Mary Sue Earley and Bankers Trust Company as Trustees of the Mary Sue Earley Revocable Trust Dated September 26, 1994 v. Board of Adjustment of Cerro Gordo County, Iowa, Gregory A. Saul and Lea Ann Saul ( 2021 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–1672
Submitted January 20, 2021—Filed February 26, 2021
MARY SUE EARLEY and BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, as Trustees of
the MARY SUE EARLEY REVOCABLE TRUST DATED SEPTEMBER 26,
1994,
Appellants,
vs.
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF CERRO GORDO COUNTY, IOWA,
Appellee,
GREGORY A. SAUL and LEA ANN SAUL,
Intervenor–Appellees.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County,
Rustin T. Davenport, Judge.
Appellants contend local board of adjustment acted illegally in
approving variance for residential improvement completed in violation of
setback ordinance. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED;
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH
DIRECTIONS.
McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all
participating justices joined. McDermott, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
2
Scott D. Brown and Travis M. Armbrust (until withdrawal) of Brown,
Kinsey, Funkhouser & Lander, P.L.C., Mason City; and Ryan G. Koopmans
(argued) of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, for appellants.
Mark S. Rolinger and Adam J. Babinat (argued) of Redfern, Mason,
Larsen & Moore, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellees Gregory A. Saul and
Lea Ann Saul.
Randall E. Nielsen of Pappajohn, Shriver, Eide & Nielsen, P.C.,
Mason City, for appellee Board of Adjustment of Cerro Gordo County, Iowa.
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McDONALD, Justice.
The issue in this appeal is whether a board of adjustment illegally
granted an area variance that allowed residential property owners to
construct the below-depicted pergola twenty-one inches from the property
line in violation of an ordinance requiring a six-foot setback. The district
court answered the question in the negative, and the court of appeals
affirmed, concluding a lesser showing is required for granting an area
variance versus a use variance. We disagree and vacate the decision of
the court of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court.
I.
Gregory and Lea Ann Saul own the property at issue. The Sauls’
property is on Clear Lake within an unincorporated area of Cerro Gordo
County and is subject to county zoning ordinances. The property is within
an area zoned R-3, single family residential district. Pursuant to county
ordinance, properties within this district must have a side yard with a six-
foot setback clear of any structures. See Cerro Gordo County, Iowa,
Zoning Ordinance 15 art. 11.6 (Mar. 13, 1990). Unaware of the setback
4
requirement, the Sauls hired a contractor to build the pergola at issue.
The pergola extends from the side of the Sauls’ house and covers a patio.
The pergola and patio are twenty-one inches from the property line. After
the pergola was built, the local planning and zoning administrator
informed the Sauls the pergola violated county ordinance. The Sauls then
applied for a permit, which the administrator denied due to the setback
violation.
The Sauls filed an application for a variance from the local
ordinance. In the application form, the Sauls were asked what they
proposed for the property affected. They explained they wanted a pergola.
They explained the pergola “was already installed without a permit by
mistake and [they] would like to retain it.” They further explained they
were “ignorant of the permit requirement which is no excuse.” They
concluded they “would prefer not to tear it all out.”
The Sauls’ application was accompanied by a variance criteria
supplemental information form. The form provided as follows:
The Applicant shall be held responsible to provide
adequate evidence that the literal enforcement of the
Ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship. “Hardship” as
used in connection with the granting of a variance means the
property in question cannot be put to a reasonable use if used
under the conditions allowed by the provisions of the
Ordinance, the plight of the landowner is due to
circumstances unique to his property not created by the
landowner; and the variance, if granted, will not alter the
essential character of the locality.
The form contained questions seeking evidence of unnecessary hardship.
Question 1 asked the Sauls to identify the reasons the property cannot
yield a reasonable use. The Sauls did not answer the question. Question 2
asked the Sauls what is unique about the property compared to other
properties in the vicinity. The Sauls responded, “None.” When asked how
the variance would fit with the character of the area, the Sauls explained
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the pergola “is a great use of space and shades the front from the hot
summer sun which saves energy.”
At the public hearing on the Sauls’ application for a variance, the
board heard from the planning and zoning administrator and the Sauls’
contractor. Neither provided much information to the board on the issue
of unnecessary hardship. The contractor explained he built the pergola in
the same footprint as the patio. The patio was built with walls to hold the
posts for the pergola. Members of the board noted there was no walking
room between the patio and the neighboring fence because the patio was
already close to the fence. The administrator stated he had not heard any
neighbors complain about the pergola. Two of the board members stated
the pergola is “nice.” Based on this information, the board unanimously
approved the variance and waived the penalty for building the pergola
without a permit.
The owner of the neighboring property, the Mary Sue Earley
Revocable Trust, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the district court
challenging the legality of the board’s action. The district court concluded
the board acted legally in granting the variance, and the court of appeals
affirmed the district court. We granted the trustees’ application for further
review.
II.
Our review is for the correction of legal error. See Vogelaar v. Polk
Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 188 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1971);
Deardorf v. Bd. of Adjustment of Plan. & Zoning Comm’n, 254 Iowa 380,
383–84, 118 N.W.2d 78, 80 (1962).
A.
Zoning law is governed by state statute and local ordinance. Iowa
Code section 335.3(1) (2019) vests county boards of supervisors with the
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power to create local zoning ordinances “with reference to land and
structures located within the county but lying outside of the corporate
limits of any city.” Iowa Code section 335.15(3) (2019) gives boards of
adjustment power to grant an individual “variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to
special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance
will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance
shall be observed and substantial justice done.”
A board’s statutory authority to grant a variance is limited. “It is
fundamental that the board may not legislate. It exercises only
administrative and quasi-judicial power strictly within the limitations” of
the statute. Deardorf, 254 Iowa at 389; 118 N.W.2d at 83. Variances
should be granted “sparingly and with great caution or in exceptional
instances only.” Id. at 390, 118 N.W.2d at 83. “The board cannot amend
or set aside the zoning ordinance under the guise of a variance.” Id. at
389, 118 N.W.2d at 83. “If an applicant does not make the required
unnecessary hardship showing, granting a variance is an ‘illegal’ act by
the board . . . .” Graziano v. Bd. of Adjustment, 323 N.W.2d 233, 237
(Iowa 1982); see also Deardorf, 254 Iowa at 385, 118 N.W.2d at 81(“Certainly, however, if there was no showing before the board of the
requisite unnecessary hardship to the owners if a variance were denied,
its order is illegal within the meaning of [the] Code . . . .”).
We first gave content to the unnecessary-hardship standard in
Deardorf v. Board of Adjustment. 254 Iowa at 386, 118 N.W.2d at 81 (“No
Iowa decision defining the term ‘unnecessary hardship’ has come to our
attention.”).1 In that case, we canvassed treatises and persuasive
1Deardorf involved a challenge to a variance from a city zoning ordinance under
Iowa Code section 414.12. 254 Iowa at 384, 118 N.W.2d at 80. Iowa Code section 414.12
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authorities and explained the justification necessary to grant a variance
was significant. Id. at 386–89, 118 N.W.2d at 81–83. The restriction must
be “so unreasonable as to constitute an arbitrary and capricious
interference with the basic right of private property . . . or that there are
factors sufficient to constitute such a hardship that would in effect deprive
the owner of his property without compensation.” Id. at 387, 118 N.W.2d
at 82 (quoting Peterson v. Vasak, 76 N.W.2d 420, 426 (Neb. 1956)). Relying
on a persuasive decision from New York, we adopted a three-part test to
establish unnecessary hardship. Id. at 386, 118 N.W.2d at 81 (citing Otto
v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (1939)). The landowner
must show: “(1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return if
used only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) the plight of the owner is
due to unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the
neighborhood . . . ; and (3) the use to be authorized by the variance will
not alter the essential character of the locality.” Id.In applying the three-part standard to the facts of the case, we
concluded the board of adjustment acted illegally in granting a variance.
Id. at 388–90, 118 N.W.2d at 82–84. In that case, the local zoning
ordinance restricted the maximum height of buildings within a residential
multifamily district. Id. at 382, 118 N.W.2d at 79. The property owners
obtained a variance to exceed the height restriction for the purpose of
constructing a seven-story apartment building. Id. at 383, 118 N.W.2d at79–80. In support of the variance, the board noted a “nice apartment
house” was needed in the city, the new building would yield greater
property taxes, and the proposed building was not unreasonable or
contrary to the public interest. Id. at 388–89, 118 N.W.2d at 82–83. We
applies to city zoning while section 335.15 applies to county zoning. The statutes are
identical in all material respects.
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concluded these considerations were insufficient to establish
“unnecessary hardship, within any of the well recognized definitions of the
term.” Id. at 388, 118 N.W.2d at 82. “Since the board’s order was made
without any substantial showing of the requisite unnecessary hardship to
the applicants for the variance it was illegal and must be annulled.” Id. at
390, 118 N.W.2d at 84.
The Deardorf standard has been the controlling standard for almost
sixty years. This court has repeatedly applied the Deardorf standard. See
Greenawalt v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 345 N.W.2d 537, 541–42
(Iowa 1984); Graziano, 323 N.W.2d at 236–37; Bd. of Adjustment v. Ruble,
193 N.W.2d 497, 502–03 (Iowa 1972). In addition, local jurisdictions,
relying on our precedents, have enacted ordinances that mirror the
Deardorf standard. See, e.g., Graziano, 323 N.W.2d at 235–36 (noting the
city ordinance adopted the Deardorf standard). Cerro Gordo County is one
such jurisdiction. Its ordinance provides, as a matter of local law, the
board shall not grant a variance unless all of the following have been
established:
a. The land in question cannot yield a reasonable
return if used only for a purpose allowed in that zone.
b. The plight of the owner is due to the unique
circumstances and not to the general conditions in the
neighborhood, which may reflect the unreasonableness of the
zoning ordinance itself.
c. The use to be authorized by the variance will not
alter the essential character of the locality.
Cerro Gordo County, Iowa, Zoning Ordinance 15 art. 24.4(A)(3).
Contrary to our precedents and the text of the local ordinance, the
court of appeals held the Deardorf standard applies differently in this case.
At the Sauls’ urging, the court of appeals, relying on a footnote in City of
Johnston v. Christenson, 718 N.W.2d 290, 299 n.4 (Iowa 2006), concluded
9
that “a less onerous burden is required to justify an area variance than a
use variance.” Without specifically identifying the elements of the less
onerous burden, the court of appeals held there was substantial evidence
supporting the board’s decision.
The court of appeals misstated the controlling law and erred in
holding the Sauls were required to make a lesser showing. Christenson
explained the difference between a use variance and an area variance.
Christenson, 718 N.W.2d at 299 n.4. “A use variance permits a use of land
for purposes other than those prescribed by the zoning ordinance, and is
based on the standard of unnecessary hardship.” Id. Whereas, “[a]n area
variance does not involve a use prohibited by an ordinance, but concerns
a deviation from specific requirements such as height limitations, setback
lines, size regulations, and the like.” Id. Christenson also explained there
was a justification for requiring a slightly lesser showing to establish an
area variance. See id. (“An ‘area variance’ is normally unrelated to a
change in use and traditionally justifies a slightly lesser showing than
required to justify a ‘use variance.’ ”). Christenson noted other courts had
adopted the distinction, but Christenson did not adopt the distinction. See
id. Twelve years after the Christenson decision, in an excellent piece
regarding use and area variances, the former dean of the Iowa College of
Law recognized the Deardorf standard still applies in Iowa with equal force
to use and area variances. See N. Williams Hines, Difficulties Standard for
Area Variances, 102 Iowa L. Rev. Online 365, 366 (2018) [hereinafter
Hines] (“Notwithstanding the distinctively different purposes served by
these two types of zoning variances, two-thirds of U.S. states, including
Iowa, apply the same strict requirements for granting them both.”
(emphasis added)). That was a correct statement of the law.
10
To the extent the Sauls argue this court should change our
jurisprudence in this area and now adopt a lesser showing for granting
area variances, we decline to do so. In declining to do so, we acknowledge
there are legitimate reasons supporting a distinction between use and area
variances. See generally Hines, 102 Iowa L. Rev. Online at 365
(articulating reasons and arguing for a less onerous standard for area
variances). However, the distinction pressed by the Sauls is not a new
one. We have noted the distinction between use and area variances in
prior decisions and have explicitly declined to adopt different standards
for one versus the other. See Graziano, 323 N.W.2d at 236 (rejecting that
argument there is a different standard for area variances as
“unconvincing” because the statute “requires a showing of unnecessary
hardship for either use or area variances”); Ruble, 193 N.W.2d at 505(rejecting that argument Deardorf should be applied only to use variances
and stating that “Deardorf applied the test to a situation involving both
use and area zoning restrictions”).
Stare decisis counsels in favor of rejecting the Sauls’ proposed
distinction between area and use variances. The doctrine of stare decisis
holds that courts should defer to precedent. Among other things, stare
decisis advances stability and consistency in the law. It increases
efficiency in the decision-making process. See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process 145 (Dover Publ’ns 2005) (1921) (“[T]he labor
of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past
decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own
course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others
who had gone before him.”). And it advances the rule of law and
concomitantly promotes respect for the judiciary as a neutral decision-
maker.
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The command of stare decisis is particularly compelling here. The
standard for granting a variance is set by statute. See Iowa Code
§§ 335.15(3), 414.12(3). Deardorf and its progeny are thus cases of
statutory interpretation. “[W]e presume the legislature is aware of our
cases that interpret its statutes. When many years pass following such a
case without a legislative response, we assume the legislature has
acquiesced in our interpretation.” Doe v. New London Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
848 N.W.2d 347, 355 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Ackelson v. Manley Toy
Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa 2013)). After almost sixty years,
“we think our legislature would be quite surprised to learn if we decided
to reverse course and take a different position under the guise of statutory
interpretation.” Id. (quoting Ackelson, 832 N.W.2d at 688).
Given our string of unbroken precedents over the last sixty years,
legislative reliance on those precedents, and local reliance on those
precedents, we decline to adopt a different standard for area variances
now. Any change in this area of law at this point is best undertaken by
the legislative department. See Hines, 102 Iowa L. Rev. Online at 383 (“In
thinking about how best to reform Iowa’s ‘unnecessary hardship’
requirement for area variances . . . I have concluded that legislative reform
is the best option.”).
B.
Having concluded Deardorf is the controlling standard, we address
the question of whether the Deardorf standard was met in this case. The
burden is upon the party seeking the variance to show unnecessary
hardship would result if the variance were denied. Graziano, 323 N.W.2d
at 237; Ruble, 193 N.W.2d 497 at 502. The Deardorf standard is in the
conjunctive. If the party seeking the variance fails to establish any of the
three elements, the board is without statutory authority to grant the
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variance. See Greenawalt, 345 N.W.2d at 542 (explaining “[t]he burden is
on the applicant to show all three of the elements” and “[a] failure to
demonstrate one of them requires the board to deny the application”);
Graziano, 323 N.W.2d at 236 (stating Deardorf “holds all requirements
must be shown”).
Under Deardorf, the Sauls were first required to establish the
property cannot yield a reasonable return without the grant of a variance
approving their pergola. This is a significant burden.
[A] variance should be granted where, and only where, the
application of the regulation in question to particular property
greatly decreases or practically destroys its value for any
permitted use, or where such application bears so little
relationship to the purposes of zoning that, as to the property
in question, the regulation is in effect confiscatory, arbitrary,
or capricious, or constitutes an unnecessary, unwarranted, or
unjust invasion of, or interference with, a fundamental right
of property.
Deardorf, 254 Iowa at 387–88, 118 N.W.2d at 82 (quoting 101 C.J.S.
Zoning § 290).
The Sauls failed to meet this significant burden. On the
supplemental information form, the Sauls were asked to identify the
reasons why the “land in question cannot yield a reasonable use.” They
left the question blank. They failed to supplement the written application
with any evidence bearing on the question presented. They did not
participate in the hearing. Their contractor did participate at the hearing.
However, the contractor did not provide any information or evidence about
the financial consequences of denying the variance. The only evidence in
this record relevant to the question of reasonable return goes against the
Sauls. The planning and zoning administrator submitted a letter to the
board stating, “There is an existing reasonable use of the property. The
Zoning Ordinance is not causing a hardship by limiting the pergola.” A
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variance cannot be granted where there was “no evidence relating to the
reasonableness of the return.” Graziano, 323 N.W.2d at 237 (emphasis
omitted).
In their application, the Sauls noted several advantages they would
gain in having a pergola. The Sauls noted the pergola is decorative, is
aesthetically pleasing, and provides shade for greater use and enjoyment
of the patio. Even if true, these considerations are immaterial. The legal
standard is not that the property could be improved or “more profit could
be made if a variance is granted. The standard is that a reasonable return
could not be garnered from a permitted use.” Graziano, 323 N.W.2d at
237; see also Greenawalt, 345 N.W.2d at 542 (“Lack of a reasonable return
may be shown by proof that the owner has been deprived of all beneficial
use of his land.” (quoting 3 Robert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning
§ 18.17, at 179–83 (1968))). “The most that may fairly be claimed for [the
Sauls’] considerations which moved the board to act is that they may
indicate its action was not ‘contrary to the public interest,’ ” but that is
insufficient to establish unnecessary hardship. Deardorf, 254 Iowa at 389,
118 N.W.2d at 83.
The Sauls also claim the denial of the variance would infringe their
right to peaceful enjoyment of their residential property. We need not
resolve the question of whether the absence of a pergola would infringe
their right to peaceful enjoyment. Even if the denial of the variance would
infringe the Sauls’ right to peaceful enjoyment, that “would not justify the
imposition of a different legal standard.” Greenawalt, 345 N.W.2d at 543.
“[T]he infringement of peaceful enjoyment must equal a denial of all
beneficial use.” Id. Here, there was no evidence that compliance with the
ordinance would deny the Sauls all beneficial use of their property or
would deny them a reasonable return on their property.
14
Although the Sauls’ failure to establish they would be denied a
reasonable return on the property requires the board’s action be reversed,
we also note the Sauls failed to establish the “plight of the owner is due to
unique circumstances and not to the general conditions in the
neighborhood.” Deardorf, 254 Iowa at 386, 118 N.W.2d at 81. The Sauls
wanted shade for their patio. Their desire to shade part of their property
is not a unique circumstance distinct from general conditions in the
neighborhood. Cf. Greenawalt, 345 N.W.2d at 543–44 (holding high
incidence of vandalism in the neighborhood did not establish
circumstances unique to the homeowner’s property). The Sauls admitted
this in their application. In the supplemental information form, the Sauls
wrote “None” in response to a question asking about unique
circumstances. At the hearing on their application, the Sauls did not
provide any additional information regarding this point.
The Sauls argue the variance should nonetheless be granted
because the patio was already built, the pergola has already been built,
and they were unaware of the local ordinance prior to completing
construction. Essentially, the Sauls argue their good-faith completion of
the noncompliant improvement favors granting the variance. We disagree.
We have repeatedly rejected these type of equitable considerations as
immaterial to the statutory grounds authorizing a variance.
For example, in Board of Adjustment v. Ruble, a property developer
started construction of a home in violation of lot requirements and
obtained a variance. See 193 N.W.2d at 499–500. The district court
reversed the decision of the board and directed the board to enter an order
denying the variance. Id. at 499. We affirmed the judgment of the district
court. Id. at 509. We held it was immaterial that the applicant had started
construction on the home and “acted in good faith and without knowledge
15
of the zoning requirement.” Id. at 505. We favorably quoted the district
court, which explained that to hold otherwise would mean the zoning
ordinance “applies only to those persons who are conscientious enough to
adequately inform themselves of its provisions and who have actual
knowledge of its terms.” Id. We concluded unique circumstances were not
shown because the hardship was a result of the intervenor’s “own making
and was attributable to his failure to make adequate inquiry as to the
provisions of the zoning ordinance and his failure to fully disclose the
circumstances of joint ownership of [the] lots.” Id. at 504.
Similarly, the need for a variance in this case is also less compelling
than that presented in Greenawalt v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of
Davenport, 345 N.W.2d 537. In that case, an ordinance limited front-yard
fences to a height of forty-two inches. Id. at 540–41. The homeowner
decided to build a six-foot fence after several incidents of vandalism and
after receiving a letter from his insurer advising he build a perimeter fence
or risk nonrenewal of his insurance policy. Id. at 540. After the
homeowner had completed ninety percent of the construction, he received
notice from the city the fence was in violation of the zoning ordinance. Id.
at 541. The board of adjustment denied the homeowner’s application for
a variance to construct the taller fence. Id. The district court affirmed the
board’s denial of the application, and we affirmed the judgment of the
district court. Id. at 541, 547. We concluded the homeowner had not
established any of the three elements. Id. at 543–44. We rejected his
argument the variance should be granted because he had already
expended a significant amount of money in completing ninety percent of
the fence. See id. at 546 (analogizing to an illegally granted permit that
was still revocable notwithstanding that the permittee “expended
considerable funds”).
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Having concluded the Sauls have not established the first two
elements of the Deardorf standard, we do not reach the issue of whether
the Sauls established the variance will not alter the essential character of
the locality.
III.
For these reasons, we conclude the board of adjustment acted
illegally in granting the Sauls’ application for a variance from the county
zoning ordinance in the absence of evidence establishing unnecessary
hardship. The district court should have sustained the petition for writ of
certiorari and annulled the board’s decision.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
All justices concur except McDermott, J., who takes no part.