State of Iowa v. Andre Jerome Lyle Jr. ( 2014 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–1339
Filed July 18, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
ANDRE JEROME LYLE JR.,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A.
Hutchison, Judge.
A juvenile challenges his sentence as cruel and unusual under the
State and Federal Constitutions. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
VACATED; DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE VACATED; CASE
REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, David A. Adams (until
withdrawal), Vidhya K. Reddy (until withdrawal), and Rachel C.
Regenold, Assistant State Appellate Defenders, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson (until
withdrawal), Benjamin M. Parrott (until withdrawal), and Darrel L.
Mullins, Assistant Attorneys General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney,
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Frank Severino Jr. and Jeffrey K. Noble, Assistant County Attorneys, for
appellee.
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CADY, Chief Justice.
In this appeal, a prison inmate who committed the crime of
robbery in the second degree as a juvenile and was prosecuted as an
adult challenges the constitutionality of a sentencing statute that
required the imposition of a mandatory seven-year minimum sentence of
imprisonment. The inmate was in high school at the time of the crime,
which involved a brief altercation outside the high school with another
student that ended when the inmate took a small plastic bag containing
marijuana from the student. He claims the sentencing statute
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the State and
Federal Constitutions when applied to all juveniles prosecuted as adults
because the mandatory sentence failed to permit the court to consider
any circumstances based on his attributes of youth or the circumstances
of his conduct in mitigation of punishment. For the reasons expressed
below, we hold a statute mandating a sentence of incarceration in a
prison for juvenile offenders with no opportunity for parole until a
minimum period of time has been served is unconstitutional under
article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.1 Accordingly, we vacate the
sentence and remand the case to the district court for resentencing.
Importantly, we do not hold that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced
to imprisonment for their criminal acts. We do not hold juvenile
1Throughout our opinion today, we use both “juvenile” and “child” to describe
youthful offenders. We recognize a statute of the Iowa Code defines “child” as “any
person under the age of fourteen years.” Iowa Code § 702.5 (2011). Nonetheless, we
believe our use of the term “child” today is appropriate. In a different section, the Code
defines “child” as “a person under eighteen years of age.” See id. § 232.2(5). Moreover,
we are hardly the first court to equate juveniles and children for the purposes of
constitutional protection. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468,
183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 422–23 (2012) (“So Graham and Roper and our individualized
sentencing cases alike teach that in imposing a State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer
misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.”).
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offenders cannot be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment. We
only hold juvenile offenders cannot be mandatorily sentenced under a
mandatory minimum sentencing scheme.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Andre Lyle Jr. was convicted following a jury trial of the crime of
robbery in the second degree on June 29, 2011. See Iowa Code
§§ 711.1–.3 (2011). He was a seventeen-year-old high school student
when he committed the crime. The conviction resulted from an incident
in October 2010 when Lyle and a companion punched another young
man and took a small bag of marijuana from him. The altercation
between the boys occurred outside the high school they attended after
the victim failed to deliver marijuana to Lyle and his companion in
exchange for $5 they had given the victim the previous day. Lyle videoed
the confrontation on his cell phone. Prior to trial, Lyle unsuccessfully
sought to transfer jurisdiction of the matter to the juvenile court.
Lyle grew up in Des Moines with little family support and few
advantages. His father was in prison, and he was raised by his
grandmother after his mother threatened him with a knife. His
grandmother permitted him to smoke marijuana, and he was frequently
tardy or absent from school. Lyle had frequent contact with law
enforcement and first entered the juvenile justice system at twelve years
of age. He was involved in many criminal acts as a teenager, including
assaults and robberies. Lyle was known to record his criminal behavior
with his cell phone and post videos on the Internet.
Lyle appeared before the district court for sentencing on his
eighteenth birthday. The district court sentenced him to a term of
incarceration in the state corrections system not to exceed ten years.
See id. § 711.3 (“Robbery in the second degree is a class ‘C’ felony.”); id.
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§ 902.9(4) (“A class ‘C’ felon, not a habitual offender, shall be confined no
more than ten years . . . .”). Pursuant to Iowa statute, the sentence was
mandatory, and he was required to serve seventy percent of the prison
term before he could be eligible for parole. See id. § 902.12(5) (“A person
serving a sentence for conviction of [robbery in the second degree in
violation of section 711.3] shall be denied parole or work release unless
the person has served at least seven-tenths of the maximum term of the
person’s sentence . . . .”).
Lyle objected to the seventy percent mandatory minimum
sentence. He claimed it was unconstitutional as applied to juvenile
offenders. The district court overruled Lyle’s objection.
Lyle appealed. In his initial appellate brief, Lyle disclaimed a
categorical challenge to mandatory minimums and instead argued the
mandatory minimum was unconstitutional as applied to him. We
transferred the case to the court of appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, the United States decided
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407(2012). In Miller, the Court held a statutory schema that mandates life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole cannot constitutionally be
applied to a juvenile. 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d
at 424. Subsequently, we held the rule contemplated by Miller was
retroactive. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Iowa 2013). We
then applied the reasoning in Miller to sentences that effectively deprived
a juvenile offender of a meaningful opportunity for early release on parole
during the offender’s lifetime based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (2013). In a trilogy of
cases, our reasoning applied not just to a de facto life sentence or one
“that is the practical equivalent of a life sentence without parole,” see
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Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121, but also to a “lengthy term-of-years
sentence,” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 72; see also State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d
88, 96–97 (Iowa 2013).
The court of appeals affirmed the sentence. Lyle sought further
review and asserted the decision of the court of appeals was contrary to
Miller. We granted his application for further review and ordered Lyle
and the State to submit additional briefing regarding whether the seventy
percent mandatory minimum of his ten-year sentence for second-degree
robbery was constitutional in light of our recent trilogy of cases. See
generally Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, Null, 836
N.W.2d 41.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
An unconstitutional sentence is an illegal sentence. See State v.
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009). Consequently, an
unconstitutional sentence may be corrected at any time. Id.; see also
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a). Although challenges to illegal sentences are
ordinarily reviewed for correction of legal errors, we review an allegedly
unconstitutional sentence de novo. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 113.
III. Issue Before the Court.
As a threshold matter, the State argues Lyle waived a categorical
challenge by failing to raise it in his initial brief. We have consistently
held an issue “may be deemed” waived if a litigant fails to identify the
issue, assign error, and make an argument supported by citation to
authority in their initial brief. See Bennett v. MC No. 619, Inc., 586
N.W.2d 512, 521 (Iowa 1998); Mueller v. St. Ansgar State Bank, 465
N.W.2d 659, 659 (Iowa 1991); McCleeary v. Wirtz, 222 N.W.2d 409, 415
(Iowa 1974). This rule, however, like most other rules, is not without
exceptions. See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 644–45 (Iowa
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2009) (addressing an issue raised for the first time in the State’s appellee
brief, which the defendant would have been unlikely to be able to
address). But see Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass’n v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d
621, 642 (Iowa 1996) (holding a civil litigant may not raise an issue for
the first time in its reply brief).
Our decision in Bruegger—a case in which the defendant
challenged his sentence as unconstitutional for the first time on appeal—
reveals one exception. 773 N.W.2d at 872 (“[A] claim [that the sentence
itself is inherently illegal] may be brought at any time.”); see also Iowa R.
Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a) (“The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time.”). Bruegger recognized that a categorical challenge to the
constitutionality of a sentence under the Eighth Amendment or article I,
section 17 targets “the inherent power of the court to impose a particular
sentence.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 871. As such, “the ordinary rules of
issue preservation do not apply.” Veal v. State, 779 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa
2010). Accordingly, a constitutional challenge to an illegal sentence,
even one brought after the initial brief has been filed, could fit within our
holding in Bruegger. See 773 N.W.2d at 871–72.
On the other hand, we recently recognized the value of a
“ ‘procedurally conservative approach’ ” to error preservation involving
novel issues raised for the first time on appeal for which there is an
inadequate factual record. See State v. Hoeck, 843 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa
2014) (quoting Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When
Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 San Diego L.
Rev. 1253, 1300 (2002)). We expressed skepticism about deciding the
issue under those circumstances: “[W]e are not convinced the claims are
fully briefed or the factual issues necessary to decide the Iowa
constitutional claims are developed.” Id. Accordingly, we remanded the
8
case to the district court to allow the parties to fully develop and argue
the claims. Id. at 72.
Yet, as in Bruegger and Veal, our decision in Hoeck acknowledges
that the failure to raise an issue in the initial appellate brief does not
waive the issue. We preserved the issue in Hoeck pending briefing of
legal issues and development of the factual record by the parties and
consideration by the district court. See id. Instead, Hoeck recognized a
commonsense prudential notion that remand is a more practicable
decision than evaluation of an entirely novel constitutional issue upon an
undeveloped record. See id.The concerns we identified in Hoeck are not present in this case.
The issue presented by Lyle in this case on further review (and more
thoroughly in response to our order for supplemental briefing) is
fundamentally similar to the one he initially raised on appeal. See Feld
v. Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72, 84–85 (Iowa 2010) (Appel, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). While disclaiming a categorical challenge,
Lyle’s initial brief suggests mandatory minimums are grossly
disproportionate for most or all juveniles. This argument is
fundamentally similar to the argument he expanded upon in his
application for further review (after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Miller) and that he ultimately articulated in his supplemental brief. The
supplemental briefing we ordered, combined with the categorical nature
of the relief Lyle seeks also obviates in this narrow circumstance the
need for more thorough briefing in the district court. Accordingly, we
proceed to consider Lyle’s categorical challenge based on Miller and our
trilogy of cases.
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IV. Merits.
Lyle contends the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment in the Iowa Constitution does not permit a statutory scheme
that mandates a person sentenced for a crime committed as a juvenile to
serve a minimum period of time prior to becoming eligible for parole or
work release. The State argues a mandatory minimum sentence of the
term of years for the crime committed in this case is not cruel and
unusual.
The Iowa Constitution provides, “Excessive bail shall not be
required; excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and unusual
punishment shall not be inflicted.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 17. The Eighth
Amendment similarly prohibits excessive punishments. See U.S. Const.
amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).2 Lyle does not
offer a substantive standard for cruel and unusual punishment that
differs from the one employed by the United States Supreme Court.
Instead, he asks us to apply the federal framework in a more stringent
2Similarity between federal and state constitutional provisions does not require
us to follow federal precedent interpreting the Federal Constitution. Instead, “[a]
decision of this court to depart from federal precedent arises from our independent and
unfettered authority to interpret the Iowa Constitution.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70 n.7;
see also State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 790 (Iowa 2013) (“[O]ur right under principles
of federalism to stand as the final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-
standing, and good law.”). Indeed, we have not hesitated to do so when, after applying
the now-familiar Tonn–Ochoa analysis, we have determined the liberty and equality of
Iowans is better served by departing from the federal rule. See, e.g., Null, 836 N.W.2d
at 70–74 & n.7 (extending, under article I, section 17, the rationale of Miller to
sentences that are equivalent to life without parole); State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149,
170–72 (Iowa 2013) (declining to adopt a special-needs exception for searches of the
homes of parolees under article I, section 8); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 802–03 (holding a
parole agreement does not establish consent to a warrantless, suspicionless search
under article I, section 8); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (holding
parole status does not alone permit a warrantless, suspicionless search under article I,
section 8); State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 293 (Iowa 2000) (holding article I, section 8
does not contain a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule), abrogated on other
grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).
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fashion. See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70 (applying the principles espoused in
Miller in a more stringent fashion under the Iowa Constitution than had
been explicitly adopted by the United States Supreme Court under the
United States Constitution); Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 883. Thus, we
follow the federal analytical framework in deciding this case, but
ultimately use our judgment in giving meaning to our prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment in reaching our conclusion. See State v.
Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 174 (Iowa 2013).
Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution “embraces a bedrock
rule of law that punishment should fit the crime.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d
at 872; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S. Ct. 1183,
1190, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1, 16 (2005) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees
individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2246, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335,
344 (2002) (“ ‘[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should
be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ” (quoting Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S. Ct. 544, 549, 54 L. Ed. 793, 798
(1910)). While “strict proportionality” is neither required nor, frankly,
possible, Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S. Ct. 2680,
2705, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836, 869 (1991), Bruegger reveals our scrutiny of the
proportionality between the crime and the sentence is not “ ‘toothless,’ ”
773 N.W.2d at 883 (quoting Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675
N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2004)).
Time and experience have taught us much about the efficacy and
justice of certain punishments. As a consequence, we understand our
concept of cruel and unusual punishment is “not static.” Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630, 642 (1958).
Instead, we consider constitutional challenges under the “currently
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prevail[ing]” standards of whether a punishment is “excessive” or “cruel
and unusual.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311, 122 S. Ct. at 2247, 153 L. Ed. 2d
at 344. This approach is followed because the basic concept underlying
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “is nothing less
than the dignity” of humankind. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100, 78 S. Ct. at 597,
2 L. Ed. 2d at 642. This prohibition “must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.” Id. at 101, 78 S. Ct. at 598, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 642. “This is
because ‘[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but
necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the
same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society
change.’ ” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, 128 S. Ct. 2641,
2649, 171 L. Ed. 2d 525, 538 (2008) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 382, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2800, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 432 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)). In other words, punishments once thought
just and constitutional may later come to be seen as fundamentally
repugnant to the core values contained in our State and Federal
Constitutions as we grow in our understanding over time. See Roper,
543 U.S. at 574–75, 125 S. Ct. at 1198, 161 L. Ed. at 25 (abrogating
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2980, 106
L. Ed. 2d 306, 325 (1989), which held a sixteen-year-old offender could
be sentenced to be executed). As with other rights enumerated under
our constitution, we interpret them in light our understanding of today,
not by our past understanding.
Until recently, there were two general classifications of cruel and
unusual sentences. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2021, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825, 836 (2010). “In the first classification
the Court consider[ed] all of the circumstances of the case to determine
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whether [a term-of-years] sentence is unconstitutionally excessive.” Id.We recognize this classification under the Iowa Constitution, but refer to
these sentences as “grossly disproportionate.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at
873. The second classification contemplated categorical bars to
imposition of the death penalty irrespective of idiosyncratic facts.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 60, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 836. This
classification of cases has traditionally “consist[ed] of two subsets, one
considering the nature of the offense, the other considering the
characteristics of the offender.” Id. In short, the death penalty simply
cannot be imposed on certain offenders or for certain crimes. For
instance, no offender can be sentenced to death—regardless of their
personal characteristics—if only convicted of a nonhomicide offense and
they did not intend to cause the death of another. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at
438, 128 S. Ct. at 2660, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 550. Additionally, a death
penalty cannot be imposed, irrespective of the crime, on an intellectually
disabled criminal offender, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S. Ct. at 2252,
153 L. Ed. 2d at 350, or a juvenile offender, Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, 125
S. Ct. at 1200, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 28.
Graham introduced a third subset of categorical challenges. See
560 U.S. at 70–74, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 843–45. This
subset involved a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence based
on the underlying sentencing practice. See id. at 61–62, 130 S. Ct. at
2022–23, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837. While the juvenile status of the offender
provided the pivotal point for the reasoning in Graham, the Court also
recognized the offender was being sentenced to life without parole for a
nonhomicide crime, a fact that itself entails categorically lesser
culpability than a homicide crime. See id. at 71, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 176
L. Ed. 2d at 842; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438, 128 S. Ct. at 2660,
13
171 L. Ed. 2d at 550 (“[Nonhomicide offenses] may be devastating in
their harm . . . but ‘in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the
person and to the public,’ they cannot be compared to murder in their
‘severity and irrevocability.’ ” (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
598, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 2869, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982, 993 (1977)). The Court
thus blended its two prior subsets of categorical challenges—
consideration of the nature of the crime and consideration of the
culpability of the offender—to generate a new subset.
Importantly, Miller added to this jurisprudence by conjoining two
sets of caselaw: outright categorical prohibitions on certain punishments
for certain crimes or against certain offenders, e.g., Graham, 520 U.S. at
75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845–46; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578,
125 S. Ct. at 1200, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 28, with another line of cases
requiring a sentencer have the ability to consider certain characteristics
about the offender as mitigating circumstances in favor of not sentencing
the offender to death, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S. Ct.
2954, 2964–65, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978). See Miller, 567 U.S. at
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 418. Although Miller did not
identify its holding as a categorical rule, it essentially articulated a
categorical prohibition on a particular sentencing practice. See id. at ___,
132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424 (“We therefore hold that the
Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”). Yet, Miller
implemented a categorical prohibition by requiring the sentencing court
to consider the offender’s youth along with a variety of other individual
facts about the offender and the crime to determine whether the sentence
is appropriate. See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2468, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 423;
see also Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115 & n.6.
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By importing the line of cases represented by Lockett, Miller
effectively crafted a new subset of categorically unconstitutional
sentences: sentences in which the legislature has forbidden the
sentencing court from considering important mitigating characteristics of
an offender whose culpability is necessarily and categorically reduced as
a matter of law, making the ultimate sentence categorically
inappropriate. This new subset carries with it the advantage of
simultaneously being more flexible and responsive to the demands of
justice than outright prohibition of a particular penalty while also
providing real and substantial protection for the offender’s right to be
sentenced accurately according to their culpability and prospects for
rehabilitation. We turn now to consider the merits of Lyle’s challenge
that mandatory minimums cannot be constitutionally applied to
juveniles.
The analysis of a categorical challenge to a sentence normally
entails a two-step inquiry. First, we consider “ ‘objective indicia of
society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state
practice’ to determine whether there is a national consensus against the
sentencing practice at issue.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 130 S. Ct. at
2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 563, 125 S. Ct. at
1191, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 17). Second, we exercise our own “independent
judgment” “guided by ‘the standards elaborated by controlling precedents
and by [our] own understanding and interpretation of the [Iowa
Constitution’s] text, history, meaning, and purpose.’ ” See id. (quoting
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421, 128 S. Ct. at 2650, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 540). In
exercising independent judgment, we consider “the culpability of the
offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with
the severity of the punishment in question.” Id. at 67, 130 S. Ct. at
15
2026, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 841. We also consider if the sentencing practice
being challenged serves the legitimate goals of punishment. Id.
Beginning with the first prong of the analysis, we recognize no
other court in the nation has held that its constitution or the Federal
Constitution prohibits a statutory schema that prescribes a mandatory
minimum sentence for a juvenile offender. Further, most states permit
or require some or all juvenile offenders to be given mandatory minimum
sentences.3 See Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s
Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 457, 494
& n.267 (2012) [hereinafter Guggenheim] (collecting state statute
permitting or requiring a mandatory minimum sentences to be imposed
on a juvenile offender tried as an adult). This state of the law arguably
projects a consensus in society in favor of permitting juveniles to be
given mandatory minimum statutory sentences. See Alex Dutton,
Comment, The Next Frontier of Juvenile Sentencing Reform: Enforcing
Miller’s Individualized Sentencing Requirement Beyond the JLWOP
Context, 23 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 173, 195 (2013) [hereinafter
Dutton] (“At this moment, no such national consensus exists against the
imposition of mandatory sentences on juvenile offenders; the practice is
common across jurisdictions.”).
3Some states have limited or abolished mandatory minimums for juveniles. See,
e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-908 (2013) (limiting the availability of mandatory minimum
sentences for juveniles); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 630A(c) (2007) (providing the
mandatory minimum for vehicular homicide shall not apply to a juvenile offender); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 31-18-13(B) (West, Westlaw current through May 21, 2014) (providing that
juvenile offenders may be sentenced to less than the mandatory minimum); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 161.620 (2003) (providing a juvenile tried as an adult shall not receive a
mandatory minimum sentence except for aggravated murder or felonies committed with
a firearm); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.540(3)(a) (West 2010) (prohibiting mandatory
minimum sentences for juvenile offenders except for aggravated first-degree murder).
16
Yet, “[c]onsensus is not dispositive.” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421,
128 S. Ct. at 2650, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 539. Moreover, as Miller
demonstrates, constitutional protection for the rights of juveniles in
sentencing for the most serious crimes is rapidly evolving in the face of
widespread sentencing statutes and practices to the contrary. See 567
U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2470–73, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424–29 (rejecting an
argument by Alabama and Arkansas that widespread use of mandatory-
life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders precluded
holding the practice to be unconstitutional). Additionally, the evolution
of society that gives rise to change over time necessarily occurs in the
presence of an existing consensus, as history has repeatedly shown. The
“tough on crime” movement in politics may have made mandatory
minimum sentences for juveniles common in society, see Dutton, Temp.
Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. at 175 (identifying “conservative, tough-on-crime
political campaigns” as one cause of harsh and longer juvenile
sentences); see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 509 (2001) (describing the
bipartisan “bidding war” to be toughest on crime), but, the shift has also
given rise to the claim that some sentencing laws have gone too far as
applied to youthful offenders, cf. Guggenheim, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
at 495 (arguing the national-consensus analysis is inadequate to protect
juvenile rights).
We also recognize that we would abdicate our duty to interpret the
Iowa Constitution if we relied exclusively on the presence or absence of a
national consensus regarding a certain punishment. Iowans have
generally enjoyed a greater degree of liberty and equality because we do
not rely on a national consensus regarding fundamental rights without
also examining any new understanding.
17
Nevertheless, the absence of caselaw does not necessarily support
the presence of a consensus contrary to the challenge by Lyle in this
case. Our legislature has already started to signal its independent
concern with mandatory prison sentences for juveniles. In 2013, it
expressed this recognition by amending a sentencing statute to remove
mandatory sentencing for juveniles in most cases. This statute provides:
Notwithstanding any provision in section 907.3 or any other
provision of law prescribing a mandatory minimum sentence
for the offense, if the defendant, other than a child being
prosecuted as a youthful offender, is guilty of a public
offense other than a class “A” felony, and was under the age
of eighteen at the time the offense was committed, the court
may suspend the sentence in whole or in part, including any
mandatory minimum sentence, or with the consent of the
defendant, defer judgment or sentence, and place the
defendant on probation upon such conditions as the court
may require.
2013 Iowa Acts ch. 42, § 14 (codified at Iowa Code Ann. § 901.5(14)
(West, Westlaw current through 2014 Reg. Sess.)).4 While this statute
does not change the minimum-term requirement for juveniles if a prison
sentence is imposed by the court, it does abolish mandatory prison
sentencing for most crimes committed by juveniles.
Just as we typically “owe substantial deference to the penalties the
legislature has established for various crimes,” State v. Oliver, 812
N.W.2d 636, 650 (2012), we owe equal deference to the legislature when
it expands the discretion of the court in juvenile sentencing. Legislative
judgments can be “the most reliable objective indicators of community
standards for purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel
and unusual.” Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873. Here, the legislative
decision to back away from mandatory sentencing for most crimes
4The State argues, and Lyle does not disagree, that the statute does not apply
retroactively. See Iowa Code § 4.13(1)(c) (2013).
18
committed by juveniles weakens the notion of a consensus in favor of the
practice of blindly sentencing juveniles based on the crime committed.
In fact, it helps illustrate a building consensus in this state to treat
juveniles in our courts differently than adults.
Actually, the statutory recognition of the need for some discretion
when sentencing juveniles is consistent with our overall approach in the
past in dealing with juveniles. Primarily, the juvenile justice chapter of
our Code gives courts considerable discretion to take action in the best
interests of the child. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 232.10(2)(a) (2013)
(permitting a transfer of venue for juvenile court proceedings for “the best
interests of the child” among other reasons); id. § 232.38(2) (permitting
the district court to excuse temporarily the presence of the child’s
parents “when the court deems it in the best interests of the child”); id.
§ 232.43(6) (permitting the district court to refuse to accept a guilty plea
by the child if the plea “is not in the child’s best interest”); id.
§ 232.45(6)(c) (permitting the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction over
delinquency proceedings if waiver “would be in the best interests of the
child and the community”); id. § 232.52(2)(e) (permitting the court to
transfer guardianship of the child to the department of human services
for “the best interest of the child” among other reasons); id. § 232.62(2)(a)
(permitting the district court to transfer venue for CINA proceedings for
“the best interests of the child” among other reasons); id. § 232.108(3)
(permitting a court to deny permission for “frequent visitation” by a
sibling if the court determines “it would not be in the child’s best
interest”).
Moreover, the Code in general is replete with provisions vesting
considerable discretion in courts to take action for the best interests of
the child. See id. § 92.13 (permitting the labor commissioner to refuse to
19
grant a work permit to a minor if “the best interests of the minor would
be served by such refusal”); id. § 232C.3(1) (permitting a court to
emancipate a minor if it is in the best interest of the child); id.
§ 282.18(5) (directing a school board “to achieve just and equitable
results that are in the best interest of the affected child” when
determining whether to permit the child to open enroll). Other statutes
prohibit juveniles from engaging in risky behavior because of the reduced
capacity for decision-making found in juveniles. See id. § 123.47(2)
(prohibiting persons under twenty-one from purchasing alcohol); id.
§ 135.37(2) (prohibiting persons under eighteen from obtaining tattoos);
id. § 321.180B (prohibiting persons under eighteen from obtaining “a
license or permit to operate a motor vehicle except under the provisions
of this section”); id. § 453A.2(2) (prohibiting persons under eighteen from
purchasing tobacco products); see also Null, 836 N.W.2d at 53 (collecting
statutes).
All of these statutes reflect a pair of compelling realities. First,
children lack the risk-calculation skills adults are presumed to possess
and are inherently sensitive, impressionable, and developmentally
malleable. Second, the best interests of the child generally support
discretion in dealing with all juveniles. In other words, “the legal
disqualifications placed on children as a class . . . exhibit the settled
understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are
universal.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2394,
2403–04, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310, 324 (2011).
Overall, it is becoming clear that society is now beginning to
recognize a growing understanding that mandatory sentences of
imprisonment for crimes committed by children are undesirable in
society. If there is not yet a consensus against mandatory minimum
20
sentencing for juveniles, a consensus is certainly building in Iowa in the
direction of eliminating mandatory minimum sentencing.5
We next turn to the second step in the analysis of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause. We must decide if the mandatory
minimum sentence for a youthful offender violates the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause in light of its text, meaning, purpose, and
history.
In doing so, we cannot ignore that over the last decade, juvenile
justice has seen remarkable, perhaps watershed, change. This evolution
must be cast in its proper place in the history of juvenile justice.
Although we have recently traced the evolution of juvenile justice, see
Null, 836 N.W.2d at 52, we highlight this history to better understand the
5We recognize many states are currently wrestling with whether Miller applies
retroactively on collateral review. Compare Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702–03
(Miss. 2013) (holding Miller applies retroactively), and State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716,
731 (Neb. 2014) (same), with State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 841 (La. 2013) (holding
Miller does not apply retroactively), Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 326 (Minn.
2013) (same), and Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. 2013) (same). Of
course, retroactivity aside, states must continue to find ways to implement Miller, and a
variety of options exist. See Lauren Kinell, Note and Comment, Answering the
Unanswered Questions: How States Can Comport with Miller v. Alabama, 13 Conn. Pub.
Int. L.J. 143, 149–58 (2013) (discussing different approaches taken by states after
Miller); Kelly Scavone, Note, How Long Is Too Long: Conflicting State Responses to De
Facto Life Without Parole Sentences After Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama, 82
Fordham L. Rev. 3439, 3441–42 (2014) (discussing varying state responses to issues
left unresolved by Miller). Even these early days of rapidly evolving juvenile justice
jurisprudence, though, we are hardly alone in our approach. For example, other courts
have similarly held a term-of-years sentence can be so lengthy as to be the “functional
equivalent” of a life sentence. See Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1194 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding a 254-year sentence for nonhomicide crimes violated Graham); People v.
Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (holding a 110-year minimum sentence is the
equivalent of life without parole); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 1 N.E.3d 259, 270
n.11 (Mass. 2013) (leaving the contours of a new sentencing scheme to the “sound
discretion” of the legislature but cautioning that any sentencing scheme “must take
account of the spirit” of Brown “and avoid imposing on juvenile defendants any term so
lengthy that it could be seen as the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without
parole” and citing Caballero, Ragland, and Null). Indeed, Massachusetts has even gone
a step further than we have had occasion to do, holding all juvenile life without parole
for homicide offenders violates the Massachusetts Constitution. See Diatchenko v. Dist.
Att’y, 1 N.E.3d 270, 284–85 (Mass. 2013).
21
challenge made in this case by Lyle. This history is particularly salient
given the categorical nature of Lyle’s challenge. It reveals children and
juveniles have been viewed as constitutionally different from adults in
this country for more than a century.
At common law, children under seven lacked criminal capacity,
and children between seven and fourteen years of age were presumed to
lack criminal capacity, but juveniles over fourteen were presumed to
have the capacity to commit criminal acts. Id.; see also In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 16, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1438, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 540 (1967). “For the
first hundred years or so after the founding of the United States,
juveniles, if they were tried at all, were tried in adult courts.” Null, 836
N.W.2d at 52 (citing Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent
Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 11,
13–14 (2007) [hereinafter Feld]). While these early courts typically did
not have authority to accord the juvenile fewer rights, In re Gault, 387
U.S. at 16–17, 87 S. Ct. at 1438, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 540, courts did not
afford juveniles any greater substantive protection. “Prior to the creation
of juvenile courts, ‘adult crime’ meant ‘adult time,’ therefore states tried
and sentenced children as adults, and imprisoned and executed them for
crimes committed as young as ten, eleven, or twelve years of age.” Feld,
10 J.L. & Fam. Stud. at 14.
By the end of the nineteenth century, progressive reformers were
“appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that
children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with
hardened criminals.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15, 87 S. Ct. at 1437, 18
L. Ed. 2d at 539. To ameliorate the harshness and inequity of trying
children in adult courts (resulting in adult punishment), reformers
advocated for the establishment of a system less concerned with
22
ascertaining the child’s guilt or innocence and more concerned with
determining what was in the child’s best interests based upon the child’s
unique circumstances. Id. at 15–16, 87 S. Ct. at 1437, 18 L. Ed. 2d at
539. “The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The
child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from
apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather
than punitive.” Id. “Accordingly, the highest motives and most
enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to
our law in any comparable context.” Id. at 17, 87 S. Ct. at 1438, 18
L. Ed. 2d at 540. Theoretically, youthful offenders would not face any
actual prison time as a result of most juvenile court proceedings. See
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 108 (1909)
[hereinafter Mack] (“[T]he protection is accomplished by suspending
sentence and releasing the child under probation, or, in the case of
removal from the home, sending it to a school instead of to a jail or
penitentiary.”).
Underlying these early juvenile courts was the fundamental conceit
that the judicial process was not adversarial when dealing with juvenile
offenders. Instead, the state ostensibly acted in parens patriae on the
child’s behalf. See In re Gault, at 15–17, 87 S. Ct. at 1437–38, 18
L. Ed. 2d at 539–40. In turn, procedural protections for the benefit of
criminal defendants did not apply in juvenile court. Id. at 15–16, 87
S. Ct. at 1437, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 539. The old law reasoned the child had
no right of liberty with his or her parents, only a right to custody, and
thus, in delinquency proceedings, the state did “not deprive the child of
any rights, because he ha[d] none. It merely provide[d] the ‘custody’ to
which the child [was] entitled.” Id. at 17, 87 S. Ct. at 1438, 18 L. Ed. 2d
at 540. In other words, the state, by prosecuting the child in juvenile
23
court, was stepping in as the child’s caretaker. See Mack, 23 Harv. L.
Rev. at 120.
Sensing the changing perceptions about liberty and due process in
the middle of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the basic prevailing underpinning of juvenile courts was
inaccurate and “that the purpose of juvenile court proceedings was no
longer primarily to protect the best interest of the child and was instead
becoming more punitive in nature.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 52; see In re
Gault, 387 U.S. at 17–19, 87 S. Ct. at 1438–39, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 540–41.
Accordingly, the Court began to require many basic protections provided
to adult offenders to be offered in juvenile courts, see In re Gault, 387
U.S. at 32–58, 87 S. Ct. at 1446–60, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 549–63, and in
proceedings in which the juvenile is waived to adult court, see Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556–57, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 1055, 16 L. Ed. 2d
84, 94–95 (1966).
Following In re Gault, however, little additional progress was
achieved. See Guggenheim, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 466–74. State
legislatures generally responded to Kent and In re Gault by amending
their laws to prosecute more juveniles as adults in adult court and to
give more juveniles adult sentences. See id. at 472–74; Donna M.
Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 Crime
& Just. 81, 84 (2000). As we have recognized “Kent and In re Gault may
have stimulated a mindset of increased exposure of youth to adult
criminal sentences.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 52; see Feld, 10 J.L. & Fam.
Stud. at 31 & n.108 (detailing the alarmist, racially charged rhetoric that
fueled ever harsher sentences); see also John J. Dilulio Jr., The Coming
of the Super-Predators, The Weekly Standard, November 27, 1995, at 23)
(predicting an onslaught of “tens of thousands of severely morally
24
impoverished juvenile super-predators”). The increase in harsh
sentencing statutes has led to longer sentences for juveniles.
Nevertheless, the Court did recognize serious differences in
juveniles that supported differential treatment in a few cases. See
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2668–69, 125
L. Ed. 2d 290, 306 (1993) (holding”sentence in a capital case must be
allowed to consider the mitigating qualities of youth”); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 836–38, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2699–2700, 101
L. Ed. 2d 702, 719–20 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding death penalty
for offenses committed by persons under sixteen years of age an
“unconstitutional punishment”); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265–67,
104 S. Ct. 2403, 2410–11, 81 L. Ed. 2d 207, 217–19 (1984)
(subordinating, in appropriate circumstances, juvenile’s liberty interest
to state’s parens patriae interest); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115–16, 102 S. Ct. 869, 877, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11–12 (1982) (remanding for
state court to consider mitigating circumstances of death penalty case of
sixteen-year-old youth). Importantly, the reasoning in Schall, which
permitted pretrial detention of youthful offenders under circumstances
not permissible of adults, was based on the notion that juveniles fail to
appreciate the gravity of the situation of prosecution—presumably
making them likely to reoffend even before trial. See 467 U.S. at 265,
104 S. Ct. at 2410, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 217–18. The Court recognized that
“[c]hildren, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take
care of themselves.” Id. It further recognized that “[s]ociety has a
legitimate interest in protecting a juvenile from the consequences of his
criminal activity [including] . . . the downward spiral of criminal activity
in which peer pressure may lead the child.” Id. at 266, 104 S. Ct. at2410–11, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 218. Schall suggested that juveniles
25
necessitate special treatment because the consequences of criminal
conduct impact them differently than adults.
In the context of capital murder, the Court recognized the
importance of youth as a mitigating factor. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at115–17, 102 S. Ct. at 877–78, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 11–12. The Court
explained:
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage. Our history is
replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors,
especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature
and responsible than adults.
Id. at 115–16, 102 S. Ct. at 877, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 11 (footnote omitted).
Further, the Court found that the presence of evidence of other types of
mitigating factors, such as a “turbulent family history, . . . beatings by a
harsh father, and . . . severe emotional disturbance” was relevant when
the defendant is a juvenile. See id. at 115, 102 S. Ct. at 877, 71
L. Ed. 2d at 11.
Indeed, the Court arrived at a similar conclusion in barring
imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders who were under the
age of sixteen at the time of the offense. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836–
38, 108 S. Ct. at 2699–2700, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 719–20. Justice Stevens,
writing for a plurality of the Court, explained two principal social
purposes justify imposition of the death penalty: retribution and
deterrence. Id. at 836, 108 S. Ct. at 2699, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 719.
However, neither of these rationales applied to fifteen-year-old offenders.
Id. at 836–38, 108 S. Ct. at 2699–2700, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 719–20.
The reasoning employed by the plurality was strikingly similar to
the reasoning and language used by the later majority in Roper.
Compare id. at 836–37, 108 S. Ct. at 2699–2700, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 719
26
(“Given the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager’s
capacity for growth, and society’s fiduciary obligations to its children,
[the retributive justification for imposing the death penalty] is simply
inapplicable to . . . a 15-year-old offender.”), with Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–
71, 125 S. Ct. at 1195, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 21 (recognizing the “diminished
culpability of juveniles” and their greater capacity for rehabilitation due
to “transient immaturity” made the death penalty categorically
inappropriate for juvenile offenders generally). Indeed, the idea that
deterrence—a more relevant rationale for punishing lesser crimes—
applied to juveniles was rejected nearly out of hand by the plurality: “The
likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit
analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so
remote as to be virtually nonexistent.” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837, 108
S. Ct. at 2700, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 720.
Eddings and Thompson demonstrate that while our emerging
knowledge of adolescent neuroscience and the diminished culpability of
juveniles is indeed compelling, see Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836, 108
S. Ct. at 2699–2700, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 719; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115–16,
102 S. Ct. at 877, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 11–12, our commonsense
understanding of youth, Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 183
L. Ed. 2d at 418, or what “any parent knows,” Roper, 543 U.S. at 569,
125 S. Ct. at 1195, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 21, has for more than thirty years
supported a fundamental and virtually inexorable difference between
juveniles and adults for the purposes of punishment. The understanding
that it was cruel and unusual punishment to mandate the same
sentences for juveniles as adults first emerged for crimes involving death
sentences. We simply could no longer see death as an acceptable
27
punishment to impose for a crime committed by a juvenile irrespective of
the offender’s youth.
Yet, for the bulk of the time after Eddings and Thompson and
before Roper, a different categorical rule prevailed: the notion “that the
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long.” See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976) (plurality
opinion). The “death is different” rule manifested itself in extreme
deference to legislative judgments regarding the appropriate duration of
punishments for juveniles for other crimes. So long as the juvenile
would not be executed, virtually any sentence or statutory sentencing
scheme was acceptable. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and
Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for
Uniformity, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1145 (2009) (“The Supreme Court
takes two very different approaches to substantive sentencing law.
Whereas its review of capital sentences is robust, its oversight of
noncapital sentences is virtually nonexistent.”).
However, ten years ago a new understanding of cruel and unusual
punishment emerged. In Roper, the Supreme Court held that a state
may not impose the death penalty for a crime committed under the age of
eighteen. 543 U.S. at 578, 125 S. Ct. at 1200, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 28.
Unquestionably, youth and its attendant characteristics were compelling
factors in the Court’s analysis. See id. at 569–74, 125 S. Ct. at 1195–97,
161 L. Ed. 2d at 21–25. The Court commented on three differences
between youth and adults. Id. at 569–70, 125 S. Ct. at 1195, 161
L. Ed. 2d at 21–23. As it had before, the Court explained:
[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological
studies . . . tend to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth
28
more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous
and ill-considered actions and decisions.”
Id. at 569, 125 S. Ct. at 1195, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 21 (quoting Johnson, 509
U.S. at 367, 113 S. Ct. at 2668–69, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 306). The Court
also noted “that juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” Id. at 569,
125 S. Ct. at 1195, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 22. These two factors generally
decrease the culpability of juvenile offenders. See id. “Their own
vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate
surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole
environment.” Id. at 570, 125 S. Ct. at 1195, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 22. “Once
the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the
penological justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser
force than to adults.” Id. at 571, 125 S. Ct. at 1196, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 23.
A greater capacity for change and rehabilitation complemented the
juvenile’s diminished culpability. The Court observed: “[T]he character of
a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits
of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.” Id. at 570, 125 S. Ct. at
1195, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 22. “From a moral standpoint it would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be
reformed.” Id. at 570, 125 S. Ct. at 1195–96, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 22.
“Indeed, ‘[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the
fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals
mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in
younger years can subside.’ ” Id. at 570, 125 S. Ct. at 1196, 161
L. Ed. 2d at 22 (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368, 113 S. Ct. at 2669,
29
125 L. Ed. 2d at 306). “It is difficult even for expert psychologists to
differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Id. at 573, 125 S. Ct. at
1197, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 24. Accordingly, the Court held the death penalty
could not be imposed for a crime committed under eighteen years of age.
Id. at 578, 125 S. Ct. at 1200, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 28.
Five years later, the Court made a revolutionary advance for
juvenile justice. In Graham, a seventeen-year-old probationer was
sentenced to life in prison (and had no opportunity for parole because
Florida has abolished its parole system, see Fla. Stat. § 921.002(1)(e)
(2003)), for actively participating in a series of armed home invasion
robberies. 560 U.S. at 54–55, 57, 130 S. Ct. at 2018–19, 2020, 176
L. Ed. 2d at 832–33, 834–35. The Court again reversed the state court
and vacated the sentence. Although there was a national consensus
against sentencing juvenile offenders to the death penalty, thirty-seven
states and the District of Columbia had statutory schemas permitting a
juvenile offender to receive a life-without-parole sentence for a
nonhomicide crime. Id. at 62, 130 S. Ct. at 2023, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837.
The Court opined, however, that “[a]ctual sentencing practices” revealed
it was rare for a juvenile to receive such a sentence. Id. at 62, 130 S. Ct.
at 2023, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 838. The Court concluded a national
consensus had developed against the practice of life-without-parole
sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders even if a statute remained
on the books in a large number of states. Id. at 67, 130 S. Ct. at 2026,
176 L. Ed. 2d at 841.
More importantly, despite what appeared to be a national
consensus against giving youthful nonhomicide offenders life-without-
30
parole sentences, the Court proceeded to the second prong of analysis in
a categorical challenge. See id. at 67–75, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–30, 176
L. Ed. 2d at 841–46. It reiterated the lessons of Roper that juveniles
generally have decreased culpability, but treated those lessons as
“established.” Id. at 68, 130 S. Ct. at 2026, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 841. After
rejecting penological justifications for life-without-parole sentences for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the Court concluded:
A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom
to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.
What the State must do, however, is give defendants like
Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
Id. at 75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845–46. This conclusion,
of course, expresses a growing understanding of the meaning of cruel
and unusual punishment. This understanding has continued to reveal
the truth that the protections against cruel and unusual punishment
need to account for the unique differences between juvenile and adult
behaviors.
Two years later, the Court took an additional stride forward by
holding in Miller that a statutory scheme that mandated a life-without-
parole sentence for juvenile homicide offenders with no opportunity to
take the offender’s youth into account as a mitigating factor violated the
Eighth Amendment. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183
L. Ed. 2d at 424. A key component of the Court’s reasoning was the
recognition that “children are constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 183 L. Ed. 2d at
418. It arrived at its conclusion not merely by relying on Roper and
Graham but by weaving together “two strands of precedent”—one
involving categorical bans on punishment for certain crimes and
31
offenders and the other requiring sentencing authorities consider
particular characteristics of the crime and the criminal before imposing a
death sentence. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2463, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 417–18.
Perhaps more importantly, the Court, recognized that “none of what
[Graham] said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory)
mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.” Id. at
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 420. The Court added, “By
making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of [a
life-without-parole sentence], such a scheme poses too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183
L. Ed. 2d at 424. The Court closed, noting:
Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make
that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into
account how children are different, and how those
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a
lifetime in prison.
Id.Last term, we expanded the reach of the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in a trilogy of juvenile justice cases decided under the Iowa
Constitution. In all three cases, we thoroughly canvassed the Court’s
precedent and examined the contours of Roper, Graham, and Miller. See
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 114–22; Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 95–97; Null,
836 N.W.2d at 60–68. We also held “that the unconstitutional imposition
of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence is not fixed by substituting it
with a sentence with parole that is the practical equivalent of a life
sentence without parole.” Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121. In Null, we held
that “[t]he prospect of geriatric release, if one is to be afforded the
opportunity for release at all, does not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’
to demonstrate the ‘maturity and rehabilitation’ required to obtain
32
release and reenter society as required by Graham.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at
71 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L Ed. 2d at
845–46). We recognized there was no meaningful difference between a
mandatory life-without-parole sentence—commanding the juvenile to
spend the entirety of his life in prison and then die there—and a
sentence styled as a mere mandatory term of years that, as a practical
matter, would obtain the same result. See Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121;
Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71. We reached even further in Pearson, however,
understanding that two twenty-five year sentences (each subject to a
mandatory minimum of seventeen-and-one-half years for a total of thirty-
five years) “effectively deprived [the defendant] of any chance of an earlier
release and the possibility of leading a more normal adult life.” 836
N.W.2d at 96. A concurrence in Pearson recognized the case was limited
to its bizarre facts and procedural posture, but pointed out that an
authentic application of Miller and Null would correctly apply to all
crimes and require a sentencing judge to have the discretion to depart
from a mandatory minimum before imposing any minimum sentence. Id.
at 98–99 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially).
To be sure, death conceivably remained different not only after the
Court’s opinion in Roper, but after the Supreme Court’s opinions in
Graham and Miller. After all, Roper was a death penalty case and could
have been viewed as merely correcting the course after Stanford. Miller
similarly concerned a statute that required a person be incarcerated for
the remainder of their life. Graham itself recognized that “life without
parole is ‘the second most severe penalty permitted by law.’ ” 560 U.S. at
69, 130 S. Ct. at 2027, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 842 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S.
at 1001, 111 S. Ct. at 2705, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 869 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)); see also William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less
33
Different than Death, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1109, 1123–28 (2010) (arguing
Graham treats life without parole as another category that, like the death
penalty, is irreducibly different than other term-of-years sentences).
Yet, as our recent trilogy of cases illustrate, death has ceased to be
different for the purposes of juvenile justice. While Graham, like Roper,
placed a barrier to one punishment for juveniles, we recognized that
Miller articulated a substantial principle requiring a district court to have
discretion to impose a lesser sentence. We realized Miller left open a
number of possibilities, including whether life without parole could ever
be imposed for homicide committed by a juvenile and “to what extent a
mandatory minimum sentence for adult crimes can automatically be
imposed on a juvenile tried as an adult.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 66–67.
While emerging neuroscience painted a compelling picture of the
juvenile’s diminished culpability “in the context of the death penalty and
life-without-parole sentences, [we recognized] it also applies, perhaps
more so, in the context of lesser penalties as well.” Pearson, 836 N.W.2d
at 98. Our recent procession of cases clearly indicates that death is no
longer irreconcilably different under article I, section 17 of the Iowa
Constitution, at least for juveniles.
Moreover, death sentences have never truly been the difference
maker with respect to treating juveniles as adults. As Professor
Guggenheim has pointed out, the Court recognized differences of
constitutional magnitude between adults and children in an array of
nonpunishment contexts. See Guggenheim, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at
474–87. The Court permitted intrusions upon the constitutional rights
of youths that would be starkly impermissible as applied to adults. See,
e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42, 105 S. Ct. 733, 742–43,
83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 734–35 (1985) (holding a school official may search a
34
child student without a warrant “when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school”);6 Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3048, 61 L. Ed. 2d 797,
813–14 (1979) (holding a statute requiring judicial supervision of a
minor’s abortion, which would be unconstitutional as applied to an
adult, could be constitutional under some circumstances); Ginsburg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641–43, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 1281–82, 20 L. Ed. 2d
195, 204–06 (1968) (holding a state statute prohibiting minors from
purchasing pornographic materials was a valid exercise of state power).
As the Court explained in Ginsburg, “even where there is an invasion of
protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.’ ” 390
U.S. at 638, 88 S. Ct. at 1280, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 203 (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S. Ct. 438, 444, 88 L. Ed. 645,
654 (1944)).
The nub of at least some of these cases is that juveniles are not
fully equipped to make “important, affirmative choices with potentially
serious consequences.” Baird, 443 U.S. at 635, 99 S. Ct. at 3044, 61
6We note that T.L.O. is also a “special needs” search case, perhaps more purely
than it is a children’s rights case. See 469 U.S. at 341–43, 105 S. Ct. at 742–43, 83
L. Ed. 2d at 734–36. In this regard, T.L.O. also prizes the interest of school teachers to
maintain order in schools. See id. at 343, 105 S. Ct. at 743, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 735 (“By
focusing on the question of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school
administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause
and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and
common sense.”). Balancing the child’s privacy interest—which is not a nullity—
against the school’s interest in maintaining order, the Court concluded a youthful
student may be searched without a warrant when a school official has reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing by the student. See id. at 342–43, 105 S. Ct. at 742–43, 83
L. Ed. 2d at 735–36. Last term, we were presented with a proffered special need in
Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 165–72. We refused to recognize the special needs doctrine, at
least for the time being. Id. at 170. Our mention of T.L.O. today expresses no opinion
regarding the special needs doctrine or the privacy interest of juveniles.
35
L. Ed. 2d at 808. “[D]uring the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.” Id.
The Court also said:
We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion
that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated
with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children;
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in
child rearing.
Id. at 634, 99 S. Ct. at 3043, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 807. This reasoning is
ancient, dating back to Blackstone, see 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
on the Laws of England *464–65 (George Sharswood ed. 1870)
(identifying common law disabilities of children but arguing “their very
disabilities are privileges; in order to secure them from hurting
themselves by their own improvident acts”), but continues to be forceful
today.
More recently, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a
child’s age is relevant to the analysis of whether the child is in custody
for the purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2402–06,
180 L. Ed. 2d at 326–27. The Court there recognized that youth “is a
fact that ‘generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and
perception’ ” that “apply broadly to children as a class” and are “self-
evident to anyone who was a child once.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2403,
180 L. Ed. 2d at 323 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674,
124 S. Ct. 2140, 2155, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938, 958 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)). Moreover, a child’s impressionability continued to be
relevant: the Court noted “that events that ‘would leave a man cold and
unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.’ ” Id.
36
(quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599, 68 S. Ct. 302, 304, 92 L. Ed.
224, 228 (1948)). In short, because children are categorically different
under the law, the child’s age is “a reality that courts cannot simply
ignore.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2406, 180 L. Ed. 2d at 327.
Upon exercise of our independent judgment, as we are required to
do under the constitutional test, we conclude that the sentencing of
juveniles according to statutorily required mandatory minimums does
not adequately serve the legitimate penological objectives in light of the
child’s categorically diminished culpability. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–
75, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 842–45. First and foremost,
the time when a seventeen-year-old could seriously be considered to have
adult-like culpability has passed. See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 70; see also
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 885 (recognizing that youth applies broadly to
diminish culpability). Of course, scientific data and the opinions of
medical experts provide a compelling and increasingly ineluctable case
that from a neurodevelopment standpoint, juvenile culpability does not
rise to the adult-like standard the mandatory minimum provision of
section 902.12(5) presupposes. Thus, this prevailing medical consensus
continues to inform and influence our opinion today under the
constitutional analysis we are required to follow. As demonstrated by
our prior opinions and the recent opinions of the United States Supreme
Court, however, we can speak of youth in the commonsense terms of
what any parent knows or what any former child knows, and so, surely,
we do not abdicate our constitutional duty to exercise independent
judgment when we determine Lyle does not have adult-like culpability.
Cf. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000, ___ L. Ed. 2d
___, ___ (2014) (“It is the Court’s duty to interpret the Constitution, but it
need not do so in isolation. The legal determination of intellectual
37
disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the
medical community’s diagnostic framework.”). The legal determination of
intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is
informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework.”). Of
course, as we have said before, we do not forget that “while youth is a
mitigating factor in sentencing, it is not an excuse.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at
75. The constitutional analysis is not about excusing juvenile behavior,
but imposing punishment in a way that is consistent with our
understanding of humanity today.
We understand and appreciate that harm to a victim is not diluted
by the age of the offender. Schall, 467 U.S. at 264–65, 104 S. Ct. at
2410, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 217. Yet, justice requires us to consider the
culpability of the offender in addition to the harm the offender caused.
After all, “[i]t is generally agreed ‘that punishment should be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.’ ”
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834, 108 S. Ct. at 2698, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 717(quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S. Ct. 837, 841, 93
L. Ed. 2d 934, 942 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). A constitutional
framework that focused only on the harm the defendant caused would
never have produced Roper, which involved a profoundly heinous crime.
See 543 U.S. at 556–58, 573–74, 125 S. Ct. at 1187–88, 1197, 161
L. Ed. 2d at 13–14, 24–25.
We recognize the prior cases considering whether certain
punishments were cruel and unusual all involved harsh, lengthy
sentences, including death sentences. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132
S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424; Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S. Ct.
at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845–46; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, 125 S. Ct. at
1200, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 28; Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367, 113 S. Ct. at 2668–
38
69, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 305–06; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836–38, 108 S. Ct.
at 2699–2700, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 719–20; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115–17,
102 S. Ct. at 877–78, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 11–12; see also Ragland, 836
N.W.2d at 121–22; Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96; Null, 836 N.W.2d at 76.
Of course, the Supreme Court has recognized that the denial of even the
opportunity to apply for parole for a portion or the entirety of the
applicable period of incarceration renders the sentence harsher. See
Graham, 560 U.S. at 70, 130 S. Ct. at 2027, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 842 (“The
Court has recognized the severity of sentences that deny convicts the
possibility of parole.”); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01, 103 S. Ct.
3001, 3015, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637, 656 (1983) (distinguishing commutation
from parole because, while “[p]arole is a regular part of the rehabilitative
process” and a prisoner can normally expect parole “[a]ssuming good
behavior,” commutation is an “ad hoc exercise of executive clemency”);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280–81, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 1142–43, 63
L. Ed. 2d 382, 395 (1980) (recognizing the opportunity for parole,
“however slim,” mollifies the severity of the convict’s sentence).
More importantly, the Supreme Court has emphasized that
nothing it has said is “crime-specific,” suggesting the natural
concomitant that what it said is not punishment-specific either. See
Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 420. We
recognized as much last term. See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71 (“[T]he notions
in Roper, Graham, and Miller that ‘children are different’ and that they
are categorically less culpable than adult offenders apply as fully in this
case as in any other.” (Emphasis added.)); see also Pearson, 836 N.W.2d
at 99 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (recognizing the gravity of the
offense does not affect the applicability of the juvenile’s rights under
article I, section 17). Simply put, attempting to mete out a given
39
punishment to a juvenile for retributive purposes irrespective of an
individualized analysis of the juvenile’s categorically diminished
culpability is an irrational exercise. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 98
(“[L]imiting the teachings and protections of these recent cases to only
the harshest penalties known to law is as illogical as it is unjust.”).
The United States Supreme Court has opined “the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as
well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.” Roper, 543
U.S. at 571, 125 S. Ct. at 1196, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 23. Punishment simply
plays out differently with juveniles. Even in the context of capital
punishment, the Court has sagaciously recognized that “[t]he likelihood
that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that
attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be
virtually nonexistent.” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837, 108 S. Ct. at 2700,
101 L. Ed. 2d at 720. We add that a deterrence rationale is actually even
less applicable when the crime (and concordantly the punishment) is
lesser. If a juvenile will not engage in the kind of cost-benefit analysis
involving the death penalty that may deter them from committing a
crime, there is no reason to believe a comparatively minor sentence of a
term of years subject to a mandatory minimum will do so. See Pearson,
836 N.W.2d at 98–99. “[A] juvenile’s impetuosity can lead them to
commit not only serious crimes, but considerably pettier crimes as well.”
Id.
Rehabilitation and incapacitation can justify criminally punishing
juveniles, but mandatory minimums do not further these objectives in a
way that adequately protects the rights of juveniles within the context of
the constitutional protection from the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment for a juvenile. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 72, 130 S. Ct. at
40
2029, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 844 (“Even if the punishment has some
connection to a valid penological goal, it must be shown that the
punishment is not grossly disproportionate in light of the justification
offered.”). As much as youthful immaturity has sharpened our
understanding to use care in the imposition of punishment of juveniles,
it also reveals an equal understanding that reform can come easier for
juveniles without the need to impose harsh measures. Sometimes a
youthful offender merely needs time to grow. As with the lack of
maturity in youth, this too is something most parents know.
The greater likelihood of reform for juveniles also substantially
undermines an incapacitation rationale. See id. at 72–73, 130 S. Ct. at
2029, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 844–45. The juvenile justice jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court—like our own—is beginning to regard the
incapacitation rationale with a healthy skepticism. See id. at 73, 130
S. Ct. at 2029, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845 (“Incapacitation cannot override all
other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against
disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”). A close reading of Graham
demonstrates the Supreme Court views the incapacitation rationale even
more limitedly: the Court recognized Florida needed to incapacitate the
youthful offender to the extent he “posed an immediate risk” of
“escalating [his] pattern of criminal conduct.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 73,
130 S. Ct. at 2029, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 844 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Given the juvenile’s greater capacity for growth and reform, it is
likely a juvenile can rehabilitate faster if given the appropriate
opportunity. “Because ‘incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth,’ care
should be taken to avoid ‘an irrevocable judgment about [an offender’s]
value and place in society.’ ” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 75 (quoting Miller, 567
41
U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 419). After the juvenile’s
transient impetuosity ebbs and the juvenile matures and reforms, the
incapacitation objective can no longer seriously be served, and the
statutorily mandated delay of parole becomes “nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.” Coker, 433
U.S. at 592, 97 S. Ct. at 2866, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 989.
If the undeveloped thought processes of juveniles are not properly
considered, the rehabilitative objective can be inhibited by mandatory
minimum sentences. After all, mandatory minimum sentences foreswear
(though admittedly not altogether) the rehabilitative ideal. Juvenile
offenders who are placed in prison at a formative time in their growth
and formation, see Null, 836 N.W.2d at 55, can be exposed to a life that
can increase the likelihood of recidivism. See Ioana Tchoukleva, Note,
Children Are Different: Bridging the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality
Post Miller v. Alabama, 4 Cal. L. Rev. Circuit 92, 104 (Aug. 2013).
In the end, we conclude all mandatory minimum sentences of
imprisonment for youthful offenders are unconstitutional under the cruel
and unusual punishment clause in article I, section 17 of our
constitution. Mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles are simply too
punitive for what we know about juveniles. Furthermore, we do not
believe this conclusion is inconsistent with the consensus of Iowans.
Although most parents fortunately will never find themselves in a
position to be in court to see their teenage child sentenced to a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for committing a forcible
felony, we think most parents would be stunned to learn this state had a
sentencing schema for juvenile offenders that required courts to imprison
all youthful offenders for conduct that constituted a forcible felony
without looking behind the label of the crime into the details of the
42
particular offense and the individual circumstances of the child.
Additionally, we think the jolt would be compounded once parents would
further discover that their child must serve at least seventy percent of
the term of the mandatory sentence before becoming eligible for parole.
This shock would only intensify when it is remembered how some serious
crimes can at times be committed by conduct that appears less serious
when the result of juvenile behavior. This case could be an illustration.
A forcible felony can be the product of inane juvenile schoolyard
conduct just as it can be the product of the cold and calculated adult
conduct most people typically associate with a forcible felony, such as
robbery. Yet, our laws have been shaped over the years to eliminate any
distinction. Juveniles over sixteen years of age or older who commit any
form of forcible felony are now excluded under our law from the
jurisdictional arm of juvenile courts and are prosecuted as adults. Iowa
Code § 232.8(1)(c). Consequently, the mandatory minimum sentences
applicable to adult offenders apply, with no exceptions, to juvenile
offenders, including those who engage in inane juvenile schoolyard
conduct. At least for those juveniles, our collective sense of humanity
preserved in our constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment and stirred by what we all know about child development
demands some assurance that imprisonment is actually appropriate and
necessary. There is no other area of the law in which our laws write off
children based only on a category of conduct without considering all
background facts and circumstances.
Overall, no other logical result can be reached under article I,
section 17, a result that is also embedded within the most recent cases
from the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court banned
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles in Miller, but it did
43
not ban nonmandatory life-without-parole sentences if the sentencing
court is given the opportunity to consider the attributes of youth in
mitigation of punishment. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469,
183 L. Ed. 2d at 424; see also Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 121. Thus,
juveniles can still be sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, but not
mandatorily.7 Accordingly, the heart of the constitutional infirmity with
the punishment imposed in Miller was its mandatory imposition, not the
length of the sentence. The mandatory nature of the punishment
establishes the constitutional violation. Yet, article I, section 17 requires
the punishment for all crimes “be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense.” Cf. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367, 30 S. Ct. at 549, 54 L. Ed. at 798.
In other words, the protection of article I, section 17 applies across the
board to all crimes. Thus, if mandatory sentencing for the most serious
crimes that impose the most serious punishment of life in prison without
parole violates article I, section 17, so would mandatory sentences for
less serious crimes imposing the less serious punishment of a minimum
period of time in prison without parole. All children are protected by the
Iowa Constitution. The constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment does not protect all children if the constitutional
infirmity identified in mandatory imprisonment for those juveniles who
commit the most serious crimes is overlooked in mandatory
imprisonment for those juveniles who commit less serious crimes. Miller
is properly read to support a new sentencing framework that reconsiders
7Because our holding focuses exclusively on a statutory schema that requires a
district court to impose a sentence containing a minimum period of time a juvenile
must serve before becoming eligible for parole and that denies a district court the
discretion to impose a lesser sentence, we do not consider the situation in which a
district court imposes a sentence that denies the juvenile the opportunity for parole in
the absence of a statute requiring such a result. Accordingly, we do not determine
whether such a sentence would be constitutional.
44
mandatory sentencing for all children. Mandatory minimum sentencing
results in cruel and unusual punishment due to the differences between
children and adults. This rationale applies to all crimes, and no
principled basis exists to cabin the protection only for the most serious
crimes.
Additionally, the analysis needed to properly apply article I, section
17 to the absence of a sentencing procedure does not bear on the
disparity between the crime and the length of the sentence. Cf. Graham,
560 U.S. at 60, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 836–37. As a
categorical challenge, the length of the sentence relative to the crime
does not advance the analysis to reach an answer. See id. at 61, 130
S. Ct. at 2022, 176 L. Ed 2d at 836–37. Instead, the analysis turns to
the procedure to see if it results in disproportionate punishment for
youthful offenders. Mandatory sentencing for adults does not result in
cruel and unusual punishment but for children it fails to account for too
much of what we know is child behavior.
Ultimately, we hold a mandatory minimum sentencing schema,
like the one contained in section 902.12, violates article I, section 17 of
the Iowa Constitution when applied in cases involving conduct
committed by youthful offenders. We agree categorical rules can be
imperfect, “but one is necessary here.” Id. at 75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176
L. Ed. 2d at 846. We must comply with the spirit of Miller, Null, and
Pearson, and to do so requires us to conclude their reasoning applies to
even a short sentence that deprives the district court of discretion in
crafting a punishment that serves the best interests of the child and of
society.8 The keystone of our reasoning is that youth and its attendant
8We do not ignore the legislature’s passage of a statute vesting considerable
discretion in district courts to depart from any part of a sentence, including any
45
circumstances and attributes make a broad statutory declaration
denying courts this very discretion categorically repugnant to article I,
section 17 of our constitution.9
It is important to be mindful that the holding in this case does not
prohibit judges from sentencing juveniles to prison for the length of time
identified by the legislature for the crime committed, nor does it prohibit
the legislature from imposing a minimum time that youthful offenders
_____________________
mandatory minimum. Iowa Code Ann. § 901.5(14) (West, Westlaw current through
2014 Reg. Sess.). However, the mere theoretical availability of unguided sentencing
discretion, no matter how explicitly codified, is not a panacea. As we said in Null, Miller
requires “more than a generalized notion of taking age into consideration as a factor in
sentencing.” Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74. Null provides a district court must expressly
recognize certain concepts and “should make findings why the general rule [that
children are constitutionally different from adults] does not apply.” Id. In Ragland, we
noted the sentencing court “must consider” several factors at the sentencing hearing,
including:
(1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of youth,
including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences”; (2) the “family and home environment” that surrounded
the youth; (3) “the circumstances of the . . . offense, including the extent
of [the youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and
peer pressures may have affected [the youth]”; (4) the “incompetencies
associated with youth—for example, [the youth’s] inability to deal with
police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or [the
youth’s] incapacity to assist [the youth’s] own attorneys”; and (5) “the
possibility of rehabilitation.”
836 N.W.2d at 115 n.6 (emphasis added) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at
2468, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 423). Clearly, these are all mitigating factors, and they cannot be
used to justify a harsher sentence. See id. at 115 & n.6; see also Null, 836 N.W.2d at
74–75. In Pearson, for instance, we found the district court’s consideration of youth as
an aggravating factor in favor a harsher sentence to be error. 836 N.W.2d at 97.
9We recognize we have held a mandatory minimum sentence constitutional. See
State v. Lara, 580 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Iowa 1998); State v. Horn, 282 N.W.2d 717, 732
(Iowa 1979); State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823, 829 (Iowa 1979); State v. Fitz, 265
N.W.2d 896, 899 (Iowa 1978); State v. Hall, 227 N.W.2d 192, 194–95 (Iowa 1975); see
also State v. Fuhrmann, 261 N.W.2d 475, 479–80 (Iowa 1978) (holding mandatory life
imprisonment for first-degree murder was constitutional). None of these cases involved
challenges brought under article I, section 17 of our constitution, nor did any of these
cases involve challenges brought by youthful offenders. Furthermore, given that the
most recent of these cases is sixteen years old and antedates Roper by seven years, we
do not find them persuasive on the outcome of our decision. We thus express no
opinion regarding the continuing vitality of these cases.
46
must serve in prison before being eligible for parole. Article I, section 17
only prohibits the one-size-fits-all mandatory sentencing for juveniles.
Our constitution demands that we do better for youthful offenders—all
youthful offenders, not just those who commit the most serious crimes.
Some juveniles will deserve imprisonment, but others may not. A statute
that sends all juvenile offenders to prison for a minimum period of time
under all circumstances simply cannot satisfy the standards of decency
and fairness embedded in article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.
We also recognize the remedy in this case is to resentence Lyle so a
judge can at least consider a sentencing option other than imprisonment.
We also recognize our decision will apply to all juveniles currently serving
a mandatory sentence of imprisonment. Thus, this case will require all
juvenile offenders who are in prison under a mandatory sentence to be
returned to court for resentencing. This process will likely impose
administrative and other burdens, but burdens our legal system is
required to assume. Individual rights are not just recognized when
convenient. Our court history has been one that stands up to preserve
and protect individual rights regardless of the consequences. The
burden now imposed on our district judges to preserve and protect the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is part of the price
paid by many judges over the years that, in many ways, has helped write
the proud history Iowans enjoy today. Even if the resentencing does not
alter the sentence for most juveniles, or any juvenile, the action taken by
our district judges in each case will honor the decency and humanity
embedded within article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution and, in
turn, within every Iowan. The youth of this state will be better served
when judges have been permitted to carefully consider all of the
circumstances of each case to craft an appropriate sentence and give
47
each juvenile the individual sentencing attention they deserve and our
constitution demands. The State will be better served as well.
Furthermore, our holding today has no application to sentencing
laws affecting adult offenders. Lines are drawn in our law by necessity
and are incorporated into the jurisprudence we have developed to usher
the Iowa Constitution through time. This case does not move any of the
lines that currently exist in the sentencing of adult offenders.
On remand, judges will do what they have taken an oath to do.
They will apply the law fairly and impartially, without fear. They will
sentence those juvenile offenders to the maximum sentence if warranted
and to a lesser sentence if warranted.
Accordingly, article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution forbids a
sentencing schema for juvenile offenders that deprives the district court
the discretion to consider youth and its attendant circumstances as a
mitigating factor and to impose a lighter punishment, including one that
suspends all or part of the sentence, including any mandatory minimum.
V. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, we vacate Lyle’s sentence and remand the
case to the district court for further proceedings.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ.
Waterman and Zager, JJ., write separate dissents. Waterman, J., joins
Zager, J., and Mansfield, J., joins both Waterman, J., and Zager, J.
48
#11–1339, State v. Lyle
WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth in Justice Zager’s
dissent, which I join. I write separately because I would go further to
overrule as plainly erroneous our court’s juvenile sentencing decisions in
Pearson and Null for the reasons explained in the dissents in those cases.
See State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 99–107 (Iowa 2013) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 77–84 (Iowa 2013) (Mansfield,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And, I would follow Eighth
Amendment decisions of our nation’s highest court when applying the
cruel-and-unusual-punishment provision of the Iowa Constitution
because our state’s founders intended those provisions to have the same
meaning. See State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009)
(“Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment in language materially identical to its federal
counterpart. Our past cases have generally assumed that the standards
for assessing whether a sentence amounts to cruel and unusual
punishment under the Iowa Constitution are identical to the Federal
Constitution.”); see also State v. Short, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2014)
(Waterman, J., dissenting) (advocating for a return to our court’s long-
standing practice of following federal precedent when construing the
same language in the Iowa Constitution).
The trial judge found Lyle, then nearly age eighteen, “poses a
serious danger to the community at present.” In denying Lyle’s motion
for transfer to juvenile court, the trial judge noted Lyle’s “cell phone
contained numerous videos which showed [him] engaging in unprovoked,
cowardly and vicious attacks against several different individuals” on or
near school property. The trial judge personally observed Lyle’s defiant
49
demeanor in open court. I have no reason to disagree with the trial
judge’s firsthand assessment of Lyle. But, even if we accept Lyle as a
merely misguided, immature schoolyard bully, the mandatory sentence
he received falls well short of being unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
punishment. More importantly, the majority’s sweeping, unprecedented
holding today precludes mandatory minimum sentences for any violent
felon who was under age eighteen at the time of the offense.
By holding Lyle’s seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for his
violent felony is cruel and unusual punishment and unconstitutional
under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution, rather than under
the Eighth Amendment, the majority evades review by the United States
Supreme Court. As Justice Zager observes, no other appellate court in
the country has gone this far. Our court stands alone in taking away the
power of our elected legislators to require even a seven-year mandatory
sentence for a violent felony committed by a seventeen-year-old.
Will the majority stop here? Under the majority’s reasoning, if the
teen brain is still evolving, what about nineteen-year olds? If the brain is
still maturing into the mid-20s, why not prohibit mandatory minimum
sentences for any offender under age 26? As judges, we do not have a
monopoly on wisdom. Our legislators raise teenagers too. Courts
traditionally give broad deference to legislative sentencing policy
judgments. See State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 650 (Iowa 2012) (“We
give the legislature deference because ‘[l]egislative judgments are
generally regarded as the most reliable objective indicators of community
standards for purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel
and unusual.’ ” (quoting Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873)). Why not defer
today?
50
Our trial judges have day-to-day experience adjudicating
thousands of juvenile cases. Why not continue to trust the trial judges
to make the right individualized judgments in deciding whether a
youthful offender should be adjudicated in juvenile court or adult
court?10 Why make today’s categorical decision invalidating any
mandatory minimum sentence for juveniles when no other appellate
court has gone that far? We are not writing on a clean slate. Courts
across the country are appropriately concluding that only mandatory life
without parole or its de facto equivalent constitute cruel and unusual
punishment for juveniles who commit violent felonies. See People v.
Pacheco, 991 N.E.2d 896, 907 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (reading state
“proportionate penalties clause” as “coextensive with the eighth
amendment” and holding automatic transfer to adult court did not
violate State or Federal Constitution; upholding twenty-year mandatory
minimum sentence); State v. Vang, ___N.W.2d ___, ___, 2014 WL
1805320, at *9–10 (Minn. May 7, 2014) (holding thirty-year sentence
does not violate State or Federal Constitution); see also State v. Lyle, ___
N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2014) (Zager, J., dissenting) (collecting additional
cases). None have followed Null or Pearson to extend constitutional
prohibitions to shorter sentences.
10The trial judge, applying the factors in Iowa Code section 232.45(7) (2011),
denied Lyle’s motion to transfer jurisdiction to juvenile court. The court reviewed Lyle’s
criminal history and juvenile court services dating back to age thirteen. The court
found
[Lyle] has obviously not benefited from any of the juvenile court services
provided to date. He has chosen to remain involved with drugs and a
gang, and has instigated numerous violent attacks on unsuspecting
victims. His demeanor during the reverse waiver hearing demonstrated
his complete disdain for the court system and his lack of interest in any
remedial program.
51
This is much more than an interesting intellectual debate over
jurisprudential philosophies and the proper role for independent state
constitutional adjudication. Today’s decision will have dramatic real-
world consequences. Justice Zager has identified the burdens imposed
on the judicial system by the scores of resentencing hearings and has
noted the trauma to victims who must testify and relive what the
defendant did to them. These hearings will reopen the wounds of the
victims and their families. And, some of the offenders will gain release
from prison earlier than under the mandatory minimum sentences.
Some of those violent felons will commit new crimes. I would instead
trust the legislative judgment of our elected branches that required a
seven-year mandatory minimum prison term for second-degree robbery,
a class “C” felony.11 A seventeen-year-old offender would still be eligible
for release by age twenty-five. But, that offender would be incarcerated
during the late teens and early twenties—the ages when violent crimes
are most likely to be committed. See Jeffery T. Ulmer & Darrell
Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship: Social Variation, Social
11Two years after Lyle’s conviction, the legislature prospectively granted
sentencing courts discretion to waive mandatory minimums if the defendant was under
age eighteen at the time he committed the crime. See 2013 Iowa Acts ch. 42, § 14
(codified at Iowa Code Ann. § 901.5(14) (West, Westlaw current through 2014 Reg.
Sess.)). Significantly, however, the legislature chose not to make this amendment
retroactive. See Iowa Code § 4.5 (2013) (“A statute is presumed to be prospective in its
operation unless expressly made retrospective.”). The majority notes only two other
states that have limited or abolished mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles. That
presumably means forty-seven states continue to allow mandatory minimum sentences
for juvenile felons. It certainly is a reasonable policy choice for our legislature in 2013
to grant trial courts discretion in place of mandatory minimums sentences for juvenile
felons. But, today’s decision precludes future legislatures from returning to the former,
reasonable policy choice of requiring a minimum prison term for certain violent felonies.
What if there is a wave of violent crimes committed by gang members under age
eighteen? I would not take the mandatory minimum sentencing option away from the
elected branches by holding any mandatory minimum sentence is cruel and unusual
punishment under our state constitution. We do not need to go that far and should not
do so.
52
Explanations, in The Nurture Versus Biosocial Debate in Criminology 377,
377–78 (Kevin M. Beaver, Brian B. Boutwell & J.C. Barnes eds., 2014).
The majority opines that the resentencing hearings to be required
of our district court judges “will honor the decency and humanity
embedded within article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution and, in
turn, within every Iowan.” I believe our elected representatives—not the
members of this court—are best equipped to decide what values are
embedded within every Iowan.
I do not wish to take issue today with the court’s earlier decision in
Bruegger. However, it is worth repeating the dissenter’s apt observation
from that case:
While some constitutional principles might be
receptive to defendant’s plight, the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause is not among them. Courts must adhere
to the constitutional framework, even when the result is
difficult to swallow. Furthermore, we must not forget that
we are not the only guardians of justice in our government.
For example, prosecutors must use sound judgment in
charging and prosecuting defendants who may be swept up
by broad legislative policies that were not likely intended to
capture them. The governor, too, is empowered to commute
a sentence viewed to be unjust. Finally, consistent with the
one true strength of our democracy, the legislature can
repair mistakes.
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 888 (Cady, J., dissenting). As the Bruegger
dissent reminds us, we are not the only repositories of fairness. It is
certainly possible to “rely upon the other components of government to
mete out justice.” Id.It is easy in the abstract to say we do not put constitutional rights
to a vote. It is the role of the courts to say where constitutional lines are
drawn. But, we must remember rights, by definition, are restrictions on
governmental power—the government elected by the people. If our court
misinterprets a statute, the legislature can amend the statute the next
53
session. But, if we misinterpret our state constitution, the people are
stuck with the decision unless the decision is overruled or the
constitution is amended. That is why judges must be extraordinarily
careful with constitutional interpretation. Adherence to settled Federal
Eighth Amendment precedent would avoid today’s aberrational judicial
decision-making on sentencing policy.12
I therefore dissent for the reasons set forth above and in Justice
Zager’s dissent.
Mansfield, J., joins this dissent.
12The amendment process is a check on judicial power. Indeed, the people of
Florida amended that state’s constitution to require conformity with Supreme Court
interpretations of the Eighth Amendment. See Fla. Const. art. I, § 17 (“The prohibition
. . . against cruel and unusual punishment[] shall be construed in conformity with
decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.”).
54
#11–1339, State v. Lyle
ZAGER, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe a seven-year mandatory
minimum sentence imposed on an individual who was a juvenile at the
time the offense was committed is cruel and unusual punishment under
either the Federal or our Iowa Constitution. This mandatory minimum
sentence is not grossly disproportional, and there is no recognized
categorical challenge for a juvenile’s “categorically diminished
culpability.” There is no authority for holding such. By holding all
mandatory minimum sentences imposed on juveniles constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment, the majority abandons any semblance of our
previous constitutional analysis of cruel and unusual punishment and
creates a new category for the sentencing of juveniles to achieve a
perceived “best practice” in sentencing. The majority expands article I,
section 17 of the Iowa Constitution to a point supported by neither our
own caselaw nor by any caselaw of the United States Supreme Court.
Neither does such an expansive interpretation find support in the
caselaw of any other appellate court in the nation. Contrary to the
majority’s reasoning, the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Federal Constitution does not support this expansive interpretation.
I would apply the reasoning of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa
2013), and State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013), to the facts of
this case and hold this mandatory minimum sentence is not cruel or
unusual under the Iowa Constitution.
In both Pearson and Null, we reversed the mandatory minimum
sentences imposed on those juvenile offenders based on an application of
the “principles in Miller as developed by the Supreme Court in its Eighth
55
Amendment jurisprudence.” Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96; see Null, 836
N.W.2d at 70 (stating “we are persuaded that Miller’s principles are
sound and should be applied in this case”). The majority here
dramatically departs from the analysis we applied in both those cases.
Instead, the majority applies the two-prong test applied by the Supreme
Court in Graham v. Florida to justify its radical departure from our own
precedents. See 560 U.S. 48, 61, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d
825, 837 (2010) (explaining the approach applied in “cases adopting
categorical rules”). One must ask, if the majority felt that all mandatory
minimum sentences for juveniles should be considered under this new
categorical analysis, why was it not applied in Null and Pearson? Likely
because it did not fit then, and it does not fit now.
It must first be recognized that Lyle did not urge this approach in
his appeal. Indeed, in his supplemental brief he “ask[ed] this court to
vacate his sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing
with consideration given to his youth, immaturity, and chance for
rehabilitation, as discussed in Miller, Null, and Pearson.” As explained
more fully below, Miller, Null, and Pearson rested on a legal concept
completely different from Graham. The Graham Court found the issue to
be decided on appeal was whether the Eighth Amendment permitted a
juvenile offender to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility for parole for a nonhomicide crime. See id. at 52–53, 130
S. Ct. at 2017–18, 176 L. Ed. 2d. at 832. The Court’s categorical ban
was only on life without the possibility of parole in nonhomicide cases.
See id. at 82, 130 S. Ct. at 2034, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 850 (“The Constitution
prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile
offender who did not commit homicide.”). Interestingly, the Court in
Miller only began its analysis of Graham’s two-prong test after it had
56
already expressly held mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles were unconstitutional. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at
2470, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424. While Null alludes to the two-prong test in
discussing Graham, see Null, 836 N.W.2d at 62–63, Pearson did not
mention the two-prong test utilized in Graham at all. Nevertheless, the
majority bypasses our caselaw from less than a year ago, attempts to
apply the Graham analysis, and strikes down all mandatory minimum
sentences for juveniles.
The majority’s reason for applying Graham is that juveniles are
categorically less culpable, and so a categorical analysis and categorical
rules are appropriate here. On its own, the majority now creates a new
constitutional category under our Iowa Constitution, but we need to be
clear that there is no judicial authority for creating this new
constitutional category. Up to this point, in most cases, the fact of a
juvenile’s diminished culpability only required the sentencing court “to
take into account how children are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” See
Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424. Were a
categorical rule appropriate based solely on a juvenile’s diminished
culpability, the Supreme Court in Miller would have imposed a
categorical rule. Instead, it expressly declined to consider the “argument
that the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without
parole for juveniles, or at least for those 14 and younger.” Id. at ___, 132
S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424. Nevertheless, the majority in this
case deems the juvenile’s diminished culpability alone is of sufficient
constitutional magnitude to impose a categorical rule against mandatory
minimum sentences and holds the sentence cruel and unusual.
57
Though the majority attempts to justify its divergence in its
analysis of cruel and unusual punishment, there is a substantial
difference between Graham’s categorical approach and the approach
applied in Miller, Null, and Pearson. In fact, the Court in Miller labored to
make clear its decision did “not categorically bar a penalty for a class of
offenders or type of crime—as, for example, [it] did in Roper [v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005)], or Graham.” See
id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2471, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 426. The decision
“mandate[d] only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering
an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a
particular penalty.” Id. The Court further noted its decision retained the
distinction between homicide and nonhomicide offenses: “Graham
established one rule (a flat ban) for nonhomicide offenses, while we set
out a different one (individualized sentencing) for homicide offenses.” Id.at ___ n.6, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 n.6, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 420 n.6. In extending
Miller’s rule to the shorter terms of imprisonment in Pearson and Null, we
heeded the Supreme Court’s words, retaining the distinction between
Graham and Miller. Now, the majority does what we did not do in
Pearson and Null and what the Supreme Court did not do in Miller. The
majority flatly bans a “penalty for a class of offenders.” See id. at ___,
132 S. Ct. at 2471, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 426. So much for the spirit of Miller,
Pearson, and Null.
Without success, the majority starts its analysis by attempting to
apply the first prong of the two-prong test in Graham. In searching for
“ ‘objective indicia of society’s standards,’ ” Graham, 560 U.S. at 61, 130
S. Ct. at 2022, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 837 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 563, 125
S. Ct. at 1191, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 17), the majority first turns to other
states’ juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. That search for authority
58
striking down all mandatory minimum sentences imposed on juveniles,
as the majority acknowledges, turns up no support for invalidating all
juvenile mandatory minimum sentences. In fact, no other state court
has held its state constitution, nor has any federal court held the Federal
Constitution, forbids imposing mandatory minimum sentences on
juveniles. In fact all authority, except in the life-without-parole context,
is to the contrary. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Turner, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2014
WL 257378, at *9–11 (Ark. 2014) (upholding a term of imprisonment of
fifty-five years for crimes committed at seventeen years of age as not
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment or Miller and Graham); People v.
Perez, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 114, 120–21 (Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that
imposing a mandatory sentence on a juvenile that allowed for parole
eligibility at age forty-seven was not severe enough to implicate Miller or
Graham); James v. United States, 59 A.3d 1233, 1238 (D.C. 2013)
(upholding a thirty-year mandatory minimum sentence imposed on a
juvenile homicide offender); People v. Pacheco, 991 N.E.2d 896, 906–07
(Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (upholding under the Federal and Illinois
Constitutions, a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence imposed on
a juvenile); Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y, 1 N.E.3d 270, 285, 286 (Mass. 2013)
(striking down life-without-parole sentence imposed on juvenile homicide
offender but upholding fifteen-year mandatory minimum); State v. Vang,
___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2014 WL 1805320, at *8–9 (Minn. 2014) (holding
mandatory life sentence with possibility of parole after thirty years for
first-degree felony murder committed when defendant was fourteen years
old did not violate either the Eighth Amendment or the Minnesota
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment);
People v. Aponte, 981 N.Y.S.2d 902, 905–06 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (concluding a
life sentence with mandatory minimum of twenty-five years for conviction
59
of second-degree murder committed by a seventeen year old was not
cruel and unusual under Miller or Graham, or under any Eighth
Amendment theory); see also United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204,
214 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Nothing in Graham or Miller suggests that a five-year
prison term is the sort of inherently harsh sentence that—like the death
penalty or its deferred equivalent, life imprisonment without parole—
requires categorical rules to ensure constitutional proportionality . . . .”).
To be clear, the majority cannot cite to any case of any court that used
the Graham–Miller line of jurisprudence to strike down as cruel and
unusual punishment any sentence imposed on anyone under the age of
eighteen when the individual still had a substantial life expectancy left at
the time of eligibility for parole.
Finding no support in a national survey on mandatory minimum
sentences for juveniles, apart from legislation limiting the use of
mandatory sentences to certain circumstances, the majority elects to give
little weight to the strong national consensus approving juvenile
mandatory minimum sentences. But see State v. Bousman, 278 N.W.2d
15, 18 (Iowa 1979) (concluding in a challenge to a sentence’s claimed
disproportionality that “[d]eference” is “appropriate” to the “collective
judgment” of “a substantial number of states” that “have determined that
the punishment rendered here is not grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime”). Instead, the majority turns to this state’s body of
unrelated statutory law concerning juveniles. The majority notes that
the legislature recently passed a statute granting sentencing judges the
discretion to impose shorter terms of imprisonment for juveniles. See
2013 Iowa Acts ch. 42, § 14 (codified at Iowa Code Ann. § 901.5(14)
(West, Westlaw current through 2014 Reg. Sess.)). According to the
majority, we owe deference to this legislative judgment because it is a
60
reliable indicator of current community standards. See State v.
Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009) (“Legislative judgments are
generally regarded as the most reliable objective indicators of community
standards for purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel
and unusual.”). But, we should not forget, “a reviewing court is not
authorized to generally blue pencil criminal sentences to advance judicial
perceptions of fairness.” Id.It is true we owe deference to the legislature’s judgments
concerning the sentences imposed for commission of various crimes. See
State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 650 (Iowa 2012) (“[W]e owe substantial
deference to the penalties the legislature has established for various
crimes.”); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at 71, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 176
L. Ed. 2d at 843 (“Criminal punishment can have different goals, and
choosing among them is within a legislature’s discretion.”); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3009, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637, 649
(1983) (“Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference
to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes . . . .”). But,
if this court is to give deference to legislative judgments concerning
punishment enacted after an offender is sentenced, then surely this
court must also give deference to legislative judgments that were in effect
when the offender was sentenced. The statute in effect at that time of
sentencing is at least as good an objective indicium of society’s standards
as a statute enacted two years later.13
13The majority seems to take the enactment of the new statute as an implicit
concession by the legislature that the previous sentencing scheme was
unconstitutional. I disagree. In Bousman, an offender, Bousman, received a one-year
sentence for resisting execution of process. 278 N.W.2d at 15–16. Two days before
Bousman’s trial began, the new criminal code became effective. See id. at 16. The new
criminal code provided a maximum punishment of thirty days in jail for the offense of
61
The statute in effect when Lyle was sentenced mandated he serve
seventy percent of his ten-year sentence. See Iowa Code § 902.12(5)
(2011). Assuming both the new sentencing statute and the older
sentencing statute should be considered as indicators of society’s
standards, they are entitled to equal amounts of deference. Nonetheless,
the majority analysis discounts one legislative judgment, because they
apparently don’t agree with it, by elevating the other with which they do
agree. This is not the role of an appellate court.
Having decided substantial deference is owed to a statute not in
effect when Lyle was sentenced, the majority identifies other statutes
that likewise grant courts discretion when dealing with juveniles. In
addition to citing various civil statutes concerning juveniles, the majority
cites numerous provisions from the juvenile justice chapter of the Iowa
Code that grant courts discretion to consider the best interests of the
child when making decisions. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 232.10(2)(a)
(allowing transfer of delinquency proceedings when transfer would serve,
among other interests, “the best interests of the child”); id. § 232.62(2)(a)
(permitting a court to transfer child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding
_____________________
which Bousman was convicted. See id. Based on this disparity, Bousman argued the
one-year sentence he received was cruel and unusual. See id. at 17.
We rejected Bousman’s argument, finding that the change in the length of the
sentence did not reflect a legislative judgment about the harshness of the previous
sentencing scheme. See id. at 17–18. Though “the subsequent action of the Iowa
Legislature in decreasing the penalty” was “relevant,” we found “its weight [was]
considerably decreased by the fact that that same legislature provided” district courts
the authority “to select the prior, more severe, punishment.” Id. at 17. Like the Code
section at issue in Bousman, the newly enacted juvenile sentencing statute does not
preclude the sentencing judge from selecting a similarly severe punishment. See 2013
Iowa Acts ch. 42, § 14 (providing “the court may suspend the sentence, in whole or in
part, including any mandatory minimum sentence” (emphasis added)). Thus, as we did
in Bousman, we can safely conclude here the new sentencing statute “demonstrates
that the legislature did not necessarily reject prior penalties as excessively harsh.”
Bousman, 278 N.W.2d at 17.
62
when transfer would serve “the best interests of the child”). According to
the majority, these statutes reflect the legislature’s recognition that
juveniles and adults are different. Giving effect to these differences
requires that courts have discretion when dealing with juveniles.
I think the majority makes too much of the legislature’s grant of
discretion to juvenile courts in these other, noncriminal contexts. The
legislature’s grant of discretion in some contexts may well reflect our
society’s judgment that juveniles are different for purposes of these
contexts. It does not follow, however, that juveniles must be treated
differently in all contexts. Surely the legislature’s discretion to select
among different penal sanctions contemplates the authority to narrow or
expand judicial discretion across varying juvenile contexts. The
prerogative for making such policy decisions typically belongs to “our
legislature, as representatives of the people.” See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d
at 887 (Cady, J., dissenting). The legislature, having made a policy
distinction it is entitled to make, limits this court’s authority to alter it.
“Courts do not intervene to alter [sentencing] policies except when the
resulting legislative scheme runs contrary to constitutional mandates.”
Id. Nothing in the majority’s survey of the objective indicia of our
society’s standards suggests our society believes violent juvenile
offenders are constitutionally different for purposes of sentencing, except
for life without parole and its functional equivalent. Thus, this court
should not interfere with the legislature’s selected sentencing scheme.
Of course this newly conferred sentencing discretion for juveniles,
as provided for by the new statute, holds the prospect of being illusory.
That is, the majority purports to favor a sentencing scheme in which
district courts are able to craft appropriate sentences according to the
unique circumstances of each juvenile. In reality, the majority’s
63
approach bestows upon our appellate courts the freedom to impose their
members’ judgments about the appropriateness of a sentence. After all,
sentences are subject to review for abuse of discretion. See State v. Loyd,
530 N.W.2d 708, 711 (Iowa 1995). I have serious concerns that in future
juvenile sentencing cases appellate courts are likely to remember “our
task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district
court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable
grounds.” See State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002)
(explaining the role of appellate courts in reviewing a district court’s
sentencing decision).
But, it is in the application of the second prong of the Graham test
that the majority most clearly departs from our previous cruel and
unusual analysis and our precedent. Though in Pearson and Null we no
doubt had the authority to independently interpret our own constitution,
nothing we said in those two cases indicated that independence was the
foundation of our analysis. Rather, we relied on and expanded on
Miller’s principles in invalidating the two juvenile sentences. See
Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96 (“Though Miller involved sentences of life
without parole for juvenile homicide offenders, its reasoning applies
equally to Pearson’s sentence of thirty-five years without the possibility of
parole for these offenses.”); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 72 (concluding that
“Miller’s principles are fully applicable to a lengthy term-of-years
sentence”). I believe we should adhere to our precedents developed just
one year ago in Pearson and Null. As will be explained below, if the
majority was true to the principles espoused in Pearson, Null and Miller,
it must hold Lyle’s sentence does not violate the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Iowa Constitution.
64
In rejecting the mandatory sentences in Pearson and Null, we
applied the principles espoused by the United States Supreme Court in
Miller. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96 (requiring Miller’s individualized
hearing); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 72 (“We conclude that Miller’s principles are
fully applicable to a lengthy term-of-years sentence as was imposed in
this case . . . .”). The Court’s holding in Miller depended on a
convergence of three factors: the offender’s age, the harsh sentence, and
the mandatory sentencing scheme. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct.
at 2460, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 414 (describing the facts of the case). This
convergence created the risk of a disproportionate sentence. See id. at
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424 (holding unconstitutional
sentencing schemes that impose mandatory life-without-parole sentences
on juvenile homicide offenders). To mitigate the risk that
disproportionate sentences will be imposed on juveniles convicted of
homicide, the Court declared sentencing courts must hold an
individualized hearing before imposing a harsh, mandatory life-without-
parole sentence on a juvenile, a procedure similar to one that courts
must perform before imposing the death penalty. See id. at ___, 132
S. Ct. at 2468, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 422 (explaining that the death penalty
may not be imposed without an individualized hearing and concluding “a
similar rule should apply when a juvenile confronts a sentence of life
(and death) in prison”). Reaching this outcome, however, required the
Court in Miller to connect the three converging factors to death-penalty
sentencing.
The Court began by explaining the differences between children
and adults as established in its precedents. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at
2464, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 418. First, juveniles are immature and their
sense of responsibility is underdeveloped, which leads to “recklessness,
65
impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” Id. Juveniles are also more
vulnerable than adults to negative influences and pressures, less able to
control their environment, and unable to escape “horrific, crime-
producing settings.” Id. A juvenile’s “character is not as well formed,” his
traits “less fixed,” and “his actions less likely be evidence of irretrievabl[e]
deprav[ity].” Id at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 418 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Psychological research confirmed differences in the brains of
adults and children. See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 183 L. Ed. 2d at
419. Those differences contribute to juveniles’ “transient rashness,
proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences.” See id. at ___,
132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 419. These developmental
deficiencies, the Court reasoned, diminished the juvenile’s culpability
and “enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological
development occurs, his deficiencies will be reformed.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Juveniles’ attributes undermine the four “penological justifications
for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when
they commit terrible crimes.” Id. First, juveniles are less blameworthy
than adults, so the case for retribution is weak. Id. Second, deterrence
does not justify the harshest sentences; juveniles are immature, reckless,
and impetuous, and so “less likely to consider potential punishment.” Id.at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 419. Third, to justify
incapacitating a juvenile for life, it would need to be found that the
juvenile was incorrigible. Id. Incorrigibility, however, is not consistent
with youth. Id. Finally, rehabilitation does not justify a life sentence. Id.In fact, such a long sentence “is at odds with a child’s capacity for
change.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 420. The Court
66
found imposing a sentence on a juvenile that “alters the remainder of his
life” advances none of these penological justifications. See id. at ___, 132
S. Ct. at 2465, 2466, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 420, 421. No one can reasonably
argue that a seven-year mandatory minimum sentence imposed on Lyle
will “alter the remainder of his life” or that it serves no penological
purpose.
While relying heavily on the other two factors, the Court’s holding
in Miller primarily focused on the mandatory nature of the juvenile’s life
without parole sentence. Mandatory life without parole sentencing
schemes prevent judges and juries from considering the juvenile’s
diminished culpability, the juvenile’s capacity for change, and the
justifications for a particular sentence. See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2466,
183 L. Ed. 2d at 420 (explaining mandatory life without parole
sentencing schemes prevent sentencers “from taking account of these
central considerations”). Indeed, by subjecting teens and children to the
same sentences as adults, mandatory life without parole sentencing laws
“prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s
harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile
offender.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2466, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 420–21.
Mandatory life without parole sentencing risks disproportionate
sentencing. But, again, we are not talking about our law’s harshest term
of imprisonment, nor does the majority opinion now base its decision on
a disproportionality analysis.
Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment allows seemingly
disproportionate mandatory life-without-parole sentences for adults.
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996, 111 S. Ct. 2680,
2683, 2702, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836, 843, 865 (1991) (upholding an adult’s
sentence of life in prison without parole for possessing more than 650
67
grams of cocaine). The Court reasoned that for a juvenile, however, a
life-without-parole sentence is like a death sentence. See Miller, 567 U.S.
at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2466, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 421. Like the offender
condemned to death, the juvenile imprisoned for life irrevocably forfeits
the balance of his life. See id. Moreover, the juvenile imprisoned for life
is often confined for a larger proportion of his life than his adult
counterpart. Id. “The penalty when imposed on a teenager, as compared
with an older person, is therefore ‘the same . . . in name only.’ ” Id.(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 70, 130 S. Ct. at 2028, 176 L. Ed. 2d at
843). In short, there is a “correspondence” between adult death
sentences and juvenile life sentences. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 183
L. Ed. 2d at 421. This is the lesson in Miller, Null, and Pearson.
Mandatory death sentences for adults are prohibited. See
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991, 49
L. Ed. 2d 944, 961–62 (1976) (concluding “that the death sentences
imposed . . . under North Carolina’s mandatory death sentence statute
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments”). The risk in
mandatory imposition of the death penalty is, of course, that the penalty
is disproportionate. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 183
L. Ed. 2d at 421 (explaining that in Woodson the Court found the
mandatory-death-penalty scheme flawed because it did not permit
considering mitigating factors). Thus, in light of Graham and the Court’s
death-penalty jurisprudence, the Court in Miller drew another connection
between death sentences and juvenile life sentences. See id. at ___, 132
S. Ct. at 2467, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 422 (explaining the death-penalty cases
“show the flaws of imposing mandatory life-without-parole sentences on
juvenile homicide offenders”). Mandatorily imposing either sentence
poses the same risk: disproportionate sentences.
68
To mitigate this risk in death-penalty cases, sentencing courts
must give the defendant an individualized hearing. See id. at ___, 132
S. Ct. at 2467, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 421. In Woodson and its offspring, the
Court underscored the importance of considering individual factors
before imposing death. See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 183 L. Ed. 2d
at 421–22 (explaining the Court’s evolving death-penalty jurisprudence).
Considering mitigating factors ensures “the death-penalty is reserved
only for the most culpable defendants committing the most serious
offenses.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 421. On the
other hand, failing to consider mitigating circumstances, especially the
“signature qualities” of youth, risks sentencing to death an offender who
is not deserving of this irrevocable penalty. See id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at
2467, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, the Court found imposing a mandatory sentence of life
without parole on a juvenile “misses too much.” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at
2468, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 422. And likewise, to mitigate the risk of
disproportionality in these cases, the Court held a sentencer must “take
into account how children are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id.at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424. Stopping short of
barring life sentences without parole for all juvenile offenders, the Court
nonetheless opined that “appropriate occasions” for imposing the
harshest penalties on juveniles after an individualized hearing “will be
uncommon.” Id.In rejecting the mandatory minimum sentences imposed in
Pearson and Null, this court relied on the convergence of the same three
factors and the need to mitigate the risk of disproportionality. See
Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96 (finding Miller’s “reasoning applies equally to”
69
a “sentence of thirty-five years without the possibility of parole”); Null,
836 N.W.2d at 72 (concluding “Miller’s principles are fully applicable to a
lengthy term-of-years sentence”). First, as in Miller, Graham, and Roper,
the offenders in Pearson and Null were juveniles. See Pearson, 836
N.W.2d at 94 (noting Pearson was seventeen at the time she committed
her crimes); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 45 (noting Null was sixteen at the time
he committed his crimes). Next, like the juvenile in Miller, both juveniles
in Pearson and Null were subject to mandatory minimum sentences.
Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 95 (describing Pearson’s challenge to the seventy
percent mandatory minimum sentence); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 45–46
(noting Null’s crimes subjected him to seventy percent mandatory
minimums). Finally, though neither Pearson nor Null was sentenced to
life without parole, we found both sentences “effectively deprived” both
teens of “the possibility of leading a more normal adult life.” Pearson,
836 N.W.2d at 96–97 (invalidating Pearson’s minimum sentence of thirty-
five years without parole); Null, 836 N.W.2d at 71 (concluding Null’s
52.5-year minimum sentence triggered an individualized hearing).
Approving these harsh, lengthy sentences, we reasoned, would have
ignored juveniles’ diminished culpability, their potential for
rehabilitation, and the difficulty courts have in identifying irredeemable
juveniles. See Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 95–96. These are the principles of
our proportionality analysis.
This court, like the United States Supreme Court, signaled fear of
the disjunction between lengthy sentences for juveniles and penological
justifications for imprisonment. See Null, 836 N.W.2d at 65 (explaining
the Supreme Court’s discussion of penological goals of imprisonment);
see also Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 419–
20 (discussing Roper, Graham, and the weakness of penological
70
justifications for imposing lengthy sentences on juveniles). The lesser
culpability of Pearson sapped the strength of the retribution rationale,
and the qualities of youth that diminish teens’ culpability also meant the
teen was more likely to disregard the consequences of criminal
misconduct, as the Court found in Miller. See Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at
95–96 (noting juveniles’ lesser culpability in relation to adults); see also
Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 419.
Moreover, we held that to lock away Null until old age and Pearson until
its cusp, would have required a finding that they were incapable of
change, which is not consistent with youth. See Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at
96 (noting the inconsistency between incorrigibility and youth); Null, 836
N.W.2d at 75, see also Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183
L. Ed. 2d at 419.
Finally, even though neither Null nor Pearson was sentenced to life
without parole, we held that in neither case did rehabilitation justify the
lengthy sentence. In Null, we rejected the idea that a “juvenile’s potential
future release in his or her late sixties after a half century of
incarceration” would “provide a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to demonstrate
the ‘maturity and rehabilitation’ required to obtain release and reenter
society.” 836 N.W.2d at 71 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S. Ct.
at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845–46). Nor could Pearson demonstrate she
had been rehabilitated before reentering society in her sixth decade of life
having spent almost four decades behind bars. See Pearson, 836 N.W.2d
at 96 (rejecting Pearson’s thirty-five-year minimum sentence and noting
juveniles’ potential for rehabilitation). We reasoned we could reasonably
expect both teens to have been rehabilitated long before they had served
their minimum sentences.
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Like Null and Pearson, Andre Lyle was a juvenile at the time he
committed his crime, but he was subject to the same mandatory
minimum sentence as an adult. In this case, however, the sentence is
not harsh, it is not cruel, and it is not unusual. Lyle was sentenced to a
maximum prison term of ten years, and he is required to serve seventy
percent of that term, or seven years, before being eligible for parole. That
minimum is only twenty percent of Pearson’s minimum and about
thirteen percent of Null’s. There is clearly no reasonable correlation
between adult death sentences, juvenile life sentences without the
possibility of parole, or even the sentences imposed in Null and Pearson,
and this seven-year mandatory minimum sentence. See Miller, 567 U.S.
at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 421. As a chronological fact,
Lyle’s sentence is significantly shorter than all the sentences with which
this court or the United States Supreme Court has previously dealt.
Lyle will also reenter society much earlier than either Null or
Pearson. Lyle’s maximum prison term is far shorter than Pearson’s
thirty-five-year minimum term. If Lyle served the maximum of ten years,
he would be released in his late twenties, about twenty-five years
younger than Pearson would have been if she been released when she
first became parole eligible. If released when he first becomes parole
eligible, Lyle will be in his mid-twenties, which would leave him ample
time for hitting major life milestones. Lyle’s minimum sentence, unlike
the sentences of Null or Pearson, does offer him the chance at “a more
normal adult life.” Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96.
Lyle’s sentence, unlike that of Pearson or Null, is also justified
under penological theories. As in the case of any juvenile, deterrence
and retribution offer little support for Lyle’s sentence because of his
immaturity and diminished culpability. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132
72
S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 419. Despite Lyle’s youth, however, one
cannot dispute that he poses a risk to public safety. Incapacitating him,
therefore, protects the public. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 72, 130 S. Ct. at
2029, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 844 (explaining incapacitation is an important
goal because of the risk recidivism poses to public safety). As with Null
or Pearson, Lyle “deserve[s] to be separated from society for some time in
order to prevent” him from committing more violent crimes. Id. But
unlike Miller’s life-without-parole sentence, or the lengthy mandatory
minimum sentences in Null and Pearson, mandating Lyle spend seven
years in prison does not require the grave judgment “that he would be a
risk to society for the rest of his life.” Id. Incapacitation is thus an
appropriate justification for Lyle’s sentence.
So too with rehabilitation; it is the “penological goal that forms the
basis of parole systems.” Id. at 73, 130 S. Ct. at 2029, 176 L. Ed. 2d at
845. Lyle’s sentence does not deny him the right to reenter society, as
was the case in Graham and Miller, and it does not leave him so few
years upon his exit from prison that he cannot demonstrate he has been
rehabilitated, as in Pearson and Null. Imprisoning Lyle until his middle
or late twenties does not forswear the “rehabilitative ideal.” Id. at 74, 130
S. Ct. at 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 845. Lyle’s comparatively short sentence
does not, unlike the life without parole sentence meted out to the
juvenile in Graham, deny Lyle “the right to reenter the community.” Id.
And it does not reflect “an irrevocable judgment about [Lyle’s] value and
place in society.” See id. Rehabilitation therefore also justifies Lyle’s
sentence.
Though Lyle was a juvenile when he committed his crime and is
mandated to serve seventy percent of his sentence, any similarity
between his sentence and the sentences imposed in Null or Pearson ends
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there. Here, Lyle does not face the prospect of geriatric release after
decades of incarceration. In fact, Lyle faces at most a single decade
behind bars. Lyle will be provided a “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” and reenter
society as required by Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S. Ct. at 2030, 176
L. Ed. 2d at 845–46, Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96, and Null, 836 N.W.2d at
71. The three factors that converged in Miller, Null, and Pearson do not
converge in this case. Therefore, there is no unacceptable risk of
disproportionality. I would apply the rationale of Miller, Null, and
Pearson and hold the sentence imposed on Lyle is not cruel and unusual
under our Iowa Constitution, and thus no individualized sentencing
hearing is required.
I also strenuously disagree with the majority’s conclusion, in the
exercise of its independent judgment, that sentencing juveniles according
to a statutorily required mandatory minimum, regardless of the length of
the sentence, does not adequately serve legitimate penological objectives
in light of the child’s categorically diminished culpability. As stated
previously, a short-term period of incarceration clearly serves penological
goals of rehabilitation and incapacitation, both goals considered
important in Graham and all of the later cases. See Miller, 567 U.S. at
___, 132 S. Ct. at 2465, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 419–20 (discussing
incapacitation and rehabilitation in relation to juveniles); Graham, 560
U.S. at 72–74, 130 S. Ct. 2029–30, 176 L. Ed. 2d at 844–45 (discussing
penological goals of incapacitation and rehabilitation); Pearson, 836
N.W.2d at 96 (explaining juveniles are less culpable than adults); Null,
836 N.W.2d at 63 (reviewing Graham’s discussion of penological goals in
relation to juveniles). There is simply no authority for this blanket
proposition. Equally important is that this conclusion appears to
74
squarely contravene the role of the legislature in devising an appropriate
sentencing scheme.
But, perhaps most troubling to me is the majority’s recognition
that every case so far employing this principle of a child’s categorically
diminished culpability involved harsh, lengthy sentences—even death.
In fact, there is no authority cited by the majority, nor did my research
disclose any authority, that would extend the principle employed by the
majority to all mandatory minimum sentences for juveniles. Undeterred,
the majority then emphasizes that nothing the Supreme Court has said
is “crime-specific.” The majority then extrapolates from this language,
“suggesting the natural concomitant that what is said is not
punishment-specific either.” The majority then cites to our Pearson and
Null opinions from last term to support this proposition. But, neither of
these cases was decided on this categorical basis. The language in Null
is that juveniles are “categorically less culpable than adult offenders
apply as fully in this case as in any other.” 836 N.W.2d at 71 (emphasis
added). This general comment is accurate as to the fifty-two and one-
half year mandatory minimum sentence for Null in relation to a life-
without-parole sentence utilizing the principles in Miller. Miller is the
basis on which the case was decided. The same logic applies to the quote
from the special concurrence in Pearson, which recognized the gravity of
the offense does not affect the applicability of the juvenile’s rights under
article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. See Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at
99 (Cady, J., concurring specially) (stating “the juvenile offender’s
decreased culpability plays a role in the commission of both grievous and
petty crimes”). This general statement is also accurate in the context of
the case in which the length of the sentence itself is being scrutinized as
being cruel and unusual. In Pearson and Null, it was the length of the
75
mandatory minimum sentences, which we held were the equivalent of life
without parole, that failed our constitutional analysis. These general
comments, taken out of the context in which the cases were decided, are
hardly an endorsement for the proposition that all mandatory juvenile
sentences are constitutionally invalid because juveniles are “categorically
less culpable.” The majority now holds that, in order to meet our
constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, every
juvenile facing a mandatory minimum sentence of any length must have
an individualized sentencing hearing utilizing the Miller factors. This is
wrong and has no constitutional support in federal jurisprudence or our
own jurisprudence.
Finally, several observations need to be made in this area of
juvenile sentencing. First, no court in the land has followed our opinions
in Pearson and Null, which dramatically extended the circumstances
under which a Miller-type sentencing hearing was constitutionally
required. In my opinion, such an extension was far beyond that
contemplated by the United States Supreme Court, and clearly, no other
federal court or state supreme court has felt it constitutionally required
to extend it either. Second, no federal court, no state supreme court, nor
any court for that matter has used a categorical analysis employed by
the majority in this case to strike down all mandatory minimum
sentences for a juvenile. In reaching this conclusion, the majority
contorts our constitutional jurisprudence under the guise of
independently analyzing our Iowa Constitution.
Third, the majority justifies its decision in this case by declaring
that its decision is based on its desire to return to the district courts its
rightful discretion in sentencing juveniles. What the majority fails to
comprehend is that these constitutionally unnecessary resentencings
76
come paired with significant practical difficulties for the district courts.
According to statistics obtained from the Iowa Justice Data Warehouse,
as of May 31, 2013, I would estimate that more than 100 juveniles were
serving mandatory sentences under the previous sentencing scheme.
See Iowa Dep’t of Human Rights, Div. of Criminal & Juvenile Justice
Planning, Current Inmates Under 18 at Time of Offense (May 31, 2013),
available at http://www.humanrights.iowa.gov/cjjp/images/pdf/Prison_
Population_Juvenile_05312013.pdf; see also Iowa Code § 902.12(1)–(6)
(providing mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for specific
enumerated felonies). Under the previous scheme, the legislature, by
mandating minimum sentence lengths for certain crimes, had provided
for an efficient, constitutional sentencing proceeding. See Iowa Code
§ 902.12. Based on the majority’s opinion, all of those juveniles must be
resentenced and have an individualized sentencing hearing. It will take
hundreds, if not thousands, of hours to perform this task. And, of
course, there will be expert witnesses: social workers, psychologists,
psychiatrists, substance-abuse counselors, and any number of related
social scientists. And, other witnesses: mothers, fathers, sisters, and
brothers. Finally, and most importantly, victims will again have to testify
and relive the trauma they experienced at the hands of the juvenile
offender. I agree that time and expense should be irrelevant if
constitutional rights are affected. However, these should be primary
considerations when deciding to impose on the courts and the
corrections systems a new sentencing practice that has no basis in this
state’s constitution. I also question whether the ultimate decisions by
our district courts will be qualitatively better given this unnecessary
time, money, and effort.
77
After the parade of witnesses ends, the district court must then
produce for each juvenile offender a detailed, reasoned sentencing
decision. District courts must consider the “juvenile’s lack of maturity,
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, vulnerability to peer pressure,
and the less fixed nature of the juvenile’s character,” keeping in mind
that these are “mitigating, not aggravating factors” in the decision to
impose a sentence. Null, 836 N.W.2d at 74–75. It does not end there.
District courts must recognize juveniles’ capacity for change and “that
most juveniles who engage in criminal activity are not destined to
become lifelong criminals.” Id. at 75. If tempted to impose a harsh
sentence on even a particularly deserving offender, “the district court
should recognize that a lengthy prison sentence . . . is appropriate, if at
all, only in rare or uncommon cases.” Id. To impose that harsh
sentence, “the district court should make findings discussing why the”
harsh sentence should be imposed. Id. at 74. And these are just the
factors enumerated by this court in Null.
For the district court that is particularly fearful of having a
sentencing decision overturned, there are yet more factors that might be
considered. See, e.g., Bear Cloud v. State, 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013)
(listing factors for sentencing courts to consider, including the juvenile’s
background and emotional development). For instance, the California
Supreme Court has advised that sentencing courts must consider
evidence of the juvenile’s home environment, evidence of the
circumstances of the offense, and evidence of the possibility the
prosecutor could have charged the juvenile with some lesser offense.
People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, ___ (Cal. 2014). In sum, “the trial
court must consider all relevant evidence” of the distinctive youthful
attributes of the juvenile offender. See id. at ___. The possibilities are
78
nearly endless. But, even if the district court were to consider additional
factors, there can be no assurance the district court weighed any
particular factor the same way the appellate court would. And, so more
time and money will be spent trying to determine the appropriate
sentence for a juvenile offender. According to the majority, this is what
our constitution requires of any juvenile offender.
I understand that the majority believes that an individualized
sentencing hearing is the “best practice” for the sentencing of juveniles:
“[A]pplying the teachings of Miller irrespective of the crime or sentence is
simply the right thing to do, whether or not required by our
Constitution.” Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 99 (Cady, J., concurring
specially). I do not necessarily disagree. But, we are not following the
teachings of Miller, Null, or Pearson; instead, the majority is deciding this
case on a categorical basis and elevating this new “category” to a
constitutional right without any cogent, legitimate jurisprudence to
support it. I would hold that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed
under Iowa Code section 902.12(5), under these facts, does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment and accordingly does not
violate article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. I would affirm the
sentence imposed by the district court.
Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., join this dissent.