Teresa Karen Bearinger v. Iowa Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division , 2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 24 ( 2014 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 13–0869
Filed March 14, 2014
TERESA KAREN BEARINGER,
Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B.
Hanson, Judge.
Petitioner appeals district court ruling affirming license revocation
and rejecting prescription-drug defense in administrative proceeding.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Aaron D. Hamrock of McCarthy & Hamrock P.C., West Des Moines,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Linkvis,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
2
WATERMAN, Justice.
This appeal requires us to decide whether the prescription-drug
defense to the criminal charge of operating a motor vehicle while under
the influence, see Iowa Code § 321J.2(11) (2011), applies in
administrative license revocation proceedings under Iowa Code sections
321J.12 through .13. Teresa K. Bearinger drove her car off the road and
destroyed a brick mailbox. At the request of the investigating police
officer, Bearinger gave a urine sample that tested positive for controlled
substances—her prescription medications. Based on these test results,
the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) revoked her license for
180 days. She contested her revocation. An administrative law judge
found the facts to establish the prescription-drug defense, but concluded
the defense did not apply in the administrative proceeding. The district
court affirmed. We retained her appeal. For the reasons explained
below, we hold the prescription-drug defense is available in license
revocation proceedings. We therefore reverse her revocation.
I. Scope of Review.
“Iowa Code chapter 17A governs review of license revocation
decisions under Iowa Code chapter 321J.” Ludtke v. Iowa Dep’t of
Transp., 646 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Iowa 2002); see also Iowa Code § 321J.14.
“The district court acts in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law
on the part of an agency . . . .” Ludtke, 646 N.W.2d at 64. “On appeal,
we apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether the
conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court.” Welch
v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 801 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2011). We are
bound by an agency’s factual findings if those findings are supported by
“ ‘substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when the
record is viewed as a whole.’ ” Ludtke, 646 N.W.2d at 65 (quoting Iowa
3
Code § 17A.19(8)(f) (1999)). “Evidence is substantial when a reasonable
person could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings.” Id.
“Because this is not an area where interpretation of the law has been
clearly vested in the discretion of the agency, we need not give deference
to the IDOT’s interpretation . . . and are free to substitute our judgment
de novo for the agency’s interpretation.” Welch, 801 N.W.2d at 594.
II. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On May 12, 2011, Teresa Bearinger was driving her car two blocks
from her home in Urbandale, Iowa, while eating a nutritional power bar.
She dropped the bar under her seat and reached down to find it,
becoming distracted. She missed a curve, drove off the road, and
collided with a brick mailbox. Her car continued into a yard, narrowly
missing a large tree before veering back onto the road. The Urbandale
police officer who responded to the accident, Shawn Popp, noted “the car
was basically disabled due to the tire being torn off” and Bearinger
“exploded the mailbox.” Officer Popp found Bearinger outside her car,
upset, shaking, and unsteady on her feet. Officer Popp noted that she
was shaking “way beyond what . . . we normally would see in something
like this.”
Bearinger told Officer Popp she was taking neurological
prescription medications and showed him a list of her medications. She
explained to Officer Popp that she hadn’t eaten much the previous day or
that morning and that she thought one of her medications was clouding
her mind. Officer Popp noted her eyes were watery. In light of all this,
Officer Popp believed Bearinger may have been impaired. He asked
Bearinger to go to the police department with him and she complied. At
the station, Bearinger agreed to take a breath test and provide a urine
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sample. The breath test indicated she had no alcohol in her system, but
the urine test revealed the presence of prescription medications.
As a result, on March 6, 2012, IDOT revoked Bearinger’s license
for 180 days. Bearinger appealed the revocation to an administrative law
judge (ALJ). Bearinger asserted she was not in violation of Iowa Code
section 321J.2 (2011) because the prescription-drug defense under Iowa
Code section 321J.2(11) applies. IDOT argued for revocation, asserting
the prescription-drug defense applies only to a criminal charge and is
unavailable in license revocation proceedings.
At the administrative hearing, Bearinger’s physician, Lynn Struck,
testified she had prescribed Bearinger the medications detected in
Bearinger’s urine. Dr. Struck testified she had not prohibited Bearinger
from driving while taking the medications, though she had warned the
medications may cause drowsiness. Bearinger testified she took her
medications as instructed for a month preceding the accident and felt
her ability to drive was not impaired.
Officer Popp also testified, recounting his interaction with
Bearinger the day of the accident. He testified that Bearinger told him,
“If she didn’t like the effects of the one [medication], she would grab
another one and take it instead.” Officer Popp suggested Bearinger may
have been self-medicating.
The ALJ believed Bearinger’s testimony, concluding “Bearinger
took her prescribed medication as prescribed.” The ALJ therefore found,
“based on the evidence presented in this proceeding, . . . the elements of
the statutory prescription-drug defense were established.” But, agreeing
with IDOT’s statutory interpretation, the ALJ determined the
prescription-drug defense does not apply in administrative license
revocation proceedings and denied Bearinger’s appeal. The IDOT
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reviewing officer and the district court affirmed. Bearinger appealed the
district court’s ruling, and we retained the appeal to answer this question
of statutory interpretation.
III. Analysis.
Iowa Code section 321J.2 criminalizes operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. “The main purpose of
chapter 321J is to promote public safety by removing dangerous drivers
from the highways.” State v. Vogel, 548 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Iowa 1996).
We discussed the reach of chapter 321J.2 in State v. Comried, 693
N.W.2d 773, 775–78 (Iowa 2005). In Comried, we noted that the
legislature amended section 321J.2 in 1998 to create a per se ban on
driving with any amount of a controlled substance in the body—
regardless of whether a person is “under the influence” of that controlled
substance. Id. at 775–76, 78. The prescription-drug defense was
already included in chapter 321J.2. See 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1220, § 2(6)
(codified at Iowa Code § 321J.2(6) (1987)) (creating chapter 321J, which
included the prescription-drug defense). In its current form, section
321J.2(1) imposes criminal liability for driving:
(a) While under the influence of an alcoholic beverage
or other drug or a combination of such substances.
(b) While having an alcohol concentration of .08 or
more.
(c) While any amount of a controlled substance is
present in the person, as measured in the person’s blood or
urine.
Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)(a)–(c) (2011) (emphasis added). Section
321J.2(1)(c) criminalizes driving with any amount of a controlled
substance in one’s system. See Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 778 (“We
conclude that the statute in question is clear and unambiguous and that
‘any amount’ means any amount greater than zero.”). As we noted in
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Comried, the “any amount” provision avoids proof problems in
determining the level of a controlled substance in the driver’s blood or
urine and whether the drug impaired the ability to drive. Id. at 776.
Many prescription drugs, however, are controlled substances. See Houck
v. Iowa Bd. of Pharmacy Exam’rs, 752 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Iowa 2008)
(discussing overlapping categories of drugs that are both controlled
substances and require a prescription); see also Iowa Code § 124.101(5)
(defining “controlled substance”); Iowa Code § 155A.3(37) (defining
“prescription drug”). Thus, without the prescription-drug defense, it
would be illegal to drive after taking one of the prescription drugs defined
as a controlled substance if any amount of that drug is detectable in the
driver’s blood or urine.
Subsection 11 of section 321J.2 codifies the prescription-drug
defense to the criminal charge:
11. a. This section does not apply to a person
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a drug
if the substance was prescribed for the person and was
taken under the prescription and in accordance with the
directions of a medical practitioner . . . or if the substance
was dispensed by a pharmacist without a prescription
pursuant to the rules of the board of pharmacy, if there is no
evidence of the consumption of alcohol and the medical
practitioner or pharmacist had not directed the person to
refrain from operating a motor vehicle.
b. When charged with a violation of subsection 1,
paragraph “c”, a person may assert, as an affirmative
defense, that the controlled substance present in the
person’s blood or urine was prescribed or dispensed for the
person and was taken in accordance with the directions of a
practitioner and the labeling directions of the pharmacy . . . .
Iowa Code § 321J.2(11).
The parties agree that section 321J.2(1)(c) is not violated when the
prescription-drug defense is established. See State v. Schories, 827
N.W.2d 659, 665–68 (Iowa 2013) (vacating conviction based on evidence
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establishing prescription-drug defense). IDOT nevertheless asserts the
prescription-drug defense is inapplicable in administrative proceedings to
revoke a driver’s license. We did not decide that issue in Schories and
confront it here as a question of first impression.
In Comried, we summarized the interpretive principles most
relevant to construing chapter 321J:1
“When we interpret a statute, we attempt to give effect
to the general assembly’s intent in enacting the law.
Generally, this intent is gleaned from the language of the
statute. To ascertain the meaning of the statutory language,
we consider the context of the provision at issue and strive to
interpret it in a manner consistent with the statute as an
integrated whole. Similarly, we interpret a statute
consistently with other statutes concerning the same or a
related subject. Finally, statutes are interpreted in a manner
to avoid absurd results and to avoid rendering any part of
the enactment superfluous.”
693 N.W.2d at 775 (quoting State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa
2003)). We also construe chapter 321J “liberally or reasonably” to
protect the public by reducing “the hazard of prohibited operation of a
motor vehicle to a minimum.” Id. (quoting 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles
§ 1385, at 274 (2002)). We apply these principles to decide this case.
We look first to the statutory provisions governing license
revocation proceedings and read them together with the criminal statutes
incorporated by reference. Iowa Code section 321J.12(1) empowers IDOT
to revoke a person’s license for operating while intoxicated. That statute
states:
1IDOT argues on appeal that we should give deference to its interpretation of
section 321J.12. Chapter 321J, however, does not give IDOT interpretive authority.
See Welch, 801 N.W.2d at 594. We declined to give deference to IDOT’s interpretation of
sections 321J.6 and 321J.9 in Welch, and we decline to do so here. See id. at 602
(holding “a motorist’s request to take the chemical test need not be honored after he or
she has previously refused that test following a valid implied consent advisory”).
8
Upon certification, subject to penalty for perjury, by the
peace officer that there existed reasonable grounds to believe
that the person had been operating a motor vehicle in
violation of section 321J.2, that there existed one or more of
the necessary conditions for chemical testing described in
section 321J.6, subsection 1, and that the person submitted
to chemical testing and the test results indicated the presence
of a controlled substance or other drug, or an alcohol
concentration equal to or in excess of the level prohibited by
section 321J.2, or a combination of alcohol and another drug
in violation of section 321J.2, the department shall revoke the
person’s driver’s license or nonresident operating
privilege . . . .
Iowa Code § 321J.12(1) (emphasis added). IDOT revoked Bearinger’s
license based on the first ground: she drove after taking “a controlled
substance or other drug.”
Bearinger argues the references to section 321J.2 in the revocation
statute obligate IDOT to consider her prescription-drug defense codified
in section 321J.2(11).2 IDOT counters that—unlike the second and third
grounds for revocation in section 321J.12(1)—the first ground does not
refer to a violation of section 321J.2. IDOT thus contends that the
prescription-drug defense in section 321J.2(11) is unavailable to avoid a
license revocation on the first ground. IDOT argues it is reasonable for
the legislature to treat license revocation differently than criminal
prosecution because license revocation is remedial, rather than punitive.
See Vogel, 548 N.W.2d at 587.
2Bearinger notes the first sentence of Iowa Code section 321J.12(1) requires the
officer to certify “there existed reasonable grounds to believe that the person had been
operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2.” Bearinger argues that a valid
prescription-drug defense would defeat this threshold requirement for revocation. We
disagree. The officer’s certification helps ensure the driver is statutorily obligated to
submit to the chemical testing or face the administrative consequences of a test refusal.
The certification requirement must be read together with the other requirements for
revocation. The prescription-drug defense comes into play only after a positive test
result for a prescription drug. The defense cannot be used to retroactively determine
the officer lacked grounds to ask the driver to submit to testing.
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If we read section 321J.12(1) in isolation, IDOT’s interpretation
would be persuasive. “Under the doctrine of last preceding antecedent,
qualifying words and phrases refer only to the immediately preceding
antecedent . . . .” Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage
Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Iowa 2000); see
also Oberbillig v. W. Grand Towers Condo. Ass’n, 807 N.W.2d 143, 151
(Iowa 2011) (explaining doctrine of the last preceding antecedent). We
note no comma separates the phrase in section 321J.12(1) incorporating
section 321J.2 in either the second or third grounds. This suggests that
each time section 321J.2 is mentioned, it modifies only that ground. See
Shell Oil Co., 606 N.W.2d at 380. Otherwise, section 321J.2 would not
be mentioned twice—in both the second and third grounds—but not in
the first. That the legislature expressly modified the second and third
grounds by requiring a violation of section 321J.2, but omitted that
reference in the first ground, suggests that a license may be revoked
under the first ground without a violation of section 321J.2. See Oyens
Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 193–94 (Iowa 2011)
(relying on the fact “the legislature selectively incorporated [a] prefatory
clause” into one subsection but not another to hold clause did not apply
to both subsections).
But, we must read section 321J.12(1) together with section
321J.13(2), which sets forth the grounds for appealing a license
revocation. Section 321J.13(2) states that the review hearing “shall be
limited to the issues of”:
whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe
that the person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of
section 321J.2 or 321J.2A and one or more of the following:
a. Whether the person refused to submit to the test or
tests.
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b. Whether a test was administered and the test
results indicated an alcohol concentration equal to or in
excess of the level prohibited under section 321J.2 or
321J.2A.
c. Whether a test was administered and the test
results indicated the presence of alcohol, a controlled
substance or other drug, or a combination of alcohol and
another drug, in violation of section 321J.2.
Iowa Code § 321J.13(2) (emphasis added).
When a comma separates a qualifying phrase from the antecedent,
the qualifying phrase generally applies to all antecedents. Shell Oil Co.,
606 N.W.2d at 380. Section 321J.13(2)(c) thus directed the ALJ to review
whether Bearinger’s test results indicated the presence of a controlled
substance or other drug in violation of section 321J.2. By definition,
there can be no violation of section 321J.2 if the prescription-drug
defense is established. And, without a violation of section 321J.2, a
person appealing IDOT’s revocation decision is entitled to prevail.
Another principle of interpretation supports Bearinger. IDOT’s
interpretation would render superfluous the language in section
321J.13(2)(c) stating that a violation of section 321J.2 is necessary for a
revocation to occur. We are to interpret chapter 321J “ ‘in a manner to
avoid . . . rendering any part of the enactment superfluous.’ ” Comried,
693 N.W.2d at 775 (quoting State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa
2003)); see also Star Equip., Ltd. v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2014)
(“[W]e do not interpret statutes so they contain surplusage.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)). Reading sections 321J.2, 321J.12, and
321J.13 together, we conclude the prescription-drug defense applies to
administrative revocation proceedings.
Our conclusion is reinforced by yet another principle of
interpretation: we are to interpret chapter 321J “ ‘in a manner to avoid
absurd results.’ ” Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 775 (quoting Pickett, 671
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N.W.2d at 870).3 The purpose of the license revocation procedure “is to
promote public safety by removing dangerous drivers from the
highways.” Vogel, 548 N.W.2d at 587. Under IDOT’s interpretation, a
driver could have her license revoked for testing positive for a
prescription drug4 that has no impact on driving ability. Examples of
such prescription drugs include Lipitor, used to control cholesterol, as
well as the antibiotic Amoxicillin, or Prilosec, an antacid. It would be
absurd to deny such drivers the prescription-drug defense in revocation
proceedings. We do not believe the legislature intended to allow the
prescription-drug defense to a criminal charge of operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence, yet withhold the defense to an
administrative license revocation.
The prescription-drug defense is available only to those who have
taken their medications in compliance with a doctor’s instructions,
without any alcohol. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(11)(a). Thus, the defense
is unavailable to those who abuse their prescription medications and
those who drive against their doctor’s orders. See id.; Schories, 827
3Theabsurd-results doctrine should be used cautiously. See Anderson v. State,
801 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2011).
“In view of our obligation to ascertain the intent of the legislature,
we are mindful of the cautionary advice of one commentator that
‘the absurd results doctrine should be used sparingly because it
entails the risk that the judiciary will displace legislative policy on
the basis of speculation that the legislature could not have meant
what it unmistakably said.”
Id. (quoting Sherwin–Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 427 (Iowa
2010)).
4Section 321J.2(1)(c) imposes criminal liability for any amount of a controlled
substance. The revocation provision is broader: Iowa Code section 321J.12(1) provides
for revocation if “the test results indicated the presence of a controlled substance or
other drug.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, revocation may be triggered by a trace amount of
a drug that is not a “controlled substance.” “Drug” is broadly defined, and includes
prescription drugs. See Iowa Code § 155A.3(13) (drug), (37) (prescription drug).
12
N.W.2d at 665 (evaluating whether substantial evidence existed to prove
driver was abusing his prescription medication); see also Tina Wescott
Cafaro, Slipping Through the Cracks: Why Can’t We Stop Drugged
Driving?, 32 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 33, 54–60 (2010) (discussing whether
states should prohibit driving under the influence of prescription drugs
and reviewing various state formulations of the prescription-drug
defense). The fact finder must determine the defense has been
established.
It was Bearinger’s burden to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that her prescription-drug defense applies. See Ludtke, 646
N.W.2d at 69 (noting petitioner has burden in IDOT administrative
proceedings to prove license should not be revoked); McCrea v. Iowa
Dep’t of Transp., 336 N.W.2d 427, 428–29 (Iowa 1983) (same).5 The ALJ
found Bearinger satisfied the elements of the prescription-drug defense.
IDOT does not contend the evidence supporting the defense is
insubstantial. We conclude the testimony of Bearinger and Dr. Struck
constitutes substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding, which
therefore is binding on appeal. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f).
Accordingly, Bearinger is entitled to a reversal of IDOT’s revocation
decision.
5For the burden in criminal proceedings, see Schories, 827 N.W.2d at 665 (“Once
a defendant has presented evidence sufficient to show the prescription drug defense
applies, the State has the burden of disproving each element of the defense beyond a
reasonable doubt.”).
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IV. Disposition.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s ruling that
affirmed IDOT’s revocation of Bearinger’s license. We remand this case
for the district court to enter an order reversing her revocation.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.