Teresa Karen Bearinger v. Iowa Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division ( 2014 )


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  •                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 13–0869
    Filed March 14, 2014
    TERESA KAREN BEARINGER,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
    MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B.
    Hanson, Judge.
    Petitioner appeals district court ruling affirming license revocation
    and rejecting prescription-drug defense in administrative proceeding.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
    Aaron D. Hamrock of McCarthy & Hamrock P.C., West Des Moines,
    for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Linkvis,
    Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    2
    WATERMAN, Justice.
    This appeal requires us to decide whether the prescription-drug
    defense to the criminal charge of operating a motor vehicle while under
    the   influence,   see   Iowa   Code       § 321J.2(11)   (2011),   applies   in
    administrative license revocation proceedings under Iowa Code sections
    321J.12 through .13. Teresa K. Bearinger drove her car off the road and
    destroyed a brick mailbox.      At the request of the investigating police
    officer, Bearinger gave a urine sample that tested positive for controlled
    substances—her prescription medications. Based on these test results,
    the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) revoked her license for
    180 days. She contested her revocation. An administrative law judge
    found the facts to establish the prescription-drug defense, but concluded
    the defense did not apply in the administrative proceeding. The district
    court affirmed.    We retained her appeal.        For the reasons explained
    below, we hold the prescription-drug defense is available in license
    revocation proceedings. We therefore reverse her revocation.
    I. Scope of Review.
    “Iowa Code chapter 17A governs review of license revocation
    decisions under Iowa Code chapter 321J.”            Ludtke v. Iowa Dep’t of
    Transp., 
    646 N.W.2d 62
    , 64 (Iowa 2002); see also Iowa Code § 321J.14.
    “The district court acts in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law
    on the part of an agency . . . .” 
    Ludtke, 646 N.W.2d at 64
    . “On appeal,
    we apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether the
    conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court.” Welch
    v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 
    801 N.W.2d 590
    , 594 (Iowa 2011).              We are
    bound by an agency’s factual findings if those findings are supported by
    “ ‘substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when the
    record is viewed as a whole.’ ” 
    Ludtke, 646 N.W.2d at 65
    (quoting Iowa
    3
    Code § 17A.19(8)(f) (1999)). “Evidence is substantial when a reasonable
    person could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings.”          
    Id. “Because this
    is not an area where interpretation of the law has been
    clearly vested in the discretion of the agency, we need not give deference
    to the IDOT’s interpretation . . . and are free to substitute our judgment
    de novo for the agency’s interpretation.” 
    Welch, 801 N.W.2d at 594
    .
    II. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    On May 12, 2011, Teresa Bearinger was driving her car two blocks
    from her home in Urbandale, Iowa, while eating a nutritional power bar.
    She dropped the bar under her seat and reached down to find it,
    becoming distracted.      She missed a curve, drove off the road, and
    collided with a brick mailbox. Her car continued into a yard, narrowly
    missing a large tree before veering back onto the road. The Urbandale
    police officer who responded to the accident, Shawn Popp, noted “the car
    was basically disabled due to the tire being torn off” and Bearinger
    “exploded the mailbox.” Officer Popp found Bearinger outside her car,
    upset, shaking, and unsteady on her feet. Officer Popp noted that she
    was shaking “way beyond what . . . we normally would see in something
    like this.”
    Bearinger   told   Officer   Popp   she   was   taking   neurological
    prescription medications and showed him a list of her medications. She
    explained to Officer Popp that she hadn’t eaten much the previous day or
    that morning and that she thought one of her medications was clouding
    her mind. Officer Popp noted her eyes were watery. In light of all this,
    Officer Popp believed Bearinger may have been impaired.           He asked
    Bearinger to go to the police department with him and she complied. At
    the station, Bearinger agreed to take a breath test and provide a urine
    4
    sample. The breath test indicated she had no alcohol in her system, but
    the urine test revealed the presence of prescription medications.
    As a result, on March 6, 2012, IDOT revoked Bearinger’s license
    for 180 days. Bearinger appealed the revocation to an administrative law
    judge (ALJ). Bearinger asserted she was not in violation of Iowa Code
    section 321J.2 (2011) because the prescription-drug defense under Iowa
    Code section 321J.2(11) applies. IDOT argued for revocation, asserting
    the prescription-drug defense applies only to a criminal charge and is
    unavailable in license revocation proceedings.
    At the administrative hearing, Bearinger’s physician, Lynn Struck,
    testified she had prescribed Bearinger the medications detected in
    Bearinger’s urine. Dr. Struck testified she had not prohibited Bearinger
    from driving while taking the medications, though she had warned the
    medications may cause drowsiness.            Bearinger testified she took her
    medications as instructed for a month preceding the accident and felt
    her ability to drive was not impaired.
    Officer   Popp   also   testified,   recounting   his   interaction   with
    Bearinger the day of the accident. He testified that Bearinger told him,
    “If she didn’t like the effects of the one [medication], she would grab
    another one and take it instead.” Officer Popp suggested Bearinger may
    have been self-medicating.
    The ALJ believed Bearinger’s testimony, concluding “Bearinger
    took her prescribed medication as prescribed.” The ALJ therefore found,
    “based on the evidence presented in this proceeding, . . . the elements of
    the statutory prescription-drug defense were established.” But, agreeing
    with   IDOT’s     statutory    interpretation,   the     ALJ   determined     the
    prescription-drug defense does not apply in administrative license
    revocation proceedings and denied Bearinger’s appeal.                The IDOT
    5
    reviewing officer and the district court affirmed. Bearinger appealed the
    district court’s ruling, and we retained the appeal to answer this question
    of statutory interpretation.
    III. Analysis.
    Iowa Code section 321J.2 criminalizes operating a motor vehicle
    while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.          “The main purpose of
    chapter 321J is to promote public safety by removing dangerous drivers
    from the highways.” State v. Vogel, 
    548 N.W.2d 584
    , 587 (Iowa 1996).
    We discussed the reach of chapter 321J.2 in State v. Comried, 
    693 N.W.2d 773
    , 775–78 (Iowa 2005).                In Comried, we noted that the
    legislature amended section 321J.2 in 1998 to create a per se ban on
    driving with any amount of a controlled substance in the body—
    regardless of whether a person is “under the influence” of that controlled
    substance.      
    Id. at 775–76,
    78.       The prescription-drug defense was
    already included in chapter 321J.2. See 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1220, § 2(6)
    (codified at Iowa Code § 321J.2(6) (1987)) (creating chapter 321J, which
    included the prescription-drug defense).          In its current form, section
    321J.2(1) imposes criminal liability for driving:
    (a) While under the influence of an alcoholic beverage
    or other drug or a combination of such substances.
    (b) While having an alcohol concentration of .08 or
    more.
    (c) While any amount of a controlled substance is
    present in the person, as measured in the person’s blood or
    urine.
    Iowa   Code     § 321J.2(1)(a)–(c)    (2011)    (emphasis   added).   Section
    321J.2(1)(c) criminalizes driving with any amount of a controlled
    substance in one’s system.           See 
    Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 778
    (“We
    conclude that the statute in question is clear and unambiguous and that
    ‘any amount’ means any amount greater than zero.”).            As we noted in
    6
    Comried,   the   “any      amount”   provision   avoids   proof   problems   in
    determining the level of a controlled substance in the driver’s blood or
    urine and whether the drug impaired the ability to drive.          
    Id. at 776.
    Many prescription drugs, however, are controlled substances. See Houck
    v. Iowa Bd. of Pharmacy Exam’rs, 
    752 N.W.2d 14
    , 19 (Iowa 2008)
    (discussing overlapping categories of drugs that are both controlled
    substances and require a prescription); see also Iowa Code § 124.101(5)
    (defining “controlled substance”); Iowa Code § 155A.3(37) (defining
    “prescription drug”).      Thus, without the prescription-drug defense, it
    would be illegal to drive after taking one of the prescription drugs defined
    as a controlled substance if any amount of that drug is detectable in the
    driver’s blood or urine.
    Subsection 11 of section 321J.2 codifies the prescription-drug
    defense to the criminal charge:
    11. a. This section does not apply to a person
    operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a drug
    if the substance was prescribed for the person and was
    taken under the prescription and in accordance with the
    directions of a medical practitioner . . . or if the substance
    was dispensed by a pharmacist without a prescription
    pursuant to the rules of the board of pharmacy, if there is no
    evidence of the consumption of alcohol and the medical
    practitioner or pharmacist had not directed the person to
    refrain from operating a motor vehicle.
    b. When charged with a violation of subsection 1,
    paragraph “c”, a person may assert, as an affirmative
    defense, that the controlled substance present in the
    person’s blood or urine was prescribed or dispensed for the
    person and was taken in accordance with the directions of a
    practitioner and the labeling directions of the pharmacy . . . .
    Iowa Code § 321J.2(11).
    The parties agree that section 321J.2(1)(c) is not violated when the
    prescription-drug defense is established.        See State v. Schories, 
    827 N.W.2d 659
    , 665–68 (Iowa 2013) (vacating conviction based on evidence
    7
    establishing prescription-drug defense).          IDOT nevertheless asserts the
    prescription-drug defense is inapplicable in administrative proceedings to
    revoke a driver’s license. We did not decide that issue in Schories and
    confront it here as a question of first impression.
    In Comried, we summarized the interpretive principles most
    relevant to construing chapter 321J:1
    “When we interpret a statute, we attempt to give effect
    to the general assembly’s intent in enacting the law.
    Generally, this intent is gleaned from the language of the
    statute. To ascertain the meaning of the statutory language,
    we consider the context of the provision at issue and strive to
    interpret it in a manner consistent with the statute as an
    integrated whole.       Similarly, we interpret a statute
    consistently with other statutes concerning the same or a
    related subject. Finally, statutes are interpreted in a manner
    to avoid absurd results and to avoid rendering any part of
    the enactment 
    superfluous.” 693 N.W.2d at 775
    (quoting State v. Pickett, 
    671 N.W.2d 866
    , 870 (Iowa
    2003)).    We also construe chapter 321J “liberally or reasonably” to
    protect the public by reducing “the hazard of prohibited operation of a
    motor vehicle to a minimum.”            
    Id. (quoting 61A
    C.J.S. Motor Vehicles
    § 1385, at 274 (2002)). We apply these principles to decide this case.
    We look first to the statutory provisions governing license
    revocation proceedings and read them together with the criminal statutes
    incorporated by reference. Iowa Code section 321J.12(1) empowers IDOT
    to revoke a person’s license for operating while intoxicated. That statute
    states:
    1IDOT argues on appeal that we should give deference to its interpretation of
    section 321J.12. Chapter 321J, however, does not give IDOT interpretive authority.
    See 
    Welch, 801 N.W.2d at 594
    . We declined to give deference to IDOT’s interpretation of
    sections 321J.6 and 321J.9 in Welch, and we decline to do so here. See 
    id. at 602
    (holding “a motorist’s request to take the chemical test need not be honored after he or
    she has previously refused that test following a valid implied consent advisory”).
    8
    Upon certification, subject to penalty for perjury, by the
    peace officer that there existed reasonable grounds to believe
    that the person had been operating a motor vehicle in
    violation of section 321J.2, that there existed one or more of
    the necessary conditions for chemical testing described in
    section 321J.6, subsection 1, and that the person submitted
    to chemical testing and the test results indicated the presence
    of a controlled substance or other drug, or an alcohol
    concentration equal to or in excess of the level prohibited by
    section 321J.2, or a combination of alcohol and another drug
    in violation of section 321J.2, the department shall revoke the
    person’s      driver’s  license   or   nonresident    operating
    privilege . . . .
    Iowa Code § 321J.12(1) (emphasis added).                IDOT revoked Bearinger’s
    license based on the first ground: she drove after taking “a controlled
    substance or other drug.”
    Bearinger argues the references to section 321J.2 in the revocation
    statute obligate IDOT to consider her prescription-drug defense codified
    in section 321J.2(11).2 IDOT counters that—unlike the second and third
    grounds for revocation in section 321J.12(1)—the first ground does not
    refer to a violation of section 321J.2.            IDOT thus contends that the
    prescription-drug defense in section 321J.2(11) is unavailable to avoid a
    license revocation on the first ground. IDOT argues it is reasonable for
    the legislature to treat license revocation differently than criminal
    prosecution because license revocation is remedial, rather than punitive.
    See 
    Vogel, 548 N.W.2d at 587
    .
    2Bearinger notes the first sentence of Iowa Code section 321J.12(1) requires the
    officer to certify “there existed reasonable grounds to believe that the person had been
    operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321J.2.” Bearinger argues that a valid
    prescription-drug defense would defeat this threshold requirement for revocation. We
    disagree. The officer’s certification helps ensure the driver is statutorily obligated to
    submit to the chemical testing or face the administrative consequences of a test refusal.
    The certification requirement must be read together with the other requirements for
    revocation. The prescription-drug defense comes into play only after a positive test
    result for a prescription drug. The defense cannot be used to retroactively determine
    the officer lacked grounds to ask the driver to submit to testing.
    9
    If we read section 321J.12(1) in isolation, IDOT’s interpretation
    would be persuasive. “Under the doctrine of last preceding antecedent,
    qualifying words and phrases refer only to the immediately preceding
    antecedent . . . .”   Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage
    Tank Fund Bd. v. Shell Oil Co., 
    606 N.W.2d 376
    , 380 (Iowa 2000); see
    also Oberbillig v. W. Grand Towers Condo. Ass’n, 
    807 N.W.2d 143
    , 151
    (Iowa 2011) (explaining doctrine of the last preceding antecedent). We
    note no comma separates the phrase in section 321J.12(1) incorporating
    section 321J.2 in either the second or third grounds. This suggests that
    each time section 321J.2 is mentioned, it modifies only that ground. See
    Shell Oil 
    Co., 606 N.W.2d at 380
    . Otherwise, section 321J.2 would not
    be mentioned twice—in both the second and third grounds—but not in
    the first. That the legislature expressly modified the second and third
    grounds by requiring a violation of section 321J.2, but omitted that
    reference in the first ground, suggests that a license may be revoked
    under the first ground without a violation of section 321J.2. See Oyens
    Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 
    808 N.W.2d 186
    , 193–94 (Iowa 2011)
    (relying on the fact “the legislature selectively incorporated [a] prefatory
    clause” into one subsection but not another to hold clause did not apply
    to both subsections).
    But, we must read section 321J.12(1) together with section
    321J.13(2), which sets forth the grounds for appealing a license
    revocation. Section 321J.13(2) states that the review hearing “shall be
    limited to the issues of”:
    whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe
    that the person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of
    section 321J.2 or 321J.2A and one or more of the following:
    a. Whether the person refused to submit to the test or
    tests.
    10
    b. Whether a test was administered and the test
    results indicated an alcohol concentration equal to or in
    excess of the level prohibited under section 321J.2 or
    321J.2A.
    c. Whether a test was administered and the test
    results indicated the presence of alcohol, a controlled
    substance or other drug, or a combination of alcohol and
    another drug, in violation of section 321J.2.
    Iowa Code § 321J.13(2) (emphasis added).
    When a comma separates a qualifying phrase from the antecedent,
    the qualifying phrase generally applies to all antecedents. Shell Oil 
    Co., 606 N.W.2d at 380
    . Section 321J.13(2)(c) thus directed the ALJ to review
    whether Bearinger’s test results indicated the presence of a controlled
    substance or other drug in violation of section 321J.2.          By definition,
    there can be no violation of section 321J.2 if the prescription-drug
    defense is established.   And, without a violation of section 321J.2, a
    person appealing IDOT’s revocation decision is entitled to prevail.
    Another principle of interpretation supports Bearinger.           IDOT’s
    interpretation would render superfluous the language in section
    321J.13(2)(c) stating that a violation of section 321J.2 is necessary for a
    revocation to occur. We are to interpret chapter 321J “ ‘in a manner to
    avoid . . . rendering any part of the enactment superfluous.’ ” 
    Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 775
    (quoting State v. Pickett, 
    671 N.W.2d 866
    , 870 (Iowa
    2003)); see also Star Equip., Ltd. v. State, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2014)
    (“[W]e do not interpret statutes so they contain surplusage.”         (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.)).      Reading sections 321J.2, 321J.12, and
    321J.13 together, we conclude the prescription-drug defense applies to
    administrative revocation proceedings.
    Our   conclusion    is   reinforced   by   yet   another    principle   of
    interpretation: we are to interpret chapter 321J “ ‘in a manner to avoid
    absurd results.’ ”   
    Comried, 693 N.W.2d at 775
    (quoting Pickett, 
    671 11 N.W.2d at 870
    ).3 The purpose of the license revocation procedure “is to
    promote       public   safety    by    removing      dangerous       drivers     from    the
    highways.” 
    Vogel, 548 N.W.2d at 587
    . Under IDOT’s interpretation, a
    driver could have her license revoked for testing positive for a
    prescription drug4 that has no impact on driving ability. Examples of
    such prescription drugs include Lipitor, used to control cholesterol, as
    well as the antibiotic Amoxicillin, or Prilosec, an antacid.                    It would be
    absurd to deny such drivers the prescription-drug defense in revocation
    proceedings.      We do not believe the legislature intended to allow the
    prescription-drug defense to a criminal charge of operating a motor
    vehicle while under the influence, yet withhold the defense to an
    administrative license revocation.
    The prescription-drug defense is available only to those who have
    taken their medications in compliance with a doctor’s instructions,
    without any alcohol. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(11)(a). Thus, the defense
    is unavailable to those who abuse their prescription medications and
    those who drive against their doctor’s orders.                  See id.; Schories, 827
    3Theabsurd-results doctrine should be used cautiously. See Anderson v. State,
    
    801 N.W.2d 1
    , 7 (Iowa 2011).
    “In view of our obligation to ascertain the intent of the legislature,
    we are mindful of the cautionary advice of one commentator that
    ‘the absurd results doctrine should be used sparingly because it
    entails the risk that the judiciary will displace legislative policy on
    the basis of speculation that the legislature could not have meant
    what it unmistakably said.”
    
    Id. (quoting Sherwin–Williams
    Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 
    789 N.W.2d 417
    , 427 (Iowa
    2010)).
    4Section 321J.2(1)(c) imposes criminal liability for any amount of a controlled
    substance. The revocation provision is broader: Iowa Code section 321J.12(1) provides
    for revocation if “the test results indicated the presence of a controlled substance or
    other drug.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, revocation may be triggered by a trace amount of
    a drug that is not a “controlled substance.” “Drug” is broadly defined, and includes
    prescription drugs. See Iowa Code § 155A.3(13) (drug), (37) (prescription 
    drug). 12 N.W.2d at 665
    (evaluating whether substantial evidence existed to prove
    driver was abusing his prescription medication); see also Tina Wescott
    Cafaro, Slipping Through the Cracks: Why Can’t We Stop Drugged
    Driving?, 32 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 33, 54–60 (2010) (discussing whether
    states should prohibit driving under the influence of prescription drugs
    and reviewing various state formulations of the prescription-drug
    defense).      The fact finder must determine the defense has been
    established.
    It was Bearinger’s burden to establish by a preponderance of the
    evidence that her prescription-drug defense applies.              See 
    Ludtke, 646 N.W.2d at 69
    (noting petitioner has burden in IDOT administrative
    proceedings to prove license should not be revoked); McCrea v. Iowa
    Dep’t of Transp., 
    336 N.W.2d 427
    , 428–29 (Iowa 1983) (same).5 The ALJ
    found Bearinger satisfied the elements of the prescription-drug defense.
    IDOT does not contend the evidence supporting the defense is
    insubstantial. We conclude the testimony of Bearinger and Dr. Struck
    constitutes substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding, which
    therefore is binding on appeal.               See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f).
    Accordingly, Bearinger is entitled to a reversal of IDOT’s revocation
    decision.
    5For the burden in criminal proceedings, see 
    Schories, 827 N.W.2d at 665
    (“Once
    a defendant has presented evidence sufficient to show the prescription drug defense
    applies, the State has the burden of disproving each element of the defense beyond a
    reasonable doubt.”).
    13
    IV. Disposition.
    For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s ruling that
    affirmed IDOT’s revocation of Bearinger’s license. We remand this case
    for the district court to enter an order reversing her revocation.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.