Paula Segura and Ricardo Segura v. State of Iowa , 2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1 ( 2017 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 15–0203
Filed January 13, 2017
PAULA SEGURA and RICARDO SEGURA,
Appellants,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County,
Marsha A. Bergan, Judge.
Plaintiffs seek further review of a court of appeals decision
affirming the district court’s order dismissing their claims against the
State for failing to exhaust their administrative remedies. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
Daniel D. Bernstein of Law Office of Daniel D. Bernstein, Iowa City,
for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Anne Updegraff, Assistant
Attorney General, and Jessica Tucker Glick and Richard M. Tucker of
Phelan, Tucker, Mullen, Walker, Tucker & Gelman, L.L.P., Iowa City, for
appellee.
2
CADY, Chief Justice.
In this case, we consider whether a person can properly present a
claim against the State without complying with a state appeals board
(board) regulation that requires the claimant to personally sign the form.
The district court dismissed the claims filed by the plaintiffs in this case
because their attorney signed the forms on their behalf. On further
review from a decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of
the district court, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse
the judgment of the district court, and remand for further proceedings.
I. Factual Background and Proceedings.
Paula Segura alleges the State of Iowa was negligent in diagnosing
and treating her acute medical condition, leading to a permanent loss of
function in her lower extremities. Ricardo Segura, her spouse, alleges
loss of consortium. The alleged negligence occurred on May 12, 2009.
The Seguras assert they learned of the injury and its cause on May 13,
2009. In April of 2010, the Seguras contacted Iowa City attorney
Daniel D. Bernstein about their potential claims. Bernstein agreed to
investigate the claim. The Seguras moved to Fort Worth, Texas, and
Bernstein maintained “on and off communication.” On May 12, 2011,
Bernstein filed two board claim forms on the Seguras’ behalf, signing
their names and his own, and writing “per POA.” Bernstein did not
attach any document that would show he actually had power of attorney.
The claim forms, together with attached appendices, identified the
Seguras’ causes of action and included a short summary of the relevant
3
facts. 1 The claim forms also contained personal information, including
the Seguras’ and Bernstein’s contact information and social security
numbers.
On February 6, 2012 (approximately nine months after filing the
claims), the board rejected the Seguras’ claims by letter addressed to
Bernstein, stating, “The State Appeal Board, after considering the facts
and circumstances forming the basis of your client’s claim and the
applicable law, has made a final determination to deny payment of this
claim.” On August 3, 2012 (approximately six months after receiving the
State’s letter), the Seguras filed their claim in district court.
The State moved to dismiss the Seguras’ petition for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, asserting the Seguras’ failure to sign the claim forms
and Bernstein’s failure to provide evidence of power of attorney
constituted noncompliance with Iowa Administrative Code rule
543—1.3(3), rendering the filings ineffectual and thus depriving the
district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seguras resisted,
1As follows:
Paula D. Segura was hospitalized at the University of Iowa Hospitals and
Clinics, Iowa City, Iowa on May 12, 2009 complaining of epigastric pain.
She underwent an endoscopic retrograde cholangiopancreatogram
(“ERCP”) performed by William B. Silverman, M.D. During the ERCP
Ms. Segura’s blood pressure and blood oxygen levels dropped
significantly. As a result, Ms. Segura experienced hypoperfusion, or low
b[loo]d flow, resulting in lesions in her spinal c[]ord and brain. Because
of this, Ms. Segura’s left lower extremity is paralyzed.
And:
Ricardo Segura’s wife, Paula D. Segura, was hospitalized at the
University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, Iowa City, Iowa on May 12,
2009 complaining of epigastric pain. She underwent an endoscopic
retrograde cholangiopancreatogram (“ERCP”) performed by William B.
Silverman, M.D. During the ERCP Ms. Segura’s blood pressure and blood
oxygen levels dropped significantly. As a result, Ms. Segura experienced
hypoperfusion, or low b[loo]d flow, resulting in lesions in her spinal c[]ord
and brain. Because of this, Ms. Segura’s left lower extremity is paralyzed.
4
arguing Bernstein was acting as their attorney and should be entitled to
file documents on their behalf, and furthermore that strict compliance
with administrative rules should not be a prerequisite to jurisdiction.
The district court denied the motion, finding it would be more
appropriately brought as a motion for summary judgment.
The parties then engaged in a discovery dispute regarding,
primarily, expert reports. The Seguras had delayed in obtaining expert
witnesses, citing high cost and the potential their claim could be
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The Seguras then moved for
declaratory judgment and/or partial summary judgment on the
jurisdiction issue, reiterating their arguments from the earlier resistance
to the State’s motion to dismiss. This time, the district court agreed with
the State and concluded, “[I]t is necessary for a claims form filed under
the [Iowa Tort Claims Act] to include evidence of a person’s authority to
represent the claimant, if the claims form is not, in fact, signed by the
claimant.” Finding Bernstein could not “show[] that the claims forms
were completed according to the administrative rules,” the district court
dismissed the petition.
The Seguras appealed. They reiterated the arguments presented to
the district court, but included additional legal authority and recast the
issue from “whether [the Seguras’] attorney’s signature on their behalf
was a harmless error in the administrative process” to whether “the State
Appeal Board claim forms presented by claimants Paula and Ricardo
Segura provided adequate notice of their claim to the State in order for
the State to commence its own investigation.” The State claimed that the
Seguras were attempting to argue a new, “substantive” issue that was
not preserved, that the only issue on appeal should be whether the
Seguras complied with the “procedural” requirements of the Iowa Tort
5
Claims Act (ITCA), and that the Seguras failed to do so by failing to
personally sign the forms. The court of appeals agreed with the State on
both error preservation and the merits and adopted the district court’s
ruling without further opinion. We granted further review.
II. Standard of Review.
“A ‘court has inherent power to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings before it.’ ” Klinge
v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Tigges v. City of
Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984)). Our review is for correction of
errors at law. Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Iowa 2013); see
also Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.
III. Analysis.
“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must
ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will
decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa
2002). “[O]ne purpose of our error preservation rules is to ensure that
the opposing party and the district court are alerted to an issue at a time
when corrective action can be taken or another alternative pursued.”
Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000);
see also Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n,
465 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1991). “Error preservation does not turn,
however, on the thoroughness of counsel’s research and briefing so long
as the nature of the error has been timely brought to the attention of the
district court.” Summy v. City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Iowa
2006), overruled in part on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,
880 N.W.2d 699, 708 n.3 (Iowa 2016). Similarly, error preservation does
not turn on “hypertechnical” challenges. Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d
388, 403 (Iowa 1994).
6
In their motion for declaratory judgment, the Seguras
characterized the issue as “whether the fact that Claimant[]s, themselves,
failed to sign the State Appeal Board Claim Forms denies the District
Court for the State of Iowa the jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit.” In their
brief in support of the motion, they posed the question, “To what extent
must a claimant comply with the promulgated state tort claim form in
order to properly submit a claim?” They pointed out that the board was
able to investigate their claims despite their failure to sign the form.
They argued to distinguish our cases holding claims must be brought by
individuals authorized to bring them. In short, the argument the
Seguras presented should have been more than enough to alert the court
of the claimed error. See Ezzone, 525 N.W.2d at 403 (finding error
preserved when challenge was hypertechnical); Office of Consumer
Advocate, 465 N.W.2d at 283–84 (finding error preserved when a party
alleged a violation of “procedural fairness” despite that party’s failure to
identify the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as the source
of the right); see also Bartlett Grain Co., LP v. Sheeder, 829 N.W.2d 18, 24
n.4 (Iowa 2013) (finding error preserved, even though parties did not cite
to specific UCC provision because appellant alerted the court of its
“essential claim”). The district court’s ruling, which not only noted the
Seguras had argued “that the act of retaining their counsel is, in and of
itself, sufficient to permit their counsel to sign the claim forms on their
behalf,” but found federal precedent persuasive and stated it
“consider[ed] the reasoning in Kanar[ v. United States, 118 F.3d 527 (7th
Cir. 1997)] as [it] consider[ed] whether Plaintiffs’ claims in the present
case must be dismissed,” shows it considered and decided the arguments
to the contrary. See State v. Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa
2012) (“If the court’s ruling indicates that the court considered the issue
7
and necessarily ruled on it, even if the court’s reasoning is ‘incomplete or
sparse,’ the issue has been preserved.”); see also Kanar, 118 F.3d at
530–31 (discussing what is required under the Federal Tort Claims Act to
present a claim).
Error was preserved in this matter. We therefore reach the
underlying issue. Doing so, we conclude the district court erred in
dismissing the Seguras’ claims and hold a claim is properly presented to
the board when it identifies sufficient information for the board to
investigate the claim and discloses the amount of damages claimed.
Finding the Seguras did so, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings to address the merits of their claims.
A. Background. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is judicial,
not constitutional or statutory in origin. See Boyer v. Iowa High Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 256 Iowa 337, 347, 127 N.W.2d 606, 612 (1964). We have
consistently held it is a jurisdictional bar. See Montandon v. Hargrave
Constr. Co., 256 Iowa 1297, 1299, 130 N.W.2d 659, 660 (Iowa 1964)
(“[The state] is immune from suit except where immunity is waived by
statute and . . . there is no statutory waiver or consent to jurisdiction in
tort actions.”). Leading up to the enactment of the ITCA, this court faced
challenges to sovereign immunity. See Montandon, 256 Iowa at 1299,
130 N.W.2d at 660; Boyer, 256 Iowa at 347, 127 N.W.2d at 612. We
declined to abrogate our doctrine and left the issue to the legislature.
See Boyer, 127 N.W.2d at 612.
In 1965, the legislature took the opportunity and passed the ITCA.
1965 Iowa Acts ch. 79, §§ 1–23 (codified at Iowa Code §§ 25A.1–25A.20
(1966)). It became effective on March 30, 1965. See Hubbard v. State,
163 N.W.2d 904, 906 (Iowa 1969).
8
Prior to passage of the Iowa Tort Claims Act in 1965,
the maxim that “the King can do no wrong” prevailed in
Iowa. No tort action could be maintained against the State
or its agencies. Throughout this period of time, one who
suffered damages as the result of a negligent or wrongful act
of a State employee had the limited choice of bringing suit
against the employee personally or seeking redress from the
Iowa General Assembly in the form of private relief.
Don R. Bennett, Handling Tort Claims and Suits Against the State of Iowa:
Part I, 17 Drake L. Rev. 189, 189 (1968) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
Bennett]. By enacting the ITCA, the State waived this immunity and
opened itself to suit, but it did so strictly on its terms. See id. at 190.
The case of Graham v. Worthington was our first assessment of the
ITCA, and we used the opportunity to uphold the Act’s constitutionality.
See generally 259 Iowa 845, 850–70, 146 N.W.2d 626, 630–42 (Iowa
1966). When it was challenged for being an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority, we stated,
It is for the General Assembly to enact laws governing
expenditure of state funds including the appropriation of
moneys for payment. But once this is constitutionally done
the procedures, mechanics, the fact finding process upon
which payment shall be made, may with reasonably proper
guides or standards be delegated to judicial or quasi-judicial
bodies.
Id. at 857, 146 N.W.2d at 635.
Later, in Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. v. Iowa State Highway
Commission, we found Iowa Code section 25A.5 (now section 669.5)
made exhaustion “a condition precedent to the right to resort to the
courts.” 224 N.W.2d 639, 648 (Iowa 1974). We looked at the rationales
for exhaustion, calling it “a product of the exercise of judicial restraint,
resting on considerations of comity and convenience.” Id. We noted it “is
designed to promote orderly procedures within the judicial system by
requiring a preliminary administrative sifting process,” and that by
9
invoking the doctrine, courts “seek to avoid interfering with the functions
of the administrative agency.” Id.
The source of the exhaustion requirement is section 669.5(1),
which provides in part,
A suit shall not be permitted . . . unless the attorney general
has made final disposition of the claim. However, if the
attorney general does not make final disposition of a claim
within six months after the claim is made in writing to the
director of the department of management, the claimant
may, by notice in writing, withdraw the claim from
consideration and begin suit under this chapter.
Iowa Code § 669.5(1) (2013); see also Feltes v. State, 385 N.W.2d 544,
547 (Iowa 1986) (finding section 669.5 “requires that all claims be
submitted to an agency and a final decision be made or six months have
passed before suit is initiated”). Part of exhaustion is “presentment”: The
plaintiff must first present the claim to the appropriate administrative
body. See In re Estate of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1996). The
presentment requirement and related administrative processes are
“intended to allow a prompt investigation of claims against the State and
facilitate an early settlement when possible.” Id. at 881.
The State argues the source of the presentment requirement is not
the same as the source of the exhaustion requirement. Instead, the
State asserts the source of the presentment requirement is section 669.3,
which provides, “A claim made under this chapter shall be filed with the
director of the department of management . . . .” Iowa Code § 669.3(2).
However, reading section 669.3 in its entirety reveals it is not the source
of the presentment requirement, but rather the ITCA’s settlement
provisions. See Iowa Code § 669.3(1) (“The attorney general, on behalf of
the state of Iowa, shall consider, ascertain, adjust, compromise, settle,
determine, and allow any claim that is subject to this chapter.”); State v.
10
DeSimone, 839 N.W.2d 660, 666 (Iowa 2013) (“[S]tatutes must be read in
their entirety.”). This section is also the source of administrative
authority to promulgate “rules and procedures for the handling,
processing, and investigation of claims.” Iowa Code § 669.3(3). These
regulations prescribe, in part, the form of claims:
1.3(1) Place of filing. Claims shall be filed in triplicate
with the Department of Management, State Capitol,
Des Moines, Iowa 50319.
1.3(2) Verification. Claims shall be verified.
1.3(3) Names and signatures. A claim shall state
thereon the name, address, telephone number, and age of
the person making the claim and the name, address and
telephone number of the attorney, if any, preparing the
claim, and their signatures.
1.3(4) Designation by number. The executive
secretary shall assign a number to each claim. Thereafter it
may be referred to by such a number.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 543—1.3(1)–(3).
In McGruder v. State and Swanger v. State, we had the opportunity
to consider the interplay between now-Iowa Code sections 669.3 and
669.5. See Swanger v. State, 445 N.W.2d 344, 350 (Iowa 1989);
McGruder v. State, 420 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Iowa 1988). In McGruder, we
were asked whether a claim must be “filed” according to now-section
669.3 for it to be “made” under now-section 669.13. See McGruder, 420
N.W.2d at 425. We followed federal law interpreting the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) to require receipt of the claim, not mere mailing, to toll
the statute. See id. at 426 (citing Anderberg v. United States, 718 F.2d
976, 977 (10th Cir. 1983)). Thus, the plaintiff in McGruder missed the
statute of limitations when he mailed the claim form on the final day
because the state did not receive the claim for two more days. See id. at
425–26. In Swanger, the plaintiffs argued that when the state’s
insurance adjuster took one claimant’s deposition, the claimant
11
presented the claim to the state. See 445 N.W.2d at 350. We reaffirmed
our holding in McGruder and went further to expressly tie the term
“made,” also in now-section 669.5, to the administrative regulations
promulgated under now-section 669.3. See id. at 350–51 (“Following our
reasoning in McGruder, we conclude that tort claims are ‘made’ for the
purposes of section 25A.5 when the prescribed forms are properly filed
with the director of management.”). We noted the board “has prescribed
the form and content of tort claims,” and that “for example, [claims] must
be verified and signed by the claimant.” See id. at 350 (citing 543 Iowa
Admin. Code rs. 1.3, 1.4). Thus, the plaintiffs’ communications to the
state’s insurance adjuster were inadequate to commence the six-month
period of now-section 669.5. See id. at 351; see also Bloomquist v.
Wapello County, 500 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1993) (finding claim barred when
not specifically identified in claim form and stating “under Iowa law it is
incumbent on the claimant to first file a claim before the proper
administrative agency, even if, as a practical matter, it would not have
changed the State’s approach to the case”).
However, we rejected a formalistic approach in a later case. In
Schneider v. State, the state argued “plaintiffs who failed to supply
information required by the state appeal board’s administrative rules had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.” 789 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Iowa
2010). The plaintiffs had filed board claim forms, “disclos[ing] the
amount of each claim for property damage and generally describ[ing] the
legal theories asserted against the State,” but they failed to respond to
requests for additional information. See id. at 144–45. Nevertheless, we
noted the board’s failure to invoke its administrative means of inducing
the plaintiffs to provide the information was evidence “the board had
available to it the information it believed it needed to make its
12
administrative determination.” See id. at 145–46. Because the board
ultimately denied the claim, we found “the administrative process ran its
course.” See id. at 146. Looking to the underlying principles of the
exhaustion doctrine, we found it inappropriate to invoke it, as doing so
would not “avoid interference with the administrative process.” See id.
In Voss, we questioned whether the rule “that a plaintiff must have
the capacity to sue in order to commence and maintain an action in
district court . . . appl[ied] to claims filed with the State Appeal Board.”
553 N.W.2d at 880. The plaintiff had filed a claim for her son’s wrongful
death in her individual capacity, failing to obtain appointment as
administrator of her son’s estate until well after the board denied her
claim. See id. at 879. Because the “settlement of claims is greatly
facilitated if the person making the claim is the person entitled to any
recovery and has the authority to settle,” and the plaintiff lacked that
capacity, her claim was barred. Id. at 881. We reiterated a point we had
applied elsewhere, that the plaintiff’s capacity to sue must exist at the
time of filing, and “future appointment . . . cannot prevent the expiration
of the limitations period.” Id. at 882 (quoting Estate of Dyer v. Krug, 533
N.W.2d 221, 224 (Iowa 1995)). We noted “[a] less theoretical reason” for
this rule: “Requiring the Board to delay consideration of a claim while
waiting for the claimant to obtain the legal authority to pursue it would
defeat the statutory goal of prompt settlement.” Id.
We recently revisited the issue in McFadden v. Department of
Transportation, 877 N.W.2d 119, 120 (Iowa 2016). There, like in Voss,
the claimant did not attach evidence of her appointment as administrator
of her husband’s estate to her board claim form when bringing a claim
for his wrongful death. See id. However, the claimant in McFadden,
unlike the claimant in Voss, was in fact the administrator at the time she
13
presented the claim. See id. Thus, she was entitled to bring the claim;
she simply failed to attach the proof. See id. at 122. The state argued
board rules, specifically 1.3(3), required the claimant to disclose her
representative capacity. See id. at 123 (citing Iowa Admin. Code r. 543—
1.3(3)). We balanced two competing principles: “Our legal processes
normally strive to resolve disputes on their merits,” and “[r]ules,
especially those which fix jurisdictional matters, are . . . vital to the
proper conduct of court business.” Id. at 121 (first quoting MC Holdings,
L.L.C. v. Davis Cty. Bd. of Review, 830 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Iowa 2013);
then quoting Gordon v. Doden, 261 Iowa 285, 288–89, 154 N.W.2d 146,
148 (1967) (alteration in original)). We found the former consideration
prevailed, quoting, “[R]ights must not be denied by too strict an
application of mere legal formality.” Id. at 123 (quoting McMillan v.
Osterson, 191 Iowa 983, 985, 183 N.W. 487, 488 (1921)). Thus, we
concluded, “The appeal board’s rules and claim form did not require [the
claimant] to allege her representative capacity in presenting the tort
claim in this case.” Id.
These two competing principles present themselves again. There is
no question the Seguras failed to comply with the administrative rules
prescribing the form of claims; they did not personally sign their claim
forms. 2 However, the State does not assert this failure hindered its
2We acknowledge Iowa Code section 602.10114 gives an attorney the power to
sign litigation documents in the name of a client. However, this general power would
not necessarily trump a specific requirement for a party to sign a document. See, e.g.,
Iowa Code § 86.13(3) (authorizing settlement of workers’ compensation claim “only if
[the agreement is] signed by all parties and approved by the workers’ compensation
commissioner”); id. § 507C.36(1)(g) (requiring in certain insurance matter proof of claim
be “signed by the claimant” and include “[t]he name and address of the claimant and
the attorney who represents the claimant, if any”); id. § 809.3(3) (requiring an
application for the return of seized property “be signed by the claimant under penalty of
perjury”). Because we resolve this case on other grounds, we need not reach this issue.
See, e.g., Jones v. Univ. of Iowa, 836 N.W.2d 127, 142 (Iowa 2013) (declining to reach
14
ability to investigate the claim, stating “[h]ow the Board dealt with [the
Seguras’] improperly filed tort claims before denying the claims is
irrelevant.” Indeed, the board appeared to have the necessary
information to handle the claim as it ultimately denied it “after
considering the facts and circumstances forming the basis of [the] claim
and the applicable law.” Schneider, 789 N.W.2d at 146 n.8 (finding the
board’s use of this language showed “the board’s explanation for the
denial of the claims appears to have rested on liability considerations
rather than the plaintiffs’ failure to sufficiently document their claims”).
We are thus called upon to answer a question previously unaddressed:
Did the legislature vest the board with the authority to deprive the courts
of jurisdiction?
B. Application to the Seguras’ Claims. We begin by reaffirming
a concept we have consistently applied: Exhaustion is a jurisdictional
prerequisite under our interpretation of the ITCA. See McFadden, 877
N.W.2d at 122 (“Exhaustion of the administrative process is
jurisdictional, and a suit commenced without complying with this
process is subject to dismissal.” (quoting Swanger, 445 N.W.2d at 347));
Feltes, 385 N.W.2d at 547 (“[W]hen an area or subcategory is excepted
from the waiver, it is still covered by sovereign immunity, and
consequently, the courts have no jurisdiction.”); Charles Gabus Ford, 224
N.W.2d at 648 (“[T]he State Appeal Board has ‘primary’ or ‘exclusive’
jurisdiction of tort claims against the State.”); see also Bennett, 17 Drake
L. Rev. at 192 (“It seems obvious that the exhaustion of the
administrative process is jurisdictional, and a suit commenced without
_________________________
statutory construction and constitutional arguments when deciding case on other
grounds).
15
complying therewith is subject to dismissal.”). Under Iowa law it is well
established the district court does not have jurisdiction to hear a tort
claim against the state until it has been presented, properly, to the
board. See Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 880; Charles Gabus Ford, 224 N.W.2d at
648. We also recognize that jurisdictional matters must be carefully
construed. See McFadden, 877 N.W.2d at 121. If the Seguras failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies by improperly presenting their
claim, the district court was correct to determine it lacked jurisdiction.
Voss, 553 N.W.2d at 880 (“Improper presentment of a claim, or not
presenting one at all, has been considered a failure to exhaust one’s
administrative remedies, depriving the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction.”).
Our polestar is legislative intent. See id. “In construing a statute,
we look to the object to be accomplished and give the statute a meaning
that will effectuate, rather than defeat, that object.” Id. We have
previously held the legislative intent in creating the administrative
process under chapter 669 was “to allow a prompt investigation of claims
against the State and facilitate an early settlement when possible.” Id. at
881. The exhaustion requirement furthers this purpose. See Schneider,
789 N.W.2d at 145 (“We have noted that the doctrine requiring a plaintiff
to exhaust administrative remedies ‘is designed to promote orderly
procedures within the judicial system by requiring a preliminary
administrative sifting process.’ ” (quoting Charles Gabus Ford, 224
N.W.2d at 648)). And, obviously, the legislature delegated some
authority to allow the functioning of this investigation and settlement
process. See Iowa Code § 669.3(3). However, while exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite, and our
legislature clearly intended this process be governed by administrative
16
rule, we have not held the legislature intended to delegate the authority
to set the jurisdiction of our courts.
As noted above, the source of the presentment requirement is Iowa
Code section 669.5. See Feltes, 385 N.W.2d at 547. Section 669.5 does
not delegate administrative authority. See generally Iowa Code
§ 669.5(1)–(2). Rather, the board’s authority comes from section 669.3.
See id. § 669.3(3). Section 669.3 governs claims processing and gives the
board the authority to “adopt rules and procedures for the handling,
processing, and investigation of claims.” Id. This delegation does not say
“for the presentment of claims,” but “for the handling, processing, and
investigation of claims.” This indicates the legislature only intended to
delegate the authority to promulgate rules necessary to investigate and
settle claims, not to govern their initial presentment for exhaustion
under section 669.5. See Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa
2013) (noting the statutory construction rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius). Any statements to the contrary in our precedent are
distinguishable on this point. McGruder merely stands for the
proposition that sections of the ITCA may work in harmony—that a claim
is not properly presented until the board receives it. See 420 N.W.2d at
426. This is not controlled by administrative rule but by statute. See id.
Nor does our statement in Swanger, “tort claims are ‘made’ . . . when the
prescribed forms are properly filed,” control. 445 N.W.2d at 351.
Section 669.5 requires the claim be made in writing. See Iowa Code
§ 669.5. In Swanger, the claimant asserted it was made by mere
statements in a deposition. See 445 N.W.2d at 351.
We can also look to the principles of exhaustion to support this
conclusion. See Charles Gabus Ford, 224 N.W.2d at 648. Exhaustion
under section 669.5 requires a claim be made in writing so that the
17
attorney general has the opportunity to make a final disposition of the
claim. See Iowa Code § 669.5(1). The administrative process cannot
“r[u]n its course” absent key information. Schneider, 789 N.W.2d at 146.
A signature, made in the presence of a notary and filed in triplicate, is
not key information to the disposition of a claim. Cf. Iowa Admin. Code
r. 543—1.3(1)–(3). These requirements, just like the additional
requirements of the claimant’s address, telephone number, and age, are
more appropriately characterized as claims-processing rules. See id.
Thus, they are appropriately promulgated pursuant to the delegation to
adopt rules governing handling and processing, but they are not rules
governing presentment. The failure to comply with these administrative
rules alone should not deprive a district court of jurisdiction.
The State argues this court’s opinion in Voss controls. The claim
in Voss was not barred because the claimant failed to comply with an
administrative rule; the claim was barred because the claimant did not
have the capacity to bring it. See 553 N.W.2d at 880, 882 (“It is ‘an
elementary rule of law’ that a plaintiff must have the capacity to sue in
order to commence and maintain an action in district court.” (quoting
Dumbaugh v. Cascade Mfg. Co., 264 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa 1978))).
When a claimant has the capacity, even if they do not attach proof with
their initial claim, the claim is not barred. See McFadden, 877 N.W.2d
122. There is no allegation Paula Segura lacks the capacity to bring her
medical malpractice claim, nor is there an allegation Ricardo Segura
lacks the capacity to bring his loss-of-consortium claim. The holding of
Voss simply does not apply to an attorney’s ability to bring a claim on
behalf of his or her clients, the true claimants. Iowa Code section
602.10114(1) authorizes an attorney to “[e]xecute in the name of a client
a bond, or other written instrument, necessary and proper for the
18
prosecution of an action or proceeding about to be or already
commenced.” See Iowa Code § 602.10114(1) (emphasis added). So, too,
do our rules of civil procedure. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.411(1) (“Each
appearance, notice, motion, or pleading . . . shall bear the signature . . .
of the party or attorney filing it.” (Emphasis added.)). If there was any
doubt, the Seguras dispelled it by filing affidavits stating Bernstein had
the authority to bring their claims. Thus, Voss is inapplicable.
We find the administrative regulations promulgated under section
669.3 do not define the jurisdictional ambit of the presentment
requirement under section 669.5. Instead, a claim is properly presented
when it, in writing, identifies sufficient information for the board to
investigate the claim and discloses the amount of damages claimed. We
reach this finding by applying our rules of statutory construction, relying
on the underlying principles of the exhaustion requirement, and building
on our existing precedent. We note, however, that this view is consistent
with the vast majority of federal courts interpreting the FTCA; these
courts similarly distinguish between presentment under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(a) and claims processing under 28 U.S.C. § 2672. 3 See GAF Corp.
v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 918–19 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Thus we hold,
with the Ninth Circuit and the majority of appellate courts to have
considered the question, that Section 2675(a) requires a claimant to file
(1) a written statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the
agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-certain damages
3Even the one jurisdiction that expressly subscribes to the view that
administrative regulations define the authority of the district court to hear the claim
would likely allow this one to proceed. See Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States, 761 F.3d
779, 787 (7th Cir. 2014) (“So long as the proper agency had the opportunity to settle the
claim for money damages before the point of suit, . . . technical deficiencies in the
administrative claim could well be a case of ‘[n]o harm, no foul.’ ” (quoting Kanar, 118
F.3d at 531)).
19
claim.”); see also Lopez v. United States, 823 F.3d 970, 976 (10th Cir.
2016) (same); Pleasant v. United States, 764 F.3d 445, 448 (5th Cir.
2014) (same); Blair v. IRS, 304 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2002) (same);
Santiago-Ramirez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Def., 984 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1993)
(same); Conn v. United States, 867 F.2d 916, 918–19 (6th Cir. 1989)
(same); Tidd v. United States, 786 F.2d 1565, 1567 (11th Cir. 1986)
(same); Tucker v. U.S. Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1982)
(same). Section 2672 authorizes the Attorney General to adopt rules that
allow the relevant federal agency to “consider, ascertain, adjust,
determine, compromise, and settle any claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2012).
But the jurisdictional requirement of presentment and exhaustion
appears to be from § 2675, which does not contain a similar delegation of
authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675. Accordingly, federal courts hold “this
means [a court] must distinguish between the presentment filing
mandated by Section 2675(a) and the settlement procedures of Section
2672.” GAF Corp., 818 F.2d at 918–19 (“Presentment is mandatory;
settlement is merely optional.” This distinction is crucial for courts
called upon to determine their jurisdiction to hear claims under the
[FTCA].”). We look to these federal decisions not to conform our
interpretation of the ITCA to their interpretation of the FTCA, but merely
for persuasive guidance on ambiguous provisions of similar law, as we
have often done. See, e.g., Feltes, 385 N.W.2d at 547 n.5 (comparing
now-section 669.5 with 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)); see also Voss, 553 N.W.2d
at 881 n.2 (noting we may “look to the Federal Tort Claims Act and
federal cases for guidance in interpreting the Iowa Tort Claims Act”).
We hold today that the information we described in Schneider is
sufficient to present a claim under the ITCA. See 789 N.W.2d at 144. A
claimant presents a claim when the board receives a writing that
20
“disclose[s] the amount of” damages claimed and “generally describe[s]
the legal theories asserted against the State.” Id.; see also Iowa Code
§ 669.5. This should give the board sufficient information to investigate
the claim, which is all that is required for the administrative process to
run its course. See Schneider, 789 N.W.2d at 145–46. To facilitate this
process, the board is vested with the authority to demand additional
information under Iowa Code section 669.3(3). Indeed, it has
promulgated rules empowering the special attorney general investigating
the claim to administer oaths, take testimony in affidavits, depositions,
or interrogatories, and even subpoena witnesses. See Iowa Admin. Code
r. 543—1.7. If the board finds the claim form lacks a signature,
verification, or any other piece of information it requires under its
regulations, it can demand it. However, the administrative rules
prescribing the form and content of claims do not operate as a
jurisdictional bar to suit if the claim is properly presented and six
months pass or the attorney general makes a final disposition. See Iowa
Code § 669.5(1).
Applied to the Seguras’ claims, they identified the underlying facts
of their causes of action 4 and asserted a claim for damages. They even
identified witnesses. There is no allegation the board lacked sufficient
information to investigate the claim, and in fact, it appears to have done
so. Thus, the Seguras presented their claim, the administrative process
ran its course, and they may now proceed before the district court.
4Ricardo Segura’s form expressly stated it was for loss of consortium. Paula
Segura’s form did not state “medical malpractice,” but a reasonable reading of the facts
it did state would reveal that is the claim presented.
21
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude the district court had jurisdiction to hear the Seguras’
claims. This result is consistent with the ITCA’s text and its purpose of
“doing substantial justice.” See id. § 669.9 (“With a view to doing
substantial justice, the attorney general is authorized to compromise or
settle any suit permitted under this chapter . . . .”); Graham, 259 Iowa at
853, 146 N.W.2d at 632 (“The self-evident purpose of the [ITCA] is to
provide an orderly method by which to compensate those tortiously
damaged by any officer, agent or employee of the state . . . .”). It is
consistent with our precedent. See McFadden, 877 N.W.2d at 123
(“[R]ights must not be denied by too strict an application of mere legal
formality.” (quoting McMillan, 191 Iowa at 985, 183 N.W. at 488)). It is
consistent with the apparent legislative intent, and it is even consistent
with the analogous approach of most federal courts. See Mader v.
United States, 654 F.3d 794, 810 (8th Cir. 2011) (Bye, J., dissenting)
(noting “the judicial consensus is that section 2675 mandates only
‘minimal notice’ ”); Feltes, 385 N.W.2d at 547 (identifying now-section
669.5 as the source of the exhaustion requirement). An alternative
holding would deny the Seguras the right to be heard solely because of a
state appeal board rule the board never attempted to enforce. The
Seguras’ completed claim forms sufficiently presented their claims to the
board by enabling it to investigate them, which it apparently did. See
Schneider, 789 N.W.2d at 146 n.8. If the board requires a signature
while investigating a future claim, it can request it during the six months
in which it has exclusive jurisdiction. See Iowa Code § 669.3(3); Iowa
Admin. R. 543—1.7; Charles Gabus Ford, 224 N.W.2d at 648. This
approach accommodates the board’s right to obtain relevant information
and verification without barring potentially meritorious claims based on
22
initial noncompliance. Accordingly, we remand this case for further
proceedings on its merits.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except Wiggins, J., who concurs specially, and
Mansfield and Waterman, JJ., who dissent.
23
#15–0203, Segura v. State
WIGGINS, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the majority that an administrative agency’s rule
cannot divest our courts of jurisdiction over a tort claim. However, the
court does not have to reach that issue because I would find the Seguras
complied with the requirements of the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) by
applying Iowa Code section 602.10114 (2013) and find that the district
court had jurisdiction of this matter.
The State takes the position that because its rules require the
signature of the client, a tort claim form filed without the client’s
signature or a power of attorney giving the attorney the power to sign the
claim form divests the courts of jurisdiction. Our statutes do not
support this claim.
The Code provides how a person makes a claim under the ITCA.
Specifically,
a claim or suit otherwise permitted under this chapter shall
be forever barred, unless within two years after the claim
accrued, the claim is made in writing and filed with the
director of the department of management under this
chapter.
Iowa Code § 669.13(1). Thus, the Code only requires the person filing
the claim to file it in writing with the department of management within a
specified time. Chapter 669 of the Code does not contain any provision
as to who has to sign the claim.
Another section of the Code allows an attorney to file a claim in a
proceeding, without the necessity of the client’s signatures. The Code
gives an attorney the power to
[e]xecute in the name of a client a bond, or other written
instrument, necessary and proper for the prosecution of an
action or proceeding about to be or already commenced, or
24
for the prosecution or defense of any right growing out of an
action, proceeding, or final judgment rendered therein.
Id. § 602.10114. Therefore, when the Code requires a party to file a
written document in a proceeding, an attorney has the authority of his or
her client to sign the document.
The State enacted an administrative rule stating,
All claims should be typewritten, but claims printed by hand
will be accepted if legible.
1.3(1) Place of filing. Claims shall be filed in triplicate
with the Department of Management, State Capitol,
Des Moines, Iowa 50319.
1.3(2) Verification. Claims shall be verified.
1.3(3) Names and signatures. A claim shall state
thereon the name, address, telephone number, and age of
the person making the claim and the name, address and
telephone number of the attorney, if any, preparing the
claim, and their signatures.
1.3(4) Designation by number. The executive
secretary shall assign a number to each claim. Thereafter it
may be referred to by such a number.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 543—1.3.
The signature boxes of the claim forms filed by Paula Segura and
Ricardo Segura were signed as follows:
I, the claimant, being duly sworn upon oath depose and
state that I have read the supplied information and the same
is true and correct to the best of my belief.
S/Paula Segura by attorney Bernstein per POA.
I, the claimant, being duly sworn upon oath depose and
state that I have read the supplied information and the same
is true and correct to the best of my belief.
S/Ricardo Segura by attorney Bernstein per POA.
In its brief, the State claims the tort claim forms were defective
because “[a] power of attorney document did not accompany either
claim.” The State’s argument in this regard was
25
Attorney Bernstein was not permitted to sign the Seguras’
names on their tort claims without valid powers of attorney.
He was certainly not permitted to sign the Seguras’ names
under oath without valid powers of attorney. Attorney
Bernstein failed to procure such powers of attorney. Paula
Segura and Ricardo Segura were thus required to sign and
verify their respective tort claims, and they did not. As a
result, the Seguras failed to comply with the procedural
requirements of the ITCA, and their tort claims were not
properly filed.
This argument makes it clear that the State acknowledges a signature on
a tort claim form signed by someone other than the claimant is allowed
under the Act as long as he or she has the power to do so. Section
602.10114 gave attorney Bernstien the authority to sign the claim forms
on behalf of the Seguras when Bernstein submitted the forms to the
department of management. I can find no authority that an
administrative rule can require additional action by a party to confer
jurisdiction on the court when that action is not required by the statute. 5
I would thus conclude attorney Bernstein’s signatures on behalf of
the Seguras on the tort claim forms complied with the Code and the rule.
First, a notary verified the claim forms. Second, they contained the
names of the claimants, and the Seguras’ attorney signed the forms on
the claimants’ behalf by a power of attorney. Third, section 602.10114
gives the attorney the power of attorney to sign the documents on the
Seguras’ behalf.
Accordingly, I would find jurisdiction.
5I also do not believe an agency can create a rule requiring a signature of a party
to a document when the statute conferring jurisdiction on the court does not have the
same requirement. See Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa
2004) (holding an agency cannot change the meaning of a statute by writing a rule).
However, neither the majority nor I need reach this issue because the State concedes
that a power of attorney is sufficient to make the claim form valid.
26
#15–0203, Segura v. State
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Under the court’s decision, the State will no
longer be able to insist upon signed claims, let alone verified ones. In my
view, the court has disregarded clear language in chapter 669 and the
Iowa Administrative Code, while uprooting established caselaw. All this
is being done to bring to life a claim that the attorney likely knew was
noncompliant when he submitted it.
This case involves alleged medical malpractice that occurred at the
University of Iowa Hospitals on May 12, 2009. As early as April 2010,
the Seguras were in contact with their present attorney. However, no
claim was filed with the State until over a year later.
Iowa Code section 669.3 provides:
1. The attorney general, on behalf of the state of Iowa,
shall consider, ascertain, adjust, compromise, settle,
determine, and allow any claim that is subject to this
chapter.
2. A claim made under this chapter shall be filed with
the director of the department of management, who shall
acknowledge receipt on behalf of the state.
3. The state appeal board shall adopt rules and
procedures for the handling, processing, and investigation of
claims, in accordance with chapter 17A.
Iowa Code § 669.3 (2013).
The applicable rules adopted by the state appeal board (board)
under the authority of subsection 3 provide:
All claims should be typewritten, but claims printed by hand
will be accepted if legible.
1.3(1) Place of filing. Claims shall be filed in triplicate
with the Department of Management, State Capitol, Des
Moines, Iowa 50319.
1.3(2) Verification. Claims shall be verified.
1.3(3) Names and signatures. A claim shall state
thereon the name, address, telephone number, and age of
27
the person making the claim and the name, address and
telephone number of the attorney, if any, preparing the
claim, and their signatures.
1.3(4) Designation by number. The executive
secretary shall assign a number to each claim. Thereafter it
may be referred to by such a number.
Iowa Admin. Code r. 543—1.3. Notably, these rules require that “[c]laims
shall be verified.” Id.
The board’s one-page claim form is not complicated or difficult to
follow. There are sections for information about the claimant and for
information on the claim itself. At the bottom of the page, consistent
with the board’s rules, there is a space for “CLAIMANT’S SIGNATURE.”
Right above the signature space the form states, “I, the claimant, being
duly sworn upon oath depose and state that I have read the supplied
information and the same is true and correct to the best of my belief.” In
addition, at the top of the one-page form, the directions state,
“CLAIMANT and NOTARY public must sign.”
Neither of the Seguras signed the form. Instead, their attorney
signed the forms in the space for “CLAIMANT’S SIGNATURE.” He added
the handwritten notation: “by attorney . . . per POA.” “POA” of course is
short for “power of attorney.”
In reality, the Seguras’ attorney had no powers of attorney. See
Iowa Code § 633B.102(9) (“ ‘Power of attorney’ means a writing that
grants authority to an agent to act in the place of the principal, whether
or not the term ‘power of attorney’ is used.”). Arguably, the attorney
could have been admonished for this misstatement. Regardless, the
claim was clearly not verified by the claimant as required by rule 543—
1.3. Indeed, the majority concedes this point. 6
6Given the court’s opinion, from now on, nobody will need to sign the claim
forms.
28
The verification requirement is not some trifling technicality.
When the State waives sovereign immunity to allow claims against it, the
State is entitled to insist that the claim be backed by the claimant’s oath
as an assurance of its reliability. See id. § 669.4 (“The immunity of the
state from suit and liability is waived to the extent provided in this
chapter.” (Emphasis added.)); accord Rivera v. Woodward Res. Ctr., 830
N.W.2d 724, 727 (Iowa 2013) (recognizing that “compliance with an
administrative scheme” is “[o]ne of the most prominent conditions
interposed by the ITCA”). After all, the Internal Revenue Code requires
that tax returns be verified, see 26 U.S.C. § 6065 (2012), insurance
companies typically require that insurance claims be verified, and we
require verifications under our own rules in a variety of situations, see,
e.g., Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.405(4) (denial of signature); id. r. 1.509(1)(c)
(interrogatory answers); id. r. 1.1502(1) (application for temporary
injunction); id. r. 1.1901-Form 16 (expedited civil action certification).
Here, because the Seguras’ claims were not verified, the Seguras were
not bound under penalty of perjury to anything the claim forms said. 7
To sum up: The statute specifically empowers the board to adopt
rules for what a claim must contain. See Iowa Code § 669.3(3). The
board did so. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 543—1.3. The Seguras’ claims
failed to comply with those rules in a material way. As the majority puts
it, “There is no question the Seguras failed to comply with the
administrative rules prescribing the form of claims . . . .”
7We also require appellants in child-in-need-of-assistance and termination-of-
parental-rights cases to personally sign the notice of appeal, even though a verification
is not required. See, e.g., Iowa R. App. P. 6.102(1)(a) (“The notice of appeal cannot be
filed unless signed by both the appellant’s counsel and the appellant.”)
29
The majority excuses this noncompliance by determining the board
lacked authority to issue its longstanding administrative rules. The
majority says that Iowa Code section 669.3(3) only authorizes the board
to promulgate rules “for the handling, processing, and investigation of
claims,” and not “for the presentment of claims”—as if the two are
distinguishable.
I don’t follow this argument. In my view, language authorizing the
board to issue rules for the “handling” and “processing” of claims
empowers the board to adopt a rule stating a claim must be signed under
oath by the claimant. We previously said so in Swanger v. State:
Section 25A.3 [now section 669.3] further empowers the
appeal board to adopt rules and procedures for handling and
processing claims. Pursuant to its rule-making authority,
the state appeal board has prescribed the form and content
of tort claims. Tort claims before the appeal board, for
example, must be verified and signed by the claimant, filed
with the department of management at Des Moines, and
must describe the accident, injuries and claims in detail.
445 N.W.2d 344, 350 (Iowa 1989) (citation omitted). In other words, in
Swanger, we cited the verification requirement as one example of a
requirement the board has prescribed “[p]ursuant to its rule-making
authority [in section 669.3].” Id. Today’s decision now tosses aside this
language from Swanger.
Of course, we are entitled to change our minds. But why would we
do so here? It would be impossible to have an orderly system for the
“processing” and “handling” of claims without some minimum criteria for
what a claim must contain. Indeed, the court adopts minimum
standards of its own—they just happen to be different from the board’s
requirements as set forth in its regulations.
The court does not dispute that the proper presentment of a claim
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit under the Iowa Tort
30
Claims Act (ITCA). See In re Estate of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa
1996) (“Improper presentment of a claim, or not presenting one at all,
has been considered a failure to exhaust one’s administrative remedies,
depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.”). The
disagreement is essentially over who gets to decide the contents of a
claim. Is it (1) the justices of this court, or (2) the board through its duly
promulgated regulations? I think the legislature delegated the matter to
the board in Iowa Code section 669.3(3)—not to us.
Today’s decision is also at odds with Voss. Voss arose out of a
fatal automobile accident where the State was allegedly at fault. See id.
at 879. The deceased’s mother signed the claim as the claimant but had
not yet been appointed administrator of her son’s estate. Id. We held
that such a claim was insufficient:
Obviously, settlement of claims is greatly facilitated if the
person making the claim is the person entitled to any
recovery and has the authority to settle.
. . . [A] claim is defective if it is not made by a
claimant to whom the State would be liable for the damages
sought.
Id. at 881. This case presents the same circumstances, practically
speaking. The person who actually made the claim was the Seguras’
attorney, who would not have been entitled to the recovery or authorized
to settle the claim.
Voss emphasizes that the claim-filing requirements are supposed
to eliminate “[t]he filing of multiple claims” and to save the State from
having to wait for a claimant “to obtain the legal authority to pursue” a
claim that has been filed. Id. at 881–82. Today these justifications
vanish, and this aspect of Voss is effectively overruled. In its stead, the
majority holds that a valid claim need only “identif[y] sufficient
31
information for the board to investigate the claim and disclose[] the
amount of damages claimed.” By this minimal standard, practically any
piece of paper will do. The court thus shifts time, burden, and expense
from the claimant to the State. And it does so despite the clear language
of Iowa Code section 669.3(3) and the board’s administrative rules, not to
mention the principle of a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.
The court relies on Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) precedent, but
this reliance is flawed at its inception because of differences in the two
statutes. We generally say that we are “guided by interpretations of the
FTCA, which was the model for the ITCA, when the wording of the two
Acts is identical or similar.” Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Iowa
2013) (emphasis added); see Smith v. Iowa State Univ. of Sci. & Tech., 851
N.W.2d 1, 21 (Iowa 2014); Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383, 406 & n.10
(Iowa 2012); see also Godfrey v. State, 847 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Iowa 2014)
(comparing section 669.5(2)(a) to similarly worded federal law). Here the
wording of the two Acts is not identical or similar.
Unlike Iowa law, the FTCA requires only that “the claimant shall
have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.” 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added). By contrast, Iowa Code section 669.3
requires the attorney general to “consider, ascertain, adjust, compromise,
settle, determine, and allow any claim” and also requires the board to
“adopt rules and procedures for the handling, processing, and
investigation of claims.” Iowa Code § 669.3(1), (3). In both instances,
section 669.3 uses the mandatory term “shall” with respect to these
requirements. Id.
Federal courts interpreting the FTCA have accordingly held that
Department of Justice regulations “which flesh out the requirements for
the presentation of administrative claims for settlement” are not
32
jurisdictionally binding because 28 U.S.C. § 2675 only mandates pre-suit
notice. See Santiago-Ramirez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Def., 984 F.2d 16, 19–20
(1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]his circuit has followed the general shift among all
circuits toward a recognition of the distinction between presenting a
claim in a section 2675 context and presenting a claim for settlement.”);
Tucker v. U.S. Postal Serv., 676 F.2d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The
question whether a plaintiff has presented the requisite section 2675
notice is determined without reference to whether that plaintiff has
complied with all settlement related requests for information.”). That is
because the FTCA does not require or even authorize the government to
adopt rules for the “handling” and “processing” of claims.
Our statutory scheme, on the other hand, mandates more than
giving the State perfunctory notice. It is designed to facilitate prompt
settlement, as we held in Voss. See 553 N.W.2d at 880–81 (“A
requirement the claimant possess the capacity to sue is . . . intended to
allow a prompt investigation of claims against the State and facilitate an
early settlement when possible.”). Whether or not the Seguras’ claims
would have passed FTCA muster is therefore irrelevant. See, e.g., Griffen
v. State, 767 N.W.2d 633, 635–36 (Iowa 2009) (rejecting an interpretation
of the FTCA as “not applicable to the ITCA” when language in the Acts
differ).
The majority also suggests today’s decision is supported by
Schneider v. State, 789 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 2010). I respectfully disagree.
In that case, “[e]ach of the plaintiffs . . . filed an administrative claim on
a form promulgated by the appeal board.” Id. at 145. There was no
issue raised as to whether the claims met the formal requirements of
Iowa Administrative Code rule 543—1.3. See id. Rather, the question we
had to decide was “whether those plaintiffs who thereafter declined the
33
board’s request for additional documentation failed to exhaust the
available administrative remedy and thereby deprived the district court of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. We noted,
Although some of the plaintiffs failed to submit any
documentation to augment their administrative claim forms,
and others submitted documentation the State’s claims
manager deemed conclusory, each of the challenged claims
disclosed the type of claim (tort) asserted, stated the amount
of property damage claimed, and provided a general
statement of the relevant legal theory supporting it.
Id. And we said that was enough. Id. at 146.
Schneider thus involved the different question of how much detail
must be provided on behalf of a claim that is presumably verified and
already complied with the board’s other requirements as to form. See id.
(“Under these circumstances, we conclude the board had available to it
the information it believed it needed to make its administrative
determination.”).
The majority also states that the board “never attempted to
enforce” the verification requirement. This assertion is unfair to the
board. At the administrative level, the board denied the claims without
giving a reason. The board didn’t know for a fact no powers of attorney
existed until the case reached the district court. That is when the State
served a document request, asking for the powers of attorney. The
Seguras’ attorney refused to respond to the request, raising a frivolous
objection that the request violated the attorney–client privilege. Finally,
after a motion to compel had been filed, counsel admitted there were no
powers of attorney in a district court hearing. If anyone was giving
somebody the runaround, it was the Seguras’ attorney and not the State.
While it might be desirable in the abstract to “accommodate[]” the
interests of the Seguras and the State, as the majority puts it, that is not
34
our role. “The State may . . . be sued in tort, but only in the manner and
to the extent to which consent has been given by the legislature.”
Swanger, 445 N.W.2d at 346.
Lastly, let me add some observations regarding the special
concurrence. The special concurrence first argues that Iowa Code
section 669.13 only requires “the person filing the claim to file it in
writing with the department of management within a specified time.”
That is not an accurate paraphrasing of the statute. Section 669.13 bars
the claim unless it was timely filed in writing with the department of
management “under this chapter.” Iowa Code § 669.13(1) (emphasis
added). “Under this chapter” means the filer has to comply with the
filing requirements of this chapter, which are set forth in section 669.3
and the corresponding administrative rules. The special concurrence
reads the phrase “under this chapter” out of the statute.
Alternatively, the special concurrence argues that another law,
Iowa Code section 602.10114, overrides section 669.3 and the board’s
administrative rule requiring signature and verification by the claimant.
Section 602.10114 dates back to our early statehood days and provides,
An attorney and counselor has power to:
1. Execute in the name of a client a bond, or other
written instrument, necessary and proper for the
prosecution of an action or proceeding about to be or already
commenced, or for the prosecution or defense of any right
growing out of an action, proceeding, or final judgment
rendered therein.
Iowa Code § 602.10114(1).
According to the special concurrence, section 602.10114 empowers
an attorney at all times to sign any litigation-related paper on the client’s
behalf. If this were true, it would invalidate any other instance where a
statute or rule requires client verification or client signature.
35
It isn’t true. This statute has been interpreted as giving the
attorney authority to execute papers on the client’s behalf unless another
law provides otherwise. See Cassady v. Mott, 203 Iowa 17, 19, 212 N.W.
332, 333 (1927) (quoting this statute and finding that an attorney could
sign notices of forfeiture after noting that the forfeiture law “does not in
terms require that the notice of forfeiture must be signed in person by
the parties”); In re Oldfield’s Estate, 158 Iowa 98, 103–04, 138 N.W. 846,
848–49 (1912) (indicating that this statute allows the attorney to sign the
notice of appeal for the appellant “where there is no statutory
requirement otherwise”); see also Iowa Code § 4.7 (resolving a conflict
between a general provision and an irreconcilable special provision in
favor of the special provision). Here Iowa Code section 669.3 and rule
543—1.3 provide otherwise.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the
district court and the decision of the court of appeals.
Waterman, J., joins this dissent.