In the Interest of R.D. R.D. , 2016 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 30 ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 15–1198
Filed March 11, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF R.D.
R.D.,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Russell G.
Keast, District Associate Judge.
Adopted person appeals juvenile court order denying application to
unseal adoption records to identify her biological parents. AFFIRMED.
Peter J. Gardner of Meardon, Sueppel & Downer, P.L.C., Iowa City,
for appellant.
2
WATERMAN, Justice.
Fifty years ago, a married couple gave up their newborn daughter
for adoption. The adoption records were sealed. Today, we must decide
whether the juvenile court correctly construed and applied Iowa Code
section 600.16A(2)(d) (2015) when it denied the adoptee’s application to
unseal those records to identify her biological parents.
A loving adoptive family raised the adoptee, but she struggles with
depression, anxiety, and alcohol abuse. She presented evidence that her
ignorance of her biological family’s history is a root cause of her mental
health problems and that learning the identities of her biological parents
would assist her treatment. The juvenile court found she met her
evidentiary burden to establish that opening the adoption records is
necessary to save her life or prevent irreparable physical or mental harm
to her. The district court examined the adoption records in camera,
found no relevant medical information other than her biological parents’
identities, and ruled the statute precluded release of their names. The
biological parents have filed no affidavit or consent to disclosure of their
identities. The adoptee appealed, and we retained her appeal. For the
reasons explained below, we determine this adoptee failed to meet her
burden to overcome the statutory protection for the confidentiality of the
identity of biological parents.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
R.D., now age fifty-one, was born in Iowa in 1965. R.D.’s biological
parents consented to her adoption and waived notice of any further
proceedings. R.D. was adopted a few days later, and the adoption
records were sealed pursuant to Iowa Code section 600.9 (1962), which
stated, “The complete record in adoption proceedings, after filing with the
clerk of the court, shall be sealed by said clerk, and the record shall not
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thereafter be opened except on order of the court.” The adoption statute
in 1965 contained no provision allowing biological parents to file an
affidavit consenting or objecting to disclosure of their identities. The
biological parents have not been contacted in the pending proceeding,
nor have they filed any consent form or affidavit regarding their position
on disclosure.
R.D.’s adoptive family was loving and supportive. When R.D.
turned six, her adoptive parents told her she was adopted. As she grew
up, R.D. felt the “loss of [her] biological family” and “the loss of [her] own
parents not having given birth to [her.]” Most importantly, she “felt like
somebody gave [her] up” because they did not love her. She became
obsessed with being the “best of everything” to avoid being abandoned
again. R.D. achieved academic success, earning advanced degrees and
induction into Phi Beta Kappa. Today she is on the faculty teaching at a
prestigious university in another state and has been married to a
supportive husband for several decades.
R.D.’s “lack of knowledge about her origins increasingly caused
anxiety and depression.” R.D. began self-medicating with alcohol in her
thirties. In 2007, R.D. voluntarily checked herself into the Hazelden
Rehabilitation Center in Center City, Minnesota. During a four-week
inpatient program, she was introduced to a twelve-step program. She
successfully completed her course of treatment. When she returned to
her home, she became an active member in Alcoholics Anonymous with a
sponsor.
In 2008, R.D. relapsed for the first time. She continued to work on
her sobriety through Alcoholics Anonymous and with therapists, but she
was unable to maintain prolonged sobriety. Each relapse involved
drinking more and taking longer to regain sobriety. She missed
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meetings, important social events, and professional deadlines during her
relapses.
In May 2013, R.D. began seeing G.P. Zurenda Jr., a psychiatric
social worker, to address her alcohol abuse. Zurenda diagnosed R.D.
with alcohol dependence, anxiety disorder, and depression. Zurenda
administered the Michigan Alcohol Screening Test to R.D., and her score
indicated alcohol dependence. She scheduled regular appointments with
Zurenda. R.D. occasionally canceled her appointments because she had
been drinking. R.D. felt she had a “hole in [her] soul.”
In June 2014, R.D. began seeing Dr. Anthony J. Pane Jr., a
psychologist specializing in anxiety, depression, relationship problems,
and substance abuse. R.D. sought out Dr. Pane because almost half of
his practice was devoted to adoptees. Dr. Pane conducted a clinical
interview and diagnosed R.D. with depression and alcohol dependence.
Dr. Pane viewed R.D.’s adoption as the issue underlying her substance
abuse and depression. Dr. Pane suggested she should try to identify her
parents.
On August 1, R.D. wrote a letter to the Linn County District Court
to ask for her adoption records to be unsealed. She wrote that she was
seeking the records “due to significant medical issues, the short- and
long-term management of which could be altered by a knowledge of [her]
family medical history.” On August 15, the district court denied R.D.’s
request. The district court indicated that it had reviewed the file and
found that there was no medical and developmental history or family
medical history in the adoption record. The district court concluded that
R.D.’s request was insufficient to warrant releasing the identities of
R.D.’s biological parents.
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On March 16, 2015, she wrote another letter to the Linn County
District Court asking the court to open her adoption records. She
indicated that her physicians and other health care providers
recommended that she learn the identities of her birth parents “due to
critical medical issues related to [her] short- and long-term health.” She
attached letters from her primary care physician, Dr. Orli Etingin, as well
as from Zurenda, and Dr. Pane.
Dr. Etingin’s letter stated that R.D. “has suffered from depression
and alcohol dependence in the past.” R.D.’s episodes of severe anxiety
affected her work, family, and personal relationships. Dr. Etingin stated
that R.D.’s “lack of information about her biologic family has impaired
[her caregivers’] ability to care for her, and her ability to recover.” R.D.’s
risk for diabetes, heart disease, and stroke were all increased because of
her stress. Dr. Etingin wrote she believed “it is medically essential that
[R.D.] be given access to family history information.”
Zurenda wrote that R.D. had made progress since he began
working with her in 2013. He noted that she was currently abstinent
and active in Alcoholics Anonymous. Zurenda stated that his
“experience and extensive research shows that correctly identifying the
etiology of one’s alcoholism is very important in improving the odds of a
person[’]s continuing recovery from the disease.” He said that knowing
the root of R.D.’s alcoholism was essential because she had cooccurring
disorders—depression and anxiety. Zurenda concluded that discovery of
R.D.’s family history was essential to treat her alcoholism.
Dr. Pane’s letter reported that R.D. was “highly gifted [and] highly
successful . . . with a very supportive husband and adoptive family.”
However, he said he believed the “root of her mental health challenges”
was her lack of knowledge about her biological parents. He “believe[d]
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that knowledge of her history will be the breakthrough essential for her
mental health.” Dr. Pane’s letter also stated that he was confident that
R.D. would handle learning her parents’ identities in a “reasoned,
sensitive and responsible manner.”
In addition to those three letters, R.D. submitted deposition
testimony of Dr. Pane and Zurenda regarding her need to know her
parents’ identities. 1 Dr. Pane opined that R.D. was unable to
compartmentalize her feelings of loss from her adoption. He believed
R.D. would resume drinking if the court refused to release the identities
of R.D.’s biological parents. Dr. Pane described her adoption, drinking,
and depression as links in an interconnected chain and asserted that
R.D. would need to know the identity of her parents to maintain her
sobriety and avoid a deep depression.
Zurenda described R.D. as a “closet drinker” because she would
drink in secret instead of attending to her professional obligations.
R.D.’s drinking binges had worsened after her inpatient treatment in
2007, but R.D. had been abstinent in recent months. Zurenda opined
that if R.D. was unable to maintain sobriety, she would need a liver
transplant. He also reported that R.D. described her adoptive parents
positively. Zurenda explained that he was unable to complete a
biopsychosocial assessment for R.D. without the identity of R.D.’s
biological parents. He testified that R.D.’s diagnosis might change based
on her extended family’s history. Zurenda said he was worried that if
R.D. did not learn the identity of her parents, she would continue to
relapse. Zurenda noted her need to know her biological parents’
identities was based on more than just curiosity:
1Both worked outside Iowa and were unable to testify in person at the hearing.
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I think that she’s developing the awareness that she does
have—her alcohol abuse dependence is a true medical
problem that she’s not being able to deal with on her own.
Quite honestly, I think if she had her preferences, she
wouldn’t even really be looking at the issue. It’s something
that has to be addressed.
Throughout his deposition, he emphasized that R.D. had a strong desire
to quit drinking. In sum, Zurenda said:
Addiction is a complicated calculus, and because I am very
confident of my sense of her true desire to refrain from
drinking, it is my informed belief that she continues to
relapse and has over the past eight years—eight plus years
that she’s doing that to a large degree because she’s having a
difficult time finding a sense of self.
This is a very high-functioning, very intelligent, very
well-educated, very competent and self-possessed woman on
most levels, but she keeps bumping into this
psychological/emotional problem that keeps bringing her
back to needing to drink, and when she falls off, she falls off
terribly; and I really am concerned that if this question of
where I came from—where she came from is not resolved
that we’re going to end up having this conversation
sometime down the road when we’re having to try and get
these files opened because she’s going to need a match to get
a liver transplant.
On May 4, R.D. presented the depositions, letters, and her own
testimony to the juvenile court. She relied on Iowa Code section
600.16A(2)(d) (2015), which allows access to adoption records “if opening
is shown to be necessary to save the life of or prevent irreparable
physical or mental harm to an adopted person or the person’s offspring.”
She attributed her alcohol abuse to her sense of loss from being adopted.
She admitted to being a closet drinker and explained that her alcohol
dependence gave her “a lot of shame and guilt.” She testified that each
time she relapses she gets closer and closer to a life-threatening
situation. She asserted that her physical and mental health was at
stake. She testified that she had not discussed with her professionals
what she would do if she learned her biological parents’ identities, but
8
she asserted she “would probably spend a long time trying to figure out
the best strategy . . . and again the most caring and compassionate one
considering that they, again . . . probably experienced their own loss as
well.” The court asked if R.D.’s intent in opening the adoption records
was to obtain “not specific information about the biological parents but
the actual identities of the biological parents themselves and that that
information is intended for treatment purposes to be directly provided to
[R.D.] to help her address her issues.” Her attorney replied that was
correct.
On May 28, the court denied R.D.’s petition. The court
emphasized that confidentiality is paramount in our adoption statutes.
The court found that R.D. had “met her evidentiary burden, by showing
upon competent medical evidence that opening the adoption records is
necessary to save the life of or prevent irreparable physical or mental
harm to the adopted person.” Nevertheless, the court denied her petition
because her sole purpose in her petition was to learn the identity of her
biological parents. The court noted the absence of any other relevant
medical information in the sealed adoption records. The court
concluded:
While the Court does not deny the existence of the
Applicant’s need to know, it is unable to conclude that by
overtly revealing the identities of the biological parents
directly to the Applicant or to medical providers whose sole
intent is to forward that information to [R.D.], that the Court
would be acting in accordance with the clear dictates of the
statute or the intent of the legislature.
We retained R.D.’s appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
We review rulings on questions of statutory interpretation for
correction of errors at law. In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d 794, 797
9
(Iowa 2002). We review de novo the factual issues in adoption-related
equitable proceedings. Id. “We give weight to the juvenile court’s factual
findings, especially as to the credibility of witnesses, but we are not
bound by them.” In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745 (Iowa 2011).
III. Analysis.
We must decide whether the juvenile court correctly denied R.D.’s
application to open the records of her adoption to identify her biological
parents. The privacy of adoption records implicates not only the rights of
the adoptee, but also the rights of the adoptive parents, biological
parents, other family members, and the state’s interest in encouraging
adoptions. See In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d at 800 (“[S]ection
600.16A is the legislature’s attempt to balance those interests. The
balance has been struck heavily in favor of keeping adoption records
sealed.”). R.D.’s biological parents terminated their parental rights in
1965 and have not been given notice of this proceeding. Unlike other
states, Iowa’s adoption statute lacks a specific provision for appointment
of a guardian ad litem to represent the biological parents on requests for
their identities. 2 Rather, under the existing Iowa adoption statute,
2New York’s adoption law requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
represent the interest of the biological parents before adoption records may be
unsealed. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 114 (4) (McKinney, Westlaw current through
L. 2016, ch. 1) (requiring a court hearing a petition to open adoption records to appoint
guardian ad litem to obtain medical information); In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779,
782 (Sur. Ct. 1976) (appointing a guardian ad litem to locate the natural parents,
inform them of their rights, and represent and protect their interests under the
authority of a combination of general guardian ad litem statutes); see also Mills v.
Atl. City Dep’t of Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 654–56 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977)
(exercising equitable power to require adoption agencies to determine whether the
natural parents object to the release of information and shifting the burden of proof to
the state to demonstrate that good cause is not present when the adoptee seeking the
information is an adult). But see In re Dixon, 334 N.W.2d 373, 373 (Mich. 1983)
(employing a presumption that the natural parents would oppose disclosure and
appointing guardian ad litem for the purpose of contesting the issue of good cause).
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biological parents may file consents 3 or affidavits 4 stating their position
as to disclosure of their identities. Those provisions did not exist in 1965
3Iowa Code section 600.16A(3) allows biological parents and adult adoptees to
file a written consent to revelation of his or her identity, as follows:
3. a. In addition to other procedures by which adoption records
may be opened under this section, if both of the following conditions are
met, the department, the clerk of court, or the agency which made the
placement shall open the adoption record for inspection and shall reveal
the identity of the biological parents to the adult adopted child or the
identity of the adult adopted child to the biological parents:
(1) A biological parent has placed in the adoption record written
consent to revelation of the biological parents’ identity to the adopted
child at an age specified by the biological parent, upon request of the
adopted child.
(2) An adult adopted child has placed in the adoption record
written consent to revelation of the identity of the adult adopted child to
a biological parent.
b. A person who has placed in the adoption record written
consent pursuant to paragraph “a”, subparagraph (1) or (2) may
withdraw the consent at any time by placing a written withdrawal of
consent statement in the adoption record.
c. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, if the adult
adopted person has a sibling who is a minor and who has also been
adopted by the same parents, the department, the clerk of court, or the
agency which made the placement may deny the request of either the
adult adopted person or the biological parent to open the adoption
records and to reveal the identities of the parties pending determination
by the juvenile court or court that there is good cause to open the
records pursuant to subsection 2.
This provision was originally enacted in 1992. See 1992 Iowa Acts ch. 1196, § 4
(codified at Iowa Code § 600.16A(3) (1993)).
4Iowa Code section 600.16A(2)(b) allows biological parents to file affidavits, as
follows:
b. The juvenile court or court, for good cause, shall order the
opening of the permanent adoption record of the juvenile court or court
for the adopted person who is an adult and reveal the names of either or
both of the biological parents following consideration . . . of the following:
(1) A biological parent may file an affidavit requesting the juvenile
court or court reveal or not reveal the parent’s identity. The juvenile
court or court shall consider any such affidavit in determining whether
there is good cause to order opening of the records.
This provision was originally enacted in 1976. See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1229, § 25
(codified at Iowa Code § 600.16(2) (1977)).
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when R.D. was adopted, and we have no such filing from her biological
parents.
Our analysis begins with the text of the statute. In re A.M., 856
N.W.2d 365, 371 (Iowa 2014) (“Our starting point is the statutory text.”).
Iowa Code chapter 600 governs adoptions. The legislature provided a
guide to construction in section 600.1:
This chapter shall be construed liberally. The best interest of
the person to be adopted shall be the paramount
consideration in interpreting this chapter. However, the
interests of the adopting parents shall be given due
consideration in this interpretation.
Iowa Code § 600.1 (footnote omitted). Section 600.16A addresses the
confidentiality of adoption records. Id. § 600.16A. Section 600.16A(1)
provides that adoption records “shall be sealed by the clerk.” Id.
§ 600.16A(1). The next three subsections set forth the grounds for
unsealing adoption records. R.D. relies on section 600.16A(2)(d), which
provides:
2. All papers and records pertaining to . . . an
adoption shall not be open to inspection and the identity of
the biological parents of an adopted person shall not be
revealed except under any of the following circumstances:
....
d. The juvenile court or court may, upon competent
medical evidence, open termination or adoption records if
opening is shown to be necessary to save the life of or
prevent irreparable physical or mental harm to an adopted
person or the person’s offspring. The juvenile court or court
shall make every reasonable effort to prevent the identity of
the biological parents from becoming revealed under this
paragraph to the adopted person. The juvenile court or
court may, however, permit revelation of the identity of the
biological parents to medical personnel attending the
adopted person or the person’s offspring. These medical
personnel shall make every reasonable effort to prevent the
identity of the biological parents from becoming revealed to
the adopted person.
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Id. § 600.16A(2)(d). We have addressed section 600.16A in only one
decision, In re Adoption of S.J.D. 641 N.W.2d at 798–802 (denying
adoptee’s motion to unseal his adoption records). In that case, the
adoptee presented no medical evidence and relied on a different section—
600.16A(2)(b). Id. at 796. By contrast, R.D. presented medical testimony
that the juvenile court found met her evidentiary burden under section
600.16A(2)(d) to show revealing the identities of her biological parents is
necessary to save her life or spare her irreparable physical or mental
harm. The juvenile court nevertheless concluded the medical showing
alone was insufficient to surmount the court’s obligation to “make every
reasonable effort to prevent the identity of the biological parents from
being revealed to the adopted person.” We agree.
The juvenile court reviewed the adoption records in camera, as
have we. The records are devoid of medical information. We must decide
whether the medical showing of the predicted therapeutic benefit to R.D.
of learning the identity of her biological parents outweighs the statutory
command to protect the identity of the biological parents. Significantly,
the first sentence of section 600.16A(2)(d) uses the permissive term
“may,” unlike the next sentence, which uses the mandatory term “shall.”
Compare Iowa Code § 600.16A(2)(d) (“The juvenile court or court may . . .
open . . . adoption records.” (Emphasis added.)), with id. (“The juvenile
court or court shall make every reasonable effort to prevent the identity
of the biological parents from becoming revealed under this paragraph to
the adopted person.” (Emphasis added.)); see also id. § 4.1(30)(c) (“The
word ‘may’ confers a power.”); id. § 4.1(30)(a) (“The word ‘shall’ imposes a
duty.”).
Thus, the medical showing R.D. made gets her to first base, not
across home plate. We are presented with a mixed question of fact and
13
law as to whether R.D. is entitled to disclosure of her birth parents’
identities. We must decide this case mindful of the competing policies,
which we review in depth below. We conclude on this record that the
balance the legislature struck in favor of confidentiality mandates denial
of R.D.’s application.
A. The Evolution of the Confidentiality of Adoption Records.
“Because English common law did not recognize the practice of adoption,
adoption in this country is purely statutory.” In re Adoption of S.J.D.,
641 N.W.2d at 799. Adoption records were public in most states until
the middle of the twentieth century:
At one point in the past, adoption records were not sealed.
“[A]doption only became part of American law in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and . . . adoption
procedures initially established by state statutes provided
neither for confidentiality with respect to the public nor for
secrecy among the parties, but were subsequently amended
to protect the parties from public scrutiny.” “In the mid-
1920s, there were virtually no confidentiality or secrecy
provisions in adoption law. . . . By the mid-1930s to the
early 1940s, there were more state provisions for
confidentiality with respect to the general public’s access to
court records, but still few provisions for secrecy among the
participants.” However, “[w]ith respect to court records
rather than birth records, contemporary evidence indicates
that by the late 1940s and early 1950s a significant, if not a
dramatic, shift had occurred: court records by that time were
apparently closed in many states to all persons.”
In re Adoption of Scott W.V., 124 A.3d 1181, 1190–91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2015) (quoting Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry
Into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 Rutgers L.
Rev. 367, 368, 374, 377 (2001) [hereinafter Samuels] (footnotes omitted)).
The evolving confidentiality of Iowa’s adoption records has reflected
the national trend. Iowa adoption records were originally filed with real
estate deeds and, like real estate deeds, were open to the public. See
Iowa Code Revision of 1860 § 2602 (1860) (“[Adoption records] shall be
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recorded in the county where the person adopting resides in the office,
and with the record of deeds of real estate; and shall be indexed with the
name of the parent by adoption as grantor, and the child as grantee in its
original name if stated in the instrument.”) (repealed 1927). Iowa closed
its adoption records in 1941. 1941 Iowa Acts ch. 294, § 1 (codified at
Iowa Code § 600.9 (1946)). The statute provided, “The complete record in
adoption proceedings, after filing with the clerk of the court, shall be
sealed by said clerk, and the record shall not thereafter be opened except
on order of the court.” Iowa Code § 600.9 (1946) (current version at Iowa
Code § 600.16A(1) (2015)).
In 1976, a decade after R.D.’s adoption, the Iowa legislature
amended the adoption statute to provide conditions for unsealing
records. See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1229, § 25 (codified at Iowa Code
§ 600.16(2)–(3) (1977)). Among other reasons, the statute, as amended,
allowed the court to open records when “necessary to save the life of or
prevent irreparable physical harm to” the adoptee. Iowa Code
§ 600.16(3) (1977) (current version at Iowa Code § 600.16A(2)(d) (2015)).
The statute was reorganized in 1993 and permitted courts to also open
records to prevent irreparable mental harm. 5 1992 Iowa Acts ch. 1196,
§ 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 600.16A(2)(d) (1993)). Although this statute
has been amended several times since 1993, there have been no
substantive changes regarding an adoptee’s grounds to open his or her
adoption records. See generally Iowa Code § 600.16A (2015).
5The 1993 amendment also created a consent registry, which allowed natural
parents to put a written consent to reveal the parent’s identity on request of the child,
and allowed an adult child to place a written consent to reveal the child’s identity to the
natural parent upon request. See 1992 Iowa Acts ch. 1196, § 4 (codified at Iowa Code
§ 600.16A(3) (1993)).
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B. The Importance of Confidentiality of Adoption Records.
“Confidentiality has been and continues to be the touchstone for these
adoption statutes.” In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d at 799; see also
In re Philip S., 881 A.2d 931, 933 (R.I. 2005) (“[T]he confidentiality of the
adoption process is deemed to be of an extraordinarily high value.”).
Today, “most states still maintain sealed records for all or most
adoptees.” Ann M. Haralambie, Use of Social Media in Post-Adoption
Search and Reunion, 41 Cap. U.L. Rev. 177, 177–78 (2013) (noting courts
rarely exercise their authority to unseal records for good cause, and
appellate courts rarely overturn denials of access, “often citing the
privacy rights of the birth parents and even the adoptive parents”). The
confidentiality of adoption records protects different interests:
[C]onfidentiality serves several purposes. It shields the
adopted child from possibly disturbing facts surrounding his
or her birth and parentage, it permits the adoptive parents to
develop a close relationship with the child free from
interference or distraction, and it provides the natural
parents with an anonymity that they may consider vital. The
State’s interest in fostering an orderly and supervised system
of adoptions is closely tied to these interests of the parties
involved.
In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d at 799 (quoting Linda F.M. v. Dep’t of
Health, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 1303 (N.Y. 1981) (citation omitted)).
Sealing adoption records helps promote the formation of the
adoptive family. Adoptive parents have a strong interest in maintaining
closed adoption records so “they may raise [the] child without fear of
interference from the natural parents and without fear that the birth
status of the illegitimate child will be revealed or used as a means of
harming the child or themselves.” In re Adoption of Baby S., 705 A.2d
822, 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (quoting Mills v. Atl. City Dep’t of
16
Vital Statistics, 372 A.2d 646, 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977)).
Confidentiality also
protects the child from any possible stigma of illegitimacy,
which, though fading, may still exist, and insures that the
relationship with his or her new parents can develop into a
loving and cohesive family unit uninvaded by a natural
parent who later wishes to intrude into the relationship.
Id. (quoting Mills, 372 A.2d at 649). Indeed, R.D. enjoyed a strong
familial bond with her adoptive parents. R.D. is age fifty-one and
testified her adoptive parents support her quest to identify her biological
parents. However, section 600.16A applies to myriad relationships
among adoptees of all ages, biological and adoptive parents, siblings, and
extended families. Moreover, R.D.’s biological parents have not
consented to revelation of their identities.
The assurance of secrecy regarding the identity of the
natural parents enables them to place the child for adoption
with a reputable agency, with the knowledge that their
actions and motivations will not become public knowledge.
Assured of this privacy by the State, the natural parents are
free to move on and attempt to rebuild their lives after what
must be a traumatic and emotionally tormenting episode in
their lives.
Id. (quoting Mills, 372 A.2d at 649). R.D.’s biological parents presumably
believed their identities would remain confidential when they placed her
for adoption. See Iowa Code § 600.9 (1962) (“The complete record in
adoption proceedings . . . shall be sealed by said clerk, and the record
shall not thereafter be opened except on order of the court.”). While
some biological parents who gave up children for adoption may welcome
contact from them, others may desire continued anonymity. An
adoptee’s contact with a birth parent can disrupt her family and
community life. See In re Creed, 337 N.W.2d 41, 42 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983) (per curiam) (stating petitioner, who had been raped and gave
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resulting baby up for adoption, alleged severe emotional distress when
her biological son confronted her twenty-one years later).
Birth mothers filed constitutional challenges to statutory
amendments when Oregon and Tennessee opened adoption records. See
Doe v. Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (dismissing natural
mothers’ constitutional challenge to Tennessee’s law opening adoption
records); Does v. State, 993 P.2d 822, 825–26 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(rejecting natural mothers’ state and federal constitutional challenges to
Oregon’s law opening adoption records); Brett S. Silverman, The Winds of
Change in Adoption Laws: Should Adoptees Have Access to Adoption
Records?, 39 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 85, 91–92 (2001) [hereinafter
Silverman] (providing personal stories from the Oregon plaintiffs in
Sundquist, 106 F.3d 702). A woman who placed her child for adoption
opposed unsealing adoption records in Oregon because she did “not want
to have to tell a curious adoptee that he or she would have been aborted
barring the danger [of an abortion], especially after four decades.”
Silverman, 39 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. at 91. Moreover, she said
she would “be very angry” if the child tried to contact her because “[t]he
idea of adoption was to permanently sever the relationship with the
child.” Id. at 92. Another Oregon birth mother placed her daughter for
adoption because she was conceived as a result of a “terrifying brutal
stranger rape” and said that opening adoption records would be
committing “emotional rape.” Id.
Iowa Code section 600.16A(2)(d) protects the biological parents’
right to privacy. See In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d at 803
(rejecting adoptee’s constitutional challenge because “[t]he right . . . to
information asserted by adoptees directly conflicts with the right to
privacy of birth parents to be left alone” (quoting Jason Kuhns, Note, The
18
Sealed Adoption Records Controversy: Breaking Down the Walls of
Secrecy, 24 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 259, 269 (1994))). In Head v. Colloton,
we weighed the competing interests of a terminally ill plaintiff and an
unrelated patient who had undergone tissue typing to determine her
suitability as a blood platelet donor for a family member. 331 N.W.2d
870, 872 (Iowa 1983). The unrelated patient was a potential bone
marrow donor for the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff petitioned the court for
access to the donor’s contact information in order to urge her to donate.
Id. at 873. We denied his request and stated,
An individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters is constitutionally based. This right is also
recognized at common law. A valuable part of the right of
privacy is the right to avoid publicity concerning private
facts. This right can be as important to a potential donor as
to a person in ill health.
Id. at 876 (citations omitted). Other courts have noted a constitutional
dimension to the privacy rights of biological parents who give up children
for adoption. See Mills, 372 A.2d at 651 (“Th[e] natural parent has a
right to privacy, a right to be let alone, that is not only expressly assured
by the provisions of N.J.S.A. 26:8–40.1 and N.J.S.A. 9:3–31 but has also
[been] recognized as a vital interest by the United States Supreme
Court.”); In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1386 (R.I. 1986) (“The natural
parents have ‘a right to privacy, a right to be let alone,’ and the
expectation of privacy arising from the confidentiality statute is
constitutionally protected.” (quoting Mills, 372 A.2d at 651)); Bradey v.
Child. Bureau of S.C., 274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981) (“This expectation
of confidentiality arising from the statute is constitutionally protected as
a right of privacy.”).
Finally, the State has an interest in maintaining confidentiality to
protect and encourage the adoption process. In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641
19
N.W.2d at 799. As the South Carolina Supreme Court aptly observed,
“we must recognize that the State’s primary concern is in maintaining an
effective adoption procedure which serves the best interests of adoptees
generally.” Bradey, 274 S.E.2d at 421. The Bradey court cautioned
against overreacting to changing attitudes on the confidentiality of
adoption records:
The primary interest of the public is to preserve the
integrity of the adoptive process. That is, the continued
existence of adoption as a humane solution to the serious
social problem of children who are or may become
unwanted, abused or neglected. In order to maintain it, the
public has an interest in assuring that changes in law, policy
or practice will not be made which negatively affect the
supply of capable adoptive parents or the willingness of
biological parents to make decisions which are best for them
and their children. We should not increase the risk of
neglect to any child, nor should we force parents to resort to
the black market in order to surrender children they can’t
care for.
The public’s interest is relevant as much to the
appropriate pace of change as it is to the nature of the
change. For example, even if there was general agreement
that adoptees should have access to otherwise sealed
records, we must still determine whether overly rapid
movement in that direction would undermine the goals of
adoption itself. In addition, the public interest requires that
more research be done to determine the effect of policy
change on the attitudes of adoptive parents and biological
parents.
No one has yet shown that decades of policy protecting
the anonymity of the biological parents and the security from
intrusion of the parent-child relationship after adoption have
been misguided. Quite the contrary. The overwhelming
success of adoption as an institution which has provided
millions of children with families, and vice versa, cannot be
easily attacked.
The public has a strong interest, too, in preserving the
confidential non-public nature of the process. Public
attitudes toward illegitimacy and parents who neglect or
abuse children have not changed sufficiently to warrant
careless disclosure of the circumstances leading to adoption.
20
Id. at 421–22 (quoting In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763–64 (Mo. 1978)
(en banc)). Accordingly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated, “We
give the benefit of the doubt to the preservation of confidentiality in close
cases.” In re Philip S., 881 A.2d at 934. Against this backdrop, we
conclude the juvenile court correctly denied R.D.’s application to compel
disclosure of the identities of her biological parents.
C. R.D. Failed to Overcome the Statutory Command to
Protect the Identities of Her Biological Parents. Our de novo review
of the medical testimony persuades us that disclosure of the identities of
R.D.’s parents would assist the treatment of her alcoholism and related
depression and anxiety. She is able to maintain sobriety for periods of
time and then relapses. Continued alcohol abuse jeopardizes her health
and life. Her treating physician, psychotherapist, and psychiatric social
worker identify her unsatisfied quest to discover her origins as a root
cause of her alcohol abuse. Yet, they can offer no assurances that her
problems will resolve upon her discovery of the identities of her biological
parents or what will follow.
R.D. cites a decision of a New York court allowing an adult adoptee
access to adoption records to identify his biological parents based on
testimony of the adoptee’s treating psychologist that “gaining such
knowledge is a necessary element in the petitioner’s mental
rehabilitation.” In re Anonymous, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (Sur. Ct. 1977).
That adoptee was “estranged from the adoptive parents who loved and
reared him,” was “unable to distinguish fact from fiction,” and was
“suffering from ‘personality [dysfunction]’ which has made the quest for
his true identity the single most important thing in his life.” Id. His
biological parents, who had been contacted by a guardian ad litem
pursuant to New York law, had consented to the release of their names
21
and addresses. Id. at 858. The court relied on their consent in releasing
the information. Id. at 859. Such consent is lacking here, and the Iowa
adoption statute does not include a provision allowing a guardian
ad litem to contact the biological parents to ascertain their position on
disclosure. However, nothing prevents parents who give up a child for
adoption in Iowa from subsequently filing an affidavit or a written
consent to reveal their identities upon the adoptee’s request. See Iowa
Code § 600.16A(2)(b)(1), .16A(3).
R.D.’s yearning to identify her birth parents is undoubtedly shared
by most adoptees. That yearning alone is insufficient to open sealed
adoption records. In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d at 802; see also
Linda F.M., 418 N.E.2d at 1304 (“[M]ere desire to learn the identity of
one’s natural parents cannot alone constitute good cause.”). R.D. has
provided the medical evidence lacking in In re Adoption of S.J.D. See 641
N.W.2d at 802 (noting adoptee failed to offer any medical evidence).
R.D.’s showing triggers the discretionary option for the court to open her
records under the first sentence of section 600.16A(2)(d), but disclosure
of the sealed information remains subject to the statutory mandate in the
next sentence to “make every reasonable effort to prevent the identity of
the biological parents from being revealed to the adopted person.” Iowa
Code § 600.16A(2)(d). In some cases, the court could allow disclosure of
medical information from the adoption records, without revealing the
names of the biological parents. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 600.16(1)(b), (2)
(allowing adopted person over age twenty-one access to medical and
developmental histories in adoption records with identifying information
redacted); Doe v. Ward Firm, P.A., 579 S.E.2d 303, 307–08 (S.C. 2003)
(appointing intermediary to review adoption files and disclose medical
information while redacting identities of biological parents). Here, the
22
adoption records contain no medical information, and all R.D. wants to
know is the names of her biological parents. The juvenile court correctly
denied that request. To hold otherwise would substantially undermine
the statutory confidentiality assured to parents who make the painful
decision to give up a child for adoption.
The level of confidentiality varies from state to state, and some
commentators favor giving adult adoptees greater access to adoption
records. See generally, e.g., Wayne Deloney, Unsealing Adoption Records:
The Right to Privacy Versus the Right of Adult Adoptees to Find Their
Birthparents, 7 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 117 (2007) (describing
the various types of adoption record statutes and arguing “the state
should continue to provide for the best interest of the adoptee by
unsealing adoption records” once the adoptee reaches adulthood);
Samuels, 53 Rutgers L. Rev. 402–34, 436 (analyzing the history of
adoption record confidentiality in the United States, acknowledging the
“difficult process of deconstructing lifelong secrecy,” but concluding that
states will likely reject confidentiality to reflect societal attitude changes);
Silverman, 39 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. at 85 (reviewing adoption
laws, the purposes behind them, and proposing a uniform adoption law
that provides the adoptive family with full access to medical history of
the biological family but allows the biological parent to veto the release of
identifying information or future contact).
As the Tennessee Supreme Court observed, “the confidentiality of
records is a statutory matter left to the legislature.” Doe v. Sundquist, 2
S.W.3d 919, 926 (Tenn. 1999) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the
Tennessee statute unsealing adoption records). We reiterate that while
“changed attitudes” may warrant a fresh look at the confidentiality of
Iowa’s adoption records, “it is not our function ‘to redraft or interpret
23
laws differently’ from what the legislature intended ‘solely to reflect
current values or lifestyles.’ ” In re Adoption of S.J.D., 641 N.W.2d at 802
(quoting In re Hayden, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (Sup. Ct. 1981)). Rather,
“it is best left to the legislature to distinguish the changing mores from
shifting moods in society.” Id. (quoting In re Hayden, 435 N.Y.S.2d at
542).
IV. Conclusion.
For those reasons, we determine the juvenile court correctly denied
R.D.’s application to identify her biological parents from the sealed
adoption records. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s ruling.
AFFIRMED.