State of Iowa v. Jeffrey Alan Meyers ( 2020 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 18–2222
Filed January 31, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JEFFREY ALAN MEYERS,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Guthrie County, Paul R.
Huscher (suppression hearing), and Michael K. Jacobsen (trial), Judges.
A defendant appeals his conviction for boating while intoxicated,
challenging the denial of his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C.,
West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, Brenna Bird, County Attorney, and Timothy D. Benton,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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MANSFIELD, Justice.
This “blue light special” presents an important question about the
status of Lake Panorama and several other recreational lakes in the State
of Iowa that were created by damming our rivers.
On a midsummer evening, two officers of the Iowa Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) were patrolling Lake Panorama. They observed
a pontoon boat displaying blue lights. They stopped the boat for violating
Iowa Code section 462A.12(4) (2018). That statute provides, “No person
shall operate on the waters of this state under the jurisdiction of the
conservation commission any vessel displaying or reflecting a blue light or
flashing blue light unless such vessel is an authorized emergency vessel.”
Id.
The stop revealed that the operator of the boat appeared to be
intoxicated. He was arrested and ultimately convicted of boating while
intoxicated in violation of Iowa Code section 462A.14(1). Before trial, he
filed a motion to suppress, asserting that Lake Panorama was not “waters
of this state under the jurisdiction of the conservation commission.” See
id. § 462A.12(4). Therefore, he argued, section 462A.12(4) did not apply
and there was no probable cause for the stop. The district court denied
the motion to suppress, but it forms the basis for the current appeal.
On appeal, we hold that the officers had probable cause to stop the
operator’s vessel because the DNR has jurisdiction over Lake Panorama
and it is not a “privately owned lake” as defined in section 462A.2(31). See
id. § 462A.2(31). When Lake Panorama was created in 1970 by damming
the Middle Raccoon River, it remained accessible to the public by boat
coming down the river from the northwest. Although the property owners
association has attempted to block off that access, this does not change
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the character of the body of water as belonging to the people of Iowa.
Accordingly, we affirm the operator’s conviction.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On the evening of July 7, 2018, two conservation officers employed
by the DNR were participating in a “saturation patrol” on Lake Panorama.
The patrol involved several officers in boats enforcing the navigation laws
on the lake. The boats had been launched from a slip rented to the DNR
by the Lake Panorama Association (LPA), an association of private property
owners who own the land around the lake.
At around 10:45 p.m., the officers observed a pontoon boat
displaying blue lights. The boat was being operated by the defendant,
Jeffrey Meyers, and had eight passengers, including four young children.
The officers stopped the boat for violating Iowa Code section 462A.12(4),
which prohibits the display of a blue light by a vessel operating in “the
waters of this state under the jurisdiction of the conservation commission.”
The officers proceeded to do a routine safety inspection of the vessel,
looking for required equipment. One of the officers, who had closer contact
with Meyers, noticed he had “some slurred speech, bloodshot watery eyes,
[and] smelled of alcohol.” There was an open beer container at his position
on the boat. When Meyers was asked to retrieve the fire extinguisher, he
fumbled the latch. Meyers failed field sobriety tests and a preliminary
breath test. He was arrested. At the Guthrie County Sheriff’s Office, a
chemical test revealed that Meyers had a blood alcohol content of .173.
Meyers was charged with one count of boating while intoxicated in
violation of Iowa Code section 462A.14(1) and four counts of child
endangerment in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a). He moved to
suppress the results of the July 7 stop, urging that it violated both the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
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section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. Specifically, Meyers maintained the
stop was unlawful because the prohibition on operating a vessel with a
blue light applied only to “waters of this state under the jurisdiction of the
conservation commission,” a term that excludes “privately owned lakes.”
See Iowa Code § 462A.2(22) (defining “navigable waters”); id. § 462A.2(31)
(defining “privately owned lake”); id. § 462A.2(45) (defining “waters of this
state under the jurisdiction of the commission”); id. § 462A.12(4)
(prohibiting the use of blue lights on waters of this state for nonemergency
vessels). Meyers asserted that Lake Panorama is a privately owned lake.
See id. § 462A.2(31).
Lake Panorama is now about fifty years old. In 1970, with the
permission of the state, the Middle Raccoon River was dammed near
Panora by a group of private property owners, creating Lake Panorama. At
present, all of the property surrounding the lake is privately owned and
every owner of lakefront property is a member of the LPA. The LPA owns
the dam. The LPA also owns the bed under the lake, as well as the lake’s
only marina and boat ramp. Use of the boat ramp is limited to LPA
members.1 The LPA has put up signs stating that Lake Panorama is a
“private lake.” The LPA also conducts its own patrols of the lake and has
its own boating regulations, which it enforces.
However, the Middle Raccoon River still flows into the lake, and the
public can access the river at Springbrook State Park above the lake. At
the suppression hearing, a DNR officer testified that when he was on duty
in 2006 and 2007, he would put into the river at the state park so he could
enter Lake Panorama in his boat for enforcement purposes unannounced.
1However, as noted, the LPA rents a slip at the marina to the DNR.
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Also, a river still flows out of the lake. There is an outlet at the dam
that allows water to keep flowing, as the Middle Raccoon River continues
south and east until it joins the South Raccoon River in Dallas County.
At the suppression hearing, evidence was presented that the LPA
has put up a barrier at the northwest end of the lake near where the Middle
Raccoon River flows into the lake in order to catch debris. When the
barrier was installed, the DNR directed the LPA to move it so it would not
interfere with navigation between the river and the lake.2
Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. The court
concluded that the DNR has jurisdiction over Lake Panorama because it
constitutes navigable waters and is not a privately owned lake within the
meaning of Iowa Code section 462A.2. See id. § 462A.2(22), (31), (45). The
court said in part,
As to the river feeding into the lake, Springbrook State Park,
north of Lake Panorama, maintains a public boat ramp into
the Middle Raccoon River. The evidence in this case supports
the conclusion, and the court does conclude, that the Middle
Raccoon River, at least from Springbrook State Park to Lake
Panorama, constitutes “navigable waters”. In fact, the
Southwest Iowa District Supervisor of the DNR testified
regarding the access by boat from Springbrook to the lake,
and that the only time it was inaccessible was when the water
was high enough that a boat could not get under the bridge at
Fansler (County Road P18/180th Trail). The conclusion that
the Middle Raccoon River is a navigable stream inlet to Lake
Panorama finds further support in the definition of “artificial
lake” at 571 Iowa Admin. Code ch. 16.1:
“Artificial lake” means all river impoundments
and all other impoundments of water to which the
public has a right of access from land or from a
navigable stream inlet. Examples are Lake
Panorama, Lake Delhi, Lake Nashua, and Lake
Macbride. [emphasis added]
2Meyers testified at the suppression hearing that the barrier now extends across
the lake so as to make it impossible for a boat like his pontoon boat to get between the
river and the lake.
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The court then discussed the legal significance of the LPA’s actions:
The Defendant provided evidence that the Lake Panorama
Association claims the lake is the “largest private lake” in the
state, that it has posted signs claiming its private nature, and
that the LPA has attempted to barricade the north end of the
lake where the Middle Raccoon River enters.
The court does not find any authority for the proposition
that posting of signs or the advertisements of littoral
landowners has any significance in determining the rights
granted or denied by statute. If the waters are indeed
navigable, the barricading of such waters constitutes nothing
more than a nuisance. See [Iowa Code] § 657.2 . . . (“The
following are nuisances: . . . 3. The obstructing or impeding
without legal authority the passage of any navigable river,
harbor, or collection of water.”)
Thereafter, Meyers stipulated to a trial on the minutes of testimony.
The court found Meyers guilty of boating while intoxicated, imposed
sentence, and dismissed the child endangerment counts.
Meyers filed his notice of appeal, and we retained the appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
Our review of constitutional claims is de novo. State v. Pettijohn,
899 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Iowa 2017). However, our review is for correction of
errors at law to the extent the constitutional claims raise issues of
statutory interpretation. Id.; see State v. Harrison, 846 N.W.2d 362, 365
(Iowa 2014).
III. Analysis.
As noted, the blue-light prohibition applies to “the waters of this
state under the jurisdiction of the conservation commission.” Iowa Code
§ 462A.12(4). Is Lake Panorama such a water? That is the salient issue
on appeal.
To put it another way, this case presents the question whether the
waters of Lake Panorama belong to all the people of Iowa or only to the
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group of private property owners who own the land surrounding and
underneath the lake itself.
A. Law in Other Jurisdictions. The general rule is that even when
the bed under a navigable body of water is privately owned, the body of
water belongs to the public if the public can lawfully access that body of
water. For example, in State v. Head, a private property owner had
dammed Black Creek, thereby creating a lake (Black’s Pond) entirely on
private property. 498 S.E.2d 389, 391 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam).
“No trespassing” signs were posted. Id. Nonetheless, Head launched his
boat on the creek upstream with permission and made into the lake where
he was charged with trespassing. Id. The South Carolina Court of Appeals
upheld the reversal of Head’s conviction, reasoning,
It appears, however, that in the case of nontidal navigable
streams, while the adjacent property owners hold title from
their shoreline to the center of the stream bed, the public has
an easement in use of the waterway. Thus, if a nontidal
watercourse is navigable, then a person who legally accesses
the watercourse, and fishes from within a boat on the
watercourse, cannot be convicted of violating § 50–1–90, as
such a person has a constitutional and statutory right to be
there.
Id. at 392–93 (citations omitted). The court went on,
[R]elevant authorities have considered a waterway navigable
in the appropriate case if a small sport fishing boat could
negotiate it at its ordinary stage. However, the existence of
occasional natural obstructions to navigation, such as rapids
or falls, or the construction of authorized or unauthorized
artificial obstructions to navigation, such as dams, generally
does not change the character of an otherwise navigable
stream. Artificial lakes along navigable streams are generally
open to public use as well, even if they were created by an
authorized private entity and cover part of privately owned
land.
Id. at 394–95 (citations omitted).
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Likewise, in Bott v. Commission of Natural Resources, the Michigan
Supreme Court reasoned,
[P]rivate lakes cannot be construed to include those having
either a navigable inlet or a navigable outlet where all the land
surrounding the lake is owned by a private person. To do so
would ignore the fact that the public has lawful access to the
water and would be inconsistent with well-reasoned prior
cases on the subject. . . .
....
. . . [I]t matters not that one may be owner in fee of all
the land underlying and surrounding a qualifiedly navigable
lake. . . .
....
One may not trespass on private lands to reach a lake
to exercise usage rights. However, if access to a lake may be
obtained by use of a navigable inlet, outlet, or both, those
members of the public having lawful access to the waterway
may also freely boat and fish upon the lake. Whether the inlet
or outlet is navigable will depend upon whether the waters are
capable of being navigated by small craft propelled by oar,
paddle or motor.
Accordingly, we hold that lakes which are private for
purposes of determining whether public use of the lake
surface is permissible are limited to those lakes having no
navigable inlet or navigable outlet, completely surrounded by
land owned by a private person to which the public has no
other ordinary lawful means of access. Since the presence of
navigable inlets or outlets provides the public with a lawful
means of access to a lake which is navigable in fact, such a
lake cannot be determined to be wholly private. The public’s
right to use inland waters impressed with the trust to which
the public has lawful access may not be abrogated.
327 N.W.2d 838, 871–72 (Mich. 1982); see also Mont. Coal. for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that a
private party may not interfere with traffic along a stream because “any
surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so used by the
public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for
nonrecreational purposes”); Ohio Water Serv. Co. v. Ressler, 180 N.E.2d 2,
9
7 (Ohio 1962) (“[T]he exclusive right to fish even as against the public is
vested in the owner of the land underlying waters which are not legally
navigable, except where such waters are a portion of a body of water that
is legally navigable.”); Hix v. Robertson, 211 S.W.3d 423, 427–28 (Tex. App.
2006) (holding the public has a right to use a lake formed by the damming
of a statutory navigable stream).
B. Iowa’s Statutory Provisions. Iowa Code chapter 462A appears
to mirror this general law. Section 462A.2(45) provides,
“Waters of this state under the jurisdiction of the commission”
means any navigable waters within the territorial limits of this
state, and the marginal river areas adjacent to this state,
exempting only farm ponds and privately owned lakes.
Iowa Code § 462A.2(45).3 Additionally, section 462A.2(22) defines
“navigable waters” broadly as “all lakes, rivers, and streams, which can
support a vessel capable of carrying one or more persons during a total of
six months in one out of every ten years.” Id. § 462A.2(22). Meanwhile,
chapter 462A defines a “privately owned lake” as a lake “which is not open
to the use of the general public but is used exclusively by the owners and
their personal guests.” Id. § 462A.2(31).
Chapter 462A also declares that all flowing rivers and streams are
“public waters of the state of Iowa and subject to use by the public for
navigation purposes in accordance with law.” Id. § 462A.3A. This rule
applies regardless of who owns the land underneath: “Land underlying
flowing surface water is held subject to a trust for the public use of the
water flowing over it.” Id.4 Thus, a flowing river or stream that can support
a vessel is both “navigable” and “subject to use by the public.”
3“Commission” refers to the natural resource commission, which is part of the
DNR. See Iowa Code § 462A.2(7).
4This rule also applies whether or not the river or stream is “meandered.” See
Iowa Code § 462A.3A. Iowa Code section 462A.3A, in fact, assumes that the river or
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C. Resolving the Status of Lake Panorama. As the foregoing
authority indicates, flowing surface water in Iowa is legally open and
available for public use regardless of who owns the land below it. The
water in the Middle Raccoon River therefore belonged to the public before
1970 when the river was dammed to form Lake Panorama. It is also clear
that the Middle Raccoon River above and below Lake Panorama remains a
water of the state today. The question is whether the 1970 dam somehow
changed things for the stretch of the river that was widened to form Lake
Panorama.
We think not. When the dam was erected, it remained possible for
a vessel to travel down the Middle Raccoon River into Lake Panorama. And
if the river is indisputably open to the public and a boat can legally get
from there to the lake, then the lake is “open to the use of the general
public” and cannot be “used exclusively by the owners and their personal
guests.” See id. § 462A.2(31).
Meyers relies heavily on the actions of the LPA in putting up a barrier
near the entry point of the Middle Raccoon River into Lake Panorama and
in repeatedly declaring the lake to be private property. But we agree with
the district court: If the public has a right to be there, so long as the public
enters via the Middle Raccoon River and Springbrook State Park, using
private self-help in violation of Iowa Code section 657.2 to keep the public
out does not change the status of the lake. Id. § 657.2; see State v.
Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Iowa 1989) (holding that the state cannot
lose title to public trust property by adverse possession); Witke v. State
Conservation Comm’n, 244 Iowa 261, 271, 56 N.W.2d 582, 588 (1953)
stream is not “meandered”; even so, the public use principle applies. See id. (stating that
use of flowing surface water “is subject to the same rights, duties, limitations, and
regulations as presently apply to meandered streams”).
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(“[A]ll persons have a right to use the navigable waters of the state, so long
as they do not interfere with their use by other citizens . . . .”); see also
Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 872 (“The public’s right to use inland waters impressed
with the trust to which the public has lawful access may not be
abrogated.”); Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. No. 96-2-3 (Feb. 6, 1996), 1996 WL
169627, at *6 (“[W]hether or not section 657.2(3) is applicable to a fence
across a non-meandered stream, such a fence could constitute a common
law nuisance by interfering with public navigation.”).
Like the district court, we recognize that a 1970 attorney general
opinion concluded Lake Panorama would be a privately owned lake not
under state jurisdiction. 1970 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 503, 508 (1970). In
that opinion, the attorney general quoted the statute accurately: “[I]n order
to be exempt from state water navigation regulations imposed pursuant to
Chapter 106 [now chapter 462A], the lake must also be ‘ . . . not open to
the use of the general public but . . . used exclusively by the owners and
their personal guests.’ ” Id. at 506 (quoting Iowa Code § 106.2(12) (now
§ 462A.2(31) (2018)). The attorney general then elaborated,
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the water of the
proposed Lake Panorama, under the facts noted, are exempt
from state water navigations as a “privately owned lake” if
substantially all use thereof is limited to owners of the lake
and their personal guests, the latter term implying a host-
visitor relationship between the owners and particular
visitors.
Id. at 508.
We share the district court’s view that this attorney general opinion
misreads the statute. The statutory test is whether the lake is open to
public use or not. The test is not whether substantially all the actual users
happen to be owners of shoreline property. The district court put it well:
“A claim of ‘substantially all use’ is not equivalent to, and does not support
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a finding of, ‘not open to the use of the general public’ and use ‘exclusively’
by the owners and their guests.” We give attorney general opinions
respectful consideration but are not bound by them. See Rilea v. Iowa
Dep’t of Transp., 919 N.W.2d 380, 391–92 (Iowa 2018); see also Renda v.
Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 784 N.W.2d 8, 17 (Iowa 2010) (declining to
follow an attorney general opinion). We respectfully disagree with this one.
More significant to us is the fact that the DNR’s own administrative
regulations recognize Lake Panorama as a lake to which the public has
access and over which the DNR has jurisdiction. In rule 571—16.1,
“artificial lake” is defined to mean “all river impoundments and all other
impoundments of water to which the public has a right of access from land
or from a navigable stream inlet. Examples are Lake Panorama, Lake
Delhi, Lake Nashua, and Lake Macbride.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 571—16.1;
see also Iowa Code § 4.6(6) (“If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in
determining the intent of the legislature, may consider among other
matters . . . [t]he administrative construction of the statute.”). We
recognize that rule 571—16.1 may be intended to implement provisions
other than the ban on blue lights, but the DNR has been interpreting the
same operative language within chapter 462A—“waters of this state under
the jurisdiction of” the natural resources commission. Compare Iowa Code
§ 462A.4 (unnumbered vessels); id. §462A.27 (nonpermanent structures);
and id. § 462A.32(1)–(2) (buoys), with id. § 462A.12(4) (blue lights).
We also agree with the district court that another attorney general
opinion is better reasoned and more persuasive. See 1962 Op. Iowa Att’y
Gen. 55, 55 (1962). There the attorney general concluded that privately
dug lagoons on private land that were navigable by boat from West Okoboji
Lake were themselves navigable waters under the jurisdiction of the DNR’s
predecessor. Id. Quoting the statutory definitions now in chapter 462A,
13
the attorney general noted that “the water flows freely from the natural
lake into and out of the lagoons and canals.” Id. He concluded, “As these
lagoons are defined in your letter, they are under the foregoing rules of law
a portion of Lake Okoboji, even though they originally may have been
privately constructed.” Id. at 56. Here, too, water flows freely from the
Middle Raccoon River into Lake Panorama, making the latter body part of
the navigable waters.
We do not believe Orr v. Mortvedt has any bearing on our decision.
735 N.W.2d 610 (Iowa 2007). Neither side cited Orr in their briefing. Orr
involved an excavated rock quarry that over time filled with water and
became a lake; it was surrounded on all sides by privately owned land. Id.
at 611–12. Hence, Orr involved a landlocked lake. See id. Thus, all the
analysis in Orr proceeds from the starting point that the lake was
nonnavigable. See id. Here, by contrast, the lake was created by damming
a navigable river. The river continues to be accessible to the public and
flows into the lake. Orr specifically states, “[I]f the lake at issue in this
case is navigable, the plaintiffs have no right to exclude [the defendants]
from using and enjoying any part of it.” Id. at 615. Orr deals with some
of the legal consequences of nonnavigability; it does not provide any legal
guidance regarding the status of Lake Panorama under Iowa Code
chapter 462A.
Arguably, the LPA wants it both ways. It wants the benefits of DNR
boating law enforcement, while also keeping the lake private to its
members. We do not think Iowa’s laws permit that. If Meyers is correct,
many other boating laws would not be enforceable on the lake. See, e.g.,
Iowa Code § 462A.4 (indicating that numbering is required if the vessel is
being operated “on the waters of this state under the jurisdiction of the
commission”); id. § 462A.12(15) (requiring lifejackets for children if the
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vessel is being operated “on the waters of this state under the jurisdiction
of the commission”); id. § 462A.15(1) (requiring an observer for water
skiers under the tow of the vessel being operated “on any waters of this
state under the jurisdiction of the commission”); id. § 462A.26(3)(a)
(indicating that speed and distance regulations apply to “waters under the
jurisdiction of the commission”).
For all these reasons, we find that Lake Panorama is not a “privately
owned lake” but falls under the DNR’s jurisdiction.5
D. The Glitch in Iowa Code Section 462A.12(4). As an
alternative ground for relief, Meyers notes that the prohibition on operating
a vessel with a blue light technically applies only to “waters of this state
under the jurisdiction of the conservation commission.” See id.
§ 462A.12(4). The conservation commission no longer exists, having been
replaced by the natural resources commission within DNR in 1986. See
1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 1808. Thus, Meyers contends the prohibition
is a nullity.
In the 1986 legislation, it appears an inadvertent error was made.
The word “commission” was not substituted for the words “conservation
commission” in this section, as occurred with other sections. See id.
§ 1826. We conclude that this clerical error does not undo the statute and
render it meaningless. See State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Iowa
1999) (“[W]e have recognized in limited circumstances the power to
judicially construe legislative enactments in such a way as to correct
inadvertent clerical errors or omissions that frustrate obvious legislative
5Of course, we do not suggest that the LPA or any individual property owner has
any obligation to permit public access to Lake Panorama over their land. See Larman v.
State, 552 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996) (stating that “the public’s right of access to public
waters is part of the public trust” but “access is protected only to the extent the land
providing such access is owned by the State”).
15
intent.”); Schultze v. Landmark Hotel Corp., 463 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa 1990)
(“[W]e have made changes in legislative enactments to correct inadvertent
clerical errors or omissions which frustrate obvious legislative intent.”);
Jones v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 207 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1973) (“If we
were to recognize the literal language of the statute, we would be hard put
to ascribe [a]ny sensible meaning to the words . . . .”). Therefore, we reject
this argument.
IV. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district’s court denial of the
motion to suppress and affirm Meyers’s conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Wiggins, C.J., and Appel, J., who dissent.
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#18–2222, State v. Meyers
WIGGINS, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. I part ways with the majority because I conclude Lake
Panorama is a privately owned lake as defined in Iowa Code section
462A.2(31) (2018). Section 462A.12(4)’s prohibition of displaying a blue
light does not apply because Lake Panorama is a privately owned lake.
Thus, the stop of the boat by the two officers of the Iowa Department of
Natural Resources was illegal. I reach these conclusions for the following
reasons.
I. The Constitutional and Statutory Provisions.
Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution guarantees
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons and things to be seized.
Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. Its federal counterpart similarly provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
“Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless
one of several carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement
applies.” State v. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa 2017). One such
exception exists when the officer has probable cause for the stop because
the officer observed a statutory violation. See State v. Harrison, 846
N.W.2d 362, 365 (Iowa 2014) (“When a peace officer observes a traffic
offense, however minor, the officer has probable cause to stop the driver
17
of the vehicle.” (quoting State v. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Iowa
1993))). Another exception is when the officer has “a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred, is occurring, or is
about to occur,” Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d at 15 (quoting State v. Vance, 790
N.W.2d 775, 780 (Iowa 2010)), and initiates an investigatory stop “to
confirm or dispel suspicions of criminal activity through reasonable
questioning,” State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002).
The district court found the conservation officers had probable
cause to stop Meyers’s vessel because they observed a violation of Iowa
Code section 462A.12(4). It also concluded that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to stop Meyers’s vessel for investigatory purposes
upon observing the blue lights on the vessel.
II. Whether the Conservation Officers Had Probable Cause to
Stop Meyers’s Vessel.
When an officer observes a statutory violation, the officer has
probable cause to stop the vessel. See Harrison, 846 N.W.2d at 365.
Meyers contends the commission officers could not have observed a
statutory violation of Iowa Code section 462A.12(4) because that provision
does not apply to Lake Panorama.
Section 462A.12(4) provides, “No person shall operate on the waters
of this state under the jurisdiction of the conservation commission any
vessel displaying or reflecting a blue light or flashing blue light unless such
vessel is an authorized emergency vessel.” Iowa Code § 462A.12(4).
Meyers contends that section 462A.12(4) does not apply in this case
because Lake Panorama is not under the jurisdiction of the commission.
For Lake Panorama to be under the jurisdiction of the commission, it must
be a “navigable water[] within the territorial limits of this state” and must
not be a farm pond or privately owned lake. Id. § 462A.2(45) (defining
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“waters of this state under the jurisdiction of the commission”). There is
no dispute that the lake constitutes a navigable water as defined in section
462A.2(22) or that it is within the territorial limits of Iowa. See id.
§ 462A.2(22) (defining “navigable waters” as used in chapter 462A). The
parties dispute only whether Lake Panorama is a privately owned lake.
Chapter 462A defines “privately owned lake” as
any lake, located within the boundaries of this state and not
subject to federal control covering navigation owned by an
individual, group of individuals, or a nonprofit corporation
and which is not open to the use of the general public but is
used exclusively by the owners and their personal guests.
Id. § 462A.2(31). Here, the parties disagree on only whether Lake
Panorama “is not open to the use of the general public but is used
exclusively by the owners and their personal guests.” Id. Accordingly, I
must consider the meaning of that language from section 462A.2(31).
“When interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain the legislature’s
intent.” State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Dakota,
Minn. & E. R.R. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 898 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Iowa 2017),
overruled on other grounds by TSB Holdings, L.L.C. v. Bd. of Adjustment,
913 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa 2018)). We look to the language used by the
legislature, not what it should or might have said. Ramirez-Trujillo v.
Quality Egg, L.L.C., 878 N.W.2d 759, 770 (Iowa 2016). We cannot allow
legislative intent to change the meaning of a statute if the words used by
the legislature do not allow for such a meaning. See Schadendorf v. Snap-
On Tools Corp., 757 N.W.2d 330, 337 (Iowa 2008).
If the legislature “ ‘act[s] as its own lexicographer’ by defining a
statutory term,” that definition ordinarily binds us. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d
at 15 (quoting Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d
417, 425 (Iowa 2010)). We construe other technical words and phrases
19
that “have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law . . .
according to such meaning.” Iowa Code § 4.1(38). We give all other terms
their ordinary and common meaning “according to the context and the
approved usage of the language.” Id.; accord Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d at 16;
Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Kratzer, 778 N.W.2d 42, 46 (Iowa 2010).
Rather than assessing just isolated words and phrases, we consider the
statute in its entirety “to ensure our interpretation is harmonious with the
statute as a whole.” Ramirez-Trujillo, 878 N.W.2d at 770.
Then we determine whether the statute is ambiguous. Lopez, 907
N.W.2d at 116. Ambiguity occurs when reasonable minds could disagree
on the statute’s meaning, City of Waterloo v. Bainbridge, 749 N.W.2d 245,
248 (Iowa 2008), and may arise from uncertainty of particular words’
meanings or from examining all of the statute’s provisions in context with
each other, Ramirez-Trujillo, 878 N.W.2d at 770.
When the statute’s language is “plain, clear, and susceptible to only
one meaning,” we do not search for meaning beyond the particular terms.
Bainbridge, 749 N.W.2d at 248. But when the meaning is ambiguous, we
resort to our tools of statutory construction. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d at 117;
see Iowa Code § 4.6.
Although the Code does not define “not open to the use of the general
public but . . . used exclusively by the owners and their personal guests,”
Iowa Code § 462A.2(31), section 462A.2 provides that “use” “means to
operate, navigate, or employ a vessel,” id. § 462A.2(39). Thus, a privately
owned lake is one that is not open for the general public’s operation,
navigation, or employment of a vessel thereon but one where the exclusive
operation, navigation, or employment of a vessel thereon is by its owners
and their personal guests.
20
Assuming section 462A.2(39)’s definition of “use” applies to the
“used exclusively” language, we give “exclusively” its ordinary and common
meaning according to its context and approved usage. See Iowa Code
§ 4.1(38); Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d at 16. By its ordinary meaning,
exclusively means “in an exclusive manner.” Exclusively, Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary (unabr. ed. 2002). And in this context,
exclusive can mean “excluding or having power to exclude (as by
preventing entrance or debarring from possession, participation, or use)”;
“limiting or limited to possession, control, or use (as by a single individual
or organization or by a special group or class)”; and “excluding . . . others
(as outsiders) from participation (as in an association or privilege).”
Exclusive, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; accord Exclusive,
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “exclusive” in pertinent
part as “[l]imited to a particular person, group, entity, or thing ”); see also Exclusive right, Black’s Law Dictionary (“A right vested in
one person, entity, or body to do something or be protected from
something.”).
I also give “open” its common and ordinary meaning according to its
context and approved usage. See Iowa Code § 4.1(38); Pettijohn, 899
N.W.2d at 16. Webster’s defines “open” in relevant part as “requiring no
special status, identification, or permit for entry or participation”; “not
restricted to a particular group or category of participants <~ to the
public>”; “fit to be traveled over or through : presenting no serious obstacle
to passage or view”; and “available to use.” Open, Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary.
Under Meyers’s interpretation, a lake is not open to the general
public’s use and is used exclusively by its owners and their guests when
the intended use of the lake is not for the general public and access to the
21
lake is legally and actively restricted to only registered owners and their
guests regardless of the general public’s theoretical or occasional,
unauthorized access to the lake from connecting navigable waters. Under
the State’s proffered interpretation, a lake is open to the general public’s
use when the public is logistically able to access it from a connecting
navigable water and the lake’s owners are prohibited from blocking the
public’s access from the connecting navigable water. Additionally, the
district court concluded a lake is not used exclusively by its owners and
their guests if the lake’s owners lack the right to exclude others because
the lake “is an impoundment of water to which the public has a right of
access from a navigable stream inlet.” Because all three interpretations
are plausible, the statute is ambiguous, and I resort to our tools of
statutory interpretation. See Lopez, 907 N.W.2d at 117–18.
Common law jurisprudence on property rights in water is instructive
for resolving this ambiguity. See Iowa Code § 4.6(4) (permitting court to
consider the common law when interpreting an ambiguous statute).
Under Iowa common law, whether a lake or other watercourse is privately
owned depends on who owns the lakebed and abutting lands. See, e.g.,
Orr v. Mortvedt, 735 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Iowa 2007). Ownership of the
lakebed generally depends on whether the lake is considered navigable
under the common law.6 Id. As we acknowledged in Orr, “ ‘Navigable water
has been likened to a public highway,’ ‘used or usable as a broad highway
for commerce.’ ” Id. (first quoting McCauley v. Salmon, 234 Iowa 1020,
1022–23, 14 N.W.2d 715, 716 (1944); and then quoting Mountain Props.,
Inc. v. Tyler Hill Realty Corp., 767 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001));
accord Estate of McFarlin v. State, 881 N.W.2d 51, 64 (Iowa 2016).
6I
note that whether a lake is considered navigable under common law is not the
same as whether it qualifies as a navigable water as defined in section 462A.2(22).
22
“In Iowa, the legal title to the beds of all navigable lakes to the
high-water mark is in the state in trust for the use and benefit
of the public.” But “[i]f a body of water is nonnavigable, it is
privately owned by those who own the land beneath the
water’s surface and the lands abutting it, and may be
regulated by them.”
Orr, 735 N.W.2d at 616 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first
quoting State v. Nichols, 241 Iowa 952, 967, 44 N.W.2d 49, 57 (1950); and
then quoting Mountain Props., 767 A.2d at 1099–1100).
Here, the parties do not dispute—and the only evidence in the record
to this point shows—that the land surrounding Lake Panorama and the
lakebed itself are privately owned by individuals or the Lake Panorama
Association (LPA). Thus, for purposes of this case, I presume that Lake
Panorama is not a navigable water under Iowa common law.7 See id.
In Orr, we held that the owner of a nonnavigable lakebed “is entitled
to exclusive use and enjoyment of that portion of the nonnavigable lake
covering the lake bed [it] owns” and has the legal right to exclude
nonowners from that portion of the lake. Id. at 616, 618; see 12 Am. Jur.
2d Boats and Boating § 28, at 283 (2019) (“[A]s to private or nonnavigable
lakes, the owners of the lake bed generally have exclusive boating rights
as against the general public. The public may not use a nonnavigable
stream flowing over private land for canoeing or other uses without
consent of the landowner if no prescriptive easement has been established
. . . .” (Footnote omitted.)). We adopted this “common law rule” in Orr
primarily because it is “consisten[t] with prevailing norms of real estate
ownership in this state.” Orr, 735 N.W.2d at 618. Thus, the owner of Lake
Panorama’s lakebed—the LPA—may exclude nonowners from accessing
the lake’s waters covering the lakebed it owns. See id. at 616, 618.
7Ofcourse, this presumption for the purposes of this case does not affect whether
Lake Panorama qualifies as a “navigable water” under Iowa Code chapter 462A. See Iowa
Code § 462A.2(22) (defining “navigable waters” as used in chapter 462A).
23
The district court concluded that whether a lake “is not open to the
use of the general public but is used exclusively by the owners and their
personal guests,” Iowa Code § 462A.2(31), depends on “whether there
exists a right to exclude all but the owners and their personal guests.” It
then concluded the LPA did not have such a right because members of the
public have a right to access Lake Panorama “from a navigable stream
inlet, the Middle Raccoon River.” The State also makes this argument on
appeal, and both relied on an Iowa attorney general opinion from 1962 to
support their conclusion.
However, to the extent the district court and the State conclude the
LPA has no right to exclude the public from accessing the water covering
the lakebed the LPA owns, they are incorrect based on the holding of Orr.
And their reliance on the 1962 attorney general opinion is misplaced.
The 1962 attorney general opinion addressed whether certain
lagoons connected to Lake West Okoboji were Iowa waters under the
jurisdiction of the commission. 1962 Op. Iowa Att’y Gen. 55, 55 (1962).
The lagoons were connected to the lake and were dug privately, and the
land surrounding them was privately owned. Id. But the lagoon waters
could be directly accessed by boat from the lake. Id. The opinion
concluded the lagoons were under the commission’s jurisdiction because
they were navigable waters (as defined in section 462A.2(45)) and were not
privately owned lakes. Id. at 55–56. That conclusion was predicated upon
a finding that the lagoons were part of Lake Okoboji under the law of
chapter 462A. See id. at 56.
Nevertheless, the attorney general opinion has fallacies and is
distinguishable from the present case. First, the opinion completely fails
to consider the ownership rights to the lagoons. While Lake West Okoboji
is a navigable water under Iowa common law and the public generally has
24
a right to access common law navigable waters, the attorney general
opinion says nothing about whether the lagoons were dug above the high-
water mark—i.e., on private property. See, e.g., Iowa Admin. Code r. 571—
13.3 (providing that Iowa “holds sovereign title in trust for the benefit of
the public to the bed[]” of Lake West Okoboji because it is a “meandered
sovereign lake[]”—i.e., “lakes which, at the time of the original federal
government surveys, were surveyed as navigable and important water
bodies and were transferred to the states upon their admission to the
union to be transferred or retained by the public in accordance with the
laws of the respective states”); Orr, 735 N.W.2d at 615–16; State v.
Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358, 361–63 (Iowa 1989); see also Wilcox v. Pinney,
250 Iowa 1378, 1383, 98 N.W.2d 720, 723 (1959) (defining “high-water
mark”). Private land above the high-water mark does not automatically
become part of the navigable lake’s bed—and thus have its title transferred
to the state to hold in trust for the public’s benefit—merely because the
land owner dug an artificial lagoon that connects with the navigable lake.
See Wilcox, 250 Iowa at 1382–83, 98 N.W.2d at 723 (holding title to
riparian lands passes to the state when the river gradually erodes those
lands and the river thereafter occupies the space where the lands used to
be); cf. Coulthard v. Stevens, 84 Iowa 241, 245–46, 50 N.W. 983, 984 (1892)
(holding title to riparian lands transferred to a second riparian owner by
accretion). And a statute providing otherwise effects a taking without just
compensation. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Iowa Const. art. I, § 18; see also
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80, 100 S. Ct. 383, 393
(1979) (holding the government cannot take the right to exclude from a
privately owned water property owner without compensation); Solomon v.
Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634, 639, 51 N.W.2d 472, 476 (1952) (indicating
riparian owner rights are constitutionally protected). Accordingly, the
25
attorney general opinion was incorrect to the extent that it concluded the
lagoons were part of Lake West Okoboji—and therefore waters of Iowa
under the commission’s jurisdiction—merely because the lagoons met the
definition of navigable waters under section 462A.2 and were connected to
and accessible from the lake, which also constituted navigable waters
under section 462A.2.
Second, even assuming the lagoons could become common law
navigable waters upon being connected to and accessible from the
common law navigable lake, the attorney general opinion is
distinguishable from the present case. The parties do not contend, there
is nothing in the record, and there is nothing in the law that indicates the
Middle Raccoon River is a common law navigable water, unlike Lake West
Okoboji. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 571—13.3 (excluding the Middle
Raccoon River from the list of “meandered sovereign rivers”—i.e., “rivers
which, at the time of the original federal government surveys, were
surveyed as navigable and important water bodies and were transferred to
the states upon their admission to the union to be transferred or retained
by the public in accordance with the laws of the respective states upon
their admission to the union”); see also Iowa Official Register 1971–1972,
at 395–403 (L. Dale Ahern ed.) (excluding the Middle Raccoon River from
the list of wildlife refuges, hunting and fishing areas, state parks, and
forests under the commission’s jurisdiction). Thus, Lake Panorama could
not become a common law navigable water merely because it was
constructed on, is connected to, and is accessible from a common law
nonnavigable water, the Middle Raccoon River.
Third, the attorney general opinion is also not persuasive because it
predates Orr. One issue addressed in Orr was whether Iowa should adopt
the common law rule or civil law rule to determine the right of an owner of
26
part of a nonnavigable lake’s bed to use and enjoy the entire lake. 735
N.W.2d at 616. Under the common law rule, the partial owner is entitled
to the exclusive use and enjoyment of the portion of the nonnavigable lake
over the lakebed he or she owns. Id. Under the civil law rule, a partial
owner is entitled to reasonably use and enjoy the entire lake. Id. at 616–
17. We adopted the common law rule. Id. at 618.
One party in Orr argued that the legislature had already codified the
civil law rule in chapter 455B. Id. at 617–18. Chapter 455B identifies
when water is public. Iowa Code § 455B.262(3) (“Water occurring in a
basin or watercourse, or other body of water of the state, is public
water . . . .”); accord Orr, 735 N.W.2d at 617. And it defines “watercourse”
as “any lake, river, creek, ditch, or other body of water or channel having
definite banks and bed with visible evidence of the flow or occurrence of
water, except lakes or ponds without outlet to which only one landowner
is riparian.” Iowa Code § 455B.261(17). We noted chapter 455B
“expresses the State’s policy to protect lives and property from floods and
to promote the orderly development, wise use, protection, and
conservation of the State’s water resources.” Orr, 735 N.W.2d at 617;
accord Iowa Code § 455B.262(1). However, because chapter 455B does
not expressly address the nature and extent of the property interests of
the owners of nonnavigable watercourses, we concluded chapter 455B
does not prescribe those property rights. Orr, 735 N.W.2d at 617.
Similarly, chapter 462A identifies when water is public. See Iowa
Code § 462A.3A (“Water occurring in any river, stream, or creek having
definite banks and bed with visible evidence of the flow of water is flowing
surface water and is declared to be public waters of the state of Iowa . . . .”).
Although chapter 462A does not define “river,” “stream,” or “creek,” under
the common law, “stream” was often used as a “catch-all” term and could
27
refer to natural lakes. See, e.g., Noyes v. Collins, 92 Iowa 566, 568, 61
N.W. 250, 250–51 (1894); cf. Orr, 735 N.W.2d at 617 (quoting section
455B.261(17)’s definition of watercourse). But as an artificial lake is not
a river, stream, natural lake, or creek, section 462A.3A does not address
the nature and extent of the property interests of the private owners of an
artificial nonnavigable lake, such as Lake Panorama. See Orr, 735 N.W.2d
at 617.
Admittedly, Orr concerned a landlocked nonnavigable lake. Id. at
616–18. However, the authorities it cited in support of its legal holdings
are unconcerned with whether the water body at issue is landlocked. See
Wehby v. Turpin, 710 So. 2d 1243, 1246–50 (Ala. 1998); Ace Equip. Sales,
Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626, 632–35 (Conn. 2005); Anderson v. Bell, 433
So. 2d 1202, 1204–07 (Fla. 1983); Lanier v. Ocean Pond Fishing Club, Inc.,
322 S.E.2d 494, 496 (Ga. 1984); Sanders v. De Rose, 191 N.E. 331, 332–
34 (Ind. 1934); Nichols, 241 Iowa at 966–68, 44 N.W.2d at 57–58;
McCauley, 234 Iowa at 1022, 14 N.W.2d at 716; Peck v. Alfred Olsen
Constr. Co., 216 Iowa 519, 522–27, 245 N.W. 131, 134–37 (1932); Black v.
Williams, 417 So. 2d 911, 911–12 (Miss. 1982); Smoulter v. Boyd, 58 A.
144, 146–47 (Pa. 1904); Mountain Props., 767 A.2d at 1099–1101; White’s
Mill Colony, Inc. v. Williams, 609 S.E.2d 811, 815–17, 820 (S.C. Ct. App.
2005); Monroe v. State, 175 P.2d 759, 761–62 (Utah 1946); Wickouski v.
Swift, 124 S.E.2d 892, 895 (Va. 1962); Ours v. Grace Prop., Inc., 412 S.E.2d
490, 493–95 (W. Va. 1991). Thus, the landlocked nature of the lake in Orr
should not, alone, preclude application of Orr to a nonlandlocked lake.
That conclusion makes sense when reading the statutory definition
of “privately owned lakes” in the context of the statutory definition of “farm
ponds.” The legislature defined “farm ponds” as “a body of water wholly
on the lands of a single owner, or a group of joint owners, which does not
28
have any connection with any public waters and which is less than ten
surface acres.” Iowa Code § 462A.2(15) (emphasis added). The legislature
enacted this definition of farm pond at the same time it enacted the
definition of privately owned lakes at issue in this case. See 1961 Iowa
Acts ch. 87, § 2 (codified as amended at Iowa Code § 462A.2 (2018)). If the
legislature intended for privately owned lakes to only include those that
are not connected to any public waters, then it would have said so like it
did in the definition of farm pond.
Finally, there are a few administrative regulations that discuss Lake
Panorama, but I do not think they are persuasive regarding our task of
interpreting privately owned lakes as defined in chapter 462A. Rules
571—16.1 and 16.4 are part of the regulation chapter on docks and other
structures “on public waters.” See Iowa Admin. Code ch. 571—16. In rule
571—16.1, the natural resource commission defined “artificial lake” to
mean “all river impoundments and all other impoundments of water to
which the public has a right of access from land or from a navigable stream
inlet. Examples are Lake Panorama, Lake Delhi, Lake Nashua, and Lake
Macbride.” Id. r. 571—16.1. And rule 571—16.4 establishes the criteria
and procedures for obtaining certain dock permits. The rules are intended
to implement Iowa Code sections 461A.4, 461A.11, 461A.18, 462A.27, and
462A.32.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that either rule either (1) gives the
commission jurisdiction over Lake Panorama or (2) means Lake Panorama
is not a privately owned lake. All five of the Iowa Code sections the rules
are intended to implement apply only to waters under the jurisdiction of
the commission. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 461A.4(1)(a) (prohibiting any
person from constructing a pier or similar structure “upon or over any
state-owned or state-managed land or water under the jurisdiction of the
29
commission” (emphasis added)); id. § 461A.11 (providing the commission
may accept gifts of land or other property and discussing the jurisdiction
of land adjacent to a meandered stream or lake that has been gifted to the
public but not to the jurisdiction of a specific agency); id. § 461A.18
(“Jurisdiction over all meandered streams and lakes of this state and of
state lands bordering thereon, not now used by some other state body for
state purposes, is conferred upon the commission.”); id. § 462A.27
(providing for the removal of nonpermanent structures from the waters
under the jurisdiction of the commission); id. § 462A.32 (providing rules
for buoys on waters under the jurisdiction of the commission). The natural
resource commission cannot circumvent the statutory definition of “waters
of this state under the jurisdiction of the commission” in chapter 462A in
order to dictate that the public has a right to access Lake Panorama by
rule. Iowa Code § 462A.2(45) (definition of “waters of this state under the
jurisdiction of the commission”); Iowa Admin. Code r. 571—16.1
(definitions of “artificial lake” and “public water body”).
In sum, under Iowa common law, when a lakebed is privately owned,
the owner may exclude nonowners from the waters covering that portion
of the lakebed owned by that private owner. Whether the waters covering
that privately owned lakebed are accessible by nonowners from connecting
waters or other portions of the lake does not affect the private owner’s right
to exclude nonowners. Accordingly, under Iowa common law, waters
covering a privately owned lakebed are not, by default, open to the use of
the general public merely because the general public is logistically able to
float into those waters from connecting waters.
Applying the above analysis to this case reveals that Lake Panorama
is “not open to the use of the general public but is used exclusively by the
30
owners and their personal guests.” Iowa Code § 462A.2(31). Accordingly,
it is a privately owned lake under section 462A.2(31).
Because Lake Panorama is a privately owned lake under section
462A.2(31), it cannot be under the jurisdiction of the commission and
section 462A.12(4) does not apply to it. Consequently, the officers could
not have observed Meyers violating section 462A.12(4) and, therefore, their
alleged basis for probable cause to stop Meyers’s vessel is without merit.
I note that my holding does not mean that boaters can boat while
intoxicated on private lakes that are not under the commission’s
jurisdiction. Section 462A.14 provides that a person commits the offense
of boating while intoxicated if that person operates a boat while intoxicated
“on the navigable waters of this state.” Id. § 462A.14(1); see id.
§ 462A.2(22) (defining “navigable waters” as used in chapter 462A as “all
lakes, rivers, and streams, which can support a vessel capable of carrying
one or more persons during a total of six months in one out of every ten
years”). In contrast to section 462A.12(4)—the blue light prohibition—
section 462A.14’s applicability is not limited to the waters of this state
under the commission’s jurisdiction. Compare id. § 462A.12(4) (“No
person shall operate on the waters of this state under the jurisdiction of the
conservation commission any vessel displaying or reflecting a blue light
. . . .” (Emphasis added.)), with id. § 462A.14(1) (“A person commits the
offense of operating a motorboat or sailboat while intoxicated if the person
operates a motorboat or sailboat on the navigable waters of this state in
any of the following conditions . . . .” (Emphasis added.)).
In this case, the only basis for the stop was a violation of section
462A.12(4)’s blue light prohibition. But because the applicability of that
provision is expressly limited to only the waters of this state under the
commission’s jurisdiction and Lake Panorama is not such a water,
31
Meyers’s display of blue lights while boating on Lake Panorama did not
give the officers a constitutional basis to stop Meyers.
III. Whether the Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion to Stop
Meyers’s Vessel.
Meyers argues the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his
vessel because there was no indication that the purpose of the stop was to
investigate criminal activity—i.e., “confirm or dispel suspicions of criminal
activity through reasonable questioning.” Krebs, 650 N.W.2d at 641.
A stop based on reasonable suspicion is often described as a “Terry
stop” or an “investigatory stop.” E.g., State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 297–
98 (Iowa 2013); State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 780–81 (Iowa 2010).
Reasonable suspicion justifies a warrantless stop to investigate a crime.
Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 298. “The principal function of an investigatory stop
is to resolve the ambiguity as to whether criminal activity is afoot.” Vance,
790 N.W.2d at 780 (quoting State v. Richardson, 501 N.W.2d 495, 497
(Iowa 1993)). Thus, an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion
may be constitutional even if the stop does not reveal any unlawful
conduct. Id. However, as we noted in Tyler, the officer conducting a
reasonable suspicion stop must expect to learn information about the
suspected criminal activity:
[I]f the officer has a legitimate expectation of investigatory
results, the existence of reasonable suspicion will allow the
stop—if the officer has no such expectations of learning
additional relevant information concerning the suspected
criminal activity, the stop cannot be constitutionally
permitted on the basis of mere suspicion.
830 N.W.2d at 298 (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3(a), at 482 (5th ed. 2012)
[hereinafter LaFave]). Moreover, if the stop cannot facilitate “immediate
investigation [of the suspected criminal activity] through temporarily
32
maintaining the status quo,” id. (quoting 4 LaFave § 9.3(a), at 482), then
the stop is not valid even if the officer had “a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a criminal act has occurred, is occurring, or is about to
occur,” Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d at 15 (quoting Vance, 790 N.W.2d at 780).
Here, the officers did not have an investigatory purpose for stopping
Meyers’s vessel. The record reveals that they stopped Meyers’s vessel
specifically because they believed his boat’s display of blue lights violated
Iowa Code section 462A.12(4). The State has made no showing that the
officers stopped the vessel to investigate whether the vessel was indeed
displaying blue lights. Nor has the State made a showing that the officers
were “attempting to actively investigate whether a[nother] crime was
occurring and that [the] seizure was required in order to accomplish that
purpose.” Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 298. Accordingly, the State cannot rely
on reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Meyers’s vessel.
IV. Whether the Officers’ Lack of Probable Cause Is Excusable
Because the Officers Made an Objectively Reasonable Mistake of Law.
The State argues that even if section 462A.12(4) does not apply to
Lake Panorama and, therefore, the officers based the stop on a mistake of
law, this court should reject our precedent under article I, section 8 of the
Iowa Constitution, adopt the United States Supreme Court’s approach in
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014),
and hold an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law can justify a
stop. Although Heien held an objectively reasonable mistake of law may
provide reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop—not
probable cause to support a noninvestigatory stop—the State appears to
request this court adopt and apply the Heien approach to questions of
probable cause as well as to questions of reasonable suspicion. See id.
33
We have held a mistake of law does not excuse a lack of probable
cause and could not justify a stop under article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 294. One year after we decided Tyler,
the Supreme Court decided Heien, holding a reasonable mistake of law
could support reasonable suspicion for a stop. 574 U.S. at 65–67, 135
S. Ct. at 539–40. In two subsequent cases, we acknowledged the Heien
decision but noted that Heien did not affect Tyler’s holding under the Iowa
Constitution and that Heien would be inconsistent with our rejection of
the good-faith exception in State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 292–93 (Iowa
2000), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606
n.2 (Iowa 2001). See State v. Scheffert, 910 N.W.2d 577, 585 n.2 (Iowa
2018); State v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284, 298 n.2 (Iowa 2017).
“Stare decisis alone dictates continued adherence to our precedent
absent a compelling reason to change the law.” Book v. Doublestar
Dongfeng Tyre Co., 860 N.W.2d 576, 594 (Iowa 2015). It requires “the
highest possible showing that a precedent should be overruled before
taking such a step.” Brewer-Strong v. HNI Corp., 913 N.W.2d 235, 249
(Iowa 2018) (quoting McElroy v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394 (Iowa 2005)).
We must undertake the task of reexamining our precedent “only for the
most cogent reasons and with the greatest caution.” State v. Brown, 930
N.W.2d 840, 854 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164,
180 (Iowa 2004) (Cady, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds by Alcala
v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 & n.3 (Iowa 2016)).
The State provides three reasons for adopting Heien: (1) our article I,
section 8 jurisprudence rejecting that approach predated Heien; (2) Tyler
relied on State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649 (Iowa 2010), for its holding,
but the Louwrens special concurrence anticipated Heien’s reasoning; and
34
(3) adopting Heien would not be inconsistent with our holding in Cline. I
do not find these three reasons persuasive.
The first two reasons are not persuasive because Louwrens, upon
which Tyler relied, provides compelling reasons to hold that a mistake of
law cannot justify a stop. In Louwrens, we acknowledged that great
deference is given to an officer’s assessment of the facts and, as long as
that assessment is objectively reasonable, probable cause is established
regardless of the officer’s subjective motivations. 792 N.W.2d at 652–53.
This deference is in large part because of “the recognition that officers are
generally in a superior position, relative to courts, to evaluate those facts
and their significance.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 72, 135 S. Ct. at 543
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). However, “the flip side of that leeway is that
the legal justification [to conduct searches and seizures] must be
objectively grounded.” Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d at 653 (quoting United
States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998)). No mistake of law—
reasonable or otherwise—is objectively grounded. See id.; see also United
States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); Miller, 146
F.3d at 279.
The law is the law. It is not susceptible to a reasonableness inquiry,
especially not in the criminal context. See, e.g., State v. Nicoletto, 845
N.W.2d 421, 427 (Iowa 2014) (acknowledging the “longstanding rule of
narrowly construing criminal statutes”), superseded on other grounds by
statute, 2014 Iowa Acts ch. 1114, § 1 (codified as amended at Iowa Code
§ 709.15(1)(f)). It is axiomatic that judicial interpretation of a statute does
not change the law codified in that statute but merely declares what the
statute says; otherwise, there would be a separation of powers issue. See,
e.g., Hansen v. Haugh, 260 Iowa 236, 241, 149 N.W.2d 169, 172 (1967)
(“It is not the function of courts to legislate and they are constitutionally
35
prohibited from doing so.” (citing Iowa Const. art. III, § 1)); Koehler v. Hill,
60 Iowa 603, 663, 15 N.W. 609, 639 (1883) (Beck, J., dissenting)
(“[D]ecisions of courts do not make law, but simply declare what the law
is. The judicial theory is that the law as declared by the courts existed
and was of force before the decision, and is to be applied to all rights
existing and transactions occurring before the decision was made.”). In
this way, a court’s interpretation of a statute applies retroactively and a
law enforcement officer’s erroneous understanding of the law is not an
objectively grounded legal justification for a search or seizure.
Additionally, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Heien reiterated many
of the reasons for our decision in Louwrens. And these reasons are not
adequately countered by the Heien majority, concurrence, or the special
concurrence in Louwrens. This is especially true regarding the practical
realities of the Heien majority’s holding.
Both the Heien dissent and Louwrens acknowledge the deference
given to law enforcement’s factual assessments as well as the tempering
of that deference by requiring the legal justification be objectively
grounded. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 72–73, 135 S. Ct. at 542–43; Louwrens,
792 N.W.2d at 652–53. Both conclude that deference is given only to
factual assessments but not to legal determinations and that mistakes of
law are not objectively grounded. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 73, 135 S. Ct. at
543; Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d at 653.
Justice Sotomayor acknowledges that traffic-type stops can be
“annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 73,
135 S. Ct. at 543 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25, 88 S. Ct. 1868,
1882 (1968)). But she wonders “how a citizen seeking to be law-abiding
and to structure his or her behavior to avoid these invasive, frightening,
and humiliating encounters could do so” if officers can “effect seizures so
36
long as they can attach to their reasonable view of the facts some
reasonable legal interpretation (or misinterpretation) that suggests a law
has been violated.” Id. at 74, 135 S. Ct. at 543–44.
Justice Sotomayor also acknowledges that officers may confront
situations in which the application of a statute is unclear. Id. at 79, 135
S. Ct. at 546. But she—rightfully—wonders “why an innocent citizen
should be made to shoulder the burden of being seized whenever the law
may be susceptible to an interpretive question.” Id.
Sometimes a statute is ambiguous and law enforcement must make
a best guess as to its meaning. And sometimes, that best guess is
incorrect. Law enforcement should not get the benefit of something
because they happened to guess wrong when, if they had guessed
correctly, they would not be entitled to that benefit. See Louwrens, 792
N.W.2d at 653 (noting that adopting a good-faith mistake-of-law exception
would remove the incentive for officers to make sure they properly comply
with and understand the law); see also Heien, 574 U.S. at 79, 135 S. Ct.
at 546 (questioning why it is appropriate to place the burden of a statute’s
ambiguity on individuals); Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d at 653 (questioning why
it is appropriate to hold a statute’s ambiguity against the defendant); cf.
Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 290 (finding the exclusionary rule deters lax
government practices in all three branches).
The State’s third reason is not persuasive because Heien is
inconsistent with our holding in Cline. In Cline, we declined to adopt the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 8. 617
N.W.2d at 283. The exclusionary rule prohibits the state from using
evidence gained through an unconstitutional search or seizure in the
criminal prosecution of the defendant. See id. (citing Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94, 34 S. Ct. 341, 344–45 (1914)).
37
Under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the purpose of the rule is
to deter police misconduct, and it is not “a personal constitutional right of
the party aggrieved.” Id. at 284 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (1974)). Whether the exclusionary rule
applies is “an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth
Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by
police conduct.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S. Ct. 3405,
3412 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2324 (1983)).
The good-faith exception is an exception to the exclusionary rule
under Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 913, 104 S. Ct. at 3415. In Leon,
the Court adopted the good-faith exception to allow the prosecution to offer
evidence seized by officers who reasonably relied on a warrant that was
ultimately determined to be invalid. Id. at 922, 104 S. Ct. at 3420. And
in Illinois v. Krull, the Court applied the good-faith exception and did not
require suppression of evidence from a warrantless search authorized by
a state statute that was subsequently declared unconstitutional. 480 U.S.
340, 349–50, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 1167 (1987). In both situations, the
exception’s applicability depended on whether the officer’s reliance on the
warrant or statute was reasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922–23, 104 S. Ct.
at 3420–21; see Krull, 480 U.S. at 349–50, 107 S. Ct. at 1167.
In Cline, we rejected the good-faith exception under article I, section
8 because we found the Court’s reasoning in Leon and Krull faulty. Cline,
617 N.W.2d at 288–93. First, we disagreed with the Court that the rule’s
sole purpose is to deter police misconduct. Id. at 289–90. Instead, we
concluded the rule also serves as a remedy for the constitutional violation
and protects the integrity of the courts by keeping them from condoning
the constitutional violation and “allow[ing] law enforcement to enjoy the
38
benefits of the illegality.” Id. We also noted that the rule “serves a
deterrent function even when the police officers act in good faith” and,
therefore, “to adopt a good faith exception would only encourage lax
practices by government officials in all three branches of government.” Id.
at 290.
Next, we highlighted several undesirable consequences of the good-
faith exception. Id. at 290–92. We reasoned that allowing the results of
an unconstitutional search or seizure to be introduced “would effectively
defeat the purpose of the search and seizure clause” because the exception
replaces the probable-cause standard with a “close enough is good
enough” standard. Id. at 290 (quoting State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 68
(Conn. 1990)). We also acknowledged that adoption of the exception would
leave those subjected to an unconstitutional search and seizure based on
good faith without any remedy. Id. at 291. Notably, we did recognize that
the exclusionary rule does not cure the constitutional violation, but it is
nonetheless the best remedy available. Id. at 289. We were further
concerned that adoption of the exception would allow courts to bypass the
constitutional inquiry—i.e., whether the search or seizure was
constitutional—and uphold the admission of the evidence based on the
officer’s good faith. Id. at 291–92. We noted this would lead to less
guidance for law enforcement and judicial officers on the parameters of
reasonable searches and seizures and would gradually erode the
constitutional protection. Id.
Third, we identified the fallacies with the Leon Court’s cost-benefit
analysis. Id. at 292. We noted the Court’s conclusion that the costs of
exclusion would be substantial was not supported by studies attempting
to qualify the number of prosecutions that were adversely affected by
exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Id. But more
 39
importantly, we clarified that the costs of exclusion are properly attributed
to the constitutional provision, not the exclusionary rule. Id.
We concluded by finding that the good-faith exception is
incompatible with article I, section 8. Id. at 292–93. We affirmatively
stated,
We believe that the only effective way to ensure that this right
is more than mere words on paper is to exclude illegally
obtained evidence. The reasonableness of a police officer’s
belief that the illegal search is lawful does not lessen the
constitutional violation. . . . This court will simply not
“condone and approve a clear and known violation of a
fundamental constitutional right in order to sustain a
conviction that we think correct.” To do so would elevate the
goals of law enforcement above our citizens’ constitutional
rights, a result not supported by any principle of
constitutional law.
Id. (quoting State v. McClelland, 164 N.W.2d 189, 200 (Iowa 1969) (Becker,
J., dissenting), overruled in part by State v. Bester, 167 N.W.2d 705, 707–
08 (Iowa 1969)).
The principles elucidated in and the reasoning of Cline apply with
the same force to what is essentially a proposed good-faith mistake-of-law
exception to article I, section 8’s probable-cause requirement. This is so
even though the mistake-of-law inquiry goes to whether the search or
seizure was constitutional, whereas the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule goes to whether there is a remedy for an unconstitutional
search or seizure. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 74–75, 135 S. Ct. at 544–45.
Adopting such an exception would replace the probable-cause
standard with a “close enough is good enough” standard. Cline portends
that close is only good enough in horseshoes and hand grenades, not when
it comes to complying with constitutional requirements. See 617 N.W.2d
at 290–91.
40
And most importantly, Cline specifically stated that “[t]he
reasonableness of a police officer’s belief that the illegal search [or seizure]
is lawful does not lessen the constitutional violation.” Id. at 292. The fact
of the matter is that the officers stopped Meyers’s vessel without probable
cause (or reasonable suspicion). That should be the end of the inquiry of
whether the stop violated article I, section 8.
The State has not persuaded me that we should abandon our
recently reaffirmed precedent when there has been no showing that that
precedent is fallible. At most, the State attacks our precedent by noting
that Meyers’s case is one where it is difficult to discern between a mistake
of law and a mistake of fact. However, assuming that is true, the State
does not explain why that fact in this one case should compel us to
overturn our precedent. It is axiomatic that we decide the law not only for
the case presently before, but for future cases as well. The State has not
demonstrated—or even truly argued—that our current approach has
repeatedly proven unworkable because it is too difficult to distinguish
mistakes of fact and mistakes of law.
Other procedural mechanisms are available to the State to get
around an officer’s mistake of law. For example, the State is not limited
to only the officer’s stated reasons for the stop when arguing there was
probable cause or reasonable suspicion but may proffer various alternative
reasons for why the stop was justified. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 295; State v.
Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 2000), abrogated on other grounds
by Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606 n.2; see Brown, 930 N.W.2d at 847.
Similarly, subject to waiver and error preservation rules, a district court
and the reviewing appellate court may also rely on any of the proffered
alternative reasons in concluding there was probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. See Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 295; see also Hawkeye Foodserv.
41
Distribution, Inc. v. Iowa Educators Corp., 812 N.W.2d 600, 609–10 (Iowa
2012). Accordingly, the State can show the stop was justified in spite of
the mistake of law.
Relatedly, law enforcement face no punishment for a good faith
mistake of law such that adopting a good-faith mistake-of-law exception
to the probable-cause requirement is necessary to protect officers. See
Heien, 574 U.S. at 75, 135 S. Ct. at 544. And it is likely such an officer
would have a defense against any claim of civil liability. See id.; Baldwin
v. City of Esterville, 915 N.W.2d 259, 260–61 (Iowa 2018); see also Cline,
617 N.W.2d at 291.
Finally, our decision not to overturn our precedent is consistent with
our sister states that have not overturned their prior holdings under their
state constitutions after Heien. See, e.g., State v. Pettit, 406 P.3d 370, 375–
76 (Idaho Ct. App. 2017) (among other things, holding that the Idaho
Constitution does not contain a good-faith exception for an officer’s
mistake of law and explaining that adopting Heien would be inconsistent
with the Idaho Supreme Court’s rejection of the good-faith exception under
the Idaho Constitution); State v. Heilman, 342 P.3d 1102, 1106 n.5 (Or.
Ct. App. 2015) (noting the trial court would be incorrect if it had thought
the officer’s good-faith mistake of law gave the officer probable cause to
stop the defendant); cf. State v. Scriven, No. A–5680–13T3, 2015 WL
773824, at *3–4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 25, 2015) (per curiam)
(continuing to rely on pre-Heien New Jersey Superior Court precedent to
conclude the officer’s good-faith mistaken interpretation of the statute did
not justify the otherwise illegal stop), aff’d on other grounds by 140 A.3d
535, 538 (N.J. 2016) (declining to reach Heien issue); State v. Sutherland,
176 A.3d 775, 776 (N.J. 2018) (again declining to reach Heien issue); State
v. Tercero, 467 S.W.3d 1, 10–11 (Tex. App. 2015) (declining to adopt Heien
42
as an exception to a state rule of procedure that prohibited admission of
evidence obtained unconstitutionally); State v. Brown, 432 P.3d 1241,
1249 (Wash. Ct. App.) (predicting that the Washington Supreme Court
would not allow a mistake of law to supply reasonable suspicion because
that court has stated that the Washington Constitution goes further than
the Fourth Amendment and “requires actual authority of law before the
State may disturb the individual’s private affairs”), rev’d on other grounds
by 454 P.3d 870, 871 (Wash. 2019).
I conclude we should not overrule Tyler. Therefore, the officers’
mistake of law regarding section 462A.12(4)’s applicability does not
provide the necessary probable cause to justify their stop of Meyers’s
vessel and the stop violated article I, section 8. The district court should
have granted Meyers’s motion to suppress under the Iowa Constitution.
Appel, J., joins this dissent.