Iowa Ass'n of Business & Industry v. City of Waterloo, The Waterloo Commission on Human Rights, and Martin M. Peterson, in His Official Capacity ( 2021 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 20–0575
Submitted April 14, 2021—Filed June 18, 2021
Amended August 31, 2021
IOWA ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY,
Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF WATERLOO, THE WATERLOO COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, and MARTIN M. PETERSON, in His Official Capacity,
Appellees.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
John Bauercamper, Senior Judge.
A trade association appeals a declaratory judgment that a city “ban
the box” ordinance is not preempted by state law. AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
Christensen, C.J., and Appel, Waterman, and Oxley, JJ., joined.
McDonald, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
McDermott, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Ryan G. Koopmans (argued) of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines,
for appellant.
Timothy C. Boller (argued) of Weilein & Boller, P.C., Cedar Falls, for
appellees.
2
David S. Walker, Windsor Heights, and Russell E. Lovell II, Des
Moines, for amicus curiae NAACP.
Shefali Aurora and Rita Bettis Austen, Des Moines, for amicus
curiae ACLU of Iowa; Leonard Bates of Newkirk Zwagerman, Des Moines,
and Melissa C. Hasso of Sherinian & Hasso Law Firm, Des Moines, for
amicus curiae Iowa Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers
Association; and Elizabeth L. Avery, Berkeley, California, for amicus
curiae National Employment Law Project.
3
MANSFIELD, Justice.
Suppose a park had a sign posted at the entrance: “No motorized
vehicles allowed, including cars, motorcycles, scooters, and other
motorized vehicles.” Would we conclude that this sign prohibited a child
from pushing her old-fashioned, nonmotorized scooter around the park?
We think not.
This case, in our view, presents a similar interpretive problem. In
2017, the legislature adopted a statute that prohibits cities from
adopt[ing], enforce[ing], or otherwise administer[ing] an
ordinance, motion, resolution, or amendment providing for
any terms or conditions of employment that exceed or conflict
with the requirements of federal or state law relating to a
minimum or living wage rate, any form of employment leave,
hiring practices, employment benefits, scheduling practices,
or other terms or conditions of employment.
2017 Iowa Acts ch. 20, § 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 364.3(12)(a) (2018)).
Does this statute prohibit cities from independently regulating all hiring
practices, or only from regulating those hiring practices that amount to
terms and conditions of employment?
The difference matters here because we are asked to decide the
impact of the 2017 law on a 2019 Waterloo “ban the box” ordinance. The
ordinance regulates the time when an employer can inquire into a
prospective employee’s criminal history. It also regulates whether an
employer can consider the employee’s criminal history at all in making a
hiring decision. The district court found that no part of the ordinance was
preempted. For the reasons discussed herein in more detail, we conclude
that the ordinance is preempted to the extent it purports to regulate
whether an employer can consider an employee’s criminal history at all—
i.e., to the extent it regulates a term and condition of employment.
However, it is not preempted where it only regulates timing, because that
4
is not a term or condition of employment. Accordingly, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural Background.
On November 4, 2019, the City of Waterloo (the City) voted to enact
Ordinance 5522. This ordinance covers two topics: (1) when an employer
can inquire into an applicant’s criminal history, and (2) whether the
employer can consider that criminal history in making its hiring
decisions.1
Abraham Funchess, the director of the Waterloo Commission on
Human Rights (WCHR), submitted an affidavit that provided background
information on Waterloo’s ordinance. Shortly after taking office in 2010,
Funchess began looking at “ban the box” as a way to reduce discrimination
within Waterloo. “Ban the box” is the colloquial term for a measure that
limits employer inquiries into the criminal histories of prospective
employees.
Waterloo has the highest African-American population, at sixteen
percent, of any city in the state. African-Americans and other persons of
color are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system, not
only in the United States generally but more specifically in Waterloo.
Funchess was “concerned that this disparity could lead to discriminatory
employment practices when an applicant’s criminal history was
considered.” Funchess had also heard personal anecdotes from persons
of color about the difficulty they were encountering in obtaining
employment if they had a criminal record.
1“[B]an-the-box laws differ widely from one jurisdiction to the next.” Dallan F.
Flake, Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work? 104 Iowa L. Rev. 1079, 1089 (2019). “In
addition to delaying the criminal record inquiry, many ban-the-box laws go further by
limiting what an employer can do with criminal background information once it is
obtained.” Id. Waterloo’s ordinance is of this nature.
5
The WCHR decided to present a proposed ordinance to the Waterloo
city council for consideration. An outside attorney was commissioned to
draft the ordinance. He surveyed “ban the box” ordinances that had been
adopted in other cities and also received assistance from a national
organization.
The proposed Waterloo ordinance was initially presented and
discussed at the August 26, 2019 Waterloo city council meeting. It was
later amended and received its third reading and final approval by a 4–3
vote on November 4.
As enacted, Ordinance 5522 prohibits all employers in Waterloo
from asking about criminal history on a job application. Waterloo, Iowa,
Code of Ordinances § 5-3-15(B) (current through June 1, 2020). It also
bars employers with fifteen or more employees from making any inquiry
into an applicant’s criminal history until a conditional offer of employment
has been made. Id. § 5-3-15(B)(1). Additionally, Ordinance 5522 prohibits
employers with fifteen or more employees from making an adverse hiring
decision based solely on arrests or pending criminal charges that have not
resulted in a conviction, criminal records that have been expunged or are
the subject of a pardon, or criminal records without a “legitimate business
reason.” Id. § 5-3-15(B)(2)–(4).
The term “legitimate business reason” is defined in detail elsewhere
in the ordinance. Id. § 5-3-15(A). It includes: (1) “[s]ituations where the
nature of the criminal conduct has a direct and substantial bearing on the
fitness or ability to perform the duties or responsibilities of the intended
employment,” (2) “[s]ituations where the granting of employment would
involve unreasonable risk of substantial harm to property or to safety of
individuals or the public, or to business reputation or business assets,”
(3) “[p]ositions working with children, developmentally disabled persons
6
and vulnerable adults where the applicant has a conviction record of a
crime against children or disabled or vulnerable adults,” and
(4) “[s]ituations where an employer must comply with any federal or state
law or regulation pertaining to background checks and the criminal
conduct is relevant to the applicant’s fitness for the job.” Id. Other than
in these four situations, an employer cannot refuse to hire an employee
based on the employee’s criminal record. Id. § 5-3-15(B)(4).
While Ordinance 5522 was under consideration, but before it had
been adopted, the Iowa Association of Business and Industry (ABI) wrote
the entire Waterloo city council in October 2019. ABI is the largest
statewide business organization with more than 1500 member businesses
employing 330,000 Iowans, including thousands in Waterloo. ABI’s
correspondence maintained that Ordinance 5522 violated Iowa Code
section 364.3(12)(a) (2020), which limits the ability of cities to regulate
employment terms and conditions.
After the ordinance received its final approval from the city council
on November 4, ABI immediately filed suit in the Black Hawk County
District Court against the City, the WCHR, and the city attorney in his
official capacity. ABI’s petition sought injunctive and declaratory relief on
the ground that the ordinance violated the aforementioned state law.
The parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment. On
March 27, with the COVID pandemic having descended on our state, the
district court conducted a telephonic oral argument on the motions. On
April 4, the district court entered its summary judgment ruling.
Preliminarily, the court determined that ABI had associational
standing to assert the rights of its members. However, on the merits, the
court ruled that the ordinance did not violate Iowa Code section
364.3(12)(a). The district court concluded that ABI’s preemption argument
7
required it to reconcile section 364.3(12)(a) with another provision of state
law—namely, section 216.19(1)(c) of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). The
court then found that Ordinance 5522 was “consistent with the authority
given to cities” by section 216.19(1)(c) to prohibit a broader range of
discriminatory practices under local civil rights ordinances. Thus, the
court granted the defendants’ motion, denied ABI’s motion, and upheld
the legality of the ordinance.
ABI appealed, and we retained the appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
Generally, we review a district court’s ruling on summary judgment
on for correction of errors at law. Weizberg v. City of Des Moines, 923
N.W.2d 200, 211 (Iowa 2018). “Summary judgment is appropriate when
the record shows no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Petro v. Palmer Coll. of
Chiropractic, 945 N.W.2d 763, 769 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Munger,
Reinschmidt & Denne, L.L.P. v. Lienhard Plante, 940 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Iowa
2020)).
III. Legal Analysis.
A. Ordinance 5522 and Iowa Code Section 364.3(12)(a).
Waterloo Ordinance 5522 provides in part,
B. Prohibited Use Of Criminal Record Information: In
connection with the employment of any person, it shall be an
unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to include a
criminal record inquiry on any application. It shall further be
an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer who
employs fifteen (15) or more persons, but not private schools
providing a regular course of instruction for any part of
kindergarten through high school education, to engage in any
of the following activity:
1. To make any inquiry regarding, or to require any
person to disclose or reveal, any convictions, arrests, or
pending criminal charges during the application process,
including but not limited to any interview. The application
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process shall begin when the applicant inquires about the
employment being sought and shall end when an employer
has extended a conditional offer of employment to the
applicant. If the applicant voluntarily discloses any
information regarding his or her criminal record at the
interview, the employer may discuss the criminal record
disclosed by the applicant.
2. To make an adverse hiring decision based solely on the
applicant’s record of arrests or pending criminal charges that
have not yet resulted in a conviction.
3. To make an adverse hiring decision based on any
criminal records which have been lawfully erased or
expunged, which are the subject of an executive pardon, or
which were otherwise legally nullified.
4. To make an adverse hiring decision based on an
applicant’s criminal record without a legitimate business
reason.
Waterloo, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 5-3-15(B).
Thus, the ordinance contains two types of restrictions. In the first
sentence of section (B) and in subsection (1), the ordinance imposes
procedural limits on employers. That is, it defers the employer’s ability to
make certain types of “inquiry” until after the employer extends a
conditional offer of employment. See id. at § 5-3-15(B), (B)(1). In
subsections (2), (3), and (4), the ordinance sets forth substantive
restrictions. These paragraphs forbid the employer from making an actual
“adverse hiring decision” for certain reasons. See id. at § 5-3-15(B)(2)–(4).
Under the Iowa Constitution and laws, cities are generally granted
home rule authority to enact ordinances “not inconsistent with the laws of
the general assembly.” Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A; Iowa Code § 364.1.
However, Iowa Code section 364.3 sets forth a number of limitations on
the powers of cities.
ABI insists that Ordinance 5522 is preempted by one such
limitation—Iowa Code section 364.3(12)(a). This particular subsection
became law in 2017 and provides,
9
A city shall not adopt, enforce, or otherwise administer
an ordinance, motion, resolution, or amendment providing for
any terms or conditions of employment that exceed or conflict
with the requirements of federal or state law relating to a
minimum or living wage rate, any form of employment leave,
hiring practices, employment benefits, scheduling practices,
or other terms or conditions of employment.
2017 Iowa Acts ch. 20, § 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 364.3(12)(a) (2018)).
ABI, quoting Iowa Code section 364.3(12)(a), maintains that all five of the
restrictions in Ordinance 5522 are “terms or conditions of employment
that exceed or conflict with the requirements of federal or state law relating
to . . . hiring practices . . . or other terms or conditions of employment.”
Therefore, according to ABI, the entire ordinance is preempted.
B. Iowa Code Section 216.19(1)(c). The district court found that
Iowa Code section 364.3(12)(a) did not control this case because the City
could derive legal authority for the ordinance from another provision of
state law, section 216.19(1)(c) of the ICRA. That section of the ICRA
provides,
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as indicating any
of the following:
....
c. Limiting a city or local government from enacting any
ordinance or other law which prohibits broader or different
categories of unfair or discriminatory practices.
Iowa Code § 216.19(1)(c). As the district court saw it, section 216.19(1)(c)
gives municipalities like Waterloo “authority” to “prohibit[t] broader or
different categories of unfair or discriminatory practices.” And because
Ordinance 5522 is a civil rights measure, section 216.19(1)(c) empowered
Waterloo to enact it.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it does not fit section
216.19(1)(c)’s actual wording. The section only says that chapter 216 shall
not be construed as limiting local authority. The section does not itself
10
grant such authority. In Petro v. Palmer College Of Chiropractic, we made
this very point regarding the related provision in section 216.19(1)(b),
which states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as indicating any
of the following:
....
b. An intent to prohibit an agency or commission of
local government having as its purpose the investigation and
resolution of violations of this chapter from developing
procedures and remedies necessary to insure the protection
of rights secured by this chapter.
Rejecting the argument that Iowa Code section 216.19(1)(b)
authorized municipalities to issue right-to-sue letters to civil rights
complainants, we concluded in Petro that the section
is a form of savings clause. . . . [W]e focus on the words
themselves. They state that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be
construed as indicating . . . [a]n intent to prohibit” the
development of local procedures and remedies. Thus, section
216.19(1)(b) is not an independent grant of authority to cities
to enact local law governing relationships between private
parties . . . . At best, it allows such local law to stand if there
is an independent basis for it.
945 N.W.2d at 773–74 (second omission and third alteration in original)
(citation omitted) (quoting Iowa Code §§ 216.19(1), .19(1)(b) (2017)).
Accordingly, we cannot agree with the basis upon which the district court
upheld Ordinance 5522. An ICRA savings clause cannot supersede the
express limits set forth in section 364.3(12)(a).
C. Does Ordinance 5522 Exceed the Requirements of Federal
or State Law? Although we are not persuaded that Iowa Code section
216.19(1)(b) can sustain the ordinance, the City argues that the ordinance
is not preempted anyway because it does not “exceed” the requirements of
state and federal law. See Iowa Code § 364.3(12)(a). “Ban the box,”
according to the City, simply implements existing civil rights law.
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We are not convinced. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has said that “[a]n employer’s use of an individual’s
criminal history in making employment decisions may, in some instances,
violate the prohibition against employment discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.” U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n, EEOC–CVG–2012–1, Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration
of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, (2012) (emphasis added). According to the EEOC, an
employer could be liable under Title VII if its use of a criminal background
check had a “disparate impact” on job applicants of a particular race and
if the background check was not “job related and consistent with business
necessity.” Id. The City overlooks these qualifiers and the general Title VII
requirement that disparate impact must be proved on an employer-by-
employer basis.2
Thus, in Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected an effort to judicially “ban the box”
via a court action under Title VII. See 975 F.3d 202, 205 (2d Cir. 2020),
reh’g denied, 988 F.3d 664 (Feb. 23, 2021) (en banc). There, the court
affirmed the dismissal of a class action complaint against a technology
services provider that had a policy not to hire persons with certain criminal
convictions. Id. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs, crucially, had failed
to allege anything specific about the qualified applicant pool for this
defendant:
[W]hile Plaintiffs’ statistics show that African Americans are
on average more likely to have been convicted of a crime than
whites, that does not, without more, make it plausible that an
African-American web developer with the educational and
2Additionally,EEOC enforcement guidance does not carry the force of law.
Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
12
technical qualifications to work at NTT is more likely to have
been convicted of a crime than his Caucasian counterpart.
Id. at 212. Some other efforts to “ban the box” at particular employers
through lawsuits have also been unsuccessful. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 465–66, 468 (4th Cir. 2015) (affirming summary
judgment for the defendant in a Title VII discrimination case alleging that
credit history and criminal background checks had a disparate impact on
Black and male applicants); Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., 89
F. Supp. 3d 944, 948–49 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (granting summary judgment
to the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff failed to show that a
statewide law mandating criminal background checks for school
employees had a disparate impact).
Our caselaw likewise requires targeted proof in a disparate impact
employment-discrimination case. In Pippen v. State, we recognized that
under Title VII, it was generally the plaintiff’s burden in a disparate impact
case not only to isolate a particular employment practice (such as a
criminal history screen) but also to subject that practice to “meaningful
statistical analysis.” 854 N.W.2d 1, 26–27 (Iowa 2014). We followed a
similar approach in rejecting the ICRA claim. Id. at 31–32.
By diving more deeply into the factual record, the special
concurrence in Pippin demonstrated that there may have been
discrimination based on race in hiring by various departments in the
executive branch during the relevant time period. See id. at 44–45
(Waterman, J., concurring specially). The special concurrence described
this situation as “disturbing.” Id. at 45. As noted by the special
concurrence, an analysis by the plaintiffs’ expert
showed that a minimally qualified white person had a forty
percent greater chance of being hired than a minimally
qualified African American. Splitting his analysis by
department, Killingsworth testified there was a statistically
13
significant disparity between the percentage of African-
American applicants hired and the percentage of white
applicants hired in many of the departments, though not all.
Id. at 34. Likewise, the state’s expert
found that African Americans were statistically less likely to
receive a department job interview after their application was
referred by DAS. Probing more deeply, he found this was only
true for about one-third of State departments. It was not true
for the remaining two-thirds of departments.
Id. at 34–35.
The plaintiffs’ case failed, however, because they simply aggregated
all state executive branch departments and all stages of the hiring process
together. Id. at 44–45.
Instead of narrowing their focus, plaintiffs brought a class
action alleging a common pattern of discrimination by the
entire state executive branch of government. Having brought
such a large case, it was then up to the plaintiffs to undertake
the considerable work required to prove it. Under the
prevailing law, this included analysis of specific hiring
practices and their impact. Plaintiffs did not meet their
burden.
Id. at 45. Thus, Pippen indicates that to prove a Title VII or ICRA disparate
impact case, the plaintiff must offer statistical proof of the effects of the
defendant’s employment practice on the defendant’s employment
decisions. Generalizations based on overall numerical trends are not
enough.
Here, the Waterloo ordinance applies to all employers, regardless of
the characteristics of their potential applicant pool. It forbids every
employer’s use of a criminal history box on the job application form for
every job, even if the employer might have valid business reasons for
asking about criminal history. These requirements go beyond Title VII and
the ICRA.3
3When a “legitimate business justification” exists as defined in the ordinance, an
employer can conduct a background check later, i.e., after extending a conditional offer
14
To look at the matter another way, if Ordinance 5522 did not go
beyond existing federal and state law, then why did Waterloo go to the
trouble of enacting it? We are not persuaded by the City’s argument that
the ordinance does no more than duplicate existing state and federal civil
rights protections.
D. Does Ordinance 5522 Prescribe Terms or Conditions of
Employment? We now turn to the third potential ground on which the
ordinance may be able to avoid preemption, at least in part. Iowa Code
section 364.3(12)(a) only supersedes city ordinances establishing different
“terms or conditions of employment.” That is, it applies to any ordinance
“providing for any terms or conditions of employment that exceed or
conflict with the requirements of federal or state law relating to . . . hiring
practices, . . . or other terms or conditions of employment.” To the extent
Ordinance 5522 does not provide for different terms or conditions of
employment, perhaps it is not preempted.
Accordingly, we have to read the language of Iowa Code section
364.3(12)(a) carefully. It preempts ordinances that prescribe different
terms or conditions of employment. This includes, most notably, local
minimum wage ordinances, which were the flashpoint of the debate in
2017. Yet to the extent Ordinance 5522 merely delays an inquiry into
criminal history, it is not prescribing different terms or conditions of
employment. Cf. Union of Auto. Technicians, AFL–CIO Loc. 563 v. Port Auth.
Emp. Rels. Panel, 144 N.Y.S.3d 12 at *13–14 (App. Div. 2021) (“The Panel
rationally found that the requirements to disclose additional convictions
were not terms and conditions of employment and did not require
collective bargaining.”); Blackhawk Tchrs.’ Fed’n Loc. 2308 v. Wis. Emp.
of employment. Waterloo, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 5-3-15(B). But the point remains
that Ordinance 5522 exceeds the requirements of federal and state civil rights law.
15
Rels. Comm’n, 326 N.W.2d 247, 258 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the
school district had a duty to bargain over substantive antidiscrimination
provisions, but not over whether “the job interview process and the job
application format” could inquire into those subjects). But see Ass’n of Pa.
State Coll. & Univ. Facs. v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 226 A.3d 1229, 1244 (Pa.
2020) (holding that where “criminal background reports and ongoing
arrest and conviction notification requirements are required for continued
employment, as they are mandatory for both new and existing faculty
members,” they are terms and conditions of employment).
Of course, it is true that section 364.3(12)(a) specifically mentions
“hiring practices.” Whether a job application includes a question about
the applicant’s criminal history might normally be considered a hiring
practice. Yet, we need to focus on what is preempted: only ordinances
providing for different “terms or conditions of employment.” The term
“hiring practices” is sandwiched between two uses of “terms or conditions
of employment.” The closing flourish—“or other terms or conditions of
employment”—heralds that only attempts to establish different terms or
conditions of employment are preempted. Therefore, as we read the text,
not all ordinances relating to hiring practices are preempted, only those
that provide for hiring practices that amount to different terms or
conditions of employment.
In contrast to Iowa, Michigan adopted legislation in 2015 that
explicitly preempted local government efforts to regulate inquiries on an
employment application:
A local governmental body shall not adopt, enforce, or
administer an ordinance, local policy, or local resolution
regulating information an employer or potential employer
must request, require, or exclude on an application for
employment [or during the interview process] from an
employee or a potential employee. This section does not
16
prohibit an ordinance, local policy, or local resolution
requiring a criminal background check for an employee or
potential employee in connection with the receipt of a license
or permit from a local governmental body.
2015 Mich. Legis. Serv. Pub. Acts 105 § 4 (codified at Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. § 123.1384 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.) (alteration
amended at 2018 Mich. Legis. Serv. Pub. Acts 84 § 4)). This was one of
nine separate provisions preempting local law relating to employer–
employee relations. See id. §§ 5–12. Other provisions concerned topics
such as minimum wage, unpaid leave, and fringe benefits. See id. §§ 5, 8,
11.
Likewise, Indiana enacted legislation in its 2017 legislative session
that expressly preempted local ordinances regarding criminal background
checks:
Unless federal or state law provides otherwise, a political
subdivision may not prohibit an employer from:
(1) obtaining or using criminal history information
during the hiring process to the extent allowed by federal or
state law, rules, or regulations; or
(2) at the time an individual makes an initial application
for employment:
(A) making an inquiry regarding the individual’s
criminal history information; or
(B) requiring the individual to disclose the individual’s
criminal history information.
2017 Ind. Legis. Serv. Pub. L. 210-2017 § 3 (codified at Ind. Code. Ann.
§ 22-2-17-3 (West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. Sess.)).
So too Mississippi in 2014:
No county, board of supervisors of a county, municipality,
governing authority of a municipality or any other political
subdivision shall adopt or maintain in effect any law,
ordinance, or rule that creates requirements, regulations,
processes or prohibitions that in any way interfere with an
employer’s ability to become fully informed about the
17
background of an employee or potential employee for the
purpose of creating or maintaining a fair, secure, safe and
productive workplace. Any ordinance or regulation that exists
as of July 1, 2014, or is created after July 1, 2014, that
violates the provisions of this section shall be explicitly
preempted and voided by this section.
2014 Miss. Laws ch. 340 § 1 (codified at Miss. Code. Ann. § 17-25-33(1)
(West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.)).
Likewise, New Jersey in 2014:
The governing body of a county or municipality shall not adopt
any ordinance, resolution, law, rule or regulation regarding
criminal histories in the employment context, except for
ordinances adopted to regulate municipal operations.
2014 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 32 § 7(a) (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann § 34:6B-
17(a) (West, Westlaw through L. 2021)).
Iowa could have followed one of these models and did not. (Three of
those models had already been enacted into positive law.) We think the
logical consequence for this case is clear. Ordinance 5522 is preempted
to the extent it attempts to establish terms and conditions of employment,
including hiring practices that constitute terms and conditions of
employment, but not preempted otherwise.
When we review Ordinance 5522, we see that subsections (2), (3),
and (4) of section (B) actually set terms and conditions of employment.
They do not allow certain employers to turn down persons with certain
types of criminal records. However, section (B) and subsection (1) do not
provide for terms and conditions of employment. They simply address the
timing of the criminal history inquiry. See Dallan F. Flake, Do Ban-the-
Box Laws Really Work? 104 Iowa L. Rev. 1079, 1092 (2019) [hereinafter
Flake] (characterizing this situation as “employers remain free to
discriminate against ex-offenders—just not right away”).
18
Before we go further, we must address two points raised by ABI
concerning the “terms or conditions of employment” language. First, ABI
argues that this ground for avoiding preemption is not properly before us
because it was raised by the NAACP as amicus curiae, not by the City as
a party. Normally, we do not allow amici curiae to raise new issues. See
Press-Citizen Co. v. Univ. of Iowa, 817 N.W.2d 480, 493–94 (Iowa 2012).
However, we think a practical approach is warranted here.
In Petro, we considered on appeal an argument regarding specific
statutory language that only an amicus curiae had raised. 945 N.W.2d at
774. We did so by crediting the appellant with raising the overall issue of
whether section 216.19 of the ICRA allowed private suits under local
ordinances, even though only the amicus had argued that section
216.19(4), in particular, allowed such suits. Id. We considered such an
approach “practical.” Id. Here, likewise, we will credit the City with raising
the broad issue of whether Ordinance 5522 can avoid preemption under
section 364.3(12)(a), while recognizing that only the NAACP relied on the
“terms or conditions of employment” language within section 364.3(12)(a).
This approach is practical because it does not result in any
unfairness to ABI. The issues in this case are purely legal. Indeed, ABI
took the unusual step of omitting a statement of facts from its opening
brief for precisely that reason. Moreover, ABI addressed the question of
whether Ordinance 5522 prescribed “terms or conditions of employment”
both in its reply brief and at oral argument. Therefore, we have a fully
developed adversarial presentation on the issue.4
4The overall issue is still whether the district court’s ruling of no preemption
should be sustained. The NAACP is raising a different argument for sustaining that no
preemption ruling. See Cox v. Iowa Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 920 N.W.2d 545, 556–57 (Iowa
2018) (same); O’Hara v. State, 642 N.W.2d 303, 310–12 (Iowa 2002) (considering a new
argument raised by an amicus); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amicus Curiae § 7, at 347–48 (2018)
(“Although courts are not obligated to consider issues raised only by an amicus curiae,
19
ABI also urges that Iowa Code section 364.3(12)(a)’s reference to
“hiring practices” becomes surplusage if we limit the preemptive effect of
the statute to “terms or conditions of employment.” See Iowa Code § 4.4(2)
(setting forth the presumption that in enacting a statute, “[t]he entire
statute is intended to be effective”). Yet, if we look at the statute as a
whole, its reference to “minimum or living wage rate” is already surplusage
since wage rates are clearly and indisputably terms or conditions of
employment. So the statute had bells and whistles to begin with. In our
view, what ultimately matters is that it preempts some hiring practices,
namely, those that amount to terms or conditions of employment.5
Finally, we need to decide whether the rest of Ordinance 5522 can
be sustained if the provisions that restrict adverse hiring decisions based
on criminal history are stricken. This is a question of severance. In
American Dog Owners Ass’n v. City of Des Moines, we held that the
unconstitutional portions of a vicious dog ordinance could be severed from
the constitutional portions. See 469 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 1991) (per
curiam). We explained,
When parts of a statute or ordinance are
constitutionally valid, but other discrete and identifiable parts
are infirm, we may sever the offending portions from the
enactment and leave the remainder intact. Severance is
appropriate if it does not substantially impair the legislative
purpose, if the enactment remains capable of fulfilling the
courts have discretion to do so, particularly if . . . the new issues concern only other
matters of law and involve important issues of policy.”). In our view, given that ABI has
had an opportunity to respond, it would be the better course of action not to strike down
an entire ordinance based on state-law preemption if, in fact, it isn’t preempted.
5With all due respect to our colleague who is dissenting in part, we do not believe
views expressed by a member of the general assembly in March 2020, three years after
Iowa Code section 364.3(12)(a) was enacted and while this case was already pending, are
relevant here. See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632, 110 S. Ct. 2658, 2667
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“In my opinion, the views of a legislator concerning
a statute already enacted are entitled to no more weight than the views of a judge
concerning a statute not yet passed.”).
20
apparent legislative intent, and if the remaining portion of the
enactment can be given effect without the invalid provision.
Id. (citations omitted). We reached the same conclusion as to severability
in Hensler v. City of Davenport, a case involving a parental-responsibility
ordinance. See 790 N.W.2d 569, 589 (2010). In that case, we relied on
the existence of a severability provision in the Davenport Municipal Code.
See id. Notably, the Waterloo Municipal Code has a similar severability
provision:
§ 1-1-7 SEVERABILITY.
The sections, paragraphs, sentences, clauses and
phases of this code are severable, and if any phrase, clause,
sentence, paragraph or section of this code shall be declared
invalid, unenforceable or unconstitutional by the valid
judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, such
invalidity, unenforceability or unconstitutionality shall not
affect any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences,
paragraphs and sections of this code.
Waterloo, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 1-1-7.
We conclude that the Waterloo city council would have wanted the
provisions that delay inquiry into criminal history to be upheld even if the
provisions that restrict use of criminal history are invalid because they
violate state law. In fact, a number of “ban the box” laws and ordinances
go no further than section (B) and subsection (1). They delay the inquiry;
they do not prevent it. See Flake, 104 Iowa L. Rev. at 1089, 1092. We
therefore uphold section (B) and subsection (1) of Ordinance 5522, while
invalidating subsections (2), (3), and (4).
IV. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the
district court’s order, and we remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
21
All justices concur except McDonald, J., who concurs in part and
dissents in part, and McDermott, J., who takes no part.
22
#20–0575, Iowa Ass’n of Business & Indus. v. City of Waterloo
McDONALD, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The majority affirms in part the judgment of the district court
because it concludes “terms or conditions of employment” as used in Iowa
Code section 364.3(12)(a) (2020) does not include the application process
and other preemployment hiring practices. This issue was not presented
to the district court. This issue was not decided by the district court. This
issue was not raised on appeal by any party to this proceeding. I would
decline to address this issue and would reverse the judgment of the district
court (as the majority does) on the issues actually preserved for and
presented on appeal. Further, to the extent the issue is before this court,
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the phrase “terms or
conditions of employment” as used in the statute. For these reasons, I
concur in part and dissent in part.
I.
“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must
ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will
decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537
(Iowa 2002). This fundamental doctrine necessarily arises out of the very
nature of the judicial power. “The judicial power shall be vested in a
supreme court, district courts, and such other courts, inferior to the
supreme court, as the general assembly may, from time to time, establish.”
Iowa Const. art. V, § 1. “The judicial power is ordinarily defined to be the
power to construe and interpret the Constitution and laws, and to apply
them and [to] decide controversies . . . .” State v. Thompson, 954 N.W.2d
402, 410–11 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Hutchins v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa
189, 205, 157 N.W. 881, 887 (1916)). “The power of appellate review is
one aspect of the judicial power.” Id. at 411. When exercising the power
23
of appellate review, this court and the court of appeals are “court[s] for the
correction of errors at law.” Iowa Const. art. V, § 4; Iowa Code §§ 602.4102,
.5103. “If a litigant fails to present an issue to the district court and obtain
a ruling on the same, it cannot be said that we are correcting an error at
law.” State v. Tidwell, No. 13–0180, 2013 WL 6405367, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Dec. 5, 2013).
The issue of whether the “terms or conditions of employment,” as
used in section 364.3(12)(a), includes the application process and other
preemployment hiring practices was never presented to or ruled on by the
district court, and the issue is not preserved for appeal. The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment in the district court. ABI argued
Ordinance 5522 “exceed[ed] the requirements of federal and state law
relating to hiring practices and conditions of employment” and was thus
in violation of section 364.3(12)(a) and article III, section 38A of the Iowa
Constitution (providing that “[m]unicipal corporations are granted home
rule power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws of the general
assembly, to determine their local affairs and government”). The City of
Waterloo (the City) did not contest that section 364.3(12)(a) applied to the
application process and other preemployment hiring practices. Instead, it
argued: (1) section 364.3(12)(a) does not apply at all because
section 216.19 of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) provided the City with
independent authority to enact Ordinance 5522; and (2)
section 364.3(12)(a) does not preempt Ordinance 5522 because the
ordinance does not exceed the requirements of federal or state law. The
district court agreed with the City, denied ABI’s motion for summary
judgment, and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. No party
raised the issue of the scope of “terms or conditions of employment” in the
24
district court, and the district court did not decide (or even discuss) the
issue.
The majority does not discuss the issue of error preservation.
Instead, relying on Petro v. Palmer College of Chiropractic, 945 N.W.2d 763(Iowa 2020), the majority concludes it can reach this wholly new issue on
appeal because amicus curiae raised the issue. In doing so, the majority
confuses the issue of error preservation with the issue of waiver or
forfeiture of an argument on appeal. Amicus curiae’s participation in this
appeal is not a cure for the City’s failure to preserve error on an issue. To
the contrary, the rules of appellate procedure provide amicus curiae’s
participation is limited to assisting the court in resolving only those issues
preserved for appellate review. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.906(1), (2) (stating
an amicus brief must “assist the court in resolving issues preserved for
appellate review in the case”); id. r. 6.906(5) (stating an amicus brief
should be allowed only where the “brief will assist the court in resolving
the issues preserved for appellate review in the case”). Amicus curiae are
not even allowed to participate in an appeal where “[t]he proposed amicus
curiae brief attempts to raise issues that were not preserved for appellate
review.” Id. r. 6.906(5)(b)(3).
“A supreme court is ‘a court of review, not of first view.’ ”
UE Loc. 893/IUP v. State, 928 N.W.2d 51, 60 (Iowa 2019) (quoting
Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 413 (Iowa 2017)).
Because “[w]e are a court of review, . . . we do not generally decide an issue
that the district court did not decide first.” 33 Carpenters Constr., Inc. v.
State Farm Life & Cas. Co., 939 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Iowa 2020) (emphasis
omitted). This is both a question of authority and fundamental fairness:
Because error preservation is based on fairness, we
think both parties should be bound by the rule. Ordinarily,
25
we attempt to protect the district court from being ambushed
by parties raising issues on appeal that were not raised in the
district court. We see no reason why we should not apply the
same rationale to the parties themselves. . . . To that end, we
hold that we will not consider a substantive or procedural
issue for the first time on appeal, even though such issue
might be the only ground available to uphold a district court
ruling.
DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002).
I would adhere to our fundamental doctrine of appellate review, our
rules of appellate procedure, and our precedents and hold error was not
preserved on the question of whether section 364.3(12)(a) applies to the
application process and other preemployment hiring practices. I
respectfully dissent from the majority’s resolution of an issue not
preserved for appellate review.
II.
A second fundamental doctrine of appellate review is the party-
presentation rule. Earlier this term, we explained that “[o]ur system ‘is
designed around the premise that [parties represented by competent
counsel] know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing
the facts and argument entitling them to relief.’ ” State v. Struve,
956 N.W.2d 90, 99 n.2 (Iowa 2021) (second alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579
(2020)), reh’g denied Apr. 6, 2021. “[C]ourts are essentially passive
instruments of government. . . . [They] wait for cases to come to [them],
and when [cases arise, courts] normally decide only questions presented
by the parties.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sineneng-Smith,
590 U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1579). In accord with this general principle,
“[i]t is a well-established rule of appellate procedure that ‘[t]he scope of
appellate review is defined by the issues raised by the parties’ briefs.’ ”
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Musal, 622 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Iowa 2001) (en banc)
26
(second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Dull v. Dull,
303 N.W.2d 402, 407 (Iowa 1981), superseded by court rule on other
grounds, Iowa R. Civ. P. 88).
Here, the City did not argue in its appellate briefs that
section 364.3(12)(a) does not relate to the application process and other
preemployment hiring practices. The City’s failure to raise the issue in its
briefing constitutes waiver or forfeiture of the issue. See Morris v.
Steffes Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 498 (Iowa 2019) (holding “unbriefed
issues” were waived); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 661–62
(Iowa 2005) (holding that appellee waived issues on appeal even though
issues were raised in and decided by district court because appellee failed
to present arguments in appellate brief), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119, § 3 (codified at Iowa Code § 692A.103
(Supp. 2009)); Goodenow v. City Council, 574 N.W.2d 18, 27 (Iowa 1998)
(declining to address issue where “[p]laintiffs did not raise this issue before
the district court, or in their initial brief”); Parkhurst v. White,
254 Iowa 477, 481, 118 N.W.2d 47, 49 (1962) (holding that appellee
waived issue not argued on appeal); Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. v. State Auto. Ins.,
246 Iowa 1294, 1302–03, 72 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1955) (declining to express
opinion on issue not raised by appellees); MGM Apartments, LLC v.
Mid-Century Ins., No. 13–0661, 2014 WL 251898, at *4 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2014) (declining to consider issue raised in reply brief but not main
brief).
The majority concludes it can nonetheless decide the issue because
amicus curiae raised the issue. This is directly contrary to the party-
presentation rule and our precedents. See Press-Citizen Co. v.
Univ. of Iowa, 817 N.W.2d 480, 493 (Iowa 2012) (“The amici curiae urge
that it would violate federal and state constitutional provisions if access to
27
public documents could depend upon the knowledge or identity of the
requester. Although this argument is developed at some length in the brief
of the amici, it was not raised below or by the Press-Citizen. We therefore
decline to reach it.”); Rants v. Vilsack, 684 N.W.2d 193, 199 (Iowa 2004)
(“Moreover, the legislators, as amicus curiae, are unable to preserve this
issue for our review.”); Mueller v. St. Ansgar State Bank, 465 N.W.2d 659,
660 (Iowa 1991) (“Under Iowa law, the only issues reviewable are those
presented by the parties.”); Shenandoah Educ. Ass’n v.
Shenandoah Cmty. Sch. Dist., 337 N.W.2d 477, 483 (Iowa 1983) (en banc)
(“The other parties in this case have not at any stage of the proceedings
questioned the constitutionality of Iowa statutes, and we can review
neither an issue which was not presented to the trial court nor an issue
raised not by the parties themselves but only by a party in the position
amicus curiae.”); Martin v. Peoples Mut. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
319 N.W.2d 220, 230 (Iowa 1982) (en banc) (“Reviewable issues must be
presented in the parties’ briefs, not an amicus brief.”).
We most recently addressed this issue just last month. In Rieder v.
Segal, the plaintiff brought a negligent credentialing claim against a
hospital. See 959 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa 2021). In that case, we stated it
was an open question whether such a claim was cognizable in Iowa.
See id. at 428. In the district court, the defendant moved for summary
judgment on the ground the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case
assuming, without conceding, the tort was cognizable. See id. at 428.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
on that limited ground, and the plaintiffs appealed. See id. at 427. On
appeal, the defendant did not raise the issue of whether the tort was
cognizable, but four amici requested a ruling on the issue. See id. at 428.
Although holding the tort was not cognizable would have been dispositive
28
of the claim, we declined to address the issue because the issue was never
presented to or ruled on by the district court and because reviewable
issues must be raised by the parties and not amici. See id. Our decision
in Rieder controls this case.
The majority relies on Petro, 945 N.W.2d 763, to reach a contrary
conclusion. In that case, the plaintiff pursued in the district court a
private cause of action arising under a local human rights ordinance.
See id. at 765. The district court held it had no jurisdiction over the matter
because the municipality could not confer jurisdiction on a state court
over a private cause of action arising under municipal law, and the plaintiff
appealed. See id. at 768–69. In the district court and on appeal, the
plaintiff argued Iowa Code section 216.19 authorized the private cause of
action and allowed for state court jurisdiction. See id. at 768, 770. Amici
argued the same thing but relied on a different subsection of the same
statute. See id. at 774. We concluded the issue was properly before us
because Petro “rais[ed] the overall question whether Iowa Code
section 216.19 authorizes suits under local ordinances.” Id.Petro is distinguishable from this case. First, in Petro, the plaintiff
and amicus raised the same legal issue—whether section 216.19
authorized the private cause of action. While they emphasized different
subsections of the same statute in support of their respective arguments,
they argued the same legal issue. Here, the City and amicus do not raise
the same legal issue. The City does not contest that section 364.3(12)(a)
applies to the application process and other preemployment hiring
practices. Instead, the City contends section 364.3(12)(a) is inapplicable
because the ICRA specifically authorizes Ordinance 5522 and because
Ordinance 5522 does not exceed federal or state law. Only amicus curiae
raised the issue regarding the scope of section 364.3(12)(a).
29
Second, and more important, in Petro, this court discussed amicus
curiae’s argument but ultimately rejected the argument. See 945 N.W.2d
at 774–76. While this court’s discussion of the argument in Petro more
fully fleshed out the relevant issue, the court’s consideration of the
argument did not change the disposition of the case. In other words, no
party was prejudiced by consideration and rejection of the argument. That
is not the case here. ABI loses this case, in part, based on a legal issue
not raised in the district court, not decided by the district court, and not
raised by any party to this case. That result is fundamentally unfair and
disallowed by our precedents.
Not only is the majority’s disposition of the case unfair and contrary
to our own precedents, it is contrary to the general rule: “It is . . . clear
beyond hope of contradiction that amici cannot ‘interject into a case issues
which the litigants, whatever their reasons might be, have chosen to
ignore.’ ” Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 n.4
(1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 175
(1st Cir. 1989)); see, e.g., Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. at ___, 140 S. Ct. at
1580–82 (vacating court of appeals’ judgment where court of appeals
ignored the party-presentation principle and relied on the arguments of
amici); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 721,
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2776 (2014) (declining to consider amici’s argument
because the Court does not “generally entertain arguments that were not
raised below and are not advanced in this Court by any party”); F.T.C. v.
Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 n.4, 133 S. Ct. 1003,
1010 n.4 (2013) (declining to consider amicus curiae’s argument
“[b]ecause this argument was not raised by the parties or passed on by the
lower courts”); MeadWestvaco Corp. ex rel. Mead Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of
Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 31, 128 S. Ct. 1498, 1508 (2008) (declining to
30
address amici’s issue because the question they “call upon us to answer
was neither raised nor passed upon in the state courts”); United Parcel
Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2, 101 S. Ct. 1559, 1562 n.2 (1981)
(declining to consider amicus curiae’s “argument since it was not raised
by either of the parties here or below”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
531 n.13, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1870 n.13 (1979) (declining to address
arguments of amicus curiae because “[n]either argument was presented to
or passed on by the lower courts; nor have they been urged by either party
in this Court”); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370, 81 S. Ct. 132,
137 (1960) (stating the court would not pass on amicus curiae’s argument
because “[t]his argument has never been advanced by petitioners in this
case”); Simko v. U.S. Steel Corp, 992 F.3d 198, 206 (3d Cir. 2021) (“We have
held that the role of an amicus brief is to elaborate issues properly
presented by the parties, not inject new issues into an appeal. Thus, an
amicus normally cannot expand the scope of an appeal with issues not
presented by the parties on appeal, at least not in cases where the parties
are competently represented by counsel.” (internal marks and citations
omitted)); Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661,
666 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Nor may amici expand an appeal’s scope to
sweep in issues that a party has waived.”); Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp.,
850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Further, we do not consider an
amicus curiae to be a party in the case where it appears. Moreover, without
‘exceptional circumstances, amici curiae may not expand the scope of an
appeal to implicate issues not presented by the parties to the district
court.’ ” (citation omitted) (quoting Richardson v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ.,
935 F.2d 1240, 1247 (11th Cir. 1991)), abrogated on other grounds by
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020); World
Wide St. Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 752 n.3
31
(5th Cir. 2009) (“It is well-settled in this circuit that ‘an amicus curiae
generally cannot expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues that
have not been presented by the parties to the appeal.’ Accordingly, we will
not consider the arguments raised only by the amicus curiae.” (citations
omitted)); Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1177 n.8
(9th Cir. 2009) (“An amicus curiae generally cannot raise new arguments
on appeal, and arguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are
waived.” (citation omitted)); Cal. Ass’n for Safety Educ. v. Brown,
36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404, 410 (Ct. App. 1994) (“California courts refuse to
consider arguments raised by amicus curiae when those arguments are
not presented in the trial court, and are not urged by the parties on appeal.
‘ “Amicus curiae must accept the issues made and propositions urged by
the appealing parties, and any additional questions presented in a brief
filed by an amicus curi[a]e will not be considered [citations].” ’ ” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Pratt v. Coast Trucking, Inc.,
39 Cal. Rptr. 332, 335 (Ct. App. 1964))).
III.
Not only is the majority’s disposition of this case contrary to our
error preservation rules, our party-presentation rule, our precedents, and
the great weight of considered authority, the majority’s interpretation is
constricted, at odds with itself, and contrary to the legislature’s intent.
The Iowa Constitution gives the legislature “the power ‘to trump or
preempt local law.’ ” Baker v. City of Iowa City, 750 N.W.2d 93, 99
(Iowa 2008) (quoting Berent v. City of Iowa City, 738 N.W.2d 193, 196
(Iowa 2007)). The legislature chose to do so here with respect to the
regulation of the “terms or conditions of employment.” Iowa Code
§ 364.3(12)(a). In interpreting this preemption provision, it is immaterial
whether the statute was good policy. “[T]his court does not entertain
32
arguments that statewide regulation is preferable to local regulation or vice
versa, but focuses solely on legislative intent as demonstrated through the
language and structure of a statute.” City of Davenport v. Seymour,
755 N.W.2d 533, 539 (Iowa 2008).
I begin with the text of the statute. See Doe v. State,
943 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 2020) (“Any interpretive inquiry thus begins
with the language of the statute at issue.”). The statute provides:
A city shall not adopt, enforce, or otherwise administer an
ordinance, motion, resolution, or amendment providing for
any terms or conditions of employment that exceed or conflict
with the requirements of federal or state law relating to a
minimum or living wage rate, any form of employment leave,
hiring practices, employment benefits, scheduling practices,
or other terms or conditions of employment.
Iowa Code § 364.3(12)(a). Our interpretive task is to “determine the fair
and ordinary meaning of the statutory language at issue.” Com. Bank v.
McGowen, 956 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2021); see also State v. Davis,
922 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Iowa 2019) (“We give words their ordinary meaning
absent legislative definition.”); Marshall v. State, 805 N.W.2d 145, 158
(Iowa 2011) (“We should give the language of the statute its fair meaning,
but should not extend its reach beyond its express terms.”). In making
that determination, we consider the statutory text and its “relationship to
other provisions of the same statute and other provisions of related
statutes.” Com. Bank, 956 N.W.2d at 133.
Three things stand out regarding the statute. First, the statute
preempts “any” local law regarding terms or conditions of employment that
exceed federal or state law. “The word ‘any’ . . . is employed to enlarge
rather than limit the terms modified. It means ‘every’ and ‘all’ . . . .” State
v. Prybil, 211 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Iowa 1973) (en banc). This means the
statute should be given an expansive reading. Second, the statute
33
preempts any local law regarding “terms or conditions of employment” that
exceed federal or state law. Use of the term “or” in this statute is
disjunctive. See, e.g., Amish Connection, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
861 N.W.2d 230, 240–41 (Iowa 2015) (interpreting the word “or” to be
disjunctive and citing cases). This means the statute preempts local law
regarding “terms of employment” or “conditions of employment” that
exceed federal or state law. Third, the legislature has acted as its own
lexicographer here and explicitly identified at least some of the items that
are considered to be “terms of employment” or “conditions of employment.”
Included among these items are “hiring practices.” Considering these
three things, it seems clear that the fair and ordinary meaning of the
statute preempts any local law regarding hiring practices that exceed
federal or state law.
The majority rejects the fair and ordinary meaning of the statute and
instead concludes the statute preempts local law regarding hiring
practices but only “those that amount to terms or conditions of
employment.” There are several problems with the majority’s reading.
First, that is not what the statute says. It says hiring practices, for the
purpose of this statute, are terms or conditions of employment. When, as
here, the legislature acts as its own lexicographer, we “are normally bound
by the legislature’s own definitions.” Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of
Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Fischer,
785 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Iowa 2010)). The majority does not abide by the
legislature’s own definition and instead inserts an entire restrictive clause
into the statute to limit its preemptive force. “No court, under the guise of
judicial construction, may add words of qualification to the statute in
question or change its terms.” Kelly v. Brewer, 239 N.W.2d 109, 114
(Iowa 1976); see also In re Det. of Geltz, 840 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Iowa 2013)
34
(“[W]e are bound to follow the legislature’s definitions and may not add
words or change terms under the guise of judicial construction.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Soward,
650 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Iowa 2002))).
Second, the majority opinion rests on the incorrect assumption that
preemployment activity, or at least the completion of an application,
cannot constitute a condition of employment. In the employment law
context, preemployment hiring practices can be considered conditions of
employment. The Code provides several examples. An employer shall not
require an applicant “as a condition of employment” to take or submit to
a polygraph. See Iowa Code § 730.4(2). Nor can an employer “as a
condition of employment” require “a test for the presence of the antibody
to the human immunodeficiency virus.” Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(d). The
Code also regulates drug testing of applicants as a condition of
employment. See Iowa Code § 730.5(4). Further, the completion of the
application itself, including the disclosure of criminal history information,
can be considered a condition of employment. See, e.g., Isaacs v.
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., No. 12–CV–040–LM, 2014 WL 1572559,
at *2–3 (D.N.H. Apr. 18, 2014) (discussing submission of truthful
application as condition of employment); Ravenscraft v. BNP Media, Inc.,
No. 09 C 6617, 2010 WL 1541455, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2010) (“As a
condition of employment with defendant, however, all employees were
required to fill out and sign an employment application.”); Hobby v.
Mulhern, No. CV050081PHXSRB, 2005 WL 2739010, at *1 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 21, 2005) (noting the plaintiff was discharged for “failing to meet the
conditions of employment, namely that she failed to list in her employment
application a December 10, 1997 arrest for ‘larceny, carrying a concealed
weapon, dangerous drugs, drug paraphernalia, two traffic offenses and
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making a false report’ ”); Chichester Sch. Dist. v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeal Bd., 592 A.2d 774, 775 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (“The referee found
that Fox completed and submitted an employment application that the
School District required as a condition of employment.”); Phelps v. McGill,
No. W2002-00018-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1592727, at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
July 9, 2002) (explaining plaintiff was discharged for failing to truthfully
complete application “as a condition of employment”).
Third, because the submission of a truthful application can be
considered a condition of employment, the majority opinion is at odds with
itself. The majority acknowledges Ordinance 5522 goes beyond Title VII
and the ICRA in prohibiting employers from asking about criminal history
in an application:
Here, the Waterloo ordinance applies to all employers,
regardless of the characteristics of their potential applicant
pool. It forbids every employer’s use of a criminal history box
on the job application form for every job, even if the employer
might have valid business reasons for asking about criminal
history. These requirements go beyond Title VII and the ICRA.
However, as noted above, an employer may establish as a condition of
employment that an applicant complete an application disclosing criminal
history information. As the majority acknowledges, nothing in Title VII or
the ICRA prohibits this, but Ordinance 5522 does prohibit this. Under the
plain language of section 364.3(12)(a), Ordinance 5522 should thus be
preempted because it exceeds both federal and state law in disallowing an
employer from imposing a lawful condition of employment.
To make the issue more concrete, consider the following example.
An employer in Waterloo seeks to employ a security guard. The employer
determines, as a condition of employment, an applicant must complete a
truthful application disclosing criminal history information. As the
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majority acknowledges, this is allowed under Title VII and the ICRA.
However, Ordinance 5522 prevents this hypothetical employer from
imposing this lawful condition of employment. Ordinance 5522 thus
exceeds federal and state law and is preempted by section 364.3(12)(a). It
is unclear to me how an ordinance that prohibits an employer from
imposing a condition of employment allowed under federal and state law
does not exceed federal or state law.
Fourth, I am not one to consider a particular legislator’s views in
interpreting statutes, but, to the extent one deems that important,
subsequent legislative history shows the majority’s interpretation of
section 364.3(12)(a) is contrary to the legislature’s intent. In 2020, the
house passed a bill amending the preemption statute. See H.F. 2309, 88th
G.A., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2020). The amendment provided for attorney fees and
costs for any person that successfully challenged a preempted ordinance.
See id. § 2. The sponsor of the legislation explained, without any dissent,
the reason for the bill: “This bill became necessary as a result of a local
government, the city of Waterloo, passing an ordinance in defiance of state
law to ban the box on private businesses’ initial employment forms.”
House Video HF 2309 - Conditions of Employment, Iowa Legislature, at
2:23:23 PM (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/
perma/060120217040. The bill sponsor cited section 364.3(12)(a) and
stated that Waterloo was regulating “hiring practices” and “what Waterloo
did was clearly against the preemptions [bill] that we passed a few years
ago.” Id. at 2:23:44 PM, 2:24:30 PM. The senate never took up the bill
because the legislature halted operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, it seems clear that at least one chamber of the legislature, rightly
in my view, understood that terms of employment or conditions of
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employment include the application process and other preemployment
hiring practices.
IV.
For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.