Dennis L. Smith v. Iowa State University of Science and Technology and State of Iowa ( 2014 )


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  •                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 12–1182
    Filed July 18, 2014
    DENNIS L. SMITH,
    Appellee,
    vs.
    IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY and
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellants.
    On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Kurt J.
    Stoebe, Judge.
    Employee and university were granted further review of court of
    appeals decision affirming in part and reversing in part the district
    court’s denial of the university’s posttrial motions following verdicts for
    the employee on intentional infliction of emotional distress and
    whistleblower claims against the university. DECISION OF COURT OF
    APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT
    JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE
    REMANDED.
    William W. Graham and Aimee R. Campbell of Graham, Ervanian
    & Cacciatore, LLP, Des Moines, for appellee.
    2
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Diane M. Stahle and
    Jordan G. Esbrook, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.
    3
    MANSFIELD, Justice.
    After a trial of more than two weeks, a jury and a judge awarded
    Dennis Smith, a writer formerly employed by the College of Engineering
    at Iowa State University (ISU), a total of $1,284,027.40 in damages
    against ISU and the State of Iowa.                    Smith recovered $500,000 for
    intentional infliction of emotional distress and an additional $784,027.40
    under a whistleblowing statute for retaliation suffered because he
    reported managerial misconduct to ISU’s president. ISU and the State
    appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the intentional infliction of
    emotional distress award, but set aside the statutory whistleblowing
    award.
    On further review, for the reasons described herein, we too affirm
    the jury’s emotional distress award.                We also reduce, but do not set
    aside, the district court’s award of damages under the whistleblowing
    statute.       We agree with the State that Smith’s loss of his job in a
    downsizing that occurred in 2010 cannot be causally linked to any
    reporting he made to ISU’s president approximately three years earlier,
    and therefore we vacate $634,027.04 of his whistleblower damages. In
    all other respects, we uphold the district court’s rulings.
    I. Facts and Procedural History.1
    Dennis Smith was born and raised in Omaha, Nebraska.                           After
    holding a variety of jobs, getting married, and graduating from college,
    Smith entered a doctoral program in English at the University of Iowa in
    the late 1980s.          While there, Smith established and directed a gun
    control organization. Smith did not obtain his doctorate, but his spouse
    1We   recite the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, who prevailed at
    trial.
    4
    received a graduate degree from the university. In 1999, both of them
    moved to Des Moines so she could pursue her career.                     In July 2000,
    Smith’s spouse suffered a devastating stroke that left her homebound.
    In April 2001, Smith was hired at ISU to be a Communication
    Specialist III for the Engineering Communications and Marketing (ECM)
    Department of the College of Engineering at ISU. Smith wrote and edited
    articles for alumni magazines and other print publications.                       ECM’s
    clients included not only the College of Engineering, but also other ISU
    colleges and even some outside entities not affiliated with ISU.2 ECM’s
    staff included writers like Smith, as well as web design and graphic
    design specialists. As it later turned out, one advantage of this position
    for Smith was that he could communicate by cell phone or video
    computer link throughout the day with his disabled wife.
    Smith’s boss was Pamela Reinig, the director of the ECM
    department.      Over the years, Smith received positive job performance
    evaluations from her. Reinig’s reviews of Smith’s writing were especially
    laudatory. By 2002, Smith was taking on supervisory responsibilities,
    and Reinig told him she would have his job classification upgraded to
    Communications Specialist IV. As part of Smith’s July 2002 evaluation,
    Reinig wrote, “I will submit a reclassification request for your position in
    August 2002.         Since January you have been doing the work of a
    Communications Specialist IV, so it is fitting to try to get you reclassified
    2ECM   operated on a cost-recovery basis and billed out its time, both to other ISU
    departments and to outside clients.        The money generated helped support the
    operations of ECM but did not cover actual costs.
    5
    to that level.” Smith received and retained a copy of this 2002 written
    evaluation of his performance.3
    For the next three years, Smith did not get the promotion. Reinig
    gave Smith various excuses as to why he had not received it, while
    continuing to tell Smith she was submitting him annually for
    reclassification. It later came to light that, despite her promises, Reinig
    had not submitted Smith’s name for reclassification.
    Smith finally obtained the upgraded classification in July 2005.
    This occurred shortly after he notified Reinig that he was looking for
    work elsewhere. Smith told Reinig at the time he was “basically fed up
    with supervising people at [his] own pay grade.”               In response, Reinig
    begged Smith not to leave and assured him that he would not have to
    supervise     anyone     and    that    she    would     submit     him    again    for
    reclassification. Thus, Smith received the promotion, but no longer had
    to supervise anyone. Smith later wrote that he was “relieved to be free of
    responsibility for supervising employees who were not qualified for their
    positions and in whose hiring [he] had little apparent influence.”
    Smith acknowledged that he has an “assertive personality.” As he
    put it, “I’m not passive certainly. I mean I tell the people what I feel, and
    I try to do it as respectfully as possible.” Smith denied that he was ever
    inappropriately aggressive.        He testified that Reinig was aware he had
    previously headed a gun control organization.                Numerous coworkers
    testified that Smith never acted in an angry or threatening manner.
    In 2006, Reinig began the hiring process for a Communications
    Specialist IV in ECM who would have supervisory responsibilities. Reinig
    3The  Microsoft Word version saved on Reinig’s desktop computer was missing
    the paragraph where Reinig promised to try to get Smith a promotion. Smith contends
    that Reinig deleted the paragraph from her version of the evaluation as an act of fraud.
    6
    told Smith she wanted him to make the final decision on whom to hire
    because she felt she had a conflict of interest with respect to one of the
    candidates, Eric Dieterle. Dieterle had previously worked for Reinig in
    the ECM department, leaving in 2000 before Smith arrived.4                      After
    examining the thirteen candidates, Smith rated Dieterle at the top and as
    “the best person for the job,” but also told Reinig that “the pool was
    weak.” In his detailed assessment of Dieterle for Reinig, Smith wrote:
    [Dieterle] is clearly a talented writer and a competent (if not
    particularly robust) editor, and I would not hesitate to
    recommend him at the level of Communications Specialist
    III. However, to support his candidacy for Communications
    Specialist IV in the College of Engineering (as opposed, say,
    to LAS or Business) requires evidence of accomplishment
    and/or experience that he did not present in either the
    application or interview process.
    On a personal level, I would be surprised should Eric,
    if hired, not fulfill the demands of the position and fulfill
    them well. But that is an assessment based on instinct, and
    instinct in the absence of objective evidence is not sufficient
    for me to make a positive recommendation in this case. . . .
    The bottom line: Given the lack of evidence of relevant
    experience in general feature-length writing and editing,
    much less in the areas of science or technology, I cannot
    specifically recommend Eric for the position. However, given
    his obvious talent and intelligence as a writer, coupled with
    some evidence of higher-level editorial instincts and
    capabilities, I would have no objection to his joining ECM.
    We are desperately in need of higher-level writing skills if we
    are to achieve the marketing goals of the college, as I
    understand them.          However, unless we reopen a
    considerably expanded search process and/or raise salary
    levels to compete for science and technology writers at the
    highest levels, Eric may represent the best choice for the
    college at this time.
    Reinig conceded in an email to Smith, “What I really need is to hire
    another you—but that’s probably a once-in-a-lifetime deal.”
    4Dieterle
    had relocated to Reno, Nevada, but for family reasons was interested in
    moving back to Ames. By the time of trial, Dieterle was no longer working at ISU and
    had moved to Arizona.
    7
    Reinig ended up hiring Dieterle later in 2006. Although another
    qualified candidate had entered the pool by then, Reinig offered the job to
    Dieterle before giving the other candidate an opportunity to finish her
    review and application procedures.           An internal investigation of the
    hiring    process   later   revealed   “serious   violations   of   policy”   and
    “manipulation of the process and inaccurate accounts of the process by
    Ms. Reinig.”
    When Reinig began the job search for the position eventually filled
    by Dieterle, she announced that the person hired would not supervise
    Smith.      However, in January 2007, Smith’s wife fell at home and
    sustained a shoulder injury. Smith took family medical leave to attend
    to her, although he continued to do some work from home. The following
    month, Reinig emailed Smith to notify him that Dieterle would supervise
    Smith’s newsletter work.
    On March 19, when Smith returned to ISU from his leave, he went
    to Reinig’s office. Smith told Reinig he wanted to discuss her directive
    that Dieterle would be supervising Smith’s newsletter work. Reinig cut
    Smith off and said, “[T]here’s nothing to talk about really, it’s my decision
    so that’s what we’re going to do.” Smith admits he “got [his] back up,”
    expressed his frustrations, and criticized the Dieterle hire.             Reinig
    responded defensively and told Smith that if he did not like it, he could
    take his concerns to the dean. Smith felt he had never been treated that
    peremptorily before by Reinig.         As a result of their argument, Reinig
    issued Smith a “verbal warning” on March 21. Smith denied that he was
    abusive or threatening during the meeting; he simply challenged Reinig
    on her broken promises.
    Meanwhile, just before Smith went on leave in January 2007, it
    had come to his attention that ECM was not receiving payment for
    8
    certain work it was performing for an outside entity—the Council of
    Advancement for Support of Education (CASE). Smith did not raise this
    subject with Reinig in their March 19 meeting.
    Following his March 19 episode with Reinig, Smith did some
    research on his job-related rights and learned he might be eligible for a
    retroactive pay increase if he had qualified for reclassification before
    2005. He went to the ISU compensation and classification office, where
    he learned Reinig had never submitted his name for reclassification
    before 2005. At this point, Smith decided to act on Reinig’s invitation to
    “take it to the dean.”
    Smith began writing up a grievance but also consulted with an ISU
    faculty member whom he trusted. The faculty member recommended to
    Smith that he bring his concerns about the CASE billing to the Dean of
    the College of Engineering, Dr. Mark Kushner.
    On March 22, Smith emailed Dr. Kushner to request a meeting.
    Smith asked that his request to meet be kept confidential. The two got
    together   later   that   day.   During   the   meeting,   Smith   informed
    Dr. Kushner of his intention to file a formal grievance against Reinig for
    several issues relating to his employment.       He also disclosed that he
    believed ECM was not properly billing CASE for work performed by ECM
    and that he suspected misconduct on Reinig’s part.
    Dr. Kushner asked Smith to provide additional details about the
    billing issue. In the conversation, Dr. Kushner agreed to maintain the
    confidentiality of what Smith told him.
    A week later, Smith emailed Dr. Kushner a document that showed
    the hours of work ECM had completed for CASE over a six-year period,
    the actual billings submitted to CASE, and the discrepancy between
    hours billed and hours worked.      In the main text of the email, Smith
    9
    added, “As per your statement, I consider my reporting obligations
    fulfilled under university regulations, and leave the resolution of this
    issue to your office.”
    The next morning, Dr. Kushner communicated via email with the
    business   manager       of    the   College   of    Engineering,    Ellen   Reints.
    Dr. Kushner’s    email        enclosed   Smith’s      email    and    attachments.
    Dr. Kushner asked Reints, “In your opinion, has there been misconduct?
    What is the next step I need to take?” Reints responded, “I don’t think I
    understand the situation and the numbers enough to give an opinion on
    whether or not there was misconduct.”               Reints added that “you can’t
    always charge a customer for all of the hours worked,” but “there should
    be a standard practice on how this is tracked.” She concluded that she
    and Dr. Kushner should visit with Reinig to discuss the concern and
    then consider whether the controller should review the billing processes
    or an internal audit should be conducted. Responding to Reints’s email,
    Dr. Kushner agreed that they should “meet with Pam [Reinig] to give her
    a heads up.”
    Dr. Kushner met with Reinig on April 2.                 The next day, Smith
    learned from a fellow employee that Reinig was “broadcasting to people
    that [Smith] had been complaining to the dean.” As a result, Smith “was
    getting a number of stares and unfriendly responses from several ECM
    employees” that “felt like retaliation.”
    On April 9, Reinig informed Dr. Kushner in writing that she had
    previously initiated disciplinary action against Smith on March 21 and
    advised him of the verbal warning she had given Smith. She indicated
    Smith’s behavior had been “insubordinate, abusive, and threatening.”
    She noted he had a history of conflict with her and other staff members,
    but she had tolerated it because she “believed it would improve” and
    10
    Smith was “under extreme ongoing stress.”            She also stated, “In
    hindsight, I could have been timelier in bringing this action to your
    attention.”
    In another memo to Dr. Kushner dated the same day, Reinig
    disclosed plans to immediately reorganize the ECM writing staff,
    specifically to reduce or eliminate Smith’s responsibilities in certain
    areas while giving him all of the article-writing duties for the college’s
    alumni magazine.          This did not materially add to or subtract from
    Smith’s overall workload, but in his view, it “effectively severed [his]
    working relationships with every other member of the ECM staff.” Some
    of Smith’s coworkers testified at trial that they believed this shift in
    Smith’s work duties was retaliatory.
    Smith informed Reinig on April 11 that he would soon be
    submitting a formal grievance to her, although he did not discuss the
    substance. Reinig said she was expecting a grievance and pledged they
    would work through the problem together.
    Yet the next day, April 12, Reinig emailed Dr. Gene Deisinger, the
    commander of the Special Operations Unit of the ISU police.5 The email
    was entitled “Safety concern” and read in its entirety as follows:
    I’ve been referred to you by Heidi Eichorn, who
    handles HR issues for the College of Engineering. I recently
    gave a verbal reprimand to a member of my staff following a
    confrontation in my office that I would describe as
    insubordinate, abusive and threatening. This employee has
    a personal situation that keeps him under high-level,
    unrelenting stress. I am concerned about his potential to
    become violent.
    Heidi thought you might have a process for receiving a
    “heads-up” on situations like this one. Please let me know
    what I need to do.
    5Dr.   Deisinger has a Ph.D. in psychology.
    11
    On April 13, Smith began the formal grievance process by
    submitting a thirteen-page, single-spaced statement of complaint to his
    supervisor, Reinig.   The complaint covered three issues: (1) Reinig’s
    manner of hiring Dieterle, (2) Reinig’s inability to maintain proper
    working   relationships   among    her   subordinates,    and    (3) Reinig’s
    misrepresentations to Smith regarding his reclassification. Among other
    things, Smith requested his reclassification be backdated to March 2002
    and that he receive backpay with interest and benefits.
    Reinig denied Smith’s grievance on April 25, but before doing so,
    she again emailed Dr. Deisinger. This email stated as follows:
    I wanted to let you know that I will hand-deliver to
    D. Smith tomorrow a response to his grievance. He will not
    be happy with it. I will be out on travel for several days so
    his initial reaction will not impact me.
    I remain quite concerned about this employee. I
    followed the trag[edy] at V-Tech closely. So many things said
    about that individual could also be said about Dennis.
    Unless I hear otherwise from you, I will keep you
    apprised of any developments in this situation.
    Dr. Deisinger replied and asked if there had been additional concerns
    raised about Smith’s behavior and instructed her to ensure that staff
    knew how to call the ISU police in an emergency. Reinig responded to
    Dr. Deisinger that there were “no additional concerns,” but stated, “He
    remains withdrawn and generally unresponsive during staff meetings.
    He spends much of his day in his office working with the door closed.”
    After Reinig denied Smith’s grievance, Smith escalated the
    grievance to the next level to Dr. Kushner. Following a meeting with both
    Reinig and Smith, Dr. Kushner denied the grievance on May 3 without
    providing written reasoning for his decision.
    On May 8, Reinig contacted both Dr. Kushner and Eichorn in
    human resources. She requested from Eichorn that Smith be required to
    12
    work at home until the grievance process was finished and mediation
    was completed. She explained:
    The day before our meeting with Dennis, he told
    another staff member that something big was coming down
    and the staff member needed to keep his eyes/ears open.
    Clearly, he had an expectation for the meeting that did not
    materialize. He was, I believe, both hostile and angry in the
    meeting, and this explains why. His behavior since then has
    been very sullen. Whatever level of anger he had going into
    the meeting was exacerbated by the meeting itself.
    Reinig added that Smith’s hostility and anger had made her “very
    uncomfortable.”   She claimed he had been verbally abusive and had
    “little regard for some members of the staff.” She concluded, “There’s no
    clear indication that his anger would eventually translate into something
    physically abusive but there’s no guarantee that it won’t, either.”
    However, Reinig’s request that Smith be required to work from home was
    not granted.
    Two days later, on May 10, Reinig again emailed Dr. Deisinger:
    I do have [a new] concern to share with you. Dennis
    [Smith] and I met with our dean last Thursday (5-3) as part
    of the grievance process. I believe I shared my impressions
    of the meeting with you. Earlier this week, I learned from
    another member of my staff that the day before this meeting,
    Dennis made a statement to this effect: Something big is
    going to happen. You’d better be ready. Keep your eyes and
    ears open.
    I suppose the comment can be interpreted many ways.
    I assume he thought that I’d be seriously reprimanded at the
    . . . meeting. I wasn’t so his anger was likely exacerbated.
    I’ve shared the comment with my dean and our college
    HR person. I’m not sure anything can be done. However, I
    want to be on record with you that my unease is growing.
    Dennis and I have offices in the same suite. I no longer feel
    comfortable being in the suite when others are absent.
    The same day, Dr. Deisinger prepared a “Critical Incident Response
    Team Threat Assessment Protocol” that named Smith as the “subject”
    and Reinig as the “target.” In a list of possible threats forming the basis
    13
    for the assessment, “physical violence” was circled with a question mark
    next to it and “harassment/intimidation” was also circled.              The form
    indicated that Smith’s stressors included his wife’s stroke and the loss of
    support from his coworkers.
    Smith once again escalated the grievance by submitting it to the
    ISU’s grievance committee on May 23. Upon learning of Smith’s decision
    to bring the grievance to the next level, Reinig contacted Eichorn and Dr.
    Deisinger. Her email stated, “Knowing [Smith] as I do, the fact that he
    feels compelled to take another step will only exacerbate his anger. If he
    is denied at the Provost level, which I expect, he will become angrier
    still.”      She   went   on   to   indicate   she   was   “getting   increasingly
    uncomfortable as this moves on,” because she knew he was “getting
    angrier.”
    In response, Dr. Deisinger asked Reinig, “Can you describe how
    you see Dennis getting angrier? What behaviors or comments contribute
    to your assessment?” Dr. Deisinger went on:
    I understand your view of the likelihood of Dennis’ increased
    frustration/anger if a finding is not made in his favor.
    However, that he continues to utilize appropriate processes
    for his grievance is a good sign. If there is any variation from
    that, please let me know.” Dr. Deisinger also sent an email
    to a broader group (including Reinig) seeking “any
    observations of [Smith’s] recent behavior, communications
    and demeanor.
    His email requested that replies be routed only to him. Reinig responded
    with a list of concerns similar to those she had already voiced: Smith was
    withdrawn, stayed mostly in his office, and was not communicating with
    her in a collegial manner.
    On June 1, Reinig again contacted Dr. Deisinger with additional
    concerns about Smith. This time, she indicated Dieterle had “observed
    significant changes in [Smith’s] behavior over the past two weeks,
    14
    roughly coinciding with Dean Kushner’s decision to deny the grievance.”
    She said her “greatest concern” regarding Smith was that “[u]nless he is
    somehow vindicated, [Smith] will become angrier as this process
    continues.” Reinig added, “[Smith] will reach a breaking point and I have
    grave concerns about the way it will manifest itself.”     She stated that
    Dr. Kushner and supervisors on her staff were “concerned about
    [Smith’s] potential to become violent.”
    On June 4, Reinig provided Dr. Deisinger with a copy of a memo
    authored by Dieterle to her.     In it, Dieterle outlined concerns about
    Smith’s “detrimental influence” within ECM. Dieterle said, “Dennis has
    not been consistently hostile or consistently cooperative . . . , but the
    instances of negative behavior are such that his continued presence is
    generally not conducive to building an environment of professional
    collegiality.” Dieterle concluded by stating:
    Quite frankly, my sense of unease increases greatly
    with this memo: I offer these written comments with no
    small degree of hesitation, fearing the risk of becoming a
    direct target of retribution. I can only hope that those in the
    university’s administration will sincerely appreciate the
    concern this causes for me and for my family.
    Dieterle later testified he prepared the document only because Reinig had
    asked him to do so.
    After receiving the memo on June 6, Dr. Deisinger asked a
    detective to interview Dieterle. Dieterle told the detective he did not feel
    physically threatened by Smith, nor did he feel Smith was going to
    physically strike out.   His concern rather was with Smith’s “constant
    negativity.”   Dr. Deisinger passed along the interview report to
    Dr. Kushner, Eichorn, Reinig, and several others. In an accompanying
    email, Dr. Deisinger summarized, “[I]t does not appear that there are
    concerns about any specified or imminent violence.          Therefore, the
    15
    situation continues to be primarily a personnel issue, best handled
    through appropriate personnel policies and actions.”
    Reinig responded privately to Dr. Deisinger, “I agree that
    performance is an issue but I remain concerned that Dennis is reaching
    a breaking point.       The wild fluctuations in his mood clearly indicate
    problems.”     She requested either separate interviews for herself and
    Smith before the grievance committee, or the presence of a DPS officer,
    commenting, “I grow increasingly fearful for my personal safety.”6
    The grievance hearing took place on June 14.                 Despite Reinig’s
    request for separate interviews, it was decided by the hearing committee
    chair and Dr. Deisinger that there was no reason both parties should not
    appear at the same time so the committee “has the opportunity to obtain
    as much information as it can.”
    Following the hearing, the committee issued a recommendation on
    June 21. It concluded that Smith’s complaint about Dieterle’s hiring was
    outside the time limit for this kind of grievance, but recommended a
    review of the hiring process by human resources because “several issues
    came to light with regard to the hiring of Mr. Dieterle.” The committee
    also criticized Reinig’s lack of follow through in managing relationships
    among her subordinates.
    Regarding the failure to submit Smith’s name for reclassification,
    the committee initially found as follows:
    The question of whether Ms. Reinig misrepresented the
    potential of the 2002 reclassification of Mr. Smith appears to
    be another example of the lack of communication between
    Ms. Reinig and Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith appears to have been
    operating under a different understanding, one that was
    6Deisinger later testified that no adverse action was ever taken against Smith by
    the ISU Department of Public Safety.
    16
    never clarified by Ms. Reinig. Given the lack of compelling
    proof that Ms. Reinig “promised” Mr. Smith a reclassification
    in 2002 and the fact that Mr. Smith could have requested
    the reclassification himself, the hearing committee does not
    find a violation or make a remedy for this issue.
    ....
    . . . If the misrepresentation of a reclassification in
    2002 was an unfortunate misunderstanding, [Reinig] has
    made no effort to discuss the misunderstanding with Mr.
    Smith, nor has she sought to restore their professional
    relationship. This alone is evidence of very poor supervisory
    judgment.         However, if the misrepresentation was
    intentional, Ms. Reinig’s actions are completely unethical,
    and she should be subject to disciplinary action. Based on
    the evidence, we cannot conclude either way.
    However, the committee made additional findings on July 23 after
    receiving a copy of Smith’s 2002 performance review from Smith, a
    document it did not have at the time of the hearing. As noted earlier, in
    the closing paragraph of this job evaluation, Reinig had indicated she
    would submit a reclassification request for Smith in August 2002. After
    receiving this document, the committee reasoned:
    The letter is signed by Mr. Smith and Ms. Reinig and
    Ms. Reinig acknowledged the signature appeared to be hers
    on the document. The 2002 evaluation that Ms. Reinig
    produced and maintained on her computer was a Word
    document, unsigned, and did not include the highlighted
    language above but otherwise included identical content.
    Ms. Reinig was unable to explain the reason for these
    different versions of Mr. Smith’s 2002 performance review. A
    review of [the] electronic date stamp on the version on
    Ms. Reinig’s computer confirmed that this particular version
    had not been modified since June 28, 2002. Unfortunately,
    neither party could produce the original document in their
    files or in the personnel file.
    The letter presents a strong likelihood that Ms. Reinig
    misrepresented the promise to reclassify Mr. Smith. Absent
    a plausible explanation by Ms. Reinig, the committee is left
    with another example of Ms. Reinig’s very poor supervisory
    judgment and very poor record-keeping. We believe she
    should be subject to disciplinary action.
    Following receipt of the committee’s revised recommendation, ISU’s
    Executive Vice President and Provost, Elizabeth Hoffman, accepted it.
    17
    She ordered disciplinary action against Reinig and directed Dr. Kushner
    to report back to her “when and how that disciplinary action has been
    carried out.”
    On August 7, ISU’s equal opportunity and diversity office
    conducted a review of Dieterle’s hiring. The reviewer concluded “that the
    search was not conducted according to the policies and procedures set
    forth to promote consistent and fair treatment to all candidates.” She
    further noted that Reinig had “recently changed the funding for Dennis
    Smith’s salary from continuous funds to grant funds.”7 Smith was the
    only one of Reinig’s subordinates who had been moved to grant funds or
    “soft funds.” The reviewer could see no reason for moving the funding for
    Smith’s position to soft funds and discounted Reinig’s explanation for
    doing so. She recommended that Reinig reverse this decision.
    On August 16, Smith submitted a formal written appeal of the
    provost’s   acceptance      of   the   committee’s   recommendation    to   ISU
    President Gregory Geoffroy.8 This was Smith’s first communication with
    ISU’s president.      In his seven-page, single-spaced appeal letter, Smith
    complained about not receiving backpay despite the finding that Reinig
    had acted wrongfully in not getting him reclassified.              Smith also
    identified several acts of retaliation on the part of Reinig, including the
    removal of other staff assistance from the alumni magazine, the
    withdrawal of the newsletters from Smith’s portfolio, and a pay raise well
    below the average raise given to others in ECM. Smith’s letter did not
    mention ECM’s failure to charge CASE for work performed.
    7A  position supported by grant funds was in jeopardy of being eliminated,
    should the funds no longer be available.
    8Smith   never met with President Geoffroy.
    18
    On August 28, Smith met with President Geoffroy’s executive
    assistant.      Along with his grievance issues, Smith brought up his
    complaints about Reinig’s alleged financial improprieties.
    President Geoffroy sent Smith a letter regarding his appeal on
    September 7. His letter directed that Smith be compensated for the loss
    of salary resulting from Reinig’s failure to seek a reclassification in 2002.
    In the same letter, President Geoffroy noted:
    Your appeal has raised other important issues that do
    not fall within the scope of a grievance, such as hiring
    practices and use of funds. I have decided to order an
    internal audit of ECM to review compliance with law and
    policy in ECM.
    Smith     wrote   back    to   President    Geoffroy     on   approximately
    September 12. While his letter criticized President Geoffroy’s resolution
    of his appeal as inadequate, it did not mention the allegations of financial
    improprieties.9
    Provost Hoffman calculated the amount of retroactive salary and
    benefits with interest due to Smith at $30,033.66. This money was then
    paid to Smith.       Provost Hoffman further expressed concerns about
    Smith’s raise for fiscal year 2007–2008.          The original recommendation
    had been for Smith to receive a 1.43% raise, but he had actually received
    a two percent raise. Provost Hoffman noted that Reinig had received a
    3.41% pay increase, and the average increase for the rest of the staff was
    4.32%. Provost Hoffman indicated Dr. Kushner should “be prepared to
    offer written justification for the salary increase determination for
    Mr. Smith.”
    9Smith  sent additional letters to President Geoffroy on December 10 and
    December 14 regarding his grievances, neither of which mentioned the alleged financial
    improprieties.
    19
    Smith filed a further appeal to the board of regents on October 10,
    challenging the adequacy of the remedies provided by President
    Geoffroy’s ruling.     In the meantime, Smith also had initiated another
    grievance.10    In his appeal to the regents, Smith noted the president’s
    ruling did not address his requests for separation from supervision by
    Reinig, reversal of the acts of retaliation taken by Reinig during the
    grievance process, and the restoration of his working relationships.
    Smith also alleged Reinig had participated in fraud and forgery by
    altering documents submitted during the grievance process, and he
    further objected to the method of determining his 2007–2008 pay
    increase. On November 21, Reinig emailed to Dieterle, “I will reiterate to
    [Dr. Kushner] that [Smith’s] not just a cancer, he’s a very real threat to
    personal safety.”
    Around Thanksgiving, Dieterle and Dr. Kushner had a meeting in
    which concerns related to Smith were discussed. Following that meeting,
    Dieterle wrote a memo to Dr. Kushner that he asked to be kept
    confidential. In the memo, Dieterle spoke of
    [n]umerous expressions (to me personally) by two
    other ECM employees of their fear of physical retaliation by
    Dennis. Specifically, I recently consoled a tearful employee
    who feared that the Omaha mall shootings were an example
    of what could happen in ECM, referring directly to a fear of
    Dennis.
    Why I am concerned
    Dennis has never explicitly or implicitly threatened me
    or anyone else in my presence. He does, in my opinion,
    consistently appear to be sullen, if not angry, and does not,
    through his demeanor or actions, invite collegiality or
    collaboration.
    10Smith ultimately filed five grievances, which he characterized as “like Russian
    nesting dolls.”
    20
    I have a limited degree of training (intermediate levels
    of two martial arts and qualification for a concealed weapons
    permit in another state) that emphasized self-defense
    awareness. Based on that training, and on what I observe
    here daily, I would like to be clear that I make myself
    consistently aware of Dennis’ physical location in this office
    and of his demeanor, and I have mentally rehearsed my
    alternatives if he were to become openly threatening. How
    many times have these words appeared in a news story? “He
    was a loner who felt unappreciated, and was angry at his
    supervisor and coworkers.” I do not intend to become the
    next unwitting victim.
    Dieterle acknowledged that, when he wrote this memo, Reinig was
    contemplating becoming the advancement director full-time. This would
    leave open the directorship of ECM. Dieterle also admitted that he and
    Smith would be two logical internal candidates for the ECM director
    position. Dieterle further admitted that when he wrote the memo, Reinig
    was telling him that she was considering Dieterle’s wife for a stay-at-
    home, free-lance, part-time position.
    On December 4, Reinig again communicated with Dr. Deisinger.
    This time she wrote:
    The situation with Dennis Smith continues and he has
    become noticeably more agitated. He spends much of his
    time with his door closed engaged in loud discussions with
    another colleague and, I believe, his attorney. Snatches of
    these conversations are often overheard by Eric Dieterle,
    whose own office is separated from Dennis’ office by a wall.
    Eric believes (and will tell you so) that Dennis is obsessed to
    the point of near complete irrationality. Of course, this
    heightens my personal safety concerns.
    I have been advised to develop a personal safety plan,
    e.g., keeping pepper spray in my desk or purse, in case
    Dennis confronts me in a threatening manner. I’ve also been
    advised to contact your office for the quickest and most
    efficient procedure to follow in the event of an emergency.
    Dr. Deisinger’s handwritten note indicates that he left Reinig a phone
    message warning against keeping pepper spray as a “possible violation of
    [ISU] policy.”
    21
    In January 2008, Dr. Kushner put Reinig on administrative leave.
    The internal audit revealed that improper payments had been made by
    CASE to Reinig personally and that Reinig had lied about the CASE
    billings. On January 16, President Geoffroy wrote Smith, informing him
    that Reinig was no longer directing ECM and that Smith would not report
    to her in the future.       Reinig ultimately resigned in March 2008 under
    threat of immediate termination. Dieterle was named interim director of
    ECM, with Smith reporting to him.                In July 2008, Dieterle became
    permanent director of ECM.11
    Smith testified that after Reinig was put on administrative leave,
    “My work conditions gradually improved. The atmosphere in ECM was
    much, much better.”          Some but not all of Smith’s former newsletter
    duties were restored. Yet he still felt the workplace was “dysfunctional.”
    On April 25, Smith filed another grievance that alleged misconduct by
    Dr. Kushner and Provost Hoffman. That grievance eventually escalated
    to another committee hearing. The committee found no retaliation by the
    dean or the provost in relation to Smith’s reporting of alleged financial
    11An  audit later conducted by the state auditor revealed that ECM had not
    received $92,495.06 in outside payments it was due. At the same time, the state
    auditor found that $58,505.08 had been improperly routed to Reinig personally and
    deposited in her personal bank account.
    The State argues that this audit shows a different type of irregularity than Smith
    had reported. Smith’s complaint was that ECM had performed work that was not being
    billed. The state auditor found that Smith’s allegation described a common practice:
    “Various Departments within the University routinely provide administrative services to
    professional organizations at little to no charge in order to further the cause of the
    profession.” From the state auditor’s perspective, what was objectionable was that
    billings had actually been generated but not sent. Even worse, Reinig had diverted
    payments that should have gone to ECM to herself to the tune of $58,505.08.
    However, Iowa Code section 70A.28 (2007) merely requires that “the employee
    reasonably believes the information evidences a violation of law or rule,
    mismanagement, [or] a gross abuse of funds.” The State does not contest that Smith
    had such a reasonable belief. Nor does the State dispute that Smith’s reporting
    ultimately resulted in the ISU’s uncovering Reinig’s improper receipt of outside funds.
    22
    misconduct or his filing of grievances. The committee also recommended
    a draft of a negative 2007 performance evaluation of Smith prepared by
    Reinig be removed from his file and his 2008 raise be elevated to 4.32%
    to match the ECM unit average.           The findings of the committee were
    adopted by President Geoffroy on August 21, and the recommended
    actions took place. Smith’s source of compensation was also changed
    back from soft funds to hard funds.
    Smith filed a further grievance on September 5. In it, he alleged
    that Dieterle and others had falsely made accusations that Smith had
    made threats of physical violence against his coworkers. He requested
    that the ISU Department of Public Safety be ordered to look into the
    allegations and that those who made false claims be disciplined
    appropriately. Though he escalated the grievance, Smith was denied a
    hearing   because      President     Geoffroy   determined    it   was     “not   an
    appropriate matter for the grievance process,” as Smith was merely
    seeking the discipline of other employees and asking for information that
    had   been   provided     by   other    employees    with    an    expectation    of
    confidentiality.
    On April 16, 2009, Smith filed a claim with the state appeal board
    and, on April 17, he filed suit against ISU, the board of regents, Reinig,
    Dieterle, and Dr. Kushner.           The petition alleged the three named
    employees had committed defamation; wrongful interference with
    employment,        business,   and    professional   relationships;      intentional
    infliction of emotional distress; violations of Iowa Code § 70A.28(2) (2007)
    (whistleblower protection statute); and conspiracy to engage in the
    wrongful acts.      It further alleged a breach of contract by ISU and the
    board of regents.
    23
    In August 2008, Dr. Kushner left ISU. An interim dean took over
    for a period of time. In July 2009, Dr. Jonathan Wickert became the new
    dean of the College of Engineering.          At the time of his appointment,
    Dr. Wickert was advised of Smith’s grievance history and Smith’s
    pending lawsuit against ISU and the other defendants.                  Shortly
    thereafter, in October 2009, the College of Engineering was forced to cut
    $2 million from its budget (a ten percent cut) because of midyear
    deappropriations by the State. Dr. Wickert testified that he did not want
    the budget cuts to affect the academic programs, and therefore he
    decided the administrative units of the college would absorb the required
    budget cuts.      All administrative units were affected, and a total of
    twenty-two positions were eliminated from the College of Engineering.
    Dr. Wickert decided the ECM unit would be reduced from eleven
    employees to four employees, would no longer perform outside work, and
    would     be   retitled   Engineering   Communications     Relations   (ECR).
    Dr. Wickert’s research indicated that ECM was quite large relative to the
    communications departments at other comparable engineering colleges
    such as Penn State, Ohio State, Texas, Illinois, and Purdue, which
    typically had two, three, or four employees.         He determined that the
    communications unit should focus in the future exclusively on promoting
    the mission of the College of Engineering. Dr. Wickert’s vision for ECR
    entailed an emphasis on new types of media, branding and public
    relations, and materials that would be a light and fast read.
    Dieterle was kept on as the head of the new department, the other
    ten positions were eliminated, and three new positions with new job
    descriptions were created: web designer, digital media specialist, and
    communications specialist.       The existing employees, including Smith,
    received a notice on May 10, 2010, that their positions would be
    24
    eliminated effective in August as part of a budget plan including
    reorganization. All were allowed to apply for the new positions. Smith
    filed an additional grievance in response to the notification he received
    on May 10 that his job was being eliminated.
    Dieterle worked with the human relations department in drafting
    the job descriptions for the three positions in the new unit.          The
    communications specialist job description indicated that a majority of
    the work would involve developing digital communications and web
    content. A master’s degree and experience with graphic design software
    were listed as “preferred” qualifications.
    Dieterle, however, was not involved in the hiring decisions.
    Dr. Wickert did not want him interviewing and considering people with
    whom he had previously worked.         Therefore, Dr. Wickert appointed a
    search committee.      Originally, there were fifteen candidates for the
    communications specialist hire. Smith and Jessica Strawn, a coworker
    in ECM, were the two finalists. The committee’s report to Dr. Wickert
    praised both candidates, indicated that the committee had received very
    positive references on both candidates, and noted some limitations of
    each candidate. The committee observed that Strawn, unlike Smith, had
    an advanced degree (an M.A. from ISU), more aptitude and experience
    with web-page building and related software, and more ideas and original
    thinking in her interview for advancing the College of Engineering’s
    mission. Dr. Wickert ultimately decided to hire Strawn and testified he
    did so because of the points cited in the search committee’s report.
    Several former coworkers of Smith testified at trial that the
    reorganization of ECM seemed retaliatory because that department
    suffered the largest personnel reductions even though it had operated on
    a cost-recovery basis.     Smith testified that he did not believe the
    25
    reorganization was conducted as part of a good-faith effort by the college.
    Smith also maintained that, although he had the minimum qualifications
    for the new position, he felt the preferred qualifications were written so
    as to disadvantage his candidacy. Another former coworker felt that the
    reference to graphic design in the job description was intended to
    disadvantage Smith, although the search committee actually listed
    graphic design as a “weakness” for Strawn, the successful candidate.
    Smith also believed he was more qualified than Strawn even under
    the job description as written, at least “to the extent I was aware of
    [Strawn’s] qualifications.” As he put it:
    I certainly have infinitely—not infinitely, but considerably
    more experience, not only in writing and editing, but—in
    both large and smaller formats, but I’d been doing video
    production for several years. I’d been working in content
    management systems. And I didn’t know what her design
    qualifications were. Mine are rudimentary, but as far as I
    knew, so were hers.
    Several months before the reorganization occurred at ECM, there
    had been a January meeting attended by Dr. Wickert, Dieterle, Eichorn,
    and three others concerning ECM.            At the meeting, according to
    handwritten notes produced at trial (Exhibit 130), there may have been
    discussion of “who stays.” Six names were listed thereunder, including
    Dieterle, a person who was identified as a web designer, a person who
    was identified as a digital media specialist, two persons identified as
    graphic designers, and a “communications specialist—Adobe products,
    content management—Jessi Strawn.” On the next page, Smith and two
    other employees were listed as individuals who “would consider” an early
    retirement incentive program.     When later questioned, Dr. Wickert did
    not recall the meeting.
    26
    At the time of trial, Smith was still unemployed despite numerous
    job applications. Because of what happened to him at ISU, Smith had to
    see a psychologist starting in August 2007.      Smith was diagnosed as
    suffering from extreme stress and anxiety that significantly impaired his
    ability to live his life happily.   Smith became physically ill and light-
    headed. He was not sleeping and lost weight.
    Smith withdrew his claim from the state appeal board, as there
    had been no action on it within six months, and filed a second lawsuit
    against ISU, the board of regents, Reinig, Dieterle, and Dr. Kushner on
    September 10. The second lawsuit reiterated the emotional distress and
    statutory whistleblower claims and recited the state appeal board’s
    failure to act. The court later consolidated the two actions.
    The attorney general certified that Dieterle and Dr. Kushner were
    acting within the scope of their employment with ISU and asked that the
    State be substituted for them as a defendant.             See 
    Iowa Code § 669.5
    (2)(a). ISU and the board of regents also filed a motion to dismiss
    the breach of contract claim, which was granted on the basis that Smith
    had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies related to that claim.
    Smith agreed to dismiss the individual claims against Dieterle and
    Dr. Kushner and to have the State substituted for them. This resulted in
    the elimination of the defamation claim and the intentional interference
    with contract rights claim with respect to the actions of those two
    individual defendants. See 
    id.
     § 669.14(4).
    Prior to trial, the district court determined the whistleblower claim
    under Iowa Code section 70A.28(2) was equitable in nature. However, at
    the close of evidence, the parties stipulated that the jury would decide
    liability on the section 70A.28(2) claim, with the court determining only
    27
    damages.12 Additionally, at the close of evidence, the parties stipulated
    that Reinig—in addition to Dieterle and Dr. Kushner—was acting within
    the scope of employment, resulting in the elimination of the defamation
    and interference claims against her as well and the State’s assumption of
    her remaining liability. Thus, by the time the case went to the jury, the
    State was effectively the only defendant.13
    The jury found for Smith on both the intentional infliction of
    emotional distress and the statutory whistleblower claims. It awarded
    Smith $500,000 in damages on the emotional distress claim. The court
    then awarded additional damages of $784,027 on the section 70A.28(2)
    claim.14 The court overruled the State’s motions for directed verdict, on
    which it had reserved a ruling, as well as the State’s posttrial motions.
    12In   its posttrial findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court
    specifically referred to this stipulation. The State now denies there was such a
    stipulation, and we have been unable to find it in the record. However, the question of
    the State’s liability on the whistleblower claim was submitted to the jury, and the State
    did not object to this verdict form. Also, nothing in the record indicates the verdict
    would be only advisory.
    Most salient to us is the dialogue that occurred when the jury sent back a
    question, asking why it was not being asked to decide damages on the whistleblower
    claim. The district court proposed to inform the jury that it could not provide any
    additional instructions. Counsel for the State thereupon objected as follows:
    I would object to providing that direction to the jury because I think they
    are confused about damages and that they should be given some
    guidance. My proposal is that after question number three on the
    special verdict form that language be inserted to say if your answer to
    question number three is yes comma, the amount of damages will be
    determined by the Court.
    The foregoing makes clear that the State understood the jury’s role was to determine
    liability on the whistleblower claim, and the court’s was to determine damages.
    13Also, the conspiracy claim had been eliminated because only one defendant
    (the State) was remaining and a party cannot conspire with itself. See Basic Chems.,
    Inc. v. Benson, 
    251 N.W.2d 220
    , 233 (Iowa 1977).
    14The  district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that were
    largely taken verbatim from Smith’s submission. See Soults Farms, Inc. v. Schafer, 
    797 N.W.2d 92
    , 97 (Iowa 2011) (discussing this practice).
    28
    The State appealed, challenging both recoveries. With respect to
    the emotional distress claim, it argued: (1) Smith’s exclusive remedy was
    in workers’ compensation, (2) the claim was the functional equivalent of
    defamation and thus barred by Iowa Code section 669.14(4), (3) Smith
    failed to present sufficient evidence of “outrageous” conduct to support a
    jury verdict, (4) Smith failed to present sufficient evidence of severe or
    extreme emotional distress, and (5) the damages awarded by the jury
    were excessive. Regarding the statutory whistleblower claim, the State
    urged: (1) Smith did not engage in protected conduct or, at most, the
    protected conduct was limited to his communications with President
    Geoffroy; (2) Smith did not lose his job or suffer other adverse work
    consequences in reprisal for his communications with President
    Geoffroy; (3) damages for emotional distress and harm to reputation are
    not recoverable under the whistleblower statute; and (4) the award of
    frontpay was speculative and inappropriate. We transferred the case to
    the court of appeals.
    The court of appeals upheld the intentional infliction of emotional
    distress award in favor of Smith but set aside the whistleblower award.
    It rejected the State’s argument that the workers’ compensation statute
    foreclosed an emotional distress claim.    It further found the conduct
    underlying the emotional distress claim went beyond defamation, and
    therefore, that claim was not “functionally equivalent” to defamation.
    The court of appeals also concluded substantial evidence supported a
    finding of outrageous conduct, a rational jury could find that Smith had
    experienced severe emotional distress, and the award of damages was
    not excessive. However, turning to the whistleblower claim, the court of
    appeals found that Smith had failed to prove a causal relationship
    between his disclosures to President Geoffroy and any actions of reprisal
    29
    taken against him. The court stressed the wrongful conduct predated
    the report to Geoffroy and continued after it, but did “not support an
    inference the wrongful conduct was ‘as a reprisal for’ Smith’s disclosure
    of Reinig’s possible violation of the law and ISU’s policies to Geoffroy,
    especially since the ‘retaliation’ began months before Smith’s disclosure.”
    Both ISU and Smith sought further review, and we granted their
    applications.
    II. Standard of Review.
    The State contends the evidence was insufficient to support the
    jury findings that it was liable for intentional infliction of emotional
    distress and violations of Iowa Code section 70A.28(2).       We review a
    district court’s ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
    verdict for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; Lee v. State, 
    815 N.W.2d 731
    , 736 (Iowa 2012). “Our role is to decide whether there was sufficient
    evidence to justify submitting the case to the jury when viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Van Sickle
    Constr. Co. v. Wachovia Commercial Mortg., Inc., 
    783 N.W.2d 684
    , 687
    (Iowa 2010).    To justify submitting the case to the jury, substantial
    evidence must support each element of the plaintiff’s claim. 
    Id.
     We will
    find evidence is substantial if “reasonable minds would accept the
    evidence as adequate to reach the same findings.”       Doe v. Cent. Iowa
    Health Sys., 
    766 N.W.2d 787
    , 790 (Iowa 2009).
    The State also contends the intentional infliction of emotional
    distress claim was barred by either Iowa Code section 85.20 or Iowa
    Code section 669.14(4). Likewise, the State contends the district court
    could not award damages for reputational harm or “frontpay” under
    section 70A.28(5).   “The district court’s interpretation of a statute is
    30
    reviewed for correction of errors at law.”            L.F. Noll Inc. v. Eviglo, 
    816 N.W.2d 391
    , 393 (Iowa 2012).
    Additionally, the State challenges the district court’s finding that
    Smith suffered loss of his job as a result of statutorily protected
    whistleblowing.       We review equitable matters, including the district
    court’s award of damages, de novo. State ex rel. Miller v. Vertrue, Inc.,
    
    834 N.W.2d 12
    , 43 (Iowa 2013) (considering de novo the district court’s
    denial of civil penalties in an equity case); Orr v. Mortvedt, 
    735 N.W.2d 610
    , 613–15 (Iowa 2007) (reviewing de novo the district court’s refusal to
    award damages in a case tried in equity); Pflepsen v. Univ. of Osteopathic
    Med., 
    519 N.W.2d 390
    , 391–92 (Iowa 1994) (conducting a de novo review
    of an equity case and reversing the district court’s award of damages).
    We give weight to the district court’s findings of fact, especially the
    credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P.
    6.904(3)(g); Green v. Wilderness Ridge, L.L.C., 
    777 N.W.2d 699
    , 702 (Iowa
    2010).15
    III. Analysis.
    A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim.
    1. Exclusivity of workers’ compensation remedy. The State argues
    the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
    intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because Smith’s
    exclusive remedy lies under the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Act (IWCA).
    See 
    Iowa Code § 85.20
     (making the rights of the employee under the
    IWCA exclusive in certain circumstances).
    15Both parties concede in their respective appellate briefs that we should apply a
    de novo standard of review to the remedies entered by the district court on the statutory
    whistleblower claim.
    31
    The State’s argument runs like this. First, we have held that “the
    term ‘personal injuries,’ as used in Iowa Code section 85.3(1), includes a
    mental injury standing alone,” and “an employee’s pure nontraumatic
    mental injury ‘arising out of and in the course of employment’ is
    compensable under chapter 85 of the Iowa Code.” See Dunlavey v. Econ.
    Fire & Cas. Co., 
    526 N.W.2d 845
    , 851 (Iowa 1995).       In Dunlavey, two
    employees sustained mental injuries as a result of what they alleged was
    a campaign of intimidation against them by their supervisors that
    resulted in increased stress, increased workloads, and harsh criticisms
    of their performance. 
    Id. at 848
    .
    Second, the State acknowledges that an intentional tort claim
    against a coworker would ordinarily not fall under exclusive IWCA
    jurisdiction.   See 
    Iowa Code § 85.20
    (2) (foreclosing non-IWCA claims
    against coemployees “provided that such injury . . . arises out of and in
    the course of such employment and is not caused by the other
    employee’s gross negligence amounting to such lack of care as to amount
    to wanton neglect for the safety of another”).
    Yet the State notes that Smith’s claims against all of the individual
    employees—Reinig, Dieterle, and Dr. Kushner—were dismissed pursuant
    to section 669.5(2)(a) and the parties’ stipulations, and the State was
    substituted as a party.   Therefore, the State argues no claims against
    coworkers exist, and section 85.20(1) rather than section 85.20(2)
    applies.   See 
    id.
     § 85.20(1) (foreclosing non-IWCA claims “[a]gainst the
    employee’s employer” with no exception for gross negligence).
    But Smith responds that he is actually complaining about
    intentional tortious acts committed by coworkers. Those coworkers, he
    observes, are no longer in the case only because of a technicality: Iowa
    Code section 669.5 requires the substitution of the State for individual
    32
    state employees when the latter are sued and were acting within the
    scope of their employment. Thus, section 669.5(2)(a) provides:
    Upon certification by the attorney general that a defendant
    in a suit was an employee of the state acting within the
    scope of the employee’s office or employment at the time of
    the incident upon which the claim is based, the suit
    commenced upon the claim shall be deemed to be an action
    against the state under the provisions of this chapter, and if
    the state is not already a defendant, the state shall be
    substituted as the defendant in place of the employee.
    Id. § 669.5(2)(a) (emphasis added).
    We need not describe the parties’ arguments further because we
    have previously decided the underlying issue. In McGill v. Fish, we held a
    claim for gross negligence against state coworkers could be pursued
    under the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA) regardless of the substitution
    provision in the Act. 
    790 N.W.2d 113
    , 120 (Iowa 2010). In that case, a
    state university employee injured in the university’s physical plant
    attempted to sue coemployees for gross negligence without complying
    with the ITCA’s administrative claim provisions.       
    Id. at 116
    .     The
    employee argued that if he had to proceed under the ITCA, he would be
    denied all relief because the state would be substituted as defendant,
    and “section 85.20 bars all claims by injured workers against employers,
    including gross negligence claims.” 
    Id. at 120
    . We rejected this line of
    reasoning, and explained:
    [T]here is no indication whatsoever our legislature sought to
    bar coemployee gross negligence claims by state workers
    when it amended the procedures in the ITCA to require the
    state to be substituted as a defendant in the lawsuit once it
    is determined the coemployee acted in the course of
    employment.
    
    Id.
     Thus, we reversed the district court, holding the injured employee’s
    action should have been dismissed for failure to file an administrative
    claim as required by the ITCA. 
    Id. at 121
    .
    33
    Applying McGill to this case, we agree with Smith that his claims
    against Reinig, Dieterle, and Dr. Kushner for intentional infliction of
    emotional distress are exempt from the IWCA under section 85.20(2) and
    do not lose that exemption because the State was substituted as a party
    under the ITCA.
    2. Immunity for defamation claims.       The ITCA does not permit
    claims arising out of “abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
    deceit, or interference with contract rights.”     
    Iowa Code § 669.14
    (4).
    However, it does not foreclose claims for “intentional infliction of
    emotional distress.”   See Dickerson v. Mertz, 
    547 N.W.2d 208
    , 213–14
    (Iowa 1996).   Nonetheless, the State contends that Smith’s cause of
    action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is the functional
    equivalent of a defamation claim and therefore barred by sovereign
    immunity.   The State relies in part on our recent decision in Minor v.
    State to support this argument.      See 
    819 N.W.2d 383
    , 406–08 (Iowa
    2012).
    In our previous cases, including Minor, we have made clear that if
    a claim is the functional equivalent of a section 669.14 exception to the
    ITCA, the State has not waived its sovereign immunity. See id.; Trobaugh
    v. Sondag, 
    668 N.W.2d 577
    , 584 (Iowa 2003); Hawkeye By-Prods., Inc. v.
    State, 
    419 N.W.2d 410
    , 411 (Iowa 1988); Greene v. Friend of Ct., 
    406 N.W.2d 433
    , 436 (Iowa 1987). Our focus is not on the terminology used
    to describe the claim but instead on the “type of wrong inflicted.”
    Trobaugh, 
    668 N.W.2d at 584
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    However, “[a] mere conceivable similarity between issues arising in the
    claim . . . and issues which may arise in a claim [exempted from the
    ITCA] is insufficient to establish the nexus of functional equivalency.” 
    Id. at 585
     (declining to find a claim for legal malpractice was the functional
    34
    equivalent of false imprisonment, abuse of process, or malicious
    prosecution and therefore barred by the ITCA); see also Minor, 819
    N.W.2d at 406.
    In Minor, a mother whose child had been removed from her care
    sued the state and two Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS)
    employees     after   the    child-in-need-of-assistance       proceeding     was
    dismissed and the child had been returned to her. 819 N.W.2d at 388.
    She alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress as one of her
    claims.   Id. at 392.     The essence of the claim was that in order to
    intentionally inflict emotional distress, a DHS worker obtained false
    information from a third party and presented it to the juvenile court. Id.
    at 407. As we put it, “[T]he basis of Minor’s claims would not exist but
    for Grabe’s alleged misrepresentation to the juvenile court.” Id. at 408.
    After reviewing the facts of the case, we determined all of the mother’s
    claims were the functional equivalent of misrepresentation or deceit. Id.
    at 407.
    This case is different.      We agree with the court of appeals that
    “[t]he underlying conduct here is far broader than false statements.” It is
    true that some of the most distasteful conduct in this case took place
    when Reinig emailed Dr. Deisinger about Smith’s alleged mental
    instability in order to divert attention from her own embezzlement of
    state funds. However, there was a good deal more. Reinig lied to Smith
    for years about putting him in for a promotion.16 She isolated him on
    the job. She changed the source of funding for his job and denied him a
    16Notably, the State does not argue on appeal that Smith’s emotional distress
    claims are the functional equivalent of deceit or misrepresentation, or some
    combination of those torts plus defamation. We therefore have no occasion to decide
    whether this would be a ground to foreclose those claims.
    35
    salary increase warranted by his performance.           In short, although
    Smith’s emotional distress claim would undeniably be weaker if Reinig
    (and, to a lesser extent, Dieterle) had not attempted to besmirch his
    character, we agree with the court of appeals that the claim is based on a
    whole series of acts, only some of which involve statements about Smith.
    “We have . . . been guided by interpretations of the [Federal Tort
    Claims Act (FTCA)], which was the model for the ITCA, when the wording
    of the two Acts is identical or similar.” Thomas v. Gavin, 
    838 N.W.2d 518
    , 525 (Iowa 2013). Like the ITCA, the FTCA indicates the waiver of
    sovereign immunity does not apply to
    [a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false
    imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
    process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
    interference with contract rights.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2680
    (h) (2006).
    To determine whether a claim “arises out of” one of the torts listed
    in § 2680(h), federal courts “look beyond a plaintiff’s classification of the
    cause of action to examine whether the conduct upon which the claim is
    based constitutes one of the torts listed in § 2680(h).” Sabow v. United
    States, 
    93 F.3d 1445
    , 1456 (9th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
    Neustadt, 
    366 U.S. 696
    , 703, 
    81 S. Ct. 1294
    , 1299, 
    6 L. Ed. 2d 614
    , 620
    (1961) (“We must then look beyond the literal meaning of the language to
    ascertain the real cause of complaint.”         (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.)); Limone v. United States, 
    579 F.3d 79
    , 92 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The
    approach that we have outlined [to determine whether a claim arises out
    of a specifically enumerated tort] necessitates a fact-sensitive, case-
    specific inquiry. In performing that tamisage, substance trumps form;
    an inquiring court must look past the nomenclature employed by the
    plaintiff and focus on the actual nature of the plaintiff’s grievance.”);
    36
    Truman v. United States, 
    26 F.3d 592
    , 594 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Even if a
    plaintiff styles a claim so that it is not one that is enumerated in section
    2680(h), the plaintiff’s claim is still barred when the underlying
    governmental conduct essential to the plaintiff’s claim can fairly be read
    to arise out of conduct that would establish an excepted cause of action.”
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
    The inquiry is “whether conduct that constitutes an enumerated
    tort is ‘essential’ to a plaintiff’s claim.” Sabow, 
    93 F.3d at 1456
    ; see also
    Thomas-Lazear v. F.B.I., 
    851 F.2d 1202
    , 1207 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Put
    another way, the Government’s actions that constitute a claim for
    slander are essential to Thomas-Lazear’s claim for negligent infliction of
    emotional distress.”); Metz v. United States, 
    788 F.2d 1528
    , 1535 (11th
    Cir. 1986) (noting an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
    was barred by § 2680 when “the government’s actions that constitute a
    claim for false arrest” were essential to the plaintiff’s claims for
    intentional infliction of emotional distress, and any differences between
    the two claims were “merely theoretical and not actual under the facts of
    the case”).
    Under the FTCA, factual overlap with a barred cause of action is
    not enough to bring a claim under the § 2680(h) immunity. See Truman,
    
    26 F.3d at 595
     (“ ‘[T]he partial overlap between . . . two tort actions does
    not support the conclusion that if one is excepted under the Tort Claims
    Act, the other must be as well.’ ” (quoting Block v. Neal, 
    460 U.S. 289
    ,
    298, 
    103 S. Ct. 1089
    , 1094, 
    75 L. Ed. 2d 67
    , 75 (1983)); Santiago-
    Ramirez v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Def., 
    984 F.2d 16
    , 21 (1st Cir. 1993)
    (“[A]lthough appellant’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional
    distress may overlap with a claim for false imprisonment, which is
    excepted, it does not follow that the first claim is also excepted.”).
    37
    In cases alleging negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
    distress, when the court determines the underlying conduct is broader or
    more extensive  than the conduct underlying a tort enumerated in
    § 2680(h), or the conduct is relevant for a reason not contemplated by
    the excepted tort, the plaintiff will be allowed to proceed with claims
    despite underlying conduct that overlaps with excepted torts.              See
    David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort
    Claims Act, 
    8 U. St. Thomas L.J. 375
    , 390 (2011) (“[T]oday a consensus
    exists that—so long as they do not simply amount to artful attempts to
    ‘plead    around’   excluded   torts—[intentional   infliction   of   emotional
    distress] claims are not barred by the FTCA.”).
    For example, in Limone, plaintiffs brought intentional infliction of
    emotional distress claims against the government after evidence came to
    light that government employees had elicited unreliable testimony that
    led to their conviction and incarceration for murder and then covered up
    exonerating evidence. 579 F.3d at 84–87. The government argued the
    emotional distress claim “arose out of” a malicious prosecution claim and
    was, therefore, barred by the FTCA. Id. at 87. The court disagreed and
    found the claim did not “rest on proof of conduct that traditionally
    comprises an excepted tort”:
    [T]he conduct undergirding the plaintiffs’ claims for
    intentional infliction of emotional distress is broader than
    that traditionally associated with the tort of malicious
    prosecution in that it includes malfeasance that postdates
    the scapegoats’ convictions, such as efforts by the FBI to
    cover up its misdeeds (a topic to which we shall return).
    And, finally, the plaintiffs’ intentional infliction claims
    require proof not only that the FBI’s conduct was something
    akin to malicious, but also that it was extreme and
    outrageous. These are substantive distinctions.
    Id. at 92–93.     The court went on to note that although “the plaintiffs
    pleaded claims of malicious prosecution arising out of essentially the
    38
    same facts that supported their intentional infliction claims,” this did not
    bar their claims as they had a right to “plead alternative theories of
    liability, and their exercise of that right did not debar them from an
    independent review of each set of claims.” Id. at 93 (citation omitted).
    Finally, the court warned against comparing damages as a means of
    determining whether one claim arose out of another:
    In a related vein, the government posits that because
    the district court found that the same damages flowed from
    both the alleged malicious prosecution and the alleged
    intentional infliction of emotional distress, the latter claims
    necessarily arise out of the former. This is sophistry, pure
    and simple. The proper inquiry focuses upon the actor’s
    tortious conduct, not the plaintiff’s damages.
    Id. (citation omitted).
    To the same effect is Sabow. There, the family of a Marine brought
    claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
    government following the Marine’s death and a subsequent, allegedly
    flawed investigation into his death by military officials. 
    93 F.3d at
    1449–
    50. The district court held the emotional distress claims, insofar as they
    were based on statements made to the wife of the deceased Marine
    during a meeting with Marine officers and an investigation into the
    medical license of the Marine’s brother, were barred by § 2680(h). Id. at
    1456–57. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. Id. at 1457.
    Although the district court had concluded the claims were covered
    by the § 2680(h) exception for defamation because the wife relied on the
    officers’ use of the terms “crook” and “felon” regarding the Marine as the
    basis of her claim, the Ninth Circuit found this was too narrow a view.
    Id. It noted the spouse alleged a “far more extensive pattern of extreme
    and outrageous conduct” during the meeting. Id. As the Ninth Circuit
    explained, the statements may have been a part of the pattern of
    39
    conduct, but their relevance was not whether they were false but
    whether the content and abusive delivery of the statements were extreme
    and outrageous under the circumstances. Id.
    Turning to the investigation into the status of the deceased’s
    brother’s medical license, the district court had concluded a letter
    drafted by a military general to the board of medicine accusing the doctor
    of unethical and criminal misconduct also arose out of defamation. Id.
    However, the court again found this view too narrow. Id. It noted the
    decision to investigate the doctor, the use of military staff to research
    ways in which the doctor’s license could be attacked, and the threat “of
    impugning Dr. Sabow’s integrity allegedly in response to Dr. Sabow’s
    efforts to find out more about his brother’s death” were broader bases for
    the emotional distress claim, and therefore, the claim was not foreclosed
    by § 2680(h). Id.; see also Truman, 
    26 F.3d at 595
    , 595 n.2 (refusing to
    bar a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress when a plaintiff
    alleged the defendant’s “numerous sexual insults, comments, and
    innuendos” caused her damages and noting the claim did not arise out of
    assault, battery, or defamation); Gross v. United States, 
    676 F.2d 295
    ,
    304 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
    distress was not barred by the intentional torts exception of § 2680
    despite the government’s contention that the conduct that gave rise to
    the   complaint     involved     “interference   with     contract    rights,
    misrepresentation, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process”).
    On the other hand, when the plaintiff’s negligent or intentional
    infliction of emotional distress claim does not allege conduct beyond an
    excepted tort, courts have disallowed the claim on the ground that it
    “arises out of” a tort under § 2680. In Thomas-Lazear, two individuals
    had applied unsuccessfully for a renewed banking license. 
    851 F.2d at
    40
    1204. They brought claims alleging an agent of the FBI, along with other
    federal defendants, “exerted political and economic pressures on officials
    . . . to persuade them to revoke [a] bank charter, and that they defamed
    [the plaintiffs] in the process.” 
    Id.
     The plaintiffs later sought to amend
    their complaint to add claims of invasion of privacy and negligent
    infliction of emotional distress. 
    Id.
     In disallowing the additional claims,
    the court concluded the plaintiffs had attempted to “fashion the slander
    and libel claims into a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
    by saying the officials were negligent in not foreseeing the effect of their
    slander in causing emotional distress to [the plaintiffs].”     
    Id. at 1206
    .
    The court noted “the Government’s actions that constitute a claim for
    slander are essential to Thomas-Lazear’s claim for negligent infliction of
    emotional distress” and found there was no other conduct alleged by the
    plaintiffs on which they could base their emotional distress claims. 
    Id. at 1207
    .
    Likewise, in Metz, a federal employee asserted intentional infliction
    of emotional distress claims against the federal government after he
    allegedly became the target of a conspiracy precipitated by his
    complaints about misconduct of fellow employees. 
    788 F.2d at
    1529–30.
    When Metz voiced his frustrations with supervisors, they stated they
    believed he posed a threat to their personal safety. 
    Id. at 1530
    . Based
    on the supervisors’ complaints, Metz was charged with making terroristic
    threats—a felony. 
    Id.
     He was arrested, transported to an Army mental
    hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, and detained there for two days. 
    Id.
    Despite clearing all mental evaluations, Metz was placed on involuntary
    sick leave and eventually terminated. 
    Id.
    The court concluded his emotional distress claim was barred
    under the intentional torts exception to the FTCA:
    41
    Mr. Metz claims that the seizure of his person renders
    the government liable for intentional infliction of emotional
    distress . . . . Applying the Block v. Neal analysis, it is clear
    that any injury Metz has suffered as a result of these alleged
    torts stems from Metz’s false arrest, a tort expressly
    exempted from the coverage of the FTCA. In other words,
    the government’s actions that constitute a claim for false
    arrest are essential to Mr. Metz’s claims for intentional
    infliction of emotional distress and intrusion into seclusion.
    There is no other government conduct upon which such
    claims can rest. Thus, even though the claims may be
    distinct from a false arrest claim, any such difference is
    merely theoretical and not actual under the facts of this
    case.
    
    Id.
     at 1534–35 (footnotes omitted).
    In a similar case, Edmonds v. United States, a plaintiff working for
    the FBI alleged she was fired for whistleblowing when she reported her
    security concerns about another agent.        
    436 F. Supp. 2d 28
    , 30–32
    (D.D.C. 2006). She also claimed negligent infliction of emotional distress
    and alleged “the Government disclosed her identity, the nature of her
    work, her accusations of misconduct and security breaches, and
    information relating to the resulting investigation,” which
    injured her reputation, thereby generating ill-will toward her
    in the United States and Turkey and causing her to fear for
    the safety of herself and her family. Further, the injury to
    her reputation allegedly prevented Ms. Edmonds from
    traveling to Turkey to deal with her properties, businesses,
    and business opportunities, and prevented her from
    obtaining a new job.
    
    Id. at 36
    . The court concluded the complained-of conduct was the FBI’s
    disclosure of her information and the essence of her emotional distress
    claim “ar[o]se from defamation.”      
    Id.
     at 36–37.   As a result, the court
    found it barred by § 2680(h). Id. at 37; see also Vander Zee v. Reno, 
    100 F.3d 952
    , 
    1996 WL 625346
    , at *5 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
    decision) (finding a plaintiff’s claims for negligent and intentional
    infliction of emotional distress arose “out of his arrest and prosecution,
    42
    allegedly coerced resignation from his job, and the terms of the
    settlement agreement, which we have already indicated must be
    understood to be claims for torts specifically enumerated under section
    2680(h)”); Doe v. United States, 
    83 F. Supp. 2d 833
    , 839 (S.D. Tex. 2000)
    (barring a plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
    when the only conduct complained of was the publication of false
    statements about the plaintiff and “the government’s conduct, in all
    aspects, can fairly be read as giving rise to the intentional tort of libel or
    slander”).
    We believe this case falls on the side of those federal precedents
    where the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim has been
    allowed to go forward. The present case involves a “pattern” of conduct
    transcending allegedly false statements about the plaintiff. See Sabow,
    
    93 F.3d at 1457
    . In fact, the relevance of the emails to Dr. Deisinger is
    not so much whether they were factually false.          See 
    id.
     (noting the
    relevance of the statements was not whether they were defamatory, but
    whether their content and allegedly abusive delivery were extreme and
    outrageous).   In many instances, Reinig (or Dieterle) carefully worded
    what they said. The emails were written so as to be conveying personal
    fears instead of making factual statements about Smith. But particularly
    after Dr. Deisinger assured them things were under control and this was
    just a personnel matter, a jury could reasonably conclude that the
    barrage of emails to Dr. Deisinger was a calculated and malicious
    attempt to take the heat off themselves and make Smith’s life miserable.
    We are not presented with a situation where, apart from the
    defamatory statements, “[t]here is no other government conduct upon
    which [Smith’s emotional distress] claim[] can rest.” See Metz, 
    788 F.2d at 1535
    ; see also Thomas-Lazear, 
    851 F.2d at 1207
    . Nor does Smith’s
    43
    claim arise only from the disclosure of false information by the
    defendants. See Edmonds, 
    436 F. Supp. 2d at 36
    . There was additional
    wrongful conduct that was not merely derived from false statements.
    The conduct engaged in by the defendants was “broader than that
    traditionally associated with” defamation and, therefore, cannot be said
    to arise out of the excluded tort of defamation, even if some of the
    conduct of the two claims overlaps.             Limone, 579 F.3d at 93.
    Accordingly, we find that Smith’s emotional distress claim was not
    barred by section 669.14(4) of the ITCA.
    3. Outrageous conduct. In order for a plaintiff to successfully bring
    a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, he or she must
    demonstrate four elements:
    “(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant
    intentionally caused, or recklessly disregarded the
    probability of causing, the emotional distress; (3) plaintiff
    suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) the
    defendant’s outrageous conduct was the actual and
    proximate cause of the emotional distress.”
    Barreca v. Nickolas, 
    683 N.W.2d 111
    , 123–24 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Fuller
    v. Local Union No. 106, 
    567 N.W.2d 419
    , 423 (Iowa 1997)).
    The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for outrageous
    conduct, and “it is for the court to determine in the first instance, as a
    matter of law, whether the conduct complained of may reasonably be
    regarded as outrageous.” Cutler v. Klass, Whicher & Mishne, 
    473 N.W.2d 178
    , 183 (Iowa 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).            “Where
    reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the
    court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been
    sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.” Restatement
    (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. h, at 77 (1965).
    44
    The State argues that Smith failed to present evidence rising to the
    level of outrageous conduct. We have stated the standard of outrageous
    conduct “is not easily met, especially in employment cases,” and
    discussed the differences between mere bad conduct and outrageousness
    as follows:
    Liability has been found only where the conduct has
    been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
    as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
    regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
    community.       Generally, the case is one in which the
    recitation of the facts to an average member of the
    community would arouse his resentment against the actor,
    and lead him to exclaim, “Outrageous!”
    Van Baale v. City of Des Moines, 
    550 N.W.2d 153
    , 156–57 (Iowa 1996)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    “When evaluating claims of outrageous conduct arising out of
    employer-employee relationships, we have required a reasonable level of
    tolerance. Every unkind and inconsiderate act cannot be compensable.”
    Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 
    459 N.W.2d 627
    , 636 (Iowa 1990) (citation
    omitted). Despite our caselaw that indicates an employer “has a duty to
    refrain from abusive behavior toward employees,” Vinson v. Linn-Mar
    Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
    360 N.W.2d 108
    , 118–19 (Iowa 1984), we have often
    found that conduct by employers and coworkers did not rise to the level
    of outrageous conduct.
    We examined whether an employer’s conduct toward an employee
    who ultimately committed suicide was outrageous in Cutler.        In that
    case, an attorney was working for a law firm when he became unable to
    practice law and was later hospitalized due to severe depression. Cutler,
    
    473 N.W.2d at 179
    . The attorney was placed on disability status by his
    firm and retained a lawyer to handle any issues related to his tenure with
    the firm; he requested all communication regarding his employment go
    45
    through his attorney.     
    Id.
         After his release from the hospital, the
    attorney sought to return to his firm part-time, but the partners refused
    to allow him to return until the attorney consented to their speaking with
    his doctor. 
    Id. at 180
    . At a partnership meeting, after voicing concerns
    about the attorney’s health and the clients he would be assisting, several
    partners determined the attorney could not return to work until a full
    partnership meeting had been held to consider the matter. 
    Id.
     A letter
    was sent to the attorney with the minutes from the partnership meeting.
    
    Id.
       Because of concerns as to how the attorney might receive the
    information in the letter, another firm member contacted one of the
    attorney’s close friends and informed him of the letter and its content.
    
    Id.
     The friend contacted the attorney’s wife with the information, and
    she, in turn, contacted another firm member. 
    Id.
     The spouse alleged the
    firm member was abrupt with her, but assured her the attorney was not
    being expelled from the firm.      
    Id.
        She alleged he said, “Look, Karen,
    we’ve got a ___ ____ business to run here.” 
    Id.
     at 184 n.3. The night
    after she spoke with the firm member, the attorney’s spouse informed
    her husband he would be receiving the letter, and he appeared to accept
    the information calmly.     
    Id.
         However, two days later the attorney
    committed suicide, and the letter from the firm was found with his body.
    
    Id.
       His wife filed an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
    against the firm. 
    Id. at 183
    . We concluded that neither the letter nor the
    alleged statement made by the firm member to Mrs. Cutler rose to the
    level of outrageous conduct. 
    Id.
     at 183–84.
    In Vinson, another case arising in the employment context, we
    likewise did not find sufficient evidence to support outrageous conduct.
    See 
    360 N.W.2d at 119
    .          There, after the plaintiff questioned her
    employer’s seniority policy and expressed concern over pay issues, she
    46
    was singled out by the defendants for special scrutiny and became the
    target of a “campaign of harassment.”        
    Id.
       The campaign included
    delaying the plaintiff’s start time, subjecting her to a time study that did
    not allow her the same amount of slack time as other employees,
    instructing her to inaccurately complete time records, accusing her of
    falsifying time records, denying her request to have her issues taken to
    the school board, discharging her on grounds of dishonesty, and
    reporting the incident to a prospective employer despite knowing the
    plaintiff had not acted dishonestly and knowing it would negatively affect
    her chances of acquiring new employment. 
    Id.
     Though we indicated a
    jury could have found the “defendants engaged in a deliberate campaign
    to badger and harass plaintiff” and that the “defendants’ actions were
    petty and wrong, even malicious,” we concluded the trier of fact could not
    “reasonably conclude that the conduct went beyond all possible bounds
    of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
    civilized community.” 
    Id.
    Similarly, we did not find conduct rising to the level of
    outrageousness in Northrup v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 
    372 N.W.2d 193
    ,
    198–99 (Iowa 1985).     In that case, the plaintiff was an alcoholic and
    admitted he was fired by his employer for that reason.          
    Id. at 199
    .
    However, he argued his firing for alcoholism, and the events leading up
    to his firing, constituted outrageous conduct. 
    Id. at 198
    . He testified his
    supervisor had yelled at him, told him he would not tolerate any more of
    his behavior, hinted that he had falsified documents, and made
    accusations that he had lied.        
    Id.
       We concluded the supervisor’s
    behavior did “not appear to be anything unusual in an employer–
    employee relationship.”     
    Id.
       We observed that a “reasonable level of
    tolerance is required” when evaluating whether conduct is outrageous.
    47
    
    Id.
       We found the relationship between the employer and employee in
    Vinson had “considerably ‘rougher edges’ ” than in Northrup and
    concluded Northrup’s firing for alcoholism, even with the additional
    conduct alleged, failed to establish outrageous conduct. 
    Id. at 199
    .
    The evidence of outrageousness did not even present a close call in
    Fuller. There, the plaintiff was seeking the business agent seat in the
    union. Fuller, 
    567 N.W.2d at 421
    . The union member whose seat the
    plaintiff was seeking made a false report that the plaintiff had been
    driving while intoxicated. 
    Id.
     The police stopped the plaintiff, but he was
    released after the officers determined he was not intoxicated. 
    Id.
     When
    the plaintiff filed charges against this union member with the union, the
    union stopped assigning work to the plaintiff.          
    Id.
       Nonetheless, we
    quickly dispensed with the plaintiff’s emotional distress claim, stating,
    “In no way could the conduct alleged here qualify under” the definition of
    outrageous conduct. 
    Id. at 423
    ; see also Van Baale, 
    550 N.W.2d at
    154–
    55, 157 (indicating a police officer’s firing after he entered a nolo
    contendere plea on a domestic abuse charge was not outrageous conduct
    even when his supervisor assured him that making such a plea would
    ensure he was not fired); Reihmann v. Foerstner, 
    375 N.W.2d 677
    , 681
    (Iowa 1985) (finding no outrageous conduct when a supervisor used his
    influence to move the plaintiff’s office to another city).
    Although we have never before found an employee’s claim of
    intentional infliction of emotional distress against an employer raised a
    jury question, the court of appeals did so in Blong v. Snyder, 
    361 N.W.2d 312
    , 317 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). In Blong, the court of appeals noted
    the record shows that plaintiff was initially dismissed for
    filling out his time cards in accordance with his supervisor’s
    instructions. After he was finally able to get his job back,
    plaintiff was subjected to verbal abuse on almost a daily
    48
    basis.     He was accused of stealing, wasting time,
    intentionally breaking his machine, intentionally producing
    inferior parts, violating fifteen company rules, and “playing
    with himself” in the restroom. All of these accusations were
    apparently groundless. Furthermore, plaintiff was assigned
    extra work without being given the proper patterns or tools
    for the job and was then berated, threatened, and disciplined
    for his inability to properly complete the task.
    
    Id.
     The court concluded that
    [w]hile any of the individual instances alone may be no more
    than insulting and humiliating, the jury could properly
    conclude that the whole of defendant’s actions over the four-
    month period were a course of conduct “exceeding all
    bounds usually tolerated by decent society.”
    
    Id.
    Although we reaffirm the foregoing precedents and believe the
    issue is a close one, we conclude the conduct here exceeded a “deliberate
    campaign to badger and harass” Smith and crossed the line into
    outrageous conduct.      Vinson, 
    360 N.W.2d at 119
    .         A reasonable jury
    could have concluded “the whole of defendant’s actions” in this case
    constituted “a course of conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated
    by decent society.” Blong, 
    361 N.W.2d at 317
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted). The district court properly performed its gatekeeping function
    here.
    This case presents the confluence of several factors.          First, the
    three    individuals   who   mistreated      Smith    (Reinig,    Dieterle,   and
    Dr. Kushner) were generally in a position of authority over him.              See
    Blong, 
    361 N.W.2d at 316
     (“We agree that plaintiff’s status as an
    employee entitled him to more protection from insultive or abusive
    treatment    than   would    be   expected    in   interactions   between     two
    strangers.”); Vinson, 
    360 N.W.2d at 118
     (indicating “the court should
    consider the relationship between the parties” when making an
    outrageous conduct determination); see also Contreras v. Crown
    49
    Zellerbach Corp., 
    565 P.2d 1173
    , 1176 (Wash. 1977) (“The relationship
    between the parties is a significant factor in determining whether liability
    should be imposed.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. e, at 74
    (“The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from
    an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which
    gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect
    his interests.”).
    In addition, the conduct included, but also went beyond, typical
    bad boss behavior such as discrimination in pay, isolation of the
    employee,      removal      of   the     employee      from     work     assignments,
    misrepresentations about promotions, and even falsification of records.
    What is striking about this record, and presumably resonated with the
    jury, were two things. First, Reinig engaged in unremitting psychological
    warfare against Smith over a substantial period of time.                  She tried to
    have him treated as a scary and mentally unstable outcast. Second, she
    did all this to cover up what basically amounted to her theft from ISU.17
    For these reasons, under the special circumstances of this case, we agree
    there was sufficient evidence of outrageous conduct to submit Smith’s
    claim to the jury.
    The State urges us to be hesitant to subject university employees
    to liability for reporting security concerns about individuals to campus
    police. This is a legitimate point. But several things should be noted
    here.    Reinig did not just report concerns.             Even after Dr. Deisinger
    clearly acknowledged and understood what Reinig was saying, she went
    back to him repeatedly to demean Smith, even though she had nothing
    17Although  Reinig’s theft obviously was contrary to the interests of ISU, we note
    again that the State stipulated at the close of evidence that Reinig had acted in the
    course of her state employment at all relevant times.
    50
    new to say or report.      And she enlisted Dieterle in her campaign.
    Additionally, as we point out above, one thing that sets this case apart is
    the strong evidence that Reinig’s motivation had nothing to do with a
    true safety concern and everything to do with getting the person who had
    stumbled onto her misconduct in trouble. Moreover, the State’s effort to
    highlight the importance of campus safety cuts in two directions.        It
    suggests that reports to university police ought to have a wide berth of
    legal protection, but it also shows that such reports can be misused
    because of current sensitivities.
    The State further argues that because of section 669.14(4), we
    need to remove any defamatory conduct from the mix before considering
    whether Smith has presented enough to get to the jury. Yet the State
    cites no authority here other than an off-point case dealing with
    privileged conduct. See Lewis v. Sch. Dist. No. 70, 
    523 F.3d 730
    , 746–47
    (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that privileged statements cannot be considered
    in evaluating outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct).       Iowa Code
    section 669.14(4) does not immunize conduct per se; it immunizes claims
    “arising out of” certain categories of conduct. We think it is appropriate
    to take into account Reinig’s statements about Smith in considering
    whether the overall conduct was outrageous, so long as Smith’s claim—
    fairly construed—is not primarily about those statements.        True, we
    rejected Minor’s claims because they “would not exist but for Grabe’s
    alleged misrepresentation to the juvenile court.” Minor, 819 N.W.2d at
    408. However, this language was intended to emphasize the primacy of
    the misrepresentation, not establish a strict but-for standard under
    which a claim against the State cannot go forward unless it would be
    viable without the inclusion of conduct that by itself would fall within
    section 669.14(4).
    51
    4. Extreme or severe emotional distress. The State further argues
    that Smith failed to prove the third prong of his intentional infliction of
    emotional distress claim—that he suffered from severe or extreme
    emotional distress. See Barreca, 
    683 N.W.2d at
    123–24. According to
    the State, Smith claimed only that he was under emotional strain,
    suffered anxiety, and sought counseling, and those issues are not
    sufficiently severe to meet the standard for recovery in Iowa.            Smith
    responds that he experienced mental trauma over an extended period of
    time, substantiated by his psychologist, that manifested itself physically
    when he became sick to his stomach and light-headed. Smith suffered
    from insomnia, the inability to eat properly, and weight loss.
    Our caselaw requires plaintiffs to “establish more than the fact
    that they felt bad for a period of time.” See Ette ex rel. Ette v. Linn-Mar
    Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
    656 N.W.2d 62
    , 71 (Iowa 2002) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).    “Our cases that have found substantial evidence of
    emotional harm have had direct evidence of either physical symptoms of
    the distress or a clear showing of a notably distressful mental reaction
    caused by the outrageous conduct.”          Steckelberg v. Randolph, 
    448 N.W.2d 458
    , 462 (Iowa 1989). When seeking to define the contours of
    severe or extreme emotional distress, we have looked to the Restatement
    (Second) of Torts for guidance. See Poulsen v. Russell, 
    300 N.W.2d 289
    ,
    297 (Iowa 1981). The Restatement notes:
    Emotional distress passes under various names, such as
    mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock,
    or the like.     It includes all highly unpleasant mental
    reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation,
    embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and
    nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises.
    Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this
    world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional
    distress is a part of the price of living among people. The law
    intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that
    52
    no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The
    intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be
    considered in determining its severity. Severe distress must
    be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous
    character of the defendant’s conduct is in itself important
    evidence that the distress has existed.
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j, at 77–78.
    We have found a plaintiff had enough to get to the jury on this
    point when he suffered from nausea, difficulty breathing, and acute
    myocardial ischemia. Meyer v. Nottger, 
    241 N.W.2d 911
    , 915–16, 918–19
    (Iowa 1976).    Similarly, claims that the plaintiff endured abdominal
    cramps, weight loss, and crying constituted sufficient evidence to
    generate a jury question.    Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc. of Iowa, 
    204 N.W.2d 850
    , 855, 860 (Iowa 1973).             Testimony that plaintiff was
    petrified, shocked, and hospitalized for near-nervous breakdown was also
    enough to constitute “substantial evidence that plaintiffs suffered severe
    or extreme emotional distress.” Randa v. U.S. Homes, Inc., 
    325 N.W.2d 905
    , 908 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
    By contrast, the evidence of severe and extreme emotional distress
    was insufficient when the plaintiff testified only that for “at least a month
    or two” he “ ‘was very, very down,’ ‘was feeling super badly’ and ‘felt that
    he lost everything.’ ” Poulsen, 
    300 N.W.2d at 297
    . We also found the
    evidence   insufficient   when   the    plaintiff’s   distress   “consisted   of
    headaches, insomnia, and loss of appetite,” and she had not been treated
    by a doctor, taken any medications, or suffered any weight loss.
    Millington v. Kuba, 
    532 N.W.2d 787
    , 794 (Iowa 1995); see also Ette, 656
    N.W.2d at 71 (insufficient showing of severe or extreme emotional
    distress when one plaintiff “testified the anxiety made him unable to
    work for three days and troubled him for nearly six months,” and
    another plaintiff stated he was uncomfortable, “a little scared,” and “tired
    53
    and hungry”); Ollinger v. Bennett, 
    562 N.W.2d 167
    , 173 (Iowa 1997)
    (evidence was insufficient when distress was limited to exacerbation of a
    preexisting high blood pressure problem and sleeplessness); Harsha v.
    State Sav. Bank, 
    346 N.W.2d 791
    , 801 (Iowa 1984) (insufficient evidence
    to submit claim to jury when the evidence of emotional distress included
    being bothered by creditors late in the evening, making enemies of
    friends by attempting to collect accounts receivable early, feeling
    degraded by entering bankruptcy, and the plaintiff’s mother noted he
    “ ‘wasn’t as interested or he was downhearted more or less’ ” and
    “ ‘depressed’ ” about the decline in his business).
    Smith manifested symptoms that were more significant than
    merely feeling down or depressed.         Cf. Poulsen, 
    300 N.W.2d at 297
    ;
    Harsha, 
    346 N.W.2d at 801
    . Rather, Smith suffered “physical symptoms
    of the distress” and “a notably distressful mental reaction” as a result of
    the defendants’ conduct. Steckelberg, 
    448 N.W.2d at 462
    . The record
    shows that in August 2007, to deal with his stress at work, Smith began
    meeting with a psychologist who diagnosed him with extreme stress and
    anxiety. All this happened before Smith consulted with an attorney or
    filed a lawsuit. Smith also became physically ill and light-headed at one
    point, was not sleeping, and lost weight. There is also some irony in the
    State’s position that Smith did not suffer severe emotional distress, given
    Reinig’s communications about his reaching a “breaking point.”         The
    evidence in the record met the level of severity necessary to generate a
    jury question.
    5. Damages. The State further argues that the damages awarded
    by the jury were excessive and not supported by the evidence.            It
    contends the $500,000 in damages was considerably higher than what
    we have recognized as within the range of reasonableness.           Smith
    54
    responds that the damages in this case were justified because his
    injuries persisted over a long period of time, were inflicted in a
    continuous manner, and caused severe emotional injury to a particularly
    susceptible person.
    When reviewing a jury’s award of emotional distress damages, we
    have stated:
    [T]he amount of an award is primarily a jury question, and
    courts should not interfere with an award when it is within a
    reasonable range of the evidence.
    ....
    . . . [I]t is generally recognized that damages for pain
    and suffering are by their nature “highly subjective” and are
    not “easily calculated in economic terms.” Nevertheless, an
    award for emotional-distress damages is not without
    boundaries, but is limited to a reasonable range derived from
    the evidence. Accordingly, it is helpful in considering a claim
    of excessive damages to consider the rough parameters of a
    range from other like cases. Of course, we have said that
    precedent is of little value when determining the
    excessiveness of a verdict. Yet this approach does not mean
    other cases should not be used to establish broad ranges
    from which to examine particular awards of emotional-
    distress damages.
    Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 
    764 N.W.2d 751
    , 772 (Iowa 2009) (citations
    omitted).     We have noted “emotional-distress damages tend to range
    higher   in    employment   cases   ...   involving   egregious,   sometimes
    prolonged, conduct.” 
    Id.
    “The determinative question posed is whether under the record,
    giving the jury its right to accept or reject whatever portions of the
    conflicting evidence it chose, the verdict effects substantial justice
    between the parties.” Kautman v. Mar-Mac Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
    255 N.W.2d 146
    , 148 (Iowa 1977).
    Another consideration for this court in examining the trial
    court’s determination is the “fact the trial court, with benefit
    of seeing and hearing witnesses, observing the jury and
    55
    having before it all incidents of the trial, did not see fit to
    interfere [with the jury’s verdict].”
    Foggia v. Des Moines Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 
    543 N.W.2d 889
    , 891 (Iowa 1996)
    (quoting Olsen v. Drahos, 
    229 N.W.2d 741
    , 743 (Iowa 1975)).
    In Jasper, we concluded the district court had not abused its
    discretion in granting the defendant a new trial following a damage
    award of $100,000 after comparing that award with a sampling of other
    emotional distress cases. 
    764 N.W.2d at
    772–73. However, in that case,
    the worker suffered distress only for a short period of time when her
    employment from a daycare center was terminated and she was briefly
    “denied access to her children” and then “confronted by police before she
    left the day-care-center with her children.”   
    Id. at 773
    . We concluded
    that because this was a “single incident of wrongful-termination conduct
    producing the more common consequences of any involuntary loss of
    employment,” Jasper’s damages should fall into the “lower range.” 
    Id.
    We pointed to Jasper’s short time of employment with the center, her
    young age and ability to become reemployed within a short period of
    time, the lack of medical testimony to support her emotional distress
    claims, and the lack of evidence that the emotional distress continued for
    any prolonged period of time. 
    Id.
    Although the State contends that Jasper sets an “upper limit” to
    the reasonable range for emotional distress damages at $200,000, we
    actually indicated higher damages amounts may be supported.             
    Id. at 773
    . (“[A] broad range of emotional-distress damages in all employment-
    termination cases may support awards of $200,000 and beyond . . . .”
    (Emphasis added.)).
    Furthermore, this is not a case like Jasper where the conduct was
    directed at a newly employed individual and limited to a single incident
    56
    with no long-term distress.   Cf. 
    id.
       Rather, Smith was subjected to
    wrongful conduct for an extended period of time in a job he had held for
    nearly a decade.      Smith was vulnerable to stress due to the
    responsibilities of taking care of his incapacitated spouse. The evidence
    shows that Reinig (and, to a lesser extent, Dieterle) were aware of that
    vulnerability and took advantage of it. Smith sought treatment from a
    psychologist and was diagnosed as suffering from extreme stress and
    anxiety that the doctor indicated was significantly impacting his life. A
    juror could easily read Smith’s lengthy written grievances and conclude,
    at a minimum, he was despondent and his life was miserable. In fact, we
    would not be surprised if jurors went through that thought process in
    the jury room.
    While a lesser verdict could also have been in the range of
    reasonableness, “we think the jury was in the best position to judge the
    credibility of the witnesses and to make the judgment call about what the
    noneconomic elements of damages were worth,” and we will “not set
    aside a verdict simply because we might have reached a different
    conclusion.” Matthess v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    521 N.W.2d 699
    ,
    704 (Iowa 1994). We do not find the verdict excessive.
    B. Section 70A.28(2) Claim.       We next turn to the statutory
    whistleblower claim. Iowa Code section 70A.28(2) provides, in part:
    A person shall not discharge an employee from or take or fail
    to take action regarding an employee’s appointment or
    proposed appointment to, promotion or proposed promotion
    to, or any advantage in, a position in a state employment
    system administered by, or subject to approval of, a state
    agency as a reprisal for . . . a disclosure of information to
    any other public official or law enforcement agency if the
    employee reasonably believes the information evidences a
    violation of law or rule, mismanagement, a gross abuse of
    funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific
    danger to public health or safety.
    57
    As we have noted, the parties agreed that liability would be submitted to
    the jury and the court would determine damages.
    The relevant liability jury instruction read as follows:
    INSTRUCTION NO 11
    Plaintiff alleges that Iowa State University took action
    against him in reprisal for reporting certain matters to a
    public official. In order to recover on this claim, the Plaintiff
    must prove all of the following
    1.    The Plaintiff reported to a public official, Iowa
    State University President Gregory Geoffroy that
    Pamela Reinig had committed a violation of a
    law or rule, mismanagement, a gross abuse of
    funds or an abuse of authority,
    2.    That Plaintiff reasonably believed the matter he
    was reporting,
    3.    That Iowa State University took action or
    retaliated against the Plaintiff after August 16,
    2007, when the president received the Plaintiff’s
    appeal of his first grievance[,]
    4.    That Defendant’s conduct was a proximate
    cause of the Plaintiff’s damage,
    5.    The amount of damage[.]
    If the Plaintiff has failed to prove any of these propositions,
    the Plaintiff is not entitled to damages. If the Plaintiff has
    proved all of these propositions, the Plaintiff is entitled to
    damages in some amount.
    The jury found that “Iowa State University retaliate[d] against
    Plaintiff as explained in Instruction No 11 because he reported certain
    matters to a public officer.”         The district court agreed with this
    determination and awarded $784,027.40 in damages in addition to the
    jury award of $500,000 for severe emotional distress.18 The $784,027.40
    included $150,000 in damage to reputation and $634,027.40 in loss of
    18The  court found that Smith had incurred the same $500,000 in emotional
    distress damages for the Iowa Code section 70A.28 violation, but declined to make a
    duplicate award.
    58
    income based upon Smith’s termination from employment in August
    2010.
    The State’s first argument is that Smith did not engage in
    protected conduct under section 70A.28(2) because he was acting for his
    own benefit when he pursued the grievance process with President
    Geoffroy. Smith responds that the State did not preserve error on this
    claim, and we agree. Jury Instruction No. 11, which the State has not
    challenged on appeal, is the law of the case. See Pavone v. Kirke, 
    801 N.W.2d 477
    , 489 (Iowa 2011).19              While the instruction adopted the
    State’s position that the only “public official” involved in the matter was
    President Geoffroy, see Hegeman v. Kelch, 
    666 N.W.2d 531
    , 534–37 (Iowa
    2003) (holding that a college dean is not a public official under Iowa Code
    section 70A.28), it did not contain any requirement that Smith had to
    have been acting in a disinterested manner when he went to President
    Geoffroy.
    The State next argues there was no causal connection between
    Smith’s loss of his job in 2010 or any other harm he suffered and his
    communications with President Geoffroy.                Smith concedes the State
    preserved error on this argument.              Citing to cases we have decided
    involving common law claims of discharge in retaliation for protected
    conduct, the State argues that Smith had to show the reports to
    President Geoffroy were a “determinative factor” in his losing his job in
    2010. See Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 
    772 N.W.2d 1
    , 13 (Iowa 2009);
    Jasper, 
    764 N.W.2d at 767
    ; Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613
    19The State did object to Instruction No. 11 below, stating, “[W]e don’t believe
    that you can meet the definition of submitting a report to a public official simply by
    pursuing an appeal of a grievance to that individual.” However, it has not pursued that
    instructional challenge on appeal. See Pavone, 801 N.W.2d at 489.
    
    59 N.W.2d 275
    , 289 (Iowa 2000); Teachout v. Forest City Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
    
    584 N.W.2d 296
    , 301–02 (Iowa 1998).
    Smith, by contrast, insists that Iowa Code section 70A.28(2), which
    requires that the action have been undertaken “as a reprisal for” the
    protected conduct, incorporates a more relaxed burden of proof.        He
    urges that we interpret section 70A.28(2) to be consistent with the
    Federal Whistleblower Protection Act, which requires only that an
    employee prove a protected disclosure was a “contributing factor” in the
    personnel action, with the burden shifting then to the employer to prove
    by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same
    personnel action in the absence of such disclosure.          See 
    5 U.S.C. § 1221
    (e). Smith also maintains that the State failed to preserve error on
    its claim that a “determinative factor” standard applies here.
    We think both Smith and the State have overlooked an important
    point. As we read Instruction No. 11, it did not contain a requirement
    that the retaliation be causally connected to Smith’s reporting to
    President Geoffroy.      It only required that the retaliation occurred
    afterward. Thus, the third element of this marshaling instruction stated
    that Smith had to prove “[t]hat Iowa State University took action or
    retaliated against the Plaintiff after August 16, 2007, when the president
    received the Plaintiff’s appeal of his first grievance.”
    Of course, this does not resolve the question of Smith’s damages,
    which were determined by the district court and are subject to our
    de novo review. The statute still requires that any adverse employment
    consequences have been in reprisal for protected conduct, and it was the
    district court’s job in calculating damages to determine exactly what
    those consequences were. The district court found that Smith’s loss of
    his job in 2010 was in retaliation for Smith’s reporting to President
    60
    Geoffroy.      It is not clear what causation standard the district court
    applied.20
    The State makes two contentions.              For one thing, it maintains
    there is no evidence that Smith’s communications with President
    Geoffroy, as opposed to other reports he made to other people at other
    times, triggered any adverse consequence for his employment, including
    his 2010 job loss. Second, it maintains there is no evidence that Smith’s
    loss of his job in 2010 was retaliatory at all. The court of appeals agreed
    with the State’s first point, ruling as follows:
    We agree with the [district] court there was a continuous
    pattern of wrongful conduct against Smith by Reinig,
    Dieterle, and [Dr.]Kushner. . . . Although these actions were
    wrongful and probably retaliatory, they bear no relation to
    Smith’s report to President Geoffroy other than preceding it
    in time. The wrongful conduct continued after Smith’s
    report to President Geoffroy.       Smith has demonstrated
    Reinig, [Dr.] Kushner, and Dieterle separately and in various
    combinations acted against him over a period of more than
    two years. The fact Smith’s report to President Geoffroy
    occurred during this period does not support an inference
    the wrongful conduct was “as a reprisal for” Smith’s
    disclosure of Reinig’s possible violation of the law and ISU’s
    policies to Geoffroy, especially since the “retaliation” began
    months before Smith’s disclosure. We conclude Smith failed
    to prove a causal relationship between his disclosure to a
    public official and the conduct of Reinig, Dieterle, and
    [Dr.] Kushner.    Without proof their conduct was “as a
    reprisal for” Smith’s protected disclosure, Smith’s claim
    under section 70A.28 fails.
    20The   liability instruction for the statutory whistleblowing claim required the
    jury to find that Smith had suffered some harm. Thus, the fourth element of
    Instruction No. 11 read, “The Defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of the
    Plaintiff’s damage.” We fully agree that this instruction is the law of the case.
    However, the issue for present purposes is not whether Smith had suffered some
    harm, but what damages are recoverable, an issue that was reserved for the court and
    as to which our review is de novo. Furthermore, the proximate cause language in
    Instruction No. 11 would not be relevant to that inquiry because the present question is
    not (a) whether Smith suffered damages when he lost his job, but (b) whether his job
    loss can be part of his damages recovery because it was in retaliation for Smith’s
    reporting to President Geoffroy. No causation standard for that issue appears in either
    the jury instructions or the court’s posttrial findings of fact and conclusions of law.
    61
    Like the district court and court of appeals, we conclude there is
    ample evidence that Smith suffered retaliation for having raised Reinig’s
    alleged financial misconduct with others at ISU, e.g., Dr. Kushner. But
    we also agree with the court of appeals that there is no evidence Smith
    suffered retaliation for reports of financial improprieties to President
    Geoffroy.       In his answering brief on appeal, Smith simply ignored this
    distinction       between      retaliation    for   whistleblowing        generally      and
    retaliation for reporting to a “public official.”                In his application for
    further review to this court, written after the court of appeals decision,
    Smith     argued        that   reasonable      minds     could     conclude      that    the
    post-August 16, 2007 retaliation was in reprisal for “Smith’s more recent
    reporting as opposed to his earlier reporting at lower levels.”
    To be clear, Smith’s letters to President Geoffroy did not even
    mention Reinig’s alleged financial improprieties. They focused on Smith.
    At most, the record allows one to conclude that Smith made an oral
    report on the billing issue on August 28, 2007, to President Geoffroy’s
    executive assistant, which led to the internal audit.                     Yet even if we
    assume for the sake of argument that the oral report to President
    Geoffroy’s assistant in August 2007 could qualify as a report to a public
    official under section 70A.28(2),21 and regardless of the causation
    21At   trial, Smith objected to Instruction No. 11. Among other things, he urged:
    The instruction limits—or appears to limit the—the reporting to the
    president to the plaintiff’s appeal of his first grievance. The evidence
    shows that there was reporting to the president through his [executive]
    assistant, Dr. Tahira Hira. And we contend that that would constitute a
    report to the president in this context and that that instruction should—
    even if the president is the only public official that we’re considering, that
    instruction should allow for reporting through his [executive] assistant,
    Dr.—Dr. Hira.
    Smith has not challenged Instruction No. 11 on appeal. We need not resolve today the
    question whether a report to the president’s executive assistant constitutes a report to
    the president under the circumstances present here.
    62
    standard, we cannot find on our de novo review that Smith’s loss of his
    job in the downsizing that occurred three years later was “as a reprisal
    for” this report.
    To begin with, there is no evidence in the record that anything that
    befell Smith can be traced to this particular report.     The lowball pay
    raise, the change in the funding source for Smith’s salary, the isolation of
    Smith, the removal of some of his job responsibilities, and the
    trumped-up reports to Dr. Deisinger all preceded the August 2007
    meeting. It is true that other reports to Dr. Deisinger were made after
    that meeting, but they were simply more of the same thing. After Reinig
    was forced out at the beginning of 2008, Smith acknowledges that things
    got better. And this was still more than two years before Smith lost his
    job.
    In his own trial testimony, Smith did not connect his 2010 job loss
    to his August 2007 report to President Geoffroy’s executive assistant on
    Reinig. To the contrary, he testified as follows:
    Q. How about the—the subsequent restructuring and
    elimination of the ECM and the elimination of your job? A. I
    believe that’s just part of the continuum.
    (Emphasis added.)
    Dr. Wickert’s explanation for his decision to downsize ECM during
    the state budget crisis that began in the fall of 2009 was a logical one.
    As he related, he had to cut $2 million from the College of Engineering
    budget, academics had already suffered cuts, and he wanted to preserve
    educational programs for students ahead of magazines and newsletters.
    The evidence also showed that the communications and marketing
    department for the College of Engineering was far larger than similar
    departments at comparable engineering schools.        The only counter to
    63
    Dr. Wickert’s testimony came in the form of supposition from some ECM
    employees that it seemed retaliatory to impose severe cuts on a
    department that received payments to cover its costs, mostly from other
    ISU departments.         But it was unrebutted that the department never
    covered all its own costs, let alone earned enough to support any of ISU’s
    academic programs.
    Furthermore, Dr. Wickert had nothing to do with Reinig’s fraud or
    any of the events of 2007; he did not even become dean until 2009. By
    that time, Reinig was long gone; she had resigned under threat of
    immediate termination. While Dr. Wickert had been briefed on Smith’s
    grievances, there is no evidence that Dr. Wickert was even aware of
    Smith’s reporting on Reinig’s alleged financial misconduct. We see no
    substantial evidence, or even a plausible argument, that his downsizing
    decision was made in 2010 to retaliate for Smith’s report to President
    Geoffroy’s executive assistant regarding Reinig in 2007.22
    There remains Smith’s contention that the decision not to retain
    him in 2010 as the only communications specialist in the new ECR
    department was retaliatory.            It is undisputed that Dr. Wickert, a
    newcomer, made this decision based upon information provided by a
    disinterested     search    committee.          Smith    does    not    challenge     the
    composition of the search committee or contend it was biased.
    Dr. Wickert cited four areas noted by the search committee in which
    Strawn rated ahead of Smith. Smith did not dispute Strawn’s relative
    22In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge the district court’s finding that
    the testimony of Dieterle and Dr. Kushner was “largely not credible.” Our conclusion is
    not premised on their credibility. The downsizing decision and the follow-on decision to
    retain Strawn rather than Smith were made by Dr. Wickert. Dr. Kushner had left ISU
    two years prior. The district court made no finding questioning Dr. Wickert’s credibility,
    and upon our review, we see no reason to question his credibility.
    64
    strengths in these areas, but contended he had different strengths, such
    as his writing ability.          This is not enough to demonstrate that the
    reasons given for hiring Strawn were pretextual. It does not tend to show
    that Dr. Wickert chose Strawn over Smith because Smith had reported
    his suspicions of Reinig’s financial misconduct to President Geoffroy’s
    executive assistant three years earlier.
    Smith’s 2010 retaliation hypothesis rests on two pieces of
    evidence. First, Smith points out that Dieterle was involved in putting
    together the job description for the communications specialist in 2010.
    In that regard, Smith complains that one of the preferred qualifications
    for   the      job   was    an   advanced        degree    in    journalism,      English,
    communications, or a related field. Strawn had such a degree; Smith did
    not. Yet there were three other areas in which Strawn graded out ahead
    of Smith. Smith does not challenge Dr. Wickert’s reliance on those areas
    or contend they resulted from Dieterle’s involvement in fashioning the job
    description.23
    Second, Smith points to some notes of a January 26, 2010 meeting
    apparently attended by Dr. Wickert, Eichorn, Dieterle, and three others
    regarding ECM (Exhibit 130).24 Although no one who was asked about it
    could recall the meeting, the notes suggest there was discussion about
    reorganizing ECM.           The notes refer to five employees plus Dieterle
    potentially staying, to fill the roles of web designer, digital media
    specialist, two graphic designers, and a communications specialist who
    23Smith   and one of his trial witnesses also testified that the references to graphic
    design and Adobe Creative Suite in the job description were intended to disadvantage
    him. But the search committee rated both candidates as essentially equal (or equally
    limited) in this area.
    24Dr.   Kushner was not at the meeting referenced in Exhibit 130, having left ISU
    in 2008.
    65
    would work on Adobe products and content management. Strawn was
    one of those listed under “who stay.”         Three employees—including
    Smith—were listed as “would consider” an early retirement incentive
    program.
    But it would be a significant leap to argue that these notes
    demonstrate the course of action followed by Dr. Wickert months later
    was retaliatory. The notes contain no reference to Reinig and appear to
    be nonjudgmental brainstorming about how to reorganize and downsize
    the ECM unit. Smith was not singled out. Smith does not dispute that
    he and the other two employees in fact were eligible for the early
    retirement incentive package, one common approach often used to bring
    about reductions in staff.     Moreover, the plan later changed.        For
    example, two of the “who stay” employees did not stay.
    In sum, regardless of the standard applied, we cannot find that
    Smith’s loss of his job in 2010 was causally linked to his discussion with
    President Geoffroy’s executive assistant in 2007 regarding Reinig’s billing
    practices.    For this reason, we set aside the district court’s award of
    damages under section 70A.28(2) relating to this event.
    This leaves the $110,732.22 in damages awarded by the district
    court under section 70A.28(2) for harms to Smith’s reputation. Smith
    argues that the State failed to preserve error on these damages, and we
    agree.    As noted above, we believe the State waived its “no causation”
    challenge to the jury’s finding of liability on the statutory whistleblower
    claim.     However, in the damages phase of the case, the State clearly
    advanced the position that Smith’s reporting to a public official did not
    result in Smith’s loss of his job in 2010. Thus, it is appropriate for us to
    consider this aspect of the State’s appeal, and Smith does not dispute
    that point.
    66
    However, the State never argued to the trial court the propriety of
    awarding reputational-harm damages per se. While the district court’s
    decision to award these damages may have come as a surprise, the State
    could have readily filed a posttrial motion under Iowa Rule of Civil
    Procedure 1.904. It did not do so. Therefore, we decline to consider for
    the first time on appeal the State’s arguments that reputational damages
    are not available under section 70A.28.             See Iowa Code § 70A.28(5)(a)
    (stating   that   a   person   is   liable   “for    affirmative   relief   including
    reinstatement, with or without backpay, or any other equitable relief the
    court deems appropriate, including attorney fees and costs”).
    IV. Conclusion.
    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of appeals is
    affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the judgment of the district
    court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Specifically, we uphold the
    jury verdicts of liability and the jury award of damages for intentional
    infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the district court’s award of
    reputational-harm damages because the State, in our view, failed to
    preserve error with respect to the challenge to that award it is now
    pursuing on appeal.      Finally, we reverse the district court’s award of
    damages under section 70A.28 for Smith’s loss of employment because
    we do not find any connection between that job loss and Smith’s
    reporting to a public official. We remand this case to the district court
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART,
    VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN
    PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED.
    All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially, and
    Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., who concur in part and dissent in part.
    67
    #12–1182, Smith v. ISU
    APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).
    I concur in the court’s decision that the district court’s judgment
    in favor of Smith and its award of damages for intentional infliction of
    emotional distress damages should be upheld. I join fully in the court’s
    opinion on these issues.
    With respect to retaliatory discharge, I concur in result only. While
    I recognize our review is de novo, the district court heard the evidence in
    this case and necessarily made credibility determinations adverse to Iowa
    State University (ISU).    I do not doubt that ISU was facing serious
    financial difficulties, that a reduction in employment in the College of
    Engineering was the only practical alternative in light of fiscal challenges,
    and that a nonretaliatory decision was made to focus on administrative
    rather than teaching staff. But Smith claims that the reorganization that
    resulted was essentially rigged to result in his discharge, noting, among
    other things, a memo of a meeting attended by the apparent decision-
    maker, Dean Wickert, prior to the implementation of the reorganization,
    identifying another employee as the sole communication specialist to
    survive change, the manipulation of the job description in a fashion
    unfavorable to him, the lack of request for writing samples by the
    committee reviewing finalists, and the unusual procedure of eliminating
    all positions and hiring anew, thereby improving the prospects for the
    favored part-time employee to move into the “new” position. An employer
    cannot avoid liability for tortuous discharge of an employee through a
    sham reorganization. See Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., 
    617 F.3d 39
    , 52 (1st Cir. 2010) (“An employer may, of course, exercise its business
    judgment to eliminate positions as part of a company reorganization or
    reduction in force, even if the individuals in those positions have engaged
    68
    in protected activity or are members of protected groups. However, an
    employer may not use ‘reorganization’ or ‘layoff’ as a convenient excuse
    for terminating an employee on a discriminatory or retaliatory basis.”
    (Citation omitted.); Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 
    282 F.3d 60
    , 69 (1st Cir. 2002) (“An employer may not try to shield a
    discriminatory or retaliatory termination by hiding it in a layoff.”).
    While Smith’s position may have legal support, the question
    remains whether as a factual matter Smith is entitled to prevail on his
    retaliation theory. The factual issue on retaliation presented to us on de
    novo rule is, to use the court’s term, “a close one.” But even accepting
    the notion that the unusual character of the reorganization may have
    been   structured   in   a   fashion   unfavorable   to    Smith’s   continued
    employment, I am not convinced that Smith has shown the necessary
    causal link between his report of misconduct to the president. Among
    other things, his discharge occurred three years later after the departure
    of Reinig and after the relationships within the unit had stabilized. As a
    result, I concur in the result on the retaliation claim.
    69
    #12–1182, Smith v. ISU
    WIGGINS, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
    I agree with the court’s well-reasoned analysis regarding Smith’s
    intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. I also mostly agree with
    the court’s analysis of Smith’s whistleblowing claim under Iowa Code
    section 70A.28(2) (2007), however, I part ways with the court’s damage
    analysis regarding the whistleblowing claim.
    I begin my analysis by examining the record and the law of the
    case under this record. The parties stipulated that the jury would decide
    liability on Smith’s whistleblowing claim and the district court would
    decide the damage issue. The district court included the agreed-upon
    elements of the whistleblowing claim in the instructions submitted to the
    jury. The agreed upon elements that the court instructed on were:
    1.    The Plaintiff reported to a public official, Iowa State
    University President Gregory Geoffroy that Pamela
    Reinig had committed a violation of a law or rule,
    mismanagement, a gross abuse of funds or an abuse
    of authority,
    2.    That Plaintiff reasonably believed the matter he was
    reporting,
    3.    That Iowa State University took action or retaliated
    against the Plaintiff after August 16, 2007, when the
    president received the Plaintiff’s appeal of his first
    grievance[,]
    4.    The Defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of the
    Plaintiff’s damage,
    5.    The amount of damage[.]
    Based on these instructions, the jury answered the following
    question in the affirmative, “Did Iowa State University retaliate against
    Plaintiff as explained in Instruction No 11 because he reported certain
    matters to a public officer?” The jury based its answer on finding Iowa
    State’s retaliation was the proximate cause of some damage suffered by
    70
    Smith. The district court then used this law, as used by the jury, to find
    the facts in favor of Smith on the retaliation claim and to determine
    Smith’s damages.
    The court in its majority opinion disregards the jury’s and the
    district court’s findings; finds the facts regarding damages anew; and
    slashes the judgment by $634,027.40, the amount of income the district
    court found Smith lost because of his termination from employment in
    August 2010. I would leave the verdict intact.
    I reach my conclusion by starting with the legal proposition that
    when Iowa State stipulated to the jury deciding the liability issue and
    then failed to object to the instruction, the instruction became the law of
    the case, even if the instruction misstated the law. Froman v. Perrin, 
    213 N.W.2d 684
    , 689 (Iowa 1973); see also Champlin v. Walker, 
    249 N.W.2d 839
    , 840 (Iowa 1977); Bus. Ventures, Inc. v. Iowa City, 
    234 N.W.2d 376
    ,
    384 (Iowa 1975); Robert G. Allbee & Kasey W. Kincaid, Error Preservation
    in Civil Litigation: A Primer for the Iowa Practitioner, 
    35 Drake L. Rev. 1
    ,
    23 (1985–1986).     Thus, the causation requirement for this cause of
    action was proximate cause.
    Next, I agree with the fact finding of the district court and adopt its
    reasoning. Even though our review is de novo and we are not bound by
    the district court’s findings, we do “give deference to those findings
    because the district court had the opportunity to assess the credibility of
    the witnesses.” Hensler v. City of Davenport, 
    790 N.W.2d 569
    , 578 (Iowa
    2010).
    The court’s majority opinion considers the facts anew regarding
    causation by finding Dieterle’s and Dr. Kushner’s testimony credible.
    This finding by our court flies in the face of the district court’s finding
    71
    regarding the credibility of Dieterle and Dr. Kushner.     Specifically, the
    district court found:
    the testimony of Dieterle and Kushner was largely not
    credible.   Kushner’s lack of credibility was especially
    apparent in matters relating to his recollection of his actions
    against [S]mith. The Court was struck with his defense of
    Reinig despite her confessed theft of ISU funds.
    Dieterle’s testimony was less profound, but it was
    obvious that his goal in the testimony was to protect himself.
    His testimony would occasionally intersect with the truth,
    but this was obviously more by coincidence than design.
    It is difficult for me to credit Dieterle’s and Dr. Kushner’s testimony in
    light of the district court’s finding.
    Moreover, my review of the evidence supports the district court’s
    finding. The district court found at one point in its ruling
    Dieterle made the determination that Smith’s position
    would be eliminated. Testimony established that the ECM
    [Engineering, Communications and Marketing department]
    was the only unit to have all staff terminated and the only
    unit to have its own reorganization plan. Despite the fact
    that the unit was purportedly eliminated, the Director of the
    ECM, Dieterle, was not terminated. A new unit called
    Engineering College Relations (“ECR”) was created. Dieterle
    determined that “new” job descriptions were required to
    create “new” positions rather than retaining any existing
    staff besides himself. Smith testified that this was done in
    order to terminate him and get around existing ISU policies
    that would prevent doing so and retaining a part-time writer,
    Jessie Strawn, full-time. Witnesses for Smith corroborated
    his testimony by testifying that it did not make business
    sense to eliminate entirely the only cost-recovery unit in the
    College of Engineering based on budgetary concerns. Smith
    testified that ISU counsel, Paul Tanaka, had been attempting
    to get Smith to leave his position in the ECM in 2008. That
    supports the fact that ISU was engaged in continuous
    attempts to get rid of Smith. The testimony of Dean Wickert
    that the elimination of ECM was his decision was brought
    into question by evidence suggesting that dissolution had
    been discussed by Dieterle prior to Wickert becoming Dean,
    in approximately September of 2008 in response to an
    “organizational dilemma.” (Trial Exhibit 114[.]) It is an
    appropriate inference that Smith was the “organizational
    dilemma.”       Documentary evidence also suggests that
    72
    contrary to ISU’s testimony, the determination was made as
    early as January of 2009 that Smith would be terminated.
    (Trial Exhibit 130[.])
    ISU also failed to rehire Smith despite the fact that he
    was qualified and a senior full-time employee. Dieterle
    testified that he had determined the job descriptions for the
    purportedly new positions. Smith testified that Dieterle had
    tailored them to favor a part-time writer, Jessi[e] Strawn.
    Smith also testified that work had been removed from him
    prior to the termination and assigned to Strawn in
    anticipation of his termination. ISU’s witnesses testified that
    a committee was formed to review applications for the
    position of communication specialist, purportedly to prevent
    any bias and lend legitimacy to the hiring.            However,
    according to defense witness John Glover, the committee in
    fact met with Dieterle prior to this process. Ultimately the
    committee did not make a recommendation or determine
    whom to hire; rather, the decision was made by Dean
    Wickert, who acknowledged that he had been briefed on
    Smith’s lawsuit against ISU upon taking his position as
    Dean.
    Exhibit 130 is especially telling. In this handwritten note, Dieterle
    and Dr. Kushner have Smith retired from the University and his
    replacement in the new position. Exhibit 130 was authored after Smith
    complained to President Geoffroy, but before the reorganization of the
    department took place.
    Accordingly, I would accept the findings of the district court and
    affirm in its entirety.
    Hecht, J., joins this concurrence in part and dissent in part.