Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Karen A. Taylor , 2012 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 51 ( 2012 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 12–0228
Filed May 18, 2012
IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
KAREN A. TAYLOR,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission reports respondent committed ethical
misconduct and recommends a public reprimand. ATTORNEY
REPRIMANDED.
Charles L. Harrington and N. Tré Critelli, Des Moines, for
complainant.
Karen A. Taylor, Des Moines, pro se.
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APPEL, Justice.
This matter comes before us on the report of a division of the
Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa (commission). See
Iowa Ct. R. 35.10. The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board
(Board) alleges the respondent, attorney Karen Taylor, engaged in
multiple instances of misconduct in violation of several rules of
professional conduct. The commission recommends a public reprimand.
Upon our de novo review, we agree with the recommendation of the
commission.
I. Procedural and Factual Background.
A. Introduction. In September 2011, the Board filed a complaint
against Taylor. The Board alleges that Taylor violated several rules of
professional conduct in her representation of Sharilyn Norin and Derrick
Coleman in appeals of family law matters. 1
In Count I, the Board alleges Taylor represented Norin in a child in
need of assistance (CINA) proceeding. In that proceeding, Norin sought
to challenge the placement of Norin’s nephew outside the family. The
Board alleges that Taylor failed to file a timely appeal to an adverse
ruling, causing dismissal of the appeal. The Board further asserts that
Taylor failed to advise her client of the dismissal in a timely fashion and
misled the client regarding the reason for the dismissal. The Board
alleges that Taylor’s conduct violated rule 32:1.3 (neglect), rule
32:1.4(a)(3) (failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status
of a matter), rule 32:1.4(a)(4) (failing to promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information), rule 32:8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving
misrepresentation), and rule 32:8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice).
1The Board voluntarily dismissed a third count against Taylor involving another
client.
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In Count II, the Board alleges that Taylor represented Coleman in a
modification proceeding where Coleman sought to alter a child custody
arrangement. The Board alleges that Taylor failed to properly prosecute
the appeal after an adverse ruling, causing dismissal of the appeal. The
Board further asserts that Taylor failed to inform the client of the true
basis of the dismissal. Based on these allegations, the Board asserts
that Taylor violated rule 32:1.3, rule 32:8.4(c), and rule 32:8.4(d).
The commission held a brief hearing. The Board offered into
evidence exhibits and called Taylor to testify. The facts were largely
undisputed. Following the hearing, the commission concluded that
Taylor had violated rules of professional conduct during her
representation of Norin and Coleman and recommended that Taylor
receive a public reprimand.
B. Facts Established at the Hearing.
1. Norin matter. Norin retained Taylor in August 2008 for the
purpose of filing a motion to intervene in a CINA matter. Norin sought to
contest the placement of her nephew with a nonfamily member. The
district court denied Norin’s request for a change of placement on
November 10. Because the matter related to CINA issues, Taylor had
fifteen days after the entry of the ruling to file a notice of appeal. See
Iowa R. App. P. 6.101.
Taylor filed a notice of appeal on December 10, thirty days after the
entry of the ruling. Taylor stated the belated filing was due to her
mistaken belief that she had thirty days to file the notice of appeal.
Taylor stated that she was aware that the fifteen-day deadline applied to
appeals involving the termination of parental rights. Taylor explained,
however, that she did not realize matters involving child placement were
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also subject to the fifteen-day deadline, instead of the thirty-day
deadline.
On December 24, the guardian ad litem of Norin’s nephew filed a
motion to dismiss based upon Taylor’s failure to file a timely notice of
appeal. Taylor did not resist the motion, and on January 29, 2009, this
court dismissed the appeal.
The Board further asserts that Taylor engaged in neglect by not
seeking an extension of time to file her brief under Iowa Rule of Appellate
Procedure 6.101(5), which allows a motion for an extension of time to be
filed within sixty days of the original deadline when the clerk of the
district court has failed to notify a prospective appellant of the filing of
the order or judgment. According to the Board’s calculation, Taylor
could have filed such a motion by January 24, 2009. In her answer to
the Board’s charges, Taylor denied that she was aware that such an
extension could be obtained. At the hearing, Taylor testified she “could
have still filed a Notice of Appeal on time” because she received the order
on November 25, within fifteen days of the filing of the order. Taylor
stated she did not file the notice of appeal on the 25th because she
believed she had until December 10 to do so. Thus, according to Taylor,
“the delay for getting a Notice of Appeal filed was irrespective of whether
or not I got the order on time, but because of my mistake.”
Taylor did not immediately inform Norin of the dismissal. On
February 10, 2009, Norin sent an e-mail to Taylor requesting a copy of
the appellate brief. On March 19, Norin sent another e-mail expressing
her dissatisfaction with Taylor’s efforts to communicate the status of the
matter. Taylor responded to the March 19 e-mail on the same day.
Taylor’s reply, however, did not tell Norin of the dismissal or of Taylor’s
error. Instead, Taylor said she would send to Norin the appellate brief,
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as requested. Norin responded the next day and stated she received the
appellate brief, but wished to know when the brief was filed.
Taylor testified that she first informed Norin of the dismissal in a
letter dated March 23. The letter was offered into evidence at the
hearing. The March 23 letter told Norin the appeal had been dismissed
and that Taylor incorrectly calculated the time for filing the appeal.
Taylor acknowledged the “error,” though she stated that “by the time that
we received a copy of the Order we were already outside of the time frame
for the filing of the appeal.”
Norin sent Taylor another e-mail on March 26, which suggested
Norin had not received Taylor’s March 23 letter. Norin’s e-mail requested
the date Taylor filed the brief and information regarding whether the
other side had submitted its response to Taylor’s brief. Norin again e-
mailed Taylor on June 9, stating, “We have been trying to patiently wait
for news regarding our appeal on behalf of our nephew . . . . The appeal
was filed around Thanksgiving. Has a decision been made? Has any
information come to you?” On June 11, Joan Ryan, a family member of
Norin, sent Taylor another e-mail. The e-mail expressed Ryan’s
disappointment in Taylor’s “lack of professionalism and communication.”
Ryan further noted her family’s frustration over Taylor’s consistent
failure to respond to their phone calls and e-mails. Ryan requested
Taylor provide information relating to the status of the appeal. Taylor did
not respond to the March 26, June 9, or June 11 e-mails.
Taylor testified she did not at first inform Norin of the dismissal
because she “wasn’t quite sure how to handle” the situation. Taylor
acknowledged her failure to inform Norin of the dismissal “compounded
the problem.” When asked whether her failure to disclose was
intentional, Taylor responded:
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The Motion to Dismiss came after I had already initially
worked on the brief and stuff, so initially I . . . wasn’t
completely forthright . . . about the dismissal, and I believe
there was probably a two-month period of time after I knew
about it where we kind of led her to believe that it hadn’t—I
hadn’t been forthright about the dismissal, and . . . I kind of
led her to believe that it was still pending.
In hindsight, Taylor realizes she should have immediately informed
Norin of her error and that it resulted in dismissal of the appeal. Taylor
reports she has since implemented measures to ensure her clients are
better informed and deadlines are met.
2. Coleman matter. In June 2008, Taylor began representation of
Coleman in a matter involving a modification of a dissolution decree.
The district court denied Coleman’s request to modify the decree on
September 29, 2009. Because the matter involved child custody issues,
the expedited deadlines of rule 6.902(1)(a) applied.
Although Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal, the combined
certificate did not state whether the expedited deadline applied, as
required by rule 6.804(4) of the rules of appellate procedure. Taylor
subsequently filed two applications to extend the filing date of the proof
brief and designation of appendix. Neither application stated whether
the expedited deadlines applied in violation of rule 6.1003(2).
The appellee in the matter filed a motion to dismiss, which noted
the appeal involved child custody issues. The motion to dismiss was not
resisted. The court order granting the motion to dismiss noted that it
was not resisted and further stated that “[t]he motion to dismiss
indicates that this appeal involves child custody issues, though this was
not noted by the appellant in the combined certificate or in his two
extension requests, as is required by the rules.”
Taylor stated she did not indicate in her court filings that the
expedited deadlines controlled the Coleman appeal because she believed
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they were inapplicable. Taylor explained that she thought the expedited
deadlines did not apply because the Coleman appeal involved child
visitation issues, not matters involving child custody. Thus, based on
her erroneous interpretation of the rules of appellate procedure, Taylor
requested extensions to extend the filing dates. Taylor further testified
she had been experiencing problems in her personal life, which
ultimately culminated in a divorce.
Within ten days of the dismissal, Taylor sent a letter to Coleman
advising of the dismissal. The letter stated that the dismissal was due to
Taylor’s “fail[ure] to file the original proof brief as required as the
docketing date missed my calendar.”
II. Standard of Review.
We review the findings of the commission de novo. Iowa Supreme
Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 792 N.W.2d 674, 677 (Iowa 2010).
The Board must prove misconduct by a “convincing preponderance of the
evidence.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 774 N.W.2d
301, 304 (Iowa 2009). This burden is less demanding than proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, but requires a greater showing than the
preponderance of the evidence standard. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004). Once
misconduct is proven, we may impose a “lesser or greater sanction than
the discipline recommended by the grievance commission.” Earley, 774
N.W.2d at 304 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. Ethical Violations.
A. Neglect. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 states, “A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3. Despite the
linguistic differences of its predecessor, DR 6–101(A)(3), we have cited
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neglect cases under DR 6–101(A)(3) as precedent in interpreting rule
32:1.3. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809
N.W.2d 96, 102 (Iowa 2012); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Iowa 2011). In this case, neither party
has argued that rule 32:1.3 should be interpreted or applied differently
than DR 6–101(A)(3).
Generally, a violation of rule 32:1.3 cannot be found if “the acts or
omissions complained of were inadvertent or the result of an error of
judgment made in good faith.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Joy, 728 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Iowa 2007). An attorney does not typically
commit neglect by missing a single deadline. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d at
102. Instead, neglect involves a consistent failure to perform obligations
the lawyer has assumed or a “conscious disregard for the responsibilities
a lawyer owes to a client,” and may arise when an attorney repeatedly
fails to meet deadlines. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 867 (Iowa 2010) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Grotewold, 642 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 2002). Further, ordinary
negligence does not constitute neglect. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Iowa 2007); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549,
551–52 (Iowa 2004).
We conclude the Board failed to establish by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence that Taylor violated rule 32:1.3 in both
the Norin and Coleman matters. This is not a case in which the
attorney’s repeated failure to comply with appellate deadlines resulted in
administrative dismissal. See Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 915; Iowa Supreme
Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Daggett, 653 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa
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2002). Nor is this a case in which the attorney used the clerk’s office as
a private tickler system. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Curtis, 749 N.W.2d 694, 699 (Iowa 2008). While Taylor’s actions in each
matter resulted in the dismissal of each appeal, the record indicates
Taylor’s actions were the result of negligence rather than neglect. See
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wintroub, 745 N.W.2d 469, 475
(Iowa 2008) (holding attorney’s failure to timely designate expert,
resulting in dismissal of action, did not constitute neglect).
B. Communication. Rule 32:1.4(a)(3) states a lawyer shall “keep
the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.” Iowa R.
Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(3). The comments to rule 32:1.4 state that
paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed
about “significant developments affecting . . . the substance of the
representation.” Id. cmt. 3. The Board alleges Taylor violated this rule
by failing to inform Norin of the dismissal. We agree. The Norin appeal
was dismissed on January 29, 2009. Taylor, however, failed to notify
Norin of the dismissal for nearly two months. We are therefore satisfied
the Board established Taylor failed to keep her client reasonably
informed about the status of the Norin matter.
The Board has also proven Taylor violated rule 32:1.4(a)(4). Rule
32:1.4(a)(4) provides that a lawyer shall “promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information.” Id. r. 32:1.4(a)(4). Following
dismissal of the Norin appeal, Norin wrote Taylor several e-mails
inquiring generally into the status of the matter. Norin also requested a
copy of the appellate brief on multiple occasions. Taylor responded to
these inquiries by sending the March 23 letter informing her clients of
the dismissal. Yet three additional letters were sent to Taylor following
March 23. The letters again requested information regarding the status
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of the matter, the date on which Taylor filed the appeal, and a copy of the
appellate brief. Taylor did not respond to any of these requests.
Therefore, the Board has proven by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence Taylor failed to promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.
C. Misrepresentation. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct
32:8.4(c) states it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Id. r.
32:8.4(c). Misrepresentation generally requires proof of intent to deceive.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 794 N.W.2d 290, 294
(Iowa 2011); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Smith, 569 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Iowa 1997) (interpreting DR 1–102(A)(4)
and stating “[t]he key question is whether the effect of the lawyer’s
conduct is to mislead rather than to inform.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)). The Board must prove the attorney acted
with some level of scienter greater than negligence. Iowa Supreme Ct.
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 605 (Iowa 2011).
We conclude Taylor violated rule 32:8.4(c) in the Norin matter but
not the Coleman matter. Norin sent Taylor an e-mail on February 10
and March 19 requesting information relating to the appeal and
expressing dissatisfaction with Taylor’s efforts to keep her informed
about the status of the matter. Taylor’s first response on March 19 did
not inform Norin of the dismissal. Instead, Taylor explained she would
send a copy of the appellate brief as requested even though she knew the
appeal had been dismissed. Taylor testified that she had not been
“forthright about the dismissal,” and that there was a period of time in
which she “kind of led [Norin] to believe that [the appeal] was still
pending.”
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Taylor then sent a letter dated March 23, 2009, clearly explaining
the reason for the dismissal. We credit Taylor’s testimony that the letter
was sent. Nonetheless, the communication of March 19 amounts to a
misrepresentation, and Taylor does not argue to the contrary.
Under these circumstances, we are satisfied Taylor’s
communication and conduct following the dismissal of the Norin appeal
constitutes conduct involving misrepresentation in violation of rule
32:8.4(c). See Thomas, 794 N.W.2d at 294 (concluding attorney deceived
client in a letter stating he would “get to the bottom of the matter” when
the attorney knew the case had been dismissed).
In the Coleman matter, however, on this record we are unable to
determine whether Taylor acted with a level of scienter greater than
negligence. The Board alleges Taylor’s letter to Coleman stating the
appeal had been dismissed due to her failure to timely file a proof brief
amounts to a misrepresentation because the true reason for the
dismissal was her failure to include a notice of the expedited deadlines in
the court filings. Taylor reasonably testified that she believed the appeal
had been dismissed due to her dilatory conduct and not her failure to
include the notice in the appeal documents. Further, Taylor took
responsibility for the dismissal in the letter to Coleman, stating the court
granted the dismissal due to her “failure” to file the necessary brief. The
letter also indicates Taylor attached the order granting dismissal. On
these facts, the Board has not established by a convincing
preponderance of the evidence Taylor had a level of scienter greater than
negligence in her correspondence with Coleman. We therefore hold the
Board failed to prove Taylor violated rule 32:8.4(c) in the Coleman
matter.
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D. Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice. Rule
32:8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in “conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). Rule
32:8.4(d) is nearly identical to its predecessor, DR 1–102(A)(5). See Iowa
Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 1–102(A)(5); Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d at
102. Conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice when it
impedes “the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary
systems upon which the courts rely by violating well-understood norms
and conventions of the practice of law.” Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d at 103
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Examples of conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice include “paying an adverse
expert witness for information regarding an opponent’s case preparation,
demanding a release in a civil action as a condition of dismissing
criminal charges, and knowingly making false or reckless charges
against a judicial officer.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa 2010). The Board alleges Taylor
violated this rule in both the Norin and Coleman matters by filing an
appeal that was ultimately dismissed.
This court has held that a neglectful failure to prosecute an appeal,
which results in an administrative dismissal, constitutes conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice. See, e.g., Dolezal, 796
N.W.2d at 914; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 793
N.W.2d 525, 530 (Iowa 2011); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Wengert, 790 N.W.2d 94, 101 (Iowa 2010); Daggett, 653 N.W.2d at 380.
We have also held an attorney can be in violation of rule 32:8.4(d) when
an appeal is administratively dismissed even though the attorney did not
commit neglect in the handling of the appeal. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright, 758 N.W.2d 227, 230–31 (Iowa 2008). Yet, in
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each of these cases, the administrative dismissal came after the
attorneys abandoned prosecution of the appeal and failed to dismiss the
appeal before administrative dismissal. Also, in those cases the clerk
filed an order accomplishing the dismissal or filed a default notice to
dismiss. The case before us, however, is distinguishable.
In this case, Taylor did not allow the appeals to be administratively
dismissed following the clerk’s default notice. See Knopf, 793 N.W.2d at
530 (stating ignoring deadlines, which results in default notices from
clerk, constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
The record does not indicate whether the clerk filed any default notice
related to either appeal. See Wengert, 790 N.W.2d at 101 (holding
attorney’s failure to timely file proof brief, followed by default notice from
clerk, constituted neglect and conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice when attorney ignored default notice); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d 661, 669 (Iowa 2007) (holding
disregard of notice of default constitutes neglect and conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice). Instead, the record shows the
dismissals resulted from motions to dismiss filed by the opponents of
Norin and Coleman in light of Taylor’s negligent failure to appreciate the
applicability of the expedited deadlines. Under these circumstances, the
Board has failed to establish by a convincing preponderance of the
evidence Taylor’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice
under rule 32:8.4(d).
IV. Sanction.
The appropriate sanction is determined by the particular
circumstances of each case. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Ackerman, 786 N.W.2d 491, 497 (Iowa 2010). We do, however, seek a
degree of consistency in our disciplinary cases with respect to sanctions.
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Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clauss, 711 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa
2006). While we give respectful consideration to recommendations of the
commission, “the matter of sanction is solely within the authority of this
court.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morrison, 727 N.W.2d
115, 119 (Iowa 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In
determining the appropriate sanction, the court weighs the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and considers “ ‘the nature of the
violations, the need for deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance
of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and the [attorney’s] fitness to
continue in the practice of law.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
v. Liles, 808 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Comm. on Prof’l Ethics
& Conduct v. Blomker, 379 N.W.2d 19, 21 (Iowa 1985)).
We first consider the mitigating factors. We note Taylor has taken
responsibility for her actions. We have held that such forthrightness is a
mitigating factor to be considered in calibrating the appropriate sanction.
See Thomas, 794 N.W.2d at 295 (noting attorney’s admission of
responsibility is a mitigating factor).
Taylor has also limited her appellate practice following the Norin
and Coleman matters. For what remains of her appellate practice, Taylor
has implemented new policies and procedures in her office to ensure
deadlines are met. See id. (noting implementation of new office
procedures to ensure missed deadlines do not recur is a mitigating
factor).
We also note that Taylor maintains a law practice that allows
persons with modest means to obtain representation in family law
matters. She charges a modest hourly rate which provides her clients
with access to the courts for an affordable fee. Providing legal
representation to an underserved part of the community is a significant
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mitigating factor. See Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Borchart, 392
N.W.2d 491, 492 (Iowa 1986) (agreeing with commission’s observation
that attorney’s service on behalf of the disadvantaged was a mitigating
factor).
Finally, Taylor cites stress related to personal issues involving the
dissolution of her marriage and subsequent child custody dispute.
Although such personal issues do not excuse ethical violations, they may
be a mitigating factor in determining sanctions. See Van Ginkel, 809
N.W.2d at 110.
Turning to the aggravating factors, we note Taylor received a public
reprimand in 2005 for neglect of a client matter and failure to provide
upon request an accounting of a client’s retainer. The details of this
matter are not provided in the record of this proceeding. Taylor also
received a temporary suspension in 2010, but the temporary suspension
was lifted a day later and appears to have been the result of a mail or
administrative error, was cured within hours of the suspension, and is of
little consequence for purposes of this proceeding.
The most troublesome feature in this case is the misrepresentation
to Norin regarding the dismissal. As we stated in Hohenadel, “[t]he court
system and the public we serve are damaged when our officers play fast
and loose with the truth.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Iowa 2001) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). Yet the conduct in this case is less
egregious than that found in other cases imposing a greater sanction.
See Daggett, 653 N.W.2d at 381–82 (imposing sixty-day suspension for
conduct involving neglect, misrepresentation, and failure to respond to
the Board’s inquiries when client was harmed); Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d
at 657 (imposing four-month suspension for attorney with history of
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unethical conduct who engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation
and neglect resulting in harm to the attorney’s clients); Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Horn, 379 N.W.2d 6, 8–10 (Iowa 1985) (holding
failure to cooperate with committee, neglect in one matter, and
misrepresentations to decedent’s daughter warranted three-month
suspension). Taylor’s conduct is closer, though not identical, to
misrepresentation cases in which we imposed a public reprimand. See
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cannon, 789 N.W.2d 756, 760
(Iowa 2010) (holding misrepresentation involving plagiarism warranted
public reprimand); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Newman,
748 N.W.2d 786, 788–89 (Iowa 2008) (holding misrepresentation in form
of forging judge’s signature warranted public reprimand in absence of
prior disciplinary history).
We agree with the commission’s conclusion that, under all the
facts and circumstances of this case, a public reprimand is the
appropriate sanction. We further agree with the commission’s
observation that future violations may well produce a different result.
V. Conclusion.
For the reasons expressed above, Karen Taylor is publically
reprimanded for the ethical violations cited in this opinion.
ATTORNEY REPRIMANDED.