Larry C. Beverage, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles E. Beverage, and Linda K. Anderson, and Bonnie K. Valentine v. ALCOA, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, and Iowa-Illinois Taylor Insulation, Inc., successor-in-interest to Iowa Illinois Thermal Insulation, Inc., an Iowa Corporation ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–1852
Submitted January 19, 2022—Filed June 17, 2022
LARRY C. BEVERAGE, Individually and as Personal Representative of the
Estate of CHARLES E. BEVERAGE, Deceased, and LINDA K. ANDERSON, and
BONNIE K. VALENTINE,
Appellants,
vs.
ALCOA, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, IOWA-ILLINOIS TAYLOR
INSULATION, INC., a successor in interest to IOWA ILLINOIS THERMAL
INSULATION, INC., an Iowa Corporation,
Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Patrick A. McElyea,
Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of defendants in asbestos litigation under statutory limitation of liability. COURT
OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED.
2
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which Christensen, C.J.,
and Appel and McDonald, JJ., joined. Waterman, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Mansfield and McDermott, JJ., joined.
Lisa W. Shirley (argued) of Dean Omar Branham Shirley, LLP, Dallas,
Texas, and James H. Cook of Dutton, Daniels, Hines, Kalkhoff, Cook & Swanson,
PLC, Waterloo, for appellants.
Kevin P. Horan (argued), Douglas M. Sinars, and Owen Blood of Sinars
Slowikowski Tomaska, LLC, Chicago, Illinois, for appellee Iowa-Illinois Taylor
Insulation, Inc.
Robert M. Livingston (argued) and William R. Hughes, Jr., of Stuart Tinley
Law Firm, LLP, Council Bluffs, for appellee Arconic, Inc., f/k/a ALCOA, Inc.
Matthew McKinney and Thomas Story of Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross &
Baskerville, P.L.C., Des Moines, and Mark Behrens of Shook, Hardy & Bacon
L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for amici curiae Iowa Association of Business and
Industry, Iowa Insurance Institute, NFIB Small Business Legal Center, and
Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc.
3
OXLEY, Justice.
In 2017, the Iowa General Assembly followed the lead of several other
states in enacting detailed tort reform related to asbestos litigation, codified in
three new chapters of the Iowa Code: chapters 686A, 686B, and 686C. As a
general matter, the legislation requires plaintiffs bringing asbestos lawsuits to
identify actual or potential claims they may have against an asbestos
manufacturer’s section 524(g) bankruptcy trust. This alerts defendants in the
asbestos litigation to other possible sources of recovery for the plaintiff that can
be used as a setoff against any recovery ordered in the litigation. The legislation
also requires a plaintiff to file detailed medical and background information with
their initial pleading to prioritize asbestos claims by plaintiffs with current
physical conditions over those by plaintiffs who are not yet sick.
Iowa also added a provision not found in any other state’s legislation: “A
defendant in an asbestos action or silica action shall not be liable for exposures
from a product or component part made or sold by a third party.” Iowa Code
§ 686B.7(5) (2018). In this asbestos case, the district court read section
686B.7(5) to limit liability to manufacturers of the offending asbestos-containing
product and granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ premises liability claims
against Alcoa and on their products liability claims against Iowa-Illinois Taylor
Insulation for supplying, but not manufacturing, the asbestos-containing
insulation in the Alcoa plant.
On our review of the statute, we conclude the district court failed to
appreciate the legal significance of the legislature’s use of the phrase “product or
4
component part made or sold by a third party” to reference a products liability
defense known as the “component parts defense,” or “bare metal defense” as
described in the specific context of asbestos litigation. Properly considering the
context of the provision, we conclude section 686B.7(5) does not apply to the
claims against Alcoa or Iowa Illinois-Taylor Insulation, and we reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Charles Beverage was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in
September 2015 and passed away from the disease on October 7, 2015. His
children, Larry Beverage, Linda K. Anderson, and Bonnie K. Valentine, and the
executor of his estate, Larry Beverage, (collectively referred to as “Beverage”) filed
this action against two defendants, Alcoa, Inc.1 and Iowa-Illinois Taylor
Insulation, Inc. (IITI), on September 27, 2017.2 In an amended petition, Beverage
alleged claims for negligence, premises liability, strict liability, breach of express
and implied warranties, and loss of consortium.
The claims stem from Charles’s exposure to asbestos-containing
insulation and other asbestos-containing products when he worked as an
independent construction contractor inside Alcoa’s aluminum plant in
Bettendorf from the 1950s through the mid-1970s. IITI, a supplier and
1Alcoa, Inc. is now known as Arconic, Inc. We refer to the defendant as “Alcoa” to
maintain consistency with the caption of the case.
2Beverage originally filed suit in Missouri state court, naming a number of other
defendants in addition to Alcoa and IITI. That case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction
over the defendants, and Beverage then filed this action in Iowa state court.
5
distributor of insulation products, supplied and installed much of the asbestos-
containing insulation used in the Alcoa plant. IITI did not manufacture
insulation, but it did, at Alcoa’s direction, supply asbestos-containing insulation
and install it at Alcoa’s plant. There are no allegations that Alcoa manufactured
or produced asbestos-containing products.
Both defendants moved for summary judgment based on recently-enacted
Iowa Code section 686B.7(5), arguing the provision’s protection against liability
“for exposures from a product or component part made or sold by a third party”
applied to each of them. Alcoa faced premises-type liability for failing to provide
Charles with a safe environment and failing to warn him of the dangers of the
asbestos dust he worked around inside its plant. IITI faced products liability
claims of negligence and strict liability for its role in supplying and installing the
insulation that was present in the Alcoa plant. The district court parsed the
twenty-eight-word provision to conclude that the statute unambiguously granted
immunity to any defendant who did not manufacture the offending asbestos-
containing products. The district court traced the insulation at issue to
manufacturers Johns Manville and Eagle-Pitcher, not Alcoa or IITI, and
dismissed all claims against both defendants.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, agreeing with its interpretation of section 686B.7(5) as
unambiguously granting immunity to Alcoa and IITI since the asbestos-
containing insulation was manufactured by third parties. We granted Beverage’s
6
application for further review to address the meaning of the newly enacted
statute.
II. Analysis.
Beverage does not dispute the factual basis for the district court’s ruling,
challenging only its legal interpretation of section 686B.7(5). We review both the
grant of summary judgment and the interpretation of a statute for correction of
legal error.3 Albaugh v. The Reserve, 930 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Iowa 2019).
“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the record reveals only a conflict
concerning the legal consequences of undisputed facts.’ ” EMC Ins. Grp. v.
Shepard, 960 N.W.2d 661, 668 (Iowa 2021) (quoting MidWestOne Bank v.
Heartland Co-op, 941 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Iowa 2020)).
A. Background of Asbestos Litigation. Iowa Code section 686B.7 was
passed as part of a comprehensive bill enacting tort reform in asbestos litigation,
so we start with an understanding of what was going on in asbestos litigation at
the time. Asbestos was once considered a “magic mineral” due to its diverse uses.
Timothy B. Mueller, Comment, Tomorrow’s Causation Standards for Yesterday’s
Wonder Material: Reiter v. ACandS, Inc. and Maryland’s Changing Asbestos
Litigation, 25 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 437, 440 & n.24 (2009) [hereinafter
Mueller]. In the early twentieth century, it became the material of choice for
industries manufacturing products that needed the heat resistance, low
3The Beverage family also raised constitutional challenges to section 686B.7(5) on appeal.
But as the court of appeals noted, those claims were not raised below and were therefore not
preserved for appellate consideration. We agree with the court of appeals’ resolution of the
constitutional challenges and do not disturb its analysis of those claims.
7
electrical conductivity, flexibility, and high tensile strength that asbestos
provided. Id. at 440–41. Asbestos has been used in thousands of products
ranging from thermal insulation to roofing shingles, acoustic ceiling tiles, floor
tiles, air conditioning systems, fireproofing, cigarette filters, and automobile
brake parts.4 Id. It can be found in houses, schools, courthouses, factories, and
industrial facilities throughout the United States.
But that miracle mineral is now considered “yesterday’s mistake” given
what is known about the harms of asbestos. Id. at 441. When asbestos fibers are
released into the air, microscopic fibrous particles are ingested or inhaled by
those in the vicinity. The fibers get stuck in the lungs, causing inflammation and
irritability of the lung tissues. Id. at 442. Repeated exposure to high
concentrations of asbestos in the ambient air over an extended period of time
can result in lung scarring, pleural thickening, and tumors. Id. at 442 & n.36.
Mesothelioma, “a rare tumor that affects the tissues lining the thoracic and
abdominal cavities,” was connected to asbestos exposure in the early 1960s. Id.
at 442–43. Mesothelioma has a latency period that is measured in decades, so it
is not detected until years after the exposure. See Ganske v. Spahn & Rose
Lumber Co., 580 N.W.2d 812, 813 n.1 (Iowa 1998) (describing mesothelioma’s
4Even before becoming part of the industrial revolution,
[a]sbestos was used in ancient times to make pottery and wicks for oil lamps.
Later, it was used for textiles, including a purse for Benjamin Franklin and even
a suit that enabled a person to walk through fire. Asbestos was even incorporated
into paper to increase the archival quality of important Vatican documents for
Pope Pius IX.
Mueller, 25 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y at 440 (footnotes omitted).
8
latency period between twenty and forty years). There is no cure for
mesothelioma, and once its symptoms appear, it is a quick but painful way to
die.
American “courts first began recognizing claims against asbestos
manufacturers in the early 1970s.” Michael D. Kelley, Boley v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 37 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 901, 912 (2011) [hereinafter Kelley]. Asbestos
litigation gained significant traction in 1973 when the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment holding asbestos
manufacturers jointly and severally liable under a theory of strict liability to an
insulation worker. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,
1096 (5th Cir. 1973). Asbestos litigation in the United States exploded, and by
2002—twenty years ago now—approximately 730,000 individuals had filed
lawsuits related to asbestos exposure. See Kelley, 37 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. at 912.
B. Legislative Responses Bringing Tort Reform to Asbestos Litigation.
Distinct issues related to asbestos litigation have led states to enact legislation
regulating asbestos lawsuits. First is the increase in “unimpaired” claims—
claims filed by plaintiffs exposed to asbestos products but who were not yet sick.
The primary concern raised by this trend “was the reality that such mass filings
would divert the limited resources away from the victims who were suffering from
cancer or other serious asbestos-related illness and into the pockets of claimants
who had some physical indication of exposure but were not sick.” 3 Lawrence G.
Cetrulo, Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 33:33, Westlaw (database updated Dec.
2021) [hereinafter Toxic Torts Litigation Guide]. In 2004, Ohio led the way with
9
asbestos tort reform by “adopt[ing] objective minimum medical criteria standards
for plaintiffs filing asbestos exposure claims.” Kelley, 37 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. at 914;
see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2307.91–.98 (West, Westlaw through File
100, 2021–22 Gen. Assemb.). The basic premise of medical criteria legislation is
to “provide for a physical impairment requirement, and necessary qualifications
of the professional rendering the diagnosis, in order to file an active claim.” Toxic
Torts Litigation Guide § 33:33. The legislation precludes plaintiffs from bringing
a claim unless and until they have medically documented physical impairments
tied to asbestos exposure. The same legislation also tolls statutes of limitation
and statutes of repose until the physical impairment has manifested so plaintiffs
don’t lose their claim before it begins. Id. Many states have followed with similar
legislation.5 Commentators describe these requirements as “significant because
they prevent plaintiffs’ attorneys from recruiting and filing weak or unimpaired
claims and settling them in the midst of claims with serious injuries, thereby
protecting the resources to compensate the plaintiffs with the most serious
injuries.” Id. & n.8 (citing Hanlon and Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 525, 568–69 (2007)). The Ohio claim prioritization
legislation has reportedly cut down ninety percent of asbestos filings. See Kelley,
37 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. at 914–16.
5See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 51-14-1 to -10 (West, Westlaw through Act 753, 2022 Reg.
Sess.) (outlining the items an exposed person can provide to show they received a medical
diagnosis showing they sustained an asbestos-related injury); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-4901 to -
4911 (2021); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-135-10 to -110 (2021); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§ 16.0031, 90.001–.012 (West 2022); W. Va. Code Ann. § 55-7G-1 to -10 (West, Westlaw through
2022 First Spec. Sess., Reg. Sess., and Second. Spec. Sess., Mar. 27, 2022).
10
The second issue stems from the proliferation of asbestos manufacturers
that have sought bankruptcy protection. Asbestos product manufacturers faced
with thousands of claims by individuals exposed to their products started
seeking relief in bankruptcy court. Johns Manville was the first, filing for
bankruptcy protection in 1982 and ultimately creating a trust as part of those
proceedings. The bankruptcy trust provided the only avenue for claimants to
recover, and it limited recovery to claimants with specific medical and exposure
criteria. See Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 33:36. Other manufacturers quickly
followed suit, and in 1994 Congress codified the Johns Manville model for
bankruptcy at 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). See id.; see also Construction and Application
of Bankruptcy Code Asbestos Trusts, 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(g), 86 A.L.R. Fed. 2d
365 § 2 (2014). Section 524(g) “trusts answer for the tort liabilities of the great
majority of the historically most-culpable large manufacturers that exited the
tort system through bankruptcy over the past several decades.” William P.
Shelley et al., The Need for Further Transparency Between the Tort System and
Section 524(g) Asbestos Trusts, 23 Widener L.J. 675, 675–76 (2014).
“As the ‘main players’ have exited the tort system through bankruptcy,
asbestos plaintiffs have turned to targeting an ever-growing number of
‘peripheral’ defendants that have comparatively lower degrees of culpability for
the claimant’s injuries.” Id. at 676. A common claim against “peripheral”
defendants is a premises liability claim. “In a practical sense (and without
excessive doctrinal scruple) premises claims are the non-product work-site
claims that are left over after the claims barred by workers’ compensation laws
11
are taken away.” Patrick M. Hanlon, Developments in Premises Liability Law
2005, ALI-ABA Course of Study: Asbestos Litigation in the 21st Century,
SL041 ALI-ABA 665, 668 (Westlaw 2005) [hereinafter Hanlon]. “Typically those
claims have been asserted by employees of independent contractors,” id., similar
to the claim made by Beverage against Alcoa.
Without disclosure of bankruptcy trust claim materials, these peripheral
defendants are often forced to pay more than their fair share of a plaintiff’s
damages, and plaintiffs could receive a double recovery—once from the
manufacturers’ 524(g) bankruptcy trusts and again from litigation with the
peripheral defendants. Toxic Torts Litigation Guide §33.37. Starting in Ohio in
2012, many states have passed legislation requiring plaintiffs in asbestos
lawsuits to identify 524(g) trusts to which they may have a claim.6 “The central
purpose of these statutes is to provide transparency by requiring plaintiffs to
disclose any trust claims in the early stages of litigation and to prevent plaintiffs
from double-dipping.” Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 33:37. Notably, the
bankruptcy trust transparency legislation does not limit a plaintiff to seeking
recovery only from the manufacturers’ trusts. Rather, it requires plaintiffs to
disclose available funds from bankruptcy trusts to their litigation defendants to
6See Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 33:37 (discussing Ohio’s enactment of asbestos
bankruptcy trust transparency legislation in 2012, codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2307.951–
.954, and the states that followed). Other states have enacted similar legislation. See, e.g., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. §12-782 (2022); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-14-7; Okla. St. tit. 76, §§ 81–89 (2021); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-34-601 to -609 (2022); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 90.051–.058; Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-2001 to -2010 (2021); Wis. Stat. §802.025 (2022).
12
ensure plaintiffs are consistent in their claimed exposures and do not unfairly
seek the same recovery from multiple sources. See id.Finally, some states have enacted legislation to limit successor liability for
entities acquiring the stock or assets of companies previously involved in
manufacturing or selling products containing asbestos as long as the successor
does not continue the asbestos-related activities of its predecessor.7
Pennsylvania has one such statute, which was described as advancing a state’s
“basic governmental interest to make sure [its] corporate merger laws do not
unfairly expose innocent companies to ruin solely because of a merger.”
Markovsky v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 107 A.3d 749, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)
(quoting Pa. S. Journal, 185th G.A., 2001 Reg. Sess., No. 63, at 1231–32 (Dec.
11, 2001)).
States have not been consistent in their asbestos litigation tort reform,
enacting forms of some or all of these general areas of tort reform. Some states
have expanded their legislation to cover other issues in asbestos litigation. For
example, Ohio enacted legislation that limits premises liability for “take home”
exposure, which often occurred when an employee who worked in a factory where
asbestos dust was present brought the dust home and his or her spouse
laundered the employee’s dusty clothes, inhaling the dangerous asbestos
particles as they flew into the air with each shake of the clothes before throwing
7See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-5-682 (2019); GA Code Ann. § 51-15-3 to -7 (2021); Ind. Code §
34-31-8-8 (2021); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-46-01 to -06 (2021); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.97; 15
Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1929.1 (2021); S.D. Codified Laws § 20-9-39 (2021); Wis. Stat.
§ 895.61 (2022); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-134 (2021).
13
them into the wash. See Kelley, 37 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. at 915–16 (questioning
whether the Ohio legislature “acted overzealously” in enacting legislation to
eliminate all take-home exposure liability). Only Ohio and Kansas have enacted
legislation precluding liability for this take-home exposure. See Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 60-4905(a) (2021); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.941(A)(1); see also Kelley,
37 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. at 915.
C. The Iowa General Assembly Enacts Senate File 376. With this
background, we turn to the legislation passed by the Iowa General Assembly in
2017 to address asbestos litigation, adding chapters 686A, 686B, and 686C to
the Iowa Code. See 2017 Iowa Acts ch. 11 (codified at Iowa Code chs. 686A–686C
(2018)). The legislation is, to some extent, modeled after legislation enacted in
other states described above. See Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 33:37 (discussing
Ohio legislation enacted in 2012, followed by legislation enacted or proposed in
almost twenty additional states).
Chapter 686A is titled the “Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust Claims
Transparency Act” and requires a plaintiff in an asbestos action to investigate
and bring claims against asbestos bankruptcy trusts before bringing a claim
against solvent defendants. Iowa Code § 686A.3(1)(a) (requiring plaintiffs to
provide a sworn statement within ninety days of filing an asbestos lawsuit
“indicating that an investigation of all asbestos trust claims has been conducted
and that all asbestos trust claims that may be made by the plaintiff or any person
on the plaintiff’s behalf have been filed”). It also requires plaintiffs to disclose to
defendants the existence of trusts against which they have made, or could make,
14
a claim. Id. § 686A.3(1)(b). Chapter 686A does not limit a plaintiff to only seeking
recovery from asbestos manufacturers’ trusts, but it does provide a mechanism
to ensure a plaintiff makes claims against any relevant trusts that can be offset
against any recovery in an asbestos tort action. See Iowa Code §§ 686A.3, .7.
Chapter 686B is titled the “Asbestos and Silica Claims Priorities Act” and
prioritizes claims in favor of plaintiffs who have experienced physical impairment
from asbestos exposure. Plaintiffs in Iowa, like elsewhere, have filed lawsuits
before experiencing physical symptoms, recovering high-dollar verdicts based on
the fear of contracting asbestos-related cancer in the future. See, e.g., Beeman
v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Comp. Fund, 496 N.W.2d 247, 254–55 (Iowa
1993) (en banc) (affirming verdict in excess of $500,000 based solely on plaintiff’s
fear of contracting asbestos-related cancer after being diagnosed with
asbestosis). Presymptomatic claims were often the only way a plaintiff could
recover damages given the long latency periods for related diseases, which meant
their claims would be barred by the statute of repose if not brought until
symptoms appeared. See, e.g., Tallman v. W.R. Grace & Co.—Conn., 558 N.W.2d
208, 211 (Iowa 1997) (holding manufacturer of asbestos spray insulation was
protected by fifteen-year statute of repose in Iowa Code § 614.1(11) (1993)
against claim brought by worker exposed to asbestos).
Chapter 686B largely follows the lead of other medical criteria legislation
by “provid[ing] for a physical impairment requirement, and necessary
qualifications of the professional rendering the diagnosis, in order to file an active
claim.” Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 33:33. In Iowa, “[a]n asbestos action
15
involving a nonmalignant condition shall not be brought or maintained in the
absence of prima facie evidence that the exposed person has a physical
impairment for which asbestos exposure was a substantial contributing factor.”
Iowa Code § 686B.4. “The prima facie showing shall be made as to each
defendant and include a detailed narrative medical report and diagnosis signed
under oath by a qualified physician.” Id. At the same time, chapter 686B tolls an
asbestos claim until the plaintiff has “received a medical diagnosis of an
asbestos-related impairment” or discovers facts that would lead “a reasonable
person to obtain a medical diagnosis.” Id. § 686B.8(1).
Chapter 686B requires the plaintiff to include with the petition a sworn
statement of the evidence that forms the basis of the claim against each
defendant. Id. § 686B.3(2). The sworn statement must identify the worksites and
employers of the exposed person; each asbestos-containing product exposed to,
whether bankrupt or not; the location, manner, and duration of exposure to the
identified products; and the identity of the manufacturer or seller of the specific
asbestos product. Id. It also places limits on asbestos claims by prohibiting class
action suits. Id. § 686B.3(5).
Titled “Procedures — limitation,” Iowa Code section 686B.7 includes five
separate subsections. These subsections limit use of the medical impairment
evidence required to establish a prima facie claim to pretrial proceedings, id.
§ 686B.7(1)–(2); preclude discovery until a prima facie case is established, id.
§ 686B.7(3); preclude consolidation of claims for trial involving different plaintiffs
absent consent of the parties, id. § 686B.7(4); and—the provision at issue here—
16
protect defendants from liability for exposures to products or component parts
made or sold by third parties. This specific provision, Iowa Code section
686B.7(5), is unique; no other state legislation includes a similar limitation on
liability.8
Finally, while not at issue in this case, chapter 686C covers successor
liability. Generally, it limits the liability of any entity sued based on the actions
of its predecessors to the fair market value of the assets it received in the
transaction from which it became the successor, assuming the entity no longer
engages in the asbestos-related activities of its predecessor. See Iowa Code
§ 686C.3. It follows legislation enacted in other states.
D. The District Court’s and Court of Appeals’ Analysis of Section
686B.7(5). This brings us to the specific issue involved in this case. Iowa Code
section 686B.7(5) provides: “A defendant in an asbestos action or silica action
shall not be liable for exposures from a product or component part made or sold
by a third party.” IITI most aptly describes the district court’s methodology in
interpreting the provision: it “painstakingly interpreted each term of the Statute
on an almost granular level.” Considering the provision word by word, the district
court consulted Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary to conclude this provision meant
that all defendants in an asbestos case are immune from any liability caused by
8The Georgia legislature proposed adding a similar provision to its asbestos code that
provided: “A product liability defendant in an asbestos action shall not be liable for exposures
from a product or component part made or sold by a third party.” H.B. 638, 156th G.A., 2021–
22 Reg. Sess., § 3 (Ga. 2021). The legislation did not pass. See GA HB 638, LegiScan,
https://legiscan.com/GA/bill/HB638/2021 (last visited June 6, 2022) (noting the bill died in
chamber).
17
a product that was either made or sold by another party. Since the
asbestos-containing insulation involved in this case was made by Johns Manville
and Eagle-Pitcher, not by Alcoa or IITI, it was made by a third party, and Alcoa
and IITI were each entitled to immunity. Under the district court’s interpretation,
only the manufacturer of the asbestos-containing product or component part
could be civilly liable for any asbestos exposure.
The court of appeals addressed Beverage’s arguments as discrete
arguments, which led the court of appeals to first conclude that the word
“defendant” broadly applied to every defendant in an asbestos action. Its focus
on the broad application to any asbestos-action defendant led the court to
discount Beverage’s argument that, read as a whole, the liability-limiting
provision applies to types of claims, not types of defendants. The court of appeals
rejected Beverage’s argument that the provision was a codification of the
bare-metal defense, concluding that the legislature “could easily have so stated”
if that was its intent.
The court of appeals also thought Beverage “overstate[d] the impact of
section 686B.7(5). It only immunizes defendants against liability for exposure to
asbestos or silica products that were ‘made or sold by a third party.’ It contains
no general grant of immunity for ‘premises owners’ or ‘asbestos product
suppliers.’ ” The court’s recognition that the provision did not expressly grant
immunity for premises owners or asbestos product suppliers is well taken, but
its conclusion misses the effect of its holding. To the contrary, the district court’s
analysis implicitly does just that by effectively limiting liability to the party who
18
both manufactured and sold the offending asbestos-containing product. Unless
the premises owner happens to also manufacture asbestos-containing products,
the court of appeals’ opinion effectively eliminates premises liability involving
asbestos. By affirming summary judgment for IITI—who admittedly supplied and
sold the offending product to Alcoa—the court of appeals also eliminated all
product supplier liability beyond the original manufacturer.
E. Parties’ Arguments. The defendants focus on the beginning language
of Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) that applies to a “defendant in an asbestos
action,” arguing the plain language provides immunity to any defendant who is
not a manufacturer of the asbestos-containing product or component part.
Beverage focuses on the language at the end of the provision, “product or
component part made or sold by a third party,” arguing that the provision limits
a manufacturer’s or seller’s liability to that stemming from their own products
or component parts but immunizes them from liability stemming from a third
parties’ products or component parts. In other words, the statute is a codification
of the component-parts defense, or in the nomenclature of asbestos litigation,
the bare-metal defense. Considered in that context, Beverage argues that the
provision applies only to products liability claims, as those are the only types of
claims that would be subject to a component-parts, or bare-metal, defense.
F. Rules of Statutory Interpretation. Our analysis turns on the meaning
of section 686B.7(5). As with all cases involving statutory interpretation, we start
with the language of the statute to determine what the statute means. Our first
step is determining whether the meaning of the provision is ambiguous; if it is
19
not, we go no further and apply the unambiguous meaning of the language used
in the provision. See Com. Bank v. McGowen, 956 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2021)
(“If the ‘text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, we will not search for a
meaning beyond the express terms of the statute or resort to rules of
construction.’ ” (quoting In re Est. of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1996))). If
it is ambiguous, we apply canons of statutory construction to determine what
the ambiguous language of the statute means. See State v. Doe, 903 N.W.2d 347,
351 (Iowa 2017) (“If there is no ambiguity, we apply that plain meaning.
Otherwise, we may resort to other tools of statutory interpretation.” (citation
omitted)).
Ambiguity may arise in two ways: (1) from the specific language used in
the statute or (2) when the provision is considered in the context of the entire
statute or other related statutes. Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass’n for
Just., 867 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Iowa 2015). “In other words, even if the meaning of
words might seem clear on their face, their context can create ambiguity.” Id.“[T]he determination of whether a statute is ambiguous does not necessarily rest
on close analysis of a handful of words or a phrase utilized by the legislature,
but involves consideration of the language in context.” State v. Richardson, 890
N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Rhoades v. State,
880 N.W.2d 431, 446 (Iowa 2016), and considering whether a “sentence” under
Iowa Code section 901.5(14) (2014) includes a restitution order by considering
how “sentence” is used in related statutes and by examining section 901.5 as a
whole).
20
The district court and court of appeals looked at each word or phrase with
laser focus, starting with the meaning of the word “defendant” and working
through each word of the statute in a similar fashion. But legislators do not
legislate one word at a time, and statutes cannot be read with blinders, dissecting
a provision one word at a time, setting that word aside, and then moving to the
next to address its meaning outside the context of the other words used in the
provision or how the provision fits into the greater statutory scheme. See Norman
J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:5
(7th ed. rev. 2014) (“A statutory subsection may not be considered in a vacuum,
but must be considered in reference to the statute as a whole . . . .”). Rather,
context is critical, and context comes from “the language’s relationship to other
provisions of the same statute and other provisions of related statutes.”
McGowen, 956 N.W.2d at 133; see also Code § 4.1(38) (“Words and phrases shall
be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language
. . . .”).
The district court focused on defining “the defendant” as any party named
as a defendant in a civil action without considering the context in which the term
was used. This led to an overly broad reading of the rest of the provision, which
we have cautioned against in other cases. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Lamb, 874 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Iowa 2016) (“We certainly understand the argument
that all liens means all liens, yet the location of the phrase within a statute that
appears to narrowly govern certain judgments imposes an obligation of further
analysis to determine the objective meaning of the statute.”); Rolfe State Bank v.
21
Gunderson, 794 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Iowa 2011) (“While the language used by the
legislature at first blush appears to be broad, we have in many cases stated that
broad and even unqualified language must be evaluated in its context.”); see also
Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990) (“[I]n expounding a statute,
we are not guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law . . . .”) (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S.
107, 115 (1989)). In the words of Judge Learned Hand, “Words are not pebbles
in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does
the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their
purport from the setting in which they are used.” N.L.R.B. v. Federbush Co., 121
F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
By focusing on the term “defendant,” the district court and court of appeals
also failed to recognize that the phrase “product or component part made or sold
by a third party” has a specific meaning in the context of products liability law.
The district court defined each word of the phrase separately using an ordinary
dictionary definition. Had it consulted Black’s Law Dictionary, it would have seen
the phrase “component-parts doctrine” as a specific legal concept. See
Component-Parts Doctrine, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining the
doctrine as “[a] rule that the seller of a component part is liable if the component
is defective and causes harm, or if the seller participates substantially in
integrating the component into the final product’s design and the component
causes the product to be defective”).
22
It is a “cardinal rule of statutory construction that when [the legislature]
employs a term of art, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it is
taken.” Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 571 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2014) (quoting
F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012)) (concluding that “Congress meant to
adopt the material falsity requirement when it incorporated the actual malice
standard into the [Aviation and Transportation Security Act] immunity
exception” in 49 U.S.C. § 44941(b)(2) even though the statute’s use of the phrase
“any disclosure made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that
disclosure” could be construed to cover truthful statements made recklessly).
Terms of art are not always easy to recognize, sometimes appearing as everyday
words. See, e.g., Cooper, 566 U.S. at 291–93 (rejecting party’s attempt to define
term “actual damages” by looking at ordinary dictionary definition of word
“actual” and word “damages” because “actual damages” is a legal term of art);
Dix v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 961 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2021) (“[W]e do not
ignore, nor do we believe the general assembly ignored, the specialized meaning
‘safety sensitive’ has developed in the context of workplace drug testing in
considering its meaning under Iowa law.”); Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., Iowa
Dep’t of Com., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (recognizing words in a statute
are to be construed based on their “established meaning in the law”). “Courts as
well as advocates have been known to overlook technical senses of ordinary
words—senses that might bear directly on their decisions.” Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 73–76 (2012)
23
(describing cases construing the legal terms “person,” “consideration,” and
“escape”). “[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source,
whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it.” Id. at
73 (alteration in original) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947)).
Beverage invoked the term of art doctrine when he argued to the district
court that “product or component part” has a specific meaning in the context of
products liability law. Beverage has further expounded that argument on appeal
in describing the general assembly’s use of the phrase “component part” as
invoking the bare-metal defense.
The court of appeals concluded that if the legislature intended to codify
the bare-metal defense, it could have easily done so. Beverage counters by
arguing that if the legislature intended to limit all liability except that imposed
on manufacturers and sellers, it could have simply said so without enacting the
detailed requirements of Iowa Code chapter 686B. Looking beyond the words of
the single provision in section 686B.7(5) and considering the entire statutory
scheme created by Senate File 376, Beverage has a point. Had the general
assembly intended to limit asbestos liability to the manufacturers and sellers of
the offending products, it could have done so in a much more straightforward
manner.
G. The Bare-Metal Defense. To understand Beverage’s argument, we
must first understand the bare-metal defense. The bare-metal defense is a
specific application of the component-parts defense, which provides “that a
24
manufacturer has no duty to warn about potential dangers from exposure to a
part of its product if the manufacturer did not make or distribute the part.” Toxic
Torts Litigation Guide § 33:18. As applied in the context of asbestos litigation, “a
company would not be held liable if a disease causing part was added to its ‘bare
metal’ product,” thus the name, bare-metal defense. Id. The bare-metal defense
is controversial, and “[j]urisdictions remain split regarding the availability of the
‘bare metal’ defense to product manufacturers.” Id.
[Some] courts have adopted a bright-line rule, finding a
manufacturer of a bare metal product can never be liable for injuries
caused by asbestos containing materials which were not original to
the product at issue. Conversely, a growing number of states have
adopted a fact-specific approach, which looks to the foreseeability
that asbestos containing materials would be added to a
manufacturer’s original bare product.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the defense under
maritime law involving two Navy veterans who contracted cancer and ultimately
died after they were exposed to asbestos on Navy ships. See Air & Liquid Sys.
Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 991 (2019). The veterans brought
failure-to-warn products liability claims against manufacturers of pumps,
blowers, and turbines supplied to the Navy. Id. The parts manufacturers raised
the bare-metal defense, arguing the Navy added asbestos insulation and
asbestos parts to their “bare metal” pumps, blowers, and turbines to allow them
to function aboard the Navy ships. Id. Recognizing “federal and state courts have
not reached consensus on how to apply” the component-parts defense, the Court
identified three approaches courts have taken. Id. at 993–94.
25
The “plaintiff friendly” approach adopted by the Third Circuit in the
DeVries case used a foreseeability rule: “A manufacturer may be liable when it
was foreseeable that the manufacturer’s product would be used with another
product or part, even if the manufacturer’s product did not require use or
incorporation of that other product or part.” Id. The “defendant-friendly
bare-metal defense” urged by the manufacturers provided complete protection
from liability:
If a manufacturer did not itself make, sell, or distribute the part or
incorporate the part into the product, the manufacturer is not liable
for harm caused by the integrated product—even if the product
required incorporation of the part and the manufacturer knew that
the integrated product was likely to be dangerous for its intended
uses.
Id. Then there is a middle approach.
[Although] foreseeability that the product may be used with another
product or part that is likely to be dangerous is not enough to trigger
a duty to warn[,] . . . a manufacturer does have a duty to warn when
its product requires incorporation of a part and the manufacturer
knows or has reason to know that the integrated product is likely to
be dangerous for its intended uses.
Id. at 993–94. For maritime claims, the Court settled on the middle approach,
concluding that
[A] product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its product
requires incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that the integrated product is likely to be dangerous
for its intended uses, and (iii) the manufacturer has no reason to
believe that the product’s users will realize that danger.
Id. at 995.
Justice Gorsuch dissented and would have applied the bare-metal defense
urged by the manufacturers. He reasoned that “it is black-letter law that the
26
supplier of a product generally must warn about only those risks associated with
the product itself, not those associated with the ‘products and systems into
which [it later may be] integrated.’ ” Id. at 997 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 5,
cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1997)). Justice Gorsuch equated the bare-metal defense with
section 5 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which addresses
the component-parts doctrine. Id.; see also Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation,
Application of “Bare Metal” Defense in Asbestos Products Liability Cases,
9 A.L.R.7th art. 2, Westlaw (2015) [hereinafter Shields] (“The ‘bare metal’
defense, an affirmative defense, provides that a manufacturer has no duty to
warn about potential dangers from exposure to a part of its product if the
manufacturer did not make or distribute the part.”).
H. Interpretation of Iowa Code Section 686B.7(5). With this
understanding of the bare-metal defense, we return to the provision at issue: “A
defendant in an asbestos action or silica action shall not be liable for exposures
from a product or component part made or sold by a third party.” Iowa Code
§ 686B.7(5). The exclusion from liability provided by section 686B.7(5)
encapsulates the bare-metal defense as urged by the manufacturers in DeVries.
The broadest view of the defense precludes liability to a manufacturer or supplier
for harm caused by an integrated product into its own product. If the defendant
did not itself make, sell, or distribute the part or incorporate the part
into the product, the manufacturer is not liable for harm caused by
the integrated product—even if the product required incorporation
of the part and the manufacturer knew that the integrated product
was likely to be dangerous for its intended uses.
27
DeVries, 139 S. Ct. at 993 (majority opinion). This is precisely what section
686B.7(5) does. It protects a manufacturer or seller from liability for exposure to
an asbestos-containing product or component part made by someone else, a
“third party” in the words of the statute.
We had neither adopted nor rejected the bare-metal defense with respect
to asbestos claims, so the general assembly was writing on a clean slate on the
specific issue of whether and how to apply the defense to asbestos claims, and
it chose to apply it broadly, the “defendant friendly” version under DeVries. See
id. Whichever formulation is used, a critical element running through the
component-part doctrine is that it provides a defense for manufacturers or
sellers facing products liability claims. Its very focus is on the part produced or
sold by the defendant as compared to a part made or sold by a third party,
limiting or eliminating liability for the manufacturer or seller whose product was
not the dangerous part. See David Judd, Disentangling DeVries: A
Manufacturer’s Duty to Warn Against the Dangers of Third-Party Products, 81 La.
L. Rev. 217, 233–34 (2020) (describing the question of whether a manufacturer
has a duty to warn about risks posed by third-party products involving a
manufacturer of component parts as a “subset of products liability cases”);
Shields, 9 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (“collect[ing] and discuss[ing] those cases in which
courts have applied the ‘bare metal’ defense in asbestos products liability cases”)
(emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Morgan v. Bill Vann Co., 969 F. Supp. 2d 1358,
1367–70 (S.D. Ala. 2013) (applying the bare metal defense under Alabama
products liability law and holding it barred plaintiff’s claim). The defense simply
28
has no application to other types of claims, such as a premises liability claim,
where the basis of liability is something other than duties owed by
manufacturers or sellers of products to warn others about risks associated with
their products.
It may well be that the Iowa General Assembly’s codification of the
component-parts defense is broader than the defense described in the
Restatement or at common law. And that is the general assembly’s prerogative.
But its use of the phrase “product or component part made or sold by a third
party” is clearly a reference to the component-parts doctrine, and we cannot
ignore the context in which that defense arises in determining the meaning of
Iowa Code section 686B.7(5).
Our interpretation of section 686B.7(5) as codifying a type of
component-parts defense to a products liability claim is confirmed by other rules
of statutory construction. We first look at the rest of the statutory scheme to
construe the reach of section 686B.7(5). See Griffin Pipe Prods. Co. v. Guarino,
663 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 2003) (“[W]e consider the context of the provision at
issue and strive to interpret it in a manner consistent with the statute as an
integrated whole.”). Chapter 686B lays out the detailed process a plaintiff must
complete in bringing an asbestos claim. A plaintiff with a nonmalignant condition
must file, with his initial pleading, “a sworn information form” containing specific
information, including the employer and occupation of the exposed person, the
specific location and manner of each alleged exposure, and the beginning and
ending dates of the exposure. Iowa Code § 686B.3(2)(a)–(d). The sworn
29
information form must also provide “[t]he identity of the manufacturer of the
specific asbestos . . . product for each exposure” and “[t]he identity of the
defendant or defendants against whom the plaintiff asserts a claim.” Id.
§ 686B.3(2)(e)–(f). If any of the required information is missing, “[t]he court shall
dismiss the asbestos action . . . without prejudice.” Id. § 686B.3(5). These details,
particularly those related to the exposed person’s occupation, employer, and
locations and manners of exposure, seem unnecessary and would serve no
purpose if liability is limited to manufacturers. So too would be the requirement
to identify both the manufacturers of the specific products for each exposure and
to separately identify the defendants against whom the plaintiff is asserting his
claim. Those are one and the same under the district court’s interpretation. We
generally read legislation in a manner to avoid rendering portions of a statute
superfluous or meaningless. See Little v. Davis, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2022 WL
1434657, at *4 (Iowa May 6, 2022) (rejecting interpretation of the Iowa Trust
Code in a way that would make other sections never operable and relying on the
“general rule of statutory construction” under which “we avoid an interpretation
or application of a statute that renders other portions of the statute superfluous
or meaningless”).
We also consider how Iowa Code chapter 686B relates to chapter 686A.
Chapter 686A requires plaintiffs bringing asbestos claims to identify bankruptcy
trusts in which they may have a claim, which essentially means identifying the
asbestos product manufacturers such as the two identified in this case—Johns
Manville and Eagle-Pitcher. While plaintiffs are required to identify any actual or
30
potential trust claims, importantly, they are not limited to only bringing their
claims against those trusts. Rather, the purpose behind chapter 686A is to
ensure trust claims are identified to prevent a plaintiff from receiving the same
recovery from both manufacturers and from other liable parties. Chapter 686A
protects “peripheral,” or non-manufacturer, defendants by requiring plaintiffs to
collect what they can from the manufacturers’ 529(g) trusts. See Iowa Code
§§ 686A.3(1)(a) (requiring plaintiffs to provide an affidavit indicating they have
investigated available trusts and filed claims in all applicable trusts), .3(3)
(allowing the court to dismiss an asbestos action if the plaintiff fails to comply
with these requirements). Amounts recovered or recoverable from 529(g) trusts
are allowed as a setoff against any recovery from a defendant in an asbestos
action. See id. § 686A.7 (“In any asbestos action in which damages are awarded
and setoffs are permitted under applicable law, a defendant is entitled to a setoff
or credit in the amount the plaintiff has been awarded from an asbestos trust
identified in section 686A.6, subsection 1, and the amount of the valuation
established under section 686A.6, subsection 2.”). Chapter 686A does not,
however, prevent asbestos actions against other non-manufacturing asbestos
defendants. Yet if section 686B.7(5) granted the broad immunity allowed by the
district court and limited liability to manufacturers, it would essentially do just
that. Further, there would be little need to identify 529(g) trusts to defendants
in asbestos actions if the only defendants were manufacturers, nearly all of
which are protected by those trusts.
31
We also consider the consequences of the district court’s interpretation of
section 686B.7(5), which eliminates liability for defendants like Alcoa that do not
sell or manufacture the offending asbestos-containing product. See Iowa Code
§ 4.6(5) (directing courts, in interpreting ambiguous statutes, to consider “[t]he
consequences of a particular construction”). Premises liability claims are
well-recognized claims that arose in asbestos litigation after manufacturers
started seeking bankruptcy protection. See Hanlon at 668 (“In the late 1980s,
premises cases began to be brought against electric utilities, and in the 1990s
they extended to other kinds of companies, including paper mills, steel mills,
and other facilities where asbestos was widely used.”). At common law, Beverage
could assert a claim against Alcoa based on its status as a premises owner, see,
e.g., Van Fossen v. MidAm. Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa 2009)
(distinguishing between a duty owed by a premise’s owner to an independent
contractor under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 413 and the lack of duty owed
to the invitee’s spouse who never visited the site), or as the one who retained
control over Beverage’s work environment, see McCormick v. Nikkel & Assocs.,
Inc., 819 N.W.2d 368, 371 (Iowa 2012) (addressing liability of the employer of an
independent contractor under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414). Neither form
of liability depended on Alcoa selling or manufacturing an asbestos-containing
product. Yet the district court’s interpretation of section 686B.7(5) completely
eliminates both types of liability.
“We have often repeated the rule that ‘statutes will not be construed as
taking away common law rights existing at the time of enactment unless that
32
result is imperatively required.’ ” Ford v. Venard, 340 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa
1983) (quoting Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 1979) (en banc)); see
also Collins v. King, 545 N.W.2d 310, 312 (Iowa 1996) (same). If the general
assembly intended to eliminate all common law claims against all defendants
except asbestos product manufacturers or sellers, it could have much more
directly done so without burying it in a subsection focused on procedure. See
Sullivan v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 326 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Iowa 1982) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that legislature made sweeping changes to the railroad-
grade-crossing common law based on statutory language—“A railroad crossing
shall not be found to be particularly hazardous for any purpose unless the
department has determined it to be particularly hazardous”—given its placement
in a provision explaining the responsibilities owed by the railroad transportation
division to the department of transportation (quoting Iowa Code § 307.26(5)(b)
(1981))). If that was the purpose of section 686B.7(5), then why, in the same
piece of legislation, did the general assembly enact such a complex scheme for
asbestos plaintiffs to identify facts relevant to establishing the basis of liability
for each defendant? Why enact the detailed provisions of chapter 686A, the
Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust Claims Transparency Act, to identify liable
manufacturers if the only potentially liable parties in an asbestos action are the
manufacturers and sellers of the offending product? The context of the entire
legislation must be considered in interpreting section 686B.7(5).
Finally, we note that section 686B.3 was amended in 2020, less than three
years after the original legislation was enacted. In addition to requiring the
33
plaintiff to “specify[] the evidence that provides the basis for each claim against
each defendant,” the amendment added the following sentence to subsection 5’s
dismissal provision: “The court shall dismiss the asbestos action . . . without
prejudice as to any defendant whose product or premises is not identified in the
information required pursuant to subsection 2.” 2020 Iowa Acts ch. 1030, § 3
(codified at Iowa Code § 686B.3(4) (2021)) (emphasis added). Allowing a
defendant to be dismissed, without prejudice, if its premises is not identified is
a clear reference to a premises liability claim untethered from a products liability
claim. If section 686B.7(5) already excluded premises liability claims by limiting
liability to only manufacturers, this would be an odd addition. If the general
assembly thought it had previously excluded premises liability claims but
wanted to reinstate premises liability, this would be an even odder way to create
liability it had eliminated through section 686B.7(5). The revision reveals that
the legislation allowed premises liability claims before the 2020 amendment,
contrary to the conclusion that section 686B.7(5)’s immunity provision
extinguished all premises liability claims. See Griffin Pipe, 663 N.W.2d at 867(holding amendment “clarified rather than changed the existing law”).
Although the district court did not have the benefit of this amendment,
and we are cautious in ascribing meaning to a prior legislature based on a later
legislature’s actions, we cannot ignore the legislature’s clear indication that
premises liability claims were viable under the 2018 version of the statute. Under
the district court’s reading, the original statute unambiguously eliminated
premises liability claims. But if that is true, did the general assembly reinstate
34
those claims just three years later? At a minimum, the 2020 amendment reveals
an ambiguity as to whether section 686B.7(5) provides immunity to every
defendant that does not manufacture or sell the asbestos-containing product or
component part. Cf. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000) (holding the Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act did not
give the Food & Drug Administration jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco as “drug delivery devices” within the context of 21 U.S.C. §
353(g)–(h) (1994) in part by considering extensive legislation of tobacco products
enacted after § 353, explaining “the meaning of one statute may be affected by
other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more
specifically to the topic at hand”). The subsequent amendment clarifies what the
initial legislation already allowed: claims based on exposure to asbestos on a
defendant’s premises are allowed as distinct claims that do not turn on that
defendant’s involvement in the manufacture or sale of the offending product. Cf.
Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 309, 317–18 (Iowa 2013) (“When a statute is
amended soon after controversy has arisen as to the meaning of ambiguous
terms in an enactment, the court has reason to believe the legislature intended
the amendment to provide clarification of such terms.”).
Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) limits products liability claims against
manufacturers or sellers to exposures from their own products or component
parts but protects manufacturers or sellers from products liability claims
premised on products or component parts made or sold by others. The provision
does not address asbestos claims outside the context of a products liability claim,
35
such as a premises liability claim. But it still does real work. We had not
previously addressed the bare-metal defense at common law, and as the
Supreme Court explained in DeVries, it has been implemented in different ways.
See 139 S. Ct. at 993. Here, the general assembly has declared the defense to be
broadly available to eliminate a manufacturer’s or seller’s liability for exposure
to asbestos-containing products or component parts made or sold by others. But
it is still a products liability defense. It simply has no relevance outside of a
products liability claim.
III. Application of Section 686B.7(5) to Claims Against Defendants.
With this understanding of the provision’s reach, the district court erred
in granting summary judgment to Alcoa. Beverage’s claims against Alcoa are
based on Alcoa’s actions of failing to provide Charles with a safe environment to
work, either as a premises owner or as the one who controlled his work
environment. These are not products liability claims that turn on who made or
sold the asbestos-containing product, and the limitation of liability in section
686B.7(5) does not extend to Beverage’s claims against Alcoa.
Beverage sued IITI for its role in supplying and installing the insulation at
the Alcoa plant. Beverage’s claims against IITI do sound in products liability, so
section 686B.7(5) could apply if the claimed exposure was from someone else’s
product or component part, as opposed to IITI’s. The district court reasoned that
the insulation was made by third parties Johns Manville and Eagle-Pitcher, not
IITI, so the statutory language “made or sold” protected IITI. See Iowa
Code § 686B.7(5). The district court replaced the disjunctive “or” with the
36
conjunctive “and,” limiting liability only to a defendant who both made and sold
the offending product. By using the disjunctive “made or sold,” the general
assembly sought to capture those in the line of distribution for the offending
product or component part—as opposed to products or component parts made
or sold by third parties. Here, the summary judgment record establishes that
IITI sold the insulation to Alcoa. That the insulation was made by Johns Manville
or Eagle-Pitcher and only sold by IITI does not assist IITI here. The exposure was
allegedly from a product sold by IITI, not a product “made or sold by a third
party.” The district court erred in granting summary judgment to IITI.
IV. Conclusion.
The district court erred in granting summary judgment to Alcoa and IITI.
Judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
Christensen, C.J., and Appel and McDonald, JJ., join this opinion.
Waterman, J., files a dissent, in which Mansfield and McDermott, JJ., join.
37
#19–1852, Beverage vs. ALCOA, Inc.
WATERMAN, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent in part. I concur with the majority’s reversal of
summary judgment in favor of Iowa-Illinois Taylor Insulation, Inc. (IITI). IITI
supplied much of the asbestos-containing insulation at issue. But the plain text
of Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) (2018) bars any claim against Alcoa, Inc. Alcoa
neither made nor sold asbestos or an asbestos-containing product. The
summary judgment in favor of Alcoa should be affirmed.
The text of the statute is dispositive. It provides, “A defendant in an
asbestos action or silica action shall not be liable for exposures from a product
or component part made or sold by a third party.” Id. “Asbestos action” is in turn
defined as “a claim for damages or other civil or equitable relief presented in a
civil action arising out of, based on, or related to the health effects of exposure
to asbestos.” Id. § 686A.2(2); see id. § 686B.2(3). This case is an asbestos action,
and third parties—not Alcoa—made and sold the asbestos and
asbestos-containing products. Accordingly, Alcoa is entitled to summary
judgment.
I am tempted to stop here. See Rhoades v. State, 880 N.W.2d 431, 451
(Iowa 2016) (Waterman, J., concurring specially) (“To me, the plain language of
the statute is dispositive. . . . No further analysis is required.”). But I will respond
briefly to some of the claims of the majority.
First, the majority asserts that Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) was meant to
codify the so-called “bare metal defense.” That term—“bare metal defense”—
38
appears nowhere in chapters 686A, 686B, or 686C. It is never mentioned in the
legislative debate. Furthermore, section 686B.7(5) is a unique provision with no
counterpart in any other state. Even if the purpose of a statute could somehow
override plain language, and it can’t, the majority has not made its case.
Second, the majority contends that Iowa Code section 686B.7(5) only
applies to product liability claims, not to premises liability claims. That
contention runs head-on into section 686A.2(2), which defines an “asbestos
action” as “a claim for damages . . . arising out of, based on, or related to the
health effects of exposure to asbestos.”9 How do our colleagues in the majority
get around this plain language? See P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 540 (Iowa
2018) (“When the legislature has defined words in a statute—that is, when the
legislature has opted to ‘act as its own lexicographer’—those definitions bind us.”
(quoting In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014))). They can’t.10
9The legislature knows how to limit tort reform statutes to specify either premises liability
or product liability claims, as it has done in separate statutes of repose. Compare Iowa Code
§ 614.1(11) (premises liability), with id. § 614.1(2A) (product liability); see also id. § 613.18
(codifying limitation of products liability of non-manufacturers). It has not done so here. The
majority is wrong to conclude that a plain-meaning interpretation of section 686B.7(5) renders
other provisions surplusage. To the contrary, the product identification and notice provisions
apply when a seller, such as IITI is sued, to avoid double-dipping and to properly allocate fault
among parties who made or sold the asbestos that injured the plaintiff.
10The majority also relies on a subsequent amendment to a different provision adding “or
premises” after “product” in section 686B.3(4), governing dismissals. See 2020 Iowa Acts
ch. 1030, § 3 (codified at Iowa Code § 686B.3(4) (2021)). They read too much into that two-word
amendment when they infer that premises liability claims must not have been included in the
original enactment if the legislature chose to add “or premises” to section 686B.3(4) three years
later. To me, that legislative tweak is simply a belt-and-suspenders clarifying amendment,
understandably motivated by the controversy exemplified in this litigation over the scope of the
statutory requirements. See Griffin Pipe Prods. Co. v. Guarino, 663 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Iowa 2003)
(holding amendment “clarified rather than changed the existing law” in response to controversy
“within the legal community concerning the correct application of the original statute”).
Importantly, the legislature left intact the broad definition of “asbestos action” in
section 686A.2(2) as used in the immunity provision, section 686B.7(5).
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Third, the majority relies on “the rule that ‘statutes will not be construed
as taking away common law rights existing at the time of enactment unless that
result is imperatively required.’ ” Ford v. Venard, 340 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa
1983) (quoting Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 1979) (en banc)). The
majority fails to mention that Iowa’s legislature has codified a contrary rule for
interpreting our state statutes: “The rule of the common law, that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code.”
Iowa Code § 4.2. The legislature is free to alter common law rights of action and
did so in section 686B.7(5). This new statute supersedes prior common law.
Difficult cases of statutory interpretation do exist. See Schmett v. State
Objections Panel, 973 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Iowa 2022) (per curiam) (“Statutory
interpretation is not like proving math theorems, and it is sometimes difficult to
come up with a neat answer that is intellectually satisfying.”). This is not one of
them.
Mesothelioma is a horrible disease. Reasonable people can argue that
there are circumstances when even a non-seller or non-manufacturer of asbestos
should be liable in an asbestos action. However, the legislature enacted a
different rule in 2017, and we are obligated to follow it. In re Det. of Geltz, 840
N.W.2d 273, 274 (Iowa 2013) (“We must apply unambiguous operative statutory
language as written without second-guessing the policy choices of the
legislature.”).11 I would affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Alcoa.
11I agree with the determination by the court of appeals and our court’s majority that the
plaintiffs failed to present any constitutional challenge to the statute in district court and
therefore failed to preserve error on any constitutional claim. The plaintiffs could have filed this
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Mansfield and McDermott, JJ., join this concurrence in part and dissent
in part.
action in Iowa before the effective date of this statute but failed to do so. See Iowa Code
§ 686B.9(1) (“This chapter applies to all asbestos actions and silica actions filed on or after
July 1, 2017.”). Charles Beverage died of mesothelioma in 2015. The plaintiffs had already sued
Alcoa and other parties in Missouri state court in 2016 but ultimately voluntarily dismissed that
action after Alcoa challenged personal jurisdiction there.