Joel Goosman Vs. State Of Iowa ( 2009 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 07–1416
Filed April 17, 2009
JOEL GOOSMAN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County,
Duane E. Hoffmeyer, Judge.
Applicant appeals from the dismissal of his application for
postconviction relief asserting that it is unconstitutional to apply State v.
Heemstra prospectively only. AFFIRMED.
Martha M. McMinn, Sioux City, and Gary Dickey, Jr. of Dickey &
Campbell Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor and Thomas S.
Tauber, Assistant Attorneys General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney,
and Mark Campbell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Edward Bull of Bull Law Office, PC, Des Moines, for amici curiae
Robert Henry, Timothy Palmer, and Dennis Gress, Iowa inmates.
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APPEL, Justice.
This case presents the issue of whether federal due process
requires our decision in State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006),
be applied retroactively to persons whose direct appeals were final prior
to the issuance of the Heemstra decision. We conclude that this
constitutional provision does not require that the Heemstra decision be
applied in such cases.
I. Factual and Procedural History.
In 1992, Joel Goosman was charged with first-degree murder in
connection with the shooting death of Chad Mackey. The State
proceeded on two alternate first-degree murder theories, premeditation
with malice aforethought and felony murder.
The underlying felony alleged in the trial information was willful
injury. The jury was instructed that the State must prove the malice
aforethought element required for a first-degree murder conviction and
either that the “defendant acted willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly,
and with specific intent to kill,” or, in the alternative, that Goosman shot
Mackey with the intent to cause a serious injury and that Mackey
sustained a serious injury.
The jury convicted Goosman of first-degree murder, and he was
sentenced to life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by the court
of appeals on November 28, 1994.
Almost twelve years after the direct appeal of Goosman’s conviction
was finalized, this court decided State v. Heemstra on August 25, 2006.
In Heemstra, this court reversed a murder conviction holding that
because the act causing willful injury was the same act that caused the
victim’s death, the assault necessarily merged into the murder and thus
could not serve as a predicate felony for felony murder purposes.
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Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 558. Because Heemstra had been convicted on
a general verdict which could have rested on either a felony-murder
theory or on a finding of premeditation with malice aforethought, this
court vacated his conviction. Id. at 558–59.
The State filed a motion for rehearing. In the rehearing motion, the
State urged this court to clarify its ruling by holding that the decision did
not apply retroactively to postconviction actions. This court
subsequently modified its ruling to state that the holding applied only to
cases where the issue was raised and where there was no final
disposition on direct appeal. Id. at 558.
On February 23, 2007, Goosman filed this application for
postconviction relief. Goosman argued that federal due process requires
the Heemstra decision be applied retroactively in postconviction-relief
proceedings. Goosman sought to have his conviction vacated and a new
trial granted or, in the alternative, to have his conviction reduced to
second-degree murder. The district court denied relief. Goosman filed
this timely appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
Generally, an appeal from a denial of an application for
postconviction relief is reviewed for correction of errors at law. Harpster
v. State, 569 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1997). However, when the applicant
alleges constitutional error, review is de novo “in light of the totality of
the circumstances and the record upon which the postconviction court’s
rulings was made.” Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa 1994).
III. Discussion.
A. The Heemstra Decision. Under Iowa law, a defendant may be
convicted of first-degree murder if the defendant “willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation kills another person.” Iowa Code § 707.2 (2009).
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In the alternative, a person may be convicted of first-degree murder if the
defendant “kills another person while participating in a forcible felony.”
Id.
The second alternative is commonly known as the felony-murder
rule. In seeking a conviction under the felony-murder rule, the State is
not required to show willfulness, deliberation, or premeditation. The
mental element of the crime is imputed from the commission of the
underlying felony. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 270 (Iowa 1979).
Under this alternative, the State need only prove that the homicide
occurred in the perpetration of a forcible felony. Id.
One of the questions that arises under Iowa’s version of the felony-
murder rule is whether a felonious assault, such as willful injury under
Iowa Code section 708.4, may serve as the predicate felony for felony-
murder purposes. In other words, can the same act that causes the
death of another serve as the underlying felony or does that act merge
with the homicide unless the felonious assault is a separate and distinct
action?
We first considered this question in State v. Beeman, 315 N.W.2d
770 (Iowa 1982). In Beeman, the defendant kicked and choked the
victim before inflicting seventeen wounds to the chest. Beeman, 315
N.W.2d at 772. Under these facts, there was ample evidence to convict
the defendant of first-degree murder even if the court adopted a
requirement that the underlying felony be independent of the act causing
death. This court, however, elected to announce a broader approach,
namely, that felonious assaults could serve as predicate felonies as
merger rules do not apply. Id. at 777. The approach in Beeman was
vigorously upheld in subsequent cases. See State v. Mayberry, 411
N.W.2d 677, 682–83 (Iowa 1987) (noting “[w]e rejected the legal premise
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[merger] . . . in State v. Beeman”); State v. Ragland, 420 N.W.2d 791, 793
(Iowa 1988) (“We see no reason to retreat from our previous decisions.”);
State v. Rhomberg, 516 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 1994) (“We have now
reexamined the argument . . . and confirm our prior analyses.”); State v.
Anderson, 517 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Iowa 1994) (“We have steadfastly
declined these invitations to disavow the principles established in
Beeman . . . [a] settled construction. . . .”).
In Heemstra, this court once again revisited the question.
Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 554–58. The court noted that the felony-
murder approach under Beeman and its progeny was far broader than
the approach employed in other states under similar statutes and by
other state courts. Id. at 556–58. We further noted that Beeman had
been subject to local criticism on the ground that it unduly expanded the
felony-murder rule far beyond that intended by the legislature. Id. at
555–56.
After reconsidering the issue, we held in Heemstra that where the
act causing willful injury is the same act that caused the victim’s death,
the former merges with the murder and cannot serve as a predicate
felony for felony-murder purposes. Id. at 558. This is not to say,
however, that willful injury could never serve as the predicate felony for
felony-murder purposes. We narrowed Heemstra’s scope by noting, for
example, that where a “defendant assaulted the victim twice, first
without killing him and second with fatal results,” only the second act
would be merged with the murder and that the first act could be
considered as a predicate felony. Id. at 557. Thus, the merger rule
announced in Heemstra applied only in cases involving a single felonious
assault on the victim which results in the victim’s death.
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Our original opinion in Heemstra disposed of the case before us,
but did not address the question of whether and how the decision would
be applied to other cases. On rehearing, we modified the opinion to
state,
The rule of law announced in this case regarding the use of
willful injury as a predicate felony for felony-murder
purposes shall be applicable only to the present case and
those cases not finally resolved on direct appeal in which the
issue has been raised in the district court.
Id. at 558.
A number of subsequent cases have challenged the
constitutionality of this statement. Goosman asserts that the federal
guarantees of due process and equal protection and the separation of
powers doctrine require retroactive application of Heemstra to his
postconviction-relief proceeding.
B. Federal Due Process. At the outset, the threshold question in
considering whether federal due process requires a judicial decision be
applied to postconviction relief proceedings is whether the decision is
substantive or procedural. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352–53,
124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522–23, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442, 449 (2004). Here, the
parties agree that our decision in Heemstra was substantive rather than
procedural in nature.
Federal precedent concerning the application of substantive law in
collateral proceedings, therefore, guides our analysis. The United States
Supreme Court has recently considered the question of retroactive
application of state court judicial decisions affecting substantive criminal
law in two cases, Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S. Ct. 712, 148 L. Ed.
2d 629 (2001), and Bunkley v. Florida, 538 U.S. 835, 123 S. Ct. 2020,
155 L. Ed. 2d 1046 (2003).
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In Fiore, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
defendant’s conviction for violating a state statute that prohibited
operating a waste facility without a permit. Fiore, 531 U.S. at 226, 121
S. Ct. at 713, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 632. Fiore was convicted of the offense
even though he actually had a permit to operate the facility in question.
Id. at 227, 121 S. Ct. at 713, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 632. The prosecution
successfully asserted, however, that his activities exceeded the scope of
the operations authorized by the permit and Fiore was convicted of the
offense. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined review, and
Fiore’s conviction became final. Id.
After Fiore’s conviction became final, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reviewed the conviction of Fiore’s co-defendant, David Scarpone,
who was convicted of the same offense. Id. In that case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the underlying statute was
inapplicable to persons that held a valid permit. Id. A person who
merely deviated from the permit’s terms, such as Fiore, could not violate
the statute. Id.
Based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 634 A.2d 1109, 1113 (Pa. 1993), Fiore
collaterally challenged his conviction. Id. His claims were rejected in
state courts. Id. He then filed an application in federal court for habeas
relief, which was granted by the federal district court. Id. The Third
Circuit reversed, reasoning that “ ‘state courts are under no [federal]
constitutional obligation to apply their decisions retroactively.’ ” Id. at
227–28, 121 S. Ct. at 714, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 633 (quoting Fiore v. White,
149 F.3d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 1998)).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and certified a
question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. Specifically, the
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Supreme Court inquired whether the state court’s decision interpreting
the statute was a new interpretation, or whether it was “the correct
interpretation of the law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiore’s conviction
became final?” Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court responded,
“Scarpone did not announce a new rule of law. Our ruling
merely clarified the plain language of the statute. . . . Our
interpretation . . . in Scarpone furnishes the proper
statement of law at the date Fiore’s conviction became final.”
Id. (quoting Fiore v. White, 757 A.2d 842, 848–49 (Pa. 2000)).
The United States Supreme Court held that because the issue
decided in Scarpone was “not new law” but simply the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s first gloss on the statute, an issue of “retroactivity” was
not raised. Id. The only question was whether federal due process
prevented Pennsylvania from convicting Fiore for conduct that its
criminal statute, as properly interpreted, did not prohibit at the time of
his conviction. Id. The Supreme Court reversed Fiore’s conviction on due
process grounds because the state did not prove each element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375 (1970)).
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of decisional retroactivity in
Bunkley. In Bunkley, the defendant had been convicted of burglary in
the first degree under a Florida statute which provided increased
penalties for burglary when the perpetrator is armed with a “dangerous
weapon.” Bunkley, 538 U.S. at 836, 123 S. Ct. at 2021, 155 L. Ed. 2d at
1049. The statute, however, explicitly exempted the “common
pocketknife” from the term “dangerous weapon.” Id. at 837, 123 S. Ct. at
2021, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 1049. In Bunkley’s case, the dangerous weapon
at issue was a pocketknife with a two-and-a-half to three-inch blade. Id.
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at 836, 123 S. Ct. at 2021, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 1049. His conviction was
affirmed on appeal in 1989.
In 1997, the Florida Supreme Court in L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d
370, 373 (Fla. 1997), considered the meaning of the term “common
pocketknife” in the statute for the first time. Id. at 837, 123 S. Ct. at
2021, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 1049. The Florida court held “that a pocketknife
with a blade of 3 3/4 inches ‘plainly falls within the statutory exception’ ”
for the common pocketknife. Id. (quoting L.B., 700 So. 2d at 373). After
the L.B. decision, Bunkley filed an application for postconviction relief in
state court. Id. at 838, 123 S. Ct. at 2021, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 1050. The
Florida Supreme Court, however, held that its decision in L.B. was not
retroactive, ignoring Fiore analysis, because only “jurisprudential
upheavals,” as opposed to “evolutionary refinements,” warranted
retroactive application. Id. at 838, 123 S. Ct. at 2022, 155 L. Ed. 2d at
1050.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the Florida court
erred in not considering the Fiore question—in light of L.B., what was the
meaning of the pocketknife exception at the time of Bunkley’s conviction.
Id. at 840, 123 S. Ct. at 2023, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 1051. The Supreme
Court recognized that while the Florida statute had not changed since
1901, the Florida Supreme Court may have “changed” the law through
its decisional precedents. Id. at 841–42, 123 S. Ct. at 2023–24, 155
L. Ed. 2d at 1052. The case was remanded to determine precisely what
the law was at the time of Bunkley’s conviction. Id. at 842, 123 S. Ct. at
2024, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 1052–53.
Taken together, Fiore and Bunkley stand for two propositions.
First, where a court announces a new rule of substantive law that simply
“clarifies” ambiguities in existing law, federal due process requires that
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the decision be retroactively applied to all cases, including collateral
attacks where all avenues of direct appeal have been exhausted. Second,
where a court announces a “change” in substantive law which does not
clarify existing law but overrules prior authoritative precedent on the
same substantive issue, federal due process does not require retroactive
application of the decision.
The treatment of Fiore and Bunkley by other state courts confirms
our analysis of the issue. For example, in Clem v. State, 81 P.3d 521,
523 (Nev. 2003), the Nevada Supreme Court considered whether federal
due process required its overruling of prior precedent regarding the
meaning of the term “deadly weapon” be applied in a state habeas corpus
proceeding. 81 P.3d at 526. The Nevada Supreme Court ruled that
because its recent case overruled a prior decision regarding the meaning
of the term “deadly weapon,” it amounted to a change in law, not a mere
clarification, and that, as a result, there was no federal due process
requirement that the change in law apply in the habeas proceeding. Id.
at 529.
Other courts have employed a similar analysis to reach the
conclusion that where a judicial decision works a change as compared to
a clarification of substantive law, federal due process is not implicated.
See Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 1335 n.12 (11th Cir.
2008); Chapman v. LeMaster, 302 F.3d 1189, 1197 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002);
Easterwood v. State, 44 P.3d 1209, 1212–21 (Kan. 2002).
Goosman draws our attention to a number of cases, particularly
Schriro, 542 U.S. at 348, 124 S. Ct. at 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 442,
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d
828 (1998), and In re Hinton, 100 P.3d 801 (Wash. 2004). Each of these
cases, however, is inapplicable as it involves a clarification of existing
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law, not a change in law under the Fiore-Bunkley framework, involves
application of a federal court decision, or constitutes a procedural rather
than substantive change in the law. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 358, 124 S. Ct.
at 2526, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 453 (holding a new procedural rule did not
have to be applied retroactively where state faithfully applied the law as it
understood it at the time); Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618, 118 S. Ct. at 1609,
140 L. Ed. 2d at 837 (discussing whether a first clarification of a federal
statute by the United States Supreme Court should be applied
retroactively); In re Hinton, 100 P.3d at 859–60 (holding a prior decision
clarifying the state of the law at the time of the defendants’ convictions
must be applied retroactively).
We conclude that Goosman does not have a federal due process
claim. Our ruling in Heemstra clearly involved a change in law and not a
mere clarification. Thus, Goosman was convicted of first-degree murder
under jury instructions, which properly stated the law at the time of his
conviction. As a result, the limitation of retroactivity announced in
Heemstra to cases on direct appeal where the issue has been preserved
did not violate federal due process under Fiore and Bunkley.1
C. Federal Equal Protection and Separation of Powers. The
State asserts that any claim on appeal based on equal protection and
separation of powers has not been preserved. Our review of the record
confirms that Goosman did not raise equal protection or separation of
powers in his application for postconviction relief and the district court
did not rule upon these issues. As a result, these issues cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. State v. McCright, 569 N.W.2d 605,
607 (Iowa 1997).
1Because we have concluded that Goosman’s federal due process claim is
without merit, we do not decide whether his claim for postconviction relief was time-
barred by operation of Iowa Code section 822.3.
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IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, the decision of the district court dismissing
Goosman’s petition is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.