Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Jeffrey M. Ireland ( 2008 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 43 / 07–1814
    Filed May 9, 2008
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
    Complainant,
    vs.
    JEFFREY M. IRELAND,
    Respondent.
    On review of the report of the Grievance Commission.
    Grievance     Commission    report    in   disciplinary   proceeding
    recommends suspension of respondent’s license to practice law.
    LICENSE SUSPENDED.
    Charles L. Harrington and Teresa A. Vens, Des Moines, for
    complainant.
    Jeffrey M. Ireland, Ozark, Missouri, pro se.
    2
    PER CURIAM.
    This case comes before the court on the report of a division of the
    Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa. See Iowa Ct. R.
    35.10.   The Commission found the respondent, Jeffrey M. Ireland,
    violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility by neglecting a
    client’s legal matter, by not providing an accounting or return of retainer
    funds to the client, by failing to return personal papers, by failing to
    notify the client he had closed his office, and by failing to cooperate with
    the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board in its investigation.
    The Commission recommends suspension of the respondent’s license
    with no possibility of reinstatement for two years. Upon our respectful
    consideration   of   the   findings   of   fact,   conclusions   of   law,   and
    recommendation of the Commission, we find the respondent committed
    the charged ethical violations and suspend his license to practice law for
    six months.
    I. Standard of Review.
    Our review of attorney disciplinary proceedings is well established.
    The Commission’s findings are reviewed de novo. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 
    729 N.W.2d 812
    , 815 (Iowa 2007).
    Although we give the Commission’s findings and recommendations
    respectful consideration, we are not bound by them. 
    Id. The Board
    has
    the   burden    of   proving   attorney     misconduct     by    a    convincing
    preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd.
    v. Conrad, 
    723 N.W.2d 791
    , 791–92 (Iowa 2006).
    This burden is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
    but more than the preponderance standard required in the
    usual civil case. Once misconduct is proven, we “may
    impose a lesser or greater sanction than the discipline
    recommended by the grievance commission.”
    3
    
    Id. (quoting Iowa
    Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 
    674 N.W.2d 139
    , 142 (Iowa 2004)).
    II. Factual Findings.
    At the time of the conduct at issue here, Jeffrey Ireland was an
    Iowa lawyer who had practiced in several communities in the state. In
    January 2002 Ireland was maintaining a law office in Panora, Iowa. The
    matter giving rise to the Board’s complaint involved the estate of Leland
    Barker.
    In early 2002 Ireland agreed to act as the attorney for the estate of
    Leland Barker.     The decedent’s son, Dale Barker, met with the
    respondent on three separate occasions to discuss the estate. At the first
    meeting, Barker provided Ireland with his father’s will and other
    paperwork. At the second meeting, the respondent agreed to handle the
    estate for a $2000 fee.   Barker’s mother and widow of the decedent,
    Pauline Barker, also met briefly with the respondent on one occasion. In
    February 2002 Barker provided Ireland with a $1000 check written on
    Pauline’s account. The memo portion of the check read “retainer for L.G.
    Barker estate.” Ireland deposited the check in his trust account.
    Ireland failed to take any action on behalf of the estate. In May
    2002 he closed his law office in Panora without notifying the Barkers.
    The Barkers never received an accounting or refund of their retainer.
    Ireland did not return their personal papers, including the decedent’s
    will. The Barkers eventually sought new counsel to handle the estate,
    which was subsequently successfully closed.
    In March 2003 Pauline Barker filed a complaint with the Board. In
    August 2005 the Board wrote to the respondent requesting a response to
    the complaint and all records and documents showing the respondent’s
    handling of the $1000 retainer. In his response, Ireland asserted he was
    4
    retained to prepare living trust documents for Dale and Pauline, not to
    probate Leland’s estate. He claimed he had tried to locate the Barkers
    prior to closing his office, but was unable to do so due to the fact that he
    had no mailing address for them.      Ireland stated he would return the
    clients’ materials if given a current address. The respondent also asked
    for more time to retrieve the documents requested by the Board.
    Subsequent requests by the Board produced a final billing
    statement that was never received by Dale or Pauline Barker, but the
    respondent did not produce the trust account statements sought by the
    Board. The respondent did, however, provide copies of the drafts of the
    living trusts he claimed to have prepared for the Barkers.
    On January 24, 2007, the Board filed a complaint against the
    respondent with the Grievance Commission, claiming various violations
    of the Iowa Rules of Professional Responsibility.     The Board asserted
    Ireland’s failure to take action on the Barker estate violated DR 6–
    101(A)(3) (neglect), DR 7–101(A)(1) (failing to meet lawful objectives of
    client), and DR 1–102(A)(5) and (6) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the
    administration of justice and conduct that adversely reflects on the
    fitness to practice law). The Board alleged Ireland’s failure to return the
    Barkers’ documents violated DR 2–110(A)(2) (lawyer shall not withdraw
    until reasonable steps have been taken, including delivery of client’s
    papers and property to the client) and DR 9–102(B)(4) (lawyer shall
    promptly deliver to client property that client is entitled to receive). It
    also asserted the respondent’s failure to fully cooperate with the Board
    violated DR 1–102(A)(5) and (6).     Finally, the Board alleged Ireland’s
    failure to provide his clients with an accounting of the advance fee
    payments and failure to promptly return funds they were entitled to
    receive was a violation of DR 9–102(B)(3) and (4) (lawyer shall maintain
    5
    records of all funds of the client coming into lawyer’s possession and
    render appropriate accounting and promptly pay or deliver to the client
    funds the client is entitled to receive).
    A hearing before a panel of the Grievance Commission was held on
    October 12, 2007.             Dale Barker testified to the circumstances
    surrounding the respondent’s retention to handle his father’s estate.1 He
    testified that after a couple of meetings with the respondent, a retainer of
    $1000 was written on his mother’s account. The check contained the
    address of the residence that both Barkers had resided at for years and
    where Pauline Barker had resided for over sixty years.              When Barker
    discovered Ireland had closed his office, Barker left numerous messages
    on the respondent’s answering machine, all of which were unreturned.
    He also sent a certified letter asking the respondent to return his papers
    and the retainer. Barker received a signed return receipt for the letter
    but nothing else.       The respondent, Barker testified, kept his mother’s
    $1000 retainer without conferring any benefit on them and without
    providing any accounting for the funds received.
    Ireland did not attend the hearing.             Now living in Missouri, the
    respondent advised the Commission by letter that he did not have the
    funds to travel to Des Moines and had no intention of returning to Iowa
    to practice law.      He maintained, however, that he did not misuse the
    retainer and completed the matter that he was hired to do—prepare
    living trusts.
    The Commission found the Board had met its burden of proving
    the violations alleged in the complaint.            Specifically, the Commission
    found Ireland had accepted employment to probate Leland Barker’s
    1Pauline   Barker died prior to the Commission’s hearing.
    6
    estate and then did nothing to achieve this end. He accepted a $1000
    retainer, but never made any accounting to his clients. Moreover, the
    Commission concluded, there was no credible evidence in the record that
    showed Ireland did anything that would allow him to keep any fee. In
    addition, he failed to return the clients’ papers upon request as he was
    required to do. Finally, Ireland abandoned his clients after getting their
    money and then failed to cooperate with the Board’s requests for
    information.
    In considering the appropriate sanction, the Board found several
    aggravating circumstances, including prior disciplinary actions and a
    current suspension. In addition, the Commission found Ireland evasive
    and untruthful with the Board in its investigation of the matter. Based
    upon these findings, the Commission recommended Ireland’s law license
    be suspended for two years.      Prior to reinstatement, the Commission
    recommended the respondent be required to provide proof that all client
    property and the $1000 retainer had been returned to Barker.
    III. Ethical Violations.
    The evidence established that Ireland completely failed to perform
    the legal work he had contracted to do, a violation of Iowa Code of
    Professional Responsibility DR 6–101(A)(3) (“a lawyer shall not neglect a
    client’s legal matter”). See 
    Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d at 817
    (stating neglect
    often involves a lawyer doing little or nothing to advance the interests of
    his client); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman,
    
    683 N.W.2d 549
    , 551 (Iowa 2004) (stating professional neglect involves
    failure to perform those obligations that a lawyer has assumed). Such
    action constitutes not only a disservice to the client, but is also conduct
    prejudicial to the administration of justice and conduct that reflects
    adversely on the fitness to practice law.    See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
    7
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Kirlin, 
    741 N.W.2d 813
    , 817 (Iowa 2007); Iowa Code
    Prof’l Responsibility DR 1–102(A)(5), (6).
    Ireland’s abandonment of his client, prior to performing the
    contracted legal services, also resulted in his failure to meet the lawful
    objectives of his client, a violation of DR 7–101(A)(1). This neglect and
    abandonment were compounded by the fact Ireland made no attempt to
    notify his clients of his withdrawal or to return their paperwork or
    retainer to them.    Contrary to his assertions, the evidence established
    Ireland made no effort to contact the Barkers, whose address had been
    unchanged for years.        Despite the Board’s repeated requests, the
    respondent failed to provide his clients with a final billing or the Board
    with an accounting of the trust fund disbursement. Thus, the Board has
    established by a convincing preponderance of the evidence violations of
    DR 2–110(A)(2) (lawyer shall not withdraw until reasonable steps have
    been taken, including delivery of client’s papers and property to the
    client) and DR 9–102(B)(3) and (4) (requiring lawyer to maintain records
    and render appropriate accounting and promptly deliver funds and
    property the client is entitled to receive). Finally, Ireland’s failure to fully
    cooperate with the Board also constituted conduct prejudicial to the
    administration of justice and reflected adversely on his fitness to practice
    law in violation of DR 1–102(A)(5) and (6). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 
    722 N.W.2d 199
    , 205 (Iowa 2006).
    IV. Sanction.
    In fashioning an appropriate sanction, we consider the nature of
    the violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue in the practice of law,
    the protection of society from those unfit to practice law, the need to
    uphold public confidence in the justice system, deterrence, maintenance
    of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or mitigating
    8
    circumstances.    
    Id. The specific
    facts and circumstances of each
    individual case determine the form and extent of a disciplinary sanction.
    
    Id. “Often, the
    distinction between the punishment imposed depends
    upon the existence of multiple instances of neglect, past disciplinary
    problems, and other companion violations.”        Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Lesyshen, 
    712 N.W.2d 101
    , 104 (Iowa 2006).
    The sanction for neglect of client legal matters generally ranges
    from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension.        
    Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d at 821
    . Harm resulting to the client and multiple incidents of
    neglect are considered aggravating circumstances warranting a more
    serious sanction. 
    Id. Misrepresentations and
    past disciplinary history
    are also factors that warrant a more serious discipline than simple
    neglect. 
    Id. In this
    case, the Barkers were harmed by the respondent’s failure
    to return the unearned retainer. Moreover, the respondent’s continued
    assertions that he was not hired to probate the estate have been shown
    to be false by the testimony presented in this case, and these
    misrepresentations to the Board and the Commission constitute further
    aggravating circumstances.
    In addition, the evidence establishes the respondent has had prior
    disciplinary sanctions including a private admonition in July 2002 and a
    public reprimand in December 2002 relating to incidents of neglect.
    Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland, 
    723 N.W.2d 439
    , 440
    (Iowa 2006). More recently, in 2006, Ireland’s license to practice law was
    suspended for not less than three months for two complaints based upon
    neglect. 
    Id. at 441–42.
        The neglect of the Barker matter occurred in
    2002, prior to this court’s suspension of the respondent’s license in
    2006. The underlying neglect, by itself, demonstrates the same pattern
    9
    of conduct found in the prior disciplinary case, thereby arguably
    warranting only an additional public reprimand. See Iowa Supreme Ct.
    Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moorman, 
    729 N.W.2d 801
    , 806 (Iowa 2007)
    (similar violations occurred during same time frame as prior acts
    resulting in suspension; reprimand warranted).        However, additional
    violations, including the respondent’s failure to cooperate with the Board,
    misrepresentations to the Board, and failure to return clients’ papers and
    funds, constitute additional aggravating factors. See Iowa Supreme Ct.
    Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. D’Angelo, 
    710 N.W.2d 226
    , 233–36 (Iowa 2006).
    Ireland has indicated he has no plans to resume the practice of
    law, thereby making suspension perhaps unnecessary for the protection
    of the public or for deterrence.     However, given the aforementioned
    aggravating circumstances, an additional suspension is consistent with
    promoting public confidence in the justice system and maintenance of
    the reputation of the bar as a whole. The commission recommends we
    suspend Ireland’s license to practice law for two years. While we agree
    that Ireland’s misconduct is serious, we conclude that a less severe
    sanction is warranted under the specific facts of this case. Accordingly,
    we conclude a six-month suspension of Ireland’s license to practice law
    is an appropriate sanction.
    V. Conclusion.
    We suspend Ireland’s license to practice law with no possibility of
    reinstatement for at least six months from the date of the filing of this
    opinion. This suspension shall apply to all facets of the practice of law.
    Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(3).
    Upon any application for reinstatement, the respondent shall have
    the burden to show he has not practiced law during the period of
    suspension and that he meets the requirements of Iowa Court Rule
    10
    35.13. In addition, as a condition to any reinstatement, the respondent
    shall satisfy this court that all client property has been returned to Dale
    Barker and that the respondent has repaid the $1000 retainer that was
    paid to him by the Barkers. Costs are taxed to the respondent pursuant
    to Iowa Court Rule 35.25(1).
    LICENSE SUSPENDED.
    This opinion shall be published.