apparent authority of Olson to consent to the search of the backpack
    located within his bedroom, or whether Officer Smithey reasonably
    needed to make further inquiry as to the ownership of the backpack.
    Based on the fact-intensive, objective standard that we must utilize, a
    reasonable person in Officer Smithey’s position would have concluded
    that Olson had the apparent authority to consent to the search of the
    backpack located on the floor of his bedroom. We only need to review the
    facts presented here to support this conclusion.
    As a starting point, contrary to the position of the majority, there is
    nothing ambiguous about Olson’s authority to consent to the search of
    his room, including the backpack. The officers initiated contact with the
    57
    occupants of the apartment as part of their investigation of an armed
    robbery that had just occurred. Their investigation revealed a direct path
    leading from the site of the robbery to the door of the apartment. This all
    occurred between 12:35 a.m. and 1:00 a.m.        There is no dispute that
    officers knocked on the door, identified themselves, and explained that
    they were investigating a robbery that had just occurred.           Turner
    consented to their entry into the apartment. They encountered Turner’s
    girlfriend, Miller, who also acknowledged that she lived in the apartment.
    Both Turner and Miller told officers that the only other person in the
    apartment was their roommate, Olson.
    Turner went to Olson’s bedroom and woke him.            The officers
    decided to speak with the two men separately.       Officer Stricker spoke
    with Turner. Turner indicated that he had been in the apartment since
    he arrived home from work at approximately 9:00 p.m. He had observed
    nothing suspicious. Meanwhile, Officer Smithey spoke with Olson in the
    kitchen. Olson confirmed he lived alone in the apartment with Turner
    and Miller.   Olson told the officer the bedroom was his alone.       Both
    Turner and Olson independently confirmed that there were no other
    tenants of the apartment, and there was no one else present in the
    apartment. Despite repeated affirmations from all three tenants to the
    contrary, when Officer Smithey asked Olson if he could peek inside his
    bedroom, he learned there was another person in the apartment. Olson
    claimed that he had gone to sleep, alone, earlier in the evening. It was
    only after he had been awakened by Turner that he realized his cousin
    Marvis had slipped into bed with him and was sleeping. When asked,
    Olson acknowledged that he did not know Marvis’s last name and they
    were not really cousins.
    58
    Olson led Officer Smithey to his bedroom while Officer Stricker
    looked on. It is at this point that an objective review of the facts becomes
    critical.   The majority blindly accepts the statements made by the
    Turner, Olson, and Miller, even in the face of their obvious incredibility
    and dishonesty.      No one suggested that Jackson had broken into the
    apartment, and no one suggested that the tenants were alarmed that
    Jackson was found in the apartment. However, these are not facts or
    evidence of anything. Likewise, none of the inhabitants—Turner, Miller,
    or Olson—even remotely suggested to the officers that Jackson was a
    tenant 5 or an overnight guest. 6
    The majority is persuaded by the statements from Turner that he
    had been home since 9:00 p.m., that no one had recently arrived at the
    apartment, and that he had not observed anything suspicious.                        Of
    course, all of these statements defy credibility. Further, the majority fails
    to explain the obvious feigned sleep or the sweat observed on Jackson’s
    forehead. This apparently does not require an explanation since “they
    found him to be cooperative once he was awake.”
    It was at this time that Jackson was informed of the outstanding
    warrant for his arrest. While neither officer could specifically remember
    telling Jackson to put his shirt back on before exiting the apartment,
    they both believe Jackson got dressed since it was the middle of winter.
    5Generally, one cotenant may consent to a search of a shared living area. United
    States v. Matlock, 
    415 U.S. 164
    , 171, 
    94 S. Ct. 988
    , 993, 
    39 L. Ed. 2d 242
    , 249–50
    (1974). However, if one of the physically present cotenants does not consent to the
    search, the search is rendered “unreasonable and invalid” as to that cotenant. Georgia
    v. Randolph, 
    547 U.S. 103
    , 106, 
    126 S. Ct. 1515
    , 1518–19, 
    164 L. Ed. 2d 208
    , 217
    (2006).
    6Overnight guests may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a host’s home.
    Minnesota v. Olson, 
    495 U.S. 91
    , 99–100, 
    110 S. Ct. 1684
    , 1689–90, 
    109 L. Ed. 2d 85
    ,
    95 (1990).
    59
    The officers did not ask Jackson if he was staying in the apartment or if
    he had any of his belongings in the apartment.     Nor do I believe they
    were required to do so.   The officers were following up on an armed
    robbery that had just occurred. The robbers had fled from the scene of
    the robbery to the apartment. In an attempt to elude detection, Jackson
    threw off his clothes, jumped into Olson’s bed, feigned sleep, and hoped
    that the tenants could prevent officers from detecting him. Officers were
    repeatedly told by all three tenants that there was no one else in the
    apartment and that no one else lived there. There is nothing ambiguous
    about this scenario. There is nothing in this record which would alert a
    reasonable officer to stop and ask Jackson whether he was staying there
    or whether he had any personal property located in the apartment. Of
    course, if Jackson wanted to alert officers that some of his property was
    located in Olson’s bedroom, he could easily have spoken up.
    Officers then asked Olson for consent to search his bedroom,
    which was granted. More importantly, Olson was specifically asked for
    consent to search his bedroom to look for guns and any evidence of the
    robbery.   When asked if any guns would be found, he replied there
    should not be any guns, or at least no guns that he knew of.       Olson
    consented to the search, without limitation. Olson also failed to inform
    the officers that some of the property in his bedroom might not belong to
    him.   Neither officer asked Olson whether he owned the backpack, or
    confirmed with Olson that everything in his bedroom belonged to him.
    Again, nothing in the record would require such an inquiry. There is no
    ambiguity under the facts here.     Nothing would have alerted Officer
    Smithey, as a person of reasonable caution, to question whether a
    backpack located near or partially in Olson’s bedroom closet actually
    belonged to him.
    60
    Certainly there were no facts tending to show the backpack
    belonged to Jackson. There is simply no evidence to support this. The
    majority first asserts that the circumstances clearly suggested that
    Jackson was an overnight guest. But let’s look at the facts. The majority
    finds significant that it was the middle of the night. However, the armed
    robbery the officers were investigating had occurred only minutes before.
    Jackson appeared to be asleep—yet the feigned heaviness of the sleep
    and the obvious sweat observed on Jackson’s forehead belies that he was
    asleep.   Olson told the officers that he did not know when Jackson
    disrobed and got into bed with him, but he was not alarmed. After first
    lying about Jackson’s mere existence in his bedroom, Olson could not
    even tell the officers Jackson’s last name. Under this set of facts, the
    majority concludes that “obviously Olson and Jackson are familiar
    enough that Jackson’s presence in Olson’s room late at night was not an
    unusual occurrence.” I find this incredible.
    The majority then enters into the realm of fantasy by suggesting
    that Jackson may have even had a key to the apartment because Turner
    and Miller did not appear to know Jackson was in the apartment and
    Olson claimed Jackson arrived after he was asleep. Or perhaps Jackson
    and someone else committed an armed robbery, Jackson ran to Turner’s
    apartment where they were let in, Jackson ran into Olson’s bedroom,
    disrobed and pretended to go to sleep, and hoped that Turner and Miller
    could hold the authorities at bay.    It is inconceivable that the officers
    here would reasonably believe that Jackson simply arrived in Olson’s
    bedroom when no one else was home sometime after Olson went to sleep
    but before Turner arrived home from work.
    Second, I agree that officers would have reasonably known that
    Jackson was probably wearing clothing other than his pajama pants
    61
    prior to his entering Olson’s bedroom.     However, I do not believe that
    adds any cogent facts to our analysis.      His clothing could have been
    literally anywhere in the apartment.       The officers had no reason to
    assume an overnight guest would stuff their wet pants in a backpack. It
    is much more likely the guest would toss their wet pants over a chair, in
    the closet, or on the tub in the bathroom.     The officers here were not
    looking for wet pants in a backpack, nor would they have any other
    reason to assume that the backpack belonged to Jackson. None of the
    facts in this record would lead a reasonable officer to question the
    ownership of the backpack.
    Similarly, the majority claims that the officers should have
    somehow reasonably known that Jackson’s clothes were concealed in an
    unmarked backpack located in Olson’s bedroom because he was in his
    pajama pants.     To support this inference, the majority repeats the
    already discredited story from Turner and Miller that they had no idea
    that Jackson was in the apartment. If they had seen his clothes in the
    bathroom, kitchen, or living room, then they would have known Jackson
    was there. The majority believes this “suggests” Jackson either changed
    into pajama pants in Olson’s room or moved the clothing to Olson’s room
    after changing. Then Jackson had the courtesy to stuff only his pants
    into the backpack, because this is the sort of container a person staying
    overnight in a place other than his own home might use to hold clothing
    and other personal items. But where is all of Jackson’s other clothing?
    Where did he find the clothing that he presumably wore out of the
    apartment?    Other than speculation and conjecture, there is simply
    nothing in these facts that aid Jackson.
    Last, the qualified statements made by Olson clearly do not alert
    officers that he knew there were items in his bedroom that did not belong
    62
    to him, namely the backpack. Olson did not give the officers a definitive
    answer when asked whether there was a gun in his room. This should
    not come as a shock based on the lack of honesty by all of the residents
    of the apartment up until this time. The majority takes this uncertainty
    in response and again suggests Olson knew there were items in the room
    that did not belong to him and knew that one of those items might be a
    container concealing a gun.     I do not believe that Olson’s avoidant
    answer to the question about a gun suggests anything close to this to a
    reasonable officer, nor would it suggest anything to a reasonable person.
    C. Conclusion.     Based on all of the above unique facts and
    circumstances, the majority concludes a reasonable officer would have
    questioned the ownership of the backpack and questioned whether Olson
    had the apparent authority to consent to the search of it. However, this
    conclusion rests upon the improper application of the Constitution and
    case law. Our inquiry under the Federal Constitution is whether it was
    reasonable for Officers Smithey and Stricker to believe that Olson had
    authority to consent to the search of the bedroom and the backpack
    contained therein. See Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 186
    , 110 S. Ct. at 2800,
    
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 160
     (“Whether the basis for such authority exists is the
    sort of recurring factual question to which law enforcement officials must
    be expected to apply their judgement; and all the Fourth Amendment
    requires is that they answer it reasonably.”). In determining whether it
    was reasonable for the officers to conclude Olson had authority to
    consent, we apply an objective standard. See Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 576.
    We ask if “the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . [would]
    ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting
    party had authority over the premises.’ ” Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. at 188
    ,
    110 S. Ct. at 2801, 
    111 L. Ed. 2d at 161
     (quoting Terry, 
    392 U.S. at
    21–
    63
    22, 
    88 S. Ct. at 1880
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d at 906
    ). All of the facts presented
    here would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that Olson
    had the authority to consent to the search of his room and the contents
    therein, including the backpack.
    The majority creates ambiguity in the undisputed facts by
    suggesting scenarios I have discounted above.        Nothing in the facts
    suggests Jackson was either an overnight guest or staying at the
    apartment. There is no reasonable ambiguity here. Importantly, when
    officers searched the backpack, they did not know who was involved in
    the restaurant robbery. The point of the consent search was an attempt
    to find evidence of the robbery.     Jackson had been arrested for an
    unrelated robbery that occurred weeks before.      Jackson had not been
    arrested for the restaurant robbery that had just occurred.
    The majority then leaps to the conclusion that the very purpose of
    the search of the backpack was to find evidence linking Jackson to the
    restaurant robbery—rather than Olson, whose bedroom was being
    searched. There is nothing in the record to support this statement. And
    there is nothing in the record to suggest the backpack even belonged to
    Jackson. Then the majority imputes to Officer Smithey that “he would
    have no motivation to open the closed backpack unless he believed it
    might belong to Jackson.” Nothing in the record even remotely suggests
    this. In fact, the only evidence in the record is that officers did not know
    who might be involved in the restaurant robbery.
    Officers were investigating a robbery and were interested in trying
    to find the gun that was used and any other evidence of the robbery.
    Olson repeatedly and unqualifiedly consented to the search of his
    bedroom. Nothing in the record suggests an alternative, improper motive
    64
    by officers in their search of the backpack in Olson’s bedroom—certainly
    nothing targeting Jackson or his personal property.
    Finally, the majority concludes that Officer Smithey could not
    reasonably rely on the apparent authority doctrine to search the
    backpack because it was not reasonable to believe that Olson owned it.
    But what evidence suggests Officer Smithey would not reasonably believe
    Olson owned the backpack?       Officers were repeatedly told by all the
    occupants that only the three tenants lived there. Olson confirmed that
    he lived in his bedroom by himself. Olson originally denied that there
    was anyone else in his bedroom. When caught, he did not even know
    Jackson’s last name.
    After Olson roused him, Jackson told the officers his name, but he
    also told them he had no identification. Jackson did not tell officers his
    identification was in his wallet in his backpack located a few feet away.
    After being arrested on the outstanding warrant, Jackson did not alert
    officers that he had a backpack located nearby.       The backpack was
    located on the floor near or in Olson’s bedroom closet.       During the
    search, Officer Smithey opened the backpack, discovered a wallet, and
    set it aside. According to the majority, this should somehow have alerted
    Officer Smithey that the backpack may belong to someone other than
    Olson. How does this raise that inference? We have no idea where Olson
    may have kept his billfold.    This is not as unusual as the majority
    suggests, and it does not point to the backpack belonging to someone
    other than Olson. Many people carry their wallet in a separate bag or
    backpack. Further, officers had just been explicitly told by Jackson that
    he had no identification.
    Officer Smithey reached into the backpack and discovered the
    jeans with the wet hem.     Again, officers did not know who the jeans
    65
    belonged to, but it was easy to conclude the jeans may have been related
    to the robbery. The majority then concludes a reasonable officer should
    have suspected the backpack belonged to Jackson. I disagree. This is
    only evidence that someone recently came in from the outdoors—which
    was exactly what the officers were investigating.    At this point, it was
    more likely for a reasonable officer to believe that the pants belonged to
    Olson than to someone else.      The majority then faults the officers for
    removing the jeans from the backpack, which lead to the discovery of the
    gun. After this discovery, and only then, was it reasonable to determine
    the ownership of the backpack. It was not, as stated by the majority, to
    clear up any ambiguity that officers reasonably had as to the ownership
    of the backpack.    Nothing in the record would have led a reasonable
    officer to doubt that Olson owned the backpack or would have put in
    doubt Olson’s ability to consent to its search.
    The facts and circumstances here were not ambiguous. Nothing in
    the record would put a reasonable officer on notice of any duty to make
    additional inquiry as to who had the authority to consent to the search of
    the closed backpack located in or around the closet of Olson’s bedroom.
    There was repeated, unqualified consent to search authorized by Olson.
    Olson clearly had the apparent authority to consent to the search of his
    bedroom and the contents of his bedroom. Nothing in the record shows
    any ambiguity in the facts requiring officers to inquire further as to the
    ownership of the backpack. Consent here was valid and lawful under
    the Fourth Amendment and supported by numerous authorities.           See,
    e.g., 
    id.
     The district court was correct in denying the motion to suppress.
    V. The Defendant’s Claim Under the Iowa Constitution.
    Jackson also argues that the State violated his rights under article
    I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.     Article I, section 8 of the Iowa
    66
    Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
    persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
    searches shall not be violated.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. Because I would
    conclude that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
    Federal Constitution in the search conducted here, I also address
    Jackson’s claim under the Iowa Constitution. See Pals, 805 N.W.2d at
    772 (“When, as here, a defendant raises both federal and state
    constitutional claims, the court has discretion to consider either claim
    first or consider the claims simultaneously.”).
    Jackson argues this court should adopt a more stringent standard
    of actual authority under the Iowa Constitution than that provided by
    the Federal Constitution.       However, the State argues that Jackson’s
    claim under the Iowa Constitution was not preserved because he did not
    specifically argue that there should be a more stringent actual-authority
    standard under the Iowa Constitution.        Jackson argues that error is
    preserved for appellate review when a defendant’s pretrial motion to
    suppress is overruled. In the alternative, Jackson argues that, to the
    extent error was not preserved, his counsel was ineffective for failing to
    adequately argue for the adoption of an actual-authority standard under
    the Iowa Constitution.
    Jackson’s motion to suppress states that “the search and evidence
    subsequently obtained violated the defendant’s rights under the 4th and
    14th amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
    8 of the Iowa Constitution.” The motion to suppress does not argue for
    any other specific application or interpretation of the Iowa Constitution
    that would be different than under the United States Constitution.
    Notably, Jackson’s motion to suppress did not specifically argue that the
    standard   for   consent   to   a   warrantless   search   under   the   Iowa
    67
    Constitution should be actual authority rather than the federal apparent-
    authority standard.     For purposes of this dissent, I assume without
    deciding that error was preserved because I find Jackson’s claim that we
    should adopt an actual-authority standard under the Iowa Constitution
    to be without merit. See State v. McNeal, 
    867 N.W.2d 91
    , 99 (Iowa 2015).
    1. Iowa law.      Jackson argues that we should adopt a more
    stringent standard under the Iowa Constitution than that afforded under
    the United States Constitution and federal case law.           He urges us to
    adopt a standard that would require a third party to have actual
    authority in order to consent to a search of a closed container.
    Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution is the “nearly identical
    [provision] to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
    State v. Short, 
    851 N.W.2d 474
    , 500–01 (Iowa 2014) (discussing the
    differences in punctuation between the state constitution and the Federal
    Constitution and how members of this court have interpreted said
    differences). It provides,
    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
    papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
    searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
    but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
    particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
    persons and things to be seized.
    Iowa Const. art. I, § 8.        Even when we hear “cases in which no
    substantive distinction had been made between state and federal
    constitutional provisions, we reserve the right to apply the principles
    differently   under   the    state   constitution   compared   to   its   federal
    counterpart.” King v. State, 
    797 N.W.2d 565
    , 571 (Iowa 2011). “Further,
    even where a party has not advanced a different standard for interpreting
    a state constitutional provision, we may apply the standard more
    68
    stringently than federal caselaw.” State v. Kooima, 
    833 N.W.2d 202
    , 206
    (Iowa 2013). However,
    our independent authority to construe the Iowa Constitution
    does not mean that we generally refuse to follow the United
    States Supreme Court decisions. . . . What is required under
    the Iowa Constitution, in each and every case that comes
    before us, is not mere identification of a potentially
    analogous federal precedent, but exercise of our best,
    independent judgment of the proper parameters of state
    constitutional commands.
    Short, 851 N.W.2d at 490.
    Only a few states have chosen to require an actual-authority
    standard under their own constitutions that is more stringent than the
    federal apparent-authority standard. See State v. Lopez, 
    896 P.2d 889
    ,
    903 (Haw. 1995) (holding that the individual giving consent to a search
    must possess actual authority to do so under the Hawaii Constitution);
    State v. McLees, 
    994 P.2d 683
    , 691 (Mont. 2000) (finding that under the
    Montana Constitution, “for third-party consent to be valid as against the
    defendant, the consenting party must have actual authority to do so”);
    State v. Will, 
    885 P.2d 715
    , 719 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that it was
    consistent with the Oregon Supreme Court precedent to require actual
    authority to consent to a search under the Oregon Constitution). Both
    Hawaii and Montana, two states that have adopted this more stringent
    standard, have a search and seizure provision in their state constitution
    that specifically grants their citizens the right to privacy—a right not
    contained in the Iowa search and seizure provision. Each of those cases
    was decided under the concept of “invasions of privacy.” No comparable
    provision is contained in the Iowa Constitution. Compare Haw. Const.
    art. I, § 7, and Mont. Const. art. II, § 10, with Iowa Const. art. I, § 8.
    Jackson also relies on the New Mexico case of State v. Wright for
    the proposition that actual authority is required under the New Mexico
    69
    Constitution. See 
    893 P.2d 455
    , 460–61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995). However,
    the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts presented
    here. In that case, officers went to a trailer after receiving a tip about
    possible drug dealing activity. 
    Id. at 457
    . They were met at the door by a
    woman. 
    Id.
     While there was some dispute in the record as to exactly
    when the consent was given by the woman to look into the bedroom
    occupied by the defendant, there is no dispute that prior to their entry
    she told the officers, “Oh, it’s not my place, but go ahead.” 
    Id.
     Officers
    proceeded to open the door to the bedroom, where they discovered the
    defendant and drug paraphernalia. 
    Id.
     at 457–58. The State attempted
    to argue the woman who answered the door had apparent authority to
    consent to the search. 
    Id. at 460
    . One of the officers testified that he did
    not believe what the woman told him about the trailer not being hers. 
    Id.
    However, he also stated he thought that she might have been a
    babysitter.       
    Id.
       Relying on these facts, the State argued the officer
    reasonably believed that she possessed common authority over the
    premises.      
    Id.
     7    The court concluded that the State’s reliance on the
    officers’ subjective belief the woman had apparent authority to consent to
    the search of the residence and bedroom occupied by the defendant ran
    counter to the provisions of article II, section 10 of the New Mexico
    Constitution. 
    Id.
     at 460–61. 8
    7I note that our case does not involve a claim of common authority, which also
    distinguishes this case.
    8Article   II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provides,
    The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects,
    from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any
    place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the
    place to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized, nor without a
    written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
    N.M. Const. art. II, § 10.
    70
    I agree with this resolution and would have reached the same
    result under our own Constitution. But the facts in Wright are a far cry
    from the facts in our case and warrant a different conclusion.        New
    Mexico accepts the minority approach under its own constitution.        Id.
    Consent to conduct a search may also be given by someone who is
    clothed with common authority or possesses some other sufficient
    relationship concerning the premises in question. Id. at 461. In Wright,
    the problem was there were no additional facts that indicated the woman
    granting the consent had a “sufficient relationship to the premises,” and
    therefore, it was unreasonable for the officers to rely on her consent. Id.
    (quoting United States v. Matlock, 
    415 U.S. 164
    , 171, 
    94 S. Ct. 988
    , 993,
    
    39 L. Ed. 2d 242
    , 250 (1974)). I suggest that, given the facts of our case,
    and even utilizing the standards adopted by the New Mexico court, that
    court would have had no problem with the consent provided by Olson.
    Jackson argues that Oregon has also rejected the concept of
    apparent authority to the consent to a search.        The Oregon Court of
    Appeals rejected the concept of apparent authority but stated actual
    authority is still required under the state constitution. Will, 
    885 P.2d at 719
    . The Oregon courts have stated that, “[b]efore police can enter or
    search without a warrant in reliance on third-party consent, they must
    inquire and ascertain whether the consenting party has common
    authority; they cannot rely on subjective good faith.” 
    Id.
     at 719–20. This
    approach is inapplicable to the facts of our case, and we have never
    adopted it.   The Oregon case Jackson relies on deals with a minor’s
    authority to consent to the search of a parent’s home, a situation entirely
    different than the one we decide today. 
    Id. at 720
    .
    However, the vast majority of states continue to apply the federal
    apparent-authority standard for third-party consent to a search, and
    71
    many have done so under their own state constitutions. See Nix v. State,
    
    621 P.2d 1347
    , 1349 (Alaska 1981); State v. Girdler, 
    675 P.2d 1301
    ,
    1305 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc); Bruce v. State, 
    241 S.W.3d 728
    , 731 (Ark.
    2006); Petersen v. People, 
    939 P.2d 824
    , 831 (Colo. 1997) (en banc); State
    v. Buie, 
    94 A.3d 608
    , 609 (Conn. 2014) (per curiam); Westlake, 353 P. 3d
    at 441; People v. Pitman, 
    813 N.E.2d 93
    , 107 (Ill. 2004); State v. Porting,
    
    130 P.3d 1173
    , 1178–79 (Kan. 2006); Commonwealth v. Nourse, 
    177 S.W.3d 691
    , 696 (Ky. 2005); Commonwealth v. Porter P., 
    923 N.E.2d 36
    ,
    52 (Mass. 2010); State v. Taylor, 
    968 P.2d 315
    , 322 (Nev. 1998) (per
    curiam); State v. Maristany, 
    627 A.2d 1066
    , 1069 (N.J. 1993); State v.
    Gatlin, 
    851 N.W.2d 178
    , 183 (N.D. 2014); State v. Linde, 
    876 A.2d 1115
    ,
    1125 (R.I. 2005); State v. Laux, 
    544 S.E.2d 276
    , 277–78 (S.C. 2001);
    Glenn v. Commonwealth, 
    654 S.E.2d 910
    , 915 (Va. 2008); State v.
    Tomlinson, 
    648 N.W.2d 367
    , 375 (Wis. 2002); Smallfoot v. State, 
    272 P.3d 314
    , 318 (Wyo. 2012).
    The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that it is not
    inconsistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution to only require apparent
    authority for a third party to consent to a search.               Commonwealth v.
    Hughes, 
    836 A.2d 893
    , 902–03 (Pa. 2003).                     Unlike the Hawaii and
    Montana        constitutional      provisions     noted      above,   Pennsylvania’s
    constitutional provision on search and seizure does not include a right to
    privacy. Compare Haw. Const. art. I, § 7, and Mont. Const. art. II, § 10
    with Pa. Const. art. I, § 8.        Rather, Pennsylvania’s search and seizure
    provision is more similar in content to our own search and seizure
    provision. Compare Pa. Const. art. I, § 8, with Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. 9
    9The   Pennsylvania searches and seizures provision reads:
    The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
    possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to
    72
    I agree with the states that continue to apply the apparent
    authority doctrine for third-party consent to a search, which is
    consistent with its federal constitutional counterpart. I would not find
    that the Iowa Constitution should be applied more stringently, as none of
    the authorities cited by Jackson are similar.                Nor are Jackson’s
    authorities persuasive enough to urge the court to hold that this state
    should diverge from the well-established precedent under the Federal
    Constitution. See State v. Jorgensen, 
    785 N.W.2d 708
    , 713 (Iowa 2009)
    (noting that even when a party does advance a standard for interpreting
    the Iowa Constitution differently, we may still interpret it using the
    federal analysis if we find that the defendant did not offer “sound
    reasons” for the distinction).
    VI. Conclusion.
    For all of the reasons set forth above, I would find that it was
    reasonable for the officers to conclude that Olson had the apparent
    authority to consent to the search of the bedroom and the backpack
    under the federal constitution.         I would decline to adopt an actual-
    authority standard under the Iowa Constitution as urged by Jackson. I
    would affirm the decision of the court of appeals, the district court ruling
    on the motion to suppress, and Jackson’s convictions.
    Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., join this dissent.
    ________________________
    search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without
    describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause,
    supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
    Pa. Const. art. I, § 8.
    73