Michael Thomas Goodwin v. Iowa District Court for Davis County ( 2019 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 18–0737
Filed December 20, 2019
MICHAEL THOMAS GOODWIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Joel D. Yates,
Judge.
Juvenile offender challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
to correct an illegal sentence. WRIT ANNULLED; DISTRICT COURT
RULING AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for plaintiff.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, Rick L. Lynch, County Attorney, and Douglas D.
Hammerand, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant.
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WATERMAN, Justice.
In this appeal, we must decide whether a motion to correct an illegal
sentence is a proper vehicle to challenge a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment on grounds alleging the sentencing court failed to correctly
apply our precedent governing juvenile sentencings. A sixteen-year-old
fatally shot his father and pled guilty to second-degree murder under a
plea agreement to jointly recommend a twenty-year mandatory minimum.
The district court conducted his individualized sentencing hearing after
our decision in State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 145–47 (Iowa 2017), which
elaborated on the juvenile sentencing factors set forth in Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 477–78, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012), and State v. Lyle,
854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa 2014). The district court, relying on
expert testimony, imposed a fifty-year prison sentence with a twenty-year
mandatory minimum before parole eligibility, consistent with the parties’
plea agreement, and recited its consideration of the sentencing factors.
The defendant filed no direct appeal. Months later, the defendant filed a
pro se motion in district court to correct an “illegal” sentence and for
appointment of counsel, alleging the district court had failed to properly
apply the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors. The district court denied his motion.
We granted the defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
On our review, we hold that a motion claiming the district court
misapplied the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors does not constitute a challenge to
an illegal sentence with a concomitant statutory right to counsel. A failure
to conduct an individualized hearing before imposing a mandatory
minimum sentence would render a juvenile’s sentence unconstitutional
and subject to a challenge as an illegal sentence. This defendant, however,
received an individualized sentencing hearing that addressed the
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Miller/Lyle/Roby factors. Accordingly, we annul the writ and affirm the
district court’s ruling and sentence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On December 11, 2015, sixteen-year-old Michael Goodwin Jr. fatally
shot his father, Michael Goodwin Sr. 1 twice in the head while the father
rested in a recliner in their living room. The son walked out without
reporting the crime and spent the night at his ex-girlfriend’s house, telling
her his father left town and he was locked out.
Goodwin had access to his grandfather’s home and truck. His
grandfather was hospitalized at that time. Goodwin drove the truck to his
ex-girlfriend’s home with his family dog, dog food, clothing, and two
firearms. She found his house keys in the truck the next day when he
picked her up from work, contradicting his claim that he was locked out.
They attended a school dance separately that evening, December 12.
There, he coerced her into leaving the dance with him by telling her if she
did not get into the truck with him he would hurt her boyfriend and “it
would not end well.” Goodwin drove her to his grandfather’s house where
he took the firearms inside. Her boyfriend picked her up there despite
Goodwin’s refusal to let her leave, which infuriated Goodwin. She reported
this incident to law enforcement that evening. Deputies detained Goodwin
and brought him to the emergency room for a mental health evaluation
based on the suicidal and homicidal statements he had made to his ex-
girlfriend. Goodwin was transferred to a juvenile detention center.
On December 13, Goodwin Sr.’s best friend, Rodney Stevens, visited
his house to check on him after he missed a church event and failed to
answer phone calls. Stevens was concerned about Goodwin Sr.’s safety
1We will refer to the father as “Goodwin Sr.” and the son as “Goodwin” throughout
this opinion.
4
given his strained relationship with his son. Upon arriving at the Goodwin
home, he smelled “death” and called law enforcement requesting a
wellness check. Davis County Deputy Robert Murry found Goodwin Sr.
dead in his reclining chair in the living room. The television was on, his
cell phone was in his lap, and his drink was undisturbed on the table next
to the recliner. The lead investigator, Chief Deputy Josh O’Dell, stated
there was no sign of a struggle, and it appeared that Goodwin Sr. “was
basically reclined in that chair like he’d been laying down watching TV.”
Investigators found the murder weapon, a Ruger 22/45 .22-caliber
pistol, in the basement rafters of the grandfather’s home. They concluded
Goodwin had killed his father and had acted alone. They found no
evidence of peer pressure to commit this crime. They were unable to
determine a motive but believed Goodwin violently overreacted to his
father’s refusal to allow him to attend that Saturday’s school dance.
On January 25, 2016, Goodwin was charged with first-degree
murder. This was not his first contact with law enforcement or the judicial
system. Since April 2012, Goodwin had been referred to juvenile court
services three times for the offenses of simple assault, disorderly conduct
(fighting in public), and two counts of carrying weapons. He successfully
completed the terms of informal adjustment agreements for the simple
assault and disorderly conduct offenses. The weapons charges stemmed
from the events on December 12, 2015, and were pending at the time of
his arrest for his father’s murder.
On April 28, 2017, Goodwin pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement under which the parties agreed to jointly recommend a
sentence with a mandatory minimum of twenty years before parole
eligibility and a fifty-year maximum. At the plea hearing, Goodwin
admitted that before the murder he argued with his father and went
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outside to blow off steam by shooting a handgun. When he came back
inside, the argument continued, and he impulsively shot his father in the
head twice from six to eight feet away. The court accepted his guilty plea.
The court conducted his sentencing hearing on July 19. Goodwin
was then age seventeen. The prosecutor began the sentencing hearing by
stating,
Your Honor, based on the recent case that came down from
the Iowa Supreme Court, State v. Christopher Roby, R-o-b-y
-- it was filed on June 16, 2017 -- the Supreme Court of Iowa
went through the additional five factors that were identified in
Lyle and explained what we should do to establish a record.
The defense is going to be calling an expert, and the State is
using that expert as well to establish why we’re having a 20-
year minimum in this case.
The State called two witnesses: Chief Deputy O’Dell and Stevens. O’Dell
testified about the murder scene, including the absence of evidence of a
struggle, and Goodwin’s activities.
Stevens testified about Goodwin’s childhood, family circumstances,
and behavior preceding the patricide. Stevens noted that Goodwin’s
parents had divorced five or six years earlier and that Goodwin initially
lived with his mother. He wanted to live with his father, and he acted out
and caused problems for his mother to get his way. After a few months,
his mother consented to his move and terminated her parental rights.
Goodwin moved in with his father. Neither parent provided much
discipline, and the father had only begun to establish ground rules shortly
before the murder. The grandfather spoiled Goodwin and gave him two
firearms without the father’s knowledge, texting, “Bubba, whatever you do,
don’t let your dad know I gave you those two guns.” Stevens witnessed
Goodwin threaten his father.
Stevens additionally observed that the son’s attitude was frequently
“belligerent” towards his father and others, with a “you don’t tell me what
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to do” attitude. Stevens was concerned enough that he told Goodwin Sr.
that he was worried his son would get access to a firearm and shoot him,
but the father replied that his son had no such access.
The defense called an expert witness, Dr. Stephen Hart, at the
sentencing hearing. Dr. Hart, a professor of clinical and forensic
psychology, relied on transcripts of depositions and his personal interview
of Goodwin. Dr. Hart described Goodwin’s childhood:
Michael’s childhood was rather disturbed or disrupted.
Early on, from his description and the description of others,
there were times when the family was relatively normal or that
he had a relatively normal childhood. He was described as
being happy but also being able to go out and play outside the
home and play with friends and so forth.
But later on, there was some serious problems due to
his father’s alcohol abuse and anger and his general
abusiveness, psychological and physical abusiveness -- and
this led to some very serious marital discord between the
parents over a long period of time, many years, and that
included frequent arguments in the house, yelling and
screaming or shouting, and also physical abusiveness
between the parents, some of which was witnessed by --
directly by Michael.
His mother was quite fearful, in part, because
Mr. Goodwin, Sr. was a large man, and eventually she
separated and moved away, essentially just leaving Michael
Jr. in the custody of Michael Sr. -- and I’m going to use the
term advisedly -- abandoning him or leaving him there and
basically cutting off contact with him.
Dr. Hart then described the situation between Goodwin and his
father after his mother relinquished her parental rights:
The situation was bettered in some ways in a sense that
Michael Sr.’s alcohol problems, which had been bad and then
had improved. He’d gone through a period of sobriety. He
restarted drinking again around the time of the final
separation, but then did regain his sobriety. So that was a
positive thing. And there was also indication that he began to
attend church more frequently and establish some stronger
friendships.
However, he also seemed to become, in some ways,
more angry and also somewhat more extreme or entrenched
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in his attitudes. And, in particular, there’s very extensive
descriptions of his prepper beliefs and behavior. He was one
of the people that believed there was a strong need to prepare
for an imminent catastrophe, and he stockpiled food and
weapons and other supplies and met regularly with people
who shared his prepper beliefs, withdrew from many other
members of society or restricted his social contact. He put
cameras around the family home.
He restricted Michael Jr. from having contact with
people outside the home. For example, he wasn’t allowed to
socialize with friends outside of school or go out in the
evenings.
He spoke a lot about his prepper beliefs and also more
general suspicious or cynical and antiauthority attitudes,
including antigovernment and antipolice attitudes. He was
focused on firearms use and taught Michael Jr. to use
firearms and made him responsible as far as part of their care
and maintenance in the family home.
But he also, towards Michael Jr., became angry and
abusive directly, often yelling at him, or frequently yelling at
him, and occasionally hitting him. And on a few occasions
was described by Michael Jr. as beating him and even pointing
handguns at him. And Michael Jr. also became concerned
that this abusive behavior was increasing in severity over
time. He actually mentioned this to some other people, but
did not report it to police.
Dr. Hart elaborated about Goodwin’s cognitive and intellectual
functions and opined he was “a relatively normal or grossly normal
adolescent male” with “average intelligence and no major cognitive
deficits.” Dr. Hart diagnosed Goodwin with attention deficit disorder for
which he never received treatment. Dr. Hart noted that he did not consider
that diagnosis to be serious since it is fairly common among children,
especially young males. He explained,
His personality functions appeared to be grossly
normal. In particular, I didn’t notice any kind of marked
personality traits that were of the type or of the severity that
might indicate a serious personality disturbance or a
burgeoning personality disorder.
He clearly has had some problems over the years with
anger and impulsive or reactive aggression. However, again,
most of that, aside from the current offense, was not serious
in nature or frequent. I would say relatively normal, perhaps
8
above average, but not extreme for an adolescent male. His
social or personal relationships are grossly normal. He had
some good social skills. He is a relatively polite or pleasant
young man, and he’s had some positive peer relationships
over the years, and even some intimate relationships, all of
this despite the fact that he’s had a restricted social life
through the problems with his father.
He also has started to re-establish a relationship with
his mother over the years.
Finally, his social attitudes or orientation were, again,
grossly normal. He acknowledges that he’s, kind of, mildly
suspicious of others at times. He’s a little bit anxious around
other people, in part because of being restricted in terms of
his ability to have interaction with other people and maybe
being a little bit suspicious of others on account of his father’s
beliefs.
But he’s, again, primarily prosocial in nature and a
polite, respectful young man. By no means perfect, and never
presented himself as such, but I would have said pretty
normal for an adolescent male. He had no serious problems
with alcohol use. He did use alcohol, but there was no
evidence of significant or serious problems. He did not use
drugs. He did not have serious or frequent antisocial conduct
in the community prior to the current offense. He had no
serious behavioral problems with school or institutional
infractions while in custody in relation to this current offense.
But even in terms of thoughts or plans for the future,
these were primarily prosocial in nature. His, kind of, long-
term dream was to maybe join the Army and then seek a
career in law enforcement or something similar, which is
somewhat unusual for the people I have evaluated.
Regarding Goodwin’s maturity and responsibility, Dr. Hart found
him to be “a, kind of, normal adolescent male” with “occasional problems
with anger and what [he] would call impulsive or reactive aggression, but
[he] would have characterized that as being related to his adverse child-
rearing experiences or other situational factors as opposed to some kind
of developmental problem.”
Dr. Hart characterized Goodwin’s home environment and family
relationships as being “seriously disturbed” and “quite poisonous in a
sense -- or toxic in a sense of being something that [he] would have
expected to have an adverse impact on any young person.” He elaborated,
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Certainly being stuck alone with his father, he was, in
some ways, almost a captive in an environment that was
extremely negative and focused on anger and aggression and
violence and guns. And he was directly exposed to this to the
point where he was physically abused by his father and had
guns pointed at him. This was just, I think by anybody’s
definition, a bad home environment.
When he was asked to give an opinion on Goodwin’s legal
competency, Dr. Hart stated,
I believe that he was, again, a pretty normal adolescent
male and did not have any significant problems with legal
competency. So, in particular, what I paid attention to was
whether he seemed to ever have failed to appreciate the nature
or object of potential consequences of the offense for which he
was arrested and charged.
I considered whether he appeared to have been
subjected to any intense investigative procedures by the police
or whether he was -- he appeared to have problems
communicating with or instructing counsel, and from the
information I reviewed and my conversations with him, I didn’t
see any potential problems in these areas.
Dr. Hart described Goodwin’s prospects for rehabilitation as “very
good or excellent” due to his identification of a number of strengths in
Goodwin’s development and psychological and social functioning, and
Dr. Hart did not see many areas of weakness except his childhood
experiences and his relationship with his father. He concluded that
Goodwin can likely “understand and abide by institutional rules and
regulations” such that it is unlikely that he will be unable to adjust to
incarceration. Dr. Hart found that Goodwin’s level of functioning and
social skills suggested that he would be able to participate in and benefit
from rehabilitative activities such as counseling and vocational programs.
He concluded that he did not see anything that suggested Goodwin posed
an elevated risk for violence.
Finally, while still under direct examination by defense counsel,
when asked about the sentence length in the plea agreement, Dr. Hart
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testified that he thought the minimum period of incarceration was
appropriate and that it would adequately protect public safety. On cross-
examination, the prosecutor questioned Dr. Hart regarding some details
in his report, his consideration of the Miller/Lyle/Roby factors, and the
conclusions he reached for each factor:
Q. The final thing I want to ask you, Dr. Hart, is in your
report you indicated you followed the five factors, and you
talked about the recent Iowa Supreme Court State v. Roby.
A. That’s correct.
Q. You had a chance to read that as well? A. I was
able to review part of it, yes. I haven’t reviewed it in detail --
or, sorry, completely -- but I reviewed the sections that had to
do with the description of the criteria that ought to be
considered.
Q. Sure. And I think Mr. Addington went through at
least four of those factors with you on direct examination, and
I just want to cover one that wasn’t covered. In the Roby case,
they talk about a third factor called “the circumstances of the
crime.” And what the Court was concerned about is, within
these circumstances, attention must be given to the juvenile
offender’s actual role and the role of various types of external
pressure in the crime.
So I just want -- so it’s clear for the record, Dr. Hart,
you didn’t find any type of group pressure being placed on the
defendant involving the shooting in this case? In other words,
he wasn’t hanging around with friends and they talked about
committing this crime or anything; is that correct? A. That’s
correct. In fact, the only things that I noted in this respect
were that -- relevant to this particular criteria was that the
actual offense itself occurred in the midst of a serious conflict
between the two Michaels, Junior and Senior.
Q. Well, that’s according to Michael Jr.; correct?
A. That’s correct. But the other element of that particular
criteria did not appear to be applicable to me in this case.
The prosecutor concluded his cross-examination by asking for Dr. Hart’s
opinion about the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence:
Q. Okay. So the bottom line is you considered those
five factors set out in State v. Roby, and after considering
those factors, reviewing documents in this case, talking to the
defendant, it’s your opinion that the 20-year mandatory
minimum is appropriate for a minimum sentence in this case?
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A. Yes. And just to follow up on your question, not only did
I do my best to consider what was explicitly included as
criteria in the Roby case and prior cases, I’ve always tried to
go beyond that to look at related kinds of issues. So I tried to
use that as a starting point, but I tried to be more broad or
individualized or contextualized in the assessment and found
nothing else that appeared to be relevant.
(Emphasis added.)
Goodwin testified on his own behalf. He detailed his family
relationships, his parents’ divorce when he was age ten or eleven, and how
he thought the best thing for him was to live with his father after the
divorce. He noted things slowly changed for the worse because he was
limited to mostly staying at home with his father and Stevens. Goodwin
described how he was unable to invite friends to his home or date because
their church opposed teens dating. He said he faced increasing verbal
abuse from his father. Goodwin explained that they argued over “little
stuff,” and he would seek refuge with his grandfather, which escalated
tensions with his father.
Goodwin testified at times they “got physical and [would] fight.” He
noted that there were handguns and rifles in the home that he knew how
to use. He described his father’s prepper behaviors and distrust of
government and the police, attitudes he shared. He stated that he could
not tell anyone other than close friends about his unhappiness, and the
only thing that relieved his stress was going to his grandfather’s, which he
was unable to do in December while his grandfather was hospitalized. On
cross-examination, Goodwin testified that he was able to communicate
with and form friendships with girls through hidden activities or on his
iPhone despite the limitations imposed by his father and the church, but
doing so increased the conflict with his father.
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The court sentenced Goodwin to a fifty-year prison term with a
twenty-year minimum before parole eligibility, consistent with the plea
agreement. The court gave these reasons for the sentence:
Mr. Goodwin, I’ve selected this particular sentence for
you after considering your age, specifically your age at the
time the crime was committed, the nature of the offense
committed by you and the harm to the victim, the plea
agreement reached by the attorneys in this case, the contents
of the PSI, and specifically the recommendation of the PSI.
I’ve also considered what the witnesses have testified to
here today. I have also considered the factors set forth in State
v. Roby. I’ve also considered your need for rehabilitation and
your potential for rehabilitation. And, finally, I’ve considered
the necessity for protecting the community from further
offenses by you and others.
Goodwin filed a motion for reconsideration of his sentence on
October 30, which the district court denied. Goodwin did not file a direct
appeal.
On March 28, 2018, Goodwin filed a pro se motion to correct an
illegal sentence and for appointment of counsel, asserting,
[t]he court failed to properly weigh the factors cited in State v.
Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017), and failed to consider any
expert testimony determining those factors, as well as other
evidence and testimony that the defendant cannot be
sentenced to any mandatory-minimum sentence without
violating both the Iowa and U.S. Constitutions.
On April 27, the district court denied this motion. Goodwin filed a pro se
petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. The state appellate
defender was appointed to represent him. We retained the case.
II. Standard of Review.
“[W]e may review a challenge that a sentence is illegal at any time.”
Jefferson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 926 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State
v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 840 (Iowa 2018)). “[T]hough we typically review
challenges to illegal sentences for correction of legal errors, our standard
13
of review for an allegation of an unconstitutional sentence is de novo.” Id.
(quoting State v. Harrison, 914 N.W.2d 178, 187–88 (Iowa 2018)).
III. Analysis.
Goodwin’s pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence alleged the
district court failed to properly weigh the Roby factors. 2 The State argues
that his claim is a procedural challenge that was improperly brought
through a motion to correct an illegal sentence. We must decide whether
Goodwin’s challenge to his sentence on these grounds constitutes an
attack on an illegal sentence, and we conclude it does not.
In Jefferson, we recognized a statutory right to counsel under Iowa
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.28(1) to represent the defendant on a proper
motion to correct an illegal sentence. 926 N.W.2d at 520, 525. We
recognized that “the motion to correct an illegal sentence has the potential
to be abused.” Id. at 525. We carefully reiterated what is, and what is not,
a proper motion to correct an illegal sentence. “To begin with, a motion
challenging a defendant’s underlying conviction is not a motion to correct
an illegal sentence.” Id. The purpose of a motion to correct an illegal
sentence is “not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other
2It is not our role to rewrite a pro se pleading, nor can we act as the advocate for
a pro se litigant. State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 913–14 (Iowa 2003) (noting that
consideration of the defendant’s claims not fully raised or analyzed in his appeal “would
require the court ‘to assume a partisan role and undertake the [defendant’s] research and
advocacy,’ a task we will not accept” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Stoen, 596
N.W.2d 504, 507 (Iowa 1999))), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d
545, 551 (Iowa 2010); see also Conkey v. Hoak Motors, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa
2001) (“As a pro se plaintiff, Conkey undertook responsibility for litigating his own cause.
No part of that obligation devolved upon the court.”). Accordingly, we will not construe
Goodwin’s district court filing as a Bruegger claim that Goodwin’s sentence is
unconstitutional as grossly disproportionate to the crime he committed. See State v.
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 884–85 (Iowa 2009); see also State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636,
650–52 (Iowa 2012) (discussing application of Bruegger). Even if read liberally, Goodwin’s
pro se motion does not present a claim for an illegal sentence. In any event, Goodwin’s
highly capable appellate counsel has not argued that Goodwin’s pro se district court filing
can be construed to raise a Bruegger claim.
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proceedings prior to the imposition of the sentence.” State v. Bruegger,
773 N.W.2d 862, 871–72 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424, 430, 82 S. Ct. 468, 472 (1962)). “Additionally, ‘a defective
sentencing procedure does not constitute an illegal sentence . . . .’ ”
Jefferson, 926 N.W.2d at 525 (quoting Tindell v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357,
360 (Iowa 2001)). A motion to correct an illegal sentence cannot be
brought to challenge “sentences that, because of procedural errors, are
illegally imposed.” Tindell, 629 N.W.2d at 359. Accordingly, the failure to
conduct a reasonable-ability-to-pay determination before imposing a
restitution award does not make the award “illegal” or subject to challenge
at any time through a motion to correct an illegal sentence. State v. Gross,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2019) (“Instead, as we have previously held, once
the deadline for direct appeal has run, the defendant is limited to filing a
petition to modify restitution (or the plan of restitution) under Iowa Code
section 910.7.”).
Labels are not controlling. Counsel need not be appointed merely
because the defendant files a challenge captioned as a “motion to correct
an illegal sentence.” And if a motion to correct an illegal sentence is
frivolous, appointed counsel “may ask to withdraw employing a procedure
similar to that authorized by [Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure] 6.1005 for
frivolous appeals.” Jefferson, 926 N.W.2d at 525.
A proper motion to challenge an illegal sentence “includes claims
that the court lacked the power to impose the sentence . . . , including
claims that the sentence is outside the statutory bounds or that the
sentence itself is unconstitutional.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 871. 3 For
example, in State v. Lathrop, we held that the defendant properly brought
3The briefing by Goodwin’s appellate counsel does not present a Bruegger claim.
15
a motion to correct an illegal sentence to challenge his sentence to lifetime
parole as unconstitutional under the ex post facto clause of the Iowa
Constitution. 781 N.W.2d 288, 294 (Iowa 2010); see also Iowa Const.
art. I, § 21.
Regarding sentences for juvenile offenders, “we have held it is the
‘absence of a sentencing procedure’ that offends article I, section 17 of the
Iowa Constitution. Thus, when there is an appropriate sentencing
procedure there is no constitutional violation.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 137
(quoting Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402). Goodwin would have a proper motion
to correct an illegal sentence if he had been denied an individualized
sentencing hearing. But “if the district court follows the sentencing
procedure we have identified and a statute authorizes the sentence
ultimately imposed, then our review is for abuse of discretion; we ask
whether there is ‘evidence [that] supports the sentence.’ ” Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2015)).
We hold that the district court had the constitutional authority to
impose Goodwin’s twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence because it
conducted an individualized sentencing hearing that applied the
Miller/Lyle/Roby factors. The Iowa Constitution permits mandatory
minimum sentences for juvenile offenders after an individualized hearing
applying those factors. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 132, 145. Indeed, “ ‘[i]f the
mandatory minimum period of incarceration is warranted,’ we commanded
[our judges] to impose the sentence.” Id. at 143 (alteration in original)
(quoting Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10).
Goodwin challenges whether the district court properly weighed the
Miller/Lyle/Roby factors and expert testimony during that hearing. In our
view, Goodwin’s claims allege a defective sentencing procedure, not an
illegal sentence beyond the court’s authority. See State v. Ayers, 590
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N.W.2d 25, 27 (Iowa 1999) (“We consider the court’s failure to exercise its
discretion a defective sentencing procedure . . . .”). A contrary holding
would allow parties to misuse motions to correct an illegal sentence to
bring untimely appeals that in substance challenge how the district court
exercised its discretion in sentencing. We will not permit such collateral
attacks on a sentence.
Even if we were reviewing Goodwin’s sentence on direct appeal, we
would determine the district court acted within its discretion and affirm.
In our view, this record shows Goodwin received the requisite
individualized sentencing hearing addressing the Miller/Lyle/Roby
factors, which are
(1) the age of the offender and the features of youthful
behavior, such as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the particular “family
and home environment” that surround the youth; (3) the
circumstances of the particular crime and all circumstances
relating to youth that may have played a role in the
commission of the crime; (4) the challenges for youthful
offenders in navigating through the criminal process; and
(5) the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for
change.
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132
S. Ct. at 2468); see also Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 135 (quoting same factors).4
In Roby, we emphasized the importance of expert testimony. 897 N.W.2d
at 145–48. Each factor was addressed by the expert in Goodwin’s
sentencing hearing.
4The State argues Roby erroneously “outsources” sentencing discretion in
applying the youth factors from judges to experts, but it stops short of asking us to
overrule Roby or Lyle. “We do not ordinarily overrule our precedent sua sponte.” Estate
of McFarlin v. State, 881 N.W.2d 51, 59 (Iowa 2016); see also State v. Roberson,
No. 2017AP1894–CR, 2019 WL 6518531, at *13 (Wis. Dec. 3, 2019) (overruling precedent
at state’s request to “return to our past practice of following decisions of the United States
Supreme Court”).
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Under the first factor, the sentencing court must consider “the age
of the offender and the features of youthful behavior, such as ‘immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.’ ” Lyle, 854
N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132 S. Ct. at
2468). Recognizing that children and adults constitutionally differ, the
court considers evidence that “speaks to the juvenile’s ‘maturity,
deliberation of thought, and appreciation of risk-taking.’ ” Zarate, 908
N.W.2d at 852 (quoting Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 145). Dr. Hart testified that
Goodwin was “a relatively normal or grossly normal adolescent male” with
“average intelligence and no major cognitive deficits,” some problems with
anger and impulsive or reactive aggression that he believed could be
attributed to his childhood or other situational factors, and good social
skills with positive peer relationships despite the social restrictions.
Although he noted that Goodwin had a history of attention deficit disorder,
he did not notice any personality traits that could indicate a serious
personality disturbance or a burgeoning personality disorder. Dr. Hart
described Goodwin as “pretty normal for an adolescent male” without a
history of antisocial conduct in the community, behavioral problems at
school, or institutional infractions while in custody. Stevens’s testimony
contradicts Dr. Hart in part, characterizing Goodwin as having a
“belligerent” and “you don’t tell me what to do” attitude toward others,
including his father. Stevens also expressed concerns for his own safety
and Goodwin Sr.’s.
Under the second factor, the sentencing court must consider “the
particular ‘family and home environment’ that surround the youth.” Lyle,
854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78, 132 S. Ct. at
2468). “This factor seeks to identify any familial dependency and negative
influences of family circumstances that can be ingrained on children” and
18
considers the impact of all home environments, financial situations, and
social backgrounds. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 146. Dr. Hart testified that
Goodwin’s childhood was initially “relatively normal” but changed with the
marital discord that led to his parents’ divorce, which included abuse and
frequent arguments that he witnessed. Dr. Hart noted Goodwin’s mother
relinquished her parental rights and subsequently had only infrequent
contact with him. After the divorce, Goodwin Sr. went through a period of
sobriety and began attending church and meetings regarding his “prepper
beliefs,” which led to him restricting his son’s social life with girls. Dr. Hart
additionally testified that Goodwin faced physical and emotional abuse by
his father. Dr. Hart discussed how Goodwin was exposed to firearms and
was responsible for their care and maintenance in the home. Overall,
Dr. Hart testified that Goodwin’s home environment and family
relationships were seriously disturbed and poisonous.
Under the third factor, the sentencing court must consider “the
circumstances of the particular crime and all circumstances relating to
youth that may have played a role in the commission of the crime.” Lyle,
854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10. Here, our caselaw directs the sentencing judge
to give attention to “the juvenile offender’s actual role and the role of
various types of external pressure.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 146. As such,
this factor is more relevant in situations of group participation in a crime.
Id. For homicide offenses, this also involves consideration of “the way
familial and peer pressures” may have affected the defendant. Zarate, 908
N.W.2d at 853 (quoting Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556). When directly asked
about this factor, Dr. Hart answered that there was no evidence of peer
pressure on Goodwin to kill his father. Dr. Hart acknowledged that
Goodwin killed his father during an argument. Nevertheless, the physical
murder scene, described during the sentencing hearing by the lead
19
investigator, belied any indication of a struggle. Goodwin Sr. was shot
dead in his recliner while watching TV with his remote and drink at his
side. No claim of self-defense was raised. Our sentencing courts can and
should consider the heinous nature of the crime in evaluating whether to
impose a mandatory minimum sentence.
Under the fourth factor, the sentencing court must consider “the
challenges for youthful offenders in navigating through the criminal
process.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10. This factor recognizes that
juveniles are typically less capable than adults at navigating the legal
process. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 146. Dr. Hart stated that Goodwin was a
“pretty normal adolescent male” that “did not have any significant
problems with legal competency.” He testified that he did not see any
potential problems regarding Goodwin Jr.’s interactions with the police or
his legal counsel.
Under the fifth factor, the sentencing court must consider “the
possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d
at 404 n.10. This factor typically favors mitigation because juveniles are
generally more capable of rehabilitation than adults. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at
147. Dr. Hart testified that Goodwin’s prospects for rehabilitation were
“very good or excellent,” given that he saw “strengths” in his development
and psychological and social functioning that suggested potential for
change. Dr. Hart identified Goodwin’s areas of weakness as being his
childhood experiences and his strained relationship with his father but
believed he would adjust to incarceration and would benefit from the
rehabilitative programs available there.
The district court heard Dr. Hart’s detailed expert testimony on his
consideration of Goodwin’s individual situation under all of the factors.
The court also explicitly stated it “considered the factors set forth in State
20
v. Roby” in reaching its sentencing determination. We determine that
Goodwin received the requisite individualized sentencing hearing, which
satisfied the constitutional requirement from article I, section 17 of the
Iowa Constitution.
The district court also had the statutory authority to impose this
sentence. Goodwin was convicted of second-degree murder. The
maximum sentence for an adult individual convicted of second-degree
murder is fifty years. Iowa Code § 707.3(2) (2016). Under section
902.12(1), thirty-five of those fifty years must be served before the
individual is eligible for parole or work release. Id. § 902.12(1). Section
901.5(14) allows the court to “suspend the sentence in whole or in part,
including any mandatory minimum sentence” when sentencing juveniles.
Id. § 901.5(14). The district court sentenced Goodwin to a minimum of
twenty years of imprisonment before parole eligibility and a fifty-year
maximum for his crime of second-degree murder. The court had the
authority to impose a fifty-year sentence under section 707.3(2), and it
was not required to impose a lower mandatory minimum term than what
is mandated in section 902.12(1) merely because Goodwin was a juvenile.
See id. § 901.5(14). Our district courts can and should weigh public safety
(incapacitation), deterrence, and retribution when sentencing juvenile
offenders for violent felonies. See Zarate, 908 N.W.2d at 854–55 (approving
consideration of other goals of criminal punishment when sentencing
juvenile offenders, including incapacitation, deterrence, and culpability).
Goodwin fails to show the district court lacked the statutory
authority to impose this sentence. To the contrary, his sentence was
within the statutory limits. In fact, Goodwin received a more lenient
sentence than the maximum authorized by the statute, a thirty-five-year
21
mandatory minimum. Goodwin will become parole eligible before age
thirty-nine, his father’s age at the time of his murder.
The district court acted within its constitutional and statutory
authority in sentencing Goodwin to the twenty-year mandatory minimum.
We therefore reject Goodwin’s claim that his sentence is illegal.
The district court adequately explained its reasons for the sentence:
Mr. Goodwin, I’ve selected this particular sentence for
you after considering your age, specifically your age at the
time the crime was committed, the nature of the offense
committed by you and the harm to the victim, the plea
agreement reached by the attorneys in this case, the contents
of the PSI, and specifically the recommendation of the PSI.
I’ve also considered what the witnesses have testified to
here today. I have also considered the factors set forth in State
v. Roby. I’ve also considered your need for rehabilitation and
your potential for rehabilitation. And, finally, I’ve considered
the necessity for protecting the community from further
offenses by you and others.
The district court relied on no impermissible sentencing factors. The
expert testimony of Dr. Hart, who was retained by the defense, supported
the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence. That sentence is also
supported by the parties’ plea agreement and joint recommendation. See
State v. Cason, 532 N.W.2d 755, 756–57 (Iowa 1995) (per curiam)
(recognizing that sentencing courts may consider the parties’ plea
agreement in imposing the sentence). Neither Goodwin nor his appellate
counsel argues his trial counsel was ineffective. To the contrary, with the
aid of his trial counsel, Goodwin avoided a longer mandatory minimum
sentence and a first-degree murder conviction. As required by our
precedent, the district court independently considered the other
sentencing factors along with the plea agreement to ensure the sentence
imposed was constitutional.
22
The absence of additional specific findings on each factor does not
make this an illegal sentence. Even a “terse and succinct statement is
sufficient . . . when the reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious
in light of the statement and the record before the court.” State v. Thacker,
862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015); see also State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201,
205 (Iowa 1981) (holding that the requirement to state reasons for the
sentence was satisfied because “it is clear from the trial court’s statement
exactly what motivated and prompted the sentence”). This is not an
example of using boilerplate language or checking boxes on a preprinted
form.
We must balance the need for finality with the need to develop a
record adequate for appellate review. This record was adequate to
demonstrate Goodwin not only received the individualized sentencing
hearing our precedent requires, but the district court also adequately
articulated its findings on the record. We hold Goodwin’s challenge to his
sentence does not constitute a proper motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Our determination is fatal to his claim he had a statutory right to counsel
under Jefferson, 926 N.W.2d at 520. Our determination also means
Goodwin’s challenges to his sentence must be dismissed as untimely.
Goodwin had to make these challenges in a direct appeal and failed to do
so.
IV. Disposition.
For the foregoing reasons, we annul the writ and affirm the district
court’s ruling and sentence.
WRIT ANNULLED; DISTRICT COURT RULING AND SENTENCE
AFFIRMED.
23
Mansfield, Christensen, and McDonald, JJ., join this opinion.
McDonald, J., files a concurring opinion in which Christensen, J., joins.
Appel, J., files a dissenting opinion in which Wiggins, C.J., joins.
24
#18–0737, Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Davis Cty.
McDONALD, Justice (concurring specially).
Goodwin’s motion fails on its face to present a claim of an illegal
sentence. There is nothing in the text of the Iowa Constitution, as
originally understood, that prohibits the imposition of a minimum
sentence on a juvenile offender. This is true whether or not the offender
received an individualized sentencing hearing as now required by State v.
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014), and State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127
(Iowa 2017). In my opinion, Lyle and Roby were wrongly decided and
should be reconsidered.
Stare decisis does not compel continued adherence to Lyle and
Roby. Stare decisis has limited application in constitutional matters. The
Iowa Constitution provides, “This Constitution shall be the supreme law
of the state, and any law inconsistent therewith, shall be void.” Iowa
Const. art. XII, § 1. Notably, the Iowa Constitution does not distinguish
between legislative, executive, and judicial acts. Instead, the Iowa
Constitution provides any law—without regard to its source—inconsistent
therewith “shall be void.” Id. Thus, “[w]hen faced with a demonstrably
erroneous precedent, my rule is simple: We should not follow it. This view
of stare decisis follows directly from the Constitution’s supremacy over
other sources of law—including our own precedents.” Gamble v. United
States, 587 U.S. ____, ____, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
Put differently, because the Constitution is supreme over
other sources of law, it requires us to privilege its text over our
own precedents when the two are in conflict. I am aware of
no legitimate reason why a court may privilege a demonstrably
erroneous interpretation of the Constitution over the
Constitution itself.
25
Id. at ___, 139 S. Ct. at 1985; see State v. Brown, 930 N.W.2d 840, 871
(Iowa 2019) (Appel, J., dissenting) (stating where constitutional precedent
is supported by “unconvincing rationale” and weak authority, “the doctrine
of stare decisis does not excuse us from” reconsidering the precedent).
Lyle and Roby are demonstrably erroneous interpretations of the
Iowa Constitution. First, the rationale underlying the Supreme Court’s
juvenile sentencing decisions and this court’s extension of the same in Lyle
and Roby is wanting. The criticisms have been well stated in other
opinions, and I need not repeat them in full herein. See Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 493–502, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477–82 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 502–09, 132 S. Ct. at 2482–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
id. at 509–15, 132 S. Ct. at 2487–90 (Alito, J., dissenting); Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 97–124, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2043–58 (2010) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); id. at 124–25, 130 S. Ct. at 2058–59 (Alito, J., dissenting);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 606–07, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1216–17 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 607–30, 125 S. Ct. at 1217–30 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 150–61 (Zager, J., dissenting); State v.
Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 842–51 (Iowa 2016) (Mansfield, J., dissenting);
State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 574–84 (Iowa 2015) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting); Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404–07 (Waterman, J., dissenting); id. at
407–20 (Zager, J., dissenting).
Second, a national consensus has emerged that Lyle was wrongly
decided. To the best of my knowledge, only one other court has agreed
with Lyle. See State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409, 418 (Wash. 2017).
The remainder of the other states that have expressly considered Lyle have
expressly rejected Lyle. See State v. Martinez, No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0290-
PR, 2017 WL 5153566, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2017) (unpublished
opinion) (“We do not read Miller to interpret the Eighth Amendment as
26
broadly as did the Iowa court.”); People v. Rigmaden, No. C071533, 2015
WL 5122916, at *18 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2015) (unpublished opinion)
(declining to follow Lyle); Burrell v. State, 207 A.3d 137, 144 (Del. 2019)
(rejecting Lyle and discussing the “more persuasive authority from other
states” that also reject Lyle); Commonwealth v. Okoro, 26 N.E.3d 1092,
1098–1101, 1101 n.17 (Mass. 2015) (rejecting Lyle); State v. Anderson, 87
N.E.3d 1203, 1212 (Ohio 2017) (“[A] mandatory minimum sentence of
three years for first degree aggravated robbery and kidnapping convictions
. . . does not violate the principle of proportionality at the heart of the
Eighth Amendment . . . .”); Brown v. State, No. M2013-00825-CCA-R3-PC,
2014 WL 5780718, at *21 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 6, 2014) (unpublished
opinion) (“Lyle constitutes persuasive, non-binding authority, and panels
of this court have refused to expand the holding in Miller to life sentences
for juveniles, let alone sentences involving less than life.”); State v.
Barbeau, 883 N.W.2d 520, 531–33 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (declining to follow
Lyle).
In addition to those states that have expressly declined to follow
Lyle, a number of other states have also held there is no federal or state
constitutional provision that prohibits the imposition of a minimum
sentence on a juvenile offender. In Commonwealth v. Lawrence, the court
reasoned,
We do not read Miller to mean that the Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits a state from imposing a
mandatory minimum imprisonment sentence upon a juvenile
convicted of a crime as serious as first-degree murder.
Appellant’s argument against a mandatory minimum of 35
years presents the same concerns as would a mandatory
minimum of 35 days’ imprisonment. Stated another way,
Appellant’s position implicitly requires us to conclude that
open-ended minimum sentencing is constitutionally required
by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. We decline to
announce such a rule.
27
99 A.3d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (footnote omitted).
Similarly, in James v. United States, the court addressed the
argument that a mandatory minimum “does not allow the sentencer to
consider the ‘mitigating qualities of youth,’ as stressed in Miller.” 59 A.3d
1233, 1238 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 476, 132 S. Ct. at 2467
(majority opinion)).
[U]nder the D.C. Code, the D.C. Council and the Executive
Branch have already considered youth and its attendant
factors, by limiting the minimum sentence to thirty years for
offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense,
as compared to life imprisonment without opportunity for
release which is available against adults. Miller and Graham
demand consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth
when imposing sentences of life in prison without opportunity
for parole. In this jurisdiction, sentencing is a joint exercise
by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Because
the sentencing statute already takes a juvenile offender’s
youth into account, the mandatory nature of appellant’s
sentence does not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted) (footnote omitted); see also People v. Tate, 352 P.3d
959, 970 (Colo. 2015) (holding Miller does not prohibit a mandatory
minimum sentence of life with possibility of parole after forty years); State
v. Taylor G., 110 A.3d 338, 347 (Conn. 2015) (“The limitations that
mandatory minimum sentences place on a trial court’s discretion,
however, do not automatically constitute an eighth amendment
violation.”); State v. Michel, 257 So. 3d 3, 4, 8 (Fla. 2018) (holding that a
statute requiring a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence for
first-degree murder does not violate the Eighth Amendment); State v.
Brown, 331 P.3d 781, 797 (Kan. 2014) (declining to extend Miller’s
prohibition on mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile
offenders to also prohibit imposing a statutorily mandated twenty-year
sentence on a juvenile because “[a] hard 20 life sentence does not
28
irrevocably adjudge a juvenile offender unfit for society”); State v. Vang,
847 N.W.2d 248, 262–63 (Minn. 2014) (“Because appellant is eligible for
release after 30 years, his mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment and the principles of Miller.”); State v. Link, 441 P.3d 664, 676
(Or. Ct. App. 2019) (limiting “Miller’s applicability . . . [to] the most serious
penalties”); State v. Smith, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, 2019 WL 6166371, at *2
(S.C. Nov. 20, 2019) (“It is clear neither the Eighth Amendment nor Miller
speaks directly to the issue of the constitutionality of mandatory minimum
sentences. In so holding, we join the overwhelming majority of
jurisdictions that has found mandatory minimum sentences
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment and Miller.” (Footnote
omitted.)); Lewis v. State, 428 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(“Miller does not forbid mandatory sentencing schemes.”).
Third, Roby created a largely unworkable standard. The
unworkability of the standard was a feature and not a bug, at least as far
as the Roby majority was concerned. The Roby standard was never
intended to be workable; instead, it was intended to be a de facto ban on
the imposition of minimum sentences on juvenile offenders. See Roby,
897 N.W.2d at 149 (Hecht, J., concurring specially) (“I write separately,
however, to express my view that article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution prohibits a mandatory term of incarceration for any offense
committed by a juvenile offender.”); id. at 150 (Appel, J., concurring
specially) (“The multifactored Miller test, as shaped by this court,
powerfully drives the analysis toward a finding that children are
constitutionally different and therefore, as a general proposition, juvenile
offenders cannot be sentenced to mandatory adult minimums.”); id. at
150–51 (Zager, J., dissenting) (explaining the “court restates the relevant
29
factors in a way that will make it difficult, if not practically impossible, for
a sentencing judge to ever impose any minimum term of incarceration”).
The dissenting opinion in this case evidences Roby was intended to be a
de facto ban on minimum sentences for juvenile offenders. Here, the
parties jointly recommended a minimum sentence, the jointly
recommended minimum sentence was far below what the district court
could have imposed, the defendant’s expert testimony supported the
sentence, and the district court made an excellent record in support of the
sentencing decision. If this record is insufficient to meet the Roby
standard, as expressed in the dissenting opinion in this case, few, if any,
could.
Fourth, the neuroscience on which Lyle and Roby relied does not
support the ultimate constitutional claims asserted in those cases. Lyle
interpreted relatively new neuroscience research to support the claim that
juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult offenders. See Lyle, 854
N.W.2d at 398 (majority opinion) (stating “scientific data and the opinions
of medical experts provide a compelling and increasingly ineluctable case
that from a neurodevelopment standpoint, juvenile culpability does not
rise to the adult-like standard”). But the neuroscience does not support
this claim. “The neuroscience evidence in no way independently confirms
that adolescents are less responsible” or less culpable than adult
offenders. Stephen J. Morse, Criminal Law and Common Sense: An Essay
on the Perils and Promise of Neuroscience, 99 Marq. L. Rev. 39, 66–67
(2015). Nor could it. Culpability is a legal question not a neurobiological
question. See, e.g., State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1985) (“The
extent to which evidence of mental impairment will be permitted to affect
criminal responsibility is therefore a legal question.”). Indeed, the
American Medical Association and the American Academy of Child and
30
Adolescent Psychiatry specifically acknowledged this in their amicus brief
submitted in Miller. See Brief for Am. Med. Ass’n & Am. Acad. of Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 3,
Miller, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) (recognizing
that “science cannot gauge moral culpability”).
Fifth, while the neuroscience evidence is new, it does not tell us
something new for which the law did not already account. We have long
known juveniles are different from adults. Almost twenty-nine centuries
ago, Homer said, “Well you know how the whims of youth break all the
rules. Our wits quicker than wind, our judgment just as flighty.” Homer,
The Iliad 577 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1998) (c. 800 B.C.E.).
In another translation it is said, “You know young people can go to
extremes—they have quick tempers, a dash of rashness[.]” Homer, The
Iliad 423 (Michael Reck trans., HarperCollins 1st ed. 1994) (c. 800 B.C.E.).
In Juvenile Offenders for a Thousand Years, Wiley B. Sanders collected
numerous historical writings documenting the different treatment of
juvenile and adult offenders. Juvenile Offenders for a Thousand Years:
Selected Readings from Anglo-Saxon Times to 1900 (Wiley B. Sanders ed.,
Univ. N.C. Press 1970). He writes,
In the minds of many intelligent and educated people
juvenile delinquency is a twentieth century problem, receiving
its first public recognition from the passage of the first juvenile
court act in Illinois in 1899. Such people assume that before
the beginning of this century child lawbreakers were tried and
punished in exactly the same way, and with the same severity,
as adult offenders. . . . These selections . . . make it
abundantly clear that as far back as written records go
children who have broken the law have been treated on the
whole more leniently than have adult offenders.
Id. at xviii. Lyle conceded the new research on which it relied merely
provided a potential explanation of “our commonsense understanding of
31
youth.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 393. 5 Lyle also conceded the law already
accounted for the differences between juveniles and adults in a variety of
contexts. See id. at 388–89 (discussing chapter 232, work permits, the
legal age for purchasing alcohol, the legal age for obtaining driving
privileges, the legal age for obtaining tattoos, and the legal age to purchase
tobacco). What Lyle failed to concede or even recognize was that the law
already accounted for the differences between juveniles and adults with
respect to criminal conduct. The legislature already accounted for this by
creating a separate juvenile justice system to address the different and
particular needs of juvenile offenders. See Iowa Code ch. 232 (2019). The
legislature also made a policy decision that, notwithstanding the known
differences between juveniles and adults, there are circumstances under
which a juvenile offender should nonetheless be prosecuted and punished
5It should be noted that the findings drawn from the research are not settled.
More recent studies suggest that the conclusions drawn from the research may be more
nuanced than Lyle acknowledges. For example, Dan Romer, Research Director at the
Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania recently wrote,
We often characterize adolescents as impulsive, reckless and emotionally
unstable. We used to attribute this behavior to “raging hormones.” More
recently, it’s been popular in some scientific circles to explain adolescent
behavior as the result of an imbalance in the development of the brain.
According to this theory, the prefrontal cortex, the center of the brain’s
cognitive-control system, matures more slowly than the limbic system,
which governs desires and appetites including drives for food and sex.
This creates an imbalance in the adolescent brain that leads to even more
impulsive and risky behavior than seen in children – or so the theory goes.
This idea has gained currency to the point where it’s become common to
refer to the “teenage brain” as the source of the injuries and other maladies
that arise during adolescence.
In my view, the most striking failure of the teen brain hypothesis is its
conflating of important differences between different kinds of risky
behavior, only a fraction of which support the notion of the impulsive,
unbridled adolescent.
Dan Romer, Why It’s Time to Lay the Stereotype of the ‘Teen Brain’ to Rest, The
Conversation (Oct. 29, 2017, 9:50 PM), https://theconversation.com/why-its-time-to-
lay-the-stereotype-of-the-teen-brain-to-rest-85888 [https://perma.cc/2EUM-ZQ9Z].
32
as an adult offender. See id. §§ 232.8, .45. Lyle and Roby thus confused
neuroscience research as evidence of a new constitutional fact mandating
different treatment for juvenile offenders rather than treating the
neuroscience research for what it was—additional evidence supporting the
legislature’s decision to create a separate juvenile justice system.
Sixth, and related, Lyle infringes the legislature’s prerogative. Lyle
stated that “[l]ines are drawn in our law by necessity and are incorporated
into the jurisprudence we have developed to usher the Iowa Constitution
through time.” Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 403. Lyle’s passive construction that
“lines are drawn in our law” masks the relevant question. The relevant
question is not whether lines have to be drawn. The relevant question is
who draws the lines. Lyle does not adequately explain why this court has
the authority to disregard the lines the legislature drew in creating a
separate juvenile justice system. In my view, there is not an adequate
explanation. “The legislature possesses the inherent power to prescribe
punishment for crime, and the sentencing authority of the courts is
subject to that power.” State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 308 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Iowa
1981). It is solely the legislature’s prerogative to set punishments that
balance the state’s interest in achieving certain penological goals with the
state’s other interests in the administration of criminal justice. While
there are constitutional bounds the legislature may not transgress in
crafting punishments, requiring an offender to serve a minimum term of
incarceration for what is an otherwise valid sentence is not one. See State
v. Cronkhite, 613 N.W.2d 664, 669 (Iowa 2000) (“There can be no serious
contention . . . a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual
becomes so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’ ” (quoting State v. Lara, 580
N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa 1998))).
33
Finally, while purporting to better serve the liberty of Iowans, see
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 384 n.2 (noting this court can interpret the
constitution to better serve the liberty of Iowans), Lyle and Roby actually
restrict the liberty of Iowans. The most fundamental liberty in a
constitutional republic is the liberty of the citizenry to govern itself. See
Iowa Const. art. I, § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people.”); see
also Honomichl v. Valley View Swine, LLC, 914 N.W.2d 223, 240 (Iowa
2018) (Waterman, J., concurring) (“We need to be cognizant of the right of
Iowans to govern themselves through laws passed by their chosen
representatives, a right recognized explicitly in article I, section 2 [of the
Iowa Constitution].”). To protect the right of all Iowans to participate in
the project of self-government, this court long ago concluded the judicial
power was limited to the enforcement of the text of the constitution the
citizens of this state adopted. See Stewart v. Bd. of Supervisors, 30 Iowa
9, 17 (1870).
As Stewart makes clear, in the absence of a direct constitutional
command, it is the right and duty of the people to resolve questions of
public policy through public discourse in the legislative chamber rather
than through legal discourse in the judicial chamber:
We cannot declare a legislative act void because it conflicts
with our opinions of policy, expediency or justice. We are not
the guardians of the rights of the people of the State unless
they are secured by some constitutional provision which
comes within our judicial cognizance. The remedy for unwise
or oppressive legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by
appeal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of
the people. If this fail[s], the people, in their sovereign
capacity, can correct the evil; but the courts cannot assume
their rights. There is no paramount and supreme law which
defines the law of nature, or settles those great principles of
legislation which are said to control State legislatures in the
exercise of the powers conferred on them by the people in the
constitution.
34
Id. (quoting Bennett v. Boggs, 3 F. Cas. 221, 227–28 (C.C.D.N.J. 1830)).
As Justice Hugo Black explained, the creation of rights through
atextual constitutionalism actually infringes the fundamental liberty of all
people to participate in the project of self-government:
It can be, and has been, argued that when this Court strikes
down a legislative act because it offends the idea of
“fundamental fairness” it furthers the basic thrust of our Bill
of Rights by protecting individual freedom. But that argument
ignores the effect of such decisions on perhaps the most
fundamental individual liberty of our people—the right of each
man to participate in the self-government of his society. . . .
Any legislature presumably passes a law because it thinks the
end result will help more than hinder and will thus further the
liberty of the society as a whole. The people, through their
elected representatives, may of course be wrong in making
those determinations, but the right of self-government that
our Constitution preserves is just as important as any of the
specific individual freedoms preserved in the Bill of Rights.
The liberty of government by the people in my opinion, should
never be denied by this Court except when the decision of the
people as stated in laws passed by their chosen
representatives, conflicts with the express or necessarily
implied commands of our Constitution.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384–85, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1083–84 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting).
This, in my view, is the fundamental defect in Lyle and Roby. See
generally Miller, 567 U.S. at 493, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“Determining the appropriate sentence for a teenager
convicted of murder presents grave and challenging questions of morality
and social policy. Our role, however, is to apply the law, not to answer
such questions.”); id. at 502, 132 S. Ct. at 2482 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Because the Court upsets the legislatively enacted sentencing regimes of
29 jurisdictions without constitutional warrant, I respectfully dissent.”);
id. at 510, 132 S. Ct. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the
Constitution supports this arrogation of legislative authority.”); Graham,
560 U.S. at 97, 130 S. Ct. 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I am unwilling
35
to assume that we, as Members of this Court, are any more capable of
making such moral judgments than our fellow citizens. Nothing in our
training as judges qualifies us for that task, and nothing in Article III gives
us that authority.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 607, 125 S. Ct. at 1217 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court should not substitute its own ‘inevitably
subjective judgment’ on how best to resolve this difficult moral question
for the judgments of the Nation’s democratically elected legislatures.”
(quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2709
(1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring))); id. at 608, 125 S. Ct. at 1217 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (decrying the Court’s decision to “proclaim[] itself sole
arbiter of our Nation’s moral standards”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370, 6 S. Ct. 1064 1071 (1886) (stating political rights are
“fundamental” because they are “preservative of all rights”).
For these reasons, I conclude Lyle and Roby were wrongly decided.
In my view, the defendant in this case did not present a facially viable
claim of an unconstitutional or otherwise illegal sentence. With all that
being said, I concur in the majority opinion and the judgment of the court.
Christensen, J., joins this concurrence.
36
#18–0737, Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Ct.
APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent as the majority prematurely terminates this litigation,
misstates the law in places, and does not recognize the unusual
procedural posture of this case.
I. Cruel and Unusual Punishment for Juveniles.
A. Introduction. A claim that a sentence violates the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution
may be brought categorically or as applied. State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d
636, 639–41 (Iowa 2012). In order to prevail on a categorical claim, a
defendant must show that the punishment cannot be applied based on the
characteristics of the crime or the criminal. Id. at 641. An as-applied
challenge can be brought when the defendant claims that a sentence as
applied to the peculiar circumstances of the case amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment even though the sentence has been authorized by
the legislature. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 879 (Iowa 2009).
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment for Juvenile Offenders Under
Roby.
1. Overview of juvenile sentencing caselaw. In order to implement
the constitutional requirements of article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution, we have developed a special area of jurisprudence as it
relates to juveniles. With respect to juveniles facing mandatory minimum
sentences, in State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017), we developed a
framework of analysis for as-applied, Bruegger-type, cruel and unusual
punishment claims. A brief review of our recent caselaw in juvenile
sentencing provides context for a cruel and unusual punishment claim
under Roby.
37
In State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378. 381–82 (Iowa 2014), we considered
the constitutional validity of statutorily established mandatory minimum
sentences for youthful offenders. In Lyle, we held that legislative
mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders violated article I,
section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 400. However, we stated that
our holding did not prohibit judges from sentencing juveniles to prison for
the length of time identified by the legislature for the crime committed. Id.
at 403. Further, we held that the Iowa Constitution forbids a mandatory
sentencing scheme that “deprives the district court of discretion to
consider youth and its attendant circumstances as a mitigating factor and
to impose a lighter punishment by eliminating the minimum period of
incarceration without parole.” Id. at 404. We did not have occasion in
Lyle, however, to develop the outline of a sentencing hearing of a juvenile.
In State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2015), however, we provided
more guidance regarding the nature of a sentencing hearing for juveniles.
In Seats, we declared that a district court sentencing a juvenile in a murder
case must consider several factors. The factors articulate namely that life
in prison without the possibility of parole should be “rare and uncommon”;
that “children are constitutionally different from adults” and that the court
should consider “family and home environment vulnerabilities together
with the juvenile’s lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of
responsibility, and vulnerability to peer pressure as mitigating, and not
aggravating, factors.” Id. at 555–56 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 470, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2664 (2012)). The court must also consider the
circumstances of the offense, including the juvenile’s participation in the
conduct and the way familial pressure and peer pressure may have played
a role and that “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than adults” and
“their actions are less likely to be the result of ‘irretrievably depraved
38
character.’ ” Id. at 556 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 130
S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2010)). In sum, the court must take into account
information regarding the family and home environment. Id. In Seats, we
noted “the district court appeared to use Seats’s family and home
environment vulnerabilities[,] together with his lack of maturity,
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, and vulnerability to peer
pressure[,] as aggravating, not mitigating factors.” Id. at 557. Based on
these constitutional deficiencies, we vacated the sentence and remanded
the case to the district court. Id. at 558; see also Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404
n.10 (outlining the parameters of resentencing to be consistent with youth-
related factors).
In Roby, we considered a case where the district court sentenced a
juvenile defendant to twenty-five years in prison with a mandatory
minimum of seventeen-and-one-half years for sexual abuse in the second
degree. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 132. The Roby majority declined “at this
time” to hold that mandatory minimum sentences on juvenile offenders
were categorically infirm. Id. at 148. The Roby court did, however, turn
to analyze the nature of the individualized hearing required by our
precedent for juvenile offenders. Id. at 145–48.
The Roby court examined in detail the factors of age and the features
of youthful behavior, family and home environment, the circumstances of
the crime, legal incompetency, and rehabilitation. We generally
emphasized the role of expert testimony in developing each of these
mitigating factors. Id. at 145–46. We stated the factors should not
normally be used to impose a mandatory minimum sentence without
expert testimony. Id. at 147.
Based on the record developed in Roby, we concluded, as a matter
of law, a mandatory minimum sentence could not be imposed on the
39
defendant. We noted how the district court has misapplied the various
factors, either finding them aggravating factors or underestimating their
mitigating impact. Id. at 148. Although Roby received an individualized
hearing, we upheld Roby’s illegal sentence claim, noting that “the district
court applied the [Miller/Lyle/Seats] factors, but not in the manner
required to protect the juvenile offender from cruel and unusual
punishment.” Id.
Following Roby, a statutorily authorized mandatory minimum
sentence imposed on a juvenile after a hearing where the district court
refused to consider or give proper weight to the Roby factors, or wrongly
applied them as aggravating factors, would be constitutionally infirm
under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. See, e.g., State v.
White, 903 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Iowa 2017) (finding resentencing with Roby
factors necessary for a juvenile offender in a mandatory minimum
situation). The mere fact that a sentence is authorized by statute is not
the end of the matter, as incorrectly suggested by the majority. We have
said that a restriction on parole under Roby should be an “uncommon
result,” even where the legislature has established a mandatory statutory
minimum. Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 147.
The majority opinion contains passages that seem to mistakenly
suggest that if there is an individualized hearing—any individualized
hearing—there is no claim under Roby. That is plainly wrong. It would
be absurd to suggest that Roby establishes merely a procedural right
regardless of the propriety or constitutionality of the substance. The mere
fact that the district court holds a hearing does not necessarily mean the
district court is authorized to impose a mandatory minimum sentence on
any juvenile regardless of the record established as a result of the
proceeding. In order to be constitutionally sound, the Roby-type hearing
40
must proceed under the constitutional framework established by our
juvenile cruel and unusual punishment cases. That means that
mandatory minimum sentences are “uncommon,” that there is a
presumption against mandatory minimum sentences, and that the
features of youth identified in Seats are actually considered as mitigating,
and not aggravating, factors. In other words, the exercise of the court’s
discretion must be consistent with our established juvenile framework. As
noted in Roby, “while the review is for abuse of discretion, it is not forgiving
of a deficiency in the constitutional right to a reasoned sentencing decision
based on a proper hearing.” Id. at 138.
2. Summary. A claim that a sentence is illegal may be brought by
a juvenile defendant even though there has been an individualized
hearing. Furthermore, the mere fact that a sentence is within the range
of punishment established by the legislature is not, as a matter of law,
determinative of a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under article I,
section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.
II. Application of Principles to This Case.
A. Self-Representation in District Court. Goodwin engaged in
self-representation in the district court when he sought to attack his
sentence. He filed what he labeled “A Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence
For Appointment of Counsel and An Evidentiary Hearing.” It states that
the district court
failed to properly weigh the factors cited in State v. Roby . . .
and failed to consider any expert testimony determining those
factors, as well as other evidence and testimony that
defendant cannot be sentenced to any mandatory-minimum
sentence without violating both the Iowa and U.S.
Constitutions.
Goodwin also stated he was indigent and sought the appointment of
counsel to assist in his representation. The State did not resist the motion
41
to correct an illegal sentence or for appointment of counsel before the
district court dismissed the matter.
We have repeatedly stated that with respect to self-represented
criminal litigants, applications for appointment of counsel should be
considered in the light most favorable to the applicant. Furgison v. State,
217 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1974) (“[I]n determining whether counsel
should be appointed, trial judges should inceptionally read the often
inartfully drawn application in a light most favorable to the applicant.”).
We have cited with approval the notion that state court judges must learn
to read inartfully drawn petitions liberally in favor of the petition. See
Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994) (noting that in
evaluating pro se filings, “some leeway must be accorded from precision in
draftsmanship”); Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 731–32 (Iowa 1994)
(noting that “[a]n inartfully drawn [pro se] petition hastily dismissed—as
this one was—could leave the petitioner without any [means of recourse
from the court]”); State v. Mulqueen, 188 N.W.2d 364, 365 (Iowa 1971) (“An
applicant for such relief ought not to be held to the niceties of lawyers’
pleadings or be cursorily dismissed because his claim seems unlikely to
prove meritorious.” (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22, 88
S. Ct. 1068, 1080 (1963)); Munz v. State, 382 N.W.2d 693, 697 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1985) (noting that an “applicant proceeding pro se is entitled to a
liberal construction of his pleadings”).
Like Iowa, many other states have found similarly. See, e.g., Tobar
v. Remington Holdings LP, 447 P.3d 747, 753 (Alaska 2019) (“We have also
concluded that pleadings of self-represented litigants should be held to a
less stringent standard and that their briefs are to be read generously.”);
Jones v. Williams, 443 P.3d 56, 58 (Colo. 2019) (“Pleadings by pro se
litigants must be broadly construed to ensure that they are not denied
42
review of important issues because of their inability to articulate their
argument like a lawyer.”); Henderson v. Comm’r of Corr., 189 A.3d 135,
145 (Conn. 2018) (“The modern trend . . . is to construe pleadings broadly
and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. . . . The courts
adhere to this rule to ensure that pro se litigants receive a full and fair
opportunity to be heard, regardless of their lack of legal education and
experience . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting Oliphant v. Comm’r of
Corr., 877 A.2d 761, 766 (Conn. 2005))); Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, P.C., 829
S.E.2d 448, 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (noting in interpreting Georgia law,
“we are required to (1) construe a complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff with any doubts resolved in her favor and (2) hold pro se
pleadings to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
attorneys”); Villaver v. Sylva, 445 P.3d 701, 708 (Haw. 2019) (“In the
context of pro se pleadings, we have explained that ‘[a] fundamental tenet
of Hawai’i law is that “[p]leadings prepared by pro se litigants should be
interpreted liberally[,]” ’ and that ‘[t]he underpinnings of this tenet rest on
the promotion of equal access to justice[.]’ ” (alterations in original)
(quoting Waltrip v. TS Enters., Inc., 398 P.3d 815, 828 (Haw. 2016))); State
v. Redding, 444 P.3d 989, 993 (Kan. 2019) (“Courts are to interpret pro se
pleadings based upon their contents and not solely on their title or labels.
In construing pro se postconviction motions a court should consider the
relief requested, rather than a formulaic adherence to pleading
requirements.” (Citation omitted.)); Adkins v. Wrightway Readymix, LLC,
499 S.W.3d 286, 289 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016) (“[W]e would repeat the notion of
a duty incumbent on trial courts to ‘liberally construe pro se pleadings to
extract the [pro se litigant]’s intent and bring about a full adjudication of
the relevant issues.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 592, 594 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011))); State v. Vasko,
43
889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017) (“Further, courts are encouraged to
read the pleadings of pro se appellants ‘with an understanding eye.’ ”
(quoting Leake v. State, 737 N.W.2d 531, 540 n.3 (Minn. 2007))); Whitlock
v. Necaise, 200 So. 3d 1096, 1099 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (“Where, as here,
a prisoner is proceeding pro se, we take that fact into account and, in our
discretion, credit not so well pleaded allegations . . . to the end that a
prisoner’s meritorious complaint may not be lost because inartfully
drafted.” (alteration in original (quoting Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d
1242, 1245 (Miss. 1991))); Ward v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. Transit
Adjudication Bureau, 95 N.Y.S.3d 779, 780 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (“[A]s a general
rule, pro se parties’ pleadings are to be ‘liberally construed, and, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ ” (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam))); Baker v. Lifeline Field
Mktg., LLC, 93 N.E.3d 1231, 1235 n.2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (“As this court
has recognized, ‘a court may afford a pro se litigant reasonable leeway in
the construction of pleadings in order to reach the merits of the action.’ ”
(quoting State v. Rickard, No. L-16-1043, 2016 WL 3578984, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. June 30, 2016))); Peck v. S.D. Penitentiary Emps., 332 N.W.2d
714, 716 (S.D. 1983) (“Generally, a pro se complaint, such as the one filed
in this case, is held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by a lawyer . . . .”); State v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 720 (Tenn.
2016) (“Pleadings prepared by self-represented litigants untrained in the
law should be measured by less stringent standards than those applied to
pleadings prepared by lawyers.”); Byrnes v. Harper, 435 P.3d 364, 366
(Wyo. 2019) (“A pro se litigant is entitled to some leniency from the
stringent standards applied to formal pleadings drafted by attorneys.”
(quoting Young v. State, 46 P.3d 295, 297 (Wyo. 2002))).
44
As noted by the United States Supreme Court, “it is settled law that
the allegations of [a pro se] complaint . . . are held to ‘less stringent
standards’ ” and “should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Hughes v. Rowe,
449 U.S. 5, 9–10, 101 S. Ct. 173, 176 (1980) (quoting Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972) (per curiam)). These
principles should apply here.
The majority knows these principles exist, but attempt to evade
them by citing State v. Piper, 663 N.W.2d 894, 913–14 (Iowa 2003),
overruled by State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Iowa 2010), and Conkey
v. Hoak Motors, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 2001). Neither of these
cases involve the proper approach to a pro se pleading in a motion to
correct an illegal sentence. Piper involved a criminal case where the
defendant was represented by counsel. See Piper, 663 N.W.2d at 913.
Conkey does not involve a pro se pleading in a motion to correct an illegal
sentence but considered a question related to the inadequacies of proof
offered at trial by a pro se party. See Conkey, 637 N.W.2d at 173. These
cases have nothing at all to do with the question of proper approach to pro
se pleadings in this motion to correct an illegal sentence matter.
The district court dismissed the claim without a hearing in a terse
order two weeks after it was filed. The district court’s reasoning stated in
total that “[a]fter review of the Motion and applicable law, the Court finds
no merit in said Motion.” The district court did not appoint counsel and
apparently did not review the record, but simply dismissed the motion on
the pleading.
Goodwin’s pleading plainly states that he claims entitlement to relief
under Roby. He also alleges that his sentence is unconstitutional under
45
both the Iowa and United States Constitutions. Combined with the
citation to Roby, his general reference to the Iowa and United States
Constitutions clearly implicate the cruel and unusual punishment clauses
of both.
Citing Bruegger, the State in its appeal brief concedes, as it must,
that Goodwin may raise “a substantive illegality and request counsel if he
raises a gross-disproportionality claim.” But Goodwin has specifically
raised a claim under Roby and generally claims that his sentence is
unconstitutional. The method of implementing a gross disproportionality
analysis in the context of mandatory minimum claims was outlined in
Roby. The State’s slicing and dicing of cruel and unusual punishment
claims is not the way we ordinarily treat a pro se filing.
B. Sua Sponte Dismissal of Pro Se Request for Appointment of
Counsel. A litigant who raises a question of an illegal sentence has a
statutory right to appointment of counsel. See generally Jefferson v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 926 N.W.2d 519, 520 (Iowa 2019). This statutory right broadly
recognizes the need for the guiding hand of counsel in making illegal
sentence claims.
In addition, a motion to correct an illegal sentence is a critical stage
of the criminal trial process. See Tully v. Scheu, 607 F.2d 31, 35–36 (3d
Cir. 1979); Williams v. State, 10 So. 3d 660, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Both the Sixth Amendment and article I, section 10 of the Iowa
Constitution provide for representation of counsel in “all criminal
proceedings.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. A motion to correct an illegal
sentence is part and parcel of the criminal proceeding. See State v.
Casiano, 922 A.2d 1065, 1069–70 (Conn. 2007) (finding right to counsel
attaches to all criminal actions, including all appeals); State v. Rudolf, 821
So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Clements, 192 A.3d 686,
46
693–94 (Md. 2018). And, article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution
extends the right to counsel to all other cases involving the life or liberty
of the accused. Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. There is thus a constitutional
footing under both the United States and Iowa Constitutions for the
representation of parties challenging their sentences as illegal.
Here, counsel would review the circumstances of the murder,
consider the relevance of the plea bargain itself and the plea bargain
hearing, and shape whatever potential claim Goodwin might have. It is
premature, based on the mere filing of the petition, to dismiss the claim
out-of-hand because it somehow fails to use language specific enough,
according to the State, to give rise to a gross disproportionality claim.
Counsel was appointed for Goodwin, the parties briefed the matter, and
this court heard oral argument.
But at the district court, Goodwin was denied appointment of
counsel in a sua sponte order by the court. The case was not developed
at all in the district court. The approach of the district court was not
followed by this court on appeal. We opened the courthouse gate by
granting certiorari, and we then appointed counsel. This is precisely the
path that should have been followed at the district court. Indeed, if it is
true that the certiorari petition was correctly granted and counsel on
appeal properly granted, it is almost certain that the district court erred
when faced with essentially the same issues after Goodwin filed his
motion.
C. Arguments and Concessions on Appeal. On appeal, Goodwin
concentrates his fire on the question of whether the district court should
have appointed counsel and not dismissed the claim. Goodwin notes,
among other things, that counsel could have provided assistance in
presenting arguments to demonstrate why the district court failed to
47
provide Goodwin with the constitutionally required individualized
sentencing process he was entitled to receive. See State v. Zarate, 908
N.W.2d 831, 855–56 (Iowa 2018). Further, Goodwin claims that counsel
“could develop the factual evidence and argument to prove it is time for
categorical rejection of mandatory minimums for juveniles.” In support of
this suggestion, Goodwin cites Roby, where we stated that “in our
independent judgment article I, section 17 does not yet require abolition
of the practice.” 897 N.W.2d at 143 (emphasis added).
The State narrowly reads Goodwin’s appellate brief as stating only
that the district court “abused its discretion” and that such a claim does
not arise to a violation of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. If
the district court acted within the legal bounds of its discretion, that would
be an unremarkable claim. But in context, Goodwin is claiming the
district court exercised its discretion in a way that violated article I, section
17. As noted in Roby, though the weighing of sentencing factors is
generally for abuse of discretion, “it is not forgiving of a deficiency in the
constitutional right to a reasoned sentencing decision based on a proper
hearing.” Id. at 138. The mere fact that a district court sentence is
attacked as an abuse of discretion does not mean it might not also be
unconstitutional.
Further, the State concedes, as already indicated, that Goodwin has
a potential Bruegger-type claim. The State, however, argues that Goodwin
did not raise this claim, instead asking only that the court examine the
adequacies of procedures and findings at his sentencing hearing, which
did not implicate the legality of the sentence itself.
But this is exactly why counsel should have been appointed at the
district court proceedings in the first place. Counsel could have filed an
48
amended pleading, to the extent one was necessary, and developed the
factual and legal basis for any cruel and unusual punishment claim.
The majority strictly construes Goodwin’s pro se pleading, claiming
in a footnote that Goodwin did not claim that his sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the crime he committed. This approach, of course, is
flatly contrary to our ordinary approach to pro se pleadings. Apparently
the majority believes that a self-represented litigant must cite Bruegger or
must use the magic words “gross disproportionality.” But doesn’t the
allegation that a sentence is cruel and unusual at least imply that the
sentence is grossly disproportionate? See Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural
Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659, 678
(1988) (noting that liberal construction of pro se pleadings is designed to
avoid narrow dismissals where a cause of action exists but where the
complaint fails to say the “magic words”).
But even more importantly, what the footnote fails to recognize is
that the State concedes that Goodwin is entitled to bring a Bruegger-type
grossly disproportionate claim. While the State, like the majority, adopts
a restrictive and narrow interpretation of Goodwin’s pleading, the State
would allow Goodwin to bring another claim in district court. The majority
opinion notes the preservation issue but not the substantive part of the
State’s concession. Indeed, language in the majority opinion indicating
that Goodwin is only entitled to an individualized hearing, regardless of
the nature of that hearing, and that Goodwin is not entitled to bring a
claim against a statutorily authorized sentence, is not only far beyond the
State’s position, but directly contrary to it.
D. Limited Nature of Plea Hearing: No Contest of Mandatory
Minimum. The majority does not really consider whether Goodwin’s
pleading should have been dismissed, without the appointment of counsel,
49
but rather essentially proceeds to try the case on the merits. That is the
point of the ten-page discussion in the majority opinion of what it sees as
the facts, going far beyond the pleading in this case. What is really going
on here is this court, on appeal, is granting summary judgment based on
its review of matters outside the pleadings, without allowing Goodwin to
be represented by counsel.
In its cursory summary judgment-type analysis, it relies on the
hearing at the plea bargain stage where no one challenged the application
of a mandatory minimum sentence for Goodwin. The record was developed
not for the purpose of challenging an application of a mandatory minimum
under Roby but to defend the application of a twenty-year minimum
sentence in lieu of a potentially longer thirty-five year mandatory minimum
sentence.
I do not think it appropriate at this stage of the proceeding to rely
on that kind of record in resolving Goodwin’s claim that the facts are
against him as a matter of law. We simply do not have a complete record
in this case. Instead of an adversarial hearing where the case is made that
a mandatory minimum should not be imposed, we have instead a hearing
on a plea bargain in which Goodwin’s counsel did essentially the opposite.
At the hearing, not only did counsel not contest a mandatory minimum,
but counsel also urged the court to accept one that was lower than what
he might have otherwise received. In short, Goodwin essentially conceded
that his case was one of those “uncommon matters” for which a mandatory
minimum sentence under Roby was appropriate.
In fact, no one at the plea hearing contested the application of a
mandatory minimum, and no attempt was made by anybody to show that
a mandatory minimum should not be imposed. As a result, the record
that was developed was for the sharply limited purpose of defending the
50
imposition of a statutory minimum of twenty years rather than a larger
mandatory minimum potential of thirty-five years. No one attempted to
show at the plea hearing that a twenty-year minimum could not be
imposed in light of the Roby factors.
Because of its limited focus, the plea hearing cannot be regarded as
a full trial record at this stage of the proceeding to attempt to determine
the merits of Goodwin’s claim. The majority treats the very limited record
developed in support of the plea as if it were a full-blown Roby hearing,
but that is plainly not the case.
What the majority has done here is not affirm a dismissal on the
pleadings, but instead fast forward the case and try it on appeal on the
merits of the very limited record developed in the context of plea bargaining
proceedings. I think that is an incorrect and unjust result. Instead, the
case should be remanded to the district court for appointment of counsel.
It may well be, of course, that the State will be entitled to summary
judgment in this case. But we are not a court of first resort, nor can we
short circuit the process. By trying the case on appeal, the majority cuts
off the ability of Goodwin, assisted by counsel, to offer evidence and
develop legal theories in the district court.
If we are to try the case on appeal on the merits, I am not at all sure
that the State will prevail. “A sentence of incarceration without parole
eligibility will be an uncommon result.” Roby, 897 N.W.2d at 147. The
majority edits this sentence out of Roby. Indeed, although the record in
Roby contained unattractive features, the Roby court held, as a matter of
law, that the mandatory minimum involved in the case could not be
constitutionally applied.
Some of the Miller/Lyle/Seats/Roby factors, such as immaturity,
risk taking, and impetuousness, obviously apply here. The record also
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contains many features that were not fully developed at the plea bargain
hearing, including, but not limited to, mental health problems since
Goodwin was ten years old; suggestions by his mother that life in his
father’s house was “hell” and that Goodwin’s father was a narcissistic
sociopath; claims that Goodwin had run away from home “so many times;”
a description of Goodwin as “a rebel child in adult body;” a suggestion that
his relationship with his mother was so difficult that she relinquished
parental rights; and a statement that during the period of time when his
parents were getting divorced, his parents would start drinking to the point
that some nights Goodwin’s mother or father would not come home.
Goodwin self-reported diagnoses of “depression, PTSD, and Bi-Polar
Disorder,” along with separately diagnosed ADHD, for which he was taking
a variety of medications, the names and purposes of which he himself was
not completely sure of.
Further, Dr. Hart’s testimony was equivocal and incomplete. On
direct examination, he testified that the prospects for rehabilitation were
“very good or excellent.” He further stated, “I don’t see any reason that he
would require lengthy incarceration or assessment or treatment or other
forms of rehabilitation for specific deterrence or for rehabilitation.” On
cross-examination, Dr. Hart was asked whether a twenty-year minimum
would be appropriate. He responded,
That’s correct. That is -- if I can reframe that. I don’t see that
any longer period of incarceration would be helpful or
necessary to give further protection to public safety. So I think
the minimum term of incarceration would adequately protect
public safety.
Not exactly an enthusiastic endorsement.
Further, while Dr. Hart did not directly address the
Miller/Lyle/Seats/Roby factors, he generally characterized Goodwin’s
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“home environment and family relationships as seriously disturbed,” that
Goodwin was “almost a captive in an environment that was extremely
negative and focused on anger and aggression and violence and guns,” and
that Goodwin’s prospects for rehabilitation were “very good or excellent.”
In any event, it is not proper to engage in a full-blown resolution of this
matter on the merits in this appeal. What the majority has done is not
really dismiss the motion to correct an illegal sentence for failure to state
a claim but decided it on the merits based on a partial record, without an
adversarial presentation in the district court. It does so without finding
that Goodwin is one of those uncommon youth for which a mandatory
minimum may be constitutionally applied as required by Roby. It mistakes
our law by suggesting that any individualized hearing on sentencing is
adequate if the end sentence is statutorily authorized, and achieves a
premature race to judgment by so narrowly construing a pro se petition
that it becomes virtually meaningless. The majority here ignores the
proper legal framework for evaluation of a pro se claim alleging violation of
Roby and constitutional provisions relating to cruel and unusual
punishment.
Can anyone doubt that the guiding hand of a lawyer would have
been helpful for Goodwin at the district court? If counsel would not have
been helpful at trial, why was counsel now helpful on appeal? I would
reverse the dismissal of Goodwin’s motion and remand the case for
appointment of counsel and an adversarial process in the district court,
where it belongs, to determine if Goodwin is entitled to relief. I take no
view, of course, on the ultimate merits of the claim.
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III. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, I would reverse the dismissal of the motion
and remand the case to the district court for appointment of counsel.
Wiggins, C.J., joins this dissent.