Maxine Gail Veatch v. City of Waverly and Jason Leonard, Individually and in His Official Capacity , 2015 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 4 ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 13–0417
Filed January 9, 2015
MAXINE GAIL VEATCH,
Appellant,
vs.
CITY OF WAVERLY and JASON LEONARD, individually and in his
official capacity,
Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, DeDra
Schroeder, Judge.
The City of Waverly seeks further review of a court of appeals
decision reinstating a plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim against the
City and one of its police detectives. DECISION OF COURT OF
APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
John J. Hines and Laura L. Folkerts of Dutton, Braun, Staack &
Hellman, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Beth E. Hansen of Swisher & Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellees.
2
HECHT, Justice.
Staff members at a nursing home became concerned that a visiting
family member had mistreated an elderly resident of the home and
contacted the police. The visitor was arrested and charged with simple
misdemeanor assault, but a jury acquitted her. After she was acquitted
of the criminal charge, the visitor brought this civil action asserting
negligence, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution theories
against the arresting officer and the city that employed him. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. After the
Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
false imprisonment claim, the defendants sought, and we granted,
further review. Because we conclude summary judgment was properly
granted, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the
district court’s ruling.
I. Factual Background.
A reasonable fact finder viewing the summary judgment record in
the light most favorable to Veatch could find the following facts. On
September 27, 2006, Maxine Veatch and her sister visited their mother,
Agnes Bell, at Woodland Terrace, a skilled-care residential nursing home
facility in Waverly, Iowa. 1 Later that day, Janet Whiteside, a nurse
employed by the nursing home, reported to her supervisor that she had
observed Veatch shoving Bell into her wheelchair, wheeling her out of the
staff’s view, and screaming at her. Whiteside’s supervisor directed
Whiteside to write a report describing her observations and submit it to
the nursing home director, Brianna Brunner.
1Veatch was designated by a durable power of attorney for health care as Bell’s
agent to make health care decisions.
3
Brunner took action after reading Whiteside’s report. She
forwarded the report to Debra Schroeder, the President and CEO of the
nursing home’s corporate owner. Brunner also directed two nurses to
examine Bell for physical evidence of an injury. The nurses performed
the examination and noted fresh bruising on Bell’s knee and forearms.
Brunner relayed the substance of Whiteside’s report to officer
Thomas Luebbers of the Waverly Police Department. Officer Luebbers
prepared a report based on his conversation with Brunner. Luebbers’s
report included allegations reported by Whiteside: that Veatch had
shoved Bell into a wheelchair, wheeled Bell into her room, shut the door,
and screamed at Bell—along with other observations giving rise to
concerns that elder abuse was occurring. 2 The report also noted that,
according to Brunner, Veatch and her sister held power of attorney for
Bell. Officer Luebbers communicated his understanding of the incident
to detective Sergeant Jason Leonard, who took over the investigation.
Sergeant Leonard’s investigation took him to Woodland Terrace,
where he discussed the incident with Brunner, Schroeder, and Jenny
Kane, a nurse who supervised Whiteside and had observed Bell’s bruises.
The meeting between Sergeant Leonard and the staff lasted one to two
hours. Sergeant Leonard asked to speak with Bell about the incident,
but the three nursing home employees dissuaded him from doing so,
suggesting Bell was reluctant to speak with people she did not know and
would fear retaliation from Veatch for any cooperation with law
enforcement. However, Sergeant Leonard learned the nursing home’s
2Officer Luebbers’s report documents Brunner’s observation that Woodland
Terrace staff members had heard Veatch and her sister screaming at Bell behind closed
doors on several other occasions, and on one occasion had seen Veatch slap Bell’s hand
away as Bell was reaching out to use a hand rail.
4
employees had asked Dr. Lee Fagre, a physician, to conduct a physical
examination of Bell and determine whether Bell’s bruises corroborated
Whiteside’s account of the incident. Sergeant Leonard decided he would
continue his investigation without interviewing Bell if he could obtain a
written report documenting Dr. Fagre’s examination and a copy of
Whiteside’s original incident report.
During the meeting at Woodland Terrace, Sergeant Leonard and
the nursing home staff also reviewed documentation of previous alleged
incidents involving Veatch and Bell and considered whether a temporary
protective order protecting Bell from Veatch should be sought. Lastly,
the meeting attendees, including Sergeant Leonard, requested assistance
from an Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) caseworker in
investigating whether dependent adult abuse was occurring.
As Sergeant Leonard’s investigation of Veatch’s conduct continued,
he received a telephone call from Kane relaying the results of Dr. Fagre’s
examination. Kane told Sergeant Leonard that Dr. Fagre had noted
“thumbprint” bruises on Bell’s forearms that appeared consistent with
someone having forcibly held Bell’s forearms to the wheelchair arms.
Kane further reported Dr. Fagre had discovered a bruise on Bell’s left
buttock consistent with Whiteside’s description of the incident and
corroborating the allegation that Veatch had shoved Bell into her
wheelchair. 3
Sergeant Leonard asked Veatch to come to the police station for an
interview. She complied. After briefly exchanging polite pleasantries,
Sergeant Leonard explained he wanted to ask Veatch some questions
3This summary was consistent with Dr. Fagre’s written report and his testimony
at Veatch’s subsequent criminal trial.
5
about a report that she had assaulted Bell at the nursing home. Veatch
responded that she would not continue the interview without legal
counsel. Veatch also told Sergeant Leonard she believed the allegations
against her by the nursing home’s staff were retaliatory in nature and
were a response to Veatch’s complaints about the quality of care
provided to her mother by the staff. Sergeant Leonard acknowledged the
request for counsel, left the interview room, and returned a few minutes
later with a complaint charging Veatch with simple misdemeanor assault
in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1 and 708.2(6) (2005). He arrested
Veatch and placed a phone call to DHS reporting he had done so. Veatch
entered a plea of not guilty, and the case went to trial. A jury acquitted
Veatch. 4
II. Procedural Background.
A. Federal Court Proceedings. Veatch filed a civil action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa against five
defendants: the nursing home, two nursing home employees, the City of
Waverly (the City), and Sergeant Leonard. See Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran
Home, No. 08–CV–2044–LRR, 2009 WL 3270823, at *1 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 9,
2009). In her complaint consisting of twelve counts, Veatch asserted a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sergeant Leonard and the City, as
well as a panoply of state law tort claims against each of the defendants.
See id.
Sergeant Leonard and the City moved for summary judgment on
the § 1983 claim. In its ruling on the motion, the federal district court
focused on the question whether the arrest violated Veatch’s rights under
4DHS conducted an administrative investigation of the incident as well.
Although the agency initially determined the incident of dependent adult abuse was
founded, the finding was later reversed by an administrative law judge.
6
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court
noted “[f]or § 1983 purposes, an arrest for a misdemeanor does not
require a warrant provided the arresting officer has probable cause,” and
therefore “the issue of probable cause is the ‘determinative factor’ to
resolve the § 1983 claim.” Id. at *7. Viewing the evidence in the
summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Veatch, the
court concluded the information Sergeant Leonard possessed “was
sufficient to establish probable cause for Veatch’s arrest because ‘the
facts and circumstances [were] sufficient to lead a reasonable person to
believe that [Veatch] ha[d] committed’ the assault.” Id. (alterations in
original) (quoting United States v. Torres-Lona, 491 F.3d 750, 755 (8th
Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, the court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.
After disposing of the § 1983 claim on the ground Sergeant
Leonard had probable cause to arrest Veatch, the federal district court
declined to rule on the remaining state law claims:
“The Supreme Court has noted that, ‘in the usual case in
which all federal[ ] law claims are eliminated before trial, the
balance of factors to be considered under the pendent
jurisdiction doctrine . . . will point toward declining to
exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state[ ] law claims.’ ”
Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir.
2004) (quoting Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
350 n.7 (1988)). Accordingly, the court declines to exercise
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against the City
and Leonard.
Id. at *8 (alterations in original). The court dismissed the § 1983 claim
with prejudice, and dismissed the remaining state law tort claims
without prejudice.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reached the same conclusion as the district court: “[T]he
information that Leonard received during the course of his investigation
7
established probable cause” because it “was sufficiently reliable to
establish a reasonable ground for belief that Veatch had committed a
misdemeanor assault.” Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home (Veatch II), 627
F.3d 1254, 1257–58 (8th Cir. 2010). The summary judgment was
therefore affirmed. Id. at 1259.
B. State Court Proceedings. Veatch refiled her state law tort
claims in the Iowa District Court for Bremer County. After the Eighth
Circuit issued its ruling, Sergeant Leonard and the City moved for
summary judgment on Veatch’s claims for false imprisonment,
negligence, and malicious prosecution. Sergeant Leonard and the City
contended the federal court’s ruling that Sergeant Leonard had probable
cause to arrest Veatch—now decided with finality in the federal court—
had preclusive effect and foreclosed each of Veatch’s remaining tort
claims. The district court agreed, concluding issue preclusion prevented
the parties from relitigating whether Sergeant Leonard had probable
cause to arrest Veatch. Having determined Veatch could not show
Sergeant Leonard lacked probable cause to make the arrest, the district
court concluded Veatch could not prevail on any of the tort theories she
asserted.
Veatch appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of
appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment ruling on the negligence and malicious prosecution theories.
The negligence claim must fail, the court of appeals explained, because
Iowa does not recognize a cause of action for negligent investigation of
crime. See Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Iowa 1989); Smith
v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Iowa 1982). The malicious prosecution
claim must fail, the court further concluded, because the federal
litigation had established as a matter of law that Sergeant Leonard had
8
probable cause to arrest Veatch for assault. See Veatch II, 627 F.3d at
1257–58; see also Whalen v. Connelly, 621 N.W.2d 681, 687–88 (Iowa
2000) (including “want of probable cause” among the elements of a
malicious prosecution claim) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, the court of appeals distinguished the federal court’s
probable cause determination from a determination that Sergeant
Leonard lawfully arrested Veatch without a warrant under Iowa law. In
particular, the court concluded the federal court’s determination that
Sergeant Leonard had probable cause to arrest Veatch under the Fourth
Amendment standard is not preclusive of the question whether the arrest
was valid under Iowa’s warrantless arrest statute. See Iowa Code
§ 804.7(2) (authorizing a peace officer to make an arrest without a
warrant “[w]here a public offense has in fact been committed, and the
peace officer has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be
arrested has committed it”); id. § 804.7(3) (authorizing a warrantless
arrest when a peace officer has reasonable ground to believe an
indictable offense has occurred and reasonable ground to believe the
suspect committed it). The court of appeals concluded a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether a public offense had in fact been
committed within the meaning of section 804.7(2). Accordingly, the
court held summary judgment should not have been granted on Veatch’s
false imprisonment claim.
The court of appeals also addressed an additional argument raised
by Sergeant Leonard and the City as an alternative ground supporting
summary judgment. This argument posited that section 804.7(3)
provided independent authorization for the warrantless arrest because
Sergeant Leonard had “reasonable ground for believing that an indictable
public offense ha[d] been committed and ha[d] reasonable ground for
9
believing that [Veatch] ha[d] committed it.” Iowa Code § 804.7(3).
Conceding Veatch was arrested for simple misdemeanor assault—which
is not an indictable offense 5—the defendants contended Sergeant
Leonard nonetheless had reasonable ground to believe Veatch had
committed dependent adult abuse resulting in physical injury, an
aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa Code section 235B.20(6). However,
the court of appeals rejected this alternative contention, concluding
Sergeant Leonard subjectively believed at the time of the arrest that
Veatch had committed simple assault, not the indictable offense of
dependent adult abuse.
Finally, the court of appeals addressed and rejected the assertion
of Sergeant Leonard and the City that they are immune from tort liability
under Iowa Code section 670.4. Citing our decision in Thomas v. Gavin,
the court concluded section 670.4 does not bar claims for false arrest.
See Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 519 (Iowa 2013).
Having determined a fact question exists whether the warrantless
arrest of Veatch was lawful under section 804.7(2) and that section
804.7(3) did not authorize a warrantless arrest in this case, the court of
appeals reversed the summary judgment on the false imprisonment
claim. Sergeant Leonard and the City requested, and we granted, further
review.
III. Scope of Review.
“We review a district court’s ruling on summary judgment for
correction of errors of law.” Thomas, 838 N.W.2d at 521. A grant of
summary judgment will be affirmed when the record shows “there is no
5See Iowa Code § 801.4(8) (“ ‘Indictable offense’ means an offense other than a
simple misdemeanor.”).
10
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P.
1.981(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In assessing whether
summary judgment is warranted, we view the entire record in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party”—in this case, Veatch. Crippen v.
City of Cedar Rapids, 618 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 2000). The nonmoving
party is entitled to “every legitimate inference that the evidence will bear
in an effort to ascertain the existence of a fact question.” Id.
Insofar as our adjudication “involves the interpretation of a
statutory provision . . ., our review is for correction of errors at law.”
Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 760 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 2008)
(quoting Mortensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 590 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Iowa
1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. The Parties’ Positions.
Sergeant Leonard and the City contend Veatch’s arrest was
justified under either section 804.7(2) or (3). They also assert the
decision of the court of appeals should be vacated and the district court
ruling should be affirmed on immunity grounds under section 670.4. 6
Sergeant Leonard and the City further contend the district court’s
summary judgment ruling should be affirmed because we apply a less
demanding probable cause standard in false arrest or false
imprisonment 7 cases than is applied in criminal cases. See Children v.
6As we have noted, the district court relied on issue preclusion as the rationale
for granting summary judgment, and did not reach the defendants’ immunity defense.
The court of appeals considered, but rejected, the immunity defense as a ground for
summary judgment. Because we resolve this case on other grounds, we do not reach
the immunity question.
7The torts of false imprisonment and false arrest have both elements in common.
See Rife v. D.T. Corner, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Iowa 2002); Kraft v. City of
Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Iowa 1984). Accordingly, we consider the terms
11
Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 680 (Iowa 1983). Under this less demanding
standard, the defendants contend, “[i]f the officer acts in good faith and
with reasonable belief that a crime has been committed and the person
arrested committed it, his actions are justified and liability does not
attach.” Id. Citing Children, Sergeant Leonard and the City posit that
summary judgment was properly granted because the summary
judgment record establishes—as a matter of law—that Sergeant Leonard
acted in good faith and with reasonable belief that an indictable crime
had been committed. 8
In contrast, Veatch urges us to affirm the court of appeals
decision. She contends the summary judgment ruling was flawed
because a fact question exists as to whether her arrest was justified
under section 804.7(2). Veatch further contends her arrest cannot be
justified under section 804.7(3) because the reasonable ground standard
under that section is a subjective one assessing only the arresting
officer’s state of mind at the time of the arrest. Noting that Sergeant
Leonard arrested her for simple assault, Veatch emphasizes that
Sergeant Leonard and the City did not claim any potential indictable
offense as a ground for the arrest until the summary judgment
proceedings in the district court.
_____________________
interchangeable. See Children v. Burton, 331 N.W.2d 673, 678 (Iowa 1983) (“A false
arrest is one way of committing the tort of false imprisonment . . . .”).
8The availability of the good-faith defense in the context of this civil case must be
distinguished from the concept of good faith as an exception to the exclusionary rule in
the context of criminal cases. See State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 292–93 & n.3 (Iowa
2000) (rejecting the good-faith defense as an exception to the exclusionary rule),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).
12
V. Discussion.
We conclude section 804.7(3) is dispositive. Although Sergeant
Leonard and the City contended in the district court they are entitled to
summary judgment because reasonable ground existed for the arrest
under Iowa Code section 804.7(3), the court did not decide the summary
judgment motion on that ground. Nonetheless, we can affirm the
summary judgment on a ground not relied upon by the district court
provided the ground was urged in that court and is also urged on appeal.
See In re Estate of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 879 n.1 (Iowa 1996); Johnston
Equip. Corp. of Iowa v. Indus. Indem., 489 N.W.2d 13, 16–17 (Iowa 1992).
A. Applicable Legal Principles. A peace officer may make a
warrantless arrest under Iowa law when the officer has “reasonable
ground for believing that an indictable public offense has been
committed and . . . reasonable ground for believing that the person to be
arrested has committed it.” Iowa Code § 804.7(3). An indictable public
offense is “an offense other than a simple misdemeanor.” Id. § 801.4(8).
We have previously stated the term “reasonable ground” in both prongs
of section 804.7(3) is equivalent to probable cause. Kraft v. City of
Bettendorf, 359 N.W.2d 466, 469 (Iowa 1984).
The statutory standard for warrantless arrests under Iowa law is
not identical to the federal constitutional standard. Compare Iowa Code
§ 804.7(3) (requiring that an officer have reasonable ground to believe an
indictable offense has been committed), with Veatch II, 627 F.3d at 1257
(noting the Fourth Amendment standard allows warrantless arrests if the
officer has probable cause to believe any offense has been committed).
Therefore, an arrest consistent with the probable cause standard under
the Fourth Amendment will not automatically satisfy the statutory
requirements for warrantless arrests under section 804.7.
13
We have held in a false arrest action that the standard for
evaluating probable cause under section 804.7(3) is an objective one.
Children, 331 N.W.2d at 679. In Children, we explained “[a] false arrest
case involving the issue of probable cause turns on what the officer knew
at the time of the arrest.” Id. at 678. The relevant question is not what
offenses Sergeant Leonard subjectively considered at the time he arrested
Veatch, but rather what offenses a reasonable person armed with the
same knowledge could have considered. See id. The focus of our
reasonable ground inquiry must therefore be on the facts known to
Sergeant Leonard, not merely the potential offenses he announced or
subjectively considered at the time he made the arrest. See id. at 680
(“The significant point is that courts look to the facts within the officers’
knowledge . . . .”). Accordingly, we reject Veatch’s contention that
because she was not arrested for an indictable offense or because
Sergeant Leonard did not announce that an indictable offense was within
the universe of potential offenses he considered at the time of the arrest,
a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether her arrest was
justified under Iowa Code section 804.7(3).
Many other courts evaluating probable cause issues have
concluded that, because probable cause is evaluated objectively, an
arrest can be sustained by probable cause for a more serious offense
than the crime the officer announced at the time of the arrest. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding an
arrest when “officers possessed sufficient information to make an arrest
for assault but stated the ground for the arrest as detoxification”);
Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304–05 (8th Cir. 1969)
(determining a vagrancy arrest was also justified by probable cause to
believe the defendant committed armed robbery); Ralph v. Pepersack, 335
14
F.2d 128, 133–34 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding probable cause to arrest the
suspect for burglary and rape, and refusing to hold the arrest was illegal
simply because officers identified the reason for the arrest as something
less); Ricehill v. Brewer, 338 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (S.D. Iowa 1971)
(looking to the substance of events, not their form, and finding it “quite
clear” that although police only arrested Ricehill for vagrancy—which is
not an indictable offense—the available facts also provided the officer
with probable cause to arrest for murder), aff’d, 459 F.2d 537, 540 (8th
Cir. 1972); Callahan v. State, 557 So. 2d 1292, 1302 (Ala. Crim. App.
1989) (“Despite the fact that Callahan was initially arrested for a traffic
offense, the fact remains that at that time there existed probable cause
for his arrest for . . . murder . . . .”); Reese v. State, 243 S.E.2d 650, 652
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that although the officer arrested the
suspect for “prowling” near the scene of a reported sexual assault, the
arrest could also have been made for rape); State v. Julian, 922 P.2d
1059, 1063 (Idaho 1996) (reviewing the record and determining officers
had probable cause to make an arrest for aggravated battery, even
though they in fact made the arrest for misdemeanor domestic battery).
Today we do the same and hold that under Iowa Code section 804.7(3),
an arrest is lawful if the facts available to the officer at the time of arrest
provide reasonable ground for believing an indictable offense has
occurred and the arrestee committed it—even if the officer announces a
lesser offense as the reason for the arrest.
Having established that an indictable offense can support an arrest
retrospectively, we now turn our attention to the indictable offense of
dependent adult abuse. Iowa Code section 235B.20(6) provides: “A
caretaker who recklessly commits dependent adult abuse on a person in
violation of this chapter is guilty of an aggravated misdemeanor if the
15
reckless dependent adult abuse results in physical injury.” Iowa Code
§ 235B.20(6). A “caretaker” under chapter 235B is “a related or
nonrelated person who has the responsibility for the protection, care, or
custody of a dependent adult as a result of assuming the responsibility
voluntarily, by contract, through employment, or by order of the court.”
Id. § 235B.2(1). The term “dependent adult abuse” includes “[p]hysical
injury to, or . . . assault of a dependent adult.” Id. § 235B.2(5)(a)(1)(a). A
“dependent adult” is “a person . . . who is unable to protect the person’s
own interests or unable to adequately perform or obtain services
necessary to meet essential human needs, as a result of a physical or
mental condition which requires assistance from another.” Id.
§ 235B.2(4).
B. Application of the Legal Principles. With these principles in
mind, we now turn to the defendants’ contention that Sergeant Leonard
had reasonable ground as a matter of law to believe Veatch had
committed dependent adult abuse.
We first note it is unclear from the summary judgment record
whether Veatch told Sergeant Leonard before she was arrested that she
believed Woodland Terrace’s allegations against her were retaliatory in
nature. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Veatch, we
assume in our analysis that she told Sergeant Leonard of her retaliation
theory before he made the arrest. We also give Veatch the benefit of an
inference that Sergeant Leonard learned before the arrest that Veatch
believed the accusations made by the Woodland Terrace staff were biased
or otherwise unreliable because they were motivated by animus.
Notwithstanding the inferences we make in Veatch’s favor, we
conclude Sergeant Leonard had reasonable ground as a matter of law to
arrest Veatch for dependent adult abuse. Assault of a dependent adult
16
by a caretaker qualifies as dependent adult abuse. Iowa Code
§§ 235B.2(5)(a)(1)(a), .20(6). The federal court adjudication preclusively
established that probable cause existed to arrest Veatch for assault.
Veatch II, 627 F.3d at 1257–58; see Fischer v. City of Sioux City, 654
N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2002) (stating elements of issue preclusion).
Thus, for the arrest to be justified under section 804.7(3), Sergeant
Leonard must have had reasonable ground to believe (1) Veatch was a
caretaker, and (2) Bell was a dependent adult. The summary judgment
record leaves no disputed issues of material fact on those elements.
Veatch was designated by a durable power of attorney for health
care as Bell’s agent to make health care decisions. See Iowa Code
§ 144B.1(1) (defining “attorney in fact” as “an individual who is
designated by a durable power of attorney for health care as an agent to
make health care decisions on behalf of a principal and has consented to
act in that capacity”). Further, it is undisputed on this record that Bell
was, at all material times, a dependent adult as defined under Iowa Code
section 235B.2(4). Additionally, as we have already noted, Sergeant
Leonard’s prearrest meeting with the Woodland Terrace staff lasted
between one and two hours, allowing time to gather information about
the alleged incident involving Veatch.
Sergeant Leonard did not rely solely on information from Woodland
Terrace staff to arrest Veatch. Instead, he waited to make the decision to
arrest until after he received word that Dr. Fagre’s examination of Bell
indicated bruising ostensibly consistent with the allegations against
Veatch. In false arrest cases decided by several other courts, an
investigation of the nature and extent conducted by Sergeant Leonard
has been viewed as supportive of a finding of probable cause. See, e.g.,
Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 391–93, 397–99 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding
17
probable cause as a matter of law when an officer personally observed an
allegedly mistreated horse rather than relying solely on the walk-in
complaint he received); Hebron v. Touhy, 18 F.3d 421, 422–23 (7th Cir.
1994) (affirming summary judgment on the probable cause issue when
officers responding to a landlord–tenant dispute recognized the likelihood
the tenant bore a grudge and investigated further before making an
arrest); Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp. 2d 128, 133–35 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(finding probable cause for arrest as a matter of law when an officer did
not simply take at face value statements provided by either spouse in the
midst of an acrimonious divorce).
We acknowledge that a contentious history between a complainant
and the arrestee can sometimes engender a fact question as to whether
probable cause supported an arrest. See Kraft, 359 N.W.2d at 470; see
also Sankar v. City of New York, 867 F. Supp. 2d 297, 306–07 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (holding when an officer “was aware of the contentious relationship
that existed between [the witness] and [the arrestee],” a reasonable juror
could conclude the police lacked probable cause to arrest); Roach v.
Marrow, No. 3:08–CV–1136, 2012 WL 1059741, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28,
2012) (“[B]ecause the record is unclear as to what [the officer] knew
about . . . Plaintiff[’]s contentious relationship with [the complainant],
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court
concludes that there is a dispute as to whether there was probable cause
because [the officer] interviewed only those witnesses who may have had
ulterior motives for giving their statements.”). In Kraft, for example, we
concluded a fact question existed on the probable cause question when
arresting officers knew about preexisting animosity between a
complainant and the person arrested for assault following a barroom
fight. Kraft, 359 N.W.2d at 470. Despite the officers’ knowledge of the
18
complainant’s animus, they nonetheless relied solely on his biased
account of the fight in making an arrest without additional investigation.
Id. at 468.
But this case is clearly distinguishable from Kraft. There, the
arresting Bettendorf police officers arrived just after a fight had ended in
a bar between the plaintiff and an off-duty, obviously intoxicated
Bettendorf police officer. Id. at 468. The officers knew their colleague
bore a longstanding animosity toward the plaintiff. Id. at 470. Yet, they
arrested the plaintiff after speaking for less than a minute to this
intoxicated, off-duty officer alone, without getting the account of any
other witness in the bar. Id. at 468. In sharp contrast, Sergeant
Leonard met with representatives of Woodland Terrace for more than an
hour, and did not arrest Veatch until after he had received confirmation
that Dr. Fagre had found bruises on Bell’s body consistent with the
complainants’ version of the events. Upon our review of the summary
judgment record in this case, we conclude a reasonable person could not
find the relationship between Veatch and the Woodland Terrace staff was
so contentious or affected by animus as to create a genuine issue of fact
on the question of whether Sergeant Leonard had reasonable ground to
believe the offense of dependent adult abuse had been committed, and
that Veatch had committed it.
VI. Conclusion.
We conclude as a matter of law that reasonable ground existed to
arrest Veatch for the indictable offense of dependent adult abuse.
Therefore, Veatch’s false imprisonment claim must fail as a matter of
law. Accordingly, we do not reach the question whether the arrest was
valid under section 804.7(2), or whether the defendants’ claims of
statutory immunity are meritorious. We vacate the decision of the court
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of appeals and affirm the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendants.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.