State of Iowa v. Alan James Kuuttila ( 2021 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–0283
Submitted September 15, 2021—Filed October 15, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
ALAN JAMES KUUTTILA,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel
(motions and trial) and James B. Malloy (sentencing), Judges.
Defendant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. AFFIRMED ON CONDITION AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Appel, Oxley,
and McDermott, JJ., joined. Waterman, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., joined.
Martha J. Lucey, Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
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Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
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McDONALD, Justice.
Alan Kuuttila was convicted of three misdemeanor drug offenses. In this
direct appeal, Kuuttila contends the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence. Kuuttila argues a sheriff’s deputy violated his federal and
state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and searches
when the deputy seized and searched his trash without first obtaining a warrant.
Kuuttila also argues the district court erred in ordering Kuuttila to pay
restitution for certain court costs and attorney fees.
In August and September of 2017, Story County Deputy Sheriff Andy
Boeckman received tips Kuuttila was dealing marijuana and methamphetamine.
Boeckman decided to investigate the tips and conduct warrantless trash pulls at
Kuuttila’s residence. Kuuttila lived in a four-plex apartment (a single family
house modified into four separate apartments). Boeckman testified there were
four separate trash cans in a fenced enclosure outside the apartments. The trash
cans were metal and lidded. None of the cans or bags in the cans had identifying
markers. Boeckman took all of the trash bags from the four cans to his office,
opened them, and searched through them. He found nothing of evidentiary
value. Approximately one week later, Boeckman again took all of the trash bags
from the four cans to his office and searched through them. During this second
search, Boeckman found one bag that contained mail addressed to Kuuttila
along with “two small baggies, one with a crystal substance in it and one with a
green leafy substance in it, as well as paraphernalia.” One of the baggies tested
positive for marijuana and one for methamphetamine.
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Based on this trash pull, Boeckman obtained a search warrant for
Kuuttila’s residence. The subsequent search of Kuuttila’s residence yielded
controlled substances, including methamphetamine and prescription pills, and
drug paraphernalia. Kuuttila cooperated with the officials executing the warrant
and admitted the controlled substances were his.
Kuuttila was charged with three misdemeanor possession offenses, each
in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2017): possession of a cannabidiol,
first offense; possession of methamphetamine; and possession of marijuana. He
was also charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Kuuttila moved to
suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless trash pull, contending it
violated his federal and state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable
seizures and searches as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Based on existing
law, the district court denied the motion to suppress evidence.
Following a trial on the minutes of testimony, the district court found
Kuuttila guilty of the possession offenses. The district court sentenced Kuuttila
to serve fifteen days in jail with credit for five days served. As restitution, the
district court assessed $192 for the cost of Kuuttila’s court-appointed attorney
as well as an unspecified amount for the costs of the action. At the time of
sentencing, the State moved to dismiss the charge for possession of drug
paraphernalia and agreed the State would pay the costs of that charge. At the
sentencing hearing, the district court agreed the charge would be “dismissed
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with costs assessed against the State.” However, the sentencing order stated the
charge was dismissed with costs assessed to the defendant.
Kuuttila timely appealed his conviction and sentence, and this court
transferred the matter to the court of appeals. On appeal, Kuuttila argued the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, the portion of
the sentencing order assessing costs for the dismissed charge was not in accord
with the oral pronouncement of sentence, and the district court erred in ordering
Kuuttila to pay restitution without first making a determination of his reasonable
ability to pay. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the
motion to suppress evidence. The court of appeals reasoned Kuuttila’s federal
and state constitutional claims were resolved by the controlling cases of
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), and State v. Henderson, 435 N.W.2d
394 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). With respect to sentencing, the court of appeals
vacated the portion of the sentencing order assessing costs for the dismissed
charge and remanded the matter for entry of an order nunc pro tunc to have the
judgment entry reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence. The court of appeals
also vacated the restitution order and remanded the matter for further
proceedings.
We granted Kuuttila’s application for further review. “On further review,
we have the discretion to review any issue raised on appeal.” Burton v. Hilltop
Care Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v. Marin, 788 N.W.2d
833, 836 (Iowa 2010), overruled on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,
880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)). With respect to the motion to suppress evidence,
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we exercise our discretion to address only Kuuttila’s claim arising under the
state constitution. With respect to sentencing and restitution, we exercise our
discretion to address only Kuuttila’s challenge to restitution. The court of
appeals decision is final as to all other claims and arguments.
Last term, in State v. Wright, 961 N.W.2d 396, 418–19 (Iowa 2021), we
overruled Henderson, 435 N.W.2d 394. In Wright, we held law enforcement
officers conducted an unreasonable and thus unconstitutional seizure and
search in violation of article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution when they seized
and searched garbage bags left out for collection without first obtaining a
warrant. Wright, 961 N.W.2d at 420. Our conclusion in that case was based on
the plain meaning of the article I, section 8 as informed by common law concepts
of trespass. Id. at 404–12. We explained that “[w]ithin the meaning of article I,
section 8, an officer acts unreasonably when, without a warrant, the officer
physically trespasses on protected property or uses means or methods of general
criminal investigation that are unlawful, tortious, or otherwise prohibited.” Id. at
416. We held that “[o]therwise prohibited conduct includes means and methods
of general criminal investigation that violate a citizen’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.” Id.
We concluded a warrantless trash pull was trespassory in two respects.
First, the officer engaged in means and methods of general criminal investigation
that were unlawful and prohibited. Id. at 417. Specifically, the municipality
prohibited any person, other than an authorized trash collector, from taking or
collecting trash left out for collection. Id. Any violation of the ordinance was
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punishable by a fine. Id. The officer was not a licensed collector and thus engaged
in unlawful conduct. Id. Second, we explained the officer violated Wright’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash:
When a citizen places garbage out for collection in a closed garbage
bag, the contents of the bag are private, as a factual matter. The
citizen understands, however, that the contents of the bag may be
revealed to someone at some point in time. That a citizen may
actually lose privacy in certain things or in certain information at
some point in the future does not preclude the possibility that a
peace officer nonetheless violated the citizen’s right to privacy in
accessing the same things or information. “Privacy rights do not
protect a reasonable expectation that privacy will be maintained, but
rather a reasonable expectation that privacy will not be lost in
certain ways.”
Id. at 418–19 (quoting Jeffrey M. Skopek, Untangling Privacy: Losses Versus
Violations, 105 Iowa L. Rev. 2169, 2174 (2020)). We reasoned that the officer’s
warrantless seizure and search of Wright’s trash violated Wright’s expectation
that his garbage bags would be accessed only by a licensed collector under
contract with the city. See id. at 419.
Both rationales are applicable in this case. Kuuttila resided in the City of
Nevada. As in Wright, the Nevada municipal code prohibits any person from
“[t]ak[ing] or collect[ing] any solid waste which has been placed out for collection
on any premises, unless such person is an authorized solid waste collector.”
Nevada, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 105.10(4) (2006). Violation of the city code
is punishable by a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment for up to thirty days. Id.
§ 1.14. Boeckman was not an authorized solid waste collector, and he acted
unlawfully and thus unreasonably in seizing and searching Kuuttila’s trash
without a warrant. See Wright, 961 N.W.2d at 417. In addition, Nevada’s
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ordinance, like similar municipal ordinances, is positive evidence of a societal
expectation that trash left out shall remain private and not disturbed by anyone
other than an authorized collector. Boeckman violated this expectation of privacy
in seizing and searching Kuuttila’s trash without a warrant. See id. at 419.
Wright was issued after the district court denied Kuuttila’s motion to
suppress evidence but while his appeal was pending. “Generally, when we create
a new standard, we remand the case to the district court to apply the standard.”
Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 799 (Iowa 2018). This applies to the case
creating the standard as well as all cases pending at the time the decision is
filed. State v. Hahn, 961 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 2021); State v. Johnson, 539
N.W.2d 160, 165 (Iowa 1995).
Accordingly, we conditionally affirm Kuuttila’s convictions and remand
this matter for further proceedings consistent with our opinion in Wright. See
State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 340 (Iowa 2019) (conditionally affirming
conviction and remanding for further proceedings in light of new rule); State v.
Lilly, 930 N.W.2d 293, 309 (Iowa 2019) (same). On remand, the district court
shall hold a hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence without
consideration of the evidence and information obtained during the trash pull
used to support the warrant application. See Hahn, 961 N.W.2d at 372. The
district court shall conduct further proceedings as necessary contingent upon
its ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. In the event the
district court concludes the convictions and sentences should stand, the
defendant must exhaust all statutory procedures to challenge the district court’s
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assessment of attorney fees and court costs. See Iowa Code §§ 910.2A, .7 (2021);
State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 606–07 (Iowa 2021).
AFFIRMED ON CONDITION AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Appel, Oxley, and McDermott, JJ., join this opinion. Waterman, J., files a
dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., join.
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#19–0283, State v. Kuuttila
WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court’s denial of Alan
Kuuttila’s motion to suppress. Under a proper reading of the Iowa Constitution,
no warrant was required to search the trash placed out for collection at his
four-plex. See State v. Wright, 961 N.W.2d 396, 429–52 (Iowa 2021) (Christensen,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 452–58 (Waterman, J., dissenting); id. at 458–65
(Mansfield, J., dissenting). This case provides yet another example of the efficacy
of trash rips as a law enforcement practice. Police had received multiple tips that
Kuuttila was a drug dealer selling methamphetamine and marijuana. A search
of his discarded trash revealed drug paraphernalia with methamphetamine
residue, which in turn supported the issuance of a search warrant for his
apartment where the narcotics were found resulting in his conviction for
possession of methamphetamine and marijuana.
We should overrule State v. Wright and rejoin the clear majority of courts
holding that antiscavenger ordinances don’t trigger a search warrant
requirement to peruse property abandoned for disposal. See, e.g., United States
v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (holding garbage placed
outside for collection did not have any Fourth Amendment protection despite an
antiscavenging ordinance because the defendant did not show he “relied upon
the ordinance to increase his expectation of privacy” and “[t]he purpose of the
ordinance was, presumably, sanitation and cleanliness, not privacy”); United
States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The town ordinance simply
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cannot change the fact that he ‘threw (these articles) away’ and thus there ‘can
be nothing unlawful in the Government’s appropriation of such abandoned
property.’ ” (quoting Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960))); Rikard v.
State, 123 S.W.3d 114, 120–22 (Ark. 2003) (noting that to hold constitutional
rights vary depending on local ordinances “would run directly contrary to a
pronouncement by this court of a uniform societal understanding relating to
privacy rights in garbage”); State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 752 n.17 (Conn.
1993) (“Our conclusion that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in garbage placed at the curb for collection is not undermined by the fact
that the legislature has authorized municipalities to prohibit the scavenging of
solid waste.”); State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding a person “who places his trash in the swale area in front of his home for
collection in accordance with applicable city ordinances governing trash
collection” does not maintain “a reasonable expectation of privacy in that trash”);
Ashlock v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining
that a local ordinance limiting who can remove trash from receptacles “has no
bearing on the validity of the search under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution”);
Commonwealth v. Pratt, 555 N.E.2d 559, 567 (Mass. 1990) (“The fact that [a local]
ordinance allowed only licensed trash collectors to transport garbage does not
make the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy any more reasonable.”);
State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 693–94 (Minn. 2015) (rejecting the dissent’s
argument that county ordinances regulating garbage disposal strengthen an
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expectation of privacy in garbage); State v. Brown, 484 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984) (per curiam) (“[I]t is unreasonable to suggest that the intent in
passing the [antiscavenging] ordinance was to impede law enforcement
authorities in the performance of otherwise lawful investigative activities.”);
Commonwealth v. Minton, 432 A.2d 212, 217 (Pa. 1981) (explaining the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because an
antiscavenging township code was for sanitation, not privacy); State v. Stevens,
734 N.W.2d 344, 347–48 (S.D. 2007) (holding an expectation of privacy in one’s
trash would be unreasonable because “[w]hile city ordinances may, in some
cases, be reflective of societal expectations of privacy, they do not manifest such
an expectation simply because they dictate how persons are to place their trash
for collection or how the trash is to be collected”).
Notably, Kuuttila never claimed he relied on the antiscavenger ordinance
or was even aware of it. The ordinance was enacted to promote sanitation and
hygiene, not to protect garbage from prying eyes. Indeed, there is no need for an
antiscavenger ordinance to deter investigators. If the property isn’t abandoned,
then it is protected by laws prohibiting theft and trespass. If it is abandoned, as
garbage placed out for collection surely is, then those prohibitions don’t apply.
In any event, Iowa cities such as Nevada are free to amend their ordinances to
clarify that police may investigate possible criminal activity by searching garbage
placed out for collection. And the legislature is free to enact a statute disclaiming
privacy rights in such trash.
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This case is also distinguishable from Wright, which involved a garbage
can used by the defendant alone at his single-family residence. Wright, 961
N.W.2d at 400–01. By contrast, the trash bins used by Kuuttila were used by
the occupants of all four apartments in his four-plex. Yet to today’s majority, it
doesn’t matter whether Kuuttila’s garbage cans were used by him alone, several
neighbors, or hundreds of others. In my view, we should follow the great weight
of authority holding that any expectation of privacy is diminished or eliminated
when the trash receptacles are shared by other people in different households.
See, e.g., United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032, 1037–40 (10th Cir. 2011)
(holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a garbage storage area
adjacent to the triplex residence); United States v. Dunkel, 900 F.2d 105, 107
(7th Cir. 1990) (“Someone who tosses documents into a dumpster to which
hundreds of people have ready access has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
the dumpster or its contents.”), vacated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 747 (1991)
(Mem); United States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1313 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Other
tenants, guests, and visitors, perhaps curious about the contents of the trash
within, could easily have rummaged through the bin. The evidence permits no
other conclusion than that [the defendant] had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the contents of the garbage bags placed in the [apartment complex’s
communal] trash bin.”); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 798–99 (Alaska 1973)
(holding there is no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in a dumpster
in a parking area that accommodated several apartments); People v. Harris, 920
N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (App. Div. 2011) (“Abandonment is a question of intent and
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trash disposed of in a communal place where others can access it with the
understanding that it will be removed by a third party is deemed to be
abandoned.”); State v. Washington, 518 S.E.2d 14, 16–17 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in garbage placed “in a
communal dumpster in the apartment complex where he resided”); State v.
Briggs, 756 A.2d 731, 743–44 (R.I. 2000) (holding there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy for trash deposited in a communal dumpster). Indeed,
Kuuttila argued at one point that the State failed to show the incriminating
garbage belonged to him. Accordingly, Wright is inapposite and not controlling
in this case.
Our court stands alone in holding discarded trash is an “effect” entitled to
constitutional protection. I would overrule Wright and affirm the district court in
this case.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., join this dissent.