Patrick Alan Ney v. John Glenn Ney ( 2017 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 16–1323
Filed March 10, 2017
PATRICK ALAN NEY,
Appellant,
vs.
JOHN GLENN NEY,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, David A.
Lester, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals district court’s dismissal on grounds of subject
matter jurisdiction. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Christopher R. Kemp of Kemp & Sease, Des Moines, and John M.
Sandy of Sandy Law Firm, P.C., Spirit Lake, for appellant.
Joseph L. Fitzgibbons and Matthew T.E. Early of Fitzgibbons Law
Firm, L.L.C., Estherville, for appellee.
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HECHT, Justice.
Two brothers stipulated to the entry of an order enjoining them
from having contact with each other. When one of them subsequently
sought a contempt order against the other for violation of the injunction,
the district court dismissed the action on the ground it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to enter or enforce a consent order barring contact
between parties. On our review, we conclude the district court had
jurisdiction to issue the injunction. We therefore reverse the dismissal
and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Patrick Alan Ney and John Glenn Ney are brothers with an
acrimonious relationship. In April 2012, Patrick filed a “Petition for
Injunctive Relief” seeking a temporary injunction against John. The
petition alleged that John had a history of assaulting Patrick, trespassing
on his property, and harassing him and his family. Patrick alleged he
had requested law enforcement’s help multiple times to no avail. The
petition further alleged John had recently broken into Patrick’s house
while drunk but fled before law enforcement arrived. 1 In support of his
claim for a temporary injunction, Patrick alleged the ongoing harassment
by John caused irreparable damage that law enforcement officers had
not been able to prevent. The prayer for relief requested John be
prohibited from entering Patrick’s property or threatening, assaulting,
stalking, molesting, attacking, harassing, or communicating with Patrick
and his family.
1Patricktestified by affidavit in support of his application for contempt that John
was charged with trespassing as a consequence of this conduct but that charge was
dropped in exchange for a guilty plea on an associated OWI charge.
3
On June 25, 2012, the parties entered into a “Stipulation and
Agreement” asking the court to incorporate the terms of their agreement
in an order for injunctive relief. The parties agreed they would,
a. Not threaten, assault, stalk, molest, attack, harass, or
otherwise abuse one another;
b. Stay away from each other’s residences and not be in
each other[’]s presence except in a courtroom during court
hearings;
c. Not communicate with each other in person or through
any means including third persons [except] . . . . through
legal counsel;
d. Not communicate with any member of each other[’]s
family[,] . . . [including] spouses, children, grandchildren,
and in-laws.
The district court approved the terms of the agreement and issued an
order (2012 order) on the same day incorporating the terms of the
stipulated agreement and directing that “[t]he parties shall have no
further communication with one another.”
On March 30, 2016, Patrick filed an “Application for Contempt of
Court” alleging John had intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly violated
the court’s 2012 order. In an attached affidavit, Patrick urged the court
to find John in contempt of the order because on four separate
occasions, John engaged in “abusive contact” against Patrick and his
family, including one instance in which John “threatened to pull his
firearm out.”
The district court found it had personal and subject matter
jurisdiction and issued an order to show cause on March 31, 2016.
John filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding, asserting the 2012 order
was void and unenforceable because the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to grant the injunction.
4
In July 2016, after conducting an unrecorded telephonic hearing
and reviewing the briefs, the district court granted John’s motion to
dismiss. The court concluded the injunction Patrick sought to enforce
was void because the issuing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
issue injunctive relief. In reaching its decision, the district court
reasoned that Iowa Code section 664A.2(2) (2011) prescribes the only
circumstances in which a district court has jurisdiction to issue a
protective order in a civil proceeding. 2 Concluding the 2012 order
purported to issue a protective order in a civil proceeding, the court
reasoned that the order was void because the conduct it restrained was
not among the grounds for which protective orders are specifically
authorized under Iowa Code section 664A.2(2). The court therefore
determined the 2012 order was void and could not be enforced through
contempt proceedings.
Patrick filed a notice of appeal on August 4, 2016. We retained the
appeal to decide whether the district court erred in concluding the 2012
order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Standards of Review.
We review a district court’s ruling on subject matter jurisdiction for
correction of errors at law. Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Iowa
2013); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. Similarly, we review a ruling on a
motion to dismiss for correction of errors at law. Hedlund v. State, 875
N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2016). When reviewing the propriety of an
injunction, we give weight to the district court’s findings of fact. Matlock
v. Weets, 531 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1995).
2Iowa Code section 664A.2(2) provides that “[a] protective order issued in a civil
proceeding shall be issued pursuant to chapter 232, 236, 598, or 915.” Iowa Code
§ 664A.2(2).
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III. Analysis.
A. The Court’s Equitable Jurisdiction. We first consider
whether the district court had equitable jurisdiction under the Iowa
Constitution to grant injunctive relief under the circumstances presented
here. The first clause of article V, section 6 of the Iowa Constitution
vests district courts with legal and equitable jurisdiction and provides
that those jurisdictions “shall be distinct and separate.” Iowa Const. art.
V, § 6. That clause gives district courts jurisdiction over equitable and
common law actions. The second clause of article V, section 6 vests
district courts with “jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters arising in
their respective district, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.”
Id. Under that clause, the constitution confers upon district courts
jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases—jurisdiction that is further
delineated by statute.
The court’s equitable jurisdiction is recognized and implemented
by the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1501–1.1511.
Our rules recognize that injunctive relief is available as an independent
remedy in equitable proceedings and authorize injunctive relief as an
auxiliary remedy in any action. Id. r. 1.1501. A party may request an
injunction by filing a petition for injunctive relief and a supporting
affidavit demonstrating the party is entitled to injunctive relief. Id.
r. 1.1502.
Petitions for injunctive relief generally invoke the court’s equitable
jurisdiction. See Sear v. Clayton Cty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 590
N.W.2d 512, 515 (Iowa 1999). They may invoke the court’s statutory
jurisdiction, however, if the general assembly has “impose[d] a duty to
grant an injunction by specifying conditions in a statute.” Max 100 L.C.
v. Iowa Realty Co., 621 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa 2001). “When this is
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done, the conditions specified in the statute supersede the traditional
equitable requirements.” Id.
A court exercising equitable jurisdiction generally has the power to
identify the relevant equities and fashion an appropriate remedy. See In
re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Iowa 1995). Yet courts of
equity are cautious in granting injunctive relief. See Matlock, 531
N.W.2d at 122. Generally, a party seeking an injunction must prove “(1)
an invasion or threatened invasion of a right; (2) that substantial injury
or damages will result unless the request for an injunction is granted;
and (3) that there is [not another] adequate [means of protection]
available.” Sear, 590 N.W.2d at 515.
Under the first prong, a party seeking an injunction must prove
intervention is necessary to protect rights cognizable in equity that have
been invaded or threatened with invasion. In re Langholz, 887 N.W.2d
770, 779 (Iowa 2016); Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at 123. We have previously
recognized personal interests such as freedom from harassment and
stalking as rights cognizable in equity and eligible for protection through
injunctive relief upon proper proof. See Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d
597, 605 (Iowa 2003) (affirming injunctive relief restraining former friend
from harassing the plaintiff); see also Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at 123
(affirming permanent injunction enjoining former boyfriend from stalking
and harassing the plaintiff). 3
3Our position is consistent with the modern rule that personal rights are
cognizable in equity. See, e.g., Siggelkow v. State, 731 P.2d 57, 60–62 (Alaska 1987)
(holding court could issue no-contact order within a divorce decree pursuant to
inherent equitable authority). We reject the archaic rule that personal rights are not
cognizable in equity. See, e.g., Bank v. Bank, 23 A.2d 700, 705 (Md. 1942) (denying
equitable jurisdiction for protection of rights of personal nature); see also A.W. Gans,
Annotation, Jurisdiction of Equity to Protect Personal Rights: Modern View, 175 A.L.R.
438, §§ 11, 21 (originally published 1948), Westlaw (explaining that Bank v. Bank is
“one of the few modern cases in which it can be said that a court actually or seemingly
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It is also well-established that “a court of equity might properly
intervene and grant a remedy by way of injunction to prevent repetition
of [a] trespass, and to stop the unwarranted interference of plaintiff’s
right to the use and possession of his own property” rather than
continually “require the plaintiff to continue to institute an action of
forcible entry and detainer to remove the defendant from the premises.”
Usailis v. Jasper, 222 Iowa 1360, 1363, 271 N.W. 524, 526 (1937); see
also Hall v. Henninger, 145 Iowa 230, 237–38, 121 N.W. 6, 8–9 (1909).
Under the second prong, a district court generally may not issue
an injunction unless substantial injury will result from the invasion of
the right or if substantial injury is to be reasonably apprehended to
result from a threatened invasion of the right. Matlock, 531 N.W.2d at
122. “Before granting an injunction, the court should carefully weigh the
relative hardship which would be suffered by the enjoined party upon
awarding injunctive relief.” Id.; see also Sear, 590 N.W.2d at 515.
The third prong requires a party seeking an injunction to prove
there is not another adequate means of protection available. See Sear,
590 N.W.2d at 515. This limiting principle teaches that an injunction
can only issue if the available legal remedies are inadequate to avoid the
substantial injury. Berry Seed Co. v. Hutchings, 247 Iowa 417, 422, 74
N.W.2d 233, 236 (1956); see also Martin v. Beaver, 238 Iowa 1143, 1148,
29 N.W.2d 555, 558 (1947) (“[C]hancery will not intervene merely to
better such remedy as the Legislature has deemed sufficient.”). We
consider the available remedies at law inadequate if the character of the
injury is such “that it cannot be adequately compensated by damages at
law, . . . occasion[s] [a] constantly recurring grievance which cannot be
_______________
denied existence of equitable jurisdiction for the protection of rights of a personal
nature”).
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removed or [otherwise] corrected,” or would result in a multiplicity of
suits or interminable litigation. Martin, 238 Iowa at 1148, 29 N.W. at
558. Moreover, an injunction cannot prevent acts already prohibited by
criminal statute unless the acts are connected with the violation of a
private right. See id. at 1150, 29 N.W.2d at 559.
We conclude the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to
grant injunctive relief enjoining Patrick and John from entering each
other’s property or otherwise contacting each other. As noted above, the
court’s power to issue the injunction was incident to its equitable
jurisdiction. See Sear, 590 N.W.2d at 515.
Although the injunction was issued within a consent judgment, it
was still within the district court’s equitable jurisdiction. See World
Teacher Seminar, Inc. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 N.W.2d 173, 176–77 (Iowa
1987) (upholding injunctive relief that “dispose[d] of the controverted
issues within the litigation”). 4 When an injunction is issued pursuant to
a consent judgment, the relevant inquiry is “whether the provisions upon
which the parties have agreed constitute an appropriate and legally
approved method of disposing of the contested issues in the litigation.”
4There is no difference for purposes of our analysis in this case in the effect of a
valid injunction issued after a trial on the merits under our three-prong analysis and
one issued by consent judgment. A consent judgment is a judgment willingly entered
by the court to which the parties consented and that contains terms and provisions
selected by the parties to the action. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 227, at 262 (2009). Parties
may either stipulate to issues of fact or concede entire issues in the litigation. In re
Prop. Seized on or About Nov. 14–15, 1989, 501 N.W.2d 482, 485 (Iowa 1993). Although
consent judgments feature elements of a contract, they are generally treated like other
judgments. See Tom R. Scott, Judgment—Contracts—Specific Performance—Consent
Judgment Enforceable by Mandatory Injunction—Wagner v. Warnasch, 295 S.W.2d 890
(Tex. Sup. Ct. 1956), 35 Tex. L. Rev. 864, 865–66 (1957). As with judgments based on
adjudications of the merits, consent judgments imposing injunctions may be enforced
through contempt proceedings and have been enforced in that way in several contexts,
including securities litigation, intellectual property disputes, family law litigation, and
more. See, e.g., FTC v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 624 F.3d 575, 584–85 (3d Cir. 2010);
United States v. Quade, 563 F.2d 375, 378–79 (8th Cir. 1977); Matrix Essentials v.
Quality King Distribs., Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 384, 386, 390–91 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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Id. at 176. “It is not necessary in order to uphold the validity of a
consent decree that the solutions therein contained be those the court
itself would have adopted if it were adjudicating the controversy.” Id.
Here, Patrick pled a prima facie case for an injunction in his
petition for injunctive relief; John consented to the imposition of Patrick’s
requested injunctive relief; and the district court granted the requested
relief by issuing a consent judgment. Thus, the district court properly
issued the injunction in this case.
In his 2012 petition for injunctive relief, Patrick alleged John
violated his personal right to be free from harassment and physical
assault and his property right to be free from trespass. As we noted
above, the personal right to be free from harassment and physical
assault and the property right to be free from trespass are both rights
cognizable in equity, and a court of equity may employ injunctive relief to
remedy violations or threatened violations of those rights upon proper
proof. See Opat, 666 N.W.2d at 605; Usailis, 222 Iowa at 1363, 271 N.W.
at 526. Thus, we find Patrick advanced interests eligible for protection
under the district court’s equitable jurisdiction in satisfaction of the first
prong.
Patrick also claimed a substantial injury under the second prong of
our analysis. His petition for injunctive relief claimed John had grabbed
Patrick by the throat, physically assaulted him, repeatedly trespassed,
threatened the plaintiff and his family, invaded Patrick’s home while
drunk, and harassed Patrick and his family. Because these injuries
alleged by Patrick were significant, extensive, and ongoing, we conclude
they were substantial and satisfied the second prong of the analytical
framework for the exercise of the court’s equitable jurisdiction.
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Finally, Patrick’s 2012 petition asserted the absence of an
adequate remedy at law under the third prong of our analytical
framework. Despite the previous involvement of law enforcement officers
responding to Patrick’s complaints, John persisted in his troublesome
actions, thus evidencing that the general deterrence provided by our
criminal laws was not adequate to protect Patrick. Moreover, had Patrick
separately litigated each of John’s torts, it would have resulted in “a
multiplicity of suits or . . . interminable litigation.” Martin, 238 Iowa at
1148, 29 N.W.2d at 558. Thus, there was a sufficient basis to conclude
Patrick lacked an adequate remedy at law for John’s conduct.
Accordingly, we conclude the third prong of our analytical framework
was also satisfied when the 2012 consent order was entered.
The district court had equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctive
relief in the 2012 order. Because Patrick pled a prima facie case for an
injunction and John stipulated to the imposition of the requested
injunctive relief, the district court had authority to grant injunctive relief
through a consent judgment.
B. Effect of Section 664A.2(2). We next turn to the question of
whether Iowa Code section 664A.2(2) limits the district court’s equitable
jurisdiction to issue injunctions in personal disputes between family
members. In Iowa, we distinguish between subject matter jurisdiction
and jurisdiction of the case. Schaefer, 841 N.W.2d at 80 n.13; see also
Alliant Energy-Interstate Power & Light Co. v. Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 869,
874 n.4 (Iowa 2007). Subject matter jurisdiction is “the authority of a
court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong, not merely the particular case then
occupying the court’s attention.” Schaefer, 841 N.W.2d at 80 n.13
(quoting Christie v. Rolscreen, 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989)).
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Jurisdiction of the case refers to a court’s “authority to hear the
particular case.” Christie, 448 N.W.2d at 450.
This distinction is important because although a statute cannot
deprive a court of its constitutionally granted subject matter jurisdiction,
it can affect the jurisdiction of the case by prescribing specific
parameters of the court’s authority to rule on particular types of matters.
See Max 100 L.C., 621 N.W.2d at 181 (“[T]he legislature may impose a
duty to grant an injunction by specifying conditions [under which an
injunction must be granted] in a statute. When this is done, the
conditions specified in the statute supersede the traditional equitable
requirements.” (Citation omitted.)); see also Mensch v. Netty, 408 N.W.2d
383, 386 (Iowa 1987) (“[C]ourts of equity are bound by statutes and
follow the law in absence of fraud or mistake.”). Further, while parties
cannot waive the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, a defect in the
court’s jurisdiction of the case can be obviated by consent, waiver, or
estoppel. In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7, 10 n.3 (Iowa 1997)
(citing State v. Mandicinio, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482–83 (Iowa 1993), which
overruled cases to the contrary).
In this case, Iowa Code section 664A.2(2) does not eliminate the
district court’s equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief when the
grounds for such relief are established. The statute merely imposes a
duty to grant an injunction when the conditions of Iowa Code section
664A.2(2) are met. See Iowa Code § 664A.2(2) (providing that “[a]
protective order issued in a civil proceeding shall be issued pursuant to
chapter 232, 236, 598, or 915.”). The statute defines “protective order”
narrowly:
[1] a protective order issued pursuant to chapter 232, [2] a
court order or court-approved consent agreement entered
pursuant to chapter 236, including a valid foreign protective
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order under section 236.19, subsection 3, [3] a temporary or
permanent protective order or order to vacate the homestead
under chapter 598, or [4] an order that establishes
conditions of release or is a protective order or sentencing
order in a criminal prosecution arising from a domestic
abuse assault under section 708.2A, or [5] a civil injunction
issued pursuant to section 915.22.
Id. § 664A.1.
Notably, the civil contexts in the definition of “protective order” are
the same ones listed in Iowa Code section 664A.2(2). Thus, chapter
664A does not govern protective orders issued under other provisions,
such as Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.504, which addresses protective
orders for relief from oppressive, unreasonable, or unduly expensive
discovery requests by requesting a protective order from such requests.
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.504; see also, 8 Tom Riley & Peter C. Riley, Iowa
Practice Series™, Civil Litigation Handbook § 50:7, at 577 (2016 ed.).
Neither does it curtail the court’s power or authority to issue injunctions
pursuant to the district court’s equitable jurisdiction, for they are not
among the scenarios for which a “protective order” is authorized under
chapter 664A.
When a party requests a protective order under Iowa Code
chapters 232, 236, 598, and 915, the district court is bound to follow the
statutory framework established in chapter 664A. See Max 100 L.C., 621
N.W.2d at 181 (noting “conditions specified in [a] statute supercede the
traditional equitable rquirements”). But this case does not involve a
protective order issued under any of those Code chapters. Accordingly,
Iowa Code section 664A.2(2) does not limit the court’s equitable
jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case.
C. Conclusion. We conclude the 2012 order was within the
district court’s equitable jurisdiction. The district court erred in
concluding Iowa Code section 664A.2(2) deprived the district court of
13
that equitable jurisdiction. Thus, we reverse the district court ruling
dismissing the action and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. The costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellee.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.